Re: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci.

2014-08-04 Thread Andrew Lockley
The full paper is now available at

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1981907

Abstract:

We conducted a two-nation study (United States, n = 1500; England, n =
1500) to test a novel theory of science communication. The cultural
cognition thesis posits that individuals make extensive reliance on
cultural meanings in forming perceptions of risk. The logic of the cultural
cognition thesis suggests the potential value of a distinctive two-channel
science communication strategy that combines information content (“Channel
1”) with cultural meanings (“Channel 2”) selected to promote open-minded
assessment of information across diverse communities. In the study,
scientific information content on climate change was held constant while
the cultural meaning of that information was experimentally manipulated.
Consistent with the study hypotheses, we found that making citizens aware
of the potential contribution of geoengineering as a supplement to
restriction of CO2 emissions helps to offset cultural polarization over the
validity of climate-change science. We also tested the hypothesis, derived
from competing models of science communication, that exposure to
information on geoengineering would provoke discounting of climate-change
risks generally. Contrary to this hypothesis, we found that subjects
exposed to information about geoengineering were slightly more concerned
about climate change risks than those assigned to a control condition.

 climate change, geoengineering, cultural cognition, risk perception

working papers series
On 4 Mar 2014 02:37, David Morrow dmorr...@gmail.com wrote:

 FYI, the lead author of that paper, Dan Kahan, posted two additional blog
 posts on culture, values, and geoengineering:


 http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/24/geoengineering-the-cultural-plasticity-of-climate-change-ris.html


 http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/26/geoengineering-the-science-communication-environment-the-cul.html



 On Thursday, February 27, 2014 2:04:00 AM UTC-6, andrewjlockley wrote:

 Poster's note : This is just brilliant. At last an explanation of why
 believing nonsense is rational. Useful to reflect on how this paper replies
 to the origin and persistence of other belief systems, as well as climate
 change. Leaves me wondering what nonsense I believe.

 http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/23/three-
 models-of-risk-perception-their-significance-for-self.html

 Three models of risk perception  their significance for self-government

 Dan Kahan Posted on Sunday, February 23, 2014 at 7:52AM

 From Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a
 Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol.  Soc.
 Sci. (in press).

 Theoretical background

 Three models of risk perception

 The scholarly literature on risk perception and communication is
 dominated by two models. The first is the rational-weigher model, which
 posits that members of the public, in aggregate and over time, can be
 expected to process information about risk in a manner that promotes their
 expected utility (Starr 1969). The second is the irrational-weigher model,
 which asserts that ordinary members of the pubic lack the ability to
 reliably advance their expected utility because their assessment of risk
 information is constrained by cognitive biases and other manifestations of
 bounded rationality (Kahneman 2003; Sunstein 2005; Marx et al. 2007; Weber
 2006).Neither of these models cogently explains public conflict over
 climate change—or a host of other putative societal risks, such as nuclear
 power, the vaccination of teenage girls for HPV, and the removal of
 restrictions on carrying concealed handguns in public. Such disputes
 conspicuously feature partisan divisions over facts that admit of
 scientific investigation. Nothing in the rational-weigher model predicts
 that people with different values or opposing political commitments will
 draw radically different inferences from common information. Likewise,
 nothing in the irrational-weigher model suggests that people who subscribe
 to one set of values are any more or less bounded in their rationality than
 those who subscribe to any other, or that cognitive biases will produce
 systematic divisions of opinion of among such groups.

 One explanation for such conflict is the cultural cognition thesis (CCT).
 CCT says that cultural values are cognitively prior to facts in public risk
 conflicts: as a result of a complex of interrelated psychological
 mechanisms, groups of individuals will credit and dismiss evidence of risk
 in patterns that reflect and reinforce their distinctive understandings of
 how society should be organized (Kahan, Braman, Cohen, Gastil  Slovic
 2010; Jenkins-Smith  Herron 2009). Thus, persons
 with individualistic values can be expected to be relatively dismissive of
 environmental and technological risks, which if widely accepted would
 justify restricting commerce and industry, 

[geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci.

2014-03-11 Thread Michael Hayes
There is an saying that goes something like *To get along one needs to go 
along.* and I believe this old saying encapsulates the issue of  'Cultural 
Theory of Risk'. The general issue loosely known as 'The Moral Hazard' is 
not an overly complicated scenario and core guidance in understanding that 
scenario may be found at the definitional level of 
Metaethicshttp://moralphilosophy.info/metaethics/. 
I've tried to simplify this general issues involved in the following 
statement (from a working draft on marine 
biomasshttps://docs.google.com/document/d/1m9VXozADC0IIE6mYx5NsnJLrUvF_fWJN_GyigCzDLn0/pubGE).






Mapping out the moral paradox:

The primary opposing views of metaethics revolves around the issue of ones’ 
perspective. To qoute 
http://moralphilosophy.info/http://moralphilosophy.info/metaethics/
:

“Perhaps the biggest controversy in metaethics is that which divides moral 
realists and antirealists.

Moral realists hold that moral facts are objective facts that are out there 
in the world. Things are good or bad independent of us, and then we come 
along and discover morality.

Antirealists hold that moral facts are not out there in the world until we 
put them there, that the facts about morality are determined by facts about 
us. On this view, morality is not something that we discover so much as 
something that we invent.”.

In the context of Global Warming Mitigation (GWM), the highly complex 
matrix of the socioeconomic, political and environmental realities, 
encompass both ‘realistic’ and ‘antirealistic’ valid moral views. This 
creates a co-realistic moral paradox.

Solving the moral paradox:

Solving paradoxes requires identifying the point of fallacy in the paradox 
and then avoiding that point. The premise that fossil fuels are currently 
irreplaceable at the global scale is the fallacy which needs avoiding as 
FFs are the core cause of GW and FFs can be replaced with current 
technology.

The overall issue of large scale mitigation of global warming offers up a 
blinding array of relative rights or wrongs which can possibly be reduced 
to one core question and a simply stated strategy.

Is the continued use of FFs, on a global scale, scientifically, morally or 
ethically supportable? If not, ending the FF era should be the prime 
objective.  Any large scale mitigation strategy which can support the 
primary objective of replacing FFs should be given priority.

Until trans-formative improvements in energy storage and or distribution 
occurs, production of vast amounts of carbon negative, renewable, low cost, 
portable biofuels are needed to supplant FF use.

Under a global carbon negative fuel scenario, *the failure to increase fuel 
production and use would be considered unethical due to the CDR/CCS 
potential of BECCS*. Thus, production of carbon negative biofuels seems to 
ethically negate the moral hazard of mitigating FF induced global warming..




 

I believe the study of meta-ethics can provide important guidance to both 
GW mitigation technology strategies and the cultural understanding of the 
complex matrix of scientific issues related to GW and GE. From the 
technical side, ethically negating the moral hazard of global warming 
mitigation is technically possible using carbon neutral/negative bio-fuels 
(BECCS) and or space based energy. From the cultural side, the 'global 
community' (what ever that may be) seems to demand both abundance and 
environmental balances. The use of carbon neutral/negative energy or space 
based energy seems capable of meeting this apparent core cultural demand of 
'Having the cake and eating it too'.


 

In the final analysis, the cultural cognition of the need for global 
warming mitigation and the mitigation method(s) employed will need to be 
well synchronized if there is to be a globally inclusive effort with a high 
level of cultural acceptance. To-date, from both the technical and cultural 
levels, only BECCS and space based energy provide the ability to ethically 
mitigate the moral hazard of global warming mitigation. The other 
mitigation methods have their value and need to be integrated with the 
primary mitigation means, when and where appropriate, as secondary 
strategies.


  

Best,


Michael   





On Thursday, February 27, 2014 12:04:00 AM UTC-8, andrewjlockley wrote:

 Poster's note : This is just brilliant. At last an explanation of why 
 believing nonsense is rational. Useful to reflect on how this paper replies 
 to the origin and persistence of other belief systems, as well as climate 
 change. Leaves me wondering what nonsense I believe. 


 http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/23/three-models-of-risk-perception-their-significance-for-self.html

 Three models of risk perception  their significance for self-government

 Dan Kahan Posted on Sunday, February 23, 2014 at 7:52AM

 From Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel 
 Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol.  

Re: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci.

2014-03-09 Thread John Nissen
Dear Dan,

Views of nature

I've read through the Thompson paper of 2003 (Chapter 8) and your paper of
2012, attached to the email sent by Jesse Reynolds a few days ago.  Neither
paper tackles geoengineering, but both help to define four camps rather
than the two I had assumed in my last email.  Of particular interest to me
was the figure 1 in the Thompson paper, where the four camps are defined in
a quadrant.  Each has a different view of nature, represented by a ball
perched on a line.  If the line is concave, then nature is inherently
stable.  If the line is convex, then nature is ephemeral.  If the line is
straight, then nature is fickle and untrustworthy.  If the line is
concave with humps on each side, then nature is tolerant up to a certain
discoverable threshold.

Strength of emotional response

Because of feelings of solidarity, people tend to be polarised into one of
the four camps (where we had two before).  Anything which conflicts with
the view of nature of the group is rejected, regardless of scientific
evidence.  This is your assertion, and I can believe it.  The strength of
rejection is remarkable in my experience, even from top scientists who one
would expect to be objective in their judgement.  Thus climate models are
often accepted in preference to observations, if these observations
conflict with deeply held views of the Earth System (as you might call
nature).  In particular, if the observations suggest the system is past a
threshold or tipping point, such a conclusion can be totally rejected by
spurious argument and reliance on models showing no such threshold.  The
views of their particular camp will then reinforce this rejection (and the
spurious arguments for it) in what one might consider group denial.

Subject of discourse

Battle lines are set in concrete.  The discourse of the papers is about
global warming and how each camp reacts to proposed policies for CO2
emissions reduction.  But CO2 emissions reduction, however drastic, will
not halt global warming and will have little effect in the Arctic, where
warming is accelerating.  This restriction of discourse makes it extremely
difficult to discuss any interventions other than CO2 emissions reduction,
with its related topics of clean energy, sustainable lifestyle, etc.

The problem of facing the real world

What does the scientist do when he finds that real-world observations of
the Earth System show that it is beyond the threshold where CO2 reduction
alone could prevent a catastrophe?  Suppose the discoverable threshold
has already been passed.  None of the camps (except perhaps the fatalists)
will accept this, because it conflicts with their world view of nature.
Geoengineering is the only solution, but is rejected by the three main
camps, because they don't believe, reject or ignore the scientific
evidence.  (The so-called fatalists in the fourth camp are inherently
defeatist, so they see no point in trying geoengineering, but at least they
are tolerant of the idea, since the evidence for a geoengineering
requirement fits with their world view.)

The way forward

Scientists in this position have no large camp to join.  They are isolated
except in their solidarity on shared scientific opinion.  Yet, if the
people in the various camps could have sufficient self-awareness to counter
their natural feelings against geoengineering, then there could be
meaningful collaboration between people in all camps to tackle the
real-world problem that these scientists present.  It is in the interests
of everyone on the planet that the climate problem is sorted.  And nobody
need suffer as a result of the kind of interventions being proposed:
removal of CO2 from the atmosphere and cloud cooling techniques to cool the
Arctic.  With careful management they should be entirely beneficial.

Could a psychologist help to solve a real-world problem of climate change
by releasing people from the restricted view of nature held by their own
camp?

Cheers,

John



On Fri, Mar 7, 2014 at 6:18 PM, Rau, Greg r...@llnl.gov wrote:

  John,
 Yes buck up = cheer up over here, sorry or the cowboy colloquialism.
 Psychology is indeed at the root of behavior, a little detail they didn't
 teach us in Earth Science grad school. That's why we need the professionals
 in human behavior on our side - Madison Ave, Mark Zuckerberg, etc  ;-)
 Greg
  --
 *From:* John Nissen [johnnissen2...@gmail.com]
 *Sent:* Thursday, March 06, 2014 3:21 PM
 *To:* Rau, Greg

 *Cc:* dmorr...@gmail.com; geoengineering@googlegroups.com;
 dan.ka...@yale.edu; John Nissen
 *Subject:* Re: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization:
 Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. 
 Soc. Sci.

Hi Greg,

  Having researched the meaning of buck up, I realise that your meaning
 is to do with cheering me up, rather than speeding me up.

  It is cheering to have a meaningful discussion on the popular rejection
 of geoengineering.  

RE: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci.

2014-03-07 Thread Rau, Greg
John,
Yes buck up = cheer up over here, sorry or the cowboy colloquialism. 
Psychology is indeed at the root of behavior, a little detail they didn't teach 
us in Earth Science grad school. That's why we need the professionals in human 
behavior on our side - Madison Ave, Mark Zuckerberg, etc  ;-)
Greg

From: John Nissen [johnnissen2...@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 06, 2014 3:21 PM
To: Rau, Greg
Cc: dmorr...@gmail.com; geoengineering@googlegroups.com; dan.ka...@yale.edu; 
John Nissen
Subject: Re: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing 
a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol.  Soc. Sci.

Hi Greg,

Having researched the meaning of buck up, I realise that your meaning is to 
do with cheering me up, rather than speeding me up.

It is cheering to have a meaningful discussion on the popular rejection of 
geoengineering.  I can understand a religious objection to geoengineering, on 
the grounds that weather is God's business so we should not interfere with it.  
And I can understand that scientists are used to observing the environment 
while trying not to alter the subject of their observations.  But these are not 
sociological effects.  What fascinates me is how a psychologist can bring a new 
perspective on this.  You, Dan, have shown, in the CCT theory, how the majority 
of people, and that of course includes scientists, fall into one of two 
distinct classes and identify themselves with an associated 'camp', as I call 
it.

My deduction from what you, Dan, have said is that geoengineering is rejected 
by both camps.  The strength of emotion exhibited against geoengineering 
indicates that something is offending deeply held values - values shared by the 
associated camp.  There is certainly overt antagonism between the camps.  But a 
strong subconscious driver may be fear.  We see an aversion to the discussion 
of present danger share by both camps - anything that is at all scary.

The camp that rejects climate change has an aversion to discussing the 
scientific evidence which indicates the danger to human society from many 
degrees of global warming and from Arctic meltdown.  This camp rejects 
geoengineering because it is associated with this evidence which it does not 
wish to discuss.  People in this camp say that geoengineering will not be 
required for a long time, if ever, because the world is changing slowly.  When 
a scientist describes the actual situation to such a person, they reply it 
can't possibly be as bad as that.

On the other hand the camp which accepts climate change also has an aversion to 
the discussion of near-term danger, while they accept the long-term danger of 
climate change, e.g. by the end of the century.  Some reject geoengineering on 
the grounds that it is a conspiracy by the other camp (especially fossil fuel 
industry) to 'get out of gaol free', i.e. to continue their vile polluting 
practice of burning fossil fuels.  Others say that geoengineering is too 
dangerous - the implication it is more risky to apply geoengineering than to 
leave the climate system to change.  (This is like condemning the fire engines 
for the water damage they might produce, while the building is burning down.)  
Others have more sophisticated arguments - all having the characteristic of 
avoiding proper discussion of near-term danger, especially from the warming of 
the Arctic.

So who can escape from this emotional reaction?  There are the psychologists, 
like you, Dan, who can present the situation as a case study in psychological 
theory.  There are economists who accept the economic impact of fossil fuel 
reduction, yet realise that climate change will have a huge economic impact, 
even within a few decades, because of the limited carbon budget set by AR5.  
And there are those of us who acknowledge that there are these two camps who 
are pre-occupied by fighting a battle over emissions reductions, while two more 
immediate problems are overlooked:

1.  The global warming and ocean acidification from existing CO2 in the 
atmosphere require that CO2 is removed from the atmosphere, by the CRD 
geoengineering techniques.

2.  The Arctic will proceed towards total meltdown, unless it is quickly cooled 
by SRM geoengineering techniques sufficient to halt the sea ice retreat.

Neither of the two camps is seriously engaged in discussion about these urgent 
requirements for geoengineering.  Or they will deny the science and scientific 
observations that point to these requirements.

And yet geoengineering offers a golden opportunity for international 
collaboration, for solving these most immediate and urgent problems faced by 
mankind.  It would be tragic if this opportunity were missed because of 
psychological problems.

Cheers,  John



On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 10:02 PM, Rau, Greg 
r...@llnl.govmailto:r...@llnl.gov wrote:
Buck up, John. Once the real hazards of rising sea level, failed crops, and 
acidified 

Re: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci.

2014-03-05 Thread Lou Grinzo
I think oversimplifies things a bit.

There's a component of society, certain very large corporations, who would 
be delighted to see major CC impacts that require massive geoengineering 
efforts.  They're the companies that will do the work.  And, as I argued 
recently on my blog 
[http://www.grinzo.com/energy/2014/01/29/the-climate-impact-line/], we have 
a CC wedge: People above it will benefit in the short term from making CC 
worse by sticking to BAU, and they are wealthy enough that they perceive 
that they and their loved ones can buy their way out of danger.  People 
below the wedge are going to suffer a great deal, and many will die.  Those 
above the wedge consider those below an expendable resource.

And there's a non-trivial portion of people who aren't thrilled with 
geoengineering not for the reasons you mention (although I know those 
people exist), but because they don't think we can do it without screwing 
it up and making a bad situation even worse.  They look at political and 
corporate ineptitude and corruption, and remember all the high-profile 
screw ups that regularly appear in the news, and they wonder how anyone 
could think we'd intentionally influence the world's environment and get it 
right.  While I don't agree with that position, it's a pragmatic view that 
I understand.


On Tuesday, March 4, 2014 2:21:47 PM UTC-5, John Nissen wrote:

 Hi Greg,

 The theory is that people tend to be polarised into two camps.  One camp 
 is against the idea that climate change can have anything to do with our 
 greenhouse gas emissions; and therefore (subconsciously) this camp is 
 against geoengineering because it would admit of a massive problem to be 
 solved.  The other camp is against geoengineering (subconsciously) because 
 of the moral hazard - the idea that it's a get out of jail free for the 
 people responsible for causing climate change in the first place.  They 
 will talk of geoengineering as a climate fix, that it is playing with 
 God, etc.

 Kahan refers repeatedly to a 2012 study where it was shown that the moral 
 hazard argument against geoengineering was scientifically invalid.  But 
 subconsciously the second camp may still have this deep-seated fear of 
 geoengineering.

 Therefore I deduce, using his argument, that neither camp will accept 
 geoengineering, whatever evidence of the need for geoengineering is 
 presented to them.

 I think this is the crux of the matter: nobody, identified with either of 
 the common camps, will accept geoengineering.  Only when this impasse is 
 properly acknowledged, will it be possible for people to accept the 
 scientific evidence that geoengineering is needed, not only to suck CO2 out 
 of the atmosphere, but also to cool the Arctic.

 Cheers,

 John






  


 On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 4:22 AM, Rau, Greg ra...@llnl.gov javascript:wrote:

  This observation may bear repeating: 
 To be effective, science communication must successfully negotiate both 
 channels. That is, in addition to furnishing individuals with valid and 
 pertinent information about how the world works, it must avail itself of 
 the cues necessary to assure individuals that assenting to that information 
 will not estrange them from their communities.

  Isn't this what good advertising does, and couldn't our community 
 benefit from some cogent advice from Madison Ave, if we could afford it? 
 Science and scientific reasoning alone apparently isn't enough, especially 
 when there are (well funded) individuals who would cast such reasoning as a 
 threat to their communities.
 Greg
  --
 *From:* geoengi...@googlegroups.com javascript: [
 geoengi...@googlegroups.com javascript:] on behalf of David Morrow [
 dmor...@gmail.com javascript:]
 *Sent:* Monday, March 03, 2014 6:27 PM
 *To:* geoengi...@googlegroups.com javascript:
 *Subject:* [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: 
 Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol.  
 Soc. Sci.

   FYI, the lead author of that paper, Dan Kahan, posted two additional 
 blog posts on culture, values, and geoengineering: 

  
 http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/24/geoengineering-the-cultural-plasticity-of-climate-change-ris.html
  
  
 http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/26/geoengineering-the-science-communication-environment-the-cul.html
  
  

 On Thursday, February 27, 2014 2:04:00 AM UTC-6, andrewjlockley wrote: 

 Poster's note : This is just brilliant. At last an explanation of why 
 believing nonsense is rational. Useful to reflect on how this paper replies 
 to the origin and persistence of other belief systems, as well as climate 
 change. Leaves me wondering what nonsense I believe. 

 http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/23/three-
 models-of-risk-perception-their-significance-for-self.html

 Three models of risk perception  their significance for self-government

 Dan Kahan Posted on Sunday, February 23, 2014 at 7:52AM


Re: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci.

2014-03-04 Thread John Nissen
Hi Greg,

The theory is that people tend to be polarised into two camps.  One camp is
against the idea that climate change can have anything to do with our
greenhouse gas emissions; and therefore (subconsciously) this camp is
against geoengineering because it would admit of a massive problem to be
solved.  The other camp is against geoengineering (subconsciously) because
of the moral hazard - the idea that it's a get out of jail free for the
people responsible for causing climate change in the first place.  They
will talk of geoengineering as a climate fix, that it is playing with
God, etc.

Kahan refers repeatedly to a 2012 study where it was shown that the moral
hazard argument against geoengineering was scientifically invalid.  But
subconsciously the second camp may still have this deep-seated fear of
geoengineering.

Therefore I deduce, using his argument, that neither camp will accept
geoengineering, whatever evidence of the need for geoengineering is
presented to them.

I think this is the crux of the matter: nobody, identified with either of
the common camps, will accept geoengineering.  Only when this impasse is
properly acknowledged, will it be possible for people to accept the
scientific evidence that geoengineering is needed, not only to suck CO2 out
of the atmosphere, but also to cool the Arctic.

Cheers,

John









On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 4:22 AM, Rau, Greg r...@llnl.gov wrote:

  This observation may bear repeating:
 To be effective, science communication must successfully negotiate both
 channels. That is, in addition to furnishing individuals with valid and
 pertinent information about how the world works, it must avail itself of
 the cues necessary to assure individuals that assenting to that information
 will not estrange them from their communities.

  Isn't this what good advertising does, and couldn't our community
 benefit from some cogent advice from Madison Ave, if we could afford it?
 Science and scientific reasoning alone apparently isn't enough, especially
 when there are (well funded) individuals who would cast such reasoning as a
 threat to their communities.
 Greg
  --
 *From:* geoengineering@googlegroups.com [geoengineering@googlegroups.com]
 on behalf of David Morrow [dmorr...@gmail.com]
 *Sent:* Monday, March 03, 2014 6:27 PM
 *To:* geoengineering@googlegroups.com
 *Subject:* [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization:
 Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. 
 Soc. Sci.

   FYI, the lead author of that paper, Dan Kahan, posted two additional
 blog posts on culture, values, and geoengineering:


 http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/24/geoengineering-the-cultural-plasticity-of-climate-change-ris.html


 http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/26/geoengineering-the-science-communication-environment-the-cul.html



 On Thursday, February 27, 2014 2:04:00 AM UTC-6, andrewjlockley wrote:

 Poster's note : This is just brilliant. At last an explanation of why
 believing nonsense is rational. Useful to reflect on how this paper replies
 to the origin and persistence of other belief systems, as well as climate
 change. Leaves me wondering what nonsense I believe.

 http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/23/three-
 models-of-risk-perception-their-significance-for-self.html

 Three models of risk perception  their significance for self-government

 Dan Kahan Posted on Sunday, February 23, 2014 at 7:52AM

 From Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a
 Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol.  Soc.
 Sci. (in press).

 Theoretical background

 Three models of risk perception

 The scholarly literature on risk perception and communication is
 dominated by two models. The first is the rational-weigher model, which
 posits that members of the public, in aggregate and over time, can be
 expected to process information about risk in a manner that promotes their
 expected utility (Starr 1969). The second is the irrational-weigher model,
 which asserts that ordinary members of the pubic lack the ability to
 reliably advance their expected utility because their assessment of risk
 information is constrained by cognitive biases and other manifestations of
 bounded rationality (Kahneman 2003; Sunstein 2005; Marx et al. 2007; Weber
 2006).Neither of these models cogently explains public conflict over
 climate change--or a host of other putative societal risks, such as nuclear
 power, the vaccination of teenage girls for HPV, and the removal of
 restrictions on carrying concealed handguns in public. Such disputes
 conspicuously feature partisan divisions over facts that admit of
 scientific investigation. Nothing in the rational-weigher model predicts
 that people with different values or opposing political commitments will
 draw radically different inferences from common information. Likewise,
 nothing in the irrational-weigher model suggests that people who 

Re: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci.

2014-03-04 Thread Andrew Lockley
My understanding is that many conservatives are rather fond of
geoengineering as it allows the continuing BAU pathway (at least
superficially).

Further, as David  Keith has pointed out, a degree of moral hazard is
entirely rational. However, what's surprising is that a degree of negative
or perverse moral hazard has been found in a couple of studies. IE that
some people become more worried about AGW when CE is explained. This can
potentially be rationalised by the shift in perception caused by realising
CE is considered a serious option. I guess they'd prefer blue skies to
SUVs, and facing that choice makes it more pressing.

My own serious games work supported negative moral hazard, but had to be
ditched due to methodology flaws.

A
 On 4 Mar 2014 19:22, John Nissen johnnissen2...@gmail.com wrote:

 Hi Greg,

 The theory is that people tend to be polarised into two camps.  One camp
 is against the idea that climate change can have anything to do with our
 greenhouse gas emissions; and therefore (subconsciously) this camp is
 against geoengineering because it would admit of a massive problem to be
 solved.  The other camp is against geoengineering (subconsciously) because
 of the moral hazard - the idea that it's a get out of jail free for the
 people responsible for causing climate change in the first place.  They
 will talk of geoengineering as a climate fix, that it is playing with
 God, etc.

 Kahan refers repeatedly to a 2012 study where it was shown that the moral
 hazard argument against geoengineering was scientifically invalid.  But
 subconsciously the second camp may still have this deep-seated fear of
 geoengineering.

 Therefore I deduce, using his argument, that neither camp will accept
 geoengineering, whatever evidence of the need for geoengineering is
 presented to them.

 I think this is the crux of the matter: nobody, identified with either of
 the common camps, will accept geoengineering.  Only when this impasse is
 properly acknowledged, will it be possible for people to accept the
 scientific evidence that geoengineering is needed, not only to suck CO2 out
 of the atmosphere, but also to cool the Arctic.

 Cheers,

 John









 On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 4:22 AM, Rau, Greg r...@llnl.gov wrote:

  This observation may bear repeating:
 To be effective, science communication must successfully negotiate both
 channels. That is, in addition to furnishing individuals with valid and
 pertinent information about how the world works, it must avail itself of
 the cues necessary to assure individuals that assenting to that information
 will not estrange them from their communities.

  Isn't this what good advertising does, and couldn't our community
 benefit from some cogent advice from Madison Ave, if we could afford it?
 Science and scientific reasoning alone apparently isn't enough, especially
 when there are (well funded) individuals who would cast such reasoning as a
 threat to their communities.
 Greg
  --
 *From:* geoengineering@googlegroups.com [geoengineering@googlegroups.com]
 on behalf of David Morrow [dmorr...@gmail.com]
 *Sent:* Monday, March 03, 2014 6:27 PM
 *To:* geoengineering@googlegroups.com
 *Subject:* [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization:
 Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. 
 Soc. Sci.

   FYI, the lead author of that paper, Dan Kahan, posted two additional
 blog posts on culture, values, and geoengineering:


 http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/24/geoengineering-the-cultural-plasticity-of-climate-change-ris.html


 http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/26/geoengineering-the-science-communication-environment-the-cul.html



 On Thursday, February 27, 2014 2:04:00 AM UTC-6, andrewjlockley wrote:

 Poster's note : This is just brilliant. At last an explanation of why
 believing nonsense is rational. Useful to reflect on how this paper replies
 to the origin and persistence of other belief systems, as well as climate
 change. Leaves me wondering what nonsense I believe.

 http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/23/three-
 models-of-risk-perception-their-significance-for-self.html

 Three models of risk perception  their significance for self-government

 Dan Kahan Posted on Sunday, February 23, 2014 at 7:52AM

 From Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a
 Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol.  Soc.
 Sci. (in press).

 Theoretical background

 Three models of risk perception

 The scholarly literature on risk perception and communication is
 dominated by two models. The first is the rational-weigher model, which
 posits that members of the public, in aggregate and over time, can be
 expected to process information about risk in a manner that promotes their
 expected utility (Starr 1969). The second is the irrational-weigher model,
 which asserts that ordinary members of the pubic lack the ability to
 reliably advance their 

Re: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci.

2014-03-04 Thread Rau, Greg
Buck up, John. Once the real hazards of rising sea level, failed crops, and 
acidified oceans materialize, the decision-makers just might yearn for some 
hazards of the moral kind. And you and I might still be around when that 
happens. Even then there is no guarantee that any countering action will be 
effective and safe unless we do some research to find out before the real need 
for hazard mitigation arises, which for some of us is right now.
Keep up the good fight...
Greg

From: John Nissen johnnissen2...@gmail.commailto:johnnissen2...@gmail.com
Date: Tuesday, March 4, 2014 11:21 AM
To: Default r...@llnl.govmailto:r...@llnl.gov
Cc: dmorr...@gmail.commailto:dmorr...@gmail.com 
dmorr...@gmail.commailto:dmorr...@gmail.com, geoengineering 
geoengineering@googlegroups.commailto:geoengineering@googlegroups.com, 
dan.ka...@yale.edumailto:dan.ka...@yale.edu 
dan.ka...@yale.edumailto:dan.ka...@yale.edu, John Nissen 
j...@cloudworld.co.ukmailto:j...@cloudworld.co.uk
Subject: Re: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing 
a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol.  Soc. Sci.

Hi Greg,

The theory is that people tend to be polarised into two camps.  One camp is 
against the idea that climate change can have anything to do with our 
greenhouse gas emissions; and therefore (subconsciously) this camp is against 
geoengineering because it would admit of a massive problem to be solved.  The 
other camp is against geoengineering (subconsciously) because of the moral 
hazard - the idea that it's a get out of jail free for the people responsible 
for causing climate change in the first place.  They will talk of 
geoengineering as a climate fix, that it is playing with God, etc.

Kahan refers repeatedly to a 2012 study where it was shown that the moral 
hazard argument against geoengineering was scientifically invalid.  But 
subconsciously the second camp may still have this deep-seated fear of 
geoengineering.

Therefore I deduce, using his argument, that neither camp will accept 
geoengineering, whatever evidence of the need for geoengineering is presented 
to them.

I think this is the crux of the matter: nobody, identified with either of the 
common camps, will accept geoengineering.  Only when this impasse is properly 
acknowledged, will it be possible for people to accept the scientific evidence 
that geoengineering is needed, not only to suck CO2 out of the atmosphere, but 
also to cool the Arctic.

Cheers,

John









On Tue, Mar 4, 2014 at 4:22 AM, Rau, Greg r...@llnl.govmailto:r...@llnl.gov 
wrote:
This observation may bear repeating:
To be effective, science communication must successfully negotiate both 
channels. That is, in addition to furnishing individuals with valid and 
pertinent information about how the world works, it must avail itself of the 
cues necessary to assure individuals that assenting to that information will 
not estrange them from their communities.

Isn't this what good advertising does, and couldn't our community benefit from 
some cogent advice from Madison Ave, if we could afford it? Science and 
scientific reasoning alone apparently isn't enough, especially when there are 
(well funded) individuals who would cast such reasoning as a threat to their 
communities.
Greg

From: geoengineering@googlegroups.commailto:geoengineering@googlegroups.com 
[geoengineering@googlegroups.commailto:geoengineering@googlegroups.com] on 
behalf of David Morrow [dmorr...@gmail.commailto:dmorr...@gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, March 03, 2014 6:27 PM
To: geoengineering@googlegroups.commailto:geoengineering@googlegroups.com
Subject: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a 
Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol.  Soc. Sci.

FYI, the lead author of that paper, Dan Kahan, posted two additional blog posts 
on culture, values, and geoengineering:

http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/24/geoengineering-the-cultural-plasticity-of-climate-change-ris.html

http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/26/geoengineering-the-science-communication-environment-the-cul.html



On Thursday, February 27, 2014 2:04:00 AM UTC-6, andrewjlockley wrote:

Poster's note : This is just brilliant. At last an explanation of why believing 
nonsense is rational. Useful to reflect on how this paper replies to the origin 
and persistence of other belief systems, as well as climate change. Leaves me 
wondering what nonsense I believe.

http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/23/three-models-of-risk-perception-their-significance-for-self.html

Three models of risk perception  their significance for self-government

Dan Kahan Posted on Sunday, February 23, 2014 at 7:52AM

From Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel 
Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol.  Soc. Sci. (in press).

Theoretical background

Three models of risk perception

The scholarly literature 

[geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci.

2014-03-03 Thread David Morrow
FYI, the lead author of that paper, Dan Kahan, posted two additional blog 
posts on culture, values, and geoengineering:

http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/24/geoengineering-the-cultural-plasticity-of-climate-change-ris.html

http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/26/geoengineering-the-science-communication-environment-the-cul.html



On Thursday, February 27, 2014 2:04:00 AM UTC-6, andrewjlockley wrote:

 Poster's note : This is just brilliant. At last an explanation of why 
 believing nonsense is rational. Useful to reflect on how this paper replies 
 to the origin and persistence of other belief systems, as well as climate 
 change. Leaves me wondering what nonsense I believe. 


 http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/23/three-models-of-risk-perception-their-significance-for-self.html

 Three models of risk perception  their significance for self-government

 Dan Kahan Posted on Sunday, February 23, 2014 at 7:52AM

 From Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel 
 Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol.  Soc. Sci. (in press).

 Theoretical background

 Three models of risk perception

 The scholarly literature on risk perception and communication is dominated 
 by two models. The first is the rational-weigher model, which posits that 
 members of the public, in aggregate and over time, can be expected to 
 process information about risk in a manner that promotes their expected 
 utility (Starr 1969). The second is the irrational-weigher model, which 
 asserts that ordinary members of the pubic lack the ability to reliably 
 advance their expected utility because their assessment of risk information 
 is constrained by cognitive biases and other manifestations of bounded 
 rationality (Kahneman 2003; Sunstein 2005; Marx et al. 2007; Weber 
 2006).Neither of these models cogently explains public conflict over 
 climate change—or a host of other putative societal risks, such as nuclear 
 power, the vaccination of teenage girls for HPV, and the removal of 
 restrictions on carrying concealed handguns in public. Such disputes 
 conspicuously feature partisan divisions over facts that admit of 
 scientific investigation. Nothing in the rational-weigher model predicts 
 that people with different values or opposing political commitments will 
 draw radically different inferences from common information. Likewise, 
 nothing in the irrational-weigher model suggests that people who subscribe 
 to one set of values are any more or less bounded in their rationality than 
 those who subscribe to any other, or that cognitive biases will produce 
 systematic divisions of opinion of among such groups.

 One explanation for such conflict is the cultural cognition thesis (CCT). 
 CCT says that cultural values are cognitively prior to facts in public risk 
 conflicts: as a result of a complex of interrelated psychological 
 mechanisms, groups of individuals will credit and dismiss evidence of risk 
 in patterns that reflect and reinforce their distinctive understandings of 
 how society should be organized (Kahan, Braman, Cohen, Gastil  Slovic 
 2010; Jenkins-Smith  Herron 2009). Thus, persons 
 with individualistic values can be expected to be relatively dismissive of 
 environmental and technological risks, which if widely accepted would 
 justify restricting commerce and industry, activities that people with such 
 values hold in high regard. The same goes for individuals 
 withhierarchical values, who see assertions of environmental risk as 
 indictments of social elites. Individuals 
 with egalitarian and communitarian values, in contrast, see commerce and 
 industry as sources of unjust disparity and symbols of noxious 
 self-seeking, and thus readily credit assertions that these activities are 
 hazardous and therefore worthy of regulation (Douglass  Wildavsky 1982). 
 Observational and experimental studies have linked these and comparable 
 sets of outlooks to myriad risk controversies, including the one over 
 climate change (Kahan 2012).Individuals, on the CCT account, behave not as 
 expected-utility weighers—rational or irrational—but rather as cultural 
 evaluators of risk information (Kahan, Slovic, Braman  Gastil 2006). The 
 beliefs any individual forms on societal risks like climate change—whether 
 right or wrong—do not meaningfully affect his or her personal exposure to 
 those risks. However, precisely because positions on those issues are 
 commonly understood to cohere with allegiance to one or another cultural 
 style, taking a position at odds with the dominant view in his or her 
 cultural group is likely to compromise that individual’s relationship with 
 others on whom that individual depends for emotional and material support. 
 As individuals, citizens are thus likely to do better in their daily lives 
 when they adopt toward putative hazards the stances that express their 
 commitment to values that they share with others, 

RE: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci.

2014-03-03 Thread Rau, Greg
This observation may bear repeating:
To be effective, science communication must successfully negotiate both 
channels. That is, in addition to furnishing individuals with valid and 
pertinent information about how the world works, it must avail itself of the 
cues necessary to assure individuals that assenting to that information will 
not estrange them from their communities.

Isn't this what good advertising does, and couldn't our community benefit from 
some cogent advice from Madison Ave, if we could afford it? Science and 
scientific reasoning alone apparently isn't enough, especially when there are 
(well funded) individuals who would cast such reasoning as a threat to their 
communities.
Greg

From: geoengineering@googlegroups.com [geoengineering@googlegroups.com] on 
behalf of David Morrow [dmorr...@gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, March 03, 2014 6:27 PM
To: geoengineering@googlegroups.com
Subject: [geo] Re: Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a 
Two-channel Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol.  Soc. Sci.

FYI, the lead author of that paper, Dan Kahan, posted two additional blog posts 
on culture, values, and geoengineering:

http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/24/geoengineering-the-cultural-plasticity-of-climate-change-ris.html

http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/26/geoengineering-the-science-communication-environment-the-cul.html



On Thursday, February 27, 2014 2:04:00 AM UTC-6, andrewjlockley wrote:

Poster's note : This is just brilliant. At last an explanation of why believing 
nonsense is rational. Useful to reflect on how this paper replies to the origin 
and persistence of other belief systems, as well as climate change. Leaves me 
wondering what nonsense I believe.

http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/23/three-models-of-risk-perception-their-significance-for-self.html

Three models of risk perception  their significance for self-government

Dan Kahan Posted on Sunday, February 23, 2014 at 7:52AM

From Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel 
Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol.  Soc. Sci. (in press).

Theoretical background

Three models of risk perception

The scholarly literature on risk perception and communication is dominated by 
two models. The first is the rational-weigher model, which posits that members 
of the public, in aggregate and over time, can be expected to process 
information about risk in a manner that promotes their expected utility (Starr 
1969). The second is the irrational-weigher model, which asserts that ordinary 
members of the pubic lack the ability to reliably advance their expected 
utility because their assessment of risk information is constrained by 
cognitive biases and other manifestations of bounded rationality (Kahneman 
2003; Sunstein 2005; Marx et al. 2007; Weber 2006).Neither of these models 
cogently explains public conflict over climate change--or a host of other 
putative societal risks, such as nuclear power, the vaccination of teenage 
girls for HPV, and the removal of restrictions on carrying concealed handguns 
in public. Such disputes conspicuously feature partisan divisions over facts 
that admit of scientific investigation. Nothing in the rational-weigher model 
predicts that people with different values or opposing political commitments 
will draw radically different inferences from common information. Likewise, 
nothing in the irrational-weigher model suggests that people who subscribe to 
one set of values are any more or less bounded in their rationality than those 
who subscribe to any other, or that cognitive biases will produce systematic 
divisions of opinion of among such groups.

One explanation for such conflict is the cultural cognition thesis (CCT). CCT 
says that cultural values are cognitively prior to facts in public risk 
conflicts: as a result of a complex of interrelated psychological mechanisms, 
groups of individuals will credit and dismiss evidence of risk in patterns that 
reflect and reinforce their distinctive understandings of how society should be 
organized (Kahan, Braman, Cohen, Gastil  Slovic 2010; Jenkins-Smith  Herron 
2009). Thus, persons with individualistic values can be expected to be 
relatively dismissive of environmental and technological risks, which if widely 
accepted would justify restricting commerce and industry, activities that 
people with such values hold in high regard. The same goes for individuals 
withhierarchical values, who see assertions of environmental risk as 
indictments of social elites. Individuals with egalitarian and communitarian 
values, in contrast, see commerce and industry as sources of unjust disparity 
and symbols of noxious self-seeking, and thus readily credit assertions that 
these activities are hazardous and therefore worthy of regulation (Douglass  
Wildavsky 1982). Observational and experimental studies have linked these and