Re: OT: Best way to send e-mails to a recipient that does know encryption
On 1/2/2024 at 9:26 AM, "Ingo Klöcker" wrote: >Posteo will release data to authorities if they are forced to do >so by a >judicial order. See their transparency reports for details: >https://posteo.de/en/site/transparency_report > >I'm still using Posteo. = Another option is Hushmail. It allows to send encrypted mail to someone who has no encryption experience and to any email address. The Receiver agrees on a passphrase with the Sender, and the Sender sends the encrypted email. The Receiver gets a notice in whatever email he/she is using, with a link to a site on the hushmail server. The Receiver clicks on a link, and Hushmail requests a passphrase. Only 3 attempts are allowed. The message is erased on the 4th try. The message is also erased after 72 hours from the time it is sent. If the passphrase is correct, it displays the plaintext of the message. Again, if you are suspected of being a terrorist or a human trafficker, and Law Enforcement gets a convincing order, they will release your information. They are based in Canada. Price is 49 US$ / year. Allows for unlimited aliases, (that haven't already been taken). If anyone wants to try out the encryption, please send me an email, and tell me what you want your passphrase to be. vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org https://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: ADK's
There are 2 simple workarounds to employment ADK's : [ 1 ]. Send a symmetrically encrypted message to the key with the ADK(This will require an agreed upon symmetric passphrase communicated in person, phone, or another non-ADK manner) [ 2 ]. Generate a non-ADK key, not uploaded to any server and send and receive messages with a hidden-ID option, and keep this key on a separated keyring. This can be communicated symmetrically as in [ 1 ]. vedaal___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org https://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Status of original PGP?
On 9/7/2022 at 6:14 PM, "Robert J. Hansen via Gnupg-users" wrote:On a lark I went looking for the current iteration of PGP. It was bought by Symantec some years ago, and the last I heard they'd renamed it to "Symantec Encryption Desktop". However, Symantec no longer has it available for sale or download, and scouring their site turns up basically nothing. Does anyone know what happened to PGP? = There is still a source for PGP freeware for PGP 8.0 and earlier:http://www.pgpi.didisoft.com/products/pgp/versions/freeware/ (I followed the successive links and then got an error page, but if this is still considered freeware for non-commercial use, then it is archived somewhere... https://zedz.net/ ) Vedaal___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org https://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Backing up your PGP key by hand
On 5/26/2022 at 12:52 AM, "Robert J. Hansen via Gnupg-users" wrote: So, yeah. I'm going to be solidly on the side of "no, really, paper is a magic technology, just be sure to talk with an archivist first to ensure you're using the right kind of paper." = The other thing to consider is the Ink. In Ancient and Medieval times, the ink was not standardized, and varied in the quantity of the ingredients. All were permanent but some were too acidic and burned through the paper. Many monastery manuscripts centuries old are still in very good condition. Today there are "Bulletproof" permanent inks (not resistant to real bullets, but resistant to water, alcohol, bleach, soap, and known solvents.) https://www.jetpens.com/blog/Noodler-s-Fountain-Pen-Inks-A-Comprehensive-Guide/pt/902#bulletproof The Noodler Eternal inks are available in a larger variety of permanent colors, and are all fountain pen safe. https://noodlersink.com/product/19208-eternal-polar-blue/ Vedaal___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org https://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
RE: Changing the encryption algorithm used for PGP/GPG private key
On 2/18/2022 at 3:12 AM, "Daniel Colquitt via Gnupg-users" wrote:Just to follow up that this isn't a gpgwin problem. I have a Debian installation and generated a test key using GnuPG and the same gpg.conf file = Try this: In gpg.conf file add the option of --expert and in personal preferences, list only AES 256, Not the other strengths. Keep all of the s2k options you listed, and try generating a new key again Vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org https://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: First Amendment and Marines?
On 1/29/2022 at 11:06 PM, "Mauricio Tavares via Gnupg-users" wrote: > The patient can choose any, all, any combination, or none of them. > And still get treatment. > Can you provide which regulation states that? I could have used it many times. = It's in the HIPPA act which requires the patient's consent to share the date, and is in the pre-treatment or pre-hospittalization consent form itself. The worst the hospital can do, if the person refuses release to the Insurance Company, is to bill the patient as self-pay. The hospital cannot refuse treatment. Can't speak about Covid, because *The Science* seems to vary between conservative and liberal states. There are many horror stories, but it is not for this mailing list. Vedaal___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org https://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: pgp263iamulti06
On 1/29/2022 at 11:02 PM, "Robert J. Hansen" wrote:> Please comment if this is adequate, or there is still a problem with > Disastry's Linux Version. Why? I've been trying to get people to move to OpenPGP for literally a quarter-century, Vedaal. I'm not going to suddenly switch gears and work on giving people reasons *not* to migrate. = I have publicly posted here that GnupG should not have to make a considerations with backward compatibility with Disastry's version, those who use Disastry's version among each other will continue to do so, and among those who communicate with GnuPG user's, will use GnuPG. If person1 has a signed and encrypted email to person 2, but which used IDEA and MD 5, and now wants to decrypt, and re-encrypt and sign, and send to person 2, who will then destroy the original email, why shouldn't they be allowed to know if this is safe. They still use GnuPG for current email and will not be discouraged by knowing that there is a safe way to do this in Linux based Diastry's version, which cannot be sent to person 2's v3 key in GnuPG 2.x vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org https://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: First Amendment and Marines?
On 1/29/2022 at 5:39 PM, "Mauricio Tavares via Gnupg-users" wrote Not quite. It cares about personal data from people residing in Europe at the time said data was collected. And even then, you need to be targeting EU/EEA residents. So, if a German citizen goes to FL and needs to stop at the emergency care to have a shark bite taken care of, that data now is owned by the hospital forever, which will figure out how to make money with it without asking permission. = This is NOT true, (but may make sense to someone who has never been a hospital patient in the US.) Every hospitalized patient is given a consent form prior to treatment, which they may edit or refuse to sign. -It allows release of medical information to the Insurance Carrier, -to the Patient's private Physician, -to a third party designated by the patient as a 'next-of-kin-with medical proxy', should the patient not be in a condition to make decisions, -or to a third party statistical group following the frequency and outcome of a particular condition requiring hospitalization. The patient can choose any, all, any combination, or none of them. And still get treatment. Vedaal___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org https://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Side-channel attacks
On 1/18/2022 at 11:26 AM, "Robert J. Hansen via Gnupg-users" wrote:> 1.4 should be able to decrypt all 2.6 generated data. Not from the Disastry builds, which extended 2.6 to support newer algorithms. = 1.4 still can decrypt and verify anything in Disastry's last build. He died before he could implement Camellia. I have been using it since it came out, and 1.4 can easily decrypt and verify, but there is a simple procedural issue.: 1.4 decides that when it sees a v3 key, it tries to decrypt Idea and verify md5. Which works perfectly for 2.6.x. In order for 1.4 to decrypt and verify messages done with other encryption algorithms and signing algorithms, the name of the signing algorithm and the name of the encryption algorithm need to be included in the command line. If this is cumbersome, so just continue to use Disastry 2.6 to decrypt and verify. It's not gnupg's problem. Vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Side-channel attacks
On 1/16/2022 at 6:12 PM, "Robert J. Hansen via Gnupg-users" wrote:On this mailing list we sometimes see requests for help from people running dangerously antique versions of GnuPG. Wasn't all that long ago I was asked for help with something in the 1.2 series (!!). Without exception, our first response is usually "for the love of God, upgrade!" They rarely do. It's worked fine for them for a decade or more, and they're not going to change... = There is also the vulnerability of the 'shortcut' of decrypting symmetric encryption, and how that needed to be upgraded to versions where it was fixed. Vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: GnuPG - signed Telefax communication
On 1/14/2022 at 11:46 AM, "Стефан Васильев via Gnupg-users" wrote:Hi all, If people have a modern Telefax machine, have you ever tried out to send a GnuPG signed Fax? = You can simply armor sign the message. Don't bother with the 'begin' and 'end' part, it can be added on the receiving end. OCR it into telefax and send. I have never done this, and the few times I have tried similar things, the OCR always made mistakes. Anyone used an OCR program that reliably could get a page of gnupg block ciphertext Without mistakes ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Install gnupg on Linux machine ( For gpg encryption & decryption )
On 1/4/2022 at 7:23 AM, "Rayapati Rama Rao (NCS)" wrote Could you please let me know which gnupg software to download for Linux machine to make use of gpg encryption & decryption. Also, may I know if any packages required to install on Linux prior to gnupg installation. If possible could you please provide me the steps to install gnupg on Linux machine. = Here is the Gnupg site for Gnupg downloads. The Linux links are listed below the ones for Windows and Mac. https://gnupg.org/download/index.html Once gnupg 2.2.33 is installed on your Linux system, you can download Kleopatra as an easy gui front end. https://www.openpgp.org/software/kleopatra/ If you do not especially need the Linux version you are using, I would highly recommend the Ubuntu 20.x LTS (long term support). It already has Gnupg installed by default when you download the .iso https://ubuntu.com/download#download All the Best Vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Detaching signature from signed object
On 6/20/2021 at 2:13 PM, "Matthew Richardson via Gnupg-users" wrote:Is there any way in GnuPG to detach (or extract) a signature from a signed object? For example, a signed object is created with:- >gpg --armor --output signedfile.asc --sign inputfile.txt where what is wanted is a detached signature which would verify against inputfile.txt. This feature is in PGP 2:- >pgp -sa inputfile.txt -o signedfile.asc >pgp -b signedfile.asc -o verified.txt which also produces verified.pgp as the detached signature. The feature is described (briefly) in the PGP 2 documentation thus:- >To detach a signature certificate from a signed message: > pgp -b ciphertextfile = Don't know how to do this in GnuPG. Cannot be done in the PGP commandlines later than 2.x with the -b command. Using the -b command in later PGP commandline versions, just decrypts, but does not save the signature. There is a program that can do this for DH keys, using the -b command but only when encrypted with AES or 3DES: Filecrypt https://m.majorgeeks.com/files/details/filecrypt.html (n.b I have NOT used 'this' version, but I did use the original Filecrypt when it first came out , to successfully use the -b command): https://www.angelfire.com/pr/pgpf/fcs.html The developer of Filecrypt is accessible in a link when downloading the Filecrypt on the majorgeeks site mentioned above. You might consider discussing a version of Filecrypt with him for your detached signature use. vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
[no subject]
On 5/4/2021 at 1:19 PM, "Ingo Klöcker" wrote:I'd always use full disk encryption ideally with the key stored on a USB token. Otherwise, with a very good passphrase. And, after use, wipe the disk and destroy the token. Modern enterprise-level SSDs also have secure erase, but, of course, you'd have to trust the hardware manufacturer to implement it properly without any backdoors which you probably don't want to do in the above scenario. = Or, for the really paranoid ;-)you can have random data on a read-only mini cdrom,and use it as an OTP, and throw it into a garbage incinerator afterwards. But really, if anyone is up against adversaries where this is necessary,this methods may ultimately not help. These adversaries are not known for their honor and fair play ... vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: How would you do that ...
Or, for the really paranoid ;-)you can have random data on a read-only mini cdrom,and use it as an OTP, and throw it into a garbage incinerator afterwards. If you are up against adversaries where this is necessary,this methods may ultimately not help ... = On 5/4/2021 at 1:19 PM, "Ingo Klöcker" wrote:On Dienstag, 4. Mai 2021 18:47:50 CEST Robert J. Hansen via Gnupg-users wrote: > For modern SSDs I generally recommend a single pass with random data: > > dd if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/foo bs=1M > > (Don't forget the blocksize [bs] parameter; it can improve speed > significantly.) > > This is enough to foil the vast majority of forensic analysis. Yes, > yes, SSDs have remapping capabilities which means certain memory cells > won't get hit even if you do this, and it's theoretically possible for a > good forensics nerd to do all kinds of wild magic to pull off data you > didn't even know was there... but that kind of very high-level forensics > nerdery costs a lot of money, and few people are worth that kind of > investment. I'd always use full disk encryption ideally with the key stored on a USB token. Otherwise, with a very good passphrase. And, after use, wipe the disk and destroy the token. Modern enterprise-level SSDs also have secure erase, but, of course, you'd have to trust the hardware manufacturer to implement it properly without any backdoors which you probably don't want to do in the above scenario. Regards, Ingo___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: question - Gnupg compatibility with Symantec
On 3/9/2021 at 4:46 AM, "Margaret via Gnupg-users Call" wrote: We would like to migrate our Symantec PGP to GNU PGP. We tested the system last week with new PGP users and a user that migrated to GNU from Symantec. We have fixed all bugs except one: Our legacy Symantec users (who have not yet transferred over to GNU) are unable to decrypt/read GNU PGP emails. = What type of key, and what encryption algorithm do your Symantec users have? What error messages do you get? ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
re: How can I add encrypted comments
vedaal at nym.hush.com vedaal at nym.hush.comwrote on Thu Jan 14 19:37:37 CET 2021: >but functionally, yes, it can be done.- my mistake. Can't really be done this way :-((= >[1] Armor the signature file ( gpg --armor filename.sig ) -should be enarmor instead of armor :-( this outputs to filename.sig.asc [2[ Armor your encrypted comments, and copy them to the end of thefilename.sig.asc, (leave one blank line between the pgp footer of the signature file,and the pgp header of the encrypted file) [3] Save the whole thing as filename.sig.asc [4] gpg filename.sig,asc will automatically verify the sig if theoriginal signed file 'filename' is present, and also decrypt the addedcomments-It doesn't.It gives weird error messages.sorry ;-( vedaal___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: How can I add encrypted comments.
On 1/14/2021 at 4:47 AM, "Ayoub Misherghi via Gnupg-users" wrote:
body p { margin-bottom:0; margin-top:0; }
I am encrypting and signing documents with myself as the
receiver. Nobody else will want to look inside them. Is it
possible to add encrypted comments or other information to a
separated signature file; and later retrieve this additional
information? I want to be able to decrypt the signature file alone
and retrieve all the information I put inside it.
=
Not exactly,
but functionally, yes, it can be done.
[1] Armor the signature file( gpg --armor filename.sig )
this outputs to filename.sig.asc
[2[ Armor your encrypted comments, and copy them to the end of the
filename.sig.asc,
(leave one blank line between the pgp footer of the signature file,
and the pgp header of the encrypted file)
[3] Save the whole thing as filename.sig.asc
[4] gpg filename.sig,asc will automatically verify the sig if the
original signed file 'filename' is present, and also decrypt the added
comments
vedaal___
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Re: Password Decript GPG public key
On 8/25/2020 at 3:21 PM, "Stefan Claas" wrote: >Maybe he could try to use a secret key without a passphrase and >give then the secret key personally to his friend? = And just have the ascii armored text of the secret key as the passphrase for the symmetrically encrypted text? There still needs to be a way to 'enter' it as the 'passphrase'. If the OP doesn't mind saving it in a file-decsriptor way, that would work, but it would work the same as the secret key had a passphrase, or even if it was an unpublished public key. vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Password Decript GPG public key
On 8/24/2020 at 8:36 AM, "Guille De La Torre via Gnupg-users" wrote: > is it possible to create a key for symmetric encryption >in such a way that the person who has my public key does not need >to enter a password? to decrypt. = No. and Yes.8^) It is not possible that the person does not have to enter 'anything' to decrypt. But is it possible for you both to have a secret symmetric passphrase you share by sending your public key, if you create a public key, and don't post it anywhere or encrypt or sign anything with it, and send that public key, encrypted, to the intended receiver's public key. Now, use the key name and long fingerprint as the password for the symmetric encryption. Example: Here is a key created for this purpose: -BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK- Version: GnuPG v2 Comment: Acts of Kindness better the World, and protect the Soul mQENBF9EEJEBCADKJIFeU4YaiZOp6tgbOMCp2ax12btTYDBqbnoveqTTwIrHZurX 1Gm2fU0X/c1WqyDbg7F5Kv9vmkn+2NGRD+AOpU6B1SiZny07ZNtgIps10zXIGI3A vgR+77HfhbZE46AK8BYuHriW0OpHmFdK11Zl3uRROA1bgPpmEGNT5dm9UzpQ+xSN 0d6O33pYisHd4E5S+uiroY08cU/i2LV0Q1YPoErtmP6OIkCvMvOWUpy3iEI+szwV db8mm0Cj4c28mYAL3qsJfKc7P8JEufjiAXmYIIsku60fmHEA0RuQtIb1zW/CGAVg 7de5rWR4fit+uyOQwW68BbvYK8VBZgOGP1MlABEBAAG0S214dHpwaHUua2xlbWF1 aiAobm9uLXB1YmxpY2l6ZWQga2V5KSA8bXh0enBodS5rbGVtYXVqQHF3ZWppZG5h bGxkaW9weHoud2RiPokBOQQTAQgAIwUCX0QQkQIbDwcLCQgHAwIBBhUIAgkKCwQW AgMBAh4BAheAAAoJECX/By3f019dnFMIAICCRK3YF3iDkXfcDYLV8+Kq+94BrZfx Bwjn9n+vgldTTtkHP+0AHvQ1QAYVRWH/gPJR7D9bU/oc3A2lWXQzt/wwR1WOogFC 1rDKJtSgPkjpeirEauoXQLiTOUCtNcM2w2Zn8yK9lAvOfdQoaH+RxN8AASYU7QUt 3CtJ7EQpA/dSRkDt5NHVVrhXcih6oCZuGyOoAldT1GB+Tz4BGDhveygWlcR6/e9o kcw6lgwgrPvfjXekQsQ2LeeO+UGcG1ITjjaBPRH6gA1Nlq/wCS/Nj98xoCzCyLab pzUcGdzOz8ScgHY11CfAR7CAlCNzcfOe1J8e3qQogXXgVtJiCB2Jav4= =tAGm -END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK- Importing the key gives the following information: User-ID: mxtzphu.klemauj (non-publicized key) Validity: from 2020-08-24 15:10 until forever Certificate type: 2,048-bit RSA Certificate usage: Signing EMails and Files, Encrypting EMails and Files, Certifying other Certificates Key-ID: DFD35F5D Fingerprint: 9D7ECA9BEDF40F804EB26A3C25FF072DDFD35F5D The user id and email address were done by typing semi-randomly at the keyboard. Now use the userid and the long fingerprint as the passphrase for your symmetric encryption: mxtzphu.klemauj@qwejidnalldiopxz.wdb9D7ECA9BEDF40F804EB26A3C25FF072DDFD35F5D Only you and the person you send this key to, will be able to decrypt your symmetrically encrypted messages. vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: In case you use OpenPGP on a smartphone ...
On 8/15/2020 at 1:02 PM, "Stefan Claas" wrote: >Ok, worked! :-) SHA256 hashes matched from both devices. = Great to hear! - >Only thing I have to do is purchasing an sd memory card, because >the regular memory is to low. = If you can afford it, there are 1 TB microsd cards available: https://www.amazon.com/SanDisk-Extreme-microSDXC-Memory-Adapter/dp/B07P9W5HJV/ref=sr_1_2?crid=LIUTHCJU5JEA=1=1tb+sandisk+micro+sd+card=1597692282=1+tb+sandisk%2Caps%2C507=8-2: I have the 1tb sandisk microsd for the phone (my smartphone is a sony xperia z2 premium. I'm in love with the camera and optics, and watch all my videos and amazon prime on the phone). Point is, official specs says it only accommodates a 250 gb microsd. This is not true. Even older galaxy androids that officially say accommodates a 64 gb card, also accommodated a sandisk 400 gb card. As long as there is a microsd slot, it accommodates any size. *BUT* The vast majority of 1 TB cards, are COUNTERFEIT, and don't ho;d more than a nominal minimal amount! Even the Kingston ones, unless you get them from Kingston itself, are very convincingly appearing fakes. I have been using sandisk since 64gb, then 128, then 400, and now 1 tb. and all of them worked, and got them all on Amazon. If you know from people who actually used them, of other brands on Amazon that are trustworthy, maybe you can get a good card for less. Even If you don't need more than 64gb, I would still recommend a Sandisk newer 64gb card, because of the much faster transfer rates. vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: In case you use OpenPGP on a smartphone ...
On 8/11/2020 at 3:00 PM, "Stefan Claas" wrote: ... >As understood a Pegasus operator can do what ever >he likes to do remotely, anonymously with our (Android/iOS) >smartphone, without that we know that this happens. ... >in form of a best practice FAQ (cross-platform), to no longer use >encryption software on online devices and work out >strategies to use offline devices and how to handle this data >securely over to an online device, until proper and affordable >hardware encryption devices for online usage are available? = There is already a simple existing solution. [1] Encrypt and decrypt on a computer that has internet hardware disabled. [2] Use an Orbic Journey V phone that gets and sends *only text* [3] Use a microsd expansion card on the orbis phone [4] set up the phone to save encrypted texts on the microsd 'storage' card [5] Take out the microsd card and use a card reader in the computer in [1] transfer text only (encrypted or decrypted) Any file can be sent as encrypted text by using the armor option -a on the GnuPG command line. (this includes audio, video .jpg, .png, pdf, etc.literally any and all possible file types.) Even if the Orbic uses the *unknown* system, if your are encrypting and decrypting on a separate air-gapped computer, and transferring only text to a microsd, it is hard to see how it can be compromised. (Yes *Anything* can happen, but without evidence, there is no end to paranoia) It is not the place of the FAQ to solve the transmission issues of an already perfectly formed GnuPG encrypted .asc file. The manual and/or FAQ, tells how to use GnuPG to encrypt or decrypt the file, and armor it. The rest is up to the User's threat model. (btw, There is, [afaik], no protection available in GnuPG against a Clairvoyancy attack vector on an encrypted file even in an air-gapped computer, and there is a rumour that any Witch or Wizard can instantly behold the plaintext of an encrypted message by flicking a wand at it, and using the simple charm 'Revelato') but not really in my threat model 8^ vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: "encrypted with 1 passphrase"
>On 2020-07-29 at 10:20 -0700, Ayoub Misherghi via Gnupg-users >wrote: >> A gpg says "encrypted with 1 passphrase". Are there situations >where a message gets encrypted with multiple passphrases? = Not exactly, but there are situations where GnuPG can simultaneously encrypt conventionally with a passphrase, and also to a Public Key Here is an example: -BEGIN PGP MESSAGE- Version: GnuPG v2 Comment: Acts of Kindness better the World, and protect the Soul hQEMA5lOTrVn/hzPAQgAmsVwn1/R2/skDhGgd//8s6z1waPM6DhD9tVMOKct+Ex+ NRireZFucQ3pcv2fmt51vnpPDyJzhY4EALrClRGBj2z5wflLszKxVaNd+WQ5VNJa 7utTQv56MlIt41crsfb7gHvMZ38Z/rnAIEhiP5IFRbzAMarod3kKRugHvqKA/M2f xiZWux96oV25U5x32SAamlHc3YuZCSyg2OXEafIQKiVI1fD8fJcAmmIRr5/0Etg2 dxmm5o1q1aAYLvAuLLmn/ORQbNHdNpz/WmViNORMrSKq64yWKGRmj51eNm0wZyFD FjrpTu5gnyaoO9rMeLAIalTbGgzxnmeq71K7l1ye4YUCDANQb0+h01+xhgEP/0pb Gga2DA7JGmaTqS6ZcY35VBQZwx94KaFb/qGlWfgd8aE/zrjVTaAXyeUTlqBec/oL 1QgyGpaYf98NxGpjTsjBu1H6sPWmDm2lDI8uyvKKDUS5s/Gotjfl5pFiPVdO3CJh 72fwMkeUIRD1CCak12bqXcaWIus/iufLL69xRdPpRqM5nf8BhQRbTj340mjHXpiB PEDIUXNNGzp3F760AKpvDC1ah9+24O3cd94OpvGg7gFC8pfLU/iMm5iblrQacv5P nl5rFOlhE1LDRVvxqH8m8116VfwPPwx2LkEYhP2fd/DLwKSdBexl0jQjeYOU69Qc plqPPsZlW3MWjKlRmtoJoAWeBAKNs/ylGIsXMkRQ7qFzY+LY3zVdoFgv5RFlWpfY PYTyXlEIC4BSUC9nVx9vp7XpOYRLnHJgNA8tNxAfjSl5fnNNUVnsRbwMR2+1rJPG Y65sGRp9yGxNGgkxO7hZ71E1psDTKYPkvfrSwDYF+iizEMhOM2ll7HX8xMnQJnF3 +y6D0re9iv9diV1hRLKjft+nH4bZzzNmaMFyw26TxD2Zz/bPP5pAPCQW9U8Wu+3M M7tlRWRhW0DdNyeLmK3wk71i2no162KXj87Kfsw4iiYBmquBIw6I4uBbbsevMnm2 wNV5ZLVTiEybjfGvoq57ZEB+x/e6HctzYGABuuI3jC4ECgMCJQ1I/TKsbGW3ZBkw juvoB83Id9tgMXKVzDdje3X0c7lPvBq2uae7JtSh0koBfo2JzxOC0IDQwjWDRxHS XlxwPsQr7KbGFZ66vCaOXmm4PJmywIYgbJ8M1F+Ih38pYvurg9qKP3OqyXGd+6iR ui1Ika1iTnmSVg== =H/WI -END PGP MESSAGE- This was encrypted simultaneously conventionally, and to a test key 1, and, (by default, also to my default key). The command used to encrypt is: gpg -a -c -e -r 1 c:\h\jadeT1.txt this produces the encrypted file jadeT.txt.asc (listed at the beginning). The passphrase is sss Here is the keypair of the public key 1 that the message was simultaneously encrypted to, (an RSA V4 key, but generated many years ago in GnuPG 1.x): -BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK- Version: GnuPG v1 Comment: Acts of Kindness better the World, and protect the Soul mQELBEOPW7oBCADMJ6daQ9QuZ/W2USGoFHB+PQnQgTIaZZYq4HJHN/j5FO8oc1kP AiLoikQIlQYtCIqTVeVUsDVgwl3s8emyrmRVjMgYSSeShUKee4Mk4dAL8wL4sp/r WIYmYtm3rHKMgCcpdMgA02vZeKC9zKQ5tZFz3rLoRAxswEm+OQ2F5U0E11ZjG6/w ADji4cvorV4VVD7PQolMXhSlx6wLkVf6XY6+8LCmpoXNTdk33pZkSqq6ygWSB8VK zee9QKxi6nLPFaqKjGo/I6oELWm2mO+5Bz1RPhGeNTTQ9thqJtpyP3EDKbnhzN8o VQlPgfmEOB/s6Qv9j+2nCfXwTPdsQdUSWmU1AAYptBZkZGRkMSA8ZGRkZDFAa2V5 LnRlc3Q+iQE3BBMBAgAhBQJDj1u6AhsPBwsJCAcDAgEEFQIIAwQWAgMBAh4BAheA AAoJEJlOTrVn/hzPmdwH/2htj5z0Xdr5Ad4NoDqPD5/twgXIakcrKOETL5Zy9iM5 CYQ2lbY2QCskKlW8eAoPxrfVhOMG64DOIdp0CBUJAp2jyKXmzMWIGjuIe/JmM2pY IakX+9z3xoAC5JrvyHOg2MIjjAzxwmvey+hMSnnJjfMvrxhGoSHSkIkHiQOb1vZE zP58t/I+5oDvRgOBeD9Cs/RDUh/joae+UeyrPcYFhQuN0Xcy0hcxDuBY5NLSNo5U ChnZmS8haWxj9DHFNm/lVgzgV6sTE6SutxLKkrfRuLpV6fZm9I8NfVoWLrnBy2h0 ZquL/EQzNMrJBga2ipvygqGUK1+hxCalUjAeuB0qITc= =9vYT -END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK- -BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK- Version: GnuPG v1 Passphrase 1 lQO8BEOPW7oBCADMJ6daQ9QuZ/W2USGoFHB+PQnQgTIaZZYq4HJHN/j5FO8oc1kP AiLoikQIlQYtCIqTVeVUsDVgwl3s8emyrmRVjMgYSSeShUKee4Mk4dAL8wL4sp/r WIYmYtm3rHKMgCcpdMgA02vZeKC9zKQ5tZFz3rLoRAxswEm+OQ2F5U0E11ZjG6/w ADji4cvorV4VVD7PQolMXhSlx6wLkVf6XY6+8LCmpoXNTdk33pZkSqq6ygWSB8VK zee9QKxi6nLPFaqKjGo/I6oELWm2mO+5Bz1RPhGeNTTQ9thqJtpyP3EDKbnhzN8o VQlPgfmEOB/s6Qv9j+2nCfXwTPdsQdUSWmU1AAYp/gIDCMeKeWtpj0YtYMTP1J/w XA5svaM25IOJTMp8kT7pAgucyiAjv6h7aK6dEl2PlnQJYNbNEZe91Yfh+0Tl3Vg9 tSj9q7KQLpFPCRdMjG8KHCPl6AZbvFZfiDB6i5cOpsCTyDn5+E/mh89hByQd0Yrm Sw0+A0cwRabZbuMOFtqNfAAq5Vx0gNJcrYhWXxbtq32LgBcUlo402v2yWrpnmxV/ luVnhLops+hQ5bLNVxbaL/sC0MwcAl8g5zB5HczxSbAZ706WroA3HjYTcMR2R2AW 7w9SRWB4t9DAFXbTp9EUMhZPDl6KdhXcLmCC8gC4NWp6A+SbL93ZwJpallfgMZN3 myI8AJT5ieRaCxfqAsybOIXYpR5eqy9ps9T6oJbxTcxvlwx6q3h1eTBFVMa5PBbP mN67KycVwq2aLwor0lHXT+ncMGuRL04yGshLpYvoD2q7PkdHuvA5MeJz9RA/M87r kdMLLGGdM3ujBmhvfKxK56BDD58dnEX9o5kj0ialI6FDthc9wAAxw0JBMjzA1C9d UORBbBsErAzGMHM3BeRYjwwEioUnl8xF7jWE+tRalOQGbYYfFniCWzwV60zr7Z+Z P6Fw0CzRLOrtkC4d+DRvumVWsLXQ0P2czJTpzTSdl1pEVoLlX5b2rKRqpIxT78uc v7M31hRf04lbu55s0l4cB0T3GM+EsMaVk/CvyNjIa9ok4fEUcgzLxU4wHfrrPGz0 HWEoOUqiVrd233O572zqWxI7Sbzt6deoPvKO9uNHHRHS7SMD0iQpXBthpO/HR8Vk 7fgl21JozTg3GLRYKmxzS5VpvZoM3225jn4ecNNWPwMYPwt3G8iiF1asVt0vrWIW wtelXYMbV/8mPmMDzObXgmKaq2ueBt4qDTXy5lk9QEh829gIqqNQnLAc7YLKkDS0 FmRkZGQxIDxkZGRkMUBrZXkudGVzdD6JATcEEwECACEFAkOPW7oCGw8HCwkIBwMC AQQVAggDBBYCAwECHgECF4AACgkQmU5OtWf+HM+Z3Af/aG2PnPRd2vkB3g2gOo8P n+3CBchqRyso4RMvlnL2IzkJhDaVtjZAKyQqVbx4Cg/Gt9WE4wbrgM4h2nQIFQkC naPIpebMxYgaO4h78mYzalghqRf73PfGgALkmu/Ic6DYwiOMDPHCa97L6ExKecmN 8y+vGEahIdKQiQeJA5vW9kTM/ny38j7mgO9GA4F4P0Kz9ENSH+Ohp75R7Ks9xgWF C43RdzLSFzEO4Fjk0tI2jlQKGdmZLyFpbGP0McU2b+VWDOBXqxMTpK63EsqSt9G4
Re: Traveling without a secret key
On 7/8/2020 at 3:49 PM, "Juergen Bruckner via Gnupg-users" wrote: >Basically, it has to be said that you should definitely have a >backup of your key. And you have to be very careful with your SC or tokens. >In principle it is almost the same as losing your credit card or >passport etc. while traveling; you have to provide alternatives >(e.g. >multiple smartcards). = There is an alternative travel approach that works for me: [1] No real keyring on my laptop, (just a dummy one to be able to use GnuPG 2.x on the laptop) [2] Bootable 1 tb usb,(same size as ordinary usb drive), which has bootable ubuntu OS on it, with the keyrings in a Veracrypt container after Ubuntu loads. (Ubuntu allows for the entire bootable drive to be encrypted, doesn't need yubi, or other programs. It can make the usb drive bootable using ubuntu OS installation options). Laptop can be used for everything not requiring a secret key. In event that a secret key needs to be used, (decrypt, sign, authenticate, etc), the laptop can be booted from the usb drive. Also, have a backup of the keyring in a Veracrypt container that easily fits on an microSD card on any android phone with microSD slots. vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: decrypt aes256 encrypted file without gpg-agent
On 6/29/2020 at 12:40 PM, "Fourhundred Thecat" <400the...@gmx.ch> wrote: >I don't have gpg-agent installed, on this particular server, where >I >need to decrypt one file. = Try this very long workaround : [1] Install a fake homedirectory [2] Install a fake keyring (1 public and secret key that you never use) Then try this command: gpg --agent-program --no-use-agent --passphrase yourpassphrasestring --decrypt filename This is a way of making the --no-use-agent option active. GnuPG still needs a homedirectory and a keyring before trying to use the passphrase to decrypt (n.b. I have not actually tried the above, so am unsure if it is effective) otherwise , just use GnuPG 1.4.x , and unless you ever need an elliptic key, it should do everything you want. vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: decrypt aes256 encrypted file without gpg-agent
On 6/26/2020 at 4:54 AM, "Fourhundred Thecat" <400the...@gmx.ch> wrote: > >Hello, > >I have file encrypted with symmetric cipher (aes256) and not >signed. > >How can I decrypt it without using gpg agent ? > >I get these errors: > >$ gpg -d file.gpg >gpg: failed to start gpg agent >... >gpg: decryption failed: no secret key = Also can't get it without using agent. Tried using option of --no-use-agent and gpg2 says 'obsolete option, has no effect'. The option of --no-default-keyring doesn't help if the home directory is not open. Agent will not start unless home directory is open ( my home directory is in an encrypted container) Once the home directory is there (when I unencrypted mine), agent starts, and a pinentry window opens asking for the symmetric passphrase, When I unencrypt the home directory, but not the keyring, gpg will still decrypt when using the option of --no-default-keyring (feature request: can GPG2 be made to work from only the command-line without a pine entry window, and without gpg-agent?) TIA vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Fwd: The GnuPR FAQ
Robert J. Hansen rjh at sixdemonbag.org wrote on Tue May 12 16:41:09 CEST 2020: >You can get by just fine in most everyday English with a vocabulary of >5,000 words. Stick to those words and you'll have an easy-to-remember >passphrase. = That's absolutely correct, Horse! Battery Staple https://xkcd.com/936/ 8^) vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Fwd: The GnuPR FAQ
On 5/11/2020 at 6:15 PM, "Robert J. Hansen" wrote: > >This arrived in my inbox: I'm presenting it here without comment. >My >response will be following in a moment. > > > Forwarded Message >Subject: The GnuPR FAQ >Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 14:19:07 -0600 >From: James Long >To:r...@sixdemonbag.org - >You've advised people to use a HORRIBLE practice of using >dictionary words solely for their password. I tested this theory myself back >in the day, so I can 100% guaranty you of this fact: A brute force >dictionary based attack can crack a password like that in LESS THAN 5 >minutes!! = How many words were in your passphrase?? Here is some data on the Diceware list: https://theworld.com/~reinhold/diceware.html The Diceware list has only 7776 words. A complete dictionary has almost 2 orders of magnitude more. "Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged, together with its 1993 Addenda Section, includes some 470,000 entries. The Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition, reports that it includes a similar number." https://www.merriam-webster.com/help/faq-how-many-english-words 10 diceware words provides a greater Brute Force space, than 2^128 (a gnupg session key for older defaults of CAST-5) ( 7776^10 = 8.08x10^382^128 = 3.40×10^38 ) 20 Diceware words provides a greater Brute Force space, than 2^256 ( 7776^20 = 6.53×10^77 2^256 =1.157×10^77 ) Even using only English words greater than 5 letters and unrelated to each other, an extremely low-bound estimate, would be 77760 words. (in reality, far greater, but let's use an example people would agree on). So using 8 words chosen semi-randomly from a dictionary, 77760^8 = 1.336×10³⁹, still greater than a a 2^128 Brute Force Space. So, not only is is NOT *horrible* advice, it should be enough for anyone's threat model. vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Proposal - variable line width for ASCII armor output
On 2/26/2020 at 2:03 PM, "Michał Górny" wrote: > >Why 'change it back'? Unless I'm mistaken, GPG shouldn't have any >real >problem with a different base64 width, as long as the overall >layout is >preserved. I've just did a quick test and GPG is entirely happy >with >the result after rewrapping at 50 chars, as well as after cheap >rewrapping with uneven lines. Yes, but not if the header, footer, comment line, or checksum are altered. If a comment line is wrapped, and the new line does not begin with a ':' Example: This should verify: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 just a test -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2 Comment: Acts of Kindness better the World, and protect the Soul iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJeVsTLAAoJEFBvT6HTX7GGNRIP/1Wf7wnKYc8EF6iff3ZT6x6h TI/ipE5X5jvQNo+rhsQm2AMQXHfTY7o9gYVFqkpy2XC3mTcKi/kKeFqRr6gHjPZS DcDhsLlMEMWix/QGx8v8JAARjoaHSoXMIegOjhkjAJs07nz16EbfhIoN9AnKUcap e4/KqzpVjAjT/Q1kToV8x2gllLBtAnwp/aOG0PAYEFkgOv7RwAKpNblI5+X1skCx 1c00i5J0hyXTmIe2vp2fPJzkyuIqhAkb9IG37rH0Rm1uTq/yIeYEuw16U5OBQABy JIiBVQQDdClPuAKHKZElT/TfRsfXgDpkj5NTV3AREJGESwrQeqrGdkwU8454pivB Ukhso5KQ3iseds/qmUSMsb4G8lJ+qu1Hri1GlRGurGcjhwIeQ8TQQ2BfQ8pbVHIZ UTCOIcqIpHbgAVzRVa/UsUFiqiCkPkS3sHIF1lz5tLbnoC0E1p6e2uA2mlXtvNNt HaXPFll+Xk7U1/OuNjnFFyjUs30yDpxLT4O+46I/hioH7zGisTFjJO1iEuSO0RqO QZ3jsyjjBEhIOC9Aiko9FMhXa6MvCqIembcFQUm2v0XoZSl6PBvtBJDmVmGvLt1P GvSmaHRbRCZaiYk/KmV3d7axJQHXmt2CyFIJvw28yFh85PrGnZN6F/0TZmwZSEKh fGTZanDrJYrys3425Fd4 =/Rbe -END PGP SIGNATURE- This, with the comment line wrapped, will not: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 just a test -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2 Comment: Acts of Kindness better the World, and protect the Soul iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJeVsTLAAoJEFBvT6HTX7GGNRIP/1Wf7wnKYc8EF6iff3ZT6x6h TI/ipE5X5jvQNo+rhsQm2AMQXHfTY7o9gYVFqkpy2XC3mTcKi/kKeFqRr6gHjPZS DcDhsLlMEMWix/QGx8v8JAARjoaHSoXMIegOjhkjAJs07nz16EbfhIoN9AnKUcap e4/KqzpVjAjT/Q1kToV8x2gllLBtAnwp/aOG0PAYEFkgOv7RwAKpNblI5+X1skCx 1c00i5J0hyXTmIe2vp2fPJzkyuIqhAkb9IG37rH0Rm1uTq/yIeYEuw16U5OBQABy JIiBVQQDdClPuAKHKZElT/TfRsfXgDpkj5NTV3AREJGESwrQeqrGdkwU8454pivB Ukhso5KQ3iseds/qmUSMsb4G8lJ+qu1Hri1GlRGurGcjhwIeQ8TQQ2BfQ8pbVHIZ UTCOIcqIpHbgAVzRVa/UsUFiqiCkPkS3sHIF1lz5tLbnoC0E1p6e2uA2mlXtvNNt HaXPFll+Xk7U1/OuNjnFFyjUs30yDpxLT4O+46I/hioH7zGisTFjJO1iEuSO0RqO QZ3jsyjjBEhIOC9Aiko9FMhXa6MvCqIembcFQUm2v0XoZSl6PBvtBJDmVmGvLt1P GvSmaHRbRCZaiYk/KmV3d7axJQHXmt2CyFIJvw28yFh85PrGnZN6F/0TZmwZSEKh fGTZanDrJYrys3425Fd4 =/Rbe -END PGP SIGNATURE- And, this will verify, but needs the gpg.conf line of ignore-mdc-error ignore-crc-error -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 just a test -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2 Comment: Acts of Kindness better the World, and protect the Soul iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJeVsTLAAoJEFBvT6HTX7GGNRIP/1Wf7wnKYc8EF6iff3ZT6x6h TI/ipE5X5jvQNo+rhsQm2AMQXHfTY7o9gYVFqkpy2XC3mTcKi/kKeFqRr6gHjPZS DcDhsLlMEMWix/QGx8v8JAARjoaHSoXMIegOjhkjAJs07nz16EbfhIoN9AnKUcap e4/KqzpVjAjT/Q1kToV8x2gllLBtAnwp/aOG0PAYEFkgOv7RwAKpNblI5+X1skCx 1c00i5J0hyXTmIe2vp2fPJzkyuIqhAkb9IG37rH0Rm1uTq/yIeYEuw16U5OBQABy JIiBVQQDdClPuAKHKZElT/TfRsfXgDpkj5NTV3AREJGESwrQeqrGdkwU8454pivB Ukhso5KQ3iseds/qmUSMsb4G8lJ+qu1Hri1GlRGurGcjhwIeQ8TQQ2BfQ8pbVHIZ UTCOIcqIpHbgAVzRVa/UsUFiqiCkPkS3sHIF1lz5tLbnoC0E1p6e2uA2mlXtvNNt HaXPFll+Xk7U1/OuNjnFFyjUs30yDpxLT4O+46I/hioH7zGisTFjJO1iEuSO0RqO QZ3jsyjjBEhIOC9Aiko9FMhXa6MvCqIembcFQUm2v0XoZSl6PBvtBJDmVmGvLt1P GvSmaHRbRCZaiYk/KmV3d7axJQHXmt2CyFIJvw28yFh85PrGnZN6F/0TZmwZSEKh fGTZanDrJYrys3425Fd4=/Rbe-END PGP SIGNATURE- vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Proposal - variable line width for ASCII armor output
On 2/26/2020 at 11:27 AM, "Stefan Claas via Gnupg-users" wrote: >I like to make a proposal for future versions of GnuPG, >where a user can change the line witdh of ASCII armor >output. = It would not be compatible with older versions. The simplest thing for you, (or any users who prefer the aesthetics of a particular custom line width), would be to first make the GnuPG ascii armored message, then change it as you want to and copy, paste, and post, with a little note of how to change it back for verification. (fwiw, in my own experience, even the GnuPG clearsigned messages with it''s header and footer, are somewhat 'resented' in any non-crypto group, and often don't verify anyway because of minor alterations by the media posting) vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Maybe a good date to create a new key pair ...
On 2/3/2020 at 4:48 PM, "Stefan Claas via Gnupg-users" wrote:Mark wrote: > I know the palindrome day was yesterday (although the article missed > several others in the 21st century). I am curious on how you were able > to create a key with a certain fingerprint. I used the (Windows) program scallion, from GitHub, with the following parameters: scallion --gpg -k 2048 02022020 That's all and it took less than five seconds to generate the private key. :-) That way you can also create keys with your birthday or deadbeef etc. After key generation you have to import the private key into GnuPG with '--allow-non-selfsigned-uid' to add a proper UID and passphrase. = So, could you pipe in a script to create a fingerprint with the following form: n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6 n7 n8 n9 n10 n11 n12 n13 n14 n15 n16 n17 n18 n19 n20 n20 n19 n18 n17 n16 n15 n14 n13 n12 n11 n10 n9 m8 n7 n6 n5 n4 n3 n2 n1 where each n is a character of (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0, A, B, C, D, E, F), and where each n is allowed to be repeated, as long as it is the same in its' corresponding mirror position, i.e., n1 can = n3 as long as it is present in the first, and third and thirty-eighth and fortieth position of the fingerprint). It might not be that simple, but it doesn't seem impossible, to create a Palindromic fingerprint, (and just reset your computer clock to 02/20/2020 at 02:20 am) 8^)) vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Maybe a good date to create a new key pair ...
On 2/2/2020 at 4:44 PM, "Stefan Claas via Gnupg-users" wrote:Since this day is so special (for me) I decided to do it again with a new (RSA) key. But this time with a 'proper' Fingerprint, to celebrate this day. :-) 0202 2020 D638 E78F 4DFE 737C 419F 025C 897D B2E6 = Maybe try generating new keys until you have a keypair of palindromic primes, or at least a palindromic fingerprint http://mathworld.wolfram.com/PalindromicPrime.html 8^)) vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Extraction of public key from an encrypted etc. message
On 11/15/2019 at 7:26 PM, "Steffen Nurpmeso" wrote:The public key _is_ in there, no? = No. Only the public Key ID is in there, not the entire public key, and and even this keyID can be hidden too, if the sender uses the option of --hidden-encrypt-to vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: gpg encrypt always creates a new encrypted file
On 10/28/2019 at 3:43 PM, "Phillip Susi" wrote:Anil Kumar Pippalapalli via Gnupg-users writes: > Hello, > I am trying to encrypt a file on my system using gpg —encrypt command but it > always creates a new encrypted file I want to overwrite the original file > instead so that I can only open it using passphrase. Is this possible. gpg -encrypt foo && mv foo.gpg foo = Alternatively, if you want no record of the plaintext written to a file at all, you can type it into the command line, and have only the encrypted output written: printf "whatever you write as plaintext" | gpg -a -e -r -o -filename.gpg | more (obviously not intended for big files, or non-text files, but occasionally a useful workaround if you aren't comfortable with your system's 'wipe' process.) vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: How to improve our GUIs (was: We have GOT TO make things simpler)
On 10/5/2019 at 12:58 PM, "Werner Koch via Gnupg-users" wrote: >I agree with you and, although I sometimes hack on GPA, I would >suggest >Kleopatra. On Windows Kleopatra and the Explorer plugin do >actually do >what you suggest and we LOTS of folks using Gpg4win. Be it for >plain >file encryption or for its Outlook plugin. ... >If you have concrete suggestions for Kleopatra, = Kleopatra already has an export keys menu. Right Click on any key, and a menu opens, with the options of 'Export Key' and then a separate option of "Export Secret Keys" and works on Ubuntu (and probably on other Linux flavors too, but have not tested them) vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: how to recover secret key passphrase?
On 8/20/2019 at 12:57 PM, "ilf" wrote: > My problem is getting a usable input for john >from the current the current private-keys-v1.d/ gpg-agent private key key >store format. = Try This: [1] Open a new terminal command prompt window [2] Type gpg -a --export-secret-key keyname The private key block should then appear in your terminal window. No passphrase is necessary unless you want to 'edit' the key. This works in both GnuPG 1.x and 2.x assuming that your keyrings are in your home directory. Don't use gpg-agent for this. vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: was Re: PGP Key Poisoner // now "Binding one person's subkey to another person's primary key"
On 8/13/2019 at 7:59 AM, "Kristian Fiskerstrand" wrote: >As you correctly point out its really not that relevant for >encryption >subkeys. It does have security implementations for signing >subkeys; see >[cross-certification section] for some details on that. > >References: >[cross-certification section] >https://gnupg.org/faq/subkey-cross-certify.html GnuPG has been requiring cross-certification for a very long time, which would mean that an attacker who attaches a person's listed subkey to a different masterkey, would still not be able to do anything with it, because the attacker can't make it cross-certify. Being simplistically naive here, How difficult would it be to get keyservers to agree that only the key owners can submit new signatures to their own keys? (i.e., The owner's detached signature of the public keyblock having the new signature, required together with any submitted key with a new signature.) A Denial-of Service attack will still always be possible against a keyserver, since it is easy for an attacker to generate a large volume of legitimate keys, with only a self-signature, and upload them to the keyserver, but at least then, no individual key by a real user, could be attacked. vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
was Re: PGP Key Poisoner // now "Binding one person's subkey to another person's primary key"
On 8/12/2019 at 7:28 AM, "Juergen Bruckner via Gnupg-users" wrote: >Am 11.08.19 um 23:47 schrieb Anonymous Remailer (austria): >> >> https://github.com/skeeto/pgp-poisoner = Here is a quote from the above site: =[ begin quoted material ]= As far as keyserver weaknesses go, key poisoning attacks are really just scratching the surface. For example, did you know other people can bind your subkeys to their primary key? =[ end quoted material ]= Can this really be done? (Does not matter so much to me personally, as I grew up with v3 keys, and even when using a V4 key, I don't generate a subkey, but allow all the functions (sign, encrypt. certify) to be done with the master key). Does matter a lot if I can't trust the subkey of someone whom I want to encrypt to. How real is this threat, and is it any threat at all, if simply binding the subkey to a different master key, won't allow for anyone else other than the 'real' owner, to decrypt messages encrypted to that subkey? TIA vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Essay on PGP as it is used today
On 7/22/2019 at 7:12 AM, "Robert J. Hansen" wrote: >Mathematicians have come up with different ways to estimate how >many >primes there were under a certain value ... >The first estimate for π(x) was "x divided by the natural >logarithm of x". ... >If we do that same equation for a 2048-bit key, it turns out there >are >10 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 >000 >000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 >000 000 >000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 >000 000 >000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 >000 000 >000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 >000 000 >000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 >000 000 >000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 >000 000 >000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 >000 000 >000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 >000 000 >000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 >000 000 >000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 >000 000 >000 000 000 000 000 000 000 different prime numbers that could go >into it. = not really, for GnuPG keys, but for the default size GnuPG key of 4096, it's actually bigger than the number you quoted above ;-) For a GnuPG key of 4096, it's only necessary to compute for primes up to 2^2048. But, Since GnuPG uses 2 primes only in the 2^2048 size, for a 4096 bit key, then the amount of primes is actually: [ (2^2048) / ln(2^2048) ] - [ (2^2047) / ln (2^2047) ] = 1.37 x 10^613 So, not to worry about someone creating a 'database' to crack GnuPG ... vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Ok this is a stupid questions
On 2/26/2019 at 3:28 PM, "Stefan Claas" wrote:And maybe another FOSS point? How about issuing Warrant Canaries? I have seen that VeraCrypt does this. = Yes. The latest one is here: https://www.idrix.fr/VeraCrypt/canary.txt Interesting, but it still boils down to *trust*. I would trust WK and the GnuPG team even if they didn't *sign* a Warrant Canary (i / we all, sort-of trust the verification of the new GnuPG releases, with his sig), And if we *don't trust*, then signing a Warrant Canary with the same signing key as the GnuPG release, wouldn't help ;-) vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: AW: Ok this is a stupid questions
On 2/26/2019 at 10:29 AM, "Stefan Claas" wrote:
Von: vedaal via Gnupg-users
Gesendet: Montag, 25. Februar 2019 22:09
An: justina colmena; gnupg-users@gnupg.org
Betreff: Re: Ok this is a stupid questions
Why do you think GnuPG is useless if you check the source-code, run
it on hardware you trust, and a Linux variant you trust, with a
Chromium/Iron browser, and avoid anything google or microsoft or apple
or any non-FOSS product?
I have learned in the past trust nobody. Therefore I would not rely
on people from the GnuPG ecosystem and what they say.
=
It depends on how realistic your threat model is.
For someone in a politically repressive regime who is being targeted,
yes, trust should be very limited, and clearly earned.
For those whose threat model is criminal hacking by individual
opportunists, there is a certain leeway.
When i first started out, I knew people who read every single line of
PGP 2.x sourcecode, and even today, refuse to migrate to gnupg because
they haven't the time to read all the code.
(Although some have considered that if there would be a minimalist
version, with a small enough code to read, they would definitely use
it.)
These people routinely 'airgap' their encrypting functions.
I respect it,
but there is literally no end to how paranoid one can be ...
For example, has anyone you know, ever checked how the compilers
work? (Reviewed gcc's source code, and the hardware necessary to make
it run, to ensure that nothing is 'added/subtracted/altered' when it
gets to machine language? Even more difficult when it is a proprietary
compiler.)
GnuPG is offering a FOSS privacy tool.
One can scrutinize it, appreciate it, and say thank you,
or be paranoid enough to never use it,
or some other in-between balance, that's comfortable for the
individual's threat model.
The gnupg-users list can help with clearing up technical questions
and let the users decide for themselves.
vedaal___
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Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
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Re: Ok this is a stupid questions
On 2/25/2019 at 2:29 PM, "justina colmena via Gnupg-users" wrote: That's why I have to call foul play on proprietary operating systems. Encryption is theoretical only: in practice useless, moot, crippled, broken, and terminally back-doored with all the malware, adware, spyware, worms, viruses, trojans, keyloggers, and screenscrapers inherent to such systems as Google Android, Microsoft Windows, and Apple OS. The Democrats will stop at nothing to keep it that way at all costs, and the Republicans just don't care. = Maybe *proprietary* encryption is theoretical only.What problems do you have with GnuPG as a FOSS program ? Ordinarily, I'm on the cautious, [maybe even borderline paranoid ;-) ] side of things, and I don't just trust things lightly. But I *DO* trust GnuPG, WK, and the host of other people who have put the time and effort into GnuPG, releasing the source code routinely so that it can be compiled by the end user on FOSS platforms (Linux, Ubuntu. etc.) You sound capable enough to review source-code, and use a Linux variant. Why do you think GnuPG is useless if you check the source-code, run it on hardware you trust, and a Linux variant you trust, with a Chromium/Iron browser, and avoid anything google or microsoft or apple or any non-FOSS product? If I misunderstand you, and your beef is not with GnuPG, only with Google, Android, MS, apple etc.then I apologize. That said, can i ask you to trim your posts from the political rants, much as they may be deserved. There are other forums ideally suited to that. Thanks. vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: [k9mail/k-9] Makes PGP sign-only mails very difficult (#2375)
On 2/5/2019 at 4:50 PM, "justina colmena via Gnupg-users" wrote:>THE DATE PROBLEM. Only the body of the email is signed, not the envelope headers, namely the subject and intended >recipients, and probably most importantly, the date. It would be nice to have an option to automatically include some of >these headers in the body of the signed message when composing a signed email message. >THE STRIPPING PROBLEM. Currently, each attachment is signed separately and independently by the PGP-MIME >standard. It would be preferable to digitally sign SHA hashes of the main message and all attachments in a single >additional attachment. This would leave an indication of any attachments that may have been "stripped" from the email >message, but without breaking the signatures of remaining attachments in such cases. = In this case, there is a simple workaround : [1] Put the subject, the intended recipients, and the date, in the introductory line(s) in the plaintext. [2] enarmor all the attachments, [ using the GnuPG --enarmor command (-a command in PGP) ], and paste the enarmored text into the body of the message, at the end of the message, right after a line saying; here are the following attachments :[3] Sign and encrypt the entire message composed of parts [1] and [2] and send it off this has the following 3 advantages: (a) no one knows what kind of attachments are being sent, or how many. (b) all the important data is in the Plaintext, where it belongs, and not vulnerable to MIMT attacks (c) backward compatibility in maintained, and no new standards have to be designed vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: pgp-phone (was Gnupg-users Digest, Vol 184, Issue 22)
On 2/1/2019 at 2:48 PM, "Stefan Claas" wrote:Maybe someone, in the future, can pick-up the idea of PGPfone and develop it further so that it can be used on Linux too or modern macOS. The old Windows version still runs fine, under Windows 7, for example. = Can be done on Ubuntu, or any Linux OS running Oracle Virtual Box with win 7, (and maybe on VB with old dos 6,2, but have not actually tried it on dos) vedaal___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: gpg - difference --encrypt-to and --recipient
On 1/3/2019 at 10:14 PM, "MFPA" wrote:> [3] only for the overly paranoid who revel in tedious > work-arounds 8^) : > (a) Encrypt to both yourself and the recipient > (b) Remove your own id packet from the ciphertext, > (c) Re-calculate the crc of the ciphertext > (d) Send the 'hacked' ciphertext along to the > original recipient > (e) Store the first ciphertext from (a) along with > the one from (d), in your sent folder > (f) now you will always be able to decrypt and > retrieve the original plaintext Would the ciphertext at (d) be much different than encrypting to the recipient and hidden-encrypt-to your own key? = Yes. The ciphertext in (d) would have no indication that it was being encrypted to anyone else. Using 'hidden-encrypt' to your own key, would show that it was encrypted to another key, but undetectable to whom. As a concrete difference, if you used the command: gpg --try-all-secrets on the file encrypted to the recipient and hidden-encrypt-to your own key, it would decrypt to your own key. Even from the ciphertext, it is detectable because it is 'longer' (i.e., has another key-packet). Try encrypting to only one recipient, and the encrypting the same plaintext to the same recipient, while also using hidden-encrypt to, and look at the difference in length. vedaal___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: gpg - difference --encrypt-to and --recipient
On 1/2/2019 at 3:59 PM, "justina colmena via Gnupg-users" wrote: >My opinion is that should be the case. However, most MUAs I've used >include the BCC recipients' keys in the encryption along with the To >and CC recipients' keys, so any email addresses in the user-IDs of >these keys are visible to all recipients. >As an exception, one MAU I used with an OpenPGP add-on would instead >send an individual copy of the message to each BCC recipient, >encrypted only to their key. >This seems like better practice. Also I would want to encrypt the transmitted email message only to the intended recipient, >and the copy stored in my "Sent" folder only to myself. >With hidden-recipient or hidden-encrypt-to or throw-keyids, it is >clear how many keys were encrypted to, but the key IDs and user-IDs >are not present. I am not terribly comfortable with this situation. It almost seems rather creepy to me to receive an encrypted message that is also encrypted for the benefit or verification of one or more unknown and unidentified third parties. I start suspecting things like a foreign government mandated key escrow or secret government backdoor on behalf of some foreign spy or law enforcement agency. = you have 3 tedious options, 1 more tedious than the other 8^) : [1] use default-recipient-self, and explain in an n.b. in your plaintext that you want to have a record of what you sent, but don't want to leave it in plaintext, and you will have an encrypted copy in your sent box openable by you (this is very common). [2] encrypt only to the sender, but also encrypt the plaintext only to you, and store the encrypted file in your sent or other convenient folder, with the date and the recipient. [3] only for the overly paranoid who revel in tedious work-arounds 8^) : (a) Encrypt to both yourself and the recipient (b) Remove your own id packet from the ciphertext, (c) Re-calculate the crc of the ciphertext (d) Send the 'hacked' ciphertext along to the original recipient (e) Store the first ciphertext from (a) along with the one from (d), in your sent folder (f) now you will always be able to decrypt and retrieve the original plaintext btw, I don't recommend this, but it is *possible* to add a (not yet done, but not terribly complicated either) patch to gnupg to 'display' the session key in the terminal window, (while you are encrypting only to one recipient), and then you can encrypt that session key to your key, and store it, or a (also not yet done, but not terribly complicated either) patch, to allow gnupg to use a session key supplied by the user as an entry in the command line(i.e. --use-session-key (64 character string from step (a) above) That session key is as random as any done by gnupg, and isn't really being 're-used', it's just being stored in the encrypted file from step (a) and is being sent with the same message encrypted to the same recipient as in step (a) This is just to point out, that if someone wants to think paranoidly about 'who else knows' what is encrypted in your encrypted e-mail that was encrypted only to you, it 'can' be done, (extremely tedious, and afaik , has not been implemented by any open-pgp variant program out there 8^) ) vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: OpenPGP key verification + legal framework
On 11/5/2018 at 3:39 PM, "Viktor" wrote: >You can register a Google account with any email address. Simply, >instead of creating an account on our service (another password >that >needs to be saved), you create an account on Google, or use an >existing one. = Ok, But suppose I want to use my existing key that I made over 10 years ago, and it is known and trusted by the people I deal with, but it happens to have more than 1 e-mail ID (not rare to switch an e-mail account in 10 years) Does this mean that it cannot be used in your system, even if you can get the preferred email to register in google, and you have passport personal verification, just because there is another ID attached? It seems unnecessarily restrictive. vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: GPG on Android
On 11/4/2018 at 4:58 PM, "Roland" wrote: > >Hello list, > >I share the wish for encrypted email on Android, but I am afraid >of storing a secret key on my android phone. (theft, hacking, >loss, etc) > >How do you feel about that? = Exactly the same way. Android phones (software) are made by Google. Google archives data from every source connecting to one of its applications, Chrome, search engine, gmail, etc. I don't trust them, and have no way of verifying any claim of what they do, or do not, store. Also, if you have any app that required 'rooting' of your phone, then even Google doesn't trust it, and expressly says that it will not guarantee false (malicious) expenditures by Google Wallet. So the 'rooted' app probably does have access to your android gnupg data. Annoying, I know, to not use gnupg on android, but prudently safe. fwiw, the gnupg apps work well on android, but I just don't trust the phone. vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Slightly OT - i need the proper wording for a signed document
Am Donnerstag, den 01.11.2018, 17:42 +0100 schrieb Stefan Claas: > On Thu, 01 Nov 2018 16:09:56 +0100, Dirk Gottschalk wrote: > That is the reason why i like to sign the .pdf, containing my key > data, with a qualified eIDAS conform signature. The detached GnuPG > sig should be an additional info, that matches the key data in the > document. = This will work well in that if the signature verifies, then the information in the .pdf can be considered reliable. It is, however, very easy for a MITM attack to 'break' the signature by very subtly altering the pdf. Try this: [1] Take your finished pdf and select all the text and copy it into a new Libre Office document. [2] At the end of your text, just add a period. [3] Use Libre Office's font coloring to change the color of the added period to white. [4] Export this new document as a pdf with the same file name as your original pdf, and the same metadata. [5] The pdf looks exactly the same, but the signature will no longer verify. I don't trust a detached, signed pdf (Again, I do, if it verifies, but am not sure if it doesn't verify). A simple, but slightly tedious workaround, would be to GnuPG Armor Sign the .pdf The elDAS signature will still work, but the Armored Signed message is much harder to alter, and such alteration is detectable as malicious rather than a 'mistake. Also, If you are planning to post your public keyblock in this pdf, please be aware that pdf treats a line return as empty whitespace, so when trying to import the key, GnuPG does not recognize the empty whitespace, and reads the version line as continuous with the keyblock, and it won't import. vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: cannot decrypt file symmetric encrypted
On 8/2/2018 at 3:01 PM, "Dirk Gottschalk via Gnupg-users" wrote: >Am Donnerstag, den 02.08.2018, 14:11 +0200 schrieb Stefano >Tranquillini: >> Hi all, >> last year I encrypted some files, today i tried to decrypt them >but >> the >> decryption fails > >> stefano@~/Downloads/words$ gpg -d words.1.gpg >> gpg: AES256 encrypted data >> gpg: encrypted with 1 passphrase >> gpg: decryption failed: Bad session key ... >Are you sure you used the correct passphrase to decrypt? = It was probably not the correct passphrase. The error that gpg2 gives when entering the wrong passphrase for a symmetrically encrypted message is exactly: gpg: decryption failed: Bad session key This is the same whether you are off for even 1 character of the passphrase, or even if you just press 'enter' without a passphrase at all. Here is a sample symmetrically encrypted message: -BEGIN PGP MESSAGE- Version: GnuPG v1 Comment: Passphrase: sss jA0EBwMCPJYegoCPRBRg0jkBnZym0Pr+ggBpBJYtHlYJgf90SL6YbWa1vcbLdl7H jwxeR5cIFoNhytyUIFxdvrLNP59qkqzLKkI= =pHIB -END PGP MESSAGE- First enter the correct passphrase, sss gpg (V1 and V2) decrypts it as is should be. now enter just ss or anything except the correct passphrase, or just press enter, and you get: gpg: decryption failed: bad key (when using Version 1.4.x) gpg: decryption failed: Bad session key (when using Version 2.x) (Something to do with the string-to-key formation. When the passphrase is off, the 'key' generated from it, is wrong, and when that wrong 'key' is used to attempt decryption, gpg rightfully gives an error message that the 'key' is bad. maybe worthy of a note in the FAQ ... ) vedaal ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
