Re: DHCP retransmission behaviour

2010-03-22 Thread David W. Hankins
On Mon, Mar 22, 2010 at 11:22:49AM +0100, Lorenzo Ruggiero wrote:
 I want to understand better the DHCP retransmit behaviour suggested
 in RFC 2131. RFC says that the client retrive using a backoff
 algorithm. This backoff algorithm will chose retransmission time
 using a value of a uniform random number chosen  from the range -1
 to +1. 
 
 My question is what 's happen if value is negative(-1,0)?
 If is negative the client won't retransmit?

I think the intent of the RFC 2131 retransmission strategy is for
each retransmission interval to be summed with a random number in the
range (-1,1), clock granularity permitting.  So the example initial
4 second timer would be between 3 and 5 seconds inclusive, the next
retransmission is exampled to be between 7 and 9 seconds inclusive.

This strategy isn't well defined, most of the behaviour is not
described in normative language, and the strongest indication
otherwise is a SHOULD.  Combine this with the problem that 4 second
retransmission timeouts isn't something most users are willing to
endure while waiting for a network connection, and I think you'll find
a lot of DHCP clients don't precisely implement this falloff
mechanism.

As RFC 2131 says, or how we choose to interpret it today, what's
important is that you use an algorithm that has an exponential growth
and some randomization to keep clients from marching together.

As an example, ISC dhclient starts every query with a fixed interval
with no randomness.  Every subsequent retransmission is determined by;

interval += random() % (2 * interval);

Then if the new interval exceeds the backoff_cutoff;

interval = (backoff_cutoff / 2) + (random() % backoff_cutoff);

The implication is that on average the interval will double every
round, until it reaches our cutoff boundary where it will remain
bound between 50% and 150% of the backoff cutoff.


If you want to discuss this further, I invite you to ask on the DHC
WG mailing list (dh...@ietf.org);

https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dhcwg

-- 
David W. HankinsBIND 10 needs more DHCP voices.
Software Engineer   There just aren't enough in our heads.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   http://bind10.isc.org/


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Re: Beyond reproach, accountability and regulation

2009-04-30 Thread David W. Hankins
On Wed, Apr 29, 2009 at 02:03:00PM -0400, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
 In theory we have a consensus based organization. In practice we have
 a system where it is rather easy for some people to take strategic
 offense as a tactic to shut down debate.

'Establishing (rough) consensus' is, at its root, Sophistic debate.

To be complete:  The IETF system relies upon those presenting drafts
to be judged as having consensus to progress, or not.  It is not
required (by either the draft authors or the audience) to provide
proof outside of convincing the judges - those who measure and form
consensus - about whether or not to progress a draft (this does not
mean that people do not supply proof, it merely is not required; one
only needs to be convincing, and certainly proof can be very
convincing).  Of course Sophists was more in the realm of determining
the truth or falsehood of a given statement, but the boolean nature of
true and false tracks well with the IETF's boolean nature of 'progress
or not,' and this system of consensus suffuses both draft progression
and the debate of draft contents.

It should therefore not be surprising that all manner of classical
Sophist rhetoric is used by the IETF's volunteers to their own ends,
successfully.

Although today we may have a negative stereotype of Sophism, I think
collectively we believe there can be no other way (than Sophistic
debate) for the IETF to pursue its agenda on the basis that we often
argue issues that simply cannot be fully explained or brought into
evidence, and even more frequently enter into the realm of politics
(and what place would logic have there?).

I was very dissatisfied with the IETF's performance towards its agenda
until this occurred to me.  It would have helped me immensely if it
were formally identified in this way (but then that would require the
IETF carry a 'Philosophy Area'), and to some extent I imagine that
this is also the problem some of the IETF's more vocal detractors are
wrestling with; the belief that the IETF does or should follow a
Socratic, Aristotelian, or even Democratic methodology, and the
resulting confusion and hurt feelings to discover that blatantly
Sophist rhetoric has succeeded where their deductions or even
elections have failed.


And yes, claiming that some person or ideaology is beyond reproach
(the end to end principle, the collective phrasology of John Postel)
is a valid, if unfortunate, Sophist technique to convince.

-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineeryou'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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Re: Subscriptions to ietf-honest

2009-03-25 Thread David W. Hankins
On Wed, Mar 25, 2009 at 10:10:04AM -0700, Joe Abley wrote:
 I have lost my sense of humour about this. It's hard to see this as 
 anything other than a systematic attempt to disrupt IETF activities.

It is my suspicion that the perpetrating gang is attempting to goad
volunteers into legal recourse.  I suspect this gang believes that
their actions will either cause IETF volunteers to create a legal
context for them to exploit (CAN SPAM suits), or that IETF's attempts
to filter or restrict access will create a legal context for them to
attack (the gang's leadership cites Exactis vs MAPS with fervor, which
I think they believe proves a network cannot restrict access to
itself).

Heads we win, tails you lose.


Anyone who's ever participated in an Internet community knows the
score here.

There are trolls for whom ostracization from the community solves the
problem; they find another community to infect and become distracted.

There are trolls that never believed they were part of the community
to start with, bold adventurers or risk takers, individualists outside
the realm of conformity, lone rangers who must stand alone against a
tide of injustice.  Ostracization does not quiet their discomfort, it
justifies it.

The only thing I have seen work for this second category of troll is
to talk to their mother.

-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineeryou'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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Re: The internet architecture

2008-12-05 Thread David W. Hankins
On Fri, Dec 05, 2008 at 08:46:48AM -0800, Dave CROCKER wrote:
 John Day wrote:
 discussed since 1972.  But you are correct, that there were still a large 
 unwashed that didn't and I am still not sure why that was. This seems to 

 After your or I or whoever indulges in our flash of brilliant insight, it 
 is the unwashed who do all the work.

I'm assuming you are using the term 'unwashed' to refer to the simple
act of bathing, rather than as in my background I understand it as a
metaphor for Christian baptism.

Surely neither Mr. Crocker nor Mr. Day are referring to IETF baptismal
practices?

Could either of you two elaborate on why you think that bathing (or
the evident lack thereof) is at all relevant to Internet standards?

I'm aware that in the ~400AD's there was actually quite a lot of
(religio) philosophical debate over the practice of bathing (which I
rather would think we'd put behind us after 1600 years), but I've
never heard it said that good engineers do (or don't) bathe.

-- 
Ash bugud-gul durbatuluk agh burzum-ishi krimpatul.
Why settle for the lesser evil?  https://secure.isc.org/store/t-shirt/
-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineeryou'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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Re: Review of draft-ietf-trill-prob-05

2008-12-02 Thread David W. Hankins
(replying to ietf@)

On Wed, Nov 26, 2008 at 09:38:02AM -0800, Bernard Aboba wrote:
 One such issue is how to rapidly seed the learning tables
 and ARP caches on movement between attachment points.

ARP cache updates shouldn't be necessary when changing attachment
points unless the client's MAC address has changed.

If you change both, then you need to update both.  I think they are
separate issues; but in ARP's case it is somewhat unfortunate...you
have to update all ARP caches that may contain an entry for you, for
although you are immediately interested in updating the caches of
those devices with which you are actively communicating, you may
start communicating with other devices at any time (they may initiate
or resume an exchange), and a stale cache entry from an erstwhile
exchange would mean an unfortunate delay.

Additionally, some deployments (passively or actively) attempt to
suppress IPv4 spoofing in BCP-38 similar ways, at the switching
layer, often by intercepting or participating with DHCPv4.  In which
case a gratuitous ARP or a DNAv4-like ARP would fail (and in DNAv4's
case it would fall back to INIT behaviour, as I recall, optimizing
for the case where the client has changed networks).

So possibly all three should be considered as sets (a gratuitous
multicast updates learning tables, a broadcast gratuitous ARP updates
ARP caches and learning tables, DHCPv4 updates ACL's, learning tables,
but not ARP caches).

And then of course there's SIP, but let's move on.

 learning tables in advance of station attachment.  In DNAv4 (RFC 4436),
 unicast ARP-Requests are sent in order to seed the router ARP cache,
 providing for return reachability within a single exchange.  The 
 motivation behind both of these devices is to minimize handoff
 latency and frame loss. 

I think that DNAv4's primary purpose was to provide a very good
indication that the client had not moved to a different network (the
same IP-addressed, same MAC-addressed router is probably on the same
broadcast domain as I used to be).  Having determined this, the
client excercises its right not to restart DHCPv4 in order to reassert
its configuration for the network (a lease is good for as long as its
lease-time option says).

The main upshots are that ARP completes much faster for the client,
and in comparison to doing a DHCPv4 INIT-REBOOT; ARP does not require
any 'update to persistent storage' (so it is _far_ less costly).

Any ARP cache update is secondary, and only serves to reinforce
contact between the DNAv4'ing client and the default router(s).  It
does not assist with conversations between the client and its peers.

In fact, DNAv4 is likely to suceed in situations where the client has
not changed MAC addresses, but rather has merely been intermittently
offline, such as when losing and re-associating with an AP, having
its ethernet link toggled, or resuming from a powersave mode (in which
case you will be re-associating with an AP or having your ethernet
link toggled anyway, modulo 'wake-on-lan' features).

In these cases, it is actually pretty unlikely that the router's ARP
cache is incorrect for the selected client.  If the client was offline
for an extended period (such as in powersaving), then the router may
have no cache entry for the client, but it should not have an
incorrect ARP cache entry in this case.

-- 
Ash bugud-gul durbatuluk agh burzum-ishi krimpatul.
Why settle for the lesser evil?  https://secure.isc.org/store/t-shirt/
-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineeryou'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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Re: [dhcwg] Last Call:draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-bulk-leasequery(DHCPv6Bulk Leasequery) toProposed Standard

2008-10-24 Thread David W. Hankins
On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 06:35:13PM -0700, Randy Presuhn wrote:
 Finally, getting to the use cases: what criteria most frequently determine
 the set of interesting (for management purposes) leases?

Why does it matter if we've already agreed that SNMP's autodetection
mechanisms are shit?

-- 
Ash bugud-gul durbatuluk agh burzum-ishi krimpatul.
Why settle for the lesser evil?  https://secure.isc.org/store/t-shirt/
-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineeryou'll just have to do it again.
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a modern-day SNMP use

2008-10-24 Thread David W. Hankins
 and
precisely two power supplies, they were always at precisely the same
OIDs), keyed again by sysObjectID.  But for example, we couldn't do
this for MAC address accounting features, a feature commonly used to
track bandwidth traded with multiple peers on one interface.

The pain involved in autodetecting the MAC accounting MIB (because it
could change more frequently than once per half hour) successfully
kept me from using it.  That is a challenge that exceeded either my
interest or my ability, I'm not sure which.  I'm sure the ops team is
still using their expect script to fetch MAC accounting data out of
the routers' CLI.  I find that preferrable either way.


So, yes Randy, there are folks who use SNMP routinely in this way,
and there are also folks who refuse to use SNMP in this way.

The lesson is that madness is relative, and you must often do insane
things to avoid even more insane consequences.

-- 
Ash bugud-gul durbatuluk agh burzum-ishi krimpatul.
Why settle for the lesser evil?  https://secure.isc.org/store/t-shirt/
-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineeryou'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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Re: [dhcwg] LastCall:draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-bulk-leasequery(DHCPv6Bulk Leasequery)toProposed Standard

2008-10-24 Thread David W. Hankins
On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 12:31:40PM -0700, Randy Presuhn wrote:
 I'm not part of your we.

Wow, this is a situation I did not anticipate.

You know about all the handstanding, all the backwards thinking,
all the extra overhead in putting scatter/gather to work.  And
you think that's the way it should be.

 Someone who cares can give the rest of
 the tutorial.

Yeah, I don't think I can help you either.  We're both failures as
teachers.

-- 
Ash bugud-gul durbatuluk agh burzum-ishi krimpatul.
Why settle for the lesser evil?  https://secure.isc.org/store/t-shirt/
-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineeryou'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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Re: [dhcwg] Last Call: draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-bulk-leasequery(DHCPv6 Bulk Leasequery) to Proposed Standard

2008-10-23 Thread David W. Hankins
On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 09:15:01PM -0700, Randy Presuhn wrote:
 Uh...  One of the useful features of tables is to organize related information
 into conceptual rows with common INDEX values.  I'm not sure where
 a single table of a single variable at a time comes from - GetBulk
 certainly has no such limitation.

I don't remember referring to GetBulk, and I don't understand why I
would have.

If you don't know where a single table of a single variable at time
comes from, then walk the 'interfaces' mib on any system at your
convenience.  Note how 'ifDescr', 'ifInOctets', and etc are all
organized with spatial locality, but the data for interface 5 is
not.  This spatial locality does not track with common application
temporal locality requirements, which wants all the details for one
conceptual object at once so that it may continue with processing it,
rather than waiting.

  For example, you start by walking a table of index advertisements,
  where you receive an 'index number' that can be used into other MIBs
  to find variables associated with that database entry.
 
  For each of these indexes you discover, you could then queue single
  GET PDU's for each separate variable you were interested in (lease
  state, lease expiration time, ...).
 
 That would be a spectacularly inefficient implementation strategy.
 I should hope there's nothing in the SNMP RFCs that would be
 read as encouraging such wasteful behaviour.

Efficiency is often subjective.  Are you optimizing for simplicity
of design (using one walk to traverse an entire mib), or are you
optimizing for the lowest latency to complete configurations?  Are
you optimizing out variables you have no interest in (most MIBs are
half extra data you don't require)?  What kind of device are you
querying?

On some models of router, for example, a SNMP query causes a message
to be sent over their own 'control bus' to fetch all statistics for
a single interface.  The most recent control command is cached,
because it was designed to be used for a CLI command to display a
single interface's data.  The typical snmpwalk or even bulkwalk
scenario means every interface is queried multiple times; once for
each table they appear in.  This kills the cached object, by using
none of its locality, and overworks the command bus.  Even if the
router's cache were larger, it would have to be equal in size to the
number of (physical and virtual) interfaces in order to have even one
hit.

An application trying not to live in 1985 might find itself doing,
as I describe, a kind of dance to get out of SNMP's spatial locality
mindset.  In this case, you would query all the data you required
pertaining to one interface at a time, before moving on to the next
interface.

An application requiring not to live in 1985 definitely will find
itself queuing more than one packet to a single SNMP server at a
time.  In this case, walking some number of tables in one session,
while queuing query packets filled to the brim with GET's for all
specific relevant data for each interface in series.

Unless you're querying a Cisco Catalyst, in which case queuing more
than one packet at a time is foolish; the Cat will drop the second
packet if it is busy with a request already, and you'll have to sit
in retransmission hell.  But I'm getting sidetracked.


The advantages here I am describing are twofold;

1) The object for interface 5 is read in the least time possible,
  even though the time to read the entire dataset remains constant
  (due more to RTT than to bandwidth).  interface 5 can move on to
  the next stage in processing while SNMP data continues to flow,
  rather than waiting for the walk to finally reach the last table of
  variables.

2) The router is not flagellated needlessly, resulting in a lower
  time to complete the operation overall.

 I'm not sure what you're trying to say here.  An SNMP message (which
 would normally be carried in a single UDP datagram) by definition
 contains exactly one SNMP PDU.

Possibly this is a kind of brain damage that arises from the SNMP
library I once used, which describes multiple query commands in one
packet as PDU's, even if they are labeled internally to SNMP as being
'variable bindings' attached to the end of the PDU.  I wind up using
the terms interchangeably as a result.

 This depends on the design of the MIB module in general, and the
 selection of the INDEX elements in particular.

I don't see how any SNMP MIB design cleverness can get around the
SNMP way of requiring strictly ordered datasets for GETNEXT support.

But good luck with that, and I look forward to reading your DHCP MIB's
draft.

-- 
Ash bugud-gul durbatuluk agh burzum-ishi krimpatul.
Why settle for the lesser evil?  https://secure.isc.org/store/t-shirt/
-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineeryou'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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Re: [dhcwg] Last Call:draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-bulk-leasequery(DHCPv6 Bulk Leasequery) toProposed Standard

2008-10-23 Thread David W. Hankins
Now I'm hearing you say what I'm saying, that is good, but we're not
quite done;

On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 09:41:49AM -0700, Randy Presuhn wrote:
 Spectacularly bad design.  It would make much more sense to only
 ask for the interfaces of interest (if known) in the first place, and in
 any case, asking for the individual variable bindings one at a time
 is just silly, if you'll pardon the harsh language.

If a DHCP relay knew what leases were present in a DHCP server before
it issued a single SNMP packet, and of them which specific ones it
needed to know about, then it probably wouldn't need to issue an SNMP
packet at all.

Now you see the conundrum.  The process to use SNMP to meet
leasequery's ends (to find out what leases it needs to query about,
and then finally also do that) would be to use SNMP in precisely the
way we are both saying is idiotic!

I have to agree completely and wholeheartedly: SNMP is just broken
for this use case.

 The requirement for ordering is inherent in the protocol, and I agree
 it makes interfacing with, e.g., an underlying SQL infrastructure (for
 which ordering entails extra processing) a pain.  But the point is
 that deciding which indexes to use needs to be driven by management
 use cases, in order to minimize the situations in which one would need
 to walk through an entire table to find the useful bits.

There simply is no usable index.  There is no database in our DHCP
implementation that is consistently sorted no matter what time (over
the runtime) you query it; in order to support GETNEXT to be able
to walk the various lists of leases and allow the clients to perform
the required discovery, we would have to change literally everything,
and vastly complicate our software.

It is work all around to shoehorn SNMP into this picture, for the
client, for the server, for everyone.

-- 
Ash bugud-gul durbatuluk agh burzum-ishi krimpatul.
Why settle for the lesser evil?  https://secure.isc.org/store/t-shirt/
-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineeryou'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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Re: [dhcwg] Last Call: draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-bulk-leasequery (DHCPv6 Bulk Leasequery) to Proposed Standard

2008-10-22 Thread David W. Hankins
On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 08:36:22AM +0300, Pekka Savola wrote:
 $ snmpwalk -m IP-FORWARD-MIB -v 2c -c foo foo-rtr 

This essentially would be identical to DHCP leasequery, minus the
bulk.  Even if transported via TCP, on the wire it would look like
a single client-server GETNEXT, waiting for a server-client reply
before sending the next one.  One PDU and one OID in it at a time.

snmpbulkwalk is a minor improvement; a single UDP reply can contain
many iterated GETNEXT's, or similarly over TCP.  There is still a
'pause' between the client's request and reply.

What the leasequery bulk methods are looking for is all at once.
The objective is to fill the socket at maximum window size.  I am
not aware of a means to do this with SNMP considering the kinds of
data in DHCP lease tables, and the usual ways MIBs are constructed.

 ip.ipForward.ipCidrRouteTable.ipCidrRouteEntry.ipCidrRouteProto.128.214.46
 IP-FORWARD-MIB::ipCidrRouteProto.128.214.46.0.255.255.255.0.0.0.0.0.0 = 
 INTEGER: netmgmt(3)
 IP-FORWARD-MIB::ipCidrRouteProto.128.214.46.254.255.255.255.255.0.0.0.0.0 = 
 INTEGER: local(2)

This kind of underlines a qualm with SNMP data management (as opposed
to network management).

For each iterated GETNEXT or GETBULK both rely upon a fixed point in
the database (node n), which was present in the database and was
the last PDU in the server's reply in the previous packet.  But it may
not be present in the database at the time the next request is made.

This requires the database models used by the servers to be able to
find a reliable sorting, where the previously-valid-now-invalid
OID can still be used as an index to provide continuation; it can
still grant the next OID.

This essentially is a problem, or at least a facility not present in
some DHCP databases, which caused us to motivate away from UDP based
bulk queries (the original bulk leasequery proposal was more similar
to snmpwalk in this regard, and this was a concern raised by
implementers).


In addition...

SNMP likes to present a single table of a single variable at a time.
I suppose we could overcome this by having the DHCP lease information
in an 'blob of octets' rather than in classical SNMP variable form
(INTEGER etc), so you only have one MIB to walk.  But it seems foreign
to SNMP to do so.

The problem is that most leasequery clients are not positioned to
allocate fields of temporary memory in order to make sense of SNMP's
kind of scatter-gather approach to this kind of data transfer.

To make sense of SNMP MIBs you have to develop some strategy to
receive multiple datapoints from different locations and times.

For example, you start by walking a table of index advertisements,
where you receive an 'index number' that can be used into other MIBs
to find variables associated with that database entry.

For each of these indexes you discover, you could then queue single
GET PDU's for each separate variable you were interested in (lease
state, lease expiration time, ...).

There are 'performance alternatives' from there, and they are
fantastic to entertain because so many SNMP server implementations
will outright crash if too many PDUs are queued in a single packet
(others corrupt their replies if there are more than single PDU's).

This becomes more problematic when you consider that some leasequery
clients are going to want only a subset of the MIB's total contents.
The question truly is what leases did I have in my table before I
rebooted?  Such filtration in an SNMP MIB model I think would be
done on the client end, not on the server end, meaning the client
still must traverse some entire MIB one PDU (GETNEXT or GETBULK) at a
time.

This is different from the proposed bulk leasequery models, where the
server writes to the TCP socket all at once, with all data for a
given lease spatially located in the same position in the TCP stream,
and a primitive query language (by query type) to provide subsets.


This doesn't mean a standard DHCP MIB isn't a bad idea for entirely
different reasons.

-- 
Ash bugud-gul durbatuluk agh burzum-ishi krimpatul.
Why settle for the lesser evil?  https://secure.isc.org/store/t-shirt/
-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineeryou'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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Re: Beggars _can_ be choosers?

2007-08-02 Thread David W. Hankins
On Wed, Aug 01, 2007 at 03:01:40PM -0400, John C Klensin wrote:
 I think you misunderstand my comment, or at least its intent.

I absolutely did, but I think reasonably so.  This version is no
longer crazy, even noble.

But I'm not sold on it.

 Or do you still think we disagree or that my comments are
 fallacious?

We're half in agreement.

Where a problem manifests, and an operator intended the configuration
as being reasonable and correct, then the reasons why the setup is
neither, or what failed, should be documented.  I would expect we
should hear very loud noises in any event where this is the case.

Where a problem manifests, and it was an accidental mishap of
misconfiguration?  It's a waste of time to pursue and document these
with the kind of rigorous investigation you suggest.

I suspect this is just a position we will disagree on, but I will
explain myself a little;

First, people who make mistakes on accident are not going to read a
document telling them not to do that beforehand.  If they did read
the document beforehand, well we're talking about _mistakes_ here...
they're going to make mistakes anyway.  Nor will they look to an RFC
after it is done.  They'll seek FAQs, mailing lists, and their
products' support chains.  They'll seek an expert on the subject
because there are simply too many references to read in a timely
fashion to find the one that tells you what mistake you made.

So it is certain that documenting this will make no real difference
to anyone, and I think the IETF Mindshare gains are dubious at best.

Second, there are just so many different ways to misconfigure your
network, we would be working at this until the heat death of the
universe.  Of course we'd want this to be a general investigation into
accidental configurations, and not a DHCP Witch-Hunt.  For IETF 69
alone, we'd have to look into why the DNS servers were reliably
reachable but not reliably answering until Tuesday.  To continue on
beyond merely the mishaps of IETF 69, we'd have to provide such
advice as:

Do not accidentally create ethernet duplex mismatches.

Do not accidentally load the full Internet BGP table into a 2501.
 Use Filters.

Do not accidentally urinate on your router while it is running.  In
 fact, avoid accidental urination altogether.  Messy.
 (True story, a housecat in Maui did this to one of our Portmasters)

Do not make typos, especially not ones which happen to pass parsing
 tests, such as but not limited to reversing digits on subnet masks.

Or my personal favorite:

Do not accidentally run outdated software with known bugs, possibly
 including well-used security vulnerabilities.  Upgrade!

This list could go on!


Basically, I think the best thing to do is to just expect our
network's operators to raise the flag themselves if they think it
is useful.  That is, that something might come of it.

This ietf@ business of inserting ourselves into the situation because
of some possibility of a difficult problem that we hope we might be
useful in addressing is another waste of time.

-- 
Ash bugud-gul durbatuluk agh burzum-ishi krimpatul.
-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineeryou'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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Re: Beggars _can_ be choosers?

2007-08-02 Thread David W. Hankins
On Thu, Aug 02, 2007 at 11:55:12AM -0400, Keith Moore wrote:
 DHCP, in particular, strikes me as a nightmare - a hodgepodge of
 unrelated attributes, many of which have no business being dictated to
 hosts by the network.  gluing DHCP to DNS creates another set of
 problems, also based on dubious assumptions about the relationship
 between a host's identity and the attachment point of a host to the
 network.  and this all strikes me as a consequence of developing network
 configuration protocols organically, i.e. without much forethought.

We clearly have a very different perception of reality.

 more broadly, I wish there were a better feedback path from operators to
 IETF to take advantage of the breadth of operational experience.  it's
 not as if the incidents occurring in IETF meeting networks are typical;
 it's just that we experience them directly and as a group rather than
 indirectly or as individuals.

Contrarily, we should specifically seek not to make decisions about
events that have affected us personally, because we have biases in our
position towards recommended changes.

That is, it further closes the gap on making IETF protocols designed
explicitly for operation at IETF meetings, and nowhere else.

-- 
Ash bugud-gul durbatuluk agh burzum-ishi krimpatul.
-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineeryou'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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Beggars _can_ be choosers?

2007-08-01 Thread David W. Hankins
On Tue, Jul 31, 2007 at 06:59:58PM -0400, John C Klensin wrote:
 Almost independent of the IPv6 autoconfig issues, I find it
 deeply troubling that we seem to be unable to both
 
   * get the ducks lined up to run IPv6 fully and smoothly,
   with and without local/auto config.
   
   * get a DHCP arrangement (IPv4 and, for those who want
   to use it, IPv6) that performs reliably, consistently,
   and largely invisibly (if I have to worry about what a
   DHCP server is doing, it isn't working well).
 
 and have both of those working seamlessly no later than Sunday
 afternoon of the meeting.
 
 If we can't do that, we should be very seriously reviewing our
 protocols and specifications: that sort of thing shouldn't be,
 in any sense, an experiment at this stage.

Wow!  Is that an IETF First for anyone else?

Ever since my first IETF, I was well aware that many folks held to the
unfortunate fallacy that, because we do X at IETF meetings and it
works allright, it is therefore sufficient for the rest of the
Internet.  No matter how much people point out the error in this
thinking, it is perpetuated...as recently as the IETF 69 tech plenary,
where we were told that firewalls were becoming obsolete, evidenced by
their lack of use at IETF meetings.

There's only one word for it:  Astounding.

I have never, until now, heard the contrary fallacy attempted.  That
is, because we did X at an IETF meeting and it did not work
allright, it is therefore insufficient for the Internet.

That's a new one on me.

Clever, but wrong: networks much larger than 1,200 laptops use DHCPv4
on a daily basis all over the Internet without similar symptoms.

-- 
Ash bugud-gul durbatuluk agh burzum-ishi krimpatul.
-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineeryou'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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Re: Beggars _can_ be choosers?

2007-08-01 Thread David W. Hankins
On Wed, Aug 01, 2007 at 09:12:14AM -0700, Joel Jaeggli wrote:
 Told by whom?

Hain...something like that?  I can't remember.  You'll have to check
whatever minutes or recordings are up.

 Start by asking the contractor, the volunteers and the IAD for a
 postmortem on the operation of the network. anything else is just
 speculation.

Why?

It's a lot of work, and I think we already know the conclusion, given
what we can observe as users.

It berates our volunteers and sponsors who provide us with the network
services during our stay...treating them like children that have to be
kept after school to explain themselves.

It embarrasses vendors who provide us with gear or software, making
them less likely to provide either.

And all we're going to discover is, It hurts when you go like this,
so don't do that then.

A useless and frivolous excercise.


If we wanted to stop begging, and really buy a network for every
IETF meeting, complete with SLA's and funding extensive testing
before opening it 'live', then that's one thing.  One totally
rediculous thing.

But in lieu of an absence of begging, we should stop being so
choosy.

They did a good job, and we more or less had net the entire meeting.

I don't think we have anything to complain about.

-- 
Ash bugud-gul durbatuluk agh burzum-ishi krimpatul.
-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineeryou'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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Re: Beggars _can_ be choosers?

2007-08-01 Thread David W. Hankins
On Wed, Aug 01, 2007 at 11:11:18AM -0700, Joel Jaeggli wrote:
 I'm one of those volunteers, operating that part of the service was not
 my responsibility... My point is to both you and the people complaining
 about the network, Drawing conclusions from an incomplete picture is
 fraught with peril.

I've drawn no final conclusions, and would similarly advise others
not to do so.

I certainly would say that, given what we can observe as users, the
possible explanations for the DNS and DHCP service outages reside in
a _very_ limited set; hardware, software, configuration, or some
combination.

None of those are IETF business in the sense of things which we can
observe or change through Reviewing our protocols and
specifications as John Klensin appears to have suggested.

 At IETF 55 I had issues with all the terminal room macs coming up with

A volunteer writing up an essay on the goings on, because he knows the
work to be fruitful, is one thing.

A bunch of bearded geeks surrounding a table, pounding their fists,
and demanding the proverbial answers is entirely another.

So if you feel like doing it, do it.

But it shouldn't be an imperative.

 We have a network contractor who has provided services at the ietf68 and
 ietf69. We pay them money, they do stuff. We also have volunteers.

If the contractor has an SLA to provide DHCP services, that's
something IETF's administrative staff should take up with them.

I suspect they don't.

 Indeed. How do we (I'm being rather inclusive here) do better next time?

I don't think we can.  By its definition, the IETF network is built
with different hardware, different software running on it, and
different operators every time.

This is an entropic nightmare...you're not just changing one variable...
you change all of them.

There's no sane way to expect 100% resilient network operations at
every event put together like that unless you _really_ start spending
money like water on it.

Just give up and stop being so choosy.

 I ask myself fairly frequently (about 3 times a year) What can I do to
 make the next one better? Not everyone can or should volunteer to help
 but the pool of volunteers is not that big...

Involve the vendors earlier.  They're probably (not) using the network
that's broken anyway.

Speaking from my own experience, I don't find out that our software is
in use until after things are broken and someone manages to find me
through a network of friends (7 layers of separation seems to be more
like 3).

Take ten minutes to write us a note with your plans beforehand, page
us on ietf@ if you can't find us, and maybe we'll answer back with
the cellphone that will work while we're in town, and ignore us if
we send back a you need to use fancy new features x, y z to test
them for me.

-- 
Ash bugud-gul durbatuluk agh burzum-ishi krimpatul.
-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineeryou'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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Re: [Geopriv] Confirmation of GEOPRIV IETF 68 Working Group Hums

2007-04-25 Thread David W. Hankins
On Wed, Apr 25, 2007 at 06:50:28AM -0700, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
 But how does my application access it?

The proper way from my point of view would be to read from your
system's option cache, so whatever DHCP the system does filters
down to applications.


 DHCP is not something that an application layer program should be allowed
 to perform.

Amen, brother!  But, you're preaching to the choir.

Macromedia Flash Proxy whatsimahoosits...sends a DHCPINFORM.
Doesn't set ciaddr, chaddr, htype or hlen.  Let me tell you,
becoming similarly compatible to this as other servers
evidently are was not an experience I would like to repeat.  [1]

Microsoft Industry Update Control.  Refuses to stop sending
DHCPINFORMs until any server responds with the WPAD option,
without placing that option on the PRL.  [2]


 It is a security issue. For good reason performing DHCP operations
 requires privileges beyond mere network connectivity on Windows.

I expect it doesn't, actually, as the relevant flash proxy bits
are sufficiently nonpriveleged.  That's via a dot net facility,
I've been told.  I see no reason to hold the system's option cache
secret from applications, when taht cache is got by a packet that
anyone can sniff off the wire.  I understand that applications
such as Opera, Firefox, and ID [3], are said to digest at least
one option in this way.

But, I'm not a Windows guy, so if someone knows how that actually
works it would be helpful.  I just know that it works from the
outside looking in.


 That is why configuring application programs from DHCP never caught on.  

The reason you have made this statement is false.

But that doesn't, on its own, mean that the conclusion is false.  I
would say it certainly is not mainstream, but it is pervasive.


[1] http://marc.info/?l=dhcp-serverm=113466843320099w=2

[2] http://marc.info/?l=dhcp-serverm=110928450802695w=2

[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_Proxy_Autodiscovery_Protocol

[4] http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/99nov/I-D/draft-ietf-wrec-wpad-01.txt

The DHCP option code for WPAD is 252 by agreement of the DHC working 
 group chair.

Possible alternative text:

I can't believe it's not IANA!

-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineer   you'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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Re: [Geopriv] Confirmation of GEOPRIV IETF 68 Working Group Hums

2007-04-20 Thread David W. Hankins
On Fri, Apr 20, 2007 at 02:02:18PM -0400, Ralph Droms wrote:
 Set up the relay agent in your router to point at my DHCP server.

There are also DHCPINFORM (v4) and Information-Request (v6) messages
which can transit the public Internet.  I think however, v4 fails
with NAT.

They are also not widely used for this purpose at the moment.


I was thinking about this while swimming yesterday.

Phillip's abstract problem is that multiple administrative domains
exist.

There is the physically attached network, which represents one
administrative domain which reaches to every place the broadcast
domain touches.  Someone is responsible for that network, and
the services it provides which facillitate access.

There is his 'home' network, which represents a second administrative
domain.

There is his 'work' network, which represents a final third domain
(or more).


It is likely that each of these three domains will wish to present
dynamic configuration contents.

One subset of them are only contextually useful when the physical and
administrative domains match (such as what's the default gateway?
and where on earth is the network port I'm attached to?).

A second subset of them are contextually useful no matter where on the
Internet Phillip's laptop is connected (such as where is my Inbox?
or where should I send my lat/long to?).


Right now, DHCP(v4|v6) has only been used to solve for the case where
the physical and administrative domains match.  Operationally.

DHCPv6 could easily be used for the case where the administrative
domain is extra to the physical broadcast domain by making use
of the Information-Request, and sorting values fetched this way
ahead of values got off the link.

DHCPv4 could potentially also be used for the same case, as the same
message exists, but we would need to introduce a signal for alternative
server behaviour (reply to source address and port) to work around
NAT if that were desirable.

Both would require a single manual configuration element - the
address(es) of the DHCP servers the laptop wishes to acquire
super-administrative configuration from.  Probably delivered as
a domain name, possibly also advertised eg via DHCP while the
client is on the administrative domain's physical links.

Firewalls or NAT, even if a problem, really aren't, since software can
cache old values until it can freely observe the system again.  This
is just the same as network partition or packet loss problems.

-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineer   you'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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Re: [Geopriv] Confirmation of GEOPRIV IETF 68 Working Group Hums

2007-04-20 Thread David W. Hankins
I'm sorry this reply is late.  I suspect you were stuck in ISC's
greylisters.

On Fri, Apr 20, 2007 at 10:48:14AM -0700, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
 That's not the point, the point here is that DHCP is not an Internet
 protocol. It is an IETF protocol but not an Internet protocol. It does
 not layer on the IP stack.

You're right, I muddled the point.

The point is that the ISO L(x) is not what one considers when judging
wether or not a certain configuration value would make a good band
name.  I mean DHCP option.

What we (strive to) consider instead is the administrative scope
of the configuration information, and wether it matches common and
practical use of DHCP.

-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineer   you'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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Re: [Geopriv] Confirmation of GEOPRIV IETF 68 Working Group Hums

2007-04-19 Thread David W. Hankins
On Thu, Apr 19, 2007 at 03:38:40PM -0700, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
 DHCP is a layer 3 technology that talks directly to layer 2.

DHCP is a technology that dynamically configures hosts.

If a host has a configuration knob that might reasonably and
properly be set by the systems administrator or the network you
are presently attached to, then it is reasonable and proper to
configure it via DHCP.

DHCP would be the wrong tool to configure how, in what frequency,
or in what manner an application would directly contact a specific
remotely administered service, such as a distant web server.  DNS
would be the correct tool for that sort of job, having as it does
a global reach, and fate sharing.


If GEOPRIV is truthfully a global service the client communicates
with directly without the local network operator's involvement,
then I think it should be configured by whatever global distribution
means is reasonable.

My impression is that GEOPRIV is a service that is provided by
the local network to which the client is attached, and as such
under the purview of that network's operator and DHCP, but I admit
to not following it very closely.

-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineer   you'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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Re: draft-ietf-syslog-protocol: Reliabledeliveryconsidered harmful.

2007-02-08 Thread David W. Hankins
On Thu, Feb 08, 2007 at 02:32:00PM +0100, Rainer Gerhards wrote:
 I also agree with the observation that reliable - and blocking -
 logging can cause harm to a system. However, I do not think that this
 is anything that the protocol can do something against. It is not the
 protocol that causes harm. If we say if we support a reliable syslog
 protocol, we can block the system and thus the protocol is harmful,
 we can also say if we deliver mail messages via a reliable protocol
 (SMTP), we can use up all system ressources (e.g. fill the disk), so
 SMTP is harmful.

RFC2821 (SMTP) defines a queueing behaviour and that servers should
retry transmission for some reasonable number of times at intervals
as specified in section 4.5.4. should there be problems at the
reliable transmission layer.

It seems your example does what the syslog draft does not, so I'm
not sure what your point really is.

 My point is that we must differentiate between the protocol and its
 implementations. A reliable syslog protocol offers the foundation on
 which a reliable syslog implementation can be build. It is the task of
 the application designer to take care of the operating environment
 specifics while implementing the protocol. A good design for Unix will
 probably take into consideration that a blocking syslogd does not do
 any good and leave options to the operator to discard messages when
 needed (and probably have turned them on by default). Even in such a

You must differentiate between the protocol and implementation, but
not to the extent of denying the implementor guidance on how to
proceed in a way that will promote the health of the protocol.

The wholesale promotion of reliable transport without the disclaimer
that the protocol-level process probably wants to enter into discarding
behaviour in effect promotes the unhealthy condition.

My hope is that a simple acknowledgement of this evidently common
implementation mistake would substantially increase the quality of
syslog implementations that are updated for it.

 design. Think about it: how can an IETF document specify what a
 syslogd should do if its sending queue is filled up? How could we word
 this so that it becomes part of an on-the-wire protocol?

If you were going to update syslog so that it might be transported
over a reliable channel, then I think the only right answer is to
define how the protocol-level process, independent of which reliable
transport is selected, deals with congestion or failure.

Barring that, there are many duct tape approaches.

Updating the security section to weigh the cons of denial of service
against the pros of reliable delivery.

Adding a glossary entry for reasonably reliable, and using such
terms instead of the absolute reliable as is currently in place.

Numerous others.

-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineer   you'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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Re: draft-ietf-syslog-protocol: Reliable delivery considered harmful.

2007-02-02 Thread David W. Hankins
On Fri, Feb 02, 2007 at 08:31:49AM +0100, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:
 Wether it is a bug or a feature depends on your requirments. On some
 high-security environments, people prefer to suspend the service
 rather than not being able to log it. (Otherwise, an attacker could
 easily attempt many attacks, fill in the hard disk and then perform
 the real attack unlogged).

I'd just like to point out that you're choosing one bug over
another.  A DOS in preference to lack of observance of events.

In my opinion, that's a bad selection, but it's your selection to
make.

That kind of preference, that kind of choice, is a good thing to
have, but it would be unwise to apply to the general case a
systematic selection of DOS over observation.

-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineer   you'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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draft-ietf-syslog-protocol: Reliable delivery considered harmful.

2007-02-01 Thread David W. Hankins
On Thu, Feb 01, 2007 at 08:09:29AM -0500, Sam Hartman wrote:
  Mark == Mark Andrews [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
  - 'The syslog Protocol ' draft-ietf-syslog-protocol-19.txt as
  a Proposed Standard
 
 Mark draft-ietf-syslog-protocol-19.txt recommends using a
 Mark reliable protocol.  Existing implementations of syslog do
 Mark this and deadlock with nameservers which are logging via
 Mark syslog.
 
 
 Please explain the deadlock in more detail.  One of the primary
 reasons for the syslog working group is reliable syslog, so I think we
 need to focus on how to avoid the deadlock in other ways rather than
 avoiding reliability.

If you have 50,000 syslog lines to put out, and only enough
network/disk/something bandwidth for 5,000 within the same time
frame, that's a problem.

If you insist on keeping all 50,000 lines of output, there is no
solution to that problem.  If you block, that's a big problem as
it ultimatley totally disables the service attempting to log
information.  If you write to a growing backing store, well you'll
run out of space eventually (even disk is not infinite).
Compression can only get you so far.

Ultimately you have to drop something, and if it's not the
syslog output, it's the service's output.

Reliability is the problem, and the advice we give our users is
not to log reliably (or even to configure servers to log to a
local file, circumventing syslog entirely).

Note that reliable network transport of syslog information is
equally damaging as reliable local storage of syslog output (eg
by forcing disk synchronization of each line).  At least one
of today's syslog implementations insists that you prefix your
filenames with a - if you /don't/ want it to fsync() every
line.  This default cripples DHCP servers.


The current words in the draft;

   It may be desirable to use a transport with guaranteed delivery to
   mitigate congestion.

May be adequate to the point of suggesting that reliable delivery
might not be desirable.  But on the whole the draft doesn't read
that way, and it doesn't state the truth: reliable delivery of
syslog output is always harmful.  The point of bothering with
reliable syslog delivery, if there is one, is for those very
rare cases where losing the data is more harmful than harming
system services.

-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineer   you'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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Re: draft-ietf-syslog-protocol: Reliable delivery considered harmful.

2007-02-01 Thread David W. Hankins
On Thu, Feb 01, 2007 at 10:08:39AM -0800, David W. Hankins wrote:
 If you have 50,000 syslog lines to put out, and only enough
 network/disk/something bandwidth for 5,000 within the same time
 frame, that's a problem.

s/5,000/49,999/

Apologies for the clerical error.

-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineer   you'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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Re: draft-ietf-syslog-protocol: Reliable delivery considered harmful.

2007-02-01 Thread David W. Hankins
On Thu, Feb 01, 2007 at 10:30:17PM +0200, Pekka Savola wrote:
 It's acceptable for the syslog sender to replace overflowing lines of 
 syslog (if some messages need to be dropped due to lack of resources) 
 with a message about rate-limiting, messages being dropped, or 
 whatever -- just the same way as messages might get dropped when 
 syslogging to a local media.

Then the word that should be used here is not reliable without
any exceptions tagged on.

 As long as a) there is a message about syslogs getting dropped, and b) 
 this is infrequent in a well operated system (i.e. the system log 
 levels are set so that typically the amount of logging is OK), this 
 should be no problem.

I should note that while this would be just fine, this is not in
fact what presently deployed syslog implementations that implement
reliable delivery (wether to network sockets or local files) do.

Today they block.

To use the world 'reliable' without illuminating clearly that
exceptions must be made is dangerous.

 IMHO, reliable delivery of syslog output is always harmful is very 
 much an over-statement.

Well, I wasn't counting on shifting the definition of reliable to
somewhat reliable.

Sure, somewhat reliable delivery of syslog output is always harmful
is very much an over-statement, I'll agree with that.

But I stand by what I said.

 get even more syslog to send. While this is a serious problem when it 
 occurs, it should be easily solvable: just drop the messages (with a 
 suitable note in syslog or in the local log) that exceed the buffer 
 size or prune messages from the buffer using some more advanced 
 strategy.

That would be fine.

But again, this is not what current implementations do, and that
is not reliable without exception.

-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineer   you'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins


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Re: draft-kolkman-appeal-support

2006-10-13 Thread David W. Hankins
On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 10:31:57AM +0200, Frank Ellermann wrote:
 http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kolkman-appeal-support
 
 ...it's just wrong.

I think he's got a good idea.  It maybe could use some tweaking.

The IETF should stop doing things that are not relevant to its
constituency and serve only to waste its (donated) time-dollars.

This includes but is not limited to: appeals from total nuts.

One perfectly acceptable tactic, which Olafur has codified in this
draft, is to limit appeals to only those made by mixed nuts.

I think it would be more productive to suggest alternative tactics
than to ask Olafur to withdraw his draft.  We would all like to
know what other options there are.

 I didn't try to find three paying members to
 support that opinion, and nobody else is qualified to support it :-(

...nor would you have had to.

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Re: draft-kolkman-appeal-support

2006-10-13 Thread David W. Hankins
On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 01:16:53PM -0400, Keith Moore wrote:
 I just don't think that IETF meeting attendance is an appropriate way to 
  decide who is a nutcase and who isn't.

Appropriate or not, it's not an effective way to distinguish nuts,
as it should not surprise you to learn that most of the people who
come to IETF meetings are nuts as well.

Nor does it have to be if the goal is to reduce the frequency of
incidence rather than a complete shut-out.  By asking for a 'conspiracy
of mixed nuts' rather than a 'single nut acting alone', the frequency of
incidence should be drastically reduced.

But, we mustn't let nuts use their mom as a supporter, or else such
conspiracies of mixed nuts would ultimately be the rule.  So, some
limitations must be made.

The definitions in Olafur's draft for qualified supporters shouldn't be
considered exclusionary.  People in that position can still participate
by expressing opinions, or possibly might convince someone else to offer
their support in proxy.

Perhaps Olafur might even be convinced to produce text in his draft
that encourages individuals to provide their support in proxy, or to
allow IAB/IESG members to waive.

-- 
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Re: draft-kolkman-appeal-support

2006-10-13 Thread David W. Hankins
On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 10:03:39AM -0700, David W. Hankins wrote:
 One perfectly acceptable tactic, which Olafur has codified in this

s/Olafur/Olaf/g

How embarrassing.  Sorry, Olaf.

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Re: [Nea] WG Review: Network Endpoint Assessment (nea)

2006-10-09 Thread David W. Hankins
On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 09:08:42AM -0700, todd glassey wrote:
 No it wasn't Brian - the WIPO IP Framework calls for a set of protections
 for Industrial Designs which ALL of the work that happens here is controlled
 by right?

I suppose you might consider ALL IETF work as protected or threatened by
WIPO Inustrial Designs [1] treaties if you first accept that ALL IETF
work is ornamental.

But of course, the joke isn't funny if you have to explain it.


[1] http://www.wipo.int/designs/en/designs.html

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Re: Proceeding CDs

2006-10-06 Thread David W. Hankins
On Fri, Oct 06, 2006 at 10:56:51PM +, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
   Remove that, and the question might be asked? What do we get for
   our money?  more often.

Are you suggesting that proceeding CD's are actually a valid answer
to this question, or that people should merely be convinced to ask
this question less frequently by any means available other than
actually providing answers?

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Re: zone is not a DNS name semantic

2006-09-28 Thread David W. Hankins
I am flattered that my simple opinion required not one but two such
voluminous responses.  Thank both of you for the compliment.

I don't think repeating my (unchanged) opinion is useful or will have
any real impact on the Internet, so I had not planned on responding.

But there is something in Dave Crocker's reply that I need to clear
up, as I gather it is my fault:

On Wed, Sep 27, 2006 at 10:32:58AM -0700, Dave Crocker wrote:
 David W. Hankins wrote:
 Quite the opposite.  DHCP server software commonly refers to shared
 code to process DHCP option contents.
 
  So citing this section of RFC3315 is telling an implementor to
  reuse that code.
 
 Oh.  So there is a specification for existing DHCP mechanism(s) that use 
 this construct?

If I gave you the impression that the ISC DHCP server and client
software shared common code or libraries with, say, the Kame server
and, say, the Apple OSX client (if there is one), that is incorrect.

I was referring to practices internal to implementations, reuse of
code internal to each.


And so long as I'm transmitting, there is one other thing;

| returns.   And what you, as a server implementer, already know
| or can take advantage of is of absolutely no use to them.

One might infer from this that I am creditable for ISC's DHCPv6
Server implementation, and that isn't correct.

Let me be clear: the only person who deserves that credit is Shane
Kerr.  If I deserve any credit, it is for helping him find bugs.

We are both, however, equally culpable for any blame.

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Re: Last Call: 'Domain Suffix Option for DHCPv6' to Proposed Standard (draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-opt-dnsdomain)

2006-09-27 Thread David W. Hankins
I'm not sure why this discussion has broken out on [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Is it not better for iesg@ and [EMAIL PROTECTED]

On Wed, Sep 27, 2006 at 08:41:27AM -0700, Dave Crocker wrote:
 as John noted, the term item is not defined, so we don't know how many 
 labels (dns fields) are permitted.  This certainly encourages the 
 confusion between TLD and organization base.

It's hard to disagree with the term 'item' being more vague than is
ideal.  To be clearest it should probaly say having exactly one root
label (one domain name) or similar.


I am, however, a little skeptical at how useful it is going to be
to define the term 'domain name suffix'.  I suspect the author of
this draft started by calling them 'zone suffixes' and was asked by
DNS people to switch to 'domain name' instead of 'zone' because
the principle concept of a 'zone name' is different from a 'domain'
(although they overlap and are sometimes equal).

That's judging by the history of edits of this document and others
it at one time referenced (which looks to be a bid to place the
suffix in RS/RA, calling it a 'zone suffix' at that time).


I think operators know what this term means intuitively.  We can
define what it means all we want, but they already know and don't
care what we think it means.  So it seems like a lot of work with
very little payout and a high degree of probability it will turn
into a windmill designed for tilting at.

Once standing upon that ground, one questions why there would be
any wonderment about the meaning of the word 'item' in this context,
where the term 'domain name suffix' is already well understood.


 I'm also a tad uncomfortable with the levels of indirection in the cited 
 reference.  The 3315 section really points to a section in 1035, modulo 
 prohibiting compressed form.  The cited section in 1035 defines a basic 
 syntax but then relies on a different section in 1035.  This all seems 
 likely to invite different interpretations.

Quite the opposite.  DHCP server software commonly refers to shared
code to process DHCP option contents.

So citing this section of RFC3315 is telling an implementor to
reuse that code.

Literally, when I read an option document for DHCPv6 that cites
this section of 3315, all I have to do is turn that into:

{ option-name, D, dhcpv6_universe, CODE_NUM, 1 },

I don't even need to look up that section of 3315 nor the 1035
document.  This is just a standard DHCPv6 domain name format.


Note that if we take this stance, that every draft must redefine
the meaning or cite some new work that does so, then we should have
done that in RFC3319, RFC3646, RFC3898, and RFC4280.  Possibly the
DHCPv6 FQDN draft (still waiting for RFC assignment) as well, I can't
remember.

All of these used this method to define options of this format, to my
recent memory at least.  It is common DHC WG guidance to authors to
cite 3315 rather than reinventing.

DHCPv4 has taught us that, while clarity is important and we strive
for it, consistency is more important of these two.

It is better that one implementation treat all similarly formatted
options the same (poor) way, than for any implementation to treat
some options differently from others.

The former is easy for implementations to construct workarounds -
in single, reused-code ways.  The latter is a nightmare construct
of matrixes of option codes and special-case code.

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Re: IETF lists as RSS?

2006-04-26 Thread David W. Hankins
On Wed, Apr 26, 2006 at 11:38:30PM +0200, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:
 On Wed, Apr 26, 2006 at 10:24:22PM +0200,
  Alexandru Petrescu [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote 
  Is it possible to read content of the IETF lists (WG discussions,
  announce, etc) as RSS feeds?
 
 It would be strange to use one of the many RSS formats while there is
 a technically superior IETF standard (RFC 4287).

It would certainly be strange, at the IETF, for anyone to suggest
using a technology that is known to be pervasively deployed and
functional.

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Re: [dhcwg] DHCP and FQDN conflicts [Re: Last Call: 'Resolution of FQDN Conflicts among DHCP Clients' to Proposed Standard]

2005-12-01 Thread David W. Hankins
I haven't seen any replies in this corner of the thread.  Apologies
if this has been covered elsehwere.


On Sat, Nov 26, 2005 at 04:27:27PM +0200, Pekka Savola wrote:
 I have one major issue with 'Resolution of FQDN Conflicts among DHCP 
 Clients', the first issue below.  It fails to properly describe the 
 threats caused by DHCP clients requesting updating non-DHCP FQDN's 
 (like a random host from example.com requesting www.example.com). 
 While this may not be a problem if DHCP clients belong to different 
 zones from non-DHCP clients, this is not discussed at all in the 
 document -- except ruled out of scope.

The WG felt that it was necessary to include language in the document
that gives implementors freedom to use alternative algorithms.  This
is one such case...where the 'example algorithm' the document set out
to describe handles the condition you describe easily (without a need
for security consideration) because the existence of an A record
without a DHCID results in update failure and the client is given a
unique name instead.

Admittedly, this makes the document 'mosey' a bit.

But it would be foolhardy to ask the authors to document every single
possible security implication of every single possible alternate
algorithm, including the alternative possibilities the WG discussion
asked it to explicitly permit.

I think the security section would rapidly become larger than the
document in total.


Now, perhaps RFCs shouldn't read like Choose your own Adventure
novels.

And asking the authors to mud the language to endorse alternative
algorithms was a waste of their time.

Perhaps the document should have documented one algorithm, noted
the possible existence of others only, and continued to document
exactly one algorithm implementing exactly one administrative
policy consistently throughout.

And leave all else to future work.

I seem to recall someone actually saying that in the WG traffic on
the subject.  I think it was the author.  Perhaps we should have
listened, or more of us should have agreed.


Overall, that's probably healthier for the DHCP-accessed dynamic
DNS universe...that the RFCfoo compliant text on each product
be the same only on those products that are actually intercompatible,
not merely those who once met the algorithm described in the draft
in a subway.


I've got to agree on this tangent with Pekka here.


 6.3.2.  DNS UPDATE When FQDN in Use
 
2.  A delete of the existing  RRs on the FQDN if the updater does
not desire  records on the FQDN or this update is adding an
 and the updater only desires a single IP address on the
FQDN.
 
 == how does the code know whether the updates only desires a single IP
 address on the FQDN or not?   AFAICS, there's no way to signal this from the
 DHCP client!

That's correct, this is the operator's decision, which may be made
for them by software of specific manufacture (or defaults of same).

A system administrator may preside over an array of DHCP clients, let us
imagine, that do not tell the DHCP server to RELEASE their lease prior
to being uncerimoniously removed from the networks to which they are
attached.

In this case, it is desirable for the clients to be treated as though
they only ever have a single address.  The old addresses are stale, and
continued resolution of them in the DNS only produces timeouts (or
failure to operate if the software can't seek to the working address).

A client or server implementation may elect to simply delete all old
A/ records whenever it updates.

Or it may elect to teardown the previous records prior to updating (ISC
DHCP one-lease-per-client true; syntax for example).

Or, if it believes both addresses are actually in use or at least leaves
it up to the client to release their leases if they aren't, it can
allow multiple addresses.


So if the 'updater', be that client or server, be that software of ISC
or Kame or Cisco or Nominum manufacture, be that Fred or George's
system, chooses, it can do what it pleases.

 Through the use of the client
FQDN option, DHCP clients and servers can negotiate the client's FQDN
and the allocation of responsibility for updating the DHCP client's A
and/or  RRs.
 
 == also PTR records, not just A/..

No.  Only A/.  The PTR is always updated by the server.  Hence
the responsibility of updating the A/ is the only thing that's
negotiated in the FQDN option.

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Re: [dhcwg] Re: DHCID and the use of MD5 [Re: Last Call:'Resolution ofFQDN Conflicts among DHCP Clients' to ProposedStandard]

2005-12-01 Thread David W. Hankins
On Wed, Nov 30, 2005 at 03:51:13AM -0500, Sam Hartman wrote:
 Phil is suggesting something like _dhcid.domain .

Except the difference between NXDOMAIN and NXRRSET is important for the
DHCID.

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Re: [dhcwg] DHCP and FQDN conflicts [Re: Last Call: 'Resolution of FQDN Conflicts among DHCP Clients' to Proposed Standard]

2005-12-01 Thread David W. Hankins
On Thu, Dec 01, 2005 at 03:00:49PM +0200, Pekka Savola wrote:
 On Wed, 30 Nov 2005, David W. Hankins wrote:
 Now, perhaps RFCs shouldn't read like Choose your own Adventure
 novels.
 
 My problem is that the spec leaves the algorithm completely open. 
 There is at least one simple algorithm (just blindly update if there's 
 no DHCID) has severe problems in certain kinds of zones.  This doc 
 should discourage or disallow that algorithm by default.  As for the 
 rest, I don't really care (though as a user, it would likely have been 
 nice if the behaviour between different vendors would have been 
 consistent, but we aren't going to get that it seems..).

I think we should take this one back to the WG.  Find out how many
algorithms there are which people actually want to use, within each
how many administrative policies there are (and name them all), and
who is interested in each one (more importantly, which One Bernie still
has the strength to document, if any).

Split up and go our separate ways, make new documents for the
additional algorithms (or don't if the interested parties don't
feel a need to).

  That's correct, this is the operator's decision, which may be made
  for them by software of specific manufacture (or defaults of same).
 
 This is exactly the problem: the software choosing what's best for the 
 user.

Welcome to DHCP?  I'm sorry, that wasn't fair.

When, for example, at an IETF, where the systems operators are
engineers of similar character and capability as the clients (IETF
attendees), this solution can mix like water and oil.  Especially if
any of the involved individuals have opinions on how things should
work, and choose to share them, which is about like applying a match
to the solution.  An IETF Molotov cocktail, if you will.

But, on a campus of some 100,000 Windows boxes, for example, where
the system operator has very limited experience with networks much
less DHCP much less DNS (because this is a job they give 'the new guy'),
and a drinking problem to boot, and the users surprise us daily by their
ability to mimic human speech, even forming rudimentary sentences such
as I want net! or Fix magic electric box now!, this is ultimately the
only sane approach.

Obviously, between those two there are a variety of equally painful
scenarios, and we hope a bell curve where reasonably skilled operators
are asked to preside over reasonably computer literate client users.
Only some skeptics say the bell is upside-down.

Software will exist that is tailored to at least those two extremes,
if not more.  I suspect most software (or most widely used software)
will need to be readily adaptable to either.

So the draft really needs to document both ends of the spectrum.

  [looks like I oversnipped bits about A/ genocide]
 
 That would be unfortunate.  Wouldn't it be sufficient that the server 
 removes the DNS records after the lease expires?  Then if the user 
 doesn't reconnect anywhere else prior to lease expiry, all is cool.

That is one approach, but it is the road generally not taken.

Lease times in campuses are often 24 hours, or more (I've seen 3-month
lease times, although they are rare...1 week is fairly common.  Also
let us not forget that RFC2131 explicitly has a special-case value
(all-ones) for the lease-time that is defined to mean infinite...there
are some actual field cases where this is used (I get patches from these
people).  Is it wise to leave forward records up indefinitely?

One operational impact of lease time is frequency of interruption for
the client.  Some clients either return to INIT state immediately should
the renewal time out (so brief interruptions in the DHCP service are
painful for some sysops), and some are known to 'hang' the IP layer
while the renewal is underway (painful for the user, more painful when
the systems administrator gets phonecalls asking why).

And in my own experimentation, I was able to consistently crash an
array of Windows 95, 98, and 2000 boxes simply by using a 30 second
lease time.

Wether these behaviours are in the spirit of the RFCs or not is
immaterial to an operator.

Add to this that larger times result in lower rate of activity on a
DHCP server (or cluster of same) in the center of a large campus.

So, larger lease times are preferred by admins.  Generally the
question is how much advance notice are you required to give for
network downtime?  Often 24, or 48 hours.

Letting these large times expire isn't tractable if the client has a
need to be reached by its name (which would be the whole point of DDNS
via DHCP - not mere vanity we would hope).

-- 
David W. HankinsIf you don't do it right the first time,
Software Engineer   you'll just have to do it again.
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Re: [dhcwg] Re: DHCID and the use of MD5 [Re: Last Call: 'Resolution ofFQDN Conflicts among DHCP Clients' to Proposed Standard]

2005-11-29 Thread David W. Hankins
On Mon, Nov 28, 2005 at 05:20:09PM -0500, Bernie Volz (volz) wrote:
 Yes, I can.
 
 The ISC's DHCP server (www.isc.org) does this (I'm not sure whether it
 uses MD5 to encode the client identity or not). Ted might know for sure.

It does, though it only encodes the client identity (client identifier
option or chaddr), it does not include the FQDN like the current DHCID
draft does.

There are a few niggling bits that are different, and obviously
incompatible (not just because it's encoded as hexadecimal in a TXT
record), but on all points that are topical to this discussion it's
the same.

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Software Engineer   you'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins

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Re: [dhcwg] DHCP and FQDN conflicts [Re: Last Call: 'Resolution of FQDN Conflicts among DHCP Clients' to Proposed Standard]

2005-11-29 Thread David W. Hankins
On Mon, Nov 28, 2005 at 01:13:43PM -0500, Sam Hartman wrote:
 You need to get sufficiently specific that in practice, the
 implementation of this option is not influencing addressing plans.
 For example if servers tend to get this wrong in a way that makes it
 difficult for me to have multiple addresses for client then you were
 not specific enough.

In practice, at least one implementation today will fail (logging an
error) if more than one A record on a given FQDN is present.

Will more specific text change that?


It's actually the current wording of the drafts that first imparted to
me the contrary, and the means to acheive that, and you might see a
future version of ISC DHCP moving in that direction as a consequence.

So, in my unreliable opinion, it's fine the way it is.

-- 
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Software Engineer   you'll just have to do it again.
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.   -- Jack T. Hankins

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