Re: #720 and #725 - Appeals and IAD autonomy
I think that the text on appeals and recalls in draft-ietf-iasa-bcp-03.txt is necessary and sufficient. There is a way to get decisions reviewed and a way to get IAOC members fired. I don't want any more than that, and I don't want the IAD formally subject to complaints except via his or her management. Brian ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: #720 and #725 - Appeals and IAD autonomy
Hi Spencer - [ Charset ISO-8859-1 unsupported, converting... ] Hi John - Your note seems like an outlier. In particular, it takes a really *strong* stance on protecting people from each other because people *will* act badly. For example, the way I read your note, the IESG will micromanage and the IASA/IAD will order bagels flown in daily from New York. Appeals will be a daily happening and people will hire lawyers instead of working it out. John's note took a stronger stand than I would have taken, but I happen to agree with most of his points - especially that IASA/IAD effectiveness should be evaluated in large slices. Maybe annually, certainly not decision-by-decision. Periodic reviews are good ... Marshall Rose once suggested a 3-year sunset clause. In any case, you know you can do that review without having that in the BCP? (As could ISOC.) That's a unilateral action and the BCP is supposed to cover a mutual agreement. In my second marriage, I have learned that in a partnership vital to both parties, I don't get to pick the parts I like and demand that the other parts change. It's a package deal. If the package works, great, but trying to turn a package that doesn't work into one that does, part by part, just isn't worth the aggravation and agony. Well, mumble, since we're going down that metaphorical rat hole ... You're right ... you can't make people change part by part. But, I can't somehow imagine a marriage between people preceeded with a 6-month pre-nuptial negotiation period. Perhaps in New York City, but certainly not on the west coast where I live. It seems to me that the IETF has been shacking up with ISOC for 10 years, has gone through an intensive courtship period with lots of dating rules, and that if this marriage is going to work less time should be spent planning the divorce and a bit more time on planning some romantic honeymoon activities like forming committees, doing budgets, and evaluating IAD applicants. I just don't see any marginal gain in further tweaking of the vows and even if you get your prospective bride to utter specific words, the lawyer/priest won't be around after the ceremony and you're going to have to work together. Isn't it time to cut that cake? Best regards and happy holidays Regards, Carl ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: #720 and #725 - Appeals and IAD autonomy
John == John Leslie [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: JohnThe whole idea here, I thought, was to set up a support John structure which would just work -- so that it could be John invisible to the IESG and never need to be discussed by John that group. (The problem, I thought, was that shortcomings John of the current Secretariat were entirely too visible; and John the IESG was spinning its wheels discussing them.) No, the secretariat function will and should not be invisible to the IETF. The IESG and IAB are likely to be in the best position to set priorities for the clerk function. The IESG is probably the body that would make a decision if people felt that a particular meeting location did not meet our openness requirements. The IESG is involved in approving a lot of scheduling requests. However the IESG and IAB are only one of the customers of the administrative function. Today if the IESG asks for something there's not a good way to know if the request is reasonable nor how it is prioritized. Understandably, Foretec's priorities are not quite the same as the IETF's priorities.They are a for-profit corporation accountable to their shareholders. To the extent that they do what the IETF wants, it is because they choose to do so. factors like good will, demonstrating to other potential customers that they do a good job and just wanting to be helpful are probably all important. One goal of the IASA is to bring this accountability into the IETF. The IASA needs to balance priorities coming in from the IAB and IESG against other needs and against available money.The IESG is expected to continue discussing secretariat functions although we hope the spinning the wheels (to the extent that it does happen--I don't know yet how much that is)will stop. And, as I said, the issue I'm raising is a key management and management-relationships principle. Whether one agrees with it or not, characterizing it as a corner case seems to me like a stretch. JohnLet's review what John Klensin asked for: * the IETF John has got to keep its hands off the day-to-day decisions, John even when they seem wrong I don't strictly disagree with this although I'd prefer something less restrictive. The structure should reasonably represent the costs of reviewing decisions so that decisions are not reviewed more frequently than is appropriate. Some may argue that this goal is difficult to achieve and that simply never reviewing day-to-day decisions is a better approach. John * the IESG and IAB need to be John prohibited structurally from micromanaging, or managing at John all, beyond the degree that the IAOC wants to permit. John They supply input, they make requests, but decisions rest John on the IAOC side of the wall and stay there, with the only John _real_ recourse being to fire the IAOC It all depends on what you mean here by managing. The BCP explicitly calls out the IESG and IAB as important customers of the IASA--or did at one point. If you are a services organization you certainly should not be invisible to your important customers. It also seems like at least in practice your important customers will be able to create significant pressure to meet their priorities or to explain why this cannot be done in the money available. On paper, though, I agree that the decision rests with the IASA. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: #720 and #725 - Appeals and IAD autonomy
--On Wednesday, 22 December, 2004 21:51 +0100 Harald Tveit Alvestrand [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John, I've probably seen enough versions of enough issues that I'm more than a little spaced out.. but I think your proposal looks very much like the in-draft version of the appeals procedure, with three differences: - Not limited to procedure, and not limited to the IAOC - Abandoning the chain model of if you don't like one decision, try again that the current appeal structure has - Not using the word appeal I like all of those properties, and it should be a small twist of language (starting from the text in the draft, not the most recent suggestion) to make it come out that way. But I'm not sure I'm reading your words correctly, so better double-check A fascinating question, actually. I think you are reading my words correctly and that, by happy coincidence, the words that are now in the draft are fairly easily adapted. But the principles are more important than the words, and I think this is a profound change in principles. It is, I think, a significant change to say if you expect the IAOC model to succeed, * the IETF has got to keep its hands off the day-to-day decisions, even when they seem wrong * the IESG and IAB need to be prohibited structurally from micromanaging, or managing at all, beyond the degree that the IAOC wants to permit. They supply input, they make requests, but decisions rest on the IAOC side of the wall and stay there, with the only _real_ recourse being to fire the IAOC and then to figure out a way to implement those principles. john ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: #720 and #725 - Appeals and IAD autonomy
--On torsdag, desember 23, 2004 04:14:58 -0500 John C Klensin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: --On Wednesday, 22 December, 2004 21:51 +0100 Harald Tveit Alvestrand [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John, I've probably seen enough versions of enough issues that I'm more than a little spaced out.. but I think your proposal looks very much like the in-draft version of the appeals procedure, with three differences: - Not limited to procedure, and not limited to the IAOC - Abandoning the chain model of if you don't like one decision, try again that the current appeal structure has - Not using the word appeal I like all of those properties, and it should be a small twist of language (starting from the text in the draft, not the most recent suggestion) to make it come out that way. But I'm not sure I'm reading your words correctly, so better double-check A fascinating question, actually. I think you are reading my words correctly and that, by happy coincidence, the words that are now in the draft are fairly easily adapted. But the principles are more important than the words, and I think this is a profound change in principles. It is, I think, a significant change to say if you expect the IAOC model to succeed, * the IETF has got to keep its hands off the day-to-day decisions, even when they seem wrong * the IESG and IAB need to be prohibited structurally from micromanaging, or managing at all, beyond the degree that the IAOC wants to permit. They supply input, they make requests, but decisions rest on the IAOC side of the wall and stay there, with the only _real_ recourse being to fire the IAOC and then to figure out a way to implement those principles. Actually, I think we have agreement on those principles, and have mostly been struggling with how to express them. Appeals procedures (under whatever name) are procedures that should exist so that if someone thinks something's gone really wrong, it's possible to get it noticed and talked about - and, if it's necessary, corrected. Trying to manage anything by routine appeals is totally broken. Harald ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: #720 and #725 - Appeals and IAD autonomy
--On Thursday, 23 December, 2004 10:22 +0100 Harald Tveit Alvestrand [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John, ... I like all of those properties, and it should be a small twist of language (starting from the text in the draft, not the most recent suggestion) to make it come out that way. But I'm not sure I'm reading your words correctly, so better double-check A fascinating question, actually. I think you are reading my words correctly and that, by happy coincidence, the words that are now in the draft are fairly easily adapted. But the principles are more important than the words, and I think this is a profound change in principles. It is, I think, a significant change to say if you expect the IAOC model to succeed, * the IETF has got to keep its hands off the day-to-day decisions, even when they seem wrong * the IESG and IAB need to be prohibited structurally from micromanaging, or managing at all, beyond the degree that the IAOC wants to permit. They supply input, they make requests, but decisions rest on the IAOC side of the wall and stay there, with the only _real_ recourse being to fire the IAOC and then to figure out a way to implement those principles. Actually, I think we have agreement on those principles, and have mostly been struggling with how to express them. Appeals procedures (under whatever name) are procedures that should exist so that if someone thinks something's gone really wrong, it's possible to get it noticed and talked about - and, if it's necessary, corrected. Trying to manage anything by routine appeals is totally broken. Well, perhaps we are close enough that it doesn't make sense to have further discussion without text, and text in context, but... I think the something's gone really wrong and ...corrected part of the above _might_ miss the point I'm trying to make. (1) If you have an appeal procedure, any appeal procedure at all, then it is up to the judgment of the individual members of the community whether a decision is really wrong. I don't need to worry about denial of service attacks here, just about people acting in good faith and with the best of intentions. Remember we have had debates on the IETF list about the variety of pastries to be available during meeting coffee breaks as well as the theory for selecting meeting sites. I may be too concerned about this, but I think those debates could easily have led to appeals about meeting locations when people concluded that the decisions being made were against the expressed consensus desires of the community (or against plain good sense). Such appeals have been prevented by the assumption that the IETF membership has no ultimate control over _individual_ secretariat or Chair meeting siting decisions and that contracts are already signed by the time meeting sites are announced. That has protected us from procedural entanglements that could easily make meeting scheduling impossible. But, with the presumed requirements on the admin structure for openness, that particular protection disappears. (2) If there is an mechanism, any mechanism at all, for the IESG and IAB to second-guess administrative entity decisions, I think it can be guaranteed, given the sorts of personalities we put on those bodies, that the mechanism will sooner or later be used and that, once used, there will be a tendency for its use to become routine. We appoint people with strong opinions and with a tendency to want to manage, sometimes micromanage, anything for which they feel responsible and to do so aggressively. If kept under control and in perspective, those tendencies can be very useful. But I think any person who has listened to a few IESG telechats, any WG Chair or Editor who has tried to get a document through the system in recent years, anyone who has worked for the Secretariat, and many others can easily identify incidents that they would consider out of control or without adequate perspective. (3) Part of the problem here is that, on the technical standards side, part of the job of the IESG is to ensure that the collection of standards the IETF emits are essentially consistent, that we don't have a standard in one area that makes a standard in another area impossible to implement. Sometimes we don't get that quite right and it requires some sorting-out. But it works most of the time, and works precisely because that is a real IESG responsibility which the IESG and the community take seriously. On the admin side, the IAOC
Re: #720 and #725 - Appeals and IAD autonomy
Hi John - Your note seems like an outlier. In particular, it takes a really *strong* stance on protecting people from each other because people *will* act badly. For example, the way I read your note, the IESG will micromanage and the IASA/IAD will order bagels flown in daily from New York. Appeals will be a daily happening and people will hire lawyers instead of working it out. I think you're trying to solve many corner cases. I don't think we need to solve them right now. As Dave Farber would say, maybe we should burn those bagels when we get to them? Seriously: this BCP seems, imo, pretty much cooked. There may be flaws and holes that people forgot, but this would be alot easier to nail down if we had some operational experience in the new framework and then solve problems that are real. There are lots of checks in balances in place, there are going to be lots of new people who have to get up to speed, and the community is watching. I know you don't want to revise the BCP every 10 minutes for the next 10 years, but if we had to ammend it once or even twice, this would not be a big tragedy. My personal advice: let's stop negotiating, call this BCP cooked, and move on to other fires. Carl (speaking as a private citizen again ... my contract with ISOC has run it's course) --On Thursday, 23 December, 2004 10:22 +0100 Harald Tveit Alvestrand [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John, ... I like all of those properties, and it should be a small twist of language (starting from the text in the draft, not the most recent suggestion) to make it come out that way. But I'm not sure I'm reading your words correctly, so better double-check A fascinating question, actually. I think you are reading my words correctly and that, by happy coincidence, the words that are now in the draft are fairly easily adapted. But the principles are more important than the words, and I think this is a profound change in principles. It is, I think, a significant change to say if you expect the IAOC model to succeed, * the IETF has got to keep its hands off the day-to-day decisions, even when they seem wrong * the IESG and IAB need to be prohibited structurally from micromanaging, or managing at all, beyond the degree that the IAOC wants to permit. They supply input, they make requests, but decisions rest on the IAOC side of the wall and stay there, with the only _real_ recourse being to fire the IAOC and then to figure out a way to implement those principles. Actually, I think we have agreement on those principles, and have mostly been struggling with how to express them. Appeals procedures (under whatever name) are procedures that should exist so that if someone thinks something's gone really wrong, it's possible to get it noticed and talked about - and, if it's necessary, corrected. Trying to manage anything by routine appeals is totally broken. Well, perhaps we are close enough that it doesn't make sense to have further discussion without text, and text in context, but... I think the something's gone really wrong and ...corrected part of the above _might_ miss the point I'm trying to make. (1) If you have an appeal procedure, any appeal procedure at all, then it is up to the judgment of the individual members of the community whether a decision is really wrong. I don't need to worry about denial of service attacks here, just about people acting in good faith and with the best of intentions. Remember we have had debates on the IETF list about the variety of pastries to be available during meeting coffee breaks as well as the theory for selecting meeting sites. I may be too concerned about this, but I think those debates could easily have led to appeals about meeting locations when people concluded that the decisions being made were against the expressed consensus desires of the community (or against plain good sense). Such appeals have been prevented by the assumption that the IETF membership has no ultimate control over _individual_ secretariat or Chair meeting siting decisions and that contracts are already signed by the time meeting sites are announced. That has protected us from procedural entanglements that could easily make meeting scheduling impossible. But, with the presumed requirements on the admin structure for openness, that particular protection disappears. (2) If there is an mechanism, any mechanism at all, for the IESG and IAB to second-guess administrative entity decisions, I think it can be guaranteed, given the sorts of personalities we put on those bodies, that the mechanism will sooner or later be used and that, once used, there will be a tendency for
Re: #720 and #725 - Appeals and IAD autonomy
--On Thursday, 23 December, 2004 09:42 -0800 Carl Malamud [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi John - Your note seems like an outlier. In particular, it takes a really *strong* stance on protecting people from each other because people *will* act badly. For example, the way I read your note, the IESG will micromanage and the IASA/IAD will order bagels flown in daily from New York. Appeals will be a daily happening and people will hire lawyers instead of working it out. No, my concern is that (i) the IESG, or the IESG's leadership, is likely to micromanage because it has tended to micromanage, or try to do so, many of the things it has touched in the last several years -- the secretariat, the content of various documents down to the editorial level, the RFC Editor, and so on (some of that has gotten better in recent months or years, but that isn't the point). Even you have made the claim that they (for some instance of they) have tried to micromanage you in terms of the contents of your various reports and recommendations. And the discussion of why the IETF and IAB Chairs had to be on the IAOC had, to me, a strong ring of so we can make sure that administrative entity does exactly what we want, which is close to an operational definition of intended micromanagement. So that one isn't a corner case, it is a simple extrapolation from behavior that has been observed in the community (and commented upon in the Problem Statement work, which makes it feel like I'm not alone in those impressions). (ii) If I'm worried about bagels (I'm really not), I'm not worried about the IAD/IASA making that decision: I expect those people to be firmly in contact with fiscal realities and priorities. If they are not, we will have far worse problems than the bagel supply. But I'm concerned about even the possibility of bagels-by-appeal, or bagels-by-IESG/IAB-overriding IAD decisions, even while realizing that particular example is (deliberately) unlikely. And, as I said, the issue I'm raising is a key management and management-relationships principle. Whether one agrees with it or not, characterizing it as a corner case seems to me like a stretch. ... Seriously: this BCP seems, imo, pretty much cooked. There may be flaws and holes that people forgot, but this would be a lot easier to nail down if we had some operational experience in the new framework and then solve problems that are real. There are lots of checks in balances in place, there are going to be lots of new people who have to get up to speed, and the community is watching. The observation that what I was suggesting was close to what was there now and would require only a few wording changes came from Harald and not from me. I was just trying to be sure we all had the same understanding of what those wording changes would be intended to mean if we mean them. I know you don't want to revise the BCP every 10 minutes for the next 10 years, but if we had to ammend it once or even twice, this would not be a big tragedy. No. But I've heard that the draft IAD job description was floated by a couple of HR/ search experts (I believe at least one of those reports has not been forwarded to the transition team because there was no indication that the advice was wanted) and that the comments involved phrases like incompetent description and no one sane would take a job defined that way. These are not small issues: they go to the very core of the likely ability of the IAD and IAOC to function. To paraphrase an out-of-context quote from a different discussion, I don't want to see Harald become the next-to-last Chair of the IETF because of this process. Put differently, I'd like to be sure that principles are well enough articulated, and details left to where they can be worked out, that we get a chance to revise the BCP without completely killing the IETF in the process. My personal advice: let's stop negotiating, call this BCP cooked, and move on to other fires. And my personal advice is to make sure that we get the principles right and that we do so, as needed, based on competent review and advice. I also recommend that we look at past behaviors and assume that they extrapolate cleanly into future behaviors unless reasons or conditions can be identified that make such extrapolation inappropriate. I further recommend that it is far more useful to look at those extrapolations and what they mean about both principles and implementation than it is to spend a lot of energy on scenarios that are really unlikely, such as how things would be handled, in detail, if IETF income from meeting fees significantly exceeded all expenses in a given year. You may have noted that I've said virtually nothing, on or off-list, about editorial matters that don't impact principles except sometimes to suggest that excess detail be removed. That is not an accident. It is consistent, I think, with your desire to get this cooked and out but without
Re: #720 and #725 - Appeals and IAD autonomy
Hi John - (i) the IESG, or the IESG's leadership, is likely to micromanage because it has tended to micromanage, or try to do so, many of the things it has touched in the last several years -- the secretariat, the content of various documents down to the editorial level, the RFC Editor, and so on (some of that has gotten better in recent months or years, but that isn't the point). Even you have made the claim that they (for some instance of they) have tried to micromanage you in terms of the contents of your various reports and recommendations. And the discussion of why the IETF and IAB Chairs had to be on the IAOC had, to me, a strong ring of so we can make sure that administrative entity does exactly what we want, which is close to an operational definition of intended micromanagement. So that one isn't a corner case, it is a simple extrapolation from behavior that has been observed in the community (and commented upon in the Problem Statement work, which makes it feel like I'm not alone in those impressions). Hmmm I don't see how worrying this particular BCP to death is going to change any of that. You're talking some pretty fundmamental doom-and-gloom stuff. If things are that broken, could any BCP fix them? (ii) If I'm worried about bagels (I'm really not), I'm not worried about the IAD/IASA making that decision: I expect those people to be firmly in contact with fiscal realities and priorities. If they are not, we will have far worse problems than the bagel supply. But I'm concerned about even the possibility of bagels-by-appeal, or bagels-by-IESG/IAB-overriding IAD decisions, even while realizing that particular example is (deliberately) unlikely. And, as I said, the issue I'm raising is a key management and management-relationships principle. Whether one agrees with it or not, characterizing it as a corner case seems to me like a stretch. Hmmm again ... maybe it is just the holiday spirit, or the six months of intensive community work that has gone into the document, but it just seems to me that bagels-by-appeal, or any of the other bagel-related scenarios, are corner cases. snip for brevity No. But I've heard that the draft IAD job description was floated by a couple of HR/ search experts (I believe at least one of those reports has not been forwarded to the transition team because there was no indication that the advice was wanted) and that the comments involved phrases like incompetent description and no one sane would take a job defined that way. These are not small issues: they go to the very core of the likely ability of the IAD and IAOC to function. To paraphrase an out-of-context quote from a different discussion, I don't want to see Harald become the next-to-last Chair of the IETF because of this process. Put differently, I'd like to be sure that principles are well enough articulated, and details left to where they can be worked out, that we get a chance to revise the BCP without completely killing the IETF in the process. Well, I wrote portions of that description, so I definitely resemble that remark. ;) I think you're overblowing this IAD position by asking for things like executive searches. Feel free to furnish new text to the committee ... As to the end of the IETF, mumble. That seems a bit much. My personal advice: let's stop negotiating, call this BCP cooked, and move on to other fires. And my personal advice is to make sure that we get the principles right and that we do so, as needed, based on competent review and advice. I also recommend that we look at past behaviors and assume that they extrapolate cleanly into future behaviors unless reasons or conditions can be identified that make such extrapolation inappropriate. I further recommend that it is far more useful to look at those extrapolations and what they mean about both principles and implementation than it is to spend a lot of energy on scenarios that are really unlikely, such as how things would be handled, in detail, if IETF income from meeting fees significantly exceeded all expenses in a given year. You may have noted that I've said virtually nothing, on or off-list, about editorial matters that don't impact principles except sometimes to suggest that excess detail be removed. That is not an accident. It is consistent, I think, with your desire to get this cooked and out but without pushing important issues under the proverbial rug in the process. YMMD, of course, and likely does. It does. I've seen a remarkable degree of consensus, a few tweaks on a few things, but no huge disagreement that the principles are wrong. It may not be a great document, the framework may not be ideal, but I think y'all should move on and get back to some real work. :) Regards, Carl ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: #720 and #725 - Appeals and IAD autonomy
--On Thursday, 23 December, 2004 13:31 -0800 Carl Malamud [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi John - (i) the IESG, or the IESG's leadership, is likely to micromanage because it has tended to micromanage, or try to do so, many of the things it has touched in the last several years -- the secretariat, the content of various documents down to the editorial level, the RFC Editor, and so on (some of that has gotten better in recent months or years, but that ... Hmmm I don't see how worrying this particular BCP to death is going to change any of that. You're talking some pretty fundmamental doom-and-gloom stuff. If things are that broken, could any BCP fix them? Well, that is one of the reasons why several members of the community have tried to comment, several times, that the Admin Reorg effort is addressing problems that are either irrelevant or not on the critical path. And I have observed that all of them, after having been ignored, have simply dropped out of the discussion. I suspect, but can't prove, that in disgust belongs at the end of that sentence. I'd also observe that I don't think you have tried to get a technical or standards track document through the system in the last year or two. (ii) If I'm worried about bagels (I'm really not), I'm not worried about the IAD/IASA making that decision: I expect those people to be firmly in contact with fiscal realities and priorities. If they are not, we will have far worse problems than the bagel supply. But I'm concerned about even the possibility of bagels-by-appeal, or bagels-by-IESG/IAB-overriding IAD decisions, even while realizing that particular example is (deliberately) unlikely. And, as I said, the issue I'm raising is a key management and management-relationships principle. Whether one agrees with it or not, characterizing it as a corner case seems to me like a stretch. Hmmm again ... maybe it is just the holiday spirit, or the six months of intensive community work that has gone into the document, but it just seems to me that bagels-by-appeal, or any of the other bagel-related scenarios, are corner cases. The bagels aren't just corner cases, they are a deliberately-silly example (which I think I've said). But the question of how much the IESG and IAB should be able to intervene in the operations of the IASA is not. snip for brevity No. But I've heard that the draft IAD job description was floated by a couple of HR/ search experts (I believe at least one of those reports has not been forwarded to the transition team because there was no indication that the advice was ... Well, I wrote portions of that description, so I definitely resemble that remark. ;) I think you're overblowing this IAD position by asking for things like executive searches. Feel free to furnish new text to the committee ... I actually never asked for an executive search. I asked for review of the description by someone competent in that area and for the transition team to consider whether an executive search was appropriate. My personal hypothesis, as I said on the list, was that it probably would not be useful and worth the costs. But I thought the question was important to ask, and am concerned about the symptoms of its not being asked, of the description not being reviewed by professionals, etc. As far as whether I'm overblowing the position, I don't know, because I still can't figure out from the draft just what the expectations are of how much authority that person has and what he or she is expected to do. If we are talking about an overblown administrative assistant (or executive assistant to the IETF Chair), then thinking seriously about searches is unnecessary. But I keep seeing phrases that imply managing a fairly large operation consisting of multiple subcontractors, shaping a reasonably large budget, and making a large number of decisions that could, if gotten wrong, impact the IETF's ability to function. If _those_ are the expectations, then I think we really want some executive-level talent in the job and that hiring someone junior who happens to know some of the IETF Leadership (not the only alternative, but one extreme possibility) would be a bit mistake. As to the end of the IETF, mumble. That seems a bit much. Well, my impression -- it is just an impression, but I am still trying to get technical work done in this community and keep hearing from others in the same boat-- is that this process is sucking a lot of the energy and life out of the community. I suggest that very few of the people who are following all of the BCP and issues traffic are functionally doing anything else in the IETF. If those impressions are correct, it brings us to the question of how long we can pull energy into administrative planning and similar structural/ organizational issues before it is fatal... whether fatal to energy, fatal to the notion that work can get done here, fatal to the notion that investing
Re: #720 and #725 - Appeals and IAD autonomy
John == John C Klensin [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: John --On Thursday, 23 December, 2004 09:42 -0800 Carl Malamud John [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi John - Your note seems like an outlier. In particular, it takes a really *strong* stance on protecting people from each other because people *will* act badly. For example, the way I read your note, the IESG will micromanage and the IASA/IAD will order bagels flown in daily from New York. Appeals will be a daily happening and people will hire lawyers instead of working it out. John No, my concern is that John (i) the IESG, or the IESG's leadership, is likely to John micromanage because it has tended to micromanage, or try to John do so, many of the things it has touched in the last several John years -- the secretariat, the content of various documents John down to the editorial level, the RFC Editor, and so on (some John of that has gotten better in recent months or years, but John that isn't the point). Even you have made the claim that John they (for some instance of they) have tried to micromanage John you in terms of the contents of your various reports and John recommendations. And the discussion of why the IETF and IAB John Chairs had to be on the IAOC had, to me, a strong ring of John so we can make sure that administrative entity does exactly John what we want, which is close to an operational definition John of intended micromanagement. So that one isn't a corner John case, it is a simple extrapolation from behavior that has John been observed in the community (and commented upon in the John Problem Statement work, which makes it feel like I'm not John alone in those impressions). Micro-management is not the same as management. I actually think the IESG and IAB have done a good job of stepping in, applying management and solving some real problems over the years. I realize that I'm now part of the IESG and thus part of the organization that you believe is doing too much micro-management. However I haven't been involved in many of the past decisions and so I think that this response is at least mostly untainted by my involvement in the IESG.p So, I do see the IESG and IAB continuing to try and set priorities for the parts of the secretariat that influence the standards process. Clearly these priorities will need to be evaluated in the entire budget context by the IASA just as they are now evaluated by Fortec. I'm not sure what specific issues you believe are micro-management. However I contend that this BCP is not the right forum for these concerns to be addressed. If you have concerns about how the IAB and IESG are conducting themselves, there are several approaches you could take. First, you can provide input to the IESG and IAB about how they have handled specific issues and how they are handling issues before them. In cases where you believe it is necessary to do so, you can even appeal decisions. You can also provide feedback to the nomcom if you believe that a different set of qualifications or outlook is required for IESG and IAB members. --Sam, speaking only for myself ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: #720 and #725 - Appeals and IAD autonomy
John C Klensin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: --On Thursday, 23 December, 2004 13:31 -0800 Carl Malamud [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [John Klensin wrote:] (i) the IESG, or the IESG's leadership, is likely to micromanage because it has tended to micromanage, or try to do so, many of the things it has touched in the last several years... John Klensin, I think, is in a position to know whether this is so. I haven't seen evidence that he's wrong... Hmmm I don't see how worrying this particular BCP to death is going to change any of that. You're talking some pretty fundmamental doom-and-gloom stuff. If things are that broken, could any BCP fix them? Well, we've had at least partial success on previous tries... But that's really not the point. We should ask, will _this_ BCP tend to make that situation better or worse? Well, that is one of the reasons why several members of the community have tried to comment, several times, that the Admin Reorg effort is addressing problems that are either irrelevant or not on the critical path. Indeed. The lack of agreement what _is_ the critical path has made this process difficult. And I have observed that all of them, after having been ignored, have simply dropped out of the discussion. This is not the way consensus is supposed to work: that things get dragged out until only like-minded people are still around. Consensus is supposed to consider issues raised by even very small minorities, and try to satisfy all reasonable persons that their concerns are addressed. ... But I'm concerned about even the possibility of bagels-by-appeal, or bagels-by-IESG/IAB-overriding IAD decisions, even while realizing that particular example is (deliberately) unlikely. This example is sufficiently unlikely that one is tempted to dismiss it, and miss the baby being thrown out with the bathwater. I'm not so much worried about IESG actually _appealing_ the decision on where to get bagels as I am about language which seems to encourage anyone who doesn't like the bagels to _ask_ the IESG to appeal it. Inevitable, somebody will claim to have heard that some-very-important-person didn't like the bagels, at which point it will be hard for any Chair to avoid wasting time talking about bagels. :^( The whole idea here, I thought, was to set up a support structure which would just work -- so that it could be invisible to the IESG and never need to be discussed by that group. (The problem, I thought, was that shortcomings of the current Secretariat were entirely too visible; and the IESG was spinning its wheels discussing them.) And, as I said, the issue I'm raising is a key management and management-relationships principle. Whether one agrees with it or not, characterizing it as a corner case seems to me like a stretch. Let's review what John Klensin asked for: * the IETF has got to keep its hands off the day-to-day decisions, even when they seem wrong * the IESG and IAB need to be prohibited structurally from micromanaging, or managing at all, beyond the degree that the IAOC wants to permit. They supply input, they make requests, but decisions rest on the IAOC side of the wall and stay there, with the only _real_ recourse being to fire the IAOC This doesn't sound like a corner case to me. You may have noted that I've said virtually nothing, on or off-list, about editorial matters that don't impact principles except sometimes to suggest that excess detail be removed. That is not an accident. It is consistent, I think, with your desire to get this cooked and out but without pushing important issues under the proverbial rug in the process. YMMD, of course, and likely does. It does. I've seen a remarkable degree of consensus, a few tweaks on a few things, but no huge disagreement that the principles are wrong. It may not be a great document, the framework may not be ideal, but I think y'all should move on and get back to some real work. :) I respect Carl's belief... but I respect John Klensin's worry more. And I think that a large fraction of that remarkable degree of consensus is consensus by exhaustion of most of the community. I've even heard from several IAB and IESG members that they have been exhausted by the process and can't deal with it any more. They shouldn't have to! If what we design doesn't make their job easier, and reduce the non-Internet things they need to worry about, this whole process will be a terrible mistake. I have a great deal of respect for Harald. He's done a very good job of managing a very difficult process. The process is an exhausting one -- we're trying to replace a totally unique process which _used_to_ work well for us with a slightly less unique process which none of us have experience with. Beliefs run strong. Legitimate concerns arise at every turn. Patience is needed here. I strongly recommend we wait for
Re: #720 and #725 - Appeals and IAD autonomy
On 23 dec 2004, at 20.07, John Leslie wrote: I'm not so much worried about IESG actually _appealing_ the decision on where to get bagels as I am about language which seems to encourage anyone who doesn't like the bagels to _ask_ the IESG to appeal it. I don't understand why it is that the IESG would make the appeals (I know this was the suggestion). I think that appeals should continue to work as they do now. First you appeal to the one who made the decision you don't like, then you escalate it. So if I want to appeal the IAD's decision, i go to the IAD. If I am not satisfied with the answer i go to the IAOC and then up the food chain (staying with the bagel motif) from there. a. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: #720 and #725 - Appeals and IAD autonomy
Hi John - Your note seems like an outlier. In particular, it takes a really *strong* stance on protecting people from each other because people *will* act badly. For example, the way I read your note, the IESG will micromanage and the IASA/IAD will order bagels flown in daily from New York. Appeals will be a daily happening and people will hire lawyers instead of working it out. John's note took a stronger stand than I would have taken, but I happen to agree with most of his points - especially that IASA/IAD effectiveness should be evaluated in large slices. Maybe annually, certainly not decision-by-decision. In my second marriage, I have learned that in a partnership vital to both parties, I don't get to pick the parts I like and demand that the other parts change. It's a package deal. If the package works, great, but trying to turn a package that doesn't work into one that does, part by part, just isn't worth the aggravation and agony. Spencer ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: #720 and #725 - Appeals and IAD autonomy
Mostly ok with me. On 22 dec 2004, at 10.21, Harald Tveit Alvestrand wrote: Suggested resolution: 1) Make a separate section for the appeals stuff in 3.4 (for clarity), so that this becomes section 3.5 2) Change the section to read: If someone believes that the IAOC has made a decision that is clearly not in the IETF's best interest, he or she can ask the IETF leadership to investigate the matter, using the same procedure as is used for appeals of procedural issues in the IETF, starting with the IESG. Well, if we follow the current process, they should be able to appeal directly to the IAOC and then escalate it as normal. In cases where appeals concern legally-binding actions of the IAOC (hiring, signed contracts, etc.), the bodies handling the appeal may advise the IAOC, but are not authorized to make or unmake any legally binding agreements on the part of IASA. In cases where no legally-binding actions are at stake, the bodies handling the appeal may nullify the IAOC decision and ask IAOC to restart its decision process. Is it necessary to restart the process. I can imagine cases where it would be sufficient to reconsider something that it had failed to consider. I would suggest substituting reconsider for restart. (mostly suggestion from Margaret) 3) Add the following to the IAOC's role in 3.2: The IAOC will hear and respond to concerns from the community about the activities of the IASA. Even though it is slightly redundant, I would like to see it specifically include a final clause activities of the IASA, including actions by the IAD. Does this make sense, or are we leaning too far in the too many appeals direction? I think it makes sense and that we are not leaning in the 'too many appeals' direction. I believe that the history of appeals, and recalls for that matter, show that they are relatively few, especially when things are running well. The process is new, and there may be a flurry of initial concerns, and these must be handled well for the community to gain confidence in the IASA. The wording 'hear and respond to' should allow for a light weight but due diligence procedure. We will only enter the domain of appeals, in the formal sense of the word, if the community believe that the IAOC is not handling this properly. a. ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
Re: #720 and #725 - Appeals and IAD autonomy
Harald, Another dissenting view... Unless we modify the suggested text to deal with all sorts of cases that we probably can't predict and that would make things quite complicated, I don't see this working as intended. The sorts of cases I'm concerned about include not only information given the IAOC under non-disclosure provisions but also personnel matters, matters that could become the subject of litigation or that were already being litigated, and so on, for probably a longer list than I can imagine. It probably will come as no surprise that I'm uncomfortable with the potential intersection of whipped-up mob with administrative entity and processes. So let me suggest an entirely different model for your consideration: (1) The IAB and/or IESG can formally ask (I don't care about the details) the IAOC, or the IAD, to reconsider its decision on any matter. If such a request is made, the relevant body or individual is obligated to review the decision, seek more voters or a larger consensus if possible, and then either reaffirm the decision or make another one. (2) Any member of the community (or, preferably, any handful of members of the community) can ask the IAB and/or IESG to initiate such a reconsideration request.The decision on that request t initiate reconsideration can be appealed using normal mechanisms. (3) If the IAOC regularly misbehaves, the correct remedy is to fire them, just like any other body acting as a board of directors. So we need to look carefully at recall and related procedures and make sure that they can be used... easily enough, but no more easily than that. Following the model of the current text leads to opportunities for micromanagement by appeal, and, if the IAOC and IAD are to be effective, we just don't want to go there. Put differently, if people don't believe that The Right Thing is being done, they shouldn't be looking in detail at particular decisions. They should, instead, be suggesting that the IAOC review its own decisions contributing whatever additional information is available to that review. And, if the IAOC adopts a pattern of doing Wrong Things, it should be time to replace them (starting with a request for resignations), not to try to retune or override individual decisions. Get the right people into these positions, and then let them do the job. If we can't find the right people and put them there, then none of these procedures --other than firing the duds and trying again-- are good enough to protect the IETF. Perhaps worse, we then run the risk of getting us seriously bogged down while we try to use those incremental correction procedures. john --On Wednesday, 22 December, 2004 16:21 +0100 Harald Tveit Alvestrand [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: These two tickets are linked, as both contain discussions on how the IAD and the IAOC behave where people believe that they have not done the Right Thing (for whatever meaning of right). The text from the head of the #720 thread: While there is a method to appeal procedural lapses by the IAOC, and I am fine with that, there does not seem to be a way for a member of the community to question, i.e. appeal, the actions of the IAD. I.e. 3.4 does not contain method to appeal the actions of the IAD for procedural issues or suspected malfeasance. The thread in #725 is rather convoluted, and touches upon a number of issues - DoS attacks, ability to appeal decisions rather than procedure violations, recourse to recall and whether that is appropriate go read the thread for details. The current relevant text from 3.4 is: If someone believes that the IAOC has violated the IAOC rules and procedures, he or she can ask the IETF leadership to investigate the matter, using the same procedure as is used for appeals of procedural issues in the IETF, starting with the IESG. If the IESG, IAB or the ISOC Board of Trustees find that procedures have been violated, they may advise the IAOC, but do not have authority to overturn or change a decision of the IAOC. and from 3.2: The IAOC's role is to provide appropriate direction to the IAD, to review the IAD's regular reports, and to oversee the IASA functions to ensure that the administrative needs of the IETF community are being properly met. Suggested resolution: 1) Make a separate section for the appeals stuff in 3.4 (for clarity), so that this becomes section 3.5 2) Change the section to read: If someone believes that the IAOC has made a decision that is clearly not in the IETF's best interest, he or she can ask the IETF leadership to investigate the matter, using the same procedure as is used for appeals of procedural issues in the IETF, starting with the IESG. In cases where appeals concern legally-binding actions of the IAOC (hiring, signed contracts, etc.), the bodies handling the appeal may advise the IAOC, but are not
Re: #720 and #725 - Appeals and IAD autonomy
John, I've probably seen enough versions of enough issues that I'm more than a little spaced out.. but I think your proposal looks very much like the in-draft version of the appeals procedure, with three differences: - Not limited to procedure, and not limited to the IAOC - Abandoning the chain model of if you don't like one decision, try again that the current appeal structure has - Not using the word appeal I like all of those properties, and it should be a small twist of language (starting from the text in the draft, not the most recent suggestion) to make it come out that way. But I'm not sure I'm reading your words correctly, so better double-check --On onsdag, desember 22, 2004 15:37:52 -0500 John C Klensin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Harald, Another dissenting view... Unless we modify the suggested text to deal with all sorts of cases that we probably can't predict and that would make things quite complicated, I don't see this working as intended. The sorts of cases I'm concerned about include not only information given the IAOC under non-disclosure provisions but also personnel matters, matters that could become the subject of litigation or that were already being litigated, and so on, for probably a longer list than I can imagine. It probably will come as no surprise that I'm uncomfortable with the potential intersection of whipped-up mob with administrative entity and processes. So let me suggest an entirely different model for your consideration: (1) The IAB and/or IESG can formally ask (I don't care about the details) the IAOC, or the IAD, to reconsider its decision on any matter. If such a request is made, the relevant body or individual is obligated to review the decision, seek more voters or a larger consensus if possible, and then either reaffirm the decision or make another one. (2) Any member of the community (or, preferably, any handful of members of the community) can ask the IAB and/or IESG to initiate such a reconsideration request.The decision on that request t initiate reconsideration can be appealed using normal mechanisms. (3) If the IAOC regularly misbehaves, the correct remedy is to fire them, just like any other body acting as a board of directors. So we need to look carefully at recall and related procedures and make sure that they can be used... easily enough, but no more easily than that. Following the model of the current text leads to opportunities for micromanagement by appeal, and, if the IAOC and IAD are to be effective, we just don't want to go there. Put differently, if people don't believe that The Right Thing is being done, they shouldn't be looking in detail at particular decisions. They should, instead, be suggesting that the IAOC review its own decisions contributing whatever additional information is available to that review. And, if the IAOC adopts a pattern of doing Wrong Things, it should be time to replace them (starting with a request for resignations), not to try to retune or override individual decisions. Get the right people into these positions, and then let them do the job. If we can't find the right people and put them there, then none of these procedures --other than firing the duds and trying again-- are good enough to protect the IETF. Perhaps worse, we then run the risk of getting us seriously bogged down while we try to use those incremental correction procedures. john --On Wednesday, 22 December, 2004 16:21 +0100 Harald Tveit Alvestrand [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: These two tickets are linked, as both contain discussions on how the IAD and the IAOC behave where people believe that they have not done the Right Thing (for whatever meaning of right). The text from the head of the #720 thread: While there is a method to appeal procedural lapses by the IAOC, and I am fine with that, there does not seem to be a way for a member of the community to question, i.e. appeal, the actions of the IAD. I.e. 3.4 does not contain method to appeal the actions of the IAD for procedural issues or suspected malfeasance. The thread in #725 is rather convoluted, and touches upon a number of issues - DoS attacks, ability to appeal decisions rather than procedure violations, recourse to recall and whether that is appropriate go read the thread for details. The current relevant text from 3.4 is: If someone believes that the IAOC has violated the IAOC rules and procedures, he or she can ask the IETF leadership to investigate the matter, using the same procedure as is used for appeals of procedural issues in the IETF, starting with the IESG. If the IESG, IAB or the ISOC Board of Trustees find that procedures have been violated, they may advise the IAOC, but do not have authority to overturn or change a decision of the IAOC. and from 3.2: The IAOC's role is to provide appropriate direction to the IAD, to review the IAD's regular reports, and to oversee the IASA functions to ensure that the administrative
Re: #720 and #725 - Appeals and IAD autonomy
John's concern and suggested improvements work for me. FWIW, I am more comfortable with 2026-style appeals when we're talking about publishing a protocol specification than I am when we're talking about (for example) contracting for an IETF meeting location. The short-term downside of not making a decision is a lot higher in the second case - and John's suggested text seems to limit the DoS characteristics, which I like. Spencer From: John C Klensin [EMAIL PROTECTED] Harald, Another dissenting view... Unless we modify the suggested text to deal with all sorts of cases that we probably can't predict and that would make things quite complicated, I don't see this working as intended. The sorts of cases I'm concerned about include not only information given the IAOC under non-disclosure provisions but also personnel matters, matters that could become the subject of litigation or that were already being litigated, and so on, for probably a longer list than I can imagine. It probably will come as no surprise that I'm uncomfortable with the potential intersection of whipped-up mob with administrative entity and processes. So let me suggest an entirely different model for your consideration: (1) The IAB and/or IESG can formally ask (I don't care about the details) the IAOC, or the IAD, to reconsider its decision on any matter. If such a request is made, the relevant body or individual is obligated to review the decision, seek more voters or a larger consensus if possible, and then either reaffirm the decision or make another one. (2) Any member of the community (or, preferably, any handful of members of the community) can ask the IAB and/or IESG to initiate such a reconsideration request.The decision on that request t initiate reconsideration can be appealed using normal mechanisms. (3) If the IAOC regularly misbehaves, the correct remedy is to fire them, just like any other body acting as a board of directors. So we need to look carefully at recall and related procedures and make sure that they can be used... easily enough, but no more easily than that. Following the model of the current text leads to opportunities for micromanagement by appeal, and, if the IAOC and IAD are to be effective, we just don't want to go there. Put differently, if people don't believe that The Right Thing is being done, they shouldn't be looking in detail at particular decisions. They should, instead, be suggesting that the IAOC review its own decisions contributing whatever additional information is available to that review. And, if the IAOC adopts a pattern of doing Wrong Things, it should be time to replace them (starting with a request for resignations), not to try to retune or override individual decisions. Get the right people into these positions, and then let them do the job. If we can't find the right people and put them there, then none of these procedures --other than firing the duds and trying again-- are good enough to protect the IETF. Perhaps worse, we then run the risk of getting us seriously bogged down while we try to use those incremental correction procedures. john --On Wednesday, 22 December, 2004 16:21 +0100 Harald Tveit Alvestrand [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: These two tickets are linked, as both contain discussions on how the IAD and the IAOC behave where people believe that they have not done the Right Thing (for whatever meaning of right). The text from the head of the #720 thread: While there is a method to appeal procedural lapses by the IAOC, and I am fine with that, there does not seem to be a way for a member of the community to question, i.e. appeal, the actions of the IAD. I.e. 3.4 does not contain method to appeal the actions of the IAD for procedural issues or suspected malfeasance. The thread in #725 is rather convoluted, and touches upon a number of issues - DoS attacks, ability to appeal decisions rather than procedure violations, recourse to recall and whether that is appropriate go read the thread for details. The current relevant text from 3.4 is: If someone believes that the IAOC has violated the IAOC rules and procedures, he or she can ask the IETF leadership to investigate the matter, using the same procedure as is used for appeals of procedural issues in the IETF, starting with the IESG. If the IESG, IAB or the ISOC Board of Trustees find that procedures have been violated, they may advise the IAOC, but do not have authority to overturn or change a decision of the IAOC. and from 3.2: The IAOC's role is to provide appropriate direction to the IAD, to review the IAD's regular reports, and to oversee the IASA functions to ensure that the administrative needs of the IETF community are being properly met. Suggested resolution: 1) Make a separate section for the appeals stuff in 3.4 (for clarity), so that this becomes section 3.5 2) Change the section to read: If someone believes that the IAOC has made a decision that is clearly not
Re: #720 and #725 - Appeals and IAD autonomy
I think your proposed three changes are a significant improvement over the current text. As I've said, I am willing to live with the current text but do not consider it ideal. --Sam ___ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
