Re: Should FCC look at SS7 vulnerabilities or BGP vulnerabilities

[scott via NANOG]

On 5/18/24 9:25 PM, Jason Baugher wrote:

As much as most of us would like to be 100% SIP, it's the big guys
holding us back with legacy TDM networks and lata tandems. 

---


While not a Big Guy, Hawaiian Telcom is actively removing all that old 
equipment because of energy/maint/personnel/etc costs.  It's a lot more 
involved and harder to do than most would think. OAEE - Old Ass 
Equipment Everywhere (-: stops migration.


With HT being a private company, I would find it hard to imagine the 
government saying "Do it now!" without some way of helping finance it. 
It costs initial money to get to the saving money part and the previous 
is what's hard to get done; spending that initial money.


This is a netgeek's outside-looking-in perspective.  I am not voice at all.

scott

Re: Best TAC Services from Equipment Vendors

[scott via NANOG]

In light of this thread's contents, I have to give a shout out to Nokia 
TAC.  Maybe because we buy a lotta stuff and have a lotta maint 
contracts, but they don't do things like what has been mentioned.  Of 
course, I see some stuff from Level 1 folks where I think 'whaaat???' 
but they haven't done anything like what I have heard on this thread in 
the past 5 years I have been using them.  Even for 'informational' 
tickets they respond quickly.


scott

Re: Any clue as to when bgp.he.net will be back?

[scott via NANOG]

:: On 1/16/24 11:20 PM, Ben Cox wrote:

:: Fixed, cheers for pointing that logical error out :)


Thanks!

scott




On 1/16/24 11:20 PM, Ben Cox wrote:

Fixed, cheers for pointing that logical error out :)

$ git show
commit 689bca929c5d3a27e6aa4f12195bf3b81b3be719 (HEAD -> master)
Author: Ben Cartwright-Cox 
Date:   Tue Jan 16 23:17:08 2024 +

 clarify pricing for a nanog person

 https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2024-January/224556.html

diff --git a/www/templates/layouts/utils.tmpl.html
b/www/templates/layouts/utils.tmpl.html
index 5d1a4dbd..3ca554a3 100644
--- a/www/templates/layouts/utils.tmpl.html
+++ b/www/templates/layouts/utils.tmpl.html
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@

  £200 / mo
  
-Originates more than a /15 of IPv4
+Originates a /15 or more of IPv4 addresses
  -
  Is tagged as a CDN or DDoS Mitigation provider
  -

On Tue, Jan 16, 2024 at 10:04 PM scott via NANOG  wrote:




On 1/16/24 2:44 PM, Ian Chilton wrote:


Not a direct answer to your question, but if you're not aware of it,
https://bgp.tools/ <https://bgp.tools/> is a great tool and shows the
same info.

--

They need to fix their page regarding cost.

Originates less than a /15 - 25 pounds/month

Originates more than a /15 - 200 pounds/month.

What if someone originates a /15?  That's one of the prefix sizes we
originate.  They need a 'less than or equal to' thingie in there.

scott

Re: Any clue as to when bgp.he.net will be back?

[scott via NANOG]

On 1/16/24 2:44 PM, Ian Chilton wrote:

Not a direct answer to your question, but if you're not aware of it, 
https://bgp.tools/  is a great tool and shows the 
same info.

--

They need to fix their page regarding cost.

Originates less than a /15 - 25 pounds/month

Originates more than a /15 - 200 pounds/month.

What if someone originates a /15?  That's one of the prefix sizes we 
originate.  They need a 'less than or equal to' thingie in there.


scott

Re: maximum ipv4 bgp prefix length of /24 ?

[scott via NANOG]

Crap, that was supposed to be private.

scott



On 10/12/23 11:29 PM, scott via NANOG wrote:



UGH, you called me out and I have no defense.  I was thinking of our 
non-NAT customers.


scott

On 10/12/23 11:20 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:




On 13 Oct 2023, at 08:31, scott  wrote:




On 10/11/23 7:47 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:
Virtually no home network on the planet has fully functional IPv4 
available to it.



Hawaiian Telcom customers have it.  No blocks at all.


So they don’t use NAT?  The internet is a peer-to-peer network.  NAT 
breaks that.


But I can’t reach IPv6 devices on the Internet from my IPv4 device 
without a transition box is no
different to I can’t reach IPv4 devices on the Internet from my IPv4 
device because PNAT *is* a

transition device.  It’s a bogus complaint and I’m calling it out.


scott

Re: maximum ipv4 bgp prefix length of /24 ?

[scott via NANOG]

UGH, you called me out and I have no defense.  I was thinking of our 
non-NAT customers.


scott

On 10/12/23 11:20 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:




On 13 Oct 2023, at 08:31, scott  wrote:




On 10/11/23 7:47 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:

Virtually no home network on the planet has fully functional IPv4 available to 
it.



Hawaiian Telcom customers have it.  No blocks at all.


So they don’t use NAT?  The internet is a peer-to-peer network.  NAT breaks 
that.

But I can’t reach IPv6 devices on the Internet from my IPv4 device without a 
transition box is no
different to I can’t reach IPv4 devices on the Internet from my IPv4 device 
because PNAT *is* a
transition device.  It’s a bogus complaint and I’m calling it out.


scott

Re: Hawaiian ILEC infrastructure and fire

[scott via NANOG]

On 8/17/23 6:28 PM, Michael Thomas wrote:


On 8/17/23 11:26 AM, scott via NANOG wrote:



I don't want to overwhelm the list, but since there's interest here's 
something interesting I just now got from the electric company.  400 
poles and 300 transformers.  Wow!


Those of us from California and the west have watched this in abject 
horror and I myself was completely clueless this was possible.


Mike, who lives 10 miles from where the Caldor fire started that burned 
all the way to Tahoe and grew up going to Paradise to visit my grandparents



Me too.  I have friends and family over there.  Even though I am not 
(and they were not) affected it has had a big impact on my emotions.


Also, fto answer an an earlier email - I found the Paniolo cable we 
connected to for the Lahaina MPLS node was a land run that was 
underground, so it didn't get burned.


scott

Re: Hawaiian ILEC infrastructure and fire

[scott via NANOG]

I don't want to overwhelm the list, but since there's interest here's 
something interesting I just now got from the electric company.  400 
poles and 300 transformers.  Wow!


scott



 Over the past week, I have been with our teams on Maui that have 
helped safely restore power to 80% of the customers affected. Among 
other efforts, we have deployed more than 400 Hawaiian Electric crew 
members and contractors to Maui.


We are:

Using a mobile substation at Lahainaluna to help restore power to 
homes, schools and county facilities;


Working with county officials to identify priority circuits to 
bring stores, pharmacies, gas stations, water and wastewater facilities 
and other key locations online as quickly as possible;


Restoring service to hotels and resorts to be used to house 
displaced residents, enabling them to move out of emergency shelters;


Replacing some of the estimated 400 poles, 300 transformers and 
other equipment damaged by the fires and high winds and conducting 
extensive repairs in areas that are safe and accessible; and


Shipping dozens of vehicles and pieces of specialized equipment 
from O‘ahu and bringing in additional expert personnel and equipment 
from the continental U.S.

Re: Hawaiian ILEC infrastructure and fire

[scott via NANOG]

I missed some of the below yesterday.


"Though I am curious about the Paniolo cable landing in Lahaina. Did it 
survive"


I believe a land section of the Paniolo cable was not burned and I think 
that's what they used.  Perhaps it was actually the undersea part and I 
just don't have access to that data.  One thing I do know is the Paniolo 
cable is what allowed us to get the MPLS node back to the core so 
quickly.  I feel pretty confident the CLS survived, but I have no actual 
data on that.




"HICS and HIFN land in Kihei instead, right?"

Yes, but there was a second fire in the Kula area (a 1.5 hour drive from 
Lahaina with no traffic) that was headed towards Kihei.  I think they 
stopped it, but it was the same thing.  Homes burnt to the ground and a 
LOT of fiber was burned up in Kula (1500-3500 feet above sea level).




"you would think they had microwave backup at minimum."

There is not very much microwave here.  There're issues with land and 
microwave tower rights on an island that size in addition to the 
geography which makes that an expensive alternative.  HT has some m/w on 
the tops of the mountains, but no other companies that I am aware of can 
get that done.




"I'm sure a few cells burned but there are over ten on the west side so 
they didn't all burn."


I am not sure how that works, but many of the cell sites are/were on 
buildings and such; not on towers.




"Feet on the ground are reporting they brought in at least a few COWS 
(cellular on wheels/portable cell site trucks)"


Yes, they did that with satellite back to their core.

scott



On 8/17/23 5:55 PM, TJ Trout wrote:
I'm familiar with the island, it's it's puzzling that the major 3 cell 
carriers would accept a single point of failure like that, you would 
think they had microwave backup at minimum. Maybe it was a generator issue.


I'm sure a few cells burned but there are over ten on the west side so 
they didn't all burn.


Feet on the ground are reporting they brought in at least a few COWS 
(cellular on wheels/portable cell site trucks)


On Thu, Aug 17, 2023, 12:53 AM William Herrin <mailto:b...@herrin.us>> wrote:


On Wed, Aug 16, 2023 at 6:43 PM scott via NANOG mailto:nanog@nanog.org>> wrote:
 > Last, it's an island and diverse paths are
 > short in number.

To put it into perspective: there are exactly TWO roads that can get
you from Lahaina back to Kahului and the airport. One of them is a
narrow, cliff-hugging single lane road that is more or less paved.

Though I am curious about the Paniolo cable landing in Lahaina. Did it
survive? HICS and HIFN land in Kihei instead, right?

Regards,
Bill Herrin



-- 
William Herrin

b...@herrin.us <mailto:b...@herrin.us>
https://bill.herrin.us/ <https://bill.herrin.us/>

Re: Hawaiian ILEC infrastructure and fire

[scott via NANOG]

On 8/17/23 3:14 AM, Jason Kuehl wrote:
I would be willing to travel down to help restore infra; I did this back 
around Sandy as well. Is there anyone we can contact?


I am not sure who to contact.  I don't work with the fiber guys as I am 
a router guy.  I could only tell you to call the main number and work 
yourself to the fiber guys or look online and see who you can find that 
way.  But they have  lot of fiber up at this time.  They got guys from 
other islands over there last week and have been stringing fiber 
non-stop since then - over the weekend and nights.  Lahaina is small 
square area wise.  We already are getting Napili online today, which is 
north of the area affected.


scott






On Wed, Aug 16, 2023 at 10:51 PM scott via NANOG <mailto:nanog@nanog.org>> wrote:




On 8/17/23 2:03 AM, John Levine wrote:
 > According to Eric Kuhnke mailto:eric.kuh...@gmail.com>>:
 >> -=-=-=-=-=-
 >>
 >> It's my understanding that the Hawaiian ILEC is now owned by
Cincinnati
 >> Bell, which is also a unique historical artifact, as it was its own
 >> independent corporation/operating entity in the region of
Cincinnati during
 >> the era of the pre-1984 Bell system.
 >
 > Not that unique, SNET was also a Bell affiliate in most of
Connecticut.
 >
 > Hawaiian Tel has a very painful history. It was independent until
 > 1967, then bought by GTE, then merged into Verizon along with the
rest
 > of GTE in 2000, then sold to a hedge fund in 2004 which knew nothing
 > about telephony and ran it into bankruptcy, then an independent
public
 > company from 2010 to 2017, when it was bought by Cincinnati Bell,
 > which in turn was bought in 2021 by Australian conglomerate
Macquarie.

Yep, that's it.  And the hedge fund (The Carlyle Group) thing was a
complete disaster.  I was here for all that.  Fugly is all I can say.



 > Running phone systems on islands is very expensive. There's only
 > 160,000 people on Maui, about the same as Salinas CA, but separated
 > from the rest of the world by a lot of water.

We have a lot of undersea fiber and it is all connected into one big
MPLS network for the internet stuff.  There is still SS7 stuff out
there, too.  I am unfamiliar with that part.

scott



--
Sincerely,

Jason W Kuehl
Cell 920-419-8983
jason.w.ku...@gmail.com <mailto:jason.w.ku...@gmail.com>

Re: Hawaiian ILEC infrastructure and fire

[scott via NANOG]

On 8/17/23 2:03 AM, John Levine wrote:

According to Eric Kuhnke :

-=-=-=-=-=-

It's my understanding that the Hawaiian ILEC is now owned by Cincinnati
Bell, which is also a unique historical artifact, as it was its own
independent corporation/operating entity in the region of Cincinnati during
the era of the pre-1984 Bell system.


Not that unique, SNET was also a Bell affiliate in most of Connecticut.

Hawaiian Tel has a very painful history. It was independent until
1967, then bought by GTE, then merged into Verizon along with the rest
of GTE in 2000, then sold to a hedge fund in 2004 which knew nothing
about telephony and ran it into bankruptcy, then an independent public
company from 2010 to 2017, when it was bought by Cincinnati Bell,
which in turn was bought in 2021 by Australian conglomerate Macquarie.


Yep, that's it.  And the hedge fund (The Carlyle Group) thing was a 
complete disaster.  I was here for all that.  Fugly is all I can say.





Running phone systems on islands is very expensive. There's only
160,000 people on Maui, about the same as Salinas CA, but separated
from the rest of the world by a lot of water.


We have a lot of undersea fiber and it is all connected into one big 
MPLS network for the internet stuff.  There is still SS7 stuff out 
there, too.  I am unfamiliar with that part.


scott

Re: Hawaiian ILEC infrastructure and fire

[scott via NANOG]

On 8/17/23 1:08 AM, Eric Kuhnke wrote:
It's my understanding that the Hawaiian ILEC is now owned by Cincinnati 
Bell, which is also a unique historical artifact, as it was its own 
independent corporation/operating entity in the region of Cincinnati 
during the era of the pre-1984 Bell system.


Yes, HT was bought by Cin Bell.  CB was then bought by an out of country 
company and are changing their name to altafiber.


scott






Somewhat like how GTE was independent in other places in the country.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cincinnati_Bell 



Some of the Hawaii ILEC structures I have seen photos of in other 
non-fire-affected places and other islands have a resemblance to designs 
that were built by BCTel, the ILEC in British Columbia, at the time when 
GTE was a shareholder in BCTel.




On Wed, Aug 16, 2023 at 10:50 AM Jay Hennigan > wrote:


On 8/16/23 09:32, Jay R. Ashworth wrote:

 > Well, it sounds like the historical Bell System attitude has
transitioned
 > forwards to ... newer transport.  Good.

Legacy GTE in this case, but agreed.

 > Best of luck to you all, out there.

Indeed.

-- 
Jay Hennigan - j...@west.net 

Network Engineering - CCIE #7880
503 897-8550 - WB6RDV

Re: Hawaiian ILEC infrastructure and fire

[scott via NANOG]

On 8/16/23 4:32 PM, Jay R. Ashworth wrote:

- Original Message -

From: "scott via NANOG" 



On 8/11/23 4:06 AM, Mark Tinka wrote:

It's like a war zone.


Yes, it definitely looks like that. We have connectivity to some of the
edges and have put up hotspots, so folks can go to the hotspot areas and
get internet access.


Well, it sounds like the historical Bell System attitude has transitioned
forwards to ... newer transport.  Good.



Yeah, the mindset of keeping it all running whatever we need to do is 
still strong here.  We have been having looong conf calls with many 
folks on it.




Best of luck to you all, out there.


Thanks.

scott




Cheers,
-- jra

Re: Hawaiian ILEC infrastructure and fire

[scott via NANOG]

On 8/16/23 3:58 AM, TJ Trout wrote:
I found it interesting that *all*? cellular service on west maui died? 
Does every carrier single-home via waves served out of the Lahaina CO? 
Or maybe they aren't allowed to have generators in Maui? Seems like they 
would have diverse paths to major sites

--

Many do mobile backhaul over various providers, including Hawaiian 
Telcom.  We do that over MPLS.  The Lahaina CO is an HT property and we 
maintain the stuff that kept it relatively safe; air handlers, filters, 
generators, battery banks, etc.  All fiber was gone.  The fire was 
intense due to the wind speed.  There was a hurricane near the islands. 
Likely, even the cell towers were melted.  I cannot speak to what the 
cell folks have in place.  Last, it's an island and diverse paths are 
short in number.


scott









On Tue, Aug 15, 2023 at 6:55 PM scott <mailto:sur...@mauigateway.com>> wrote:




 > On Tue, Aug 15, 2023, 5:21 PM scott via NANOG mailto:nanog@nanog.org>
 >
 >     On 8/11/23 4:06 AM, Mark Tinka wrote:
 >      > It's like a war zone.
 >
 >     Yes, it definitely looks like that. We have connectivity to
some of the
 >     edges and have put up hotspots, so folks can go to the
hotspot areas
 >     and
 >     get internet access.


On 8/16/23 12:39 AM, TJ Trout wrote:

  > Scott: Just an FYI that anecdotal reports from social media
coming in or
  > stating that residents have been unable to connect to the Wi-Fi
hotspots
  > that the local government have been promoting in the Lahaina area.
--


I don't have anything to do with that as I work in the core and we got
the node up for west Maui, so I am done. (:  But I wonder if those are
different wifis.  I'd imagine the focus now is plant poles, hang fiber
and get the Access part of the network fully up before getting those
up,
if they're the same ones.

scott

Re: Hawaiian ILEC infrastructure and fire

[scott via NANOG]

On Tue, Aug 15, 2023, 5:21 PM scott via NANOG 

On 8/11/23 4:06 AM, Mark Tinka wrote:
 > It's like a war zone.

Yes, it definitely looks like that. We have connectivity to some of the
edges and have put up hotspots, so folks can go to the hotspot areas
and
get internet access.



On 8/16/23 12:39 AM, TJ Trout wrote:

> Scott: Just an FYI that anecdotal reports from social media coming in or
> stating that residents have been unable to connect to the Wi-Fi hotspots
> that the local government have been promoting in the Lahaina area.
--


I don't have anything to do with that as I work in the core and we got 
the node up for west Maui, so I am done. (:  But I wonder if those are 
different wifis.  I'd imagine the focus now is plant poles, hang fiber 
and get the Access part of the network fully up before getting those up, 
if they're the same ones.


scott

Re: Hawaiian ILEC infrastructure and fire

[scott via NANOG]

On 8/11/23 4:06 AM, Mark Tinka wrote:

It's like a war zone.



Yes, it definitely looks like that. We have connectivity to some of the 
edges and have put up hotspots, so folks can go to the hotspot areas and 
get internet access.


scott

Re: Hawaiian ILEC infrastructure and fire

[scott via NANOG]

On 8/11/23 3:17 AM, Eric Kuhnke wrote:
Recently saw an aerial video where an entire neighborhood in Laihana had 
burned down *except* for the concrete block structure small ILEC CO.


Pictures I have seen of other ILEC sites in Hawaii closely resemble some 
GTE sites in the Pacific Northwest (now Ziply), which makes sense with 
the history of GTE in Hawaii.


Does anyone have some more detailed photos or examples of a telecom site 
that's survived while everything else around it is burned up?


I'm looking to share this with some contacts in BC for rural telecom 
purposes and disaster preparedness discussions.



Hey,

This email is delayed because we have all been busy not only with 
getting the network up, but also collecting tons of stuff to donate to 
the folks over there.  Many lost everything except the clothes on their 
back and what little they could carry.


That's a Hawaiian Telcom CO in Lahaina.  I work (again) for HT these 
days.  We have special air filters and air handlers.  The generators 
came on and kept everything going and air conditioned.  Once the poles 
were put up and the fiber strung we found all the equipment running just 
fine.


In that CO is a lot of stuff, but the main thing for the router guys was 
a Nokia ESS-7 chassis that has been running since around 2007. (approx)


We got connectivity to it from the core yesterday and are getting 
connectivity to the edges as I type.


Here is a photo a tech took.  They were the first allowed into the area 
after electric folks.  Notice the smoke everywhere and all the debris on 
the road.


surfer.mauigateway.com/lhna-co.jpg

scott

Re: is nanog really in the spoofer report?

[scott via NANOG]

On 7/10/2022 11:18 AM, Matthew Luckie wrote:

I just realized that many automatically put emails with the subject
line of "Spoofer Report for NANOG" in the trash, so I changed it.

Is that for real or a spoof itself?  If it's real I know a buncha
guys that will help. ;)


This is real:

https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?as_include=19230

These are correlated with conference network deployments at each NANOG
event.  Some NANOG conference networks have SAV deployed (more so
before 2017), but my understanding is that networking equipment does
not come with SAV enabled by default, so it is easy to overlook.

-


Ah, OK.  I didn't think of conferences.  DOH!  I have never been to one.

Thanks!
scott

is nanog really in the spoofer report?

[scott via NANOG]

I just realized that many automatically put emails with the subject line 
of "Spoofer Report for NANOG" in the trash, so I changed it.


Is that for real or a spoof itself?  If it's real I know a buncha guys 
that will help. ;)


scott



On 7/8/2022 10:35 AM, scott wrote:



"> 19230  NANOG 2016-06-13   2022-06-07"

Wait...what?  :)

scott


On 7/8/2022 7:00 AM, CAIDA Spoofer Project wrote:

In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.

This report summarises tests conducted within usa, can.

Inferred improvements during Jun 2022:
ASN    Name   Fixed-By
22898  ATLINK 2022-06-02
208563 LINUXGEMINI    2022-06-15
33696  NEXTARRAY-ASN-01   2022-06-23

Further information for the inferred remediation is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php

Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jun 2022:
ASN    Name   First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
5650   FRONTIER-FRTR 2016-02-22   2022-06-30
54825  PACKET    2016-04-15   2022-06-23
19230  NANOG 2016-06-13   2022-06-07
7029   WINDSTREAM    2016-06-21   2022-06-30
40285  NORTHLAND-CABLE   2016-07-17   2022-06-28
209    CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST   2016-08-16   2022-06-17
6128   CABLE-NET-1   2016-09-03   2022-06-02
27364  ACS-INTERNET  2016-09-27   2022-06-18
20412  CLARITY-TELECOM   2016-09-30   2022-06-30
271    BCNET 2016-10-24   2022-06-30
22898  ATLINK    2016-12-16   2022-06-28
1246   TLL-WEST  2017-04-20   2022-06-29
63296  AWBROADBAND   2017-09-01   2022-06-29
33452  RW    2018-09-19   2022-06-21
8047   GCI   2019-04-11   2022-06-13
21804  ACCESS-SK 2019-06-09   2022-06-18
53703  KWIKOM    2021-01-17   2022-06-30
398836 NP-NETWORKS   2021-03-12   2022-06-18
56207  Converge  2021-03-26   2022-06-06
212934 AS_POTVIN 2021-10-03   2022-06-28
394437 PSLIGHTWAVE   2021-12-02   2022-06-19
12119  ITV-3 2022-06-07   2022-06-14
59 WISC-MADISON  2022-06-14   2022-06-14
32645  PIVOT 2022-06-16   2022-06-16
397086 LAYER-HOST-HOUSTON    2022-06-16   2022-06-23
399486   2022-06-18   2022-06-18

Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=usa,can_block=1 



Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-i...@caida.org

Re: Spoofer Report for NANOG for Jun 2022

[scott via NANOG]

"> 19230  NANOG 2016-06-13   2022-06-07"

Wait...what?  :)

scott


On 7/8/2022 7:00 AM, CAIDA Spoofer Project wrote:

In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA's source address validation measurement project
(https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.

This report summarises tests conducted within usa, can.

Inferred improvements during Jun 2022:
ASNName   Fixed-By
22898  ATLINK 2022-06-02
208563 LINUXGEMINI2022-06-15
33696  NEXTARRAY-ASN-01   2022-06-23

Further information for the inferred remediation is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php

Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jun 2022:
ASNName   First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
5650   FRONTIER-FRTR 2016-02-22   2022-06-30
54825  PACKET2016-04-15   2022-06-23
19230  NANOG 2016-06-13   2022-06-07
7029   WINDSTREAM2016-06-21   2022-06-30
40285  NORTHLAND-CABLE   2016-07-17   2022-06-28
209CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST   2016-08-16   2022-06-17
6128   CABLE-NET-1   2016-09-03   2022-06-02
27364  ACS-INTERNET  2016-09-27   2022-06-18
20412  CLARITY-TELECOM   2016-09-30   2022-06-30
271BCNET 2016-10-24   2022-06-30
22898  ATLINK2016-12-16   2022-06-28
1246   TLL-WEST  2017-04-20   2022-06-29
63296  AWBROADBAND   2017-09-01   2022-06-29
33452  RW2018-09-19   2022-06-21
8047   GCI   2019-04-11   2022-06-13
21804  ACCESS-SK 2019-06-09   2022-06-18
53703  KWIKOM2021-01-17   2022-06-30
398836 NP-NETWORKS   2021-03-12   2022-06-18
56207  Converge  2021-03-26   2022-06-06
212934 AS_POTVIN 2021-10-03   2022-06-28
394437 PSLIGHTWAVE   2021-12-02   2022-06-19
12119  ITV-3 2022-06-07   2022-06-14
59 WISC-MADISON  2022-06-14   2022-06-14
32645  PIVOT 2022-06-16   2022-06-16
397086 LAYER-HOST-HOUSTON2022-06-16   2022-06-23
399486   2022-06-18   2022-06-18

Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:
https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=usa,can_block=1

Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-i...@caida.org

Re: Verizon no BGP route to some of AS38365 (182.61.200.0/24)

[scott via NANOG]

On 6/23/2022 11:48 AM, holow29 wrote:
I've been trying (to no avail) for over a month now to get Verizon to 
investigate their lack of BGP routing to 182.61.200.0/24 
, which hosts Baidu Wangpan at pan.baidu.com 
 (Baidu's cloud services/equivalent of Google Drive).


Easily verified through Verizon's Looking Glass.

We all know Verizon's BGP routing is a disaster, but does anyone have 
any ideas?

--


Looks like chinanet is the routing disaster.  But over Lumen I can get 
to Baidu's 182.61.254.169 IP when tracerouting to 182.61.254.1.


scott

Re: how networking happens in Hawaii

[scott via NANOG]

On 4/30/2022 1:31 PM, William Herrin wrote:


Strictly speaking, the U.S. government didn't overthrow Hawaii. U.S.
expats acting on their own (with some funny business that looked like
bribery of U.S. military in the area) overthrew Kamehameha's
descendant. 


That would be the Committee of Safety formed of very, very rich people 
expressly to overthrow the Hawaiian Kingdom:


"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Committee_of_Safety_(Hawaii)"

(Their families are still extraordinarily rich to this day)




The U.S. President at the time denounced it (especially
the part about suborning the military) but half a decade later the
U.S. government agreed to admit the already-conquered territory rather
than leave it to be picked off by someone else.


The president at the time of the overthrow attempt saw the lies the 
Committee of Safety was saying about the lives of Americans being in 
danger and said no to the overthrow.  Extraordinarily rich mainland 
Americans (steel/rail guys, I think) bought the next president and he 
was the one that authorized the overthrow.  There's a lot more to the 
story, including US government military marching up Richards St in 
downtown Honolulu to `Iolani palace and arresting queen Lili`uokalani 
under gun point.





Countries whose law derives from English Common law have a concept of
adverse possession. Details vary but mainly if you can hold the land
for 20 years against the owner's wishes then it's your land.
Conceptually it applies to nations just as surely as individuals. 


Hawaiians did not have this concept.  It was forced on them militarily.

scott
(use your filtering tool to ignore this... :))



This

is wise - it allows folks now alive to avoid an endless descent into
the murderous history of land changing hands.

Regards,
Bill Herrin

Re: how networking happens in Hawaii

[scott via NANOG]

On 4/30/2022 12:19 PM, Randy Bush wrote:

This reads a lot like dsl wars between ilecs and clecs in the late 90s and
early 2ks.


compounded by a 100+ year old military occupation

---
Hee is definitely acting in an old school (meaning 60s/70s) Hawaii 
manner... ;)


Also, for the others here...on the occupation.  I haven't read this 
particular article, but I'm sure it covers the basics. The main question 
is 'was it a nation when the US gov't overthrew Hawaii or was it a group 
of individual kingdoms?'  Many get that wrong and that's what matters to 
international courts on the current issue of Hawaiian sovereignty.  For 
sure, it was a nation due to a forced treaty agreement with Kaumuali`i. 
 The rest of the individual island kingdoms were conquered with 
violence by Kamehameha who then created a lahui..a nation.  Therefore, 
it is a military occupation.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overthrow_of_the_Hawaiian_Kingdom


scott

well, that does it for the history lesson. ;-)

how networking happens in Hawaii

[scott via NANOG]

I thought I'd put a smile on your faces for Friday.  This is how 
networking happens in Hawaii...


https://www.civilbeat.org/2022/04/thousands-of-hawaiians-could-lose-phone-and-internet-service-amid-bankruptcy-dispute


--
"State regulators have opened an emergency investigation of Sandwich 
Isles Communications..."


"The investigation comes as Sandwich Isles is apparently blocking access 
to its telecom infrastructure to another provider, Hawaiian Telcom, 
alleging trespass, filing police reports and putting customer phone and 
internet service at risk."


"Sandwich Isles Communications is an Oahu-based telephone company 
founded in 1995 with a mission to provide communication services to 
Native Hawaiians living on homesteads"


"In 2015, founder Albert Hee was convicted of criminal tax fraud...Hee 
was sentenced in 2016 to 46 months in prison."


"With federal backing, the company built the Paniolo Network, a web of 
undersea and terrestrial fiber optic cables."


"...a bankruptcy trustee ordered the sale of the Paniolo Network to 
Hawaiian Telcom."


"Hawaiian Telcom says Sandwich Isles has removed, destroyed or tampered 
with Hawaiian Telcom locks on perimeter fences surrounding buildings 
purchased by Hawaiian Telcom. And that Sandwich Isles has installed its 
own locks and devices on buildings and premises owned by Hawaiian 
Telcom, as well as welding shut access gates. The company also says 
Sandwich Isles has made multiple false police reports alleging Hawaiian 
Telcom is trespassing on its property."


"Al Hee was requesting that Hawaiian Telcom’s lock on its Paniolo 
Building at Laiopua on the Big Island be replaced. Otherwise, Hee said 
he would call the police."


"In a Sept. 11 letter to customers, Sandwich Isles blamed the situation 
on Hawaiian Telcom."

--


When your brother is very connected politically I guess one feels 
invincible...


"...welding shut access gates..."  hahaha!  Insanity!

There're other 'outages' that didn't make the article.  Repeated fiber 
damaged off shore, etc.



scott