Re: Germany's geopolitics
Brian, the condescending signaling — finding this or that amusing, somehow recalling something else, God forbid this and sorry about that, horror! about something else, and most of all *assigning readings* — is a bad look. You should cut it out. Nothing I said suggests that your interests or ideas are "illegitimate" or anything like that; on the contrary, I said "those considerations might be real, valid, or important." I believe that, and I learn a lot from you on this list. I also argued that we shouldn't accept at face value the quasi-transcendent pretensions of certain frames of reference or styles of thought. That's just skepticism 101. Andre can speak for himself, but the only mention I made of conspiracies related specifically to the right, which clearly doesn't include you. I'm not sure why you'd focus on that rather than engage with a single thing I actually did say. Here's an "assignment": go back and skim my mail for discussions that might *specifically* apply to you. Part of one paragraph, arguably a bit of another. The rest is about cops, courts, the feds, academia, the right, the UK. More than that, it's an effort to understand how (not *why*) so many leftists have gotten so tangled up in their theories that they end up actively endorsing Russian imperialist aggression. If that doesn't apply to you, great. Cheers, Ted On 3 Mar 2023, at 15:55, Brian Holmes wrote: > I find it very amusing that a thread devoted to Germany's relations to > China is conceived as a conspiracy theory that aims at covering up the > reality of Russia's brutal invasion of Ukraine. > > It seems to me rather *legitimate* to explore what might be happening > between Germany, the US and China, at a time when the possibilities of a > war between the US and China are being discussed in major news and > international-relations publications across the world. God forbid, I even > find it legitimate to explore what these tensions have to do with the > Ukraine war, at a time the international relations experts are analyzing > China's growing support for Russia, and worrying whether China might > actually send arms to Russia, raising the spectre of - God forbid it again > - something like a "proxy war." (Sorry, the word and the thought are taboo, > I know.) > > Hmmm, I somehow recall saying very clearly in an earlier thread that I am > in favor of NATO arming Ukraine, but simultaneously, I am wary of what > comes next, the possibility of a larger conflict. Doesn't matter, > conspiracy theorists always do that, it's not worth reading what they > actually say. > > Speaking of reading, Andre and Ted, perhaps you guys have read the books by > Bruno Macaes, "Belt and Road" and "The Dawn of Eurasia", and surely you > have verified the conspirational nature of that kind of thinking? I guess > you would have to throw in reams of articles in publications like Foreign > Affairs and so on, the kind of stuff that I consult before writing, known > conspiracy theorists all. > > Ted, when you've finished The Dawn of Eurasia - go ahead, it won prizes > back in 2016, and rightly so, because it predicted the current era of > inter-civilizational conflict between Russia, China and the US - well, when > you've finished that, I am sure you will be convinced that Macaes, too, is > a conspiracy theorist, and surely a "leftoid" to boot (after all, I think > he mentions Aleksandr Dugin in there, and only leftoids do that). After a > little study you will be able to better analyze and trash whatever I might > come up with next. > > Just throw in Macaes' recent publications in The New Statesman, and it will > give you a very accurate picture of the paralyzing lack of agency that you > diagnose with such consummate precision. Go ahead, look at all that, take > some time to put it all in the balance, and reconcile the results with your > horror at anyone who attempts a 'why' explanation of complex world events. > > thoughtfully, Brian > > On Fri, Mar 3, 2023 at 9:10 AM Ted Byfield wrote: > >> Andre, you really nailed it. >> >> As some may have noticed, the US in particular is suffering from, let's >> say, a *maldistribution of agency*. It's mostly imaginary, but like all >> imaginaries, it functions like a mass-magic spell: its very unreality >> makes it that much more real. >> >> The left — not a good name for it, but that's a discussion for another >> time — has been consumed with efforts to "give agency to" or "empower" >> its various grassroots constituencies for decades. I happen to support >> those liberationist struggles, *and* I can also see the myriad ways >> those cultural activities are inextricably intertwined with the left
Re: Germany's geopolitics
Andre, you really nailed it. As some may have noticed, the US in particular is suffering from, let's say, a *maldistribution of agency*. It's mostly imaginary, but like all imaginaries, it functions like a mass-magic spell: its very unreality makes it that much more real. The left — not a good name for it, but that's a discussion for another time — has been consumed with efforts to "give agency to" or "empower" its various grassroots constituencies for decades. I happen to support those liberationist struggles, *and* I can also see the myriad ways those cultural activities are inextricably intertwined with the left's plainly obvious inability to effectively occupy governmental entities and functions at *any* level. The right, which has been supremely effective at subsuming government functions — whether by simply taking them over or by rewriting the laws and media that construct them — is consumed with growing imaginary allegations of excessive agency: conspiracies, "the gubmint," "globalists," various insidious "agendas," "cancellations," "false flags" (i.e., misattributed agency), and ridiculous "lizard people"–style nonsense (i.e., allegations of infinite agency to entities that look like they don't have agency *because they look like us*), etc, etc More: US police forces are increasingly consumed by their sense of helplessness and even fragility, even as their numbers skyrocket, their budgets and powers expand uncontrollably, and the quantity and "quality" of their weaponry — as well as their willingness to use it on the slightest pretext — has metastasized. US courts have become little more than a forum for rightists to adjudicate ways to destroy ideas and facts developed by the left. But the courts can't *do* anything directly — all they can do is direct other branches not do or not do this or that. So they too are acutely aware of their lack of agency and power, even as they grow by the day. And the US federal government, with almost undisputed military and financial power, is suffering from some sort of collective aphasia, unable to effectively *name* the abuses tearing people's lives to pieces: "insurrection" and "coup," the "mass murder" of gun violence, "criminal negligence" (like public beta tests of allegedly self-driving cars on the public at large), mass "disenfranchisement" through gerrymandering and worse, the "indentured servitude" of student debt and the "slavery" of so much employment, the "price-gouging" and "profiteering" of corporations, large-scale "fraud" and "theft" by networks of grifters. The state's undisputed power to *name* things is dissolving into endless scholastic debates and procedural formalisms, resulting in inexplicable paralysis. It's a prime example of how *seeing like a state* — which is more about naming than seeing — both works and doesn't work: if you can't name it you can't do anything about it, so if you don't want to do anything about just don't name it. I could go on with this list, but there's no need because they're all variations on the same paradoxical misapprehension of agency. People, institutions, forces see it where it isn't, can't see it where it is, imagine they have none and others have it all. No realistic or effective analysis of agency or power can come from this mess. The funny-not-funny thing about this is that the left has the conceptual tools it needs to sort this out this, but (wait for it...) can't seem to use them. For example, if someone were to apply theories of intersectionality — a staple of leftist thinking that comes from (cue the horror-movie soundtrack) CRT and therefore for domestic use only — to Ukraine and its people, lo and behold, their struggle could be seen in both/and rather than either/or terms: as part of a cynical geopolitical strategy *and* a legitimate struggle for autonomy, as politically problematic *and* morally right, as terrifyingly risky *and* worth the risk, etc. But acknowledging that might mean supporting their struggle, however awful the consequences. And that support would violate Rule #1: it would be *inconsistent*. Inconsistent, that is, with other stances and beliefs - pacifism or commitment to nonviolence, say. And so we can see that one major obstacle to support often has little or nothing to do with actual Ukrainians, their actual lives, their actual country. Instead, it stems from a reluctance to make exceptions on whatever grounds, to hold incompatible beliefs, to recommend one thing in one context and its opposite in another. To do that, to take the personal authority of believing things that don't fit together easily or clearly, is a sovereign act: it asserts priority over the systems of thought that constrain agency. Doing that, being inconsistent, doesn't go well these days, because much of our mediated landscape — and therefore much of our conversational landscape, at every level — is devoted to "holding people accountable" for being, saying, or doing inconsistent things. Your
Re: Stormy weather?
On 15 Feb 2023, at 20:02, Pit Schultz wrote: > In terms of the green transition, this war is already a huge setback, The Economist: > This complexity makes it difficult to discern whether the tumult in energy > markets has aided or impeded the energy transition. To assess the overall > picture, The Economist has looked at a range of factors, including > fossil-fuel consumption, energy efficiency and renewables deployment. Our > findings suggest that the crunch caused by the war in Ukraine may, in fact, > have fast-tracked the green transition by an astonishing five to ten years. https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2023/02/13/war-and-subsidies-have-turbocharged-the-green-transition "YMMV" Cheers, Ted # distributed via : no commercial use without permission #is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
Re: Stormy weather? Daniele Ganser edit
On 14 Feb 2023, at 4:48, Michael Guggenheim wrote: > I sent an email to NLR alerting them to this quote. Maybe I was not the only > one. I was hoping, and suggesting, they would add a comment to D’Eramo’s > text, explaining who Ganser is, and maybe asking D’Eramo to explain to the > reader why he included the passage. Instead they deleted it, without leaving > a note as to the alteration of the text. > > I understand that the editors of NLR may not know who Ganser is, and that > they cannot be expected to check every reference in every text. Michael, I appreciate your conciliatory gesture here, but they *can* be expected to do exactly that. Not every reference, you're right: for mentions of some arcane scholarly debates about Jane Austen or whatever, no. But D'Eramo's piece is a broadside in a debate where counter/charges of antisemitism are rife all around. The piece has only a handful of references — to Financial Times, to Foreign Policy, and to a well-known, decade-old book by an established Oxbridge historian. It's running in a journal in the UK, where the Labour Party has been riven with accusations of baked-in antisemitism. And, as you note, it's an ad for a book with a recent publication date and a title that couldn't be more blunt: D'Eramo's own words were "Daniele Ganser’s 2022 book _NATO’s Illegal Wars_." This is *exactly* the kind of situation where an editor should check that one, odd reference. For ref, here's a screenshot of the D'Eramo piece before and after, side by side: https://tldr.nettime.org/@tb/109863202886355396 Checking D'Eramo's reference took a few minutes: Ganser > amazon[dot]de > title > publisher (Westend) > author bio > link to his "Swiss Institute for Peace and Energy Research." And what did I find? The lead story on SIPER's site is about the "9/11 debate," which claims "WTC7 was blown up, says the Hulsey study from 2019. The history of the terrorist attacks must be rewritten." Uh, OK. Here's my take as an editor: In a journal a closing paragraph should distill what needs to be said. In D'Eramo's piece, the ( ) around the Ganser reference mean *by definition* this doesn't need to be said. They got there one of two ways: either (1) D'Eramo included them, in which case the editor should have said nope, cut it, or (2) NLR's editor *did* take it up with D'Eramo but gave in, then added them. My $5 says (2) is what happened, but it doesn't matter because NLR's later decision to cut the reference without comment works equally well with both. Since D'Eramo likes to cast his argument in terms of US militarism, here's another: When Clark Clifford, the famously fastidious adviser to decades of US presidents, got caught up in the BCCI scandal, he said, "I have a choice of either seeming stupid or venal." (I was working on the book where he said that while the scandal was breaking and I proposed a draft for that footnote — but not that wording, which became a sort of ur-meme in East Coast power-corridor circles.) That more or less sums up the NLR's predicament here: compromised or stupid — or maybe both. This 'forensicky' micro-stuff is ridiculous, but for one thing: It suggests that NLR still has at least one foot stuck in the muck of tankie horseshoe nonsense. They aren't alone. In the US, The Nation does too, as Duncan Campbell recently documented in gruesome detail for a less rump-y UK left outlet, Byline Times: https://bylinetimes.com/2023/02/04/russia-and-the-us-press-the-article-the-cjr-didnt-publish/ Bigger picture: D'Eramo's list of weaponry — which, after all, is why Brian cited the article to begin with — is the kind of crude "Soviet tank-counting exercise" I would have expected from the Brookings Institution in the mid-'80s. And that's basically D'Eramo's argument, isn't it? But for a war that's almost universally seen as inaugurating a radically new era of conflict — drones — that kind of 'untimely' analysis is itself plainly nostalgic. That says a lot about the school of thought D'Eramo follows: rather than face the future, it faces the past. There are lots of reasons to be pessimistic, but people who actively and explicitly embrace the past so they reduce the present to known categories aren't likely to find much room for optimism, are they? This is one of the main problems that dogs so much establishment leftism now. The other is a categorical rejection of the use of force to achieve their political ends, a leftover of the excesses of the hard left of the late '60s / early '70s, which the chronically culturalist 'new new left' shares, unfortunately. It's not that force is good, right, or even acceptable; rather, it's that rejecting force as such concedes it to the right, whose vanguard is happily embracing *violence*. Ultimately, if the left wants to achieve more than a sort of meta-NIMBYism, it'll need to get its shit together in terms of its attitude toward the state. A 'lite' anarchism
Re: Moving Nettime to the Fediverse
Geoff — Thanks for this. I agree with the outlines of what you say, and with most of the detail too. Felix and Doma have their own perspectives, so this is just me. I'm not sure what you mean about a recurring argument, but that's not to suggest you're mistaken. As a mod, I probably see nettime through a more technical lens than most subscribers would, and that's no doubt shaped how I've talked about the list and its project. That said, I agree the problems aren't technical in nature, and neither would any 'solutions' be — if anyone's inclined to believe in 'solutions' (FWIW, I'm not). One example, which Felix touched on: the quasi-generational aspect of email, both relative (when someone ~adopted it) and absolute (how old/young you are). As we noted in the announcement, it's morphed from a pleasure into something more like a utility — in part *because* of its standardization, reliability, etc. Like a lot of nettimers, I've spent decades teaching, and have a fairly broad experience of students' attitudes to email have become more negative. Saying it's 'dead' was hyperbole, i.e, an exaggeration with a seed of truth. Chalk that up to the context: an invitation may say 'happy holidays' or whatever, but it's not intended as a diktat (though I always hear a bit of that ideological force too). To say that every discussion-oriented mailing list I'm on is graying would be a serious understatement. They might be fascinating, lively, provocative, solid, or whatever, but the retirement-home vibe is strong indeed. But in our case that's just one piece of a puzzle whose picture is very diffuse — with ~gender / identity issues, regional concentrations, received norms about relevance and style, etc, etc. I think many would agree the list is great *and* has problems — or, if you like, could be greater in new ways. It's plainly true that we're hopping on the fediverse bandwagon, so questioning the wisdom of that kind of precipitous action is, without question, wise. (It's also true, though less visible, that it's only the most recent move we've weighed.) But that implies another question: is 'doing nothing' — or at least following the same path wise? In the short term, sure, but in the longer term no, I think. Doing that would all but guarantee the list's historical weaknesses would only become more ingrained, and with that the list would become more and more insular. If we had announced we autocratically decided to shut down the list, your criticism would be spot-on, but we didn't — or at least not quite. We did say that maintaining both 'infrastructures' seems like it'd be too much for us, but whatever decisions will be made in that regard can and should be collective. That's an invitation. We don't know to what exactly, or to whom, or when, or how, or anything else. For me at least, that uncertainty was/is pretty much the essence of this ~move. It's a risk, but I think nettime's ~stagnation — not just as a list but as a larger project — is largely due to the fact that we haven't found ways to take new risks. Cheers, Ted On 29 Nov 2022, at 22:19, Geoffrey Goodell wrote: > I am confused by your recurring argument that the > problem with Nettime is fundamentally technical in > nature, or indeed that there is a problem with Nettime > at all. Speaking personally, Nettime works well for > me. I read interesting commentary from people I > respect, with the reassurance that I can always add my > voice to the symphony. > > The fact that I do not post more often is mainly > testament to the fact that I am busy with other > responsibilities. I am sure that this is true of > others here as well. This problem will not suddenly > disappear with a shift to a different choice of > underpinning technology. In fact, it will be > exacerbated, because although I run my own e-mail > server, the tools for engaging with the so-called > 'fediverse' are not part of my workflow. And so, a > shift in technology will inexorably induce a 'shake > out' in which people are forced to either adopt new > workflows or face exclusion. I would have thought that > the moral foundation of Internet ethics would be > incompatible with the use of force in this way. > > As far as I know, the argument that 'fediverse' > technology, such as that used by Hometown and Mastodon, > is superior to e-mail is weak at best and has never > been articulated to this group. As far as I know, such > technology is in the hands of a handful of software > developers and has not been subject to the same > rigorous standardisation process of the sort that led > to the establishment of e-mail. I suspect that most > people on this list did not use e-mail before 1977, by > which point RFC 724 was already published [1]. Of > course, this standard has evolved over the years, in a > direction that has benefited the world and is now used > by billions of people. As far as I know, there has not > yet been a comparable
h-net.org review of Michael Century's Northern Sparks
< https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=58169 > networks.h-net.org Dickey on Century, 'Northern Sparks: Innovation, Technology Policy, and the Arts in Canada from Expo 67 to the Internet Age' | H-Sci-Med-Tech Author: Michael Century 9–11 minutes Michael Century. Northern Sparks: Innovation, Technology Policy, and the Arts in Canada from Expo 67 to the Internet Age. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2022. Illustrations. 262 pp. $35.00 (paper), ISBN 978-0-262-04500-1. Reviewed by Erin Dickey (University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill) Published on H-Sci-Med-Tech (October, 2022) Commissioned by Penelope K. Hardy (University of Wisconsin-La Crosse) Michael Century’s Northern Sparks: Innovation, Technology Policy, and the Arts in Canada from Expo 67 to the Internet Age explores the interplay between cultural policy, artistic experimentation, and technological innovation, resisting unnuanced oppositions between government initiatives and radical critique and acknowledging the important role of institutions in fostering alternative art practices between the late 1960s and early 1990s in Canada. Relevant to histories of media, art, and technology as well as to innovation policy studies, Century’s narrative hinges on his characterization of Canada’s “alternative technological ethos,” set in opposition to art designated solely for the market and technology geared merely toward efficiency and productivity. Instead, Century argues that this ethos “emphasized sensorial immediacy, embodied interaction, and improvisatory expression” (p. xiii). Meant to provide an answer to “restrictive standardizations” and “corporate consolidation” of telecommunications in the latter half of the twentieth century, this ethos undergirded critical artistic interventions contesting a familiar pattern for emergent technology: the normalization, essentialization, and instrumentalization of the affordances of a new technology without in-depth exploratory use (p. 3). Century positions this history within the national context of Canada during globalization. He terms this period the “Information Paradigm,” a time of intense acceleration in computing and telecommunications with concomitant postmodern cultural shifts, elsewhere theorized as “informaticization” (by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in Empire [2000]), “the network society” (by Manuel Castells in The Rise of the Network Society [1996]), and “late capitalism” (by Ernest Mandel in Late Capitalism [1972] and Fredric Jameson in Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism [1991]). Broad in scope but with detailed detours, Northern Sparks covers a half century of Canadian media art and technology policy, providing a useful model for examining the work of a country on its own terms in an increasingly global context. With inspiration from B. W. Powe’s 1990s-era political philosophy, Towards a Canada of Light, Century contends that his focus historical period represents an “episode of light,” tying a uniquely generative period of art-and-technology experimentation to a reconfiguration of Canadian nationalism (p. xiii). As one might expect, Marshall McLuhan is a central figure in both policy and theory contexts. From McLuhan’s comments on art’s role in technological experimentation during Expo 67—a world’s fair held in Montreal that serves as Century’s starting point—to his exchanges with Pierre Trudeau regarding the potential role of government in modern telecommunications, Century demonstrates the direct effect McLuhan had on arts funding and technology policy, as well as on media theory and critique. Other important, more recent media-theoretical interlocuters he discusses include Jody Berland and Jonathan Sterne. Century’s text provides a mix of institutional history, technological genealogy, and art analysis. After an introductory chapter summarizing the complexities of Canadian nationalism and cultural policy over the focus decades, chapter 2 examines Scottish Canadian animator Norman McLaren’s influence within the National Film Board (NFB). Century’s characterization of McLaren as a bricoleur or tinker aims to trouble the perceived gulf between art and science, noting with Bruno Latour that the space between science and nonscience consisted of a “lot of small, uncertain, unexpected divides” (p. 50). Chapter 3 continues the study of innovation in computer animation, looking at software development at the NFB and the National Research Council of Canada (NRC) in the ’60s and ’70s and contextualizing later developments in 3D animation software packages. Where earlier chapters focus on artist-driven research, chapter 4 considers the relationships between interface theory, experiments in human-computer interaction (HCI), and metaphors for Canadian national experience as “borderline” (p. 76). The wide-ranging chapter includes brief analyses of Ron Baecker’s computer-mediated animation system using hand-drawn gestures,
On Dugin
< https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/alexander-dugin-darya-putin-russia-ukraine-assassination > /// There are many in the West happy to take him at face value, as 'Putin's Brain' or 'Putin's Rasputin'. He is not, though, and never has been especially influential. He has no personal connection to Putin, but rather is just one of a whole breed of 'political entrepreneurs' trying to pitch their plans and doctrines to the Kremlin. For a while, in 2014, he was in favour; his notions of Russia's civilisational destiny and status as a Eurasian nation convenient to rationalise a land grab in Ukraine's Donbas. Suddenly he was on every TV channel, his book Foundations of Geopolitics was on the syllabus at the Academy of the General Staff and he was offered a chair at MGU, Moscow State University, the country's premier institute of higher learning. But then the Kremlin decided against outright annexation of the Donetsk and Lugansk 'People's Republics' and Dugin was no longer useful. The invitations began to dry up, MGU rescinded its offer, and he was back in the marketplace, hawking his books to the public and his ideas to the leadership. In the process, he mastered the art of retrospective thought-leading. In other words, of picking up on hints about what the Kremlin was about to do and loudly advocating just this move – and then claiming the credit. Overall, though, he has been more effective in selling himself to western alt-right circles – which to be sure, gives him some value to Moscow as an agent of influence – than to the Kremlin. /// Cheers, Ted # distributed via : no commercial use without permission #is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
Kamil Galeev on Dmitry Galkovsky
This Twitter thread by Kamil Galeev on Dmitry Galkovsky is really worth reading: https://twitter.com/kamilkazani/status/1533154409722658824 Notable: "People think with words. If you want to change the way people think about things, you *must* be giving those things new names. If you want to be a law giver, you must also be a a name giver. And Galkovsky is probably the most productive and successful name-giver in modern Russia" Also: "When I say that Galkovsky reshaped the Russian nationalist discourse, I don't mean the people in power. I don't picture him in a role of 'Putin's secret adviser' that so many morons ascribe to Dugin. I imply that he influenced the youngsters teaching them what and *how* to think" And then there are the bits about how the very idea of the medieval period is nonsense and all evidence of it is forged, how Protestantism is older than Catholicism, etc. I actually studied that stuff, and my hunch is that Galkovsky ideas are based at least in part on Walter Bauer's (brilliant) Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity, just extrapolated to an absurd degree. But Galeev's summary is secondhand, so it's hard to know. Either way, it's important to note that 'Galkovskian' ideas and their local equivalents are everywhere, not just Russia. That's helpful on several levels, imo. For example, it lends more nuance to a 'society vs the state' approach to Russia, which is important for minimizing demonization and creating space for constructive resolution; and it also begins to address the concerns underlying self-styled anti-imperialist left critiques of Western support for Ukraine. But we shouldn't be lulled into both-sidesism. This kind of revisionist rubbish is one downside of the sprawling reevaluation of so many histories, institutions, and mores. From that, it's easy to see how left/prog revisions of national myths could seem equally "extreme," and how centrism could seem like a sensible approach. But, as always, we should take special care when political rhetoric takes refuge in metaphors of geometry and balance. This war has made it increasingly clear that Putin's relationship to Trump should be understood less as instrumental than as co-dependent — two drowning men trying to save each other. On its face that might seem a bit meta, but *if it's true* I think the implications are huge. Cheers, Ted # distributed via : no commercial use without permission #is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
Re: irregular ukraine linklist
On 12 May 2022, at 6:05, podinski wrote: > "Why I Can't Wave a Ukrainian Flag – A Dissenting Teach-In on Russia's > > Invasion" by Daniel Herman > > [https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/183040](https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/183040) This is a wordy, milquetoast variation on self-styled 'anti-imperialist left' muzak, right down to the telltale mention of (BOO!) Victoria Nuland. It indulges in the usual bothsidesisms, for example, "imagine that Russia was an economic juggernaut able to spend $5 billion to turn Mexico into a close ally" (it didn't), and "The U.S. also provoked the war with its own election meddling in Eastern Europe, especially in Ukraine, a meddling that was magnitudes—light years—greater than whatever Russia did or did not do in our 2016 election" (uh, sure, dude). But maybe most of all it falls into the conventional leftoid trap of casting the alleged 'real' aggressors — an alphabet soup comprised of the US, the CIA, NATO, the NED, and "the West’s lavishly funded NGO complex" — as abstract, impersonal forces, whereas Putin benefits from being psychologized: he's cornered by this, reacting to that, had no choice about the other thing. The essay needs to do that, because it hangs on a single, central proposition, that "Putin, though capable of great brutality, is a rational actor"; I don't think we don't need 'go there' and speculate on his health to wonder how true it is that's he's acting rationally. And, though ostensibly leftist, the author says, "I have no particular expertise in foreign policy, but I defer to those who do (or did before their decease)" — notably, Kennan, Nitze, Warnke, Pipes, and (wait for it...) Kissinger. That alone suggests that the author is good at cranking out lots of words but not so good at gluing them together in meaningful ways. What the author doesn't do is provide a symmetrically detailed accounting of the internal deliberations and actions of Russia, its allies, its technocratic intellectuals, and their collective institutions and networks over the last decades. Why? To a limited extent, it's the result of multiple biases in global media: language, focus, and of course hegemonic status. If you want to put serious time in, in libraries or even just on twitter, detailed analyses of these things are available. But they're hyperspecialized, and for a reason: the fundamental structure and fabric of governance in Russia, and before it in the USSR, as well as their networks of influence — these things have been traditionally and ideologically opaque for the last century. Reasonable people can disagree about the West's relative openness vs Russia's opacity, that, but essays like this should at least acknowledge their derivative bias front and center. Doing so would make it *much* harder to argue that the West is bad because A, B, C, D, E, F, G, whereas Russia is good because [no data]. One of my main takeaways from these debates about Russia and Ukraine is that the western lefts (very much plural) need to rethink their relationship to the state and, in particular, to the use of force. You don't have to like these things, theoretically or practically, to acknowledge that they exist and are effective — and that, if you don't grab them by the horns, someone else will. Cheers, Ted # distributed via : no commercial use without permission #is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
Re: Applebaum, etcetera
On 5 May 2022, at 8:38, Michael Benson wrote:
> In a windy piece in the NYRB on her last book, Jackson Lears
> tries to palm Applebaum off as someone under the influence
> of behavioral economist Karen Stenner, who (he says) views
> ideological differences as "merely" reflections of varying
> "cognitive styles." I think that's a bit dismissive, given
> that it's pretty undeniable that such "styles" (that is, of
> the kind that tend towards actual cognition rather than the
> reverse) tend to produce the most resistance to the
> authoritarian impulse and the most awareness of ideological
> manipulation. And he quotes Applebaum from her book
> "Twilight of Democracy: The Seductive Lure of
> Authoritarianism" (Doubleday, 2021) as observing:
> "Authoritarianism appeals, simply, to people who cannot
> tolerate complexity... there is nothing intrinsically
> ‘left-wing’ or ‘right-wing’ about this instinct at all." He
> calls this a view stemming from "the rarefied atmosphere of
> the meritocratic elite, where political disagreements
> evaporate into elusive distinctions between those who can
> tolerate complexity and those who cannot."
It seems like everyone's agreed, in theory if not quite so diligently in
practice, that 'pre-screening' is for the dogs. That's no surprise, because,
put so crudely, it's yet another ~name for the purity tests that have bedeviled
so much left–right debate — or, better, left–right shadow-boxing — for much of
the last century. But if we blur our focus a bit, it becomes more serious: not
the cartoon version ('does so-and-so meet Ideological Criterion X, allowing me
to sully my eyes and mind with their latest publication?'), but the subtler
problem of assessing how to apply what we know of so-and-so's past work to
inform what they're saying now. The cartoon version is can pass itself off as a
scientific-executive rigor: decisive, clear, efficient, brief. The subtler
version is and will remain an art: weighing changing contexts, looking for
shifting emphases, tentatively filling in the blanks, teasing out
idiosyncracies, and all the rest.
Lears is an interesting case in his own right. He's a southern intellectual,
which used to be rare but now seems to be a critically endangered species. His
dissertation, published as _No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the
Transformation of American Culture, 1880–1920_ (published in '81 by Pantheon
when it was a leftish powerhouse and was nominated for an National Book Critics
Circle Award) is a dazzling analysis of the fusion of anti-modernism,
anti-intellectualism, and anti-cosmopolitanism during the US's
industrialization. His second book, _Fables of Abundance: A Cultural History of
Advertising in America_ ('94), is narrower but great. I've only half-read his
third, _Something for Nothing: Luck in America_ ('03), but have planned to get
back to it for years now. If you take a step back, you can see how neatly these
books also trace — beyond their ostensible focus — the rise of conservatism in
the US, from the forces that coalesced into Reaganism through the neoliberal
substitution of individualist fortune (in every sense) for social welfare. And,
granted, this is really obscure, but his article on "Intellectuals and
Intellectualism" for the _Encyclopedia of American Social History_, seemed
utterly brilliant when I read it decades ago. I think that might be where he
diagnosed what he called the "cult of bourgeois social transparency" — the
quintessentially yankee faith that souls can commune, and the kind of thing
that would lead, say, George W. Bush to believe he could look into Putin's eyes
and "see his soul." That might help us to understand Lears's impulse to write
off Applebaum as mired in some cognitive style. His entire career has been in
the north, but — and he knows this as well as anyone — his own cognitive style
is pretty southern, if only in its sensitivities to northern pretensions and
presumptions like "the rarefied atmosphere of the meritocratic elite."
So: Applebaum is a moving target, and Lears is too. Pretty much everyone worth
paying attention to is as well — one good reason that the 'pre-screening' we
all disavow (even as we do it, all the time) is unhelpful. But, as Brian often
notes, in a time when institutions and ideologies are collapsing, that kind of
consumptive-cognitive filtering becomes especially dangerous: a way to
'perform' recognizable political stances even as their foundations are melting
into air. What we need now, more than anything, is intellectual 'transiness':
openness, eclecticism, ambiguity, questing. Because, it seems to me, we know
where the alternative is headed: nuclear annihilation.
Cheers,
Ted
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Re: Anne Applebaum
Allan, WRT Russia/Ukraine one notable feature of the current US political landscape is that a fair number of ostensible leftists are making arguments that are remarkably similar to fascist trolls like Tucker Carlson. I'm no fan of Applebaum's at all, so when I saw her name I was skeptical; but as I read through her essay, nothing she said jumped out at me as outrageously skewed. Since your comment didn't offer any specific criticisms, could you be persuaded to do so? Cheers, Ted On 1 May 2022, at 15:00, allan siegel A Train wrote: > Hello Nettimers > I find it odd that Anne Applebaum's questionable commentary on the events - > and historical references - in Ukraine are uncritically posted here. Anne > Applebaum is a notorious right-wing ideologue of the unquestionable > neoliberal persuasion who has been lauded for her attacks on left-leaning > politics (to say the least). As the conflict in Ukraine becomes increasingly > enmeshed in the myopic politics of the cold-war and as America descends into > pre-civil rights post war policies it becomes increasingly important to > consider who is describing reality and from what vantage point. Most people > in the U.S. still believe that the atomic bomb was used to save the lives of > U.S. soldiers and to end WW II. A very questionable assumption. Saber > rattling by Biden and others indebted to military contractors won't bring > democracy to Ukraine or necessarily even peace. > Best > Allan # distributed via : no commercial use without permission #is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
Re: Further on Greg Yugin and Russian facism
Happy (and not not) to say I agree with all of this — really well put, Brian. Two thoughts: (1) As you probably know, "lustration" also refers to a more or less formal process of governmental and social transformation — basically, an alternative to more rigorous truth-and-reconciliation processes. There are many people on this list who know much more than I do, but it's my understanding that lustration was the generic term for describing "decommunization" processes in many Eastern Bloc countries after the fall of the wall. Its use now, in addition to the religious connotations you note, is also just trollish revanchism. (2) Much more US-centric: Mark Milley, the head of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, said a few days ago: "It's a bit early, still, even though we're a month plus into the war. There is much of the ground war left in Ukraine, but I do think this is a very protracted conflict. And I think it's at least measured in years." I haven't seen the larger context of his comments, so it could be that he clarified exactly what he meant; but it's hard to imagine that high-ups, particularly in the US, see a viable path toward peace and normal relations anytime soon. And the neocons, always thirsty for war, are no doubt back in force telling everyone who'll listen "I told you so." It's hard to speculate further without bumping into the 800-pound gorilla of Russian interventions in US elections. Sanctions will make them more difficult, and being associated with Russians and their wealth will be déclassé for all but the most rightists. But the US has a habit of making things about itself, and this is an especially inappropriate time for that. Having said that, a great deal will hinge on which party wins in the Congressional elections this year and, yes, the presidential ones two years from now. Not all: Putin is older and (I think) much frailer than he looks, so the question of who'll succeed him is surely in the air. The shortest path to peace would be for Putin to be ousted and whatever regime follows to trade on that transition to restore relations. Putin knows that, and will escalate and exacerbate everything he can to make that impossible. Cheers, Ted On 6 Apr 2022, at 13:01, Brian Holmes wrote: > On Mon, Apr 4, 2022, 12:53 Michael Benson wrote: > >> >> Anyone doubting the truth of Yugin's allegation that Putinism is directly >> comparable to the German Nazism or Spanish and Italian fascisms of the >> 1930's ... >> > > Thank you Michael, I don't doubt it but the editorial from RIA Novosti is > particularly brutal and reveals yet another element that has been thrown in > the historical cement mixer, namely decolonization. Thus the great > struggles of the twentieth century are stripped of their meaning and > enrolled in the ideological message machine. > > The use of the religious term lustration (ritual cleansing and > purification) apparently refers to what they have done in Bucha, etc. But > it also points to the centrality of the Orthodox Church, which may be a far > more effective pillar of population management than the mythical constructs > of the Nazis. > > Currently all this horror is funded by global energy consumerism. And the > lack of action to stop such funding makes it appear that European > governments do not see or cannot act on the totalitarian nature of the > threat, which demands some sacrifice from citizens. This fear of economic > disruption is absurd. If the war continues unopposed, the global facts on > the ground will include an unprecedented refugee crisis, significant > starvation among people in poor countries and a gradual hollowing-out and > replacement of the current monetary order, or in other words, disruption of > a degree surpassing anything since WWII. Given the preview, do we really > want to see a world system centered on and governed by Russia and China? > > The serious question is how far can an active totalitarianism go before > world war begins in earnest. I don't think much further. The Russians have > engaged a whole-of-society strategy. To avoid both defeat, and a nuclear > war that would be worse than defeat, democracies would need to mobilize > their citizens in a deliberate project including direct military moves > alongside effective economic ones, definitely involving sacrifice > from individuals and corporations. This is as yet unimaginable, but unless > the Russian offensive halts and a retreat to the Donbas is confirmed, I > think we will begin to see efforts toward such a mobilization very soon. > How it plays out among civil societies will then become a central issue. > > Thoughtfully yours, Brian # distributed via : no commercial use without permission #is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/
Re: The War to come ...
Some yes, mostly no. There are some intersections, but I specifically and deliberately did NOT argue that anti-imperialists are echoing Russian disinfo bots, let alone aiding and abetting Putin’s project. On the contrary, I was challenging exactly that model of a priori dismissal of opposing viewpoints. Ted On Mar 20, 2022, 17:03 -0400, David Garcia , wrote: > Ted Byfield > > Internationalism is an absolutely legitimate leftist stance too: > > anti-imperialist I'm seeing here and elsewhere seems to be, more than > > anything else, not just intellectually isolationist in its >origins but > > practically isolationist in its consequences. And when it consigns other > > differently minded leftoids to oblivion as it does to Ukrainian thinkers, > > it isn't clear to me what's left of its >leftism at all. But let's shed > > that label for now. What positive vision is this anti-imperialist grounded > > in? What constructive change is it proposing? And how does telling others > > they can't >possibly understand what you're saying lead in that direction? > --- > Many of the contradictions and predicaments faced by left you point to are > echoed in an excellent piece by George Monbiot > > https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/02/russian-propaganda-anti-imperialist-left-vladimir-putin > > > > > # distributed via : no commercial use without permission > # is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, > # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets > # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l > # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org > # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject: > > # distributed via : no commercial use without permission #is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
Re: The War to come ...
On 19 Mar 2022, at 13:42, I wrote: > I read Streeck's essay when it first appeared, and my sense was that you > could string together many of the points he makes and arrive at very > different conclusions. Someone pointed me to this FAZ piece on Streeck's essay: https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wissen/geist-soziales/wolfgang-streeck-zum-imperialismus-im-ukraine-krieg-17859748.html tl;dr: Its argument is similar to what I said, but far better — more thorough and with context. Maybe Streeck was widely known and cited before this essay, but I wouldn't be surprised if he shares one thing in common with John Mearsheimer, who was all over the ~news in the US a few weeks ago: someone who, among leftists, and almost overnight went from almost entirely unknown to near-viral (let's say 'bacterial'), in that disposable social-media way. Unsurprisingly, it turned out Mearsheimer is a bit of a theoretical turd, with a history of blaming 'liberals' for pretty much anything and everything. In US political rhetoric, 'liberal' has two, often overlapping meanings: a fairly neutral description of a mainly postwar international political project and a sort of ritual-hippy-punching dogwhistle — so it was a bit odd to see leftoids citing his work as if it were gospel. The essay by Yassin al-Haj Saleh that Dave Mandl sent several days ago, ostensibly about Chomsky on Syria, is relevant in this context — partly why Dave sent it, I'm sure: > His [Chomsky's] scattered comments reveal that he views the Syrian struggle — > as with every other struggle — solely through the frame of American > imperialism. He is thus blind to the specificities of Syria’s politics, > society, economy and history. > > What’s more, his perception of America’s role has developed from a provincial > Americentrism to a sort of theology, where the U.S. occupies the place of > God, albeit a malign one, the only mover and shaker. https://newlinesmag.com/review/chomsky-is-no-friend-of-the-syrian-revolution/ The essay does a good job of laying out the structural weaknesses of anti-imperialist discourse from within the (supposed) empire: first and foremost it's a de facto *intellectual* isolationism. No one in 'the West' can be faulted for a systemic ignorance of the Syrian intellectual scene. New Lines bills the author as "a leading Syrian intellectual," and I have no earthly idea if that's true, or even what it means in context, so maybe he's a theoretical turd too — but, based on this essay, I doubt it. The same holds true for Ukraine: one thing I haven't seen in the anti-imperialist arguments is many, or even *any*, citations of Ukrainian thinkers making similar arguments. That silence would make sense now, at a time when making those arguments would be untimely to say the least. But How about 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 years ago, in less pressured circumstances? There must be some, right? Have at it, people. These wars are a learning experiences for pretty much everyone who isn't directly involved (for those directly involved too, but that's a different 'curriculum'). Aside from the handful of people who happen to have a deep and specific understanding of regional and national politics, we're all pretty much winging it on the basis of what we thought we knew. ~Liberals who support efforts to challenge Russian expansion have their own issues to sort out — very serious issues — but what strikes me about anti-imperialists is a kind of willful know-nothingism. They don't say: "Wait wait wait, military intervention is premature and insanely risky, so give us a little time to think things through." Instead they just say: "You're fucked up." If your argument relies on casting those who disagree with you as hopelessly benighted and *unable* to grasp the truth of what you're saying — as if there were really no difference between a money-grubbing televangelist, a crazy hawk in the US DOD, and someone who's skeptical about Russia's justifications for invading Ukraine — you maybe need to work on it a bit more. In particular, you might consider where the left (however you define it) fits into the overall structures you're advocating. Is it condemned to anti-statist margins? If so, it seems like you're consigning yourself to purely reactive position WRT an implicitly rightist meta/state (that's legit but also problematic). If not, though, it might be good to imagine — what an idea, *imagine* — what a more leftish ~state might look and act like. Brass tacks included: all those things you say *should be* more fair / free / open / transparent / equal / etc. Sooner or later, actually achieving those ideals will require the use of force in some form. A leftism that, most of all, eschews the use of force anywhere in any form is a politics of toilet paper packaging: kittens, fuzzy bears, and butterflies romping around luminous cotton clouds. It feels good, but there are bigger issues. Pacifism and conscientious objection
Re: Dugin to lead Russia's Channel One (?)
Thanks for this, Olia. So while Western intellectuals prop him up as the latest incarnation of the Rasputin > Zhirinovsky trope — a subspecies of Orientalism, imo — at least one Russian outlet is taking the piss. But if people are really wedded to the tragic worldview, we could debate whether this squib is authentic or 'really' the work of some intelligence outfit messing with our heads. On second thought, nah. Cheers, Ted On 19 Mar 2022, at 14:30, olia lialina wrote: > It is from satire magazine Panorama > > https://panorama.pub/news/aleksandr-dugin-naznachen-generalnym-direktorom-pervogo-kanala > > > Panorama is like Onion or Titanic in Germany > > > > On 19 Mar 2022 18:54, Ted Byfield wrote: >> via Facebook. I have no idea if this is true, but if it is it should be an >> opportunity to see a bit more clearly whether Dugin is really so significant. >> >> - - - - - - - - - - - - 8< SNIP! 8< - - - - - - - - - - - - >> >> Осетия - АланИр · >> >> Алина Доева · March 17 at 11:57am # distributed via : no commercial use without permission #is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
Dugin to lead Russia's Channel One (?)
via Facebook. I have no idea if this is true, but if it is it should be an opportunity to see a bit more clearly whether Dugin is really so significant. - - - - - - - - - - - - 8< SNIP! 8< - - - - - - - - - - - - Осетия - АланИр · Алина Доева · March 17 at 11:57am Alexander Dugin has been appointed General Director of Channel One. At an emergency meeting, the Board of Directors of Channel One decided to terminate the contract with Constantine Ernst. A well-known Russian philosopher and political scientist Alexander Dugin has been appointed as the new general director of "Pervogo". "For me, this assignment became a pleasant surprise. I am a faithful son of Russia and the Russian people, who have now finally begun to wake up. My front is an information war. I will expel the entire Russophobic element from the state, all these liberals, comedians and once and for all I will end the stench and stupid shows," the philosopher said. Dugin added that all employees of the channel will have a personal interview with him, and his colleagues from the Eurasian Youth Union will analyze their social media pages. After this, a decision on the termination of the employment contract may be made. In addition, in the broadcast network "First Channel" in early April there will be new programs - "Project Eurasia", "Conservative Revolution" and "The Theory of the Multipolar World", which will be the director himself. - - - - - - - - - - - - 8< SNIP! 8< - - - - - - - - - - - - Cheers, Ted # distributed via : no commercial use without permission #is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
Re: The War to come ...
I read Streeck's essay when it first appeared, and my sense was that you could string together many of the points he makes and arrive at very different conclusions. His historical analysis is strong, but at key points it hinges more on simplistic grievances than facts, or as close as we can get to them. For example, "It is true that historically, Russia always wanted to be part of Europe, and something like Asiaphobia is deeply anchored in its national identity": "It is true that" is the kind of rhetorical preface that often appears when a writer is saying something that maybe isn't as clear as they'd like. I seem to recall the USSR having some pretty specific ideas about what the terms of belonging to Europe should entail, like worker's revolutions and stuff. There are lots of other examples like this in his essay, turns where his efforts to assess the situation fairly reveal a willingness to give ~Russia the benefit of the doubt but holds the opposition — Europe, the US, the EU, NATO, the world — to very different standards. For me, those shifting goalposts turn what could be a brilliant analysis into more of a generic 'anti-imperialist' screed. There are structural reasons that make these different standards sensible, even necessary. 'The West' is much more heterogeneous and wooly entity than Russia, which has made its endless contention much more publicly accessible than Russia's: we don't see or hear everything, but we do see and hear a lot. Russia, in contrast, has been far more opaque, and the USSR before it even more so. That's not a criticism in itself, just an acknowledgment that a smaller bloc of adjacent countries with very different histories and norms of governance reveal much less about what they're thinking and doing. This isn't abstract. There are entire libraries of mass-market books dedicated to analyzing Western aggression in gruesome detail, but as far as I know — and I know pretty far — there isn't an equivalent literature on Soviet and Russian adventurism. Again, there are structural reasons, like language: English is a lingua franca(?!), which makes the markets for these books (and the debates they contribute to) widely accessible on many levels; that's not true of Russia at all. We see more benign forms of this kind of divide everywhere. Whatever the causes, the result (as much as hate this kind of verbal tic) is an informational asymmetry. It's difficult to piece together commensurate historical accounts. Debating 'the West' and its legacies of violence is possible; Russia's equivalents not so much. I don't think anyone can write a responsible high-level analysis without explicitly taking into account how difficult that asymmetry makes an even-handed analysis of the kind Streeck is aiming for. (I can already hear the peanut gallery: I'm conflating the USSR and Russia, indulging in both-sidesism, etc. Sorry, no: I'm describing the regional / historical / linguistic conditions of *difference*, not advocating for sameness. And, if it weren't obvious, I'm not the author of the idea that this war has two 'sides.') It seems there's a widespread problem in discussions of this war: 'Western' leftists have justifiable grievances about how the worlds they live in have developed, but they conflate their own grievances with Russia's — or, more accurately, with Putin's. This kind of enemy-of-my-enemy 'logic' is a catastrophe, imo. When we're presented with astonishing spectacles like national and international finance authorities vigorously chasing down superyachts, there are a few ways we can respond. One is justifiable cynicism: "Oh, NOW you're going after them," "What about Western oligarch's yachts, hmmm?", "LOLOLO Bojo's Londongrad — still chasing Russian money!", and so on. That's totally justified. It's also comically embittered, the grumblings of terminally angry old men. What we need is a more dialectical response, like "Good start! Now let's talk about yachts that belong to Murdoch, Bezos, and all those Western oligarchs." Not a very high-level analysis, true, but it's different in one fundamental respect: it doesn't find satisfaction in affirming a tragic worldview. That, ultimately, is my issue with Streeck's analysis: he doesn't just describe tragedy, he's committed to it as the alpha and omega of his analysis. Russia isn't a good guy, it just serves as a foil for Streeck's target, the West as bad guy. Weirder still, Streeck's rhetoric — and yours too, Wolfgang — presents 'the US propaganda machine' as a mirror of Russia's. Yes and no, imo. Either way, though, pre-blaming people who don't see eye-to-eye with you as pill-munching coppertops in the Matrix? If the western left is so hopelessly deluded, maybe people who think so should articulate a new pole. Feel free to lay out its fundamental principles and how they can be applied to create something better. Russians, as in the people, have lived through
Re: nettime-l Digest, Vol 174, Issue 40
This is my favorite debate strategy: when you don’t have a substantive argument, just say your interlocutors are incapable of understanding the truth. It works for Macgregor’s fanboys on Fox, no reason it shouldn’t work on nettime. Cheers, Ted On Mar 17, 2022, 18:26 -0400, Stefan Heidenreich , wrote: > it's a double bind + cognitive dissonance problem: > > for most western intellectuals, after years of fighting for the right > causes (which I also supported and keep supporting) it is very difficult > to realize that one has been gaslighted as useful idiot for the > military-industrial complex. # distributed via : no commercial use without permission #is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
Re: Irregular Ukraine Linklist
On 16 Mar 2022, at 4:45, Stefan Heidenreich wrote: > add this: Former senior advisor the Secretary of Defense Col. Doug Macgregor > on the situation in Ukraine and Washington: It seems strange to see this on nettime. Macgregor is a Putin apologist who's called Zelensky a "puppet," accused him of using the Ukrainian people as "human shields," described the wanton destruction as "surprisingly little damage," and argued that the Russian military should have been *more* violent in the opening days of the war. He's a fixture on Fox News because he makes hosts like Tucker Carlson sound moderate. The Secretary of Defense that Macgregor advised (for a few months) was Chris Miller, who Trump installed just days after losing the election as part of a larger purge of mil/intel leadership. There's good reason to think that Macgregor actively involved in Trump’s attempted coup. From Wikipedia on Macgregor’s failed nomination (by Trump) to be ambassador to Germany: > He has asserted that Muslim immigrants (referred to as "Muslim invaders") > come to Europe "with the goal of eventually turning Europe into an Islamic > state". Macgregor has argued that the German concept of > Vergangenheitsbewältigung, used to cope with Germany's Nazi past and its > atrocities during World War II, is a "sick mentality." Macgregor has also > stated that martial law should be instituted on the U.S.-Mexico border and > argued for the extrajudicial execution of those who cross the border at > unofficial ports of entry. Macgregor has also made statements in support of > Israel having defensible borders, the annexation of the Golan Heights, and > the decision to move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem. In a column in The > Washington Post he was described as "a racist crackpot who is pro-Russia, > anti-Merkel, anti-Muslim and anti-Mexican." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Douglas_Macgregor?wprov=sfti1 Admittedly, Wikipedia is a problematic source — in this case because it understates Macgregor's extremism. His view that Ukraine should serve as a "neutral" buffer between NATO/EU and RU is consistent with his advocacy for summary executions of undocumented migrants at the US/Mex border: he doesn't like change, and he's happy to exchange others' lives en masse to prevent it. Your suggestion that the INC should add some random rightist-noise YT video to their list of practical Ukraine resources seems a bit...tone-deaf? Ted # distributed via : no commercial use without permission #is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
Re: The American theory of hybrid war
On 15 Mar 2022, at 0:07, Brian Holmes wrote: > The American theory was produced after the 2005 Isreal-Lebanon war which > resulted in the Israelis finally exiting the South of Lebanon. Origin of > the concept is a guy named Hoffmann, 2007 (bit.ly/3MPtEVc). This is > distinct from the Russian concept of hybrid war, it's not about > information. Instead the model is a situation where irregular forces on the > ground have a structural partner in conventional state forces using all > levers except direct military intervention. In the Israel-Lebanon war, the > irregular forces were Hezbollah and the conventional state was Iran. In the > current conflict, you get it. This is schematic to the point of being inaccurate. Hoffmann's ideas have been influential, but giving a single person so much credit is like saying America's corporate, higher ed, agriculture, or tech sectors coalesced around a single theory. There are indeed theories that have had that level of impact in those sectors — Milton Friedman's proposal that corps should focus solely on maximizing shareholder value, for example, or ideas with murkier origins, say, that college tuition *should* rise — but Hoffmann's work is nowhere near that kind of systemic status. What he offered was less a manifesto than a carefully calibrated compromise: a sort of let's-agree-to-disagree lowest-common-denominator, why-can't-we-all-be-friends, just-don't-mention-you-know-what-in-front-of-the-in-laws approach that everyone could get on board with without rocking anyone else's boat too much. But it's even narrower than that. The US military has a long history of para-academic theories about how do what it does, which can be traced back across a century+ of buzzy concepts: hybrid war, low-intensity conflict, counterinsurgency, anti-guerrilla, anti-partisan, and so on. And those are just the street-level theories about how to do old-fashioned stuff like actually try to win; what's notable is how divorced they are from the the 'strategic' theories driving showcase systems like missiles, advanced 'aerial platforms,' etc. Some of those buzzy ideas were significant, others were basically just rebranding. What they have in common is reaching a critical mass within the US mil/intel bureaucracies (which are VERY plural and contentious). Those ideas spilled into public discussion because they were translated into institutional agendas — i.e., budgets shifted, entities were created or combined, technical standards and protocols were developed, weapons systems were commissioned and acquired, education and training curricula were changed, personnel and materiel were moved around the chessboard, and so on. All of that requires overcoming mind-bending institutional inertia and cynicism — which, again, helps to account for why Hoffmann's ideas can be understood not just in terms of their impact but also in terms of their *lack* of impact. Those non/changes point to a larger problem, which the US mil/intel establishment shares with US academia — because it has its own vast, internal version of higher ed, ranging from vocational schools to Ivy League-like prestige academies, think tanks, and all the rest. The problem? It produces far more qualified candidates than it can absorb. That has all kinds of effects, but the one that stands out is the explosion of private-sector para-mil/intel entities — think Blackwater/Academi, but multiply it by a few orders of magnitude. A huge chunk of that is arms manufacture, but another segment that's visible to the public in actual conflict are the 'private contracting' outfits. For the most part, those mercenaries get their orders and paychecks not from the DoD but from the 'intelligence community,' which itself is a sort of dumping ground for ex-military people. For us civvies, "turning an aircraft carrier around" is a metaphor for guiding impossibly cumbersome change, but in the military it isn't a metaphor: they actually turn real aircraft carriers around. Getting the DoD, the IC, *and* all their sprawling private-sector dependents to coordinate is more like turning a Dunkirk-scale flotilla around. Or turning an archipelago around: you don't actually move it, you just say you did. Again: if Hoffmann's work has been influential (and it has), that's partly because he found a way for lots of people and entities to say "Look! See! We're on board!" without changing that much. Hoffmann and his work are closely associated with the US Marine Corps, whose aggressive branding compensates, in part, for its on-again-off-again, fill-in-the-blanks history. Check out the USMC's Wikipedia entry and you'll see: the history section has all kinds of surprising talk about the service's periodic 'dissolution,' 'decline,' 'malaise,' conflict with the army, dependencies on the navy and air force, and more. And you can be sure USMC loyalists police that entry as vigorously as they'd protect any forward-operating
Re: The War to come ...
Felix gets it, imo. Not sure about elsewhere, but the 'special relationship left' — the US certainly and the UK as well, I think — has been stuck in a rut. OT1H hard-ish doctrinaire 'anti-imperialist' formations robotically denounce NATO in the monolithic, one-sided terms Felix points out; OT0H milquetoast centrists revert to form and support all kinds of aggressive action, if not outfight belligerence (yet), with little or no introspection about how that relates to their other earlier stances. Both are backward-glancing in a way that Corey Robin put well a week ago on Facebook: > God, I hate left debates about international politics. More than any other > kind of debate, they never have anything to do with the matter at hand but, > instead, always seem to involve some attempt, on all sides, to remediate and > redress some perceived failure or flaw of politics past. I don't think the left will make much progress until it gets over its post-'70s anxiety over the use of force — always coercive, sometimes violent — to achieve its political ends. Until then, it'll necessarily marginalize itself with anti-statist denialism masquerading as warm-fuzzy idealism. The way out? Ditch the genealogical-moral hand-wringing and accept the fact that human institutions, all of them, are deeply flawed, but each in their own unique way. A bit like what Tolstoy said of families: All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. The question is how can we work with the institutions we have toward *better* (NOT 'the best') political ends — in this case, fostering conditions that help Russian populations (very plural) to try once again to remake their society in more sustainable, fairer ways. If we had more than one major multilateral alliance and were asking which would be better suited to realizing that end, fine, let's debate whether NATO is the better choice; but we don't, really, so scholastic debates about whether NATO is Good or Evil lead nowhere. Are McDonald's and Coke "Good"? No. Is their withdrawal from Russia the right thing in moral and practical terms? Yes. That wasn't so hard, now, was it? Why would we discuss NATO in any different way? Because, being a multilateral entity that's ultimately grounded in democratic national governments it "represents" us more than McDonald's and Coke? Good luck arguing that. Cheers, Ted On 10 Mar 2022, at 7:21, Felix Stalder wrote: > On 10.03.22 06:02, Brian Holmes wrote: >> >> Here's the thing though. Should Nato really have denied entry to all those >> Eastern European states that requested it? Remember that most of those >> states, they had been taken over but not absorbed by the Soviet Union. They >> lived for decades under significant degrees of political repression. Did >> they have a valid reason to want to join Nato after 1989? Looking at the >> brutality of the current war, it seems suddenly obvious to me that they did >> -- and by the same token, I have suddenly become less certain of what I >> always used to say, that Nato is an imperialist war machine that should be >> disbanded. Russia is also an imperialist war machine, for sure (and the two >> owe each other a lot). But maybe China is also an imperial war machine? And >> India, maybe not yet? > > I don't think that NATO ever was an imperialist war machine. The US doesn't > really need NATO for it's imperialist projects in Latin America or Asia. > > NATO, it seems to me, was always a "cold war" war machine, aimed at > confronting the SU/Russia, primarily in Europe. To the degree that this > confrontation was not seen as vital after 1990 (either because the US read > geopolitics as uni-polar, or the Europeans believed in trade leading to > peace) NATO languished. Irrelevant for Trump, brain-dead for Macron, not > worth investing for the Germans. > > For the Eastern European countries, for very understandable, deep historical > reasons, "confronting Russia" remained a vital concern also after the end of > the cold war, hence NATO was always seen crucially important and they entered > NATO voluntarily. > > History has born them out, but was that really inevitable? Of course not, > because nothing ever is, but the miss-conception of geopolitics as unipolar > is certainly a big factor in this. > > But the paradox is, to develop a real peace architecture in Europe, NATO > would have had to deny Eastern European countries membership and work on some > kind of large block-free zone between itself and Russia. I'm not sure such a > project would have been popular in Poland, though. # distributed via : no commercial use without permission #is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
Re: Almost zero
I took the noise about Surkov with a grain of salt, because it was obvious even at the time that "he" was an orientalist trope — a Svengali-Rasputin figure, maybe with an added dash of vulgar Baudrillard. The fact that that *trope* — not the actual person but the figure — still exerts such magnetic attraction for Western minds says a lot. If Surkov was as innovative as his theorists claimed, that implies that earlier Russian history (and the Soviet history that came both before and after it) were, in comparison, a mix of stable, continuous, grounded, factual. Does that sound right? Not to my ear. If not, then maybe Surkov wasn't so innovative or so unique after all; maybe even the opposite. Here's a useful twitter thread that looks at the prehistory of Putin's strange claims about "denazifying" Ukraine: https://twitter.com/kamilkazani/status/1497306746330697738 One line I'd like to highlight: Putinism as "Russian Orthodox National-Communist Monarchism." Does that ring a few bells? It should. On the one hand, it's a template form understanding other incoherent reactionary movements like the GOP. But, more relevant here, I expect quite a few Nettimers have seen Michael Benson's excellent rocku-mocku-documentary _Predictions of Fire_, which — among many other things — traces how NSK / Irwin / Laibach mobilized wildly contradictory visual and rhetorical tropes — x>thirty years ago. If that's a substantive part of what Putin is doing now, then his alleged futurism turns out to be leftovers reheated one too many times. There's a low-res version of Michael's film on YouTube: https://youtu.be/j_WFz_1Imjc In particular, note the sequence in which NSK et al unfurl "Red Square on Black Square," in both a retrospective homage to Malevich and a futuristic provocation: https://vimeo.com/33345604 Brian wrote: > In the run-up to this war both the US and Britain tried something entirely > new for them, surely influenced by their knowledge of Surkov and associated > military doctrines. What did they do? Instead of strategically managing the > truth, they basically made their intelligence public as it came in. And the > intelligence was spot on. What a weird feeling: trustable intelligence. > Compare what happened before the Iraq War. It's nowhere near the same > circumstances, but still, positive. Who is this "they"? The US and UK? That's pretty vague. If you looked at the average age of staffers in the two countries' civilian / military / intel leadership offices, you'd see that the current "they" are, by definition, far too young to be the same "they" responsible for, say, either or the Gulf Wars. So OF COURSE "they" are doing things differently — they *are* different. So what are they doing now? Standard fare, imo. The rise of the net has brought about some pretty significant changes in how we ~read. For example, it's given rise to fluid experiments in forms, genre, structure, style; it's also led to vast numbers of people to read far more, and far more widely, than they used to. Both have contributed to a growing sensitivity to the *structures* of dialog. We've seen this very clearly in liberationist movements like #metoo and BLM, which have taught many more people to listen for ideology, in both substance and form. But this kind of thing everywhere — which helps to explain the meteoric rise of the word "trope," from an obscure-ish term of art to stock TikTok fare. Websites like TV Tropes, typologies of trolls and trolling (e.g., "sea-lioning," 'splaining, etc), and the all-consuming, ever-present tendency of young people to profile each other all point in different ways to what we could call the weaponization of genre itself. When you react to what someone says or does, they set the terms of debate; so, increasingly, people respond to *the form* of what someone says or does, in an effort to change and challenge those terms. I don't think we need Surkov to explain any of this. If anything, mentioning him just confuses things. Cheers, Ted On 26 Feb 2022, at 14:06, Brian Holmes wrote: > On Sat, Feb 26, 2022 at 10:00 AM May Jayyusi wrote: > >> >> You mean to say that the USA is not a managed democracy? >> > > Well, those who have read me for longer may not agree about the lack of > critical distance from this quite terrifying society, the USA. But it's a > detail and doesn't matter. I share your outrage at all the things you > mention. > > I used to refer to Sheldon Wolin with his notion of managed democracy or > inverted totalitarianism, to describe the US formula of social control. > However that has broken down over the last decade, both usefullly (who > wants to be managed?) and dangerously (who wants to fall into chaos and be > taken over by a bunch of right-wing thugs?). Societies have become a lot > harder to manage over the last decade, for better and worse. So far the > fascist / authoritarian resurgence has been the big beneficiary.
Re: CfP: Critical reflections on pandemic politics: left-wing, feminist and anti-racist critiques
I think I know how that happened, and it's more likely a spellcheck thing — but that's one of those unknowables, isn't it? And a poor excuse in any case, and carries much less weight than the context — nettime's long-established history of gender bias. Way back I had a boss who all but beat into me how important it is to get names right; he was a creep but he was also right. So: Ana, please accept my apologies, and bronac, thank you for pointing out my mistake. Ted On 21 Jan 2022, at 8:34, bronac ferran wrote: > can't help wondering who the 'Alan' is to whom your email is addressed > > seems a perfect subliminal reflex (I won't say knee jerk response) ... > > as ever > > B > > On Fri, 21 Jan 2022 at 13:26, Ted Byfield wrote: > >> Alan, your question seems right on. I think there's an answer — it's just >> not very satisfying. <...> # distributed via : no commercial use without permission #is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
Re: CfP: Critical reflections on pandemic politics: left-wing, feminist and anti-racist critiques
Alan, your question seems right on. I think there's an answer — it's just not very satisfying. It's standard fare (with good reason) to note that the maldistribution of global healthcare, from R through everyday practices, benefits the global north at the expense of the global south. This criticism has been especially prominent in a few areas like HIV/AIDS and (not coincidentally) vaccine research. As you and everyone else who will read this almost certainly know, quite a bit of pharma research is conducted in less-developed countries (i.e., *on people in LDCs*), but when it comes time to make the resulting products available, the debate mysteriously shifts — to the need to amortize R costs, corporate rights to profit, etc, etc. So there are valid arguments to be made about colonialism (and therefore imperialism) in the context of pharma. The problem comes when those decades-old, generic arguments are applied in new contexts. Admittedly, 'new' has a pretty woolly meaning here, but you kinda now it when you see it. For example, ebola may be ancient, but the threat it poses in the context of globalization — largely thanks to aviation — are new. No one in their right mind would argue that ebola should have been deliberately transported to the EU or US so we could make sure that candidate vaccines are tested 'equitably.' The risks outside of narrow confines of testing are too extreme, so candidates were mainly tested in situ — and, crucially, *the vaccines were deployed in situ*. (I'll ignore the fact that OF COURSE there are samples of it and other pathogens in 'secure' facilities, often quasi-military.) SARS-CoV-2 moved too quickly to be isolated 'like' ebola, so the challenge it presented was genuinely global — and the same is true for the vaccine research, in part because national regulatory structures around the world adapted quickly. Upshot: candidate vaccines were tested much more widely than usual, in LDCs as well as WEIRD countries, and anywhere else that worked. And yet the global south, which has played a decisively important role in helping everyone to understand SARS-CoV-2, has gotten screwed in a familiar range of ways (not just access). So, again, there are valid grounds to talk about colonialism (and therefore imperialism) in the context of Covid-related pharma. But, as you note, the moment someone starts to talk about "provax" imperialism, everything turns upside-down and backwards. I think I get the general argument (not yours), that the West's overall pro-vaccine stance is part and parcel of a larger ideological front — a double bind that both valorizes vaccinations then denies access to them — and that that morally untenable position is continuous with 'imperialism.' But, as you suggest, the more pressing issue — as measured by populations sickened or dying from Covid. That's a lot more compelling than some vast schematic criticism untethered from any practical solution, like better access to vaccines and healthcare. Cheers, Ted On 20 Jan 2022, at 12:30, Ana Teixeira Pinto wrote: > What is "pro-vax imperialism"? To what concrete, real, policy does this > term apply? It seems to suggest that vaccines are being foisted on the > global south when the actual problem is hoarding... > > > On Thu, Jan 20, 2022 at 6:06 PM Ted Byfield wrote: > >> This kind of 'concern trolling'–esque appropriation of leftish discourse >> in the service of rightish agendas is becoming pervasive in the US at least >> — and elsewhere, I'm sure, albeit with less detail. >> >> As with most of these discursive tendencies it's first and foremost >> impersonal, which can make it hard to counter without opening oneself up to >> charges of relying on ad hominem. I think that helps to account for its >> rise as a rhetorical strategy: it 'works' mainly because it lays basis for >> a scripted form of pseudo-argument — pious platitudes about science, >> openness, debate, democracy, whatever. But, as I think you suggest, >> Florian, it would be a serious mistake to see it as merely rhetorical: it >> has concrete consequences. >> >> It might be useful to think of this turn in terms of rightist >> 'culture-jamming,' 'overidentification,' and related ideas. >> >> Cheers, >> Ted >> >> On 20 Jan 2022, at 7:00, Florian Cramer wrote: >> >>>> - Government propaganda and censorship around lockdown and vaccination >>>> >>> [...] >>> >>>> - The role of mass and social media in anti- or pro-lockdown or vaccine >>>> propaganda, political polarization and forms of media virality (eg. via >>>> covid-19 memes) >>>> >>> [...] >>> >>>> - Mandatory vaccine rollouts as assaults to the feminist appeal to >> bodily >
Re: CfP: Critical reflections on pandemic politics: left-wing, feminist and anti-racist critiques
This kind of 'concern trolling'–esque appropriation of leftish discourse in the service of rightish agendas is becoming pervasive in the US at least — and elsewhere, I'm sure, albeit with less detail. As with most of these discursive tendencies it's first and foremost impersonal, which can make it hard to counter without opening oneself up to charges of relying on ad hominem. I think that helps to account for its rise as a rhetorical strategy: it 'works' mainly because it lays basis for a scripted form of pseudo-argument — pious platitudes about science, openness, debate, democracy, whatever. But, as I think you suggest, Florian, it would be a serious mistake to see it as merely rhetorical: it has concrete consequences. It might be useful to think of this turn in terms of rightist 'culture-jamming,' 'overidentification,' and related ideas. Cheers, Ted On 20 Jan 2022, at 7:00, Florian Cramer wrote: >> - Government propaganda and censorship around lockdown and vaccination >> > [...] > >> - The role of mass and social media in anti- or pro-lockdown or vaccine >> propaganda, political polarization and forms of media virality (eg. via >> covid-19 memes) >> > [...] > >> - Mandatory vaccine rollouts as assaults to the feminist appeal to bodily >> autonomy >> > [...] > >> - Ethical considerations regarding mass experimentation, moral shaming and >> lateral citizen surveillance >> > [...] > >> - Teleological and theological narratives of science as salvation (eg. via >> vaccinations) > > > All beautiful examples of a "Querfront" discourse where extreme right > positions are packaged in left-wing rhetoric. Not a single point, however, > on minorities and vulnerable people and communities endangered by > anti-vaccer egoism, and neo-Darwinist politics - for example in the UK, > Sweden and the Netherlands, of "herd immunity" through survival of the > fittest. > > You should invite Dutch experts Willem Engel and Thierry Baudet as keynote > speakers. # distributed via : no commercial use without permission #is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
Re: The Dawn of Everything (very short review)
So, basically, magic is indistinguishable from any sufficiently advanced technology. I mean, if we can't distinguish the two, then the observation should cut both ways, right? But Arthur C. Clarke's formulation, "any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic," is the only one we ever hear, and that bias makes its function clear: "mystifying" technology. My mentor, the ancient histirian Morton Smith known for his controversial discovery of an allegedly 'secret' gospel and his popularizing book _Jesus the Magician_, had a brutally succinct definition of religion: "pretentious magic." It isn't sufficient, but it's a useful starting point. When you set aside the magical claims of a religion, you're left with human ~institutions like (and, like all institutions, also unlike) any other, and you can begin to analyze them not in terms of (and on the terrain of) their purported truths but, rather, in terms of of their observable activities, functions, and effects. As science and tech have become *literally* all-consuming, they have, ironically, opened up new spaces — and many would say needs – to think about ~religion and ~magic. We're now seeing more and more that their seemingly naive wholism maybe wasn't so naive after all. In a similar vein, the best definition of I've run across was by Dennis Flanagan, an editor whose work is known far more than his name: he turned Scientific American from a mediocre intellectual property into a powerhouse that was, AFAIK, entirely new: a mass magazine whose mission was to enable scientists to explain complex research directly to popular audiences. The impact of SA cannot be overstated, imo. He said: "science is what scientists do." Far from a tautology, it's a fantastically open-ended formula akin to Smith's model of religion: an invitation to look at a self-privileging human institution in terms of its observable activities, functions, and effects — externalities included. Religion and magic have become, in large part, the only available ~space for critiques of scientism and its effects. I think for many the function of the truths religion claims is less that they're true than that they retain an aura of legitimacy. What other semi-solid ground could there be for a critique of scientism or technocratic culture? Oh, right: opinion . Welcome to QAnon. Dispensing with the truth is often the best way to get a little closer to it. As Lacan put it, more obscurely (but of course!) than either Smith or Flanagan: "I always speak the truth. Not the whole truth, because there's no way, to say it all. Saying it all is literally impossible: words fail. Yet it's through this very impossibility that the truth holds onto the real." Most debates about religion 'vs' science boil down to not much more than partisans claiming their model of truth is sufficient and therefore exclusive — boundary policing writ large or, less politely mystification. Cheers, Ted On 9 Dec 2021, at 10:00, mp wrote: > On 09/12/2021 06:59, Michael Goldhaber wrote: >> As a one-time theoretical physicist, I find this quote from Gosden to >> be out-dated, overly reductive, and incorrect, at least as far as >> the most thoughtful scientists go. >> >> Scientific understanding doesn’t “derive from abstraction,” but >> rather the other way round. It doesn’t separate humans from the world >> , but rather emphasizes our total embededness in it. It is no >> coincidence that almost all aspects of the current environmental >> movement, whether against the destruction of species , the concerns >> about global warming, the dire effects of plastics, etc., come from >> scientific observations. Nor is it any coincidence that scientists >> for the most part are instigators and fervent supporters of that >> movement. >> >> Darwin, after all, is generally considered a scientist, yet the most >> basic and originally shocking point of evolutionary theory is that we >> are related to all other living things. Ethologists constantly >> emphasize how close we are in behavior to other animals , etc., etc., >> etc. And, by the way, since Einstein physicists have agreed that >> matter and energy are the same. > > That view of science is a central part of Gosden's narrative and > arguments, he is not in any possible way pushing science down or away. > Quite the contrary. > > "No choice is needed between magic, science or religion. They each > stress and develop varied aspects of human action and belief, working > best when complementary" (2020: 10) > > He is expressly celebrating the advances of science and showing how > quantum mechanics (appearing on pp: 31, 354, 397, 403, 415, 423, 424), > plantneurobiology (and intelligence of plants on pp: 32, 420–21, 421, > 429) ecology, etc. reveal elements of the nature of reality that > tendentially align with the animist, magical understanding of the world > (to show science in relation with magic on pp: 1, 4–5, 11–16,
Re: “Meta”
I agree with Brian that Facebook's "rebranding" isn't an urgent problem in its own right, but I disagree with the rhetorical gambit of introducing a preferred subject by dismissing another. There are lots of genuinely important subjects that never get a word on nettime, and it isn't hard to see why "Meta" would be of particular interest to many people on this list. That said, a few thoughts — and don't be dissuaded by the massive block of text quoted below. (1) It seems pretty obvious that the rebranding serves in part to cover for a corporate restructuring aimed at insulating Facebook against growing threats of regulation. The company needs to be broken up, and not in the presumptive "break off Instagram and WhatsApp" way that's usually bounced around. The breakup of AT is a better model: split FB into a host slew of competing RBOC-like "Babyfaces" that are forced to (a) interoperate according well-documented protocols and standards, (b) compete on the basis of features, and (c) faced with draconian rules when it comes to tolerating civil- and human-rights abuses. When I mentioned that (on FB, naturally) Shiva Vaidyanathan — a legitimate expert on the subject, if ever there was one — intervened, saying that way of thinking is mired in the 20th C, that FB is unprecedented, etc, etc. Sorry, no: what it *does* may be unprecedented, but at bottom it's a corporation. There's no doubt that protecting its current officers, assets, and operations was a consideration in the rebranding; the only question is how high it was as a priority. My guess: very high. (2) Proposing a trademark is a legal process, and the filing entity has to disclose what it imagines the trademark covers. The scale and scope of FB's proposal defy description. Even when you discount the tendency of IP lawyers to law claim to the known universe and beyond, this proposal is first and foremost evidence of the — no exaggeration here — *sovereign* ambitions of FB's C-suite. Brace yourself: >>> Downloadable software in the nature of a mobile application; Computer >>> hardware; Downloadable software for social networking and creating and >>> interacting with online communities; Downloadable software for creating, >>> managing and accessing groups within virtual communities; Software >>> development tools; Downloadable software to enable development, assessment, >>> testing, and maintenance of mobile software applications for portable >>> electronic communication devices, namely, mobile phones, smartphones, >>> handheld computers and computer tablets; Downloadable software for use as >>> an application programming interface (API); Downloadable software for >>> organizing events, searching for events, calendaring and managing events; >>> Downloadable software for creating, editing, uploading, downloading, >>> accessing, viewing, posting, displaying, tagging, blogging, streaming, >>> linking, annotating, indicating sentiment about, commenting on, interacting >>> with, embedding, and sharing or otherwise providing electronic media, >>> images, video, audio, audio-visual content, data, and information via the >>> internet and communication networks; Downloadable computer software for >>> finding content and content publishers, and for subscribing to content; >>> Downloadable software for creating and managing social media profiles and >>> user accounts; Interactive photo and video equipment, namely, kiosks for >>> capturing, uploading, editing, printing and sharing digital images and >>> video; Downloadable software for streaming multimedia entertainment >>> content, audio-visual content, video content, and associated text and data; >>> Downloadable software for enabling transmission of images, audio, audio >>> visual and video content and data; Downloadable software for modifying >>> photographs, images and audio, video, and audio-visual content; >>> Downloadable software for use in taking and editing photographs and >>> recording and editing videos; Downloadable software for processing images, >>> graphics, audio, video, and text; Downloadable software for collecting, >>> managing, organizing, synchronizing, and the storage of data and >>> information; Downloadable e-commerce software to allow users to perform >>> electronic business transactions via a global computer and communication >>> networks; Downloadable software and mobile application software providing a >>> virtual marketplace; Downloadable software for sending and receiving >>> electronic messages, alerts, notifications and reminders; Downloadable >>> software for file sharing; Downloadable messaging software; Computer search >>> engine software; Downloadable software for use in creating, managing, >>> measuring, and disseminating advertising of others; Advertisement server, >>> namely, a computer server for storing advertisements and delivering >>> advertisements to websites; Downloadable software for creating, sharing,
Re: Democracy Net Zero
The first page opens with a “fable” about a lifeless town, but she puts that conceit to rest just a few paragraphs later: “This town does not actually exist, but it might easily have a thousand counterparts in America or elsewhere in the world. I know of no community that has experienced all the misfortunes I describe. Yet every one of these disasters has actually happened somewhere, and many real communities have already suffered a substantial number of them. A grim specter has crept upon us almost unnoticed, and this imagined tragedy may easily become a stark reality we all shall know. What has already silenced the voices of spring in countless towns in America? This book is an attempt to explain.” There isn’t a word in the ensuing 350-odd pages that could be mistaken for fiction. Carson went to great lengths to have her work reviewed by scientists and experts across several relevant fields, and the resulting prose reflects her commitment to clearly and accurately presenting the truth. Cheers, Ted On Jun 1, 2021, 12:53 AM -0600, d.gar...@new-tactical-research.co.uk, wrote: > Hi Ryan, yes I take your point that calling Silent Spring 'fiction' > when maybe the word fable might not have been more appropriate was a > mistake. > > I guess this usage followed without enough reflection on from work I > have been doing over the last few years around the idea of 'fiction > as method' > https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/cross_fac/cim/events/asif/. > https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/fiction-method > > This particularly applied to an exhibition I curated in 2017/18 called > 'How Much of this is Fiction'. Which worked with artists whose work > used simulations or hoaxes to satirise or un-veil hidden political > realities.https://www.fact.co.uk/event/how-much-of-this-is-fiction > > That said I was probably quite clumsy in the way I characterised > Carson's ground breaking work. > > Best > > David > > On 2021-05-30 18:52, Ryan Griffis wrote: > > Thanks for this David! > > > > Minor point: "Silent Spring" is not a work of fiction in any sense of > > the word; the short first chapter "Fable for Tomorrow," is, as its > > title suggests, a fable (of a "town that does not actually exist"). > > That chapter is obviously a literary device that establishes the > > stakes up front and in an accessible and compressed manner, but I > > wouldn't use it to classify the rest of the book as even "creative > > nonfiction." The book is otherwise a work of reportage, probably *the* > > model for popular contemporary climate/science journalists such as > > Elizabeth Kolbert who rely on a combination of first-person > > observations, interviews, and syntheses of scientific papers and > > policy documents. > > Unfortunately, it's still deeply relevant 50 years later... > > > > Take care all, > > Ryan > > > > "To get a comparative sense of where we currently stand its useful to > > contrast today?s environmental politics with the political impact of > > Rachel Carson?s ?Silent Spring? published in 1962. As is well known > > this > > was an account of an imaginary community afflicted by environmental > > calamity. Although a fiction the narrative drew on detailed evidence > > from events that had already actually happened in a number of separate > > > > incidents. Carson had simply and brilliantly drawn these threads > > together into a worst-case scenario." > > # distributed via : no commercial use without permission > > # is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, > > # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets > > # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l > > # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org > > # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject: > # distributed via : no commercial use without permission > # is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, > # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets > # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l > # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org > # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject: # distributed via : no commercial use without permission #is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
Re: 3 or 4 good links on NFTs
Tacticalmediasplained! On 27 Apr 2021, at 5:52, d.gar...@new-tactical-research.co.uk wrote: But when a supermodel is doing tactical media that's far more compelling than all of nettime combined, and writing about it in ways that radiate relevance to issues that are (let's say) less 'pale, male, and stale,' it's time for a rethink. I found Ted's list of articles is very useful (thanks). Particularly Emily Ratajkowski's extraordinary text 'The Cut' on her struggle to regain control of her own image. And the wider exasperated challenge for us to work harder to break out of our cognitive and political confinement is well taken. So in this spirit I suggest that the process should start by acknowledging that reducing Ratajkowski's brilliant essay to "supermodel doing tactical media..'is really "not ok" (at least give her name!). Apart from also being a serious actor and a fine essayist Ratajkowski also studied fine art at UCLA. Her article makes clear that this education meant that her encounter with Richard Prince's work was mediated through her knowledge of its Warholian ethos (and as it later turned out she was able to use her erudition to diagnose an acute moral vacuum). So my point is that there is more than a hint of a further step in a process of 'objectifying' Ratajkowski going on in Ted's commentary. So yes agreed, less 'pale, male and stale' please. David Garcia (1) How many layers of copyright infringement are in Emily Ratajkowski’s new NFT? Ratajkowski trolls an art troll Jacob Kastrenakes Apr 24, 2021 https://www.theverge.com/2021/4/24/22399790/emily-ratajkowski-nft-christies-copyright-nightmare-richard-prince note the link to her essay "Buying Myself Back When does a model own her own image?" (Sept. 15, 2020) https://www.thecut.com/article/emily-ratajkowski-owning-my-image-essay.html (2) The Downward Spiral: Popular Things Dean Kissick (n.d.) https://www.spikeartmagazine.com/articles/downward-spiral-popular-things-dean-kissick (3) The One Redeeming Quality of NFTs Might Not Even Exist Kal Raustiala and Christopher Jon Sprigman April 14, 2021 https://slate.com/technology/2021/04/nfts-digital-art-authenticity-problem.html # distributed via : no commercial use without permission #is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
3 or 4 good links on NFTs
NFTs don't strike me as intrinsically interesting, but the seeming inability of conventional leftish/academic to address them *is* interesting. I'd be hard-pressed to think of another time when it seemed so clear that the force of criticism has been *to categorize* — that is, to dispense with the rough edges of specificity in order file something away as quickly as possible and reaffirm the big picture. That's not without its benefits; for example, it can spin off all kinds of erudition. But it shouldn't be hard to do all that *and also* acknowledge that some curious new spaces might be opening up. It seems to me that that victory of more or less disciplinary self-regard over the raw potential of things is pretty much a case study in performativity. And, like a lot of performativity these days, it feels less than promising. Here are three articles on the subject that I thought were worth the time. Just retweeting, not endorsing, as they say. But when a supermodel is doing tactical media that's far more compelling than all of nettime combined, and writing about it in ways that radiate relevance to issues that are (let's say) less 'pale, male, and stale,' it's time for a rethink. Links below, obv. Cheers, Ted --- (1) How many layers of copyright infringement are in Emily Ratajkowski’s new NFT? Ratajkowski trolls an art troll Jacob Kastrenakes Apr 24, 2021 https://www.theverge.com/2021/4/24/22399790/emily-ratajkowski-nft-christies-copyright-nightmare-richard-prince note the link to her essay "Buying Myself Back When does a model own her own image?" (Sept. 15, 2020) https://www.thecut.com/article/emily-ratajkowski-owning-my-image-essay.html (2) The Downward Spiral: Popular Things Dean Kissick (n.d.) https://www.spikeartmagazine.com/articles/downward-spiral-popular-things-dean-kissick (3) The One Redeeming Quality of NFTs Might Not Even Exist Kal Raustiala and Christopher Jon Sprigman April 14, 2021 https://slate.com/technology/2021/04/nfts-digital-art-authenticity-problem.html # distributed via : no commercial use without permission #is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
Re: deep humanities initiative
I have a few thoughts: the first has to do with these one-off comments about "deep," the second has to do with the gender aspect of this thread in just five messages long. They're related, in a way. (1) DEEP Somewhere in my piles of scribbles I have some notes for an essay on the poetics of "deep." tl;dr: no, *do* forget web, pockets, and Europe. Those associations are fine, but there are better ways to approach this kind of thing than a couple of guys dashing off whatever comes to mind. One of my favorite mini-methods for just-add-water cultural analysis is Google's autocomplete — say, what it coughs up if you type in "deep a", "deep b", "deep c", etc. 26 searches is boring, but its rote, mechanical quality forces you to look at what other people are thinking. In this case it's pretty funny (part of me wants to say *deeply ironic*), because you're staring the problem right in its face: what do millions, maybe billions of people mean when they think "deep"? There are several ~layers of meaning, but I'll just get to a few: One is older, and has a miscellaneous quality because "deep" is literal: "deep pockets," "deep ocean," "deep end," etc. They're not so interesting, though "deep sleep" is one of them, and it was probably a basis for later, more metaphorical notions of deep." Then there's another layer where the marketing kick in, and you start to see more metaphorical phrases like "deep conditioner" or "deep tissue massage." This second layer is less miscellaneous because the marketing has a focus, the human body. In this sense, "deep" takes on a new, latent meaning through an implied contrast — not just with a traditional antonym like "shallow", I think, but with something more like "superficial." It's not so explicit in this context, but this turn came with gendering — I think because commercial representations of bodies tended to focus on women first, and conveyed a sort of double-bind message: your body is a chronic problem / this product will fix or maintain it / turn your body into a promise. Lather, rinse, repeat, as they say. I'll fast-forward past a bunch of other mutations in the micro-poetics of depth, rooted in things like the rise of certain styles of audio-production (especially in "industrial" music), "deep ecology" (first used in 1973 but only widely adopted in English in the '90s), the rise of aerial and satellite surveillance (which promoted a vertical perspective that made high-resolution a matter of "depth," and not just in the optical sense of depth of field — see William Burrows's seminal book on space-based intelligence, _Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security). But those things would all need essays in their own right, some of which have been written. One sign the poetics of depth was catching on was the glut of movies and TV in the '90s: Star Trek — Deep Space Nine, Deep Cover, Deep Impact, Deep Blue Sea, Deep Rising, The Deep, etc, etc. For me, the key shift was the use of "deep" to describe statecraft or the appearance of it. The obvious reference is the "deep state," which was first used in Turkey in the '90s, and a decade or so later started to become a staple of US political vocabulary — probably an interesting history of how that happened, but one that'll likely never be written. But part of the reason it worked is that "deep" had been a staple in paranoiac rightist ideas about "deep cover," "sleeper cells," and "Manchurian" this and that — some of which vaguely referred not just to anti-Soviet ideas but also to anti-Chinese kookiness about "brainwashing," dating from the Korean War. That background might explain why the name of a '72 porn movie was adopted as the pseudonym for the Watergate informer "Deep Throat" in the same year. There were other, more progressive uses, like Pauline Oliveros's phrase "deep listening," which was both a pun. IIRC see coined it around '90 or so after a recording experiment in some subterranean chamber — but it also referred to a more deliberate but also open focus, which is related to emerging ideas about "immersive" experiences — another implicit reference to depth, but one that also tacitly invokes intensifying modernist ideas about rising distraction (cf. the 2016 self-help book Deep Work about avoiding distraction). I think Oliveros probably was tapping into the kinds of thinking that characterized ideas like "deep ecology," with their emphasis on forms of connection and engagement that eluded conventional and technocratic ways of slicing and dicing the world. Also: Deep Thoughts is the name of the computer in Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy, which probably accounts for a huge swath of "deep" names in tech, even if the bros don't know it (let alone know it was a joke). So those are the main clusters of cultural noise that were available or in the air when tech bro culture started to tag things as "deep": deep web (not to be confused with the
Re: deep humanities initiative
On 23 Apr 2021, at 19:11, Molly Hankwitz wrote: What is “Deep Humanities”? This seems like your basic Silly Valley 'branding' proposal powerpoint, right down to the gobsmacking conceit that what they're doing is 'deep,' which implies that what everyone else has been doing — like for the last century or two (or twenty) — is shallow. Without fail the opposite is true, but there are the words, right there in front of you, and they say the opposite, so reading things like this always involves a fleeting doubt about who's insane, you or the authors. The bullet points follow a formula, which is to toss out a potted definition that might be at home in a catalog description for an intro-level undergrad course, followed by an effort to make it relevant to tech bros. For example: Culture: not as a stable set of practices to be manipulated or overcome, but as a dynamic site of struggle for meaning; as a form of “artificial intelligence” that enhances and extends human intelligence and capabilities. Ethics: ethical ways of conceiving and connecting with the Other all its planetary diversity; integrating ethics into STEM/STEM education, business, politics, planning, and policy. Language/communication – communication/language in human/non-human; human cognition/intelligence as well as AI and machine learning, including notions of context, common sense, and critical thinking. I'm not *even* going to touch the one about "reality." At its most profound, Deep Humanities aims to bring our cumulative accumulated knowledges about the practice of being human to engage the urgent issues of our times. As opposed to all those shallow humanities. And, yes, I saw the thing about "cumulative accumulated knowledges." I don't think the authors are insane. I sympathize with how difficult it must be to teach humanities in a setting like San Jose, where everything, everywhere, in every moment radiates the boundless, inbred naive confidence of tech wealth and power. Even very strong people would need to make serious accommodations to survive. This initiative seems like a product of those accommodations. Cheers, Ted # distributed via : no commercial use without permission #is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
Re: what does monetary value indicate?
On 18 Mar 2021, at 13:21, I wrote: Felix, what you're talking about looks theoretical, but at root these are really just questions of provenance, which the art world knows about only too well. Lo and behold: < https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/04/nfts-werent-supposed-end-like/618488/ > The only thing we’d wanted to do was ensure that artists could make some money and have control over their work. Back in May 2014, I was paired up with the artist Kevin McCoy at Seven on Seven, an annual event in New York City designed to spark new ideas by connecting technologists and artists. I wasn’t sure which one I was supposed to be; McCoy and his wife, Jennifer, were already renowned for their collaborative digital art, and he was better at coding than I was. At the time, I was working as a consultant to auction houses and media companies—a role that had me obsessively thinking about the provenance, ownership, distribution, and control of artworks. Seven on Seven was modeled after tech-industry hackathons, in which people stay up all night to create a working prototype that they then show to an audience. This was around the peak of Tumblr culture, when a raucous, wildly inspiring community of millions of artists and fans was sharing images and videos completely devoid of attribution, compensation, or context. As it turned out, some of the McCoys’ works were among those being widely “reblogged” by Tumblr users. And Kevin had been thinking a lot about the potential of the then-nascent blockchain—essentially an indelible ledger of digital transactions—to offer artists a way to support and protect their creations. See also: https://www.wired.com/1997/05/site-aims-to-be-applets-r-us-of-web/ The NFT bubble doesn't have enough substance or specificity to support much theory. If you knocked some zeroes off the sales prices, no one would even bother. So, really, the only thing driving the theorizing is the strings of zeroes. Cheers, Ted # distributed via : no commercial use without permission #is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
