Re: Fascist "trolls" and back on track
Dear Emaline and Alice, Thank you for generous replies. Nobody's ever pinned down what may or many not be attributed to consciousness unencumbered by four or five decades of lived experience and memory, but I detect something vaguely optimistic in both your responses, an optimism that I sometimes have difficulty projecting. Maybe it has to do with what Alice said, that for many in your age cohort the call-out is so yesterday. That is good to hear, and I kind of see it. Not only have people like Angela Nagle and now Haider offered some very fair critiques, but I kind of see it in my own life. For example, in the students I taught this summer and in the Millennial-heavy DSA meetings I've been attending, people are very into developing a class-consciousness, one that is informed by social difference in its very core self-understanding. Reactive Suey Park-style shaming is over it seems, or at least has died down into background noise. The new generation proceeds with diversity as a fact, not an aspiration. What Emaline says about the socializing as an attractive feature of today's grassroots activism, that would be a welcome silver lining to the toxic effects of social media. On a basic level the socializing was ever a feature of insurgent political cultures, going back to the dances and picnics of the early British trade unionists. If the socializing satisfies presently in a new and different way because of our screen time, esp for the young who know of no pre-Web world, then so much the better. Your remark about it sometimes feeling like engagement boils down to a choice between socializing or grant writing, well, that certainly speaks to a compulsory professionalization that, to me, also seems like a symptom of post-'89 (to take a convenient marker of time) neoliberalized work. This is a condition at least equal to the movement problems I described, probably a lot more harmful in terms of assembling mass movements. Angela, For the sake of simplicity, I admit that I probably overstated some of the generational differences. But I am not sure what you mean by my "historiography" in relation to social movement history, most of what I said is more or less settled, the broad turns, anyway. Further, I am just trying to make sense of what I lived through and have observed, helped along by texts by others that people can read, instead of just hearing about my experiences. >I mean, I understand your suggestion that "identity politics" is >depoliticising, but I also don't understand it at all because the >treatment of conflicts "over resources and labour" has always been >conducted through more or less tacit assumptions about identity that >link to entitlement. And your disappearance of white men's identity >politics as a tacit default or "universal" has the effect of yielding a >narrative that says (incorrectly in my view) that "identity politics" >>only began when the former's claim of universality was challenged. Also let me clarify, what I mean is that there is a tendency within identity politics (which, simply put, I take to be a constellation of discourses in different fields and disciplines, as well as in activist settings, that foregrounds interpretations through the lenses of social difference) to privilege moral status over questions of power. Obviously there is slippage between "moral" and "power"; so much of the intra-movement Civil Rights conversation was about that relationship (because, yes, the Christian thing, etc). But no, I did not and have never said that identity politics is "depoliticising" in a blanket fashion. A tendency, not the whole. If my original post did not make it clear, I myself, including much of my activist history, am a product of the 1980s full emergence of identity politics. Mine is a self-critique. Which is also to say, I never said the younger generation "is doing it wrong." What I said was, we (including myself) failed in transmitting the history. That so many, including Alice and Emaline, are doing it RIGHT despite the failures of their leftist elders, speaks volumes to the hope I have for the up and coming. But yes to Marx as a writer, not a cult figure. But quite a writer he was. Maybe you already went deep enough to read his articles on China and the opium warring. Check out some of those dispatches if you haven't, just for another angle on Marx and his times. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1853/china/index.htm Thank you, Dan w. On 11/10/18, 11:54 AM, "Emaline Friedman" wrote: >Dan, > > >Even before your solicitation, I was prepared to be the American >20-something (thanks, also, for your post, Alice): > > >What an interesting experience it's been here on Nettime for the last few >years as I've been writing a critical-psychological dissertation about >"Internet Addiction" (a perfectly Foucaultian generational problem)! In >between then and now I became deeply involved with a post-blockchain >project called Holochain and so went from
Re: Fascist "trolls" and back on track
Dan, Even before your solicitation, I was prepared to be the American 20-something (thanks, also, for your post, Alice): What an interesting experience it's been here on Nettime for the last few years as I've been writing a critical-psychological dissertation about "Internet Addiction" (a perfectly Foucaultian generational problem)! In between then and now I became deeply involved with a post-blockchain project called Holochain and so went from resistant net-asceticism to deep web, crypto-cultural exploration. What sets Holochain apart, at least in the core group, is its having started with eco-hippies who had been designing complementary currencies for intentional (and religious) communities for decades. Which brings me to the point about the 60's... I'll make the same preface about criticizing the youth, but in the other direction. Please don't take my agreement with your points as Oedipal variety anger. I do wish to emphasize, though, that it's worth taking a good hard look at what's been created through the de-politicization of 60's social movements. In my (odd) tech world this has taken the form of solutionism + a staunch DIY ethos that refuses engagement with national governments and other major social institutions and thus also eludes any realistic political context. Simultaneously, in grade school as much as in grad school, teachers and professors sang the praises of the 60's greats. While first as moral heroes and later as exemplars of driving affective flows, we never got much more than celebrated lifestyles that never seemed to match up with the modes of reading the present from which they are ostensibly generated. The primary rift between young activists on the left and right (though these terms are SO RARELY used) is that the young "left" believes that mass movements are now smaller, but that that's *ok* because the most important thing to uphold is being a good person...even if it never gets anywhere or benefits anyone. The young alt-light has a deeper understanding of power operating in the shadows and, contrary to Bard's Marxian heroism, accepts that it will not look like it did in the 60's. Unless of course you're at Burning Man or one of the numerous regional burns quite popular among gamers and others in the Southeast. By the way, I use the alt-light label to denote folks who will confess their ultimately fascist ideals on lots of drugs but who have no problem working with a jewish woman (me) by day on tech we all understand as a powerful pharmakon. We happily hold our own hopes about whose hands these tools will fall into. Note that the kindness you spoke of indeed crosses these political boundaries. And why shouldn't it? As I said, these terms are never used. They are hardly identities for us, making cooperation a given on the backdrop of "you've got your fantasies and I've got mine". Please understand that for me, like many young Americans, diversity has always been depoliticized and thus is often rightly met with the proverbial eyeroll of moralistic education. I'm from suburban California and then moved, first to the rural, then urban, south. The moralism is extreme off the heels of a disavowed Christianity, and I sometimes feel here as if I'm occupying a place so far to the left that I appear to be looping around to the far right -- ironically, because such morals feel impossible to uphold provided one is not white, male, privileged, etc. As I see it, without school or jobs, socializing is a huge motivator for involvement in activism. So, when your peers begin to morally lambast you harder than your parents for discursive missteps, prospects seem few. Compare this to the style of engagement of someone like Bard. At least he gave a sporty acknowledgement of your effort. I often feel torn between participating in overtly activist spaces, what sometimes feels like "just being a body" and doing the not so glamorous work no one seems willing to do. Shake hands with people in positions of "power over". It's a choice between socializing and grant writing. This is where identity comes in for me -- I am grateful to be a woman when I have a minor surge of hope that it'll give me better opportunity to struggle to fund my peers and me to live how we want: in zero-waste communities, learning regenerative agriculture, and confidently networked enough to know that we can provide and receive swells of support in what are obviously impending disaster zones. Not a far cry from the pamphlet Ian just posted in the other thread, which was promptly accused of being masculinist alt-right literature. Sigh. Thanks, Dan, and everyone, for your insights. I've wanted to express my appreciation for this group for a long time. <3 On Thu, Nov 8, 2018 at 7:30 PM Dan S. Wang wrote: > Thank you, Angela. > > Until Ryan singled out the tasteless and revealing remark about > Charlottesville, it hadn¹t registered for me. Why not? Because in Bard¹s > response addressed to me, his first line about my post
Re: Fascist "trolls" and back on track
Hi Iain, You're right about the "deep intergenerational transmission of a culture of resistance." About the anecdote, just some context: the journalist was asking this question in reminding Macron's "Make the planet great again" vs "Make the USA great again," so the interviewed person was explaining that it's necessary to, first, make the USA great again in order to, second, save the planet. This is then that the the interviewee used the analogy, doing so putting Europa in the position of a child and the USA in a parent position... Nationalism, I think, we can call that, "right"? And concerning the oxygen mask: let's hope it will not take too much time to find it. All the best, Frederic On Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 10:45 PM Iain Boal wrote: > Frédéric: You say "To be a rightist is the opposite way: me first; then, > maybe, the world (I heard on France Info (French radio) someone in Texas > saying: First, the USA, then the planet; "it's like parents in a plane: > first;, they put on the oxygen mask; then, they can take care of children"- > that's the essence of the right)." > > Putting on an oxygen mask is, surely, not a case of ‘me first’ but simply > the condition of possibility of taking care of the children. I’ve rejected > positing this kind of scenario - favored by Jesuits and other specialists > in situation ethics - even since I was required to argue, in a ‘balloon > debate’ at school, the case for throwing overboard one of the following: > the Archbishop of Canterbury or the Queen Mother or Mahatma Gandhi. > > In general, I don’t believe we get to the essence of human nature or > political allegiance by studying - or imagining - people’s reactions *in > extremis*. In any case the remarkable story of the Chamonnais under Nazi > occupation, told by Philip Hallie in *Lest Innocent Blood be Shed: The > Story of the Village of Le Chambon and How Goodness Happened There*, > offers a profound challenge to any glib account of the relation between > politics and morality, and attests to the power of deep intergenerational > transmission of a culture of resistance. > > Iain > > > > Hi Dan, hi Angela, > > Thanks for your posts. > > Just an idea about morals and politics: > > - When the most important thing is me, myself, my identity, my job, my > work, my resentment, my religion, etc., we are in the realm of morals and > revenges and trials (and lawyers and money and punishments) reign; > - I would say that politics begins when I speak about a situation that > does not concern me first, but someone else, a stranger, a foreigner, an > embodiment of gender or sexuality that is not *exactly* mine (it has not > to be completely other, of course). > > So politics begins with an *impossible* identification, and it is this > impossibility that is the proof that a real plurality, not a homogeneous > community but an heterogeneous assemblage, is at stake. It is also the > proof that I don't speak *for* but *with* someone else. > > I try to remember what Spivak says about the subalterns, it's something > like: speaking instead of subalterns is maintaining the voiceless, but > considering that their situation is their business only is also a way to > maintain oppression. A double bind that has to be negotiated, and undone, > in every specific situation. > > Another recollection: Deleuze saying that to be a leftist is to begin with > "le lointain," the world, the horizon, what is far away, and then, only in > a second moment, we can see how that concerns my situation. To be a > rightist is the opposite way: me first; then, maybe, the world (I heard on > France Info (French radio) someone in Texas saying: First, the USA, then > the planet; "it's like parents in a plane: first;, they put on the oxygen > mask; then, they can take care of children"- that's the essence of the > right). > > In solidarity, > > Frédéric > > > > > > On Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 7:13 PM Angela Mitropoulos > wrote: > >> On Fri, 9 Nov 2018 at 11:30, Dan S. Wang wrote: >> >>> The reduction of politics to a question of good and bad people deeply >>> afflicts radical political subcultures in the US, >> >> >> Dan, >> >> I find it difficult to reconcile your historiography of US activism and >> politics with what I know about both US history and theoretical paradigms >> more generally. I'm also a bit confused by the definition of "identity >> politics" as a paradigm of good and bad people. >> >> I mean, I understand your suggestion that "identity politics" is >> depoliticising, but I also don't understand it at all because the treatment >> of conflicts "over resources and labour" has always been conducted through >> more or less tacit assumptions about identity that link to entitlement. And >> your disappearance of white men's identity politics as a tacit default or >> "universal" has the effect of yielding a narrative that says (incorrectly >> in my view) that "identity politics" only began when the
Re: Fascist "trolls" and back on track
Frédéric: You say "To be a rightist is the opposite way: me first; then, maybe, the world (I heard on France Info (French radio) someone in Texas saying: First, the USA, then the planet; "it's like parents in a plane: first;, they put on the oxygen mask; then, they can take care of children"- that's the essence of the right)." Putting on an oxygen mask is, surely, not a case of ‘me first’ but simply the condition of possibility of taking care of the children. I’ve rejected positing this kind of scenario - favored by Jesuits and other specialists in situation ethics - even since I was required to argue, in a ‘balloon debate’ at school, the case for throwing overboard one of the following: the Archbishop of Canterbury or the Queen Mother or Mahatma Gandhi. In general, I don’t believe we get to the essence of human nature or political allegiance by studying - or imagining - people’s reactions in extremis. In any case the remarkable story of the Chamonnais under Nazi occupation, told by Philip Hallie in Lest Innocent Blood be Shed: The Story of the Village of Le Chambon and How Goodness Happened There, offers a profound challenge to any glib account of the relation between politics and morality, and attests to the power of deep intergenerational transmission of a culture of resistance. Iain Hi Dan, hi Angela, Thanks for your posts. Just an idea about morals and politics: - When the most important thing is me, myself, my identity, my job, my work, my resentment, my religion, etc., we are in the realm of morals and revenges and trials (and lawyers and money and punishments) reign; - I would say that politics begins when I speak about a situation that does not concern me first, but someone else, a stranger, a foreigner, an embodiment of gender or sexuality that is not exactly mine (it has not to be completely other, of course). So politics begins with an impossible identification, and it is this impossibility that is the proof that a real plurality, not a homogeneous community but an heterogeneous assemblage, is at stake. It is also the proof that I don't speak for but with someone else. I try to remember what Spivak says about the subalterns, it's something like: speaking instead of subalterns is maintaining the voiceless, but considering that their situation is their business only is also a way to maintain oppression. A double bind that has to be negotiated, and undone, in every specific situation. Another recollection: Deleuze saying that to be a leftist is to begin with "le lointain," the world, the horizon, what is far away, and then, only in a second moment, we can see how that concerns my situation. To be a rightist is the opposite way: me first; then, maybe, the world (I heard on France Info (French radio) someone in Texas saying: First, the USA, then the planet; "it's like parents in a plane: first;, they put on the oxygen mask; then, they can take care of children"- that's the essence of the right). In solidarity, Frédéric On Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 7:13 PM Angela Mitropoulos mailto:s0meti...@gmail.com>> wrote: On Fri, 9 Nov 2018 at 11:30, Dan S. Wang mailto:danw...@mindspring.com>> wrote: The reduction of politics to a question of good and bad people deeply afflicts radical political subcultures in the US, Dan, I find it difficult to reconcile your historiography of US activism and politics with what I know about both US history and theoretical paradigms more generally. I'm also a bit confused by the definition of "identity politics" as a paradigm of good and bad people. I mean, I understand your suggestion that "identity politics" is depoliticising, but I also don't understand it at all because the treatment of conflicts "over resources and labour" has always been conducted through more or less tacit assumptions about identity that link to entitlement. And your disappearance of white men's identity politics as a tacit default or "universal" has the effect of yielding a narrative that says (incorrectly in my view) that "identity politics" only began when the former's claim of universality was challenged. I don't see how this could be described as depoliticisiing so much as the very opposite: heightened conflict, including over the use of resources, and labour (which presumably also includes things like enormous pay disparaties, sexual harassment which involves employers and coworkers treating other workers' bodies as their unlimited property, and so on). As to the separate issue of the way this heightened conflict is handled, I think there are better explanations than Millennials are doing it wrong. There is a longstanding approach that treats fascism as if it were a variety of sin (the Catholic philosopher Girard, for instance). I could not disagree more with that understanding of fascism, or politics more generally. But with regard to the US, the growing influence of
Re: Fascist "trolls" and back on track
I usually and prefer to lurk but since we’re talking about Generation Queer, I want to weigh in as a queer 26 year old :) Here’s the longest thing I’ve ever written on nettime. I thought Dan’s words about morality and politics were great, as well as Angela’s analysis of how Protestantism continues to influence American politics. Thanks for that—it woke some things up in me. The appeal for political agency through the language of morality is as old as America itself. The first black and indigenous people able to claim some sort of political and social status in this country did so through the church. Same with (white and middle class) women’s rights, with the abolition of alcohol and anti sex work. By subverting the logic of evangelizing, those who were willing to assume the position of being preached to were able to justify their need of political power by doing “God’s work.” The tightest knit Christian groups today are still ethnic churches. In my experience of activist spaces, the freedom presented is an ideal that reminds me of biblical language. There’s the idea that the freedom we are seeking is one where all types of oppression is absolished, where no group can oppress others, and that oppression is of the world and worldly thing (capitalism). This freedom or solidarity can only be worked towards but not obtained. The work we do towards this freedom is fellowship. A lot of people I met in these spaces have backgrounds in the church. Issues of morality have contributed to minefield politics but I’ve seen far less of that in the past year. It’s considered “last year” to tell someone to check their privilege. The Protestant answer to morality is just so complicated, with predestination and sacrifice overruling the original sin as well as the commandments. Part of why Christianity has been powerful is because it has such beautiful answers to oppression (give onto Caesar’s what is Caesar’s, for example, which shows that the power of money can never be owned but only issued). I just wanted to mention that, because it seems to me that making ones point (on social, political, and economic oppression) in Christianity is a little like making one’s point in English. Ultimately, it’s the oppressor’s language that works very well in the oppressor’s institutions. It seems that people my age are using such language because we are navigating the question Civil Rights never answered—that of integration or separation, of whether we can build more political power by integrating with the nation and its institutions, and of whether we are even able to accept our already anti-nationalistic identities (foreign, property, instigator) and build forms of separate power. IMO, morality and English are still being used today because that question has been closed and not answered. Christianity and English are tools (of the master) that exist on the hyphen of Americans who are always becoming American but never allowed to arrive. Hyphenated Americans do the work of building America as a project, of freedom and protest as soft power. I myself am an assimilated Asian American who tries to work towards social change (which lets me be a little bad but mostly work very hard), exactly as expected of a model minority. Revolution will not come from us in the western nations who perform professionalized protestor roles, who work in academics or non profits. It will come from the subaltern. Sent from my iPhone > On Nov 9, 2018, at 8:11 PM, Angela Mitropoulos wrote: > >> On Fri, 9 Nov 2018 at 11:30, Dan S. Wang wrote: >> The reduction of politics to a question of good and bad people deeply >> afflicts radical political subcultures in the US, > > Dan, > > I find it difficult to reconcile your historiography of US activism and > politics with what I know about both US history and theoretical paradigms > more generally. I'm also a bit confused by the definition of "identity > politics" as a paradigm of good and bad people. > > I mean, I understand your suggestion that "identity politics" is > depoliticising, but I also don't understand it at all because the treatment > of conflicts "over resources and labour" has always been conducted through > more or less tacit assumptions about identity that link to entitlement. And > your disappearance of white men's identity politics as a tacit default or > "universal" has the effect of yielding a narrative that says (incorrectly in > my view) that "identity politics" only began when the former's claim of > universality was challenged. I don't see how this could be described as > depoliticisiing so much as the very opposite: heightened conflict, including > over the use of resources, and labour (which presumably also includes things > like enormous pay disparaties, sexual harassment which involves employers and > coworkers treating other workers' bodies as their unlimited property, and so > on). > > As to the separate issue of
Re: Fascist "trolls" and back on track
Hi Dan, hi Angela, Thanks for your posts. Just an idea about morals and politics: - When the most important thing is me, myself, my identity, my job, my work, my resentment, my religion, etc., we are in the realm of morals and revenges and trials (and lawyers and money and punishments) reign; - I would say that politics begins when I speak about a situation that does not concern me first, but someone else, a stranger, a foreigner, an embodiment of gender or sexuality that is not *exactly* mine (it has not to be completely other, of course). So politics begins with an *impossible* identification, and it is this impossibility that is the proof that a real plurality, not a homogeneous community but an heterogeneous assemblage, is at stake. It is also the proof that I don't speak *for* but *with* someone else. I try to remember what Spivak says about the subalterns, it's something like: speaking instead of subalterns is maintaining the voiceless, but considering that their situation is their business only is also a way to maintain oppression. A double bind that has to be negotiated, and undone, in every specific situation. Another recollection: Deleuze saying that to be a leftist is to begin with "le lointain," the world, the horizon, what is far away, and then, only in a second moment, we can see how that concerns my situation. To be a rightist is the opposite way: me first; then, maybe, the world (I heard on France Info (French radio) someone in Texas saying: First, the USA, then the planet; "it's like parents in a plane: first;, they put on the oxygen mask; then, they can take care of children"- that's the essence of the right). In solidarity, Frédéric On Fri, Nov 9, 2018 at 7:13 PM Angela Mitropoulos wrote: > On Fri, 9 Nov 2018 at 11:30, Dan S. Wang wrote: > >> The reduction of politics to a question of good and bad people deeply >> afflicts radical political subcultures in the US, > > > Dan, > > I find it difficult to reconcile your historiography of US activism and > politics with what I know about both US history and theoretical paradigms > more generally. I'm also a bit confused by the definition of "identity > politics" as a paradigm of good and bad people. > > I mean, I understand your suggestion that "identity politics" is > depoliticising, but I also don't understand it at all because the treatment > of conflicts "over resources and labour" has always been conducted through > more or less tacit assumptions about identity that link to entitlement. And > your disappearance of white men's identity politics as a tacit default or > "universal" has the effect of yielding a narrative that says (incorrectly > in my view) that "identity politics" only began when the former's claim of > universality was challenged. I don't see how this could be described as > depoliticisiing so much as the very opposite: heightened conflict, > including over the use of resources, and labour (which presumably also > includes things like enormous pay disparaties, sexual harassment which > involves employers and coworkers treating other workers' bodies as their > unlimited property, and so on). > > As to the separate issue of the way this heightened conflict is handled, I > think there are better explanations than Millennials are doing it wrong. > > There is a longstanding approach that treats fascism as if it were a > variety of sin (the Catholic philosopher Girard, for instance). I could not > disagree more with that understanding of fascism, or politics more > generally. But with regard to the US, the growing influence of evangelicals > and religious conservatism more generally has tended to displace a concept > of people doing awful things that people can change with a concept of good > and evil. This is hardly down to Millennials. At the same time, > evangelicals and conservative Catholics have adopted a pretty selective, > exculpatory response to awful things that powerful people (powerful white > men) do, which suspends judgement because only God can posthumously judge > what is in someone's heart etc. It's obviously highly selective, given the > growth of mass incarceration, extra-legal and legitimated violence, that > has been directed, in the main, against black people, people of colour > (think border violence), and women. > > Add to this the way in which a younger generation have been thrown to the > wolves as a consequence of increasingly precarious conditions of work and > highly restrictive conditions on welfare, I am not surprised that part of > the pushback involves an insistence on the powerful being held to account > for their actions. *In this world.* I disagree, strongly with moral > economic theories (Catholics like Polanyi and Mouffe peddle this mysticism > far more than any Millennial). But I can't bring myself to fault young > people for insisting on accountability and change. > > best, > Angela > > > > > > # distributed via : no commercial use without permission > #is a moderated
Re: Fascist "trolls" and back on track
On Fri, 9 Nov 2018 at 11:30, Dan S. Wang wrote: > The reduction of politics to a question of good and bad people deeply > afflicts radical political subcultures in the US, Dan, I find it difficult to reconcile your historiography of US activism and politics with what I know about both US history and theoretical paradigms more generally. I'm also a bit confused by the definition of "identity politics" as a paradigm of good and bad people. I mean, I understand your suggestion that "identity politics" is depoliticising, but I also don't understand it at all because the treatment of conflicts "over resources and labour" has always been conducted through more or less tacit assumptions about identity that link to entitlement. And your disappearance of white men's identity politics as a tacit default or "universal" has the effect of yielding a narrative that says (incorrectly in my view) that "identity politics" only began when the former's claim of universality was challenged. I don't see how this could be described as depoliticisiing so much as the very opposite: heightened conflict, including over the use of resources, and labour (which presumably also includes things like enormous pay disparaties, sexual harassment which involves employers and coworkers treating other workers' bodies as their unlimited property, and so on). As to the separate issue of the way this heightened conflict is handled, I think there are better explanations than Millennials are doing it wrong. There is a longstanding approach that treats fascism as if it were a variety of sin (the Catholic philosopher Girard, for instance). I could not disagree more with that understanding of fascism, or politics more generally. But with regard to the US, the growing influence of evangelicals and religious conservatism more generally has tended to displace a concept of people doing awful things that people can change with a concept of good and evil. This is hardly down to Millennials. At the same time, evangelicals and conservative Catholics have adopted a pretty selective, exculpatory response to awful things that powerful people (powerful white men) do, which suspends judgement because only God can posthumously judge what is in someone's heart etc. It's obviously highly selective, given the growth of mass incarceration, extra-legal and legitimated violence, that has been directed, in the main, against black people, people of colour (think border violence), and women. Add to this the way in which a younger generation have been thrown to the wolves as a consequence of increasingly precarious conditions of work and highly restrictive conditions on welfare, I am not surprised that part of the pushback involves an insistence on the powerful being held to account for their actions. *In this world.* I disagree, strongly with moral economic theories (Catholics like Polanyi and Mouffe peddle this mysticism far more than any Millennial). But I can't bring myself to fault young people for insisting on accountability and change. best, Angela # distributed via : no commercial use without permission #is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nett...@kein.org # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
Fascist "trolls" and back on track
Thank you, Angela. Until Ryan singled out the tasteless and revealing remark about Charlottesville, it hadn¹t registered for me. Why not? Because in Bard¹s response addressed to me, his first line about my post being "so very very brilliant" put me off to the extent that I didn't even read the rest of it. I had seen enough to engage directly. My desire was to throw some thoughts, spun out from that thread, for the list at large. My references to Bard's lines and "arguments" were, I hope, taken as intended. Which is to say, with an edge of ridicule. The fascist shibboleths regarding identity politics can be dispensed with and I thank Ian, Alice, Angela, Ryan, Ted and others for clearing this space of that. I, for one, would be grateful to have the conversation continued about the genesis of identity politics in various national contexts, and its contemporary usefulness--or dysfunction. Without the fascist Bard. So, back to the irregularly scheduled programming: Here is an observation about the Millennial activist US subcultures to which I have been exposed. In my experience both in activist and teaching settings, today's twenty-somethings have an understandable fascination with the 60s/70s period, of course as I did. Their relationship to a comparatively more distant time is itself interesting to me, and, I would say, presents challenges that sometimes are not met productively. (Let me say here, before I get accused of hating on the kids, that the young people are our hope in the US. GenQ, I call them, for Generation Queer--the POC/mixed/queer rad youth who were the first ones out in the streets in a rage on election night in 2016, the ones who are knitting together causes and constituencies as intuitively as they take to the burn of the tattoo gun, the ones who are feeling the despair of climate catastrophe in ways a 50 y.o. like myself cannot even imagine--and yet press on, with a general kindness toward each other that I never expressed as a young person. I am critical but that doesn't lessen my admiration. Btw I have a 22 y.o. daughter, so I am not entirely personally disconnected to the new generation.) There is now a social movement canon in place that was not yet established in my 80s student days; we were still living through a hangover period. Many of the figures vaunted today as legend were still out and about, no longer on the lam, resurfacing to haunt the college lecture circuit, and still raising ruckuses in perfectly human--which is to say, contradictory ways. On many levels it was easier in the 80s for young activists to feel a continuity with the old guard, people who were no more heroic than we potentially could be. The fact that overall life conditions, particularly around information technology and other kinds of speedy mobility, had not made the quantum departure it would in the late 90s, also had the effect of linking us to the earlier radicalisms, even with movements in retreat, even when we were reacting against their excesses and blind spots. For younger people now, the gap between the 60s/70s and the present day must feel like the chasm between myth and reality. And yet, those are the go-to touchstones. Panthers, SDS, Malcolm, Stonewall, etc etc. The beginnings of those movements, the full expression of those figures and projects, remain inspiring. But it is in the defeats, failures, cooptations, and disintegrations that the most valuable lessons lay. The decline of the mass movements--and parallel opportunism of the right wing--is missing in the received history. The reason for this? My take is, liberal mainstream education seeks to include a diversity of narratives but depoliticizes them. Thus, what gets taught--and consequently internalized--is a moral narrative rather than a political one. For example, it is the moral analysis of the Civil Rights movement that gets emphasized in US high schools, not the problem of political powerlessness. So US history gets taught as a forward march of moral progress, not a back-and-forth contest over resources and labor. The reduction of politics to a question of good and bad people deeply afflicts radical political subcultures in the US, and I see it particularly in the younger generation. I do not dismiss such moral calculations at all, but I do think they can be destructive to movement-building when the pseudo-politics of moralism play out in close range, producing conflict horizontally among would-be allies, and not vertically, leaving those who hold positions of 'power-over' untouched. That the pseudo-politics often deploys a discourse of identity is where my afore-described 80s context for the rise of identity politics would be helpful, I think--to reclaim identity politics for it was and always will be: a reserve well of power located in the deeply personal (a kind of incipience, Hardt & Negri would call it) that even slavery could not eradicate, and from which we may build out the broad tide of insurgency that vastly
