Re: [PEIRCE-L] More Peirce MSS posted online by Harvard, incl [Reasoning and Instinct] - MS 831
Ben: Thanks for your work in posting this work. A minor technical question: It is apparently the case that some pages contain only a few words. Is there any apparent reason for this? Is the date of the writing known to you? Cheers jerry On Jul 22, 2015, at 7:32 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: List, Harvard has placed more Peirce manuscript images online. They keep changing the URL for the list of Peirce MS images online, and now one has to search at Harvard's Oasis instead of Harvard's Hollis. I'll need to update the info at Arisbe. Anyway, for the current list of Harvard's online images of Peirce's manuscripts, go (or try to go) to http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/deepLinkDigital?_collection=oasisinoid=nullhistno=nulluniqueId=hou02614 One of the manuscripts newly available is MS 831. I've mentioned MS 831 a number of times, based on the Robin Catalog's description of it: 831. [Reasoning and Instinct] A. MS., n.p., n.d., pp. 2–29, incomplete. The fine gradations between subconscious or instinctive mind and conscious, controlled reason. Logical machines are not strictly reasoning machines because they lack the ability of self-criticism and the ability to correct defects which may crop up. Three kinds of reasoning: inductive, deductive, hypothetical. Quasi-inferences. I've transcribed and posted MS 831 at http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm Best, Ben - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] More Peirce MSS posted online by Harvard, incl [Reasoning and Instinct] - MS 831
Thanks again, Ben. (Where would this list serve be without you?) After reading this again, it became obvious to me (I am a slow learner) that the underlying issue here is the origin of symbolization with respect to biological / human actions. Ben, do you suppose that instinctual actions (such as those that are directly comparable to animal behavior, such as fight or flight, or feeding,) are not symbolized? The quasi-hypotheses being merely mental patterns of spontaneous neuronal assemblies that manifest the material reality by activating communication toward the ecosystem through internal electrical musculatures? Cheers Jerry On Jul 23, 2015, at 10:16 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: Hi, Jerry, you're welcome. Yes, some of the pages contain few words. If something looks wrong, you can check it against the manuscript online at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:FHCL.HOUGH:12486086 (also linked at my transcription http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm ) and please do let me know if something's missing. I don't think I missed anything but sometimes it takes one a few days to see an error, because, I guess, of slowness of change of frame of mind. MS 831 is undated but one can see that it must have been written after the publication of _Studies in Logic_ (1883) because Peirce mentions its publication. Another way maybe to narrow the date down: In MS 831, Peirce uses the words inference and reasoning to mean pretty much the same thing, and uses quasi-inference to mean instinctive or otherwise automatic inference. There comes a time when he uses reasoning to mean conscious, deliberate inference, thus widening the sense of inference to encompass instinctive inference (quasi-inference in MS 831). I'm not sure how consistent he was about that in later years, but assembling the dates of later quotes on reasoning and inference might help suggest a more specific time period during which he wrote MS 831. Best, Ben On 7/23/2015 10:46 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: Ben: Thanks for your work in posting this work. A minor technical question: It is aparently the case that some pages contain only a few words. Is there any apparent reason for this? Is the date of the writing known to you? Cheers jerry On Jul 22, 2015, at 7:32 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: List, Harvard has placed more Peirce manuscript images online. They keep changing the URL for the list of Peirce MS images online, and now one has to search at Harvard's Oasis instead of Harvard's Hollis. I'll need to update the info at Arisbe. Anyway, for the current list of Harvard's online images of Peirce's manuscripts, go (or try to go) to http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/deepLinkDigital?_collection=oasisinoid=nullhistno=nulluniqueId=hou02614 One of the manuscripts newly available is MS 831. I've mentioned MS 831 a number of times, based on the Robin Catalog's description of it: 831. [Reasoning and Instinct] A. MS., n.p., n.d., pp. 2–29, incomplete. The fine gradations between subconscious or instinctive mind and conscious, controlled reason. Logical machines are not strictly reasoning machines because they lack the ability of self-criticism and the ability to correct defects which may crop up. Three kinds of reasoning: inductive, deductive, hypothetical. Quasi-inferences. I've transcribed and posted MS 831 at http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm Best, Ben - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] More Peirce MSS posted online by Harvard, incl [Reasoning and Instinct] - MS 831
Hi, Jerry, you're welcome. Yes, some of the pages contain few words. If something looks wrong, you can check it against the manuscript online at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:FHCL.HOUGH:12486086 (also linked at my transcription http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm ) and please do let me know if something's missing. I don't think I missed anything but sometimes it takes one a few days to see an error, because, I guess, of slowness of change of frame of mind. MS 831 is undated but one can see that it must have been written after the publication of _Studies in Logic_ (1883) because Peirce mentions its publication. Another way maybe to narrow the date down: In MS 831, Peirce uses the words inference and reasoning to mean pretty much the same thing, and uses quasi-inference to mean instinctive or otherwise automatic inference. There comes a time when he uses reasoning to mean conscious, deliberate inference, thus widening the sense of inference to encompass instinctive inference (quasi-inference in MS 831). I'm not sure how consistent he was about that in later years, but assembling the dates of later quotes on reasoning and inference might help suggest a more specific time period during which he wrote MS 831. Best, Ben On 7/23/2015 10:46 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: Ben: Thanks for your work in posting this work. A minor technical question: It is aparently the case that some pages contain only a few words. Is there any apparent reason for this? Is the date of the writing known to you? Cheers jerry On Jul 22, 2015, at 7:32 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: List, Harvard has placed more Peirce manuscript images online. They keep changing the URL for the list of Peirce MS images online, and now one has to search at Harvard's Oasis instead of Harvard's Hollis. I'll need to update the info at Arisbe. Anyway, for the current list of Harvard's online images of Peirce's manuscripts, go (or try to go) to http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/deepLinkDigital?_collection=oasisinoid=nullhistno=nulluniqueId=hou02614 One of the manuscripts newly available is MS 831. I've mentioned MS 831 a number of times, based on the Robin Catalog's description of it: 831. [Reasoning and Instinct] A. MS., n.p., n.d., pp. 2–29, incomplete. The fine gradations between subconscious or instinctive mind and conscious, controlled reason. Logical machines are not strictly reasoning machines because they lack the ability of self-criticism and the ability to correct defects which may crop up. Three kinds of reasoning: inductive, deductive, hypothetical. Quasi-inferences. I've transcribed and posted MS 831 at http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm Best, Ben - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] More Peirce MSS posted online by Harvard, incl [Reasoning and Instinct] - MS 831
Hi, Jerry, You're welcome again. Now, in Peirce's view, symbols not only are generals but also do not, of themselves, symbolize anything but generals, so that excludes individual actions from being symbolized. Nevertheless, a symbol that incorporates an index (supplied by one's mind or more physically) makes a sign that can represent an individual action as an instance of a practice, a form of conduct, a norm, a general. More generally speaking, to the extent that an individual is an instance of a general, it is the individual that represents the general, not vice versa, Peirce's idea here being that generals, norms, etc., govern, more-or-less determine, individuals, not vice versa (or not significantly vice versa); and objects influence, more-or-less determine, signs to represent them, not vice versa, so the individuals take the sign role, the generals the object role, in such cases. (I give an example in an appendix to this message.) A symbol is itself individually instanced, in Peirce's system, not by a concrete individual symbol, which doesn't exist in Peirce's system, but instead by a kind of indexical sinsign that points to one's experience of the symbolized object. But is the question you're asking something more like: Are there unconscious, instinctual, merely animal-level symbols? In Peirce's system, they're certainly allowed, since a symbol is a sign that represents by norm or disposition of interpretation regardless of (non-)resemblance or dynamical (non-)connection to its object. Such a norm or disposition could be instinctual. There are places (I forget where off-hand) Peirce says that not all symbols are artificial (I mean in the sense that words are), some are natural in some sense. Unfortunately I don't remember those discussions well. Best, Ben Appendix: So, let's say you have an accurate computer-program model of a storm. Indices help make the program part of a representation of the storm; but without the indices, the program is a general diagram, and the actual storm an individual diagram, of the same object, a mathematical structure. (It would be an impossibly lucky program, to have been made without indexical connection to the actual storm yet mirror the storm so well that indices merely need to be added to make the result able to represent the storm to an interpretant.) On 7/23/2015 11:38 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: Thanks again, Ben. (Where would this list serve be without you?) After reading this again, it became obvious to me (I am a slow learner) that the underlying issue here is the origin of symbolization with respect to biological / human actions. Ben, do you suppose that instinctual actions (such as those that are directly comparable to animal behavior, such as fight or flight, or feeding,) are not symbolized? The quasi-hypotheses being merely mental patterns of spontaneous neuronal assemblies that manifest the material reality by activating communication toward the ecosystem through internal electrical musculatures? Cheers Jerry On Jul 23, 2015, at 10:16 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: Hi, Jerry, you're welcome. Yes, some of the pages contain few words. If something looks wrong, you can check it against the manuscript online at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:FHCL.HOUGH:12486086 (also linked at my transcription http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm ) and please do let me know if something's missing. I don't think I missed anything but sometimes it takes one a few days to see an error, because, I guess, of slowness of change of frame of mind. MS 831 is undated but one can see that it must have been written after the publication of _Studies in Logic_ (1883) because Peirce mentions its publication. Another way maybe to narrow the date down: In MS 831, Peirce uses the words inference and reasoning to mean pretty much the same thing, and uses quasi-inference to mean instinctive or otherwise automatic inference. There comes a time when he uses reasoning to mean conscious, deliberate inference, thus widening the sense of inference to encompass instinctive inference (quasi-inference in MS 831). I'm not sure how consistent he was about that in later years, but assembling the dates of later quotes on reasoning and inference might help suggest a more specific time period during which he wrote MS 831. Best, Ben On 7/23/2015 10:46 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8786] Re: Instinct and emotion
Hi Ed, Thanks for detailing your theory of motion (which is fascinating), according to which Newton's Second Law allows for irreversible mechanical motions unlike its usual textbook interpretation implying that all mechanical motions should be reversible (since the equation is symmetric with respect to time, at least formally). So Peirce's following statement would be invalid even based Newton's second law (if we adopt your new interpretation of it): . . . the law of the conservation of energy is equivalent to the proposition that all operations governed by mechanical laws are reversible; so that an immediate corollary from it is that growth is not explicable by those laws, . . . CP 6.14 Besides, this statement would be invalid based on the Second Law of Thermodynamics (SLT), which was what I had in my mind but did not explicate in my 7/22/2015 post. As you know, according to SLT, all mechanical motions in ISOLATED systems tend toward disorder irreversibly. But in NON-ISOLATED systems such as biological organisms, some mechanical motions (e.g. growth) can produce order, IF and ONLY IF such motions are coupled to (or supported by) other motions that tend toward disorder (e.g., respiration, ATP hydrolysis). This was the heart of Prigogine's two lectures given at Rutgers as I mentioned, entitled The Constructive (yang) role of Irreversibility (yin) (parentheses are my addition). All the best. Sung On Thu, Jul 23, 2015 at 4:26 AM, Ed Dellian ed.dell...@t-online.de wrote: Dear Sung, please let me get just one foot in the door; it concerns your mentioning of Newton's second law in paragraph (3). You say it wouldn't allow for irreversible motion. This is true with respect to the second law as it is taught in textbooks: Force equals mass times acceleration. It is not true, however, with respect to Newton's authentic theory. Just read his second law: Mutationem motus proportionalem esse vi motrici impressae (I spare the second half), which is: A change in motion is proportional to the motive force impressed (I use the Cohen-Whitman transl., Berkeley 1999). Note that change in motion is not continuous acceleration, but rather the difference delta p between a former and a different latter state of motion, p; change (mutatio motus) happens between both states. This terminology evidently implies that time flows between the two states, and since the flow of time is irreversible the law implies irreversible change in motion as well. Note, secondly, that being proportional is not being equal, as the latter is presupposed by those who assert force equals maass-acceleration to be Newton's law. Newton's term requires a constant of proportionality between change in motion and impressed force. Symbolizing the force with A, the change in motion with B, I obtain the triadic relation A/B = C = constant for Newton's authentic second law. Note that I succeeded years ago in identifying the dimensions of the constant of proportionality (which constant is omitted in the classical rendering of the law): they read element of space over element of time. Therefore, the full second law reads impressed force over change in motion = element of space over element of time. This is no longer triadic, rather it is a quaternary proportion, or a tetraktys, and you find it first in Galileo's Discorsi of 1638, at the beginning of the Third day, when he mathematically (in terms of geometric proportion theory, that is) introduces the law of uniform straightlined motion, wherefrom Newton took it, as he explicitly says in a Scholium after Corollary 6 to the laws of motion, in the little-known second edition of the Principia (London 1713). It is evident that with a Newtonian second law that reads impressed force over change in motion equals element of space over element of time *everything *in the theoretical science of motion of today must change. In symbols the law reads: F/delta p = c, or generally: F/p = c, which is identical with the E/p = c derived from the Maxwell equations by Poynting in 1884. The same E/p = c is behind Planck's energy term of 1900, if you only remember that p = h/lambda (which in the end leads to E/p = c). It is behind Einstein's special relativity (just see Max Born's book on Einstein's relativity theory, chapter The inertness of energy (my translation from the German Trägheit der Energie). It is also the germ of Heisenberg's theory. This can be seen as early as you put Heisenberg's relations together to form a quaternary equation of products, so that h vanishes, and then transform it into an equation of relations according to the known rules of geometric proportion theory. This to consider I expect of you because I think that Galileo and Newton were right with their law of cause and effect, of *irreversible change* in motion caused by impressed forces, so that it was never necessary to conceive a special second law of thermodynamics in order to bring
