Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Nov 20, 2015, at 1:01 PM, Søren Brier  wrote:
> 
> I agree but Peirce is integrating it with an emptiness ontology inspired by 
> Buddhism. Hartshorne describes it as his  Buddhisto-Christianism. Bishop 
> writes a paper on Peirce and Eastern Thought. See my  
> Pure  Zero paper attached.

I just finished it. Very interesting. I hadn’t known that Peirce was connected 
with Suzuki before. (Again as I said I know just enough Buddhism to be 
dangerous but not enough to really be able to say much) 

One tangental comment that came to mind in one of your quotes. You have Peirce 
commenting on his famous relationship of mind and matter.

I believe the law of habit to be purely psychical. But then I suppose matter is 
merely mind deadened by the development of habit. While every physical process 
can be reverse without violation of the law of mechanics, the law of habit 
forbids such reversal. (CP 8.318)

I assume here meaning we can’t lose a habit once developed. Does Peirce ever 
defend this position? I confess it seems a dubious position to hold although I 
understand why his ontology requires it. 

On much else I’ve taken Peirce, contra say the scientific realists, to reject 
any kind of convergence. That is there can be periods of rapid development and 
then because of fallibilism falling away or change. To use the metaphors James 
Burke famously did in the 70’s and 80’s about science, it is less convergence 
than pinball process.

That’s always seemed more persuasive as a view of habit-forming too. Yet the 
reversibility is something that in at least a few places Peirce denies.

Of course Peirce is inconsistent on this in certain ways. After all he 
conceives of belief as habit yet the ability to change belief entails the 
ability to reverse habit. So I’m never quite sure how to take this. In practice 
it seems sufficient to merely accept that some habits are more ingrained than 
others. Habits as laws are much less reversible. With Peirce’s conception of 
substance (at least in his early period) as extremely congealed habit.

At the end of your paper you say,

Like the Buddhists, Peirce sees this order as no-thing. Niemoczynsk (2011) 
shows that both Eckhart and Böhme posited a pre-personal ground within God’s 
own being, where this ground was called “the godhead” or “the abyss”. It 
contains infinite potential, the absolute freedom to be, and even the will or 
desire to be.

Which order are you speaking of here? Plotinus, among the neoplatonists has two 
classes of absolute otherness. On the one is the One which is pure potency and 
the origin of all the emanations. Yet somewhat following Aristotle he has 
matter as pure privation which is also absolutely Other. Peirce makes a similar 
move in his early works with pure Being to pure Substance and his three 
categories in between. In the quote you have in your paper what he compares to 
the Hebrew tohu bohu is the infinite past with pure chaotic emptiness. 

Within Hebrew mysticism, especially certain forms of Kabbalism, there’s a 
notion of Tzimtzum. (I tend to follow the traditional interpretation that the 
Jewish mystics got this from gnosticism and neoplatonism but there’s a strain 
that argues for the influence going the other way or at least co-evolution. In 
any case the major form is Lurianic Kabbalism which is a 16th century 
phenomena) This is the idea of God withdrawing to create a space within himself 
that creation can take place. In other words a primal nothing creates a 
secondary nothing. This enables finitude to take place. The reason to see 
connection to platonism is the parallel to the creation of the elements from 
the forms and place or khora in the Timaeus. The khora is receptical or empty 
space and the origin of the forms would be the One of Plotinus.

Getting back to Peirce and your paper you say that Eckhart and Bohme have a 
pre-personal ground within God’s being called the godhead or abyss. This seems 
similar. And of course Duns Scotus who also was a big influence on Peirce has 
some writings on the ground of the Godhead that makes a similar move. I’ve 
studied this more in connection to Heidegger but it seems like there are some 
similar moves with Peirce.

Within Peirce how do you see this notion of the Nothing as source and Nothing 
as end as well as the distinction between God’s being and this space within 
God’s being (or even its ground)?  I confess it’s not something I’ve studied in 
the least.










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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Rationalism : Philosophical and Scientific

[Jon Awbrey]

Thread:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17681

Peircers,

I'm sure we all learned in one place or another that Locke, Berkeley, and Hume
belonged to a group called “The Empiricists” while Descartes, Spinoza, and 
Leibniz
belonged to a group called “The Rationalists”, where “empiricism” and 
“rationalism”
were described or exemplified as positions or tendencies the former and the 
latter,
respectively, bore in common.  That's all very pat, and pat enough to content 
the
mind for a time, but if one gets the idea that thinkers split in their practices
as cleanly and deeply as gradgrinds teach undergrads to categorize their thought
then that would be a mistake.

Consulting my Runes, I find the following definition.



Rationalism:  A method, or very broadly, a theory of philosophy,
in which the criterion of truth is not sensory but intellectual
and deductive.  Usually associated with an attempt to introduce
mathematical methods into philosophy, as in Descartes, Leibniz,
and Spinoza.  (Vernon J. Bourke)

The history of rationalism begins with the Eleatics (q.v.),
Pythagoreans, and Plato (q.v.) whose theory of the self-sufficiency
of reason became the leitmotif of neo-Platonism and idealism (q.v.).



I will try to remember that people still attach those meanings to the
word “rationalism” but I'm pretty sure I never thought of empiricism
and rationalism as “never the twain shall meet” ways of approaching
the world.  So I'll take a cue from the passage that Clark quoted,
and call the brand of rationalism that Peirce deprecated by the
name of “philosophical rationalism”.  Personally, I have never
found much use for it, but I don't have much use for any ism
that is taken to such extremes that it become a religion,
so there is nothing very surprising about that.

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rationalism : Philosophical and Scientific

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Nov 22, 2015, at 7:25 PM, Jon Awbrey  > wrote:
> I'm sure we all learned in one place or another that Locke, Berkeley, and Hume
> belonged to a group called “The Empiricists” while Descartes, Spinoza, and 
> Leibniz
> belonged to a group called “The Rationalists”, where “empiricism” and 
> “rationalism”
> were described or exemplified as positions or tendencies the former and the 
> latter,
> respectively, bore in common.  That's all very pat, and pat enough to content 
> the
> mind for a time, but if one gets the idea that thinkers split in their 
> practices
> as cleanly and deeply as gradgrinds teach undergrads to categorize their 
> thought
> then that would be a mistake.

This seems right. When discussing a movement we usually focus on some key 
aspects of the movement even though it’s rare that the actual exemplars within 
the movement held to all these positions. It’s even more pronounced when they 
movements become objects for later philosophers to differentiate themselves 
from. Even philosophers rarely believe quite what their name represents. 
Descartes is probably among the most obvious of this. But it’s frequently true 
of any great philosopher who, later generations come to think, made a grave 
error.

Even when philosophers perhaps are better served by their representations there 
are often different ways of reading their texts. Hegel being a great example of 
this.

That said, I think there are useful things to be learned from a simple 
presentation of Rationalism against Empiricism and both against more nuanced 
later positions. And for all of so many in the 20th century seeing Descartes as 
ushering in centuries of philosophical error, his never quite became the 
pejorative strawman that the logical positivists found themselves becoming by 
the late 20th century.
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[PEIRCE-L] Rationalism : Philosophical and Scientific

[Jon Awbrey]

Peircers,

It may not be until after Thanksgiving that I can focus on the
incidental issues of rationalism and relational reducibility that
arose on the Terms, Propositions, Arguments thread, though I might
have a few scattered moments of quiet time in the interval, so for
ease of future reference let me just assemble a budget of links to
the more salient posts where those tangents spun off the main line:

FR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17582
FR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17626
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17629
JC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17639
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17640
FK:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17641
JC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17642
SB:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17643
JBD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17644
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17645
JC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17646
SB:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17647
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17648
CG:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17649
JC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17650
CG:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17652
JC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17658
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17659
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17662
CG:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17664
JC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17670
JBD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17673
FR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17674
CG:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17675
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17676

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semeiotic Neostructuralism and Language

[Stephen C. Rose]

What's fascinating to me in the work I am now doing is the way an effort to
actually imagine a dialog between Jesus and Abba which I am working on
segues with a dialog I'm currently working on involving CP2 (Logic) and
Triadic Philosophy. For philosophy to progress I am guessing that many
terms will need to be moved about to enable the entire project of
philosophy to progress. How this can happen given the current fragmentation
of disciplines and the profusion of variant (scholarly?) languages. I have
no real idea. Cheers, S

Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3

On Sun, Nov 22, 2015 at 1:07 PM, Michael Shapiro 
wrote:

> Yes, Stephen, language does evolve, and probably in just the sense that
> Darwin's concept of final cause adumbrates. Apropos, "in the beginning was
> the word" seems most apt!
> M.
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: "Stephen C. Rose"
> Sent: Nov 22, 2015 1:01 PM
> To: Michael Shapiro , Peirce List
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semeiotic Neostructuralism and Language
>
> This is most interesting Michael. If I were to say that language evolves
> would that make sense in terms of this? Or, more precisely, that progress
> necessitates the evolution of meanings via words? I have been working on a
> project which in essence looks back to what we might see as creation and
> what engenders evolution and I must assume that whatever else may be the
> whole kahuna of creation it must contain a vocal element merely to be able
> to relate to its evolving reality. In other words, "In the beginning was
> the word".
>
> Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
> Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3
>
> On Sun, Nov 22, 2015 at 12:33 PM, Michael Shapiro 
> wrote:
>
>> Dear Peirce-Listers,
>>
>>
>> I'm posting below some material from the second edition (currently in
>> progress) of my book* The Speaking Self: Language Lore and English Usage
>> *in case anybody is interested in a conception of language structure
>> that repudiates the Chomskyan model and asserts one that is strictly
>> anchored to Peircean pragmaticism (prominently including his
>> semeiotic).This material is also part of my paper "Paradox: Theme and
>> Semiotic Variations," which recently appeared in *Semiotics 2014: The
>> Semiotics of Paradox*, ed. J. Pelkey et al., 1-28. (SSA Yearbook, 2. Ottawa:
>> Legas, 2015). I'll be glad to send you a PDF of the latter upon request.
>>
>> Michael
>>
>>
>> P. S. Many years ago, in a publication I can't now remember, Chomsky
>> stated, when asked who his favorite philosopher was, that it was Peirce. In
>> my opinion, whatever reading of Peirce's rationalism there is that can be
>> attributed to Chomsky, none of it that can be called accurate is compatible
>> with generative grammar.
>>
>> *5.29 Semeiotic Neostructuralism and Language*
>>
>>
>>
>> *GLOSSARY*
>>
>>
>>
>> *cortex*, n.: outer layer of neural tissue in humans and other mammals
>>
>> *postbiotic, *adj.: pertaining to the period following the appearance of
>> life
>>
>> *pragmaticism*, n.: the pragmatic philosophy of C. S. Peirce
>>
>> *semeiotic*, adj. < *semeiosis*, n.: the process whereby something
>> functions as a sign
>>
>> *teleology*, n.: a metaphysical doctrine explaining phenomena and events
>> by final causes
>>
>>
>>
>> Readers of this book who have an interest in the conceptual
>> underpinnings of its vignettes may benefit from being reminded of some of
>> the main points in which the doctrine christened “semeiotic
>> neostructuralism” (in the spirit of C. S. Peirce’s pragmaticism) by the
>> author differs fundamentally from the dominant paradigm of contemporary
>> linguistics, which is nominally identified with Chomsky and his
>> followers––regardless, nota bene, whether these latter-day practitioners
>> have renamed their particular enterprise (e. g., “Optimality Theory” or
>> “Cognitive Linguistics;” ALL linguistics is necessarily ‘cognitive’, hence
>> CL is a pleonasm) so as to differentiate it from what was originally called
>> “tranformational” or “generative” grammar.
>>
>> Chomsky has a rather mechanistic/mechanicalist view of
>> language, for all that he understands that the freedom to compose sentences
>> that are original, unpredictable, and yet intelligible is different from
>> the unoriginal, predictable products of strictly mechanical  action. His
>> view is mechanistic nonetheless because he simply posits underlying
>> structures by which sentences are to be generated. Possibly in a wider
>> perspective, Chomsky is no more reductively mechanistic than a semeiotic
>> neostructuralist, in a wider perspective, is a phenomenalist. For he no
>> doubt admits (or would admit) that the linguistic universals in our brains
>> are not just there, period, but evolved, with the brain’s evolution, as
>> chance variants that were ‘selected’ by the principle of reproductive
>> success. Similarly, the 

SV: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Søren Brier]

Dear Clark

I have developed these thought and their relation to Perennial Philosophy more 
in 
http://www.transpersonalstudies.org/ImagesRepository/ijts/Downloads/A%20Peircean%20Panentheist%20Scientific%20Mysticism.pdf
  and in a couple of other articles to the Concordia transcendentalists.

Best
Søren

Fra: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sendt: 20. november 2015 21:27
Til: PEIRCE-L
Emne: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments


On Nov 20, 2015, at 1:01 PM, Søren Brier > 
wrote:

I agree but Peirce is integrating it with an emptiness ontology inspired by 
Buddhism. Hartshorne describes it as his  Buddhisto-Christianism. Bishop writes 
a paper on Peirce and Eastern Thought. See my
Pure  Zero paper attached.


Thank you Soren. I’ll try and read that this evening if I have time.

I should note that emptiness ontology can be found in the neoPlatonic 
tradition. I don’t know enough about the speculations of influence on the 
various neoPlatonists to say how much if at all it originated with them.

My knowledge of Buddhism is far more fragmentary than I’d like. So I’m very 
interested in your insights here. My understanding is that sunya in Buddhism is 
actually fairly close to the neoPlatonic notion of emptiness as pure potency 
(which pops up in Peirce in many places as well as other figures like Heidegger 
who had an odd debate about nothing with Carnap tied to all this)

I hope you don’t mind some questions over the weekend after I’ve read your 
paper.

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[PEIRCE-L] Semeiotic Neostructuralism and Language

[Michael Shapiro]

Dear Peirce-Listers,


I'm posting below some material from the second edition (currently in progress)
of my book The Speaking Self: Language
Lore and English Usage in case anybody is interested in a conception of
language structure that repudiates the Chomskyan model and asserts one that is
strictly anchored to Peircean pragmaticism (prominently including his
semeiotic).This material is also part of my paper "Paradox: Theme and
Semiotic Variations," which recently appeared in Semiotics 2014: The Semiotics of Paradox, ed. J. Pelkey et al., 1-28. (SSA Yearbook,
2. Ottawa: Legas, 2015). I'll be
glad to send you a PDF of the latter upon request.



Michael


P. S. Many years ago, in a publication I can't now remember, Chomsky
stated, when asked who his favorite philosopher was, that it was Peirce. In my opinion, whatever reading of Peirce's rationalism there is that can be attributed to
Chomsky, none of it that can be called accurate is compatible with generative
grammar.



5.29
Semeiotic Neostructuralism and Language

 



GLOSSARY

 

cortex, n.: outer layer of neural tissue in humans and other mammals

postbiotic, adj.: pertaining to the period following the
appearance of life

pragmaticism, n.: the pragmatic philosophy of C. S. Peirce

semeiotic, adj. < semeiosis,
n.: the process whereby something
functions as a sign

teleology, n.: a metaphysical doctrine explaining phenomena and events by
final causes  



 

    Readers
of this book who have an interest in the conceptual underpinnings of its
vignettes may benefit from being reminded of some of the main points in which
the doctrine christened “semeiotic
neostructuralism” (in the spirit of C. S. Peirce’s pragmaticism) by the author
differs fundamentally from the dominant paradigm of contemporary linguistics,
which is nominally identified with Chomsky and his followers––regardless, nota
bene, whether these latter-day practitioners have renamed their particular
enterprise (e. g., “Optimality Theory” or “Cognitive Linguistics;” ALL
linguistics is necessarily ‘cognitive’, hence CL is a pleonasm) so as to
differentiate it from what was originally called “tranformational” or “generative”
grammar.

    Chomsky
has a rather mechanistic/mechanicalist view of language, for all that he
understands that the freedom to compose sentences that are original,
unpredictable, and yet intelligible is different from the unoriginal,
predictable products of strictly mechanical  action. His view is
mechanistic nonetheless because he simply posits underlying structures by which
sentences are to be generated. Possibly in a wider perspective, Chomsky is no
more reductively mechanistic than a semeiotic
neostructuralist, in a wider perspective, is a phenomenalist. For he no doubt
admits (or would admit) that the linguistic universals in our brains are not
just there, period, but evolved, with the brain’s evolution, as chance variants
that were ‘selected’ by the principle of reproductive success. Similarly, the
intentions or needs or felt urgencies to speak or to achieve certain outcomes
might explain––but only in a context wider than Chomskyan linguistics––why
language’s generative mechanisms are used in this way rather than in that.

    But
if we focus simply on the linguist’s study, as diversely conceived by Chomsky
and the semeiotic neostructuralist, then there
is this difference: for the one, the teleology of language is excluded from
linguistic explanation, while for the other it is the very stuff of
explanation. For the one, linguistic phenomena conform to a describable
structure of highly abstract laws, while for the other linguistic phenomena
exhibit an intelligible if less abstract, more complicated structure. For the
one, the system is a given, and any changes in it are accidental, while for the
other development is essential to language––development is more the reality
than is any one system of  rules––and that development is also
intelligible and not merely given.

    That
is the conflict. The reason the semeiotic
neostructuralist approach is, if it is successful, superior is that it can be
used to explain the very evolution of the brain-mechanism or linguistic
capacities and universals that Chomsky can at best describe. That is, given
creatures somewhat sociable, exchanging  signs as their way of life, then
the survival value of their communicating more elaborate and precise diagrams
would explain the retention of those fortuitous variations, say, in brain
structure that promote exactly such powers of expressible diagrammatization.
That is, the principle of this evolution will be itself linguistic, and
continuous with the principles of postbiotic, strictly linguistic evolution.

    The
thought here is not unlike that which refuses to postulate linguistic
intentions separate from the capacity to exercise those intentions. Just as
there could be no desire to speak without an ability to speak, so 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semeiotic Neostructuralism and Language

[Stephen C. Rose]

This is most interesting Michael. If I were to say that language evolves
would that make sense in terms of this? Or, more precisely, that progress
necessitates the evolution of meanings via words? I have been working on a
project which in essence looks back to what we might see as creation and
what engenders evolution and I must assume that whatever else may be the
whole kahuna of creation it must contain a vocal element merely to be able
to relate to its evolving reality. In other words, "In the beginning was
the word".

Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3

On Sun, Nov 22, 2015 at 12:33 PM, Michael Shapiro 
wrote:

> Dear Peirce-Listers,
>
>
> I'm posting below some material from the second edition (currently in
> progress) of my book* The Speaking Self: Language Lore and English Usage *in
> case anybody is interested in a conception of language structure that
> repudiates the Chomskyan model and asserts one that is strictly anchored to
> Peircean pragmaticism (prominently including his semeiotic).This material
> is also part of my paper "Paradox: Theme and Semiotic Variations," which
> recently appeared in *Semiotics 2014: The Semiotics of Paradox*, ed. J.
> Pelkey et al., 1-28. (SSA Yearbook, 2. Ottawa: Legas, 2015). I'll be glad
> to send you a PDF of the latter upon request.
>
> Michael
>
>
> P. S. Many years ago, in a publication I can't now remember, Chomsky
> stated, when asked who his favorite philosopher was, that it was Peirce. In
> my opinion, whatever reading of Peirce's rationalism there is that can be
> attributed to Chomsky, none of it that can be called accurate is compatible
> with generative grammar.
>
> *5.29 Semeiotic Neostructuralism and Language*
>
>
>
> *GLOSSARY*
>
>
>
> *cortex*, n.: outer layer of neural tissue in humans and other mammals
>
> *postbiotic, *adj.: pertaining to the period following the appearance of
> life
>
> *pragmaticism*, n.: the pragmatic philosophy of C. S. Peirce
>
> *semeiotic*, adj. < *semeiosis*, n.: the process whereby something
> functions as a sign
>
> *teleology*, n.: a metaphysical doctrine explaining phenomena and events
> by final causes
>
>
>
> Readers of this book who have an interest in the conceptual
> underpinnings of its vignettes may benefit from being reminded of some of
> the main points in which the doctrine christened “semeiotic
> neostructuralism” (in the spirit of C. S. Peirce’s pragmaticism) by the
> author differs fundamentally from the dominant paradigm of contemporary
> linguistics, which is nominally identified with Chomsky and his
> followers––regardless, nota bene, whether these latter-day practitioners
> have renamed their particular enterprise (e. g., “Optimality Theory” or
> “Cognitive Linguistics;” ALL linguistics is necessarily ‘cognitive’, hence
> CL is a pleonasm) so as to differentiate it from what was originally called
> “tranformational” or “generative” grammar.
>
> Chomsky has a rather mechanistic/mechanicalist view of
> language, for all that he understands that the freedom to compose sentences
> that are original, unpredictable, and yet intelligible is different from
> the unoriginal, predictable products of strictly mechanical  action. His
> view is mechanistic nonetheless because he simply posits underlying
> structures by which sentences are to be generated. Possibly in a wider
> perspective, Chomsky is no more reductively mechanistic than a semeiotic
> neostructuralist, in a wider perspective, is a phenomenalist. For he no
> doubt admits (or would admit) that the linguistic universals in our brains
> are not just there, period, but evolved, with the brain’s evolution, as
> chance variants that were ‘selected’ by the principle of reproductive
> success. Similarly, the intentions or needs or felt urgencies to speak or
> to achieve certain outcomes might explain––but only in a context wider than
> Chomskyan linguistics––why language’s generative mechanisms are used in
> this way rather than in that.
>
> But if we focus simply on the linguist’s study, as diversely
> conceived by Chomsky and the semeiotic neostructuralist, then there is
> this difference: for the one, the teleology of language is excluded from
> linguistic explanation, while for the other it is the very stuff of
> explanation. For the one, linguistic phenomena conform to a describable
> structure of highly abstract laws, while for the other linguistic phenomena
> exhibit an intelligible if less abstract, more complicated structure. For
> the one, the system is a given, and any changes in it are accidental, while
> for the other development is essential to language––development is more the
> reality than is any one system of  rules––and that development is also
> intelligible and not merely given.
>
> That is the conflict. The reason the semeiotic
> neostructuralist approach is, if it is successful, superior is that it can
> be 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semeiotic Neostructuralism and Language

[Michael Shapiro]

Yes, Stephen, language does evolve, and probably in just the sense that Darwin's concept of final cause adumbrates. Apropos, "in the beginning was the word" seems most apt!M.-Original Message-
From: "Stephen C. Rose" 
Sent: Nov 22, 2015 1:01 PM
To: Michael Shapiro , Peirce List 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semeiotic Neostructuralism and Language

This is most interesting Michael. If I were to say that language evolves would that make sense in terms of this? Or, more precisely, that progress necessitates the evolution of meanings via words? I have been working on a project which in essence looks back to what we might see as creation and what engenders evolution and I must assume that whatever else may be the whole kahuna of creation it must contain a vocal element merely to be able to relate to its evolving reality. In other words, "In the beginning was the word".Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3
On Sun, Nov 22, 2015 at 12:33 PM, Michael Shapiro  wrote:

















Dear Peirce-Listers,


I'm posting below some material from the second edition (currently in progress)
of my book The Speaking Self: Language
Lore and English Usage in case anybody is interested in a conception of
language structure that repudiates the Chomskyan model and asserts one that is
strictly anchored to Peircean pragmaticism (prominently including his
semeiotic).This material is also part of my paper "Paradox: Theme and
Semiotic Variations," which recently appeared in Semiotics 2014: The Semiotics of Paradox, ed. J. Pelkey et al., 1-28. (SSA Yearbook,
2. Ottawa: Legas, 2015). I'll be
glad to send you a PDF of the latter upon request.



Michael


P. S. Many years ago, in a publication I can't now remember, Chomsky
stated, when asked who his favorite philosopher was, that it was Peirce. In my opinion, whatever reading of Peirce's rationalism there is that can be attributed to
Chomsky, none of it that can be called accurate is compatible with generative
grammar.



5.29
Semeiotic Neostructuralism and Language

 



GLOSSARY

 

cortex, n.: outer layer of neural tissue in humans and other mammals

postbiotic, adj.: pertaining to the period following the
appearance of life

pragmaticism, n.: the pragmatic philosophy of C. S. Peirce

semeiotic, adj. < semeiosis,
n.: the process whereby something
functions as a sign

teleology, n.: a metaphysical doctrine explaining phenomena and events by
final causes  



 

    Readers
of this book who have an interest in the conceptual underpinnings of its
vignettes may benefit from being reminded of some of the main points in which
the doctrine christened “semeiotic
neostructuralism” (in the spirit of C. S. Peirce’s pragmaticism) by the author
differs fundamentally from the dominant paradigm of contemporary linguistics,
which is nominally identified with Chomsky and his followers––regardless, nota
bene, whether these latter-day practitioners have renamed their particular
enterprise (e. g., “Optimality Theory” or “Cognitive Linguistics;” ALL
linguistics is necessarily ‘cognitive’, hence CL is a pleonasm) so as to
differentiate it from what was originally called “tranformational” or “generative”
grammar.

    Chomsky
has a rather mechanistic/mechanicalist view of language, for all that he
understands that the freedom to compose sentences that are original,
unpredictable, and yet intelligible is different from the unoriginal,
predictable products of strictly mechanical  action. His view is
mechanistic nonetheless because he simply posits underlying structures by which
sentences are to be generated. Possibly in a wider perspective, Chomsky is no
more reductively mechanistic than a semeiotic
neostructuralist, in a wider perspective, is a phenomenalist. For he no doubt
admits (or would admit) that the linguistic universals in our brains are not
just there, period, but evolved, with the brain’s evolution, as chance variants
that were ‘selected’ by the principle of reproductive success. Similarly, the
intentions or needs or felt urgencies to speak or to achieve certain outcomes
might explain––but only in a context wider than Chomskyan linguistics––why
language’s generative mechanisms are used in this way rather than in that.

    But
if we focus simply on the linguist’s study, as diversely conceived by Chomsky
and the semeiotic neostructuralist, then there
is this difference: for the one, the teleology of language is excluded from
linguistic explanation, while for the other it is the very stuff of
explanation. For the one, linguistic phenomena conform to a describable
structure of highly abstract laws, while for the other linguistic phenomena
exhibit an intelligible if less abstract, more complicated structure. For the
one, the system is a given, and any changes in it are accidental, while for the
other development is essential 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semeiotic Neostructuralism and Language

[Sungchul Ji]

Michael, lists,

I would appreciate receiving a PDF copy of your article mentioned above.

(1)  By 'deep structure'  in the title of my previous post, I meant
specifically the regularities of the genetic systems that are revealed
through the mathematics of tensor algebra, i.e., the overlapping of the
64-element matrix generated from the tensor products of the (2*2)-matrices
of Watson-Crick nucleotides, A, C, G and T/U  with the 64-codon table
determined experimentally (see Row 4 in Table 2 in my previous post). As we
all know, this 'structure' has been invariant over 3.7x10^9 years and
across about 9x10^6 species.  Hence there is no doubt that there are the
'structures' or the 'regularities' in living systems that remain
'invariant' despite the continuous variations of living structures
resulting from the biological evolution.  For the lack of a better term, we
may refer to this fact as the "variation with invariance" (VWI) or as the
less paradoxical-sounding "evolution with invariance" (EWI).

(*2*)  The content of my previous post is consistent with the triadic model
of language that I proposed in [1] which suggests *waves *as the mechanism
of EWI, in agreement with the Petoukhov hypothesis that *resonant waves*
play fundamental roles in organisms [2] and with my conclusion that the
wave-particle duality operates through the Universe, from atoms to the
cell, the brain and the cosmos [3]:

  *Cosmese*
 (Quantum waves)
 /\
   /\
 /\
 *Humanese* *Cellese*
   (Sound waves) (Concentration
waves)

 * Figure 1.*  The postulated Irreducible Triadic Relation
(ITR) among three languages -- Cosmic language (Cosmese), Human language
(Humanese) and Cell language (Cellese).  Rerproduced from [1].


(*3*)  Figure 1 above can be re-expressed using the ITR template that I
discussed on these lists on numerous occasions.  Figure 2 also depicts the
triadic model of the world discussed by Burgin and others [4].

 f
  g
*Cosmese * >  *Cellese*
-> * Humanese*
   (World of Structures)  (Physical world)
 (Mental world)
   |
 ^
   |
 |

 ||
   h


*Figure 2.  *'Isomorphism' between the triadic model of languages and the
triadic model of the World.  Please note that the characters of the nodes
can vary but Peirce's ITR remains invariant and hence, Figure 2 exemplifies
EWI (Evolution with invariance). f = biogenesis; g = glottogenesis; h =
information flow

If Figure 2 is right, it may embody the principle of EWI, since Processes f
and g can be viewed as evolutionary processes with invariance (which may be
identified with what mathematicians call "structure-preserving mappings")
so that Process f can, in effect, "transfer" information from the Universe
to the human mind, just as the curvature of spacetime, in effect,
"transfers'  gravitational force (or gravitons) from one body to another
across space.  Welch and Smith in [5, 6] applied the language of the
relativity physics to account for the organization of cell metabolism in
space and time.  Largely influenced by Welch and Smith [5, 6], I was led to
postulate the existence of the cell force inside the cell (mediated by the
so-called *'cyton*' [7] in analogy to the *graviton *mediating the motions
of macroscopic objects in space and time) that are responsible for the
spatiotemporal organizations of the chemical reactions occurring inside the
living cell that underlie the phenomenon we call life.

Finally, I wonder if Figure 2 can contribute to integrating the seemingly
irreconcilable language theories that have been proposed by equally
competent linguists on both sides of the opposing camps over the past half
a century or so.

With all the best.

Sung


References:
   [1] Ji, S. (2012).  *Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts,
Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications*.  Springer, New York.
See Table 2.13 on p. 44.  PDF at http://www.conformon.net under
Publications > Book Chapters.
   [2] Petoukhov, S. V. (2015). The system-resonance appraoch in modeling
genetic structures.  *BioSystems *(in press).
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/aip/03032647 .
   [3] Ji, S. (2015). Planckian distributions in molecular machines, living
cells, and brains: The wave-particle duality in biomedical