[PEIRCE-L] Entropy - anticipating the demise of the genocentric paradigm

[Stephen Jarosek]

Lists,

In a recent tweet of his, reading between the lines, it would seem that
Richard Dawkins is beginning to respond to challenges to his genocentric
paradigm within the context of the second law of thermodynamics (entropy).
Due to uncertainties wrt copyright, I won't include his tweet here. But we
should be paying attention. In another forum, I posted the following comment
that succinctly summarizes my position and the problem with the genocentric
paradigm:

To the materialist paradigm, we owe the infotech narrative that portrays DNA
as "data" to be computed. Yet there is no sign anywhere of said "computer".
Hello? And these people call themselves scientists? And to extend the
absurdity of their "just so" narrative they might suggest that the computer
is somehow bound into the molecular sequences and structures around which
all reactions take place, as if this somehow ameliorates their position. It
does not. The absurdity remains because the complex properties of the
subatomic, atomic and molecular structures that make life possible still
need to be accounted for. As if by magic, their materialist complexity
emerges contrary to the laws of thermodynamics and the forces of entropy
that are arrayed against it. Whether it's "because natural selection" or
"because genes" or "because epigenetics" or "because Darwin" or "because
evo-psych" or "because hunter-gatherers of the Pleistocene", there is no
axiomatic framework that hangs together. They have no axiomatic framework.
These labcoats masquerading as scientists don't even know what an axiomatic
framework is or what it is for. The materialist paradigm is an unprecedented
woo on steroids.


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[PEIRCE-L] CFP: Semiofest

[Gary Richmond]

http://2016.semiofest.com/2015/12/01/call-for-papers/
[image: SEMIOFEST] 

   - SEMIOFEST 2016 
   - CFP 
   - BLOG 
   - LOCATION 
   - TEAM 
   - CONTACTS 

Call for papers
 1st December 2015 
katre  #cultureofinnovation
, #semiofest2016
, call for papers
, news
, Tallinn

[image: innovation_v3]

“Semiotics and Culture of Innovation”

Semiofest Tallinn 2016 will explore one of the most important problems
facing countries, economies and entrepreneurs alike by asking how semiotic
thinking can be applied to foster innovation. How can we contribute to
build a culture of innovation?

*We invite you to present your experience and vision of semiotics as a tool
of innovation*: Reflect your experiences of innovation working with
companies, governments or communities; share the tools and models of
innovation that you have applied in your work. How can semiotics be applied
semiotics to provide insights in any step of the innovation cycle, from
mapping out the needs and opportunities for innovation to embedding new
products and services in new markets across sectors?

*We also invite you to explore the culture of innovation within semiotics*:
How can applied semiotic thinking bring about change in semiotics? What new
perspectives, methods, and insights originate from practical applications?
What are the emergent trends and new fields for applied semiotic research?
What is your vision of the future of applied semiotics? We also invite you
to make explicit the innovative aspect of the our own everyday work.

Semiotic thinking is always in the service of innovation. You can’t do
things differently or be inventive without grasping the cultural or
communication context. With the help of semiotic thinking you can discover
fresh spaces for innovation and can arrive at unforeseen alternatives that
lead us to fresh solutions. You can use it for deep diagnostics, for quick
insights or to spark inspiration. It helps to make sense of the complex
factors that frame any new development and uncover cultural trends that
work either for or against any novel product, service, process or
application. It is a route to innovation by shifting perspectives!

Think of possible fields (but not exclusively!):

   - Fresh cultural insight and foresight
   - Methodology and new approaches
   - Media and creative industries
   - IT and startups
   - Design-lead problem solving
   - Strategic planning
   - Brand innovation
   - Social innovation and social enterprise

Abstract submission

Please submit your proposal of no more than 500 words *by February 1, 2016 *
to *cfp [at] semiofest.com *. In your proposal
indicate clearly:

   1. your name, organization and job title.
   2. the title of your presentation
   3. whether you would like to present a case study, a position, a
   methodological innovation, or academic research/critique
   4. a 300 word abstract of your presentation.
   5. three takeaways that the audience will benefit from.

*Let’s create together an atmosphere of sharing and learning, June 1-4,
2016, Kultuurikatel, Tallinn, Estonia.*

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Elementary Relatives or Individual Relatives

[gnox]

Jon,

 

This doesn't explain “the difference between relations proper and elementary 
relations” (which you said was

"critically important to understand"), because the latter term is itself used 
in a specific "technical sense" by Peirce in the places you cite. It doesn't 
help to understand which “technical sense” of the word you have in mind.

 

My guess is that what’s confusing some of us in understanding triadic relations 
is that some of them relate correlates which are themselves relations. (Perhaps 
correlates which are not relations are “individual relatives”?)

 

Gary f.

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] 
Sent: 2-Dec-15 22:30



Peircers,

 

As I wrote before, I used the phrase "relations proper"

merely to emphasize that I was talking about relations in the technical sense.  
Another common idiom to the same purpose would be "relations, strictly 
speaking".

 

As for "elementary relatives", Peirce uses this term in the 1870 Logic of 
Relatives.

See, for example, CP 3.121ff and a later remark at 3.602ff.

 

See Also:

 

☞   
https://www.google.com/search?hl=en_q=Peirce_epq=Elementary+Relative

 

And toward the end of this section:

 

☞  

 
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Differential_Logic_:_Introduction#Operational_Representation

 

Regards,

 

Jon

 

> Gary, all,

> 

> I used the phrase “relations proper” to emphasize that I was speaking 

> of relations in the strict sense of the word, not in any looser sense.

> I have been reading Peirce for almost 50 years now and I can't always 

> recall where I read a particular usage.  In the 1970s I spent a couple 

> of years poring through the microfilm edition of his Nachlass and read 

> a lot of still unpublished material that is not available to me now.

> But there is no doubt from the very concrete notations and examples 

> that he used in his early notes and papers that he was talking about 

> the formal objects that are variously called elementary relations, 

> elements of relations, individual relations, or ordered tuples.

> 

> I did, however, more recently discuss a number of selections from 

> Peirce's

> 1880 Algebra of Logic that dealt with the logic of relatives, so I can 

> say for a certainly that he was calling these objects or the terms 

> that denote them by the name of “individual relatives”.

> 

…

> 

> On 11/27/2015 12:42 PM,   g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

>> Jon,

>> 

>> If it’s critically important to understand the difference between 

>> “relations proper” and “elementary relations”, can you tell us what 

>> that difference is, or point us to an explanation? These are not 

>> terms that Peirce uses, so how can the rest of us tell whether we understand 
>> them or not? Being unfamiliar with those terms does not indicate lack of 
>> understanding of the important concepts they signify.

>> 

>> Gary f.

>> 

>> From: Jon Awbrey [  mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: 
>> 27-Nov-15 11:16

>> 

>> Gary, all,

>> 

>> It is critically important to understand the difference between 

>> relations proper and elementary relations, also known as tuples.

>> 

>> It is clear from his first work on the logic of relative terms that 

>> Peirce understood this difference and its significance.

>> 

>> Often in his later work he will speak of classifying relations when 

>> he is really classifying types of elementary relations or single tuples.

>> 

>> The reason for this is fairly easy to understand. Relations proper 

>> are a vastly more complex domain to classify than types of tuples so 

>> one naturally reverts to the simpler setting as a way of getting a foothold 
>> on the complexity of the general case.

>> 

>> But nothing but confusion will reign from propagating the categorical error.

>> 

>> Regards,

>> 

>> Jon

 

-- 

 

academia:   
http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey

my word press blog:   
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list:  
 http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/

isw:   
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA

oeiswiki:   
http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey

facebook page:   
https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

[Michael Shapiro]

	



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[PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

[Michael Shapiro]

Harmony, Linguistic and Musical

 



GLOSSARY

 

cacoglossic, adj.: exhibiting or characteristic of distorted
or ungrammatical speech

cacophonic, adj. < cacophony,
n.: harsh or discordant sound; dissonance

dialogism, n.: the principle that all utterances (and hence all
communication) acquiremeaning
only in the context of a dialogue to which they contribute and in which the presence
and contributions of other voices (or other discourses, languages, etc.) are inescapably
implied, with the result that meaning and _expression_ cannot be reduced to
a single system or subjected to a single authority; the embodiment of this principle
in a form of _expression_, esp. a literary text

figurative, adj.: transferred in
sense from literal or plain to abstract or hypothetical (as by the
_expression_ of one thing in terms of another with which it can be regarded as analogous)

lexically, adv. < lexical,
adj.: of or relating to words, word formatives,
or the vocabulary of a language
as distinguished from its grammar and construction

Peirce: Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), American
logician and scientist

triadic, adj. < triad,
n.: a union or group of three, esp. of three
closely related persons, beings,
or things 



 

    My
hero, Charles Peirce, rightly says that logic exists in the service of ethics,
and ethics in the service of aesthetics. Following this triadic
characterization of the foundations of knowledge, both language and music, in
order to be good and beautiful, must be underpinned by well-formedness, alias
logic. Thus even a child’s grammatically and lexically well-formed utterance is
to be deemed superior to an adult’s cacoglossic
one, just as the harmonically grammatical commercial jingle always puts the
typically cacophonic piece of contemporary classical music to shame.

     In this matter, my favorite pre-Socratic
philosopher, Heraclitus “The Obscure” (of “No man ever steps in the same river
twice” fame), has something pertinent to say.

    One
of Heraclitus’ most famously enigmatic fragments goes like this:

 

        Οὐ
ξυνίασι ὅκως διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῷ ὁμολογέει·
παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη ὅκωσπερ
τόξου καὶ λύρης.

        Ou
xyniasin hokōs diaferomenon heoutoi homologeei palintropos
harmoniē hokōsper
toxou kai lyres. 

 

    (“They
do not comprehend how a thing agrees at variance with itself [literally how being
brought apart it is    brought together with itself]; it is an attunement turning back
on itself, like that of the bow and the lyre.”)

 

    This
fragment is typical of Heraclitus’ forma mentis in that it begins with a
negation (“They do not comprehend”) that seems to be a polemical retort to and
denial of some prior position held by others. This immediately engages
dialogism as a constitutive principle of the form of Heraclitus’ utterance.
Leaving aside the phrase “at variance with itself” for the moment, what is
crucial to the interpretation of the whole fragment is the combination palintropos
harmoniē ('backward-turning structure [attunement/connection]'). The
original sense of harmoniē seems to have been joining or fitting
together, and that is the way it is used by Homer and Herodotus among others in
the context of carpentry or shipbuilding. But harmoniē also has from the
beginning a figurative meaning—“agreements” or “compacts” between hostile men
(as in the Iliad)—from which it can move to the connotation of
reconciliation (personified, for instance, as the child of Ares and Aphrodite
in Hesiod’s Theogony). Finally, harmoniē occurs in the familiar
musical sense of the “fitting together” of different strings to produce the
desired scale or key.

    It
is in this final sense that speaking harmoniously is accordingly a matter of
fitting together the bow and the lyre. But in order to be aesthetically
pleasing, language use must be undergirded by both ethics and logic. This is
where Heraclitus joins hands with Peirce.

 







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Fw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

[Michael Shapiro]

No, I don't think there is a difference between my (loose) formulation and the way Peirce stated it. The pruport is the same, in my opinion.M.-Forwarded Message-
From: Michael Shapiro 
Sent: Dec 3, 2015 12:31 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard , CSP 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering


	



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RE: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Michael, List,

You say:  "My hero, Charles Peirce, rightly says that logic exists in the 
service of ethics, and ethics in the service of aesthetics."

I am not able to find a place where Peirce says that one of these is in the 
service of another.  I do, however, see where he says that one these normative 
sciences rests on another.  Do you think there is a difference between the two 
claims?

--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Michael Shapiro [poo...@earthlink.net]
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 10:15 AM
To: CSP
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

Harmony, Linguistic and Musical

GLOSSARY

cacoglossic, adj.: exhibiting or characteristic of distorted or ungrammatical 
speech
cacophonic, adj. < cacophony, n.: harsh or discordant sound; dissonance
dialogism, n.: the principle that all utterances (and hence all communication) 
acquiremeaning only in the context of a dialogue to which they contribute and 
in which the presence and contributions of other voices (or other discourses, 
languages, etc.) are inescapably implied, with the result that meaning and 
expression cannot be reduced to a single system or subjected to a single 
authority; the embodiment of this principle in a form of expression, esp. a 
literary text
figurative, adj.: transferred in sense from literal or plain to abstract or 
hypothetical (as by the expression of one thing in terms of another with which 
it can be regarded as analogous)
lexically, adv. < lexical, adj.: of or relating to words, word formatives, or 
the vocabulary of a language as distinguished from its grammar and construction
Peirce: Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), American logician and scientist
triadic, adj. < triad, n.: a union or group of three, esp. of three closely 
related persons, beings, or things

My hero, Charles Peirce, rightly says that logic exists in the 
service of ethics, and ethics in the service of aesthetics. Following this 
triadic characterization of the foundations of knowledge, both language and 
music, in order to be good and beautiful, must be underpinned by 
well-formedness, alias logic. Thus even a child’s grammatically and lexically 
well-formed utterance is to be deemed superior to an adult’s cacoglossic one, 
just as the harmonically grammatical commercial jingle always puts the 
typically cacophonic piece of contemporary classical music to shame.
 In this matter, my favorite pre-Socratic philosopher, Heraclitus 
“The Obscure” (of “No man ever steps in the same river twice” fame), has 
something pertinent to say.
One of Heraclitus’ most famously enigmatic fragments goes like this:

Οὐ ξυνίασι ὅκως διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῷ ὁμολογέει·

παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης.
Ou xyniasin hokōs diaferomenon heoutoi homologeei 
palintropos harmoniē hokōsper toxou kai lyres.

(“They do not comprehend how a thing agrees at variance with itself 
[literally how being brought apart it isbrought together with itself]; it 
is an attunement turning back on itself, like that of the bow and the lyre.”)

This fragment is typical of Heraclitus’ forma mentis in that it 
begins with a negation (“They do not comprehend”) that seems to be a polemical 
retort to and denial of some prior position held by others. This immediately 
engages dialogism as a constitutive principle of the form of Heraclitus’ 
utterance. Leaving aside the phrase “at variance with itself” for the moment, 
what is crucial to the interpretation of the whole fragment is the combination 
palintropos harmoniē ('backward-turning structure [attunement/connection]'). 
The original sense of harmoniē seems to have been joining or fitting together, 
and that is the way it is used by Homer and Herodotus among others in the 
context of carpentry or shipbuilding. But harmoniē also has from the beginning 
a figurative meaning—“agreements” or “compacts” between hostile men (as in the 
Iliad)—from which it can move to the connotation of reconciliation 
(personified, for instance, as the child of Ares and Aphrodite in Hesiod’s 
Theogony). Finally, harmoniē occurs in the familiar musical sense of the 
“fitting together” of different strings to produce the desired scale or key.
It is in this final sense that speaking harmoniously is accordingly 
a matter of fitting together the bow and the lyre. But in order to be 
aesthetically pleasing, language use must be undergirded by both ethics and 
logic. This is where Heraclitus joins hands with Peirce.

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[PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

Moving on to the first trichotomy of sign types in “Nomenclature and Divisions 
of Triadic Relations”:

 

CP 2.244: According to the first division, a Sign may be termed a Qualisign, a 
Sinsign, or a Legisign. 

A Qualisign is a quality which is a Sign. It cannot actually act as a sign 
until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character 
as a sign.

[As a Sign, this “quality” must be a correlate of a triadic relation with its 
Object and Interpretant, “by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant 
is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the 
same Object, and for some possible Interpretant” (CP 2.242). Yet it cannot act 
as a sign until it is embodied, i.e. until it becomes involved in at least a 
dyadic relation, and thus enters the universe of existence. Yet its 
significance is its quality (not its embodiment), and qualities being monadic, 
there is no real difference between Sign and Object (or Interpretant either). 
So I think we might call this a doubly degenerate kind of triadic relation, 
where the Sign is virtually self-representing, and self-determining as its own 
Interpretant. Compare the “self-sufficient” point on a map which Peirce offers 
as an example of doubly degenerate Thirdness in his third Harvard Lecture, 
EP2:162.) Or, since this degeneracy is relative, we can say that the Qualisign 
is degenerate relative to the Sinsign and to the Legisign (just as the Icon is 
degenerate relative to the Index and the genuine Symbol, according to Peirce in 
both the third Harvard lecture of 1903 and “New Elements” of 1904).

 

On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign types defined 
in NDTR, including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a possible 
ambiguity in the concepts of genuine and degenerate; and possibly this problem 
is related to the concepts of embodiment, just introduced, and of involvement, 
which is introduced in the next paragraph:]

 

245. A Sinsign (where the syllable sin is taken as meaning “being only once,” 
as in single, simple, Latin semel, etc.) is an actual existent thing or event 
which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a 
qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a 
peculiar kind and only form a sign through being actually embodied.

[Evidently it is the involvement of qualisigns in a Sinsign — which, I suppose, 
constitutes their embodiment — that makes them “peculiar,” because a “normal” 
Qualisign is disembodied (and does not act as a Sign). But perhaps this will be 
clarified by the definition of Legisign, which I’ll leave for the next post.]

 

Gary f. 

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary F - I certainly consider all ten classes as genuine Signs. I don't  think 
this suggests an ambiguity in the meaning of 'genuine' and 'degenerate' but 
rather, an ambiguity in your definition of the Sign.  

You, as I understand it, confine the meaning of 'Sign' to be a synonym for 
'Representamen.  This leads, I think, to an understanding of the Sign as really 
a Saussurian Sign, with the Signifier=Object; and the Signified=Interpretant. 
Obviously, I reject this dyadism. I  consider the Peircean Sign to be an 
integral triad of three Relations: That between the Representamen and Object; 
that of the Representamen in itself; and that between the Representamen and the 
Interpretant. [See 8.344--]

So, if you consider only the Representamen as the Sign, then, I don't see how 
you can define it, on its own, as genuine or degenerate.  It isn't that the 
Representamen can't act as a sign [Representamen] unless it is embodied; it 
isn't a Representamen UNLESS it is embodied. Otherwise, you are moving into 
Platonism which does accept non-embodied Forms. [And yes, I'm aware of Peirce's 
terms of "it cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied" 2.244.

I don't see how a Sign (the triad) with all three Relations in a mode of 
Firstness is  degenerate or even 'doubly degenerate'. After all, Firstness as a 
categorical mode, has no nature of degeneracy. 

The genuine and degenerate forms of the Categories, is another issue, where, as 
we know, Peirce considers that Firstness has no degeneracy; Secondness has both 
a genuine and degenerate mode (2-2 and 2-1); and Thirdness has both a genuine 
and two degenerate modes (3-3, 3-2, 3-1). 

When Peirce refers to a genuine or degenerate index, he is referring to its 
categorical mode of Secondness. That is, the modal categories in themselves are 
genuine or degenerate not the Relation.

I don't see that a Qualisign, which is in a mode of pure Firstness (and not 
3-1) can be degenerate as compared to a Sinsign or Legisign.

How can 'a normal Qualisign' be disembodied? There's no such thing in Peirce as 
a 'free-floating Representamen'.  That's Platonism. 

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: g...@gnusystems.ca 
  To: 'Peirce-L' 
  Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 11:31 AM
  Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Moving on to the first trichotomy of sign types in “Nomenclature and 
Divisions of Triadic Relations”:

   

  CP 2.244: According to the first division, a Sign may be termed a Qualisign, 
a Sinsign, or a Legisign. 

  A Qualisign is a quality which is a Sign. It cannot actually act as a sign 
until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character 
as a sign.

  [As a Sign, this “quality” must be a correlate of a triadic relation with its 
Object and Interpretant, “by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant 
is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the 
same Object, and for some possible Interpretant” (CP 2.242). Yet it cannot act 
as a sign until it is embodied, i.e. until it becomes involved in at least a 
dyadic relation, and thus enters the universe of existence. Yet its 
significance is its quality (not its embodiment), and qualities being monadic, 
there is no real difference between Sign and Object (or Interpretant either). 
So I think we might call this a doubly degenerate kind of triadic relation, 
where the Sign is virtually self-representing, and self-determining as its own 
Interpretant. Compare the “self-sufficient” point on a map which Peirce offers 
as an example of doubly degenerate Thirdness in his third Harvard Lecture, 
EP2:162.) Or, since this degeneracy is relative, we can say that the Qualisign 
is degenerate relative to the Sinsign and to the Legisign (just as the Icon is 
degenerate relative to the Index and the genuine Symbol, according to Peirce in 
both the third Harvard lecture of 1903 and “New Elements” of 1904).

   

  On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign types 
defined in NDTR, including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a 
possible ambiguity in the concepts of genuine and degenerate; and possibly this 
problem is related to the concepts of embodiment, just introduced, and of 
involvement, which is introduced in the next paragraph:]

   

  245. A Sinsign (where the syllable sin is taken as meaning “being only once,” 
as in single, simple, Latin semel, etc.) is an actual existent thing or event 
which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a 
qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a 
peculiar kind and only form a sign through being actually embodied.

  [Evidently it is the involvement of qualisigns in a Sinsign — which, I 
suppose, constitutes their embodiment — that makes them “peculiar,” because a 
“normal” Qualisign is disembodied (and does not act as a Sign). But perhaps 
this will be clarified by the 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Elementary Relatives or Individual Relatives

[Jon Awbrey]

Thread:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17890
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17894

A budget of readings for present and future reference:

Survey of Relation Theory
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/11/30/survey-of-relation-theory-%E2%80%A2-2/

First, we need to be clear about the difference between objects and signs:

Relations are formal objects of discussion and thought while
Relative Terms are signs we use to denote/describe relations.
(The shorthand term "relative" is short for "relative term".

The default meaning for "relative term" is "general relative term",
that is, a term whose denotation extends over many objects.

The default meaning for "relation" is "general relation",
that is, a formal object that is a set of many elements.

Next, we need to be clear about the distinction between
relatives (= general relatives) and elementary relatives.

Note.  There is a distinction in Peirce's usage between
elementary relatives and individual relatives, but if we
factor in what he says about the Doctrine of Individuals
and recognize that we are dealing with abstract forms
then it becomes a "distinction without a difference".
So I will tend to use the terms interchangeably.

Here is one place where Peirce exhibits his appreciation
for the critical difference between relatives in general
and elementary or individual relatives.

Peirce’s 1880 “Algebra Of Logic” Chapter 3 • Selection 7
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/02/28/peirces-1880-algebra-of-logic-chapter-3-%E2%80%A2-selection-7/



Chapter 3. The Logic of Relatives (cont.)
=

§4. Classification of Relatives

225.  Individual relatives are of one or other of the two forms

A : A
A : B

and simple relatives are negatives of one or other of these two forms.

226.   The forms of general relatives are of infinite variety,
but the following may be particularly noticed. ...



It needs to be appreciated that classifying relations is vastly
more complex than classifying elementary or individual relations.

In particular, classifying sign relations is vastly more complex
than classifying elementary or individual sign relations, which
is just about all that the massive literature on sign taxonomy
has been able to touch, albeit confusedly, from Peirce's time
to ours.

Regards,

Jon

On 12/3/2015 11:31 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

Jon,

This doesn't explain “the difference between relations proper and elementary 
relations” (which you said was
"critically important to understand"), because the latter term is itself used in a 
specific "technical sense" by
Peirce in the places you cite. It doesn't help to understand which “technical 
sense” of the word you have in mind.

My guess is that what’s confusing some of us in understanding triadic relations 
is that some of them relate
correlates which are themselves relations. (Perhaps correlates which are not 
relations are “individual relatives”?)

Gary f.





-Original Message- From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: 
2-Dec-15 22:30



Peircers,



As I wrote before, I used the phrase "relations proper"

merely to emphasize that I was talking about relations in the technical sense.  
Another common idiom to the same
purpose would be "relations, strictly speaking".



As for "elementary relatives", Peirce uses this term in the 1870 Logic of 
Relatives.

See, for example, CP 3.121ff and a later remark at 3.602ff.



See Also:



☞  
https://www.google.com/search?hl=en_q=Peirce_epq=Elementary+Relative



And toward the end of this section:



☞  

http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Differential_Logic_:_Introduction#Operational_Representation



Regards,



Jon




Gary, all,







I used the phrase “relations proper” to emphasize that I was speaking



of relations in the strict sense of the word, not in any looser sense.



I have been reading Peirce for almost 50 years now and I can't always



recall where I read a particular usage.  In the 1970s I spent a couple



of years poring through the microfilm edition of his Nachlass and read



a lot of still unpublished material that is not available to me now.



But there is no doubt from the very concrete notations and examples



that he used in his early notes and papers that he was talking about



the formal objects that are variously called elementary relations,



elements of relations, individual relations, or ordered tuples.







I did, however, more recently discuss a number of selections from



Peirce's



1880 Algebra of Logic that dealt with the logic of relatives, so I can



say for a certainly that he was calling these objects or the terms



that denote them by the name of “individual relatives”.






…






On 11/27/2015 12:42 PM,  

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

Edwina, in my study of NDTR, I am using Peirce’s definition of “Sign” exactly 
as given in that work; I quoted it (again) in the post you are responding to. 
If you have a problem with it, you’ll have to take it up with Peirce, not with 
me. As for what you choose to place into your pigeonholes of “Saussurean sign”, 
“Platonism” etc., that has no relevance to NDTR that I can see.

 

Peirce says that a Sinsign “involves a qualisign, or rather, several 
qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind” — and I suggested an 
explanation of why Peirce calls them “peculiar” (implying of course that there 
is another kind of Qualisign that is not peculiar). My suggestion is prompted 
by Peirce’s statement about the Qualisign that its “embodiment has nothing to 
do with its character as a sign.” You don’t like my suggestion, which is fine, 
but you’ve offered no alternative. Why are the qualisigns involved in sinsigns 
“of a peculiar kind”?

 

Gary f. 

 

}  {

  http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: 3-Dec-15 14:41
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

 

Gary F - I certainly consider all ten classes as genuine Signs. I don't  think 
this suggests an ambiguity in the meaning of 'genuine' and 'degenerate' but 
rather, an ambiguity in your definition of the Sign.  

 

You, as I understand it, confine the meaning of 'Sign' to be a synonym for 
'Representamen.  This leads, I think, to an understanding of the Sign as really 
a Saussurian Sign, with the Signifier=Object; and the Signified=Interpretant. 
Obviously, I reject this dyadism. I  consider the Peircean Sign to be an 
integral triad of three Relations: That between the Representamen and Object; 
that of the Representamen in itself; and that between the Representamen and the 
Interpretant. [See 8.344--]

 

So, if you consider only the Representamen as the Sign, then, I don't see how 
you can define it, on its own, as genuine or degenerate.  It isn't that the 
Representamen can't act as a sign [Representamen] unless it is embodied; it 
isn't a Representamen UNLESS it is embodied. Otherwise, you are moving into 
Platonism which does accept non-embodied Forms. [And yes, I'm aware of Peirce's 
terms of "it cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied" 2.244.

 

I don't see how a Sign (the triad) with all three Relations in a mode of 
Firstness is  degenerate or even 'doubly degenerate'. After all, Firstness as a 
categorical mode, has no nature of degeneracy. 

 

The genuine and degenerate forms of the Categories, is another issue, where, as 
we know, Peirce considers that Firstness has no degeneracy; Secondness has both 
a genuine and degenerate mode (2-2 and 2-1); and Thirdness has both a genuine 
and two degenerate modes (3-3, 3-2, 3-1). 


When Peirce refers to a genuine or degenerate index, he is referring to its 
categorical mode of Secondness. That is, the modal categories in themselves are 
genuine or degenerate not the Relation.

 

I don't see that a Qualisign, which is in a mode of pure Firstness (and not 
3-1) can be degenerate as compared to a Sinsign or Legisign.

 

How can 'a normal Qualisign' be disembodied? There's no such thing in Peirce as 
a 'free-floating Representamen'.  That's Platonism. 

 

Edwina

 

 

- Original Message - 

From: g...@gnusystems.ca   

To: 'Peirce-L'   

Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 11:31 AM

Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

 

Moving on to the first trichotomy of sign types in “Nomenclature and Divisions 
of Triadic Relations”:

 

CP 2.244: According to the first division, a Sign may be termed a Qualisign, a 
Sinsign, or a Legisign. 

A Qualisign is a quality which is a Sign. It cannot actually act as a sign 
until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character 
as a sign.

[As a Sign, this “quality” must be a correlate of a triadic relation with its 
Object and Interpretant, “by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant 
is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the 
same Object, and for some possible Interpretant” (CP 2.242). Yet it cannot act 
as a sign until it is embodied, i.e. until it becomes involved in at least a 
dyadic relation, and thus enters the universe of existence. Yet its 
significance is its quality (not its embodiment), and qualities being monadic, 
there is no real difference between Sign and Object (or Interpretant either). 
So I think we might call this a doubly degenerate kind of triadic relation, 
where the Sign is virtually self-representing, and self-determining as its own 
Interpretant. Compare the “self-sufficient” point on a map which Peirce offers 
as an example of doubly degenerate Thirdness in his third Harvard 

[PEIRCE-L] New York Pragmatist Forum: Spring Meeting Schedule, Call for Papers

[Gary Richmond]

THE NEW YORK PRAGMATIST FORUM
Fordham University at Lincoln Center, 9th (Columbus) Avenue at 60th Street
New York, USA 10023

For more information: jmgr...@fordham.edu 

Spring 2016 Meetings Announcement and
Call for Papers

Friday, January 29, 2016, 5:30-7:30 p.m.

“New Work in Contemporary Pragmatism: Crossing Boundaries”

- - - - - - -

Friday, February 26, 2016, 5:30-7:30 p.m.

“The Pluralist Philosophical Legacy of Bruce Wilshire:
Pragmatism, Phenomenology, Native American Philosophy”

- - - - - - -

Friday, April 1, 2016, 5:30-7:30 p.m.

“Philosophy and Disabilities”

- - - - - - -

Friday, April 29, 2016, 5:30-8:30 p.m.

“The Critical Pragmatism of Axel Honneth:
A Symposium”

- - - - - - -

Graduate students and independent scholars as well as professional
philosophers are welcome to submit 250-word abstracts for 2500-word papers
they would like to present at one of these Spring 2016 meetings of the New
York Pragmatist Forum.  Please indicate your name, institutional
affiliation, and the theme and date of the meeting for which you would like
your proposed paper to be considered. Send this information to Prof. Judith
greenjmgr...@fordham.edu as soon as possible, and no later than one month
before the meeting at which you would like to present.
[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Elementary Relatives or Individual Relatives

[Helmut Raulien]

Hi Jon, All,

I dont want to interrupt the discussion about terms, but I have a question that is about the mathematical relation- but I think this consideration might be expanded to semantics and semiotics. In mathematics, I have read somewhere, a relation is a subset of a cartesian product. Now I think, that there is a difference between the actual subset, and the reason for it, as well as the result of it. So I think, there are three different things: relation reason, actual relation (subset), and relation result. I wonder, whether this is a matter in mathematics. It seems triadic somehow. Example: Three equal sets A=B=C={1,2,3}. The relation reason is:"a unequal b unequal c unequal a", in other words: "No equal elements in a tuple". The actual relation is then: {(123)(132)(213)(231)(312)(321)}. Now this actual relation could have had another relation reason too: "a+b+c=a*b*c", in words: "The elements added is equal as the elements multiplied with each other". So, for relation result you have the relation reason, plus this second thing, the "might-have-been-too-reason". Of course this is a coincidence, but by fetching a bit far, one might say, that it is a crude example for how prejudices or myths come into being. Now, am I right with guessing, that the actual relation (the subset) is the elementary relation, and eg. "no equal elements" is a proper relation?

Helmut

 

 03. Dezember 2015 um 21:00 Uhr
"Jon Awbrey" 
 

Thread:
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17890
GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17894

A budget of readings for present and future reference:

Survey of Relation Theory
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/11/30/survey-of-relation-theory-%E2%80%A2-2/

First, we need to be clear about the difference between objects and signs:

Relations are formal objects of discussion and thought while
Relative Terms are signs we use to denote/describe relations.
(The shorthand term "relative" is short for "relative term".

The default meaning for "relative term" is "general relative term",
that is, a term whose denotation extends over many objects.

The default meaning for "relation" is "general relation",
that is, a formal object that is a set of many elements.

Next, we need to be clear about the distinction between
relatives (= general relatives) and elementary relatives.

Note. There is a distinction in Peirce's usage between
elementary relatives and individual relatives, but if we
factor in what he says about the Doctrine of Individuals
and recognize that we are dealing with abstract forms
then it becomes a "distinction without a difference".
So I will tend to use the terms interchangeably.

Here is one place where Peirce exhibits his appreciation
for the critical difference between relatives in general
and elementary or individual relatives.

Peirce’s 1880 “Algebra Of Logic” Chapter 3 • Selection 7
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/02/28/peirces-1880-algebra-of-logic-chapter-3-%E2%80%A2-selection-7/



Chapter 3. The Logic of Relatives (cont.)
=

§4. Classification of Relatives

225. Individual relatives are of one or other of the two forms

A : A
A : B

and simple relatives are negatives of one or other of these two forms.

226. The forms of general relatives are of infinite variety,
but the following may be particularly noticed. ...



It needs to be appreciated that classifying relations is vastly
more complex than classifying elementary or individual relations.

In particular, classifying sign relations is vastly more complex
than classifying elementary or individual sign relations, which
is just about all that the massive literature on sign taxonomy
has been able to touch, albeit confusedly, from Peirce's time
to ours.

Regards,

Jon

On 12/3/2015 11:31 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> Jon,
>
> This doesn't explain “the difference between relations proper and elementary relations” (which you said was
> "critically important to understand"), because the latter term is itself used in a specific "technical sense" by
> Peirce in the places you cite. It doesn't help to understand which “technical sense” of the word you have in mind.
>
> My guess is that what’s confusing some of us in understanding triadic relations is that some of them relate
> correlates which are themselves relations. (Perhaps correlates which are not relations are “individual relatives”?)
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
>
>
> -Original Message- From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: 2-Dec-15 22:30
>
>
>
> Peircers,
>
>
>
> As I wrote before, I used the phrase "relations proper"
>
> merely to emphasize that I was talking about relations in the technical sense. Another common idiom to the same
> purpose would be "relations, strictly speaking".
>
>
>
> As for "elementary relatives", Peirce uses this term in the 1870 Logic of Relatives.
>
> See, for example, CP 3.121ff and a later remark at 3.602ff.
>
>
>
> See Also:
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary F-  I'm aware that Peirce used the term 'sign' to refer to both the 
Representamen and the full triadic semiosic process. As you know, your 
confining the term to mean ONLY the Representamen, is a problem I have, not 
with Peirce, but with your outlines. I doubt that you and I will agree on this.

I don't think that the term 'peculiar' naturally leads to its being defined as 
'degenerate'. That's because I understand the terms 'genuine' and 'degenerate' 
to refer only to the modal categories. So, if the Relations between the three 
parts of the triad (Object-Representamen-Interpretant) are operating within the 
degnerate modes of (2-1, 3-1, 3-2) rather than the 'pure modes' (1-1, 2-2, 
3-3)...then, we can see them as 'degenerate relations'.

I do not know what Peirce meant by 'these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and 
only form a sign through being actually embodied" 2.245.  He might be saying 
that a Sinsign, which functions as a particularity, might have a qualitative 
relation (as well as a direct relation) with its Object in the mode of 2-1, or 
Secondness-as-Firstness. 

Therefore, I reject your view that the "Qualisign is degenerate relative to the 
Sinsign and to the Legisign ".  It's the Relations in their categorical modes 
that are genuine or degenerate; i.e., the modes are genuine/degenerate. Not the 
Signs.

Qualisigns in themselves do not actually form a Representamen, for a 
Representamen is not a collection of particular relations, but is a 
transformation of these relations into generalities, into laws.  Qualisigns are 
connected to the object by an 'embodiment' process that is descriptive rather 
than denotative. . But, since no qualisign exists 'per se' but functions within 
a relation to its object (which could be also be in a mode of Firstness)  then, 
it could be that the 'peculiar' mode of a qualisign as related to a Sinsign 
(which is in a mode of Secondness) is in a categorical mode of 2-1, or, 
Secondness as Firstness. 

Peirce also, in 2.246, refers to the Legisign, as requiring Sinsigns, but 
again, 'these are not ordinary Sinsigns, such as are peculiar occurrences that 
are regarded as significant'. Same thing. In a Legisign Representamen, the 
Relations between the Representamen and the Object and Interpretant could be in 
a mode of 3-2, or Thirdness operating in Secondness.

Again - how can a 'normal Qualisign' be disembodied? What's your meaning of 
this statement?

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: g...@gnusystems.ca 
  To: 'Peirce-L' 
  Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 3:20 PM
  Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Edwina, in my study of NDTR, I am using Peirce’s definition of “Sign” exactly 
as given in that work; I quoted it (again) in the post you are responding to. 
If you have a problem with it, you’ll have to take it up with Peirce, not with 
me. As for what you choose to place into your pigeonholes of “Saussurean sign”, 
“Platonism” etc., that has no relevance to NDTR that I can see.

   

  Peirce says that a Sinsign “involves a qualisign, or rather, several 
qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind” — and I suggested an 
explanation of why Peirce calls them “peculiar” (implying of course that there 
is another kind of Qualisign that is not peculiar). My suggestion is prompted 
by Peirce’s statement about the Qualisign that its “embodiment has nothing to 
do with its character as a sign.” You don’t like my suggestion, which is fine, 
but you’ve offered no alternative. Why are the qualisigns involved in sinsigns 
“of a peculiar kind”?

   

  Gary f. 

   

  }  {

  http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

   

  From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
  Sent: 3-Dec-15 14:41
  To: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L' 
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

   

  Gary F - I certainly consider all ten classes as genuine Signs. I don't  
think this suggests an ambiguity in the meaning of 'genuine' and 'degenerate' 
but rather, an ambiguity in your definition of the Sign.  

   

  You, as I understand it, confine the meaning of 'Sign' to be a synonym for 
'Representamen.  This leads, I think, to an understanding of the Sign as really 
a Saussurian Sign, with the Signifier=Object; and the Signified=Interpretant. 
Obviously, I reject this dyadism. I  consider the Peircean Sign to be an 
integral triad of three Relations: That between the Representamen and Object; 
that of the Representamen in itself; and that between the Representamen and the 
Interpretant. [See 8.344--]

   

  So, if you consider only the Representamen as the Sign, then, I don't see how 
you can define it, on its own, as genuine or degenerate.  It isn't that the 
Representamen can't act as a sign [Representamen] unless it is embodied; it 
isn't a Representamen UNLESS it is embodied. Otherwise, you are moving into 
Platonism which does accept non-embodied 

Re: [biosemiotics:8992] Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Edwina, Gary R, John, lists,

Edwina wrote:

"Because Peirce's three categories don't correlate to the three worlds of
Burgin and Popper   (120315-a)
[both of whom are excellent scholars] ,  doesn't mean that Peircean theory
doesn't have
anything to do with modern natural sciences or with information science."


I agree.  But this does not conflict with what I said in the post you are
responding to.
In that post I said, in effect:

"If your statement that "Burgin's  and Popper's three worlds . . . do not have
anything to do with (120315-b)
the Peircean categories" is right, then *Peirce *(as *represented by E.
Taborsky*) would have nothing
to do with modern *natural sciences* (*as represented by Popper and  *
*Penrose*) or with
*information science* (*as represented by Burgin*),. . . ."

You misunderstood this statement, thus wrongly equating it with the
following:

"If your statement that "Burgin's  and Popper's three worlds . . . do not have
anything to do with  (120315-c)
the Peircean categories" is right, then *Peirce  *would have nothing to do
with modern *natural sciences*
or with *information science*, . . . ."

Do you see the difference between (120315-b) and (120315-c) ?  The former
is correct (which was what I said),
and the latter is not (which is not what I said but you wrongly attributed
it to me).

Your conflation between (120315-b) and (12035-c) may have arisen from your
conflating "types" and "tokens".
I came to this conclusion based on the following analysis.

(*2*)  For convenience, I will use the notations given below:

*PS(T)* = *Peircean semiotics  *(as *represented by E. Taborsky*)

(120315-d)
*NS(PP)* = modern *natural sciences* (*as represented by Popper and Penrose*)
 (120315-e)
*IS(B*) =  *information science* (*as represented by Burgin*)

(120315-f)

To me (120315-d), (120315-e), and (120315-f) are the *tokens* of *types*
*PS* (Peircean semiotics), *N*S (Natural sciences), and *IS* (Information
sciences), respectively, as summarized in *Table 1*.

___

*Table 1.*  Tokes are not types.
The symbol "_" represents a "placeholder" which can be occupied by any
element of a set; T = Taborsky; P = Popper or Penrose; B = Burgin.
___

Different Disciplines  *Tokens
 Types*
___

*Peircean semiotics* *PS(T) PS(
_ )*
___

*Natural sciences * *NS(PP)
NS( _ )*
___

*Information science *  *IS(B)   IS
( _ )*
___


Using the symbols defined in *Table 1*, we can re-write (120315-b) as
(120315-g) for a clearer comparison with (120315-c)  re-written as
(120315-i):

"If your statement that "Burgin's  and Popper's three worlds . . . do not have
anything to do with (120315-b)
the Peircean categories" is right, then *Peirce *(as *represented by E.
Taborsky*) would have nothing
to do with modern *natural sciences* (*as represented by Popper and  *
*Penrose*) or with
*information science* (*as represented by Burgin*), . . . ."

"If your statement that IS(B) and NS(PP)  . . . do not have anything to do
with PS(T)" is right,(120315-g)
then PS(T) would have nothing to do with modern NS (PP) or IS(B), . . . "

which is equivalent to saying that

"If IS(B) and NS(PP) are not PS(T), then PS(T) is not IS(B) or NS(PP)"
(120315-h)


This statement must be valid, since logic is reversible: "If A is not B,
then B is not A."


Now (120315-c) can be re-written as  (120315-i):

"If your statement that "Burgin's  and Popper's three worlds . . . do not have
anything to do with   (120315-c)
the Peircean categories" is right, then *Peirce  *would have nothing to do
with modern
*natural sciences*  or with *information science*, . . . ."


"If your statement IS(B) and NS(PP) . . . do not have anything to do with
 PS(T) is right,   (120315-i)
then PS( _ )   would have nothing to do with NS( _ ) or IS( _ ) . . . ."

I repeat, (120315-g) is true but (120315-i) is not.  In other words,


"Even if PS(T) does not correlate with NS(PP) or IS(B), it does not follow
that  (120315-j)
PS( _) would not correlate with NS( _ ) or  IS( _ )."

In other words, Edwina's misunderstanding of my statement (120315-b), I
believe, has resulted from what may be called the "type-token confusion
(TTC)"

(*3*)  Another example of TTC is provided by the universal applicability of PDE
(Planckian distribution equation), Equation (120315-k),
to the long tailed histograms generated from a wide variety of 

Re: [biosemiotics:8992] Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Typos:

(1) Please replace "they thought that the same form of a mathematical
equation, i.e., DPD, applies to both" with "they thought that it was
impossible for the same form of a mathematical equation, i.e., DPD, to
apply to both."

(2) "Burgin [1]" with "Burgin [4]".

Sorry for the confusion.

S. Ji

On Thu, Dec 3, 2015 at 7:48 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Edwina, Gary R, John, lists,
>
> Edwina wrote:
>
> "Because Peirce's three categories don't correlate to the three worlds of
> Burgin and Popper   (120315-a)
> [both of whom are excellent scholars] ,  doesn't mean that Peircean
> theory doesn't have
> anything to do with modern natural sciences or with information science."
>
>
> I agree.  But this does not conflict with what I said in the post you are
> responding to.
> In that post I said, in effect:
>
> "If your statement that "Burgin's  and Popper's three worlds . . . do not have
> anything to do with (120315-b)
> the Peircean categories" is right, then *Peirce *(as *represented by E.
> Taborsky*) would have nothing
> to do with modern *natural sciences* (*as represented by Popper and  *
> *Penrose*) or with
> *information science* (*as represented by Burgin*),. . . ."
>
> You misunderstood this statement, thus wrongly equating it with the
> following:
>
> "If your statement that "Burgin's  and Popper's three worlds . . . do not have
> anything to do with  (120315-c)
> the Peircean categories" is right, then *Peirce  *would have nothing to
> do with modern *natural sciences*
> or with *information science*, . . . ."
>
> Do you see the difference between (120315-b) and (120315-c) ?  The former
> is correct (which was what I said),
> and the latter is not (which is not what I said but you wrongly attributed
> it to me).
>
> Your conflation between (120315-b) and (12035-c) may have arisen from your
> conflating "types" and "tokens".
> I came to this conclusion based on the following analysis.
>
> (*2*)  For convenience, I will use the notations given below:
>
> *PS(T)* = *Peircean semiotics  *(as *represented by E. Taborsky*)
>
> (120315-d)
> *NS(PP)* = modern *natural sciences* (*as represented by Popper and
> Penrose*)  (120315-e)
> *IS(B*) =  *information science* (*as represented by Burgin*)
>
> (120315-f)
>
> To me (120315-d), (120315-e), and (120315-f) are the *tokens* of *types*
> *PS* (Peircean semiotics), *N*S (Natural sciences), and *IS* (Information
> sciences), respectively, as summarized in *Table 1*.
>
> ___
>
> *Table 1.*  Tokes are not types.
> The symbol "_" represents a "placeholder" which can be occupied by any
> element of a set; T = Taborsky; P = Popper or Penrose; B = Burgin.
> ___
>
> Different Disciplines  *Tokens
>  Types*
> ___
>
> *Peircean semiotics* *PS(T)
> PS( _ )*
> ___
>
> *Natural sciences * *NS(PP)
> NS( _ )*
> ___
>
> *Information science *  *IS(B)
> IS ( _ )*
> ___
>
>
> Using the symbols defined in *Table 1*, we can re-write (120315-b) as
> (120315-g) for a clearer comparison with (120315-c)  re-written as
> (120315-i):
>
> "If your statement that "Burgin's  and Popper's three worlds . . . do not have
> anything to do with (120315-b)
> the Peircean categories" is right, then *Peirce *(as *represented by E.
> Taborsky*) would have nothing
> to do with modern *natural sciences* (*as represented by Popper and  *
> *Penrose*) or with
> *information science* (*as represented by Burgin*), . . . ."
>
> "If your statement that IS(B) and NS(PP)  . . . do not have anything to
> do with PS(T)" is right,(120315-g)
> then PS(T) would have nothing to do with modern NS (PP) or IS(B), . . . "
>
> which is equivalent to saying that
>
> "If IS(B) and NS(PP) are not PS(T), then PS(T) is not IS(B) or NS(PP)"
> (120315-h)
>
>
> This statement must be valid, since logic is reversible: "If A is not B,
> then B is not A."
>
>
> Now (120315-c) can be re-written as  (120315-i):
>
> "If your statement that "Burgin's  and Popper's three worlds . . . do not have
> anything to do with   (120315-c)
> the Peircean categories" is right, then *Peirce  *would have nothing to
> do with modern
> *natural sciences*  or with *information science*, . . . ."
>
>
> "If your statement IS(B) and NS(PP) . . . do not have anything to do with
>  PS(T) is right,   (120315-i)
> then PS( _ )   would have nothing to do with NS( _ ) or IS( _ ) . . . ."
>
> I repeat, (120315-g) is true but (120315-i) is not.  In other 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

[Stephen C. Rose]

My hero, Charles Peirce, rightly says that logic exists in the service of
ethics, and ethics in the service of aesthetics. Following this triadic
characterization of the foundations of knowledge, both language and music,
in order to be good and beautiful, must be underpinned by well-formedness,
alias logic.

To which I would append this from CP2



Peirce: CP 2.34 Cross-Ref:††



34. These tendencies are irrepressible: in the long run they will cause that

which they need to come into being. But much more than that, they are

thoroughly reasonable; and that which they call for ought to be. Now that
which they demand above all is the fact and the admission that the world is
reasonable-- reasonably susceptible to becoming reasonable, for that is
what it is, and all that it is, to be reasonable †2--or in other words,
that man is made after his maker's image.


Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3

On Thu, Dec 3, 2015 at 12:59 PM, Michael Shapiro 
wrote:

> Always a good sign (sic!), Gary.
> M.
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: g...@gnusystems.ca
> Sent: Dec 3, 2015 12:53 PM
> To: 'CSP'
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering
>
> Michael, you are probably unaware that my book *Turning Signs* also draws
> upon that same Heraclitus fragment, along with several others —
> http://gnusystems.ca/TS/gds.htm#bios — and my whole Chapter 2 (
> http://gnusystems.ca/TS/dlg.htm) is (you might say) an introduction to
> dialogism. Since I haven’t read your book yet, and I presume you haven’t
> read mine, this means that we’ve arrived at similar ideas by different
> routes, which is always encouraging. Though of course the Peirce connection
> is there in both!
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } The wind blows where it will, and you hear the sound thereof, but cannot
> tell whence it comes or whither it goes: so is every one that is born of
> the spirit. [John 3:8] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
> *From:* Michael Shapiro [mailto:poo...@earthlink.net]
> *Sent:* 3-Dec-15 12:16
> *To:* CSP 
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering
>
>
>
> *Harmony, Linguistic and Musical*
>
>
>
> *GLOSSARY*
>
>
>
> *cacoglossic*, adj.: exhibiting or characteristic of distorted or
> ungrammatical speech
>
> *cacophonic,* adj. < *cacophony*, n.: harsh or discordant sound;
> dissonance
>
> *dialogism*, n.: the principle that all utterances (and hence all
> communication) acquiremeaning only in the context of a dialogue
> to which they contribute and in which thepresence and contributions of
> other voices (or other discourses, languages, etc.) are
> inescapably implied, with the result that meaning and expression cannot be
> reduced to a single system or subjected to a single authority; the
> embodiment of this principle in a form of expression, esp. a literary text
>
> *figurative*, adj.: transferred in sense from literal or plain to
> abstract or hypothetical (as by the expression of one thing in terms of
> another with which it can be regarded asanalogous)
>
> *lexically*, adv. < *lexical*, adj.: of or relating to words, word
> formatives, or the vocabulary of a language as distinguished
> from its grammar and construction
>
> *Peirce: *Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), American logician and
> scientist
>
> *triadic*, adj. < *triad*, n.: a union or group of three, esp. of three
> closely related persons, beings, or things
>
>
>
> My hero, Charles Peirce, rightly says that logic exists in the
> service of ethics, and ethics in the service of aesthetics. Following this
> triadic characterization of the foundations of knowledge, both language and
> music, in order to be good and beautiful, must be underpinned by
> well-formedness, alias logic. Thus even a child’s grammatically and
> lexically well-formed utterance is to be deemed superior to an adult’s
> cacoglossic one, just as the harmonically grammatical commercial jingle
> always puts the typically cacophonic piece of contemporary classical music
> to shame.
>
> In this matter, my favorite pre-Socratic philosopher,
> Heraclitus “The Obscure” (of “No man ever steps in the same river twice”
> fame), has something pertinent to say.
>
> One of Heraclitus’ most famously enigmatic fragments goes like
> this:
>
>
>
> Οὐ ξυνίασι ὅκως διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῷ ὁμολογέει·
> παλίντροπος ἁρμονίηὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης.
>
> *Ou xyniasin hok*ō*s diaferomenon heoutoi
> homologeei palintropos harmoniē   hok*ō*sper
> toxou kai lyres. *
>
>
>
> (“They do not comprehend how a thing agrees at variance with
> itself [literally how  being brought apart it isbrought together with
> itself]; it is an attunement turningback on itself, like that
> of the bow and 

Re: Fw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

[Gary Richmond]

Michael, Jeff, List,

Martin Lefebvre in "Peirce's Ethetics: A Taste for Signs in Art"
(TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOCIETY Vol. 43, No. 2, 2007)
remarks: "For Peirce, the indebtedness of ethics and logic to esthetics
lies at the very heart of the normativity and the rationality of both
sciences."

And, later comments:

The three-part division of philosophy as well as that of the normative
sciences is made on the basis of how a given science foregrounds aspects of
the three Categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. Simply put,
this implies that the normative sciences, being set between
phaneroscopy-First and metaphysics-Third, must display characteristics of
Secondness. Next, the internal subdivision of the normative sciences
implies that, relative to one another, they all display different
categorial characteristics: monadicity of esthetics, dyadicity of ethics,
triadicicy of logic. Finally, according to Peirce’s categorial taxonomic
scheme, sciences which are “Firsts” offer operating principles to those
that are “Second” and “Third”, and those that are “Second” do the same for
those that are “Third”—this is how one must understand Peirce’s statement
that “logic needs the help of esthetics.”


I would tend to agree with Lefebvre's analysis.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Thu, Dec 3, 2015 at 12:34 PM, Michael Shapiro 
wrote:

> No, I don't think there is a difference between my (loose) formulation and
> the way Peirce stated it. The pruport is the same, in my opinion.
> M.
>
> -Forwarded Message-
> From: Michael Shapiro
> Sent: Dec 3, 2015 12:31 PM
> To: Jeffrey Brian Downard , CSP
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

[PEIRCE-L] RE: Entropy - anticipating the demise of the genocentric paradigm

[Stephen Jarosek]

Here is an interesting article that supports my conjecture for DNA
entanglement (nonlocality) - for if every cell in a body houses an identical
suite of DNA and chromosomes within its nucleus, then, following through on
the thesis of this article, this would seem to suggest that DNA entanglement
is integral to life, identity and the binding problem:
http://nautil.us/issue/30/identity/quantum-mechanics-is-putting-human-identi
ty-on-trial
(DNA entanglement would also be entropically friendly, unlike the
genocentric-materialist paradigm)


-Original Message-
From: Stephen Jarosek [mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au] 
Sent: Thursday, 3 December 2015 11:39 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'PEIRCE-L'
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Entropy - anticipating the demise of the genocentric
paradigm

Lists,

In a recent tweet of his, reading between the lines, it would seem that
Richard Dawkins is beginning to respond to challenges to his genocentric
paradigm within the context of the second law of thermodynamics (entropy).
Due to uncertainties wrt copyright, I won't include his tweet here. But we
should be paying attention. In another forum, I posted the following comment
that succinctly summarizes my position and the problem with the genocentric
paradigm:

To the materialist paradigm, we owe the infotech narrative that portrays DNA
as "data" to be computed. Yet there is no sign anywhere of said "computer".
Hello? And these people call themselves scientists? And to extend the
absurdity of their "just so" narrative they might suggest that the computer
is somehow bound into the molecular sequences and structures around which
all reactions take place, as if this somehow ameliorates their position. It
does not. The absurdity remains because the complex properties of the
subatomic, atomic and molecular structures that make life possible still
need to be accounted for. As if by magic, their materialist complexity
emerges contrary to the laws of thermodynamics and the forces of entropy
that are arrayed against it. Whether it's "because natural selection" or
"because genes" or "because epigenetics" or "because Darwin" or "because
evo-psych" or "because hunter-gatherers of the Pleistocene", there is no
axiomatic framework that hangs together. They have no axiomatic framework.
These labcoats masquerading as scientists don't even know what an axiomatic
framework is or what it is for. The materialist paradigm is an unprecedented
woo on steroids.



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

RE: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

[Michael Shapiro]

Always a good sign (sic!), Gary.M.-Original Message-
From: g...@gnusystems.ca
Sent: Dec 3, 2015 12:53 PM
To: 'CSP' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering






Michael, you are probably unaware that my book Turning Signs also draws upon that same Heraclitus fragment, along with several others — http://gnusystems.ca/TS/gds.htm#bios — and my whole Chapter 2 (http://gnusystems.ca/TS/dlg.htm) is (you might say) an introduction to dialogism. Since I haven’t read your book yet, and I presume you haven’t read mine, this means that we’ve arrived at similar ideas by different routes, which is always encouraging. Though of course the Peirce connection is there in both! Gary f. } The wind blows where it will, and you hear the sound thereof, but cannot tell whence it comes or whither it goes: so is every one that is born of the spirit. [John 3:8] {http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway From: Michael Shapiro [mailto:poo...@earthlink.net] Sent: 3-Dec-15 12:16To: CSP Subject: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering Harmony, Linguistic and Musical GLOSSARY cacoglossic, adj.: exhibiting or characteristic of distorted or ungrammatical speechcacophonic, adj. < cacophony, n.: harsh or discordant sound; dissonancedialogism, n.: the principle that all utterances (and hence all communication) acquire    meaning only in the context of a dialogue to which they contribute and in which the    presence and contributions of other voices (or other discourses, languages, etc.) are   inescapably implied, with the result that meaning and _expression_ cannot be reduced to a single system or subjected to a single authority; the embodiment of this principle in a form of _expression_, esp. a literary textfigurative, adj.: transferred in sense from literal or plain to abstract or hypothetical (as by  the _expression_ of one thing in terms of another with which it can be regarded as    analogous)lexically, adv. < lexical, adj.: of or relating to words, word formatives, or the vocabulary of a language as distinguished from its grammar and constructionPeirce: Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), American logician and scientisttriadic, adj. < triad, n.: a union or group of three, esp. of three closely related persons, beings, or things  My hero, Charles Peirce, rightly says that logic exists in the service of ethics, and ethics in the service of aesthetics. Following this triadic characterization of the foundations of knowledge, both language and music, in order to be good and beautiful, must be underpinned by well-formedness, alias logic. Thus even a child’s grammatically and lexically well-formed utterance is to be deemed superior to an adult’s cacoglossic one, just as the harmonically grammatical commercial jingle always puts the typically cacophonic piece of contemporary classical music to shame.     In this matter, my favorite pre-Socratic philosopher, Heraclitus “The Obscure” (of “No man ever steps in the same river twice” fame), has something pertinent to say.    One of Heraclitus’ most famously enigmatic fragments goes like this: Οὐ ξυνίασι ὅκως διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῷ ὁμολογέει·
παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη        ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης.    Ou xyniasin hokōs diaferomenon heoutoi homologeei palintropos harmoniē       hokōsper toxou kai lyres.  (“They do not comprehend how a thing agrees at variance with itself [literally how  being brought apart it is    brought together with itself]; it is an attunement turning    back on itself, like that of the bow and the lyre.”) This fragment is typical of Heraclitus’ forma mentis in that it begins with a negation (“They do not comprehend”) that seems to be a polemical retort to and denial of some prior position held by others. This immediately engages dialogism as a constitutive principle of the form of Heraclitus’ utterance. Leaving aside the phrase “at variance with itself” for the moment, what is crucial to the interpretation of the whole fragment is the combination palintropos harmoniē ('backward-turning structure [attunement/connection]'). The original sense of harmoniē seems to have been joining or fitting together, and that is the way it is used by Homer and Herodotus among others in the context of carpentry or shipbuilding. But harmoniē also has from the beginning a figurative meaning—“agreements” or “compacts” between hostile men (as in the Iliad)—from which it can move to the connotation of reconciliation (personified, for instance, as the child of Ares and Aphrodite in Hesiod’s Theogony). Finally, harmoniē occurs in the familiar musical sense of the “fitting together” of different strings to produce the desired scale or key.    It is in 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Elementary Relatives or Individual Relatives

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F., Jon, List, 

In a discussion of elementary relatives, you ask:  "Perhaps correlates which 
are not relations are 'individual relatives'?"  

Here is a nice passage from "On an Improvement in Boole's Calculus of Logic:  
"There are in the logic of relatives three kinds of terms which involve 
general suppositions of individual cases. The first are individual terms, 
which denote only individuals; the second are those relatives whose 
correlatives are individual: I term these infinitesimal relatives; the third 
are individual infinitesimal relatives, and these I term elementary relatives." 
CP 3.95

In the preceding paragraph, Peirce makes the following point:  "If we call a 
thought about a thing in so far as it is denoted by a term, a second intention, 
we may say that such a term as 'any individual man' is individual by second 
intention. The letters which the mathematician uses (whether in algebra or in 
geometry) are such individuals by second intention. Such individuals are one in 
number, for any individual man is one man; they may also be regarded as 
incapable of logical division, for any individual man, though he may either be 
a Frenchman or not, is yet altogether a Frenchman or altogether not, and not 
some one and some the other." This discussion of individual terms, 
infinitesimal relatives and elementary relatives is found in the context of a 
discussion of a system of formal logic.  I take this to be, first and foremost, 
an inquiry in mathematical logic.  

The crucial move, I take it, is that Peirce is building a mathematical system 
that has the character of a second intentional system of formal logic.  What 
happens when we include the kinds of abstractions that involve taking 
terms--like numbers--that are used first and foremost as pure indexes that are 
put into relations of one-to-one correspondence with some collection of 
individuals (such as a collection of spots on a page), and we then treat the 
mathematical signs themselves as individuals?  This abstractive move gives us 
an individual that has the character of an elementary relative.  It is 
elementary in the sense that it is not amenable to any further logical 
division.  That is, we can't logically divide the indexical "2" that was put 
into correspondence with a couple of individual spots on the page any further.  
It is an individual of a special sort.  While there may be, as Qunie suggests 
in Word and Object, rabbit time slices, there are no number time slices--are 
there?  This is true even when we are talking about a specific use of "2" as an 
index that is put into a relation of correspondence.

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 9:31 AM
To: 'Peirce List'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Elementary Relatives or Individual Relatives

Jon,



This doesn't explain “the difference between relations proper and elementary 
relations” (which you said was

"critically important to understand"), because the latter term is itself used 
in a specific "technical sense" by Peirce in the places you cite. It doesn't 
help to understand which “technical sense” of the word you have in mind.



My guess is that what’s confusing some of us in understanding triadic relations 
is that some of them relate correlates which are themselves relations. (Perhaps 
correlates which are not relations are “individual relatives”?)



Gary f.





-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
Sent: 2-Dec-15 22:30


Peircers,



As I wrote before, I used the phrase "relations proper"

merely to emphasize that I was talking about relations in the technical sense.  
Another common idiom to the same purpose would be "relations, strictly 
speaking".



As for "elementary relatives", Peirce uses this term in the 1870 Logic of 
Relatives.

See, for example, CP 3.121ff and a later remark at 3.602ff.



See Also:



☞ https://www.google.com/search?hl=en_q=Peirce_epq=Elementary+Relative



And toward the end of this section:



☞ 
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Differential_Logic_:_Introduction#Operational_Representation



Regards,



Jon



> Gary, all,

>

> I used the phrase “relations proper” to emphasize that I was speaking

> of relations in the strict sense of the word, not in any looser sense.

> I have been reading Peirce for almost 50 years now and I can't always

> recall where I read a particular usage.  In the 1970s I spent a couple

> of years poring through the microfilm edition of his Nachlass and read

> a lot of still unpublished material that is not available to me now.

> But there is no doubt from the very concrete notations and examples

> that he used in his early notes and papers that he was talking about

> the formal objects that are variously called elementary relations,

> elements of relations, 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

[gnox]

Michael, you are probably unaware that my book Turning Signs also draws upon 
that same Heraclitus fragment, along with several others — 
http://gnusystems.ca/TS/gds.htm#bios — and my whole Chapter 2 
(http://gnusystems.ca/TS/dlg.htm) is (you might say) an introduction to 
dialogism. Since I haven’t read your book yet, and I presume you haven’t read 
mine, this means that we’ve arrived at similar ideas by different routes, which 
is always encouraging. Though of course the Peirce connection is there in both!

 

Gary f.

 

} The wind blows where it will, and you hear the sound thereof, but cannot tell 
whence it comes or whither it goes: so is every one that is born of the spirit. 
[John 3:8] {

  http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

From: Michael Shapiro [mailto:poo...@earthlink.net] 
Sent: 3-Dec-15 12:16
To: CSP 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

 

Harmony, Linguistic and Musical

 

GLOSSARY

 

cacoglossic, adj.: exhibiting or characteristic of distorted or ungrammatical 
speech

cacophonic, adj. < cacophony, n.: harsh or discordant sound; dissonance

dialogism, n.: the principle that all utterances (and hence all communication) 
acquiremeaning only in the context of a dialogue to which they 
contribute and in which thepresence and contributions of other voices (or 
other discourses, languages, etc.) are   inescapably implied, with the 
result that meaning and expression cannot be reduced to a single system or 
subjected to a single authority; the embodiment of this principle in a form of 
expression, esp. a literary text

figurative, adj.: transferred in sense from literal or plain to abstract or 
hypothetical (as by the expression of one thing in terms of another with which 
it can be regarded asanalogous)

lexically, adv. < lexical, adj.: of or relating to words, word formatives, or 
the vocabulary of a language as distinguished from its grammar and 
construction

Peirce: Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), American logician and scientist

triadic, adj. < triad, n.: a union or group of three, esp. of three closely 
related persons, beings, or things 

 

My hero, Charles Peirce, rightly says that logic exists in the 
service of ethics, and ethics in the service of aesthetics. Following this 
triadic characterization of the foundations of knowledge, both language and 
music, in order to be good and beautiful, must be underpinned by 
well-formedness, alias logic. Thus even a child’s grammatically and lexically 
well-formed utterance is to be deemed superior to an adult’s cacoglossic one, 
just as the harmonically grammatical commercial jingle always puts the 
typically cacophonic piece of contemporary classical music to shame.

In this matter, my favorite pre-Socratic philosopher, Heraclitus 
“The Obscure” (of “No man ever steps in the same river twice” fame), has 
something pertinent to say.

One of Heraclitus’ most famously enigmatic fragments goes like this:

 

Οὐ ξυνίασι ὅκως διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῷ ὁμολογέει·

παλίντροπος ἁρμονίηὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης.

Ou xyniasin hokōs diaferomenon heoutoi homologeei 
palintropos harmoniē   hokōsper toxou kai lyres. 

 

(“They do not comprehend how a thing agrees at variance with itself 
[literally how  being brought apart it isbrought together with itself]; it 
is an attunement turningback on itself, like that of the bow and 
the lyre.”)

 

This fragment is typical of Heraclitus’ forma mentis in that it 
begins with a negation (“They do not comprehend”) that seems to be a polemical 
retort to and denial of some prior position held by others. This immediately 
engages dialogism as a constitutive principle of the form of Heraclitus’ 
utterance. Leaving aside the phrase “at variance with itself” for the moment, 
what is crucial to the interpretation of the whole fragment is the combination 
palintropos harmoniē ('backward-turning structure [attunement/connection]'). 
The original sense of harmoniē seems to have been joining or fitting together, 
and that is the way it is used by Homer and Herodotus among others in the 
context of carpentry or shipbuilding. But harmoniē also has from the beginning 
a figurative meaning—“agreements” or “compacts” between hostile men (as in the 
Iliad)—from which it can move to the connotation of reconciliation 
(personified, for instance, as the child of Ares and Aphrodite in Hesiod’s 
Theogony). Finally, harmoniē occurs in the familiar musical sense of the 
“fitting together” of different strings to produce the desired scale or key.

It is in this final sense that speaking harmoniously is accordingly 
a matter of fitting together the bow and the lyre. But in order to be 
aesthetically pleasing, language