Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk

[Jerry Rhee]

dear kirsti, list:

I was responding to your remark:
""Morphogenetic field" is just a name, a term standing for a theoretical
concept. Naming is not explaining. - For explaining anything, a theory is
needed, with sound experimental evidence backing it up."

I posted a quote from Lewis Wolpert's theoretical paper on pattern
formation that ought to lead you to the sound experimental evidence on
morphogenetic fields.  It's rather large and still mysterious once you get
down to the molecular details.

Best,
J


On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 1:42 PM,  wrote:

> Dear J. Rhee,
>
> You addressed you post especially to me, but I can't see any connection to
> my recent post to the list.
>
> Seeing the host of copies you listed up, I guess you take your point to be
> a most important one.
>
> Please do enlighten me on your reasons and grounds.
>
> With most kind regards.
>
> Kirsti
>
>
>
>
>
> Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 6.6.2017 21:21:
>
>> Dear kirsti, all,
>>
>> "The size of embryonic fields is, surprisingly, usually less than 50
>> cells in any direction."
>>
>> Surprisingly, that makes a morphogenetic field about 500um in
>> diameter.
>>
>> Best,
>> J
>>
>> On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 1:10 PM,  wrote:
>>
>> Helmut,
>>>
>>> "Morphogenetic field" is just a name, a term standing for a
>>> theoretical concept. Naming is not explaining. - For explaining
>>> anything, a theory is needed, with sound experimental evidence
>>> backing it up.
>>>
>>> Do you think the experimental evidence Sheldrake has been
>>> presenting is not sound? Are there flaws and shortcomings in his
>>> theory? - If so, where?
>>>
>>> Or are his theories just surprising and odd?
>>>
>>> In 1990's I got interested in Sheldrake. Took up some of his
>>> experiments both in detail and as wholes. Found out that they were
>>> exceptionally well designed and carried out.
>>>
>>> I did (and do) find some shortcomings in his theory, but only of
>>> the usual sort. They could be even better. (As any worthwhile theory
>>> should!)
>>>
>>> All criticism should be specified in these respects. I think.
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Kirsti
>>>
>>> Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 6.6.2017 02:52:
>>>
>>> Supplement: Sorry, Mr. Laplace, please transform into Lamarck in
>>> the
>>> below text.
>>> Lalala,
>>> Helmut
>>>
>>> Dear list members,
>>> I suggest three steps of more or less innovative thinking: 1.:
>>> Dogmaticness, 2.: Open-mindedness, 3.: Magical thinking. I think
>>> that
>>> the middle way is the best: Open minded thinking. Dogmaticness
>>> blocks
>>> the inquiry, and magical thinking reverses cause and effect and
>>> leads
>>> to false conclusions.
>>> To tell, whether a theory is open-minded or magical, there are two
>>> ways, I think. One of them is theoretical, the other experimental.
>>> The
>>> experimental way is easy: Can the experiment be reproduced by other
>>> experimenters in other laboratories, and will the results be the
>>> same?
>>>
>>> If this is so, but there is no theoretical explanation available to
>>> explain the results, then I guess that scientists will not stop
>>> looking for explanations until they have found them. I do not
>>> think,
>>> that they are afraid of being accused of pseudo-scientificness. If
>>> they were, they would not have become scientists, but clerks or
>>> something like that. I think, that scientists are curious, and not
>>> remote-controlled, as conspiration-theorists often claim.
>>> I have read somewhere the proposal, that scientists should not only
>>> publish their successes, but also their failures. Is this being
>>> done
>>> now to some extent?
>>> On the other hand, for a long time Darwinism was the dogma,
>>> Laplacism
>>> was refuted, it was even correctly said, that in the Soviet Union
>>> Laplacist-like attempts of crop adaption to colder climate has lead
>>> to
>>> famines. But today, Laplacism has a revival, due to the discovery
>>> of
>>> epigenetic mechanisms.
>>> When Sheldrake was claiming, that rats in Australia can be easier
>>> convinced to jump through a burning ring, if before rats in England
>>> have been taught to do that, you might ask: What should be the
>>> carrying mechanism for this effect? Maybe there is something we do
>>> not
>>> know now, just as we did not know about the epigenetic methyl
>>> molecules.
>>> But: "Morphogenetic field" is not an explanation. Neither is the
>>> "Dormative principle" of opium, and neither is "Habit". This
>>> Peircean
>>> "Habit" sort of disturbs me, because it is not an explanation. It
>>> is
>>> merely an observation. I think it is necessary to inquire about the
>>> ways how "habit" exactly is formed, stored (memorized),
>>> transmitted,
>>> and so on.
>>> Best,
>>> Helmut
>>>
>>> 02. Juni 2017 um 08:55 Uhr
>>> "John Collier"  wrote:
>>>
>>> I am not sure that these "dogmas" are not merely working hypotheses
>>> that have served well.
>>>
>>> But there is some reason to think scientists (if not science) 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?

[Clark Goble]

> On Jun 6, 2017, at 11:55 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> Clark, List,
> 
> You say:  "So Peirce clearly didn’t see conservation of energy as universal 
> due to the role of chance. While I don’t think he put it in quite those 
> terms, I believe the implication is that chance breaks symmetries enabled by 
> determinism."
> 
> In saying this, you seem to be putting greater weight on points 2 and 3 
> below. 
> 
> 1. The general prevalence of growth, which seems to be opposed to the 
> conservation of energy.
> 2. The variety of the universe, which is chance, and is manifestly 
> inexplicable.
> 3. Law, which requires to be explained, and like everything which is to be 
> explained must be explained by something else, that is, by non-law or real 
> chance.
> 4. Feeling, for which room cannot be found if the conservation of energy is 
> maintained. (CP 6.613)
> 
> I would have thought that points 1 and 4 would be particularly important for 
> understanding some of the reasons for limiting the scope of the 1st and 2nd 
> laws of thermodynamics as explanatory for the growth of order in natural 
> systems (i.e., that they govern closed systems, but are limited, in some 
> sense, in the application to open systems). Here are two questions. 

In the discussion we were talking about habits as related to physics. I think 
Peirce recognized all four as important but the question was how chance could 
lead to habits, the way he argues in his cosmology. He provides a few arguments 
for this although not everyone will be convinced. And of course his cosmology, 
as I frequently note as a caveat, is among his more controversial positions. 
I’m not sure I agree with him there although I find myself also unable to fully 
dismiss his reasoning.

> 
> (a) In what ways do points 1 and 4 add something that is not already found in 
> points 2 and 3? 

I think (3) is important in terms of what is demanded for explanation. i.e. we 
can’t just take regularities for granted but must ask how and why they arise. 
(1) and (2) are just premises due to observation. I don’t see (2) & (3) 
entailing (1) since (3) is just a demand for explanation not a conclusion.

> (b) How might Peirce's account of the law of mind--which I take to be 
> embodied in a summary way in the 1st and 4th points--help us better 
> understand the relationships between the making and breaking of fundamental 
> symmetries and the growth of order in natural systems?

I think they end up being the same thing. The earlier back cosmologically in 
terms of physics, not ontology, one goes the more symmetries you have. Thus the 
evolution of the early universe is a series of symmetry breaking by chance. 
Those in turn result in new natural laws due to the symmetry breaking. (Not 
fundamental natural law obviously) The justification for this in physics is due 
to cosmological expansion. That acts in a fashion akin to state change in 
general thermodynamics. Think starting with a gas and compressing until it’s a 
liquid and then a solid. Here the process goes the opposite direction but is 
analogous in terms of symmetry breaking.

Now where it gets trickier is when Peirce moves to his more neoplatonic 
thinking before time to the ultimate ontological cosmology. There he’s doing 
something more akin to the Timaeus. But I’m not quite sure I buy it as he ends 
up not having time proper but something very much like time in terms of 
precession. Yet that’s a hidden ontological feature he doesn’t analyze. So from 
a purely philosophical perspective those ontological muses seem problematic due 
to the way he grapples with time.

In a somewhat similar fashion the closer to the big bang one gets the more 
problematic time becomes in terms of quantum mechanics. To the point that I 
don’t think we can say much. That’s not an ontological analogue to Peirce’s 
cosmology though. Just that time is a tricky thing.
> 
> These two questions are not yet well formulated. I'm posing them here in the 
> hopes of working towards a better formulation of what it is that I find 
> puzzling about the law of mind and its application to these questions about 
> the growth of order.

There are some interesting quotes by Peirce here. I’m not sure his solutions 
are fully satisfactory though. Here’s one quote to keep in mind.

We are brought, then, to this: conformity to law exists only within a limited 
range of events and even there is not perfect, for an element of pure 
spontaneity or lawless originality mingles, or at least must be supposed to 
mingle, with law everywhere. Moreover, conformity with law is a fact requiring 
to be explained; and since law in general cannot be explained by any law in 
particular, the explanation must consist in showing how law is developed out of 
pure chance, irregularity, and indeterminacy. (CP 1.407)

While not explicitly about mind, it does explain the mind-like constitution of 
the universe. Mind is mind because of its 

Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear kirsti, all,

"The size of embryonic fields is, surprisingly, usually less than 50 cells
in any direction."

Surprisingly, that makes a morphogenetic field about 500um in diameter.

Best,
J

On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 1:10 PM,  wrote:

> Helmut,
>
> "Morphogenetic field" is just a name, a term standing for a theoretical
> concept. Naming is not explaining. - For explaining anything, a theory is
> needed, with sound experimental evidence backing it up.
>
> Do you think the experimental evidence Sheldrake has been presenting is
> not sound? Are there flaws and shortcomings in his theory? - If so, where?
>
> Or are his theories just surprising and odd?
>
> In 1990's I got interested in Sheldrake. Took up some of his experiments
> both in detail and as wholes. Found out that they were exceptionally well
> designed and carried out.
>
> I did (and do) find some shortcomings in his theory, but only of the usual
> sort. They could be even better. (As any worthwhile theory should!)
>
> All criticism should be specified in these respects. I think.
>
> Best,
>
> Kirsti
>
>
> Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 6.6.2017 02:52:
>
>> Supplement: Sorry, Mr. Laplace, please transform into Lamarck in the
>> below text.
>> Lalala,
>> Helmut
>>
>> Dear list members,
>> I suggest three steps of more or less innovative thinking: 1.:
>> Dogmaticness, 2.: Open-mindedness, 3.: Magical thinking. I think that
>> the middle way is the best: Open minded thinking. Dogmaticness blocks
>> the inquiry, and magical thinking reverses cause and effect and leads
>> to false conclusions.
>> To tell, whether a theory is open-minded or magical, there are two
>> ways, I think. One of them is theoretical, the other experimental. The
>> experimental way is easy: Can the experiment be reproduced by other
>> experimenters in other laboratories, and will the results be the same?
>>
>> If this is so, but there is no theoretical explanation available to
>> explain the results, then I guess that scientists will not stop
>> looking for explanations until they have found them. I do not think,
>> that they are afraid of being accused of pseudo-scientificness. If
>> they were, they would not have become scientists, but clerks or
>> something like that. I think, that scientists are curious, and not
>> remote-controlled, as conspiration-theorists often claim.
>> I have read somewhere the proposal, that scientists should not only
>> publish their successes, but also their failures. Is this being done
>> now to some extent?
>> On the other hand, for a long time Darwinism was the dogma, Laplacism
>> was refuted, it was even correctly said, that in the Soviet Union
>> Laplacist-like attempts of crop adaption to colder climate has lead to
>> famines. But today, Laplacism has a revival, due to the discovery of
>> epigenetic mechanisms.
>> When Sheldrake was claiming, that rats in Australia can be easier
>> convinced to jump through a burning ring, if before rats in England
>> have been taught to do that, you might ask: What should be the
>> carrying mechanism for this effect? Maybe there is something we do not
>> know now, just as we did not know about the epigenetic methyl
>> molecules.
>> But: "Morphogenetic field" is not an explanation. Neither is the
>> "Dormative principle" of opium, and neither is "Habit". This Peircean
>> "Habit" sort of disturbs me, because it is not an explanation. It is
>> merely an observation. I think it is necessary to inquire about the
>> ways how "habit" exactly is formed, stored (memorized), transmitted,
>> and so on.
>> Best,
>> Helmut
>>
>>  02. Juni 2017 um 08:55 Uhr
>>  "John Collier"  wrote:
>>
>> I am not sure that these "dogmas" are not merely working hypotheses
>> that have served well.
>>
>> But there is some reason to think scientists (if not science) can be
>> dogmatic. A colleague and occasional co-author of mine is one of the
>> world's experts on Douglas fir. He submitted a grant application
>> noting that he had found variation that could be explained neither by
>> genetics nor by environment, and he wanted to explore
>> self-organization during development. This is a commonplace now, but
>> thirty years ago he failed to get the grant because his referees (not
>> Douglas fir experts) said that he just hadn't looked hard enough for a
>> selectionist explanation.
>>
>> John Collier
>>
>> Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
>>
>> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
>>
>> http://web.ncf.ca/collier [2]
>>
>> FROM: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
>>  SENT: Thursday, 01 June 2017 11:19 PM
>>  TO: Peirce-L 
>>  SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED
>> Talk
>>
>> John S, list,
>>
>> John S wrote: "As Peirce emphasized and nearly all scientists agree,
>> nothing is a dogma of science." Well, I would certainly agree that
>> nothing _ought _to be a dogma.
>>
>> And yet Peirce railed against "the mechanical 

Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk

[kirstima]

Helmut,

"Morphogenetic field" is just a name, a term standing for a theoretical 
concept. Naming is not explaining. - For explaining anything, a theory 
is needed, with sound experimental evidence backing it up.


Do you think the experimental evidence Sheldrake has been presenting is 
not sound? Are there flaws and shortcomings in his theory? - If so, 
where?


Or are his theories just surprising and odd?

In 1990's I got interested in Sheldrake. Took up some of his experiments 
both in detail and as wholes. Found out that they were exceptionally 
well designed and carried out.


I did (and do) find some shortcomings in his theory, but only of the 
usual sort. They could be even better. (As any worthwhile theory 
should!)


All criticism should be specified in these respects. I think.

Best,

Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 6.6.2017 02:52:

Supplement: Sorry, Mr. Laplace, please transform into Lamarck in the
below text.
Lalala,
Helmut

Dear list members,
I suggest three steps of more or less innovative thinking: 1.:
Dogmaticness, 2.: Open-mindedness, 3.: Magical thinking. I think that
the middle way is the best: Open minded thinking. Dogmaticness blocks
the inquiry, and magical thinking reverses cause and effect and leads
to false conclusions.
To tell, whether a theory is open-minded or magical, there are two
ways, I think. One of them is theoretical, the other experimental. The
experimental way is easy: Can the experiment be reproduced by other
experimenters in other laboratories, and will the results be the same?

If this is so, but there is no theoretical explanation available to
explain the results, then I guess that scientists will not stop
looking for explanations until they have found them. I do not think,
that they are afraid of being accused of pseudo-scientificness. If
they were, they would not have become scientists, but clerks or
something like that. I think, that scientists are curious, and not
remote-controlled, as conspiration-theorists often claim.
I have read somewhere the proposal, that scientists should not only
publish their successes, but also their failures. Is this being done
now to some extent?
On the other hand, for a long time Darwinism was the dogma, Laplacism
was refuted, it was even correctly said, that in the Soviet Union
Laplacist-like attempts of crop adaption to colder climate has lead to
famines. But today, Laplacism has a revival, due to the discovery of
epigenetic mechanisms.
When Sheldrake was claiming, that rats in Australia can be easier
convinced to jump through a burning ring, if before rats in England
have been taught to do that, you might ask: What should be the
carrying mechanism for this effect? Maybe there is something we do not
know now, just as we did not know about the epigenetic methyl
molecules.
But: "Morphogenetic field" is not an explanation. Neither is the
"Dormative principle" of opium, and neither is "Habit". This Peircean
"Habit" sort of disturbs me, because it is not an explanation. It is
merely an observation. I think it is necessary to inquire about the
ways how "habit" exactly is formed, stored (memorized), transmitted,
and so on.
Best,
Helmut

 02. Juni 2017 um 08:55 Uhr
 "John Collier"  wrote:

I am not sure that these "dogmas" are not merely working hypotheses
that have served well.

But there is some reason to think scientists (if not science) can be
dogmatic. A colleague and occasional co-author of mine is one of the
world's experts on Douglas fir. He submitted a grant application
noting that he had found variation that could be explained neither by
genetics nor by environment, and he wanted to explore
self-organization during development. This is a commonplace now, but
thirty years ago he failed to get the grant because his referees (not
Douglas fir experts) said that he just hadn't looked hard enough for a
selectionist explanation.

John Collier

Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate

Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal

http://web.ncf.ca/collier [2]

FROM: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
 SENT: Thursday, 01 June 2017 11:19 PM
 TO: Peirce-L 
 SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED
Talk

John S, list,

John S wrote: "As Peirce emphasized and nearly all scientists agree,
nothing is a dogma of science." Well, I would certainly agree that
nothing _ought _to be a dogma.

And yet Peirce railed against "the mechanical philosophy,"
materialism, necessitarianism (recall his response to Camus in "Reply
to the Necessitarians"), reducing cosmology to the nothing-but-ism of
actions/reactions of 2ns, etc.

Certainly not holding dogmatic views is an _ideal_ of scientific, but
I do not agree you in that it seems to me that any number of
scientists in Peirce's day and in ours as well yet hold them, whether
they would say they do, or think they do, or not.

Late in life, Peirce concluded the N.A. (not including the
Additaments) by writing that even 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Clark, List,

You say:  "So Peirce clearly didn’t see conservation of energy as universal due 
to the role of chance. While I don’t think he put it in quite those terms, I 
believe the implication is that chance breaks symmetries enabled by 
determinism."

In saying this, you seem to be putting greater weight on points 2 and 3 below.

1. The general prevalence of growth, which seems to be opposed to the 
conservation of energy.
2. The variety of the universe, which is chance, and is manifestly inexplicable.
3. Law, which requires to be explained, and like everything which is to be 
explained must be explained by something else, that is, by non-law or real 
chance.
4. Feeling, for which room cannot be found if the conservation of energy is 
maintained. (CP 6.613)

I would have thought that points 1 and 4 would be particularly important for 
understanding some of the reasons for limiting the scope of the 1st and 2nd 
laws of thermodynamics as explanatory for the growth of order in natural 
systems (i.e., that they govern closed systems, but are limited, in some sense, 
in the application to open systems). Here are two questions.

(a) In what ways do points 1 and 4 add something that is not already found in 
points 2 and 3?

(b) How might Peirce's account of the law of mind--which I take to be embodied 
in a summary way in the 1st and 4th points--help us better understand the 
relationships between the making and breaking of fundamental symmetries and the 
growth of order in natural systems?

These two questions are not yet well formulated. I'm posing them here in the 
hopes of working towards a better formulation of what it is that I find 
puzzling about the law of mind and its application to these questions about the 
growth of order.

--Jeff




Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Clark Goble 
Sent: Thursday, June 1, 2017 12:33 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?


On May 30, 2017, at 2:49 PM, Helmut Raulien 
> wrote:

I am not happy with tychism: Conservation laws require infinite exactness of 
conservation: Energy or impulse before a reaction must be exactly the same 
before and after a reaction. Though in a very small (quantum) scale it is not 
so, but then there must be some kind of counting buffer mechanism to make sure 
that in a bigger scale infinite exactness is granted. This one is also governed 
by laws. I do not believe in the dualism sui-generis versus laws, I rather 
guess that it is all laws providing the possibility of evolution and generation 
of new things, self-organization and so on. Without laws nothing would happen, 
I´d say. I think that natural constants may change, but that there are some 
laws that dont. And if these laws are only the ones based on tautology: One 
plus one can never be 2.001, because 2 is defined as 1+1. I guess these 
eternal laws are the laws of logic. I think they are tautologies, like a 
syllogism is a tautology: The conclusion is nothing new, all is already said in 
the two premisses: "Arthur is a human, all humans are mortal, so Arthur is 
mortal", you can forget the conclusion by just putting an "and" between the 
premisses: "Arthur is a human, and all humans are mortal". The conclusion ", so 
Arthur is mortal" is redundant, except you do not believe in continuity which 
is indicated by the word "and" between the two premisses.
My conclusion: "Law" is an inexact term. A "law" is a compound constructed of 
an eternal part (tautology, continuity), and a changeable part ((temporary) 
constants).

Mathematically of course conservation laws arise out of Noether’s Theorem. That 
more or less just states the relationship between symmetries and conservation 
laws. I don’t think we need a “buffer” to deal with this, just symmetries. It 
would seem that continuity may (or may not) apply to those symmetries and thus 
determines the conservation.

Of course Noether did her important work both on the theorem that bares her 
name as well as linear algebra well after Peirce died. But Peirce did do some 
work in the logic of linear algebra that is tied to the theorem. So far as I 
know he never approached the insight of her theorem though. He was familiar 
with the abstract principles though. However Peirce did write on conservation 
laws which we discussed here a few months back as tied to chance and 
determinism relative to habits.

In my attack on "The Doctrine of Necessity" I offered four positive arguments 
for believing in real chance. They were as follows:
1. The general prevalence of growth, which seems to be opposed to the 
conservation of energy.
2. The variety of the universe, which is chance, and is manifestly inexplicable.
3. Law, which requires to be explained, and like everything which is to be 
explained must be explained by something 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?

[kirstima]

Clark,

I fully agree with your points.

Kirsti

Clark Goble kirjoitti 1.6.2017 22:33:

On May 30, 2017, at 2:49 PM, Helmut Raulien 
wrote:

I am not happy with tychism: Conservation laws require infinite
exactness of conservation: Energy or impulse before a reaction must
be exactly the same before and after a reaction. Though in a very
small (quantum) scale it is not so, but then there must be some kind
of counting buffer mechanism to make sure that in a bigger scale
infinite exactness is granted. This one is also governed by laws. I
do not believe in the dualism sui-generis versus laws, I rather
guess that it is all laws providing the possibility of evolution and
generation of new things, self-organization and so on. Without laws
nothing would happen, I´d say. I think that natural constants may
change, but that there are some laws that dont. And if these laws
are only the ones based on tautology: One plus one can never be
2.001, because 2 is defined as 1+1. I guess these eternal laws
are the laws of logic. I think they are tautologies, like a
syllogism is a tautology: The conclusion is nothing new, all is
already said in the two premisses: "Arthur is a human, all humans
are mortal, so Arthur is mortal", you can forget the conclusion by
just putting an "and" between the premisses: "Arthur is a human, and
all humans are mortal". The conclusion ", so Arthur is mortal" is
redundant, except you do not believe in continuity which is
indicated by the word "and" between the two premisses.
My conclusion: "Law" is an inexact term. A "law" is a compound
constructed of an eternal part (tautology, continuity), and a
changeable part ((temporary) constants).


Mathematically of course conservation laws arise out of Noether’s
Theorem. That more or less just states the relationship between
symmetries and conservation laws. I don’t think we need a
“buffer” to deal with this, just symmetries. It would seem that
continuity may (or may not) apply to those symmetries and thus
determines the conservation.

Of course Noether did her important work both on the theorem that
bares her name as well as linear algebra well after Peirce died. But
Peirce did do some work in the logic of linear algebra that is tied to
the theorem. So far as I know he never approached the insight of her
theorem though. He was familiar with the abstract principles though.
However Peirce did write on conservation laws which we discussed here
a few months back as tied to chance and determinism relative to
habits.


In my attack on "The Doctrine of Necessity" I offered four positive
arguments for believing in real chance. They were as follows:

1. The general prevalence of growth, which seems to be opposed to
the conservation of energy.

2. The variety of the universe, which is chance, and is manifestly
inexplicable.

3. Law, which requires to be explained, and like everything which is
to be explained must be explained by something else, that is, by
non-law or real chance.

4. Feeling, for which room cannot be found if the conservation of
energy is maintained. (CP 6.613)


So Peirce clearly didn’t see conservation of energy as universal due
to the role of chance. While I don’t think he put it in quite those
terms, I believe the implication is that chance breaks symmetries
enabled by determinism.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Patterns in Primes

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
Jon, List,
Thanks; I had not seen this work before, nor the Web site.
Very interesting. BTW, did you have any comment on the
referenced paper?
Mike


On 6/4/2017 12:40 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

Mike, all
  ...
  
  
  I have found much study and many happy wanderings
  
  in the Forest Primeval, probing patterns in primes.
  
  Here for your musement are a few of my work pages at
  
  Neil Sloane's Online Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences.
  
  
  https://oeis.org/wiki/Riffs_and_Rotes
  
  https://oeis.org/wiki/Forest_Primeval
  
  
  https://oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey/GRAPHICS
  
  https://oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey/WORKSPACE
  
  
  Regards,
  
  
  Jon
  
  
  On 6/3/2017 8:32 PM, Mike Bergman wrote:
  
  List,


I have a hunch this article might be of interest to many
Peirceans, with

connections to tychism and emerging structure (primes?), perhaps
the "surprising

fact" arising from Thirdness that causes us to categorize anew
emerging knowledge:


https://neetisinha.scienceblog.com/53/prime-numbers-paralleling-reality-possible/


Mike


  
  


  


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[PEIRCE-L] Logic in Question 7 - with Pierre Cartier and Saul Kripke - Paris- Sorbonne, June 13-14

[jean-yves beziau]

Workshop Logic in Question 7 - June 13 and 14, 2017
House of Research, University Paris-Sorbonne
http://www.logic-in-question.org

Every Spring people meet in Paris to discuss about logic ...
This year there will be in particular talks  by

Pierre Cartier: "This is not a proof, QED"
Saul Kripke: "A Model Theoretic Approach to Gödel's Theorem"

Entrance if free but if you want to attend send an e-mail to:
l...@logic-in-question.org
For safety reasons the house of research will ask identity documents at the
entrance.

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