Dear kirsti, all, "The size of embryonic fields is, surprisingly, usually less than 50 cells in any direction."
Surprisingly, that makes a morphogenetic field about 500um in diameter. Best, J On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 1:10 PM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote: > Helmut, > > "Morphogenetic field" is just a name, a term standing for a theoretical > concept. Naming is not explaining. - For explaining anything, a theory is > needed, with sound experimental evidence backing it up. > > Do you think the experimental evidence Sheldrake has been presenting is > not sound? Are there flaws and shortcomings in his theory? - If so, where? > > Or are his theories just surprising and odd? > > In 1990's I got interested in Sheldrake. Took up some of his experiments > both in detail and as wholes. Found out that they were exceptionally well > designed and carried out. > > I did (and do) find some shortcomings in his theory, but only of the usual > sort. They could be even better. (As any worthwhile theory should!) > > All criticism should be specified in these respects. I think. > > Best, > > Kirsti > > > Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 6.6.2017 02:52: > >> Supplement: Sorry, Mr. Laplace, please transform into Lamarck in the >> below text. >> Lalala, >> Helmut >> >> Dear list members, >> I suggest three steps of more or less innovative thinking: 1.: >> Dogmaticness, 2.: Open-mindedness, 3.: Magical thinking. I think that >> the middle way is the best: Open minded thinking. Dogmaticness blocks >> the inquiry, and magical thinking reverses cause and effect and leads >> to false conclusions. >> To tell, whether a theory is open-minded or magical, there are two >> ways, I think. One of them is theoretical, the other experimental. The >> experimental way is easy: Can the experiment be reproduced by other >> experimenters in other laboratories, and will the results be the same? >> >> If this is so, but there is no theoretical explanation available to >> explain the results, then I guess that scientists will not stop >> looking for explanations until they have found them. I do not think, >> that they are afraid of being accused of pseudo-scientificness. If >> they were, they would not have become scientists, but clerks or >> something like that. I think, that scientists are curious, and not >> remote-controlled, as conspiration-theorists often claim. >> I have read somewhere the proposal, that scientists should not only >> publish their successes, but also their failures. Is this being done >> now to some extent? >> On the other hand, for a long time Darwinism was the dogma, Laplacism >> was refuted, it was even correctly said, that in the Soviet Union >> Laplacist-like attempts of crop adaption to colder climate has lead to >> famines. But today, Laplacism has a revival, due to the discovery of >> epigenetic mechanisms. >> When Sheldrake was claiming, that rats in Australia can be easier >> convinced to jump through a burning ring, if before rats in England >> have been taught to do that, you might ask: What should be the >> carrying mechanism for this effect? Maybe there is something we do not >> know now, just as we did not know about the epigenetic methyl >> molecules. >> But: "Morphogenetic field" is not an explanation. Neither is the >> "Dormative principle" of opium, and neither is "Habit". This Peircean >> "Habit" sort of disturbs me, because it is not an explanation. It is >> merely an observation. I think it is necessary to inquire about the >> ways how "habit" exactly is formed, stored (memorized), transmitted, >> and so on. >> Best, >> Helmut >> >> 02. Juni 2017 um 08:55 Uhr >> "John Collier" <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: >> >> I am not sure that these "dogmas" are not merely working hypotheses >> that have served well. >> >> But there is some reason to think scientists (if not science) can be >> dogmatic. A colleague and occasional co-author of mine is one of the >> world's experts on Douglas fir. He submitted a grant application >> noting that he had found variation that could be explained neither by >> genetics nor by environment, and he wanted to explore >> self-organization during development. This is a commonplace now, but >> thirty years ago he failed to get the grant because his referees (not >> Douglas fir experts) said that he just hadn't looked hard enough for a >> selectionist explanation. >> >> John Collier >> >> Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate >> >> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal >> >> http://web.ncf.ca/collier [2] >> >> FROM: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] >> SENT: Thursday, 01 June 2017 11:19 PM >> TO: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >> SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED >> Talk >> >> John S, list, >> >> John S wrote: "As Peirce emphasized and nearly all scientists agree, >> nothing is a dogma of science." Well, I would certainly agree that >> nothing _ought _to be a dogma. >> >> And yet Peirce railed against "the mechanical philosophy," >> materialism, necessitarianism (recall his response to Camus in "Reply >> to the Necessitarians"), reducing cosmology to the nothing-but-ism of >> actions/reactions of 2ns, etc. >> >> Certainly not holding dogmatic views is an _ideal_ of scientific, but >> I do not agree you in that it seems to me that any number of >> scientists in Peirce's day and in ours as well yet hold them, whether >> they would say they do, or think they do, or not. >> >> Late in life, Peirce concluded the N.A. (not including the >> Additaments) by writing that even "approximate acceptance of the >> Pragmaticist principle" has helped those who do accept it: >> >> ". . . to a mightily clear discernment of some fundamental truths >>> that other philosophers have seen but through a mist, and most of >>> them not at all. Among such truths -- all of them old, of course, >>> yet acknowledged by few -- I reckon their denial of >>> necessitarianism; their rejection of any "consciousness" different >>> from a visceral or other external sensation; their acknowledgment >>> that there are, in a Pragmatistical sense, Real habits (which Really >>> would produce effects, under circumstances that may not happen to >>> get actualized, and are thus Real generals); and their insistence >>> upon interpreting all hypostatic abstractions in terms of what they >>> would or might (not actually will) come to in the concrete. . . . " >>> >>> (CP 6.485). >>> >> >> It seems to me that Peirce is clear--and while here he seems to be >> addressing philosophers in particular, elsewhere and frequently he >> argues this for science more generally--that many thinkers >> (philosophers and scientists alike) do indeed hold such dogmas as >> "necessitarianism" and "mechanism" (==Sheldrake's slide for dogma #1 >> "EVERYTHING IS ESSENTIALLY MECHANICAL). That Peirce's views were far >> from dogmatic follows for me from his theory of inquiry including his >> pragmaticism. >> >> Again, I don't necessarily agree with Sheldrake's list of putatie >> dogmas, and I would certainly fully agree with you if by "nothing is a >> dogma of science" you mean that this should be an essential maxim of >> the ethics of science. But just as Peirce argued that every scientist >> has a metaphysics--even as certain scientists argue against >> metaphysics altogether, that everyone of them ought take pains at >> discovering what are her perhaps hidden metaphysical >> presuppositions--I think that even those who claim that "nothing is a >> dogma of science" (but, I must quickly add, certainly not you, John) >> still many yet hold certain dogmatic views, and that these can enter >> into even whole 'schools' in certain fields of scientific endeavor. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> GARY RICHMOND >> >> PHILOSOPHY AND CRITICAL THINKING >> >> COMMUNICATION STUDIES >> >> LAGUARDIA COLLEGE OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK >> >> C 745 >> >> 718 482-5690 >> >> On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 2:34 AM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: >> >> On 5/31/2017 10:48 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: >>> >>> I agree that #3 is not a dogma of science. >>>> >>> >>> As Peirce emphasized and nearly all scientists agree, >>> nothing is a dogma of science. >>> >>> John >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY >>> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [1] . >>> >> >> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply >> List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L >> posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a >> message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line >> "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [1] . >> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply >> List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L >> posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a >> message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line >> "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [1] . >> >> Links: >> ------ >> [1] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm >> [2] http://web.ncf.ca/collier >> > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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