Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's classifications of the sciences

[John F Sowa]

On 9/2/2017 8:31 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

[Metaphysics is] "First in dignity, last in the order of learning":
What is meant by "learning"? Is it the learning of the researcher,
or the learning of the pupil, who is being taught by the researcher
the results of the research?


The word Aquinas used was 'addiscendo'.  I checked a Latin dictionary
for the verbs 'discere' (to learn), 'adiscere' (to learn by heart or
memorize), and 'addiscere' (to learn further or in addition to).
This implies that 'addiscendo' may be considered advanced learning.

In those days, the university curriculum began with the seven liberal 
arts.  More advanced science and philosophy would come later.  The

order would be approximately the same for both pupil and researcher.


I think, that Thomas of Aquino has seen everything much more
complicatedly than necessary


Aquinas is considered one of the best and clearest commentators
on Aristotle.  Even today, his commentaries are highly regarded.
He limited the religious issues to his theological writings.

But I also received an offline note that recommended an article
"The Historicity of Peirce’s Classification of the Sciences" by
Chiara Ambrosio:  https://ejpap.revues.org/625

Some excerpts:

At least since Beverley Kent’s landmark study Charles S. Peirce:
_Logic and the Classification of the Sciences_ (Kent 1987),
Peirce’s classification has been regarded as the key to solve
some of the most complex puzzles surrounding his approach to
logic, epistemology and metaphysics...

I aim to re-contextualise Peirce’s classification and investigate
it as a quintessentially nineteenth century pursuit...  Peirce
himself, in a later note which will turn out to be quite important
for my argument, admits to have examined “upward of a hundred
attempts to classify the sciences” ...

I hope to show that the classification of the sciences, far from being
a philosophical pursuit conducted in isolation, is more productively
investigated as Peirce’s effort to balance and reconcile the internal
consistency of his scheme with broader, external trends to reconfigure
the sciences and their relationships as a conduit to social order...

The strongest influence on Peirce’s classification of the sciences
was Comte’s scheme... [which] placed the sciences on a ladder in order
of abstractness or generality... It started from mathematics, the most
abstract of the sciences, and continued with astronomy, physics,
chemistry, biology and social physics or sociology.  More concrete
sciences depended on more abstract ones...

[Peirce 1892] "My own classification is a direct reformation of that
of Comte... But I separate from Comte, in making pure mathematics a
science, in making philosophy a science, in recognizing the psychical
sciences as a series parallel to the physical sciences..."


I believe that the dependencies I highlighted in the dotted lines
of CSPsciences.jpg can be clarified by Ambrosio's article and
by the previous article that discussed Avicenna and Aquinas:
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11406-013-9484-8.pdf

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Deduction, induction, abduction, categories

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



If what we all say is true, then when it comes to making our ideas clear,

it appears Peirce was not altogether a Greek-minded man.



With best wishes,
Jerry Rhee

On Sun, Sep 3, 2017 at 9:41 AM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:

> All through this, it seems to me that no form of logic can be tied to one
> or two or three. If all thought is signs getting into specifying where they
> are is impossible since they are everywhere.I see Peirce as an ethicist and
> aesthetician who never got to the logical conclusion of how the
> pragmaticist maxim would play out in the world. But he knew that he was
> onto something and that it is not what Aristotle had in mind exactly.
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Sun, Sep 3, 2017 at 10:30 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt 
> wrote:
>
>> Dear All -
>>
>>
>>
>> To the question of category-classification of inference types:
>>
>> In Peirce's mature years, after 1900, he vacillated between two
>> solutions, both having Abduction as First, but one version taking Induction
>> as Second and Deduction as Third; the other vice versa.
>>
>> The 1-Ab, 2-De, 3-In version, however, seems to have become the most
>> elaborated in the sense that here, Peirce developed proposals for the
>> relevant 1-2-3 subdivisions: Corollarial vs. Theorematic for Deduction; and
>> Crude vs. Qualitative vs. Quantitative for Induction.
>>
>> The Ab-De-In also follows his preferred epistemological sequence: Ab
>> proposes a new hypothesis; De infers some of the ideal consequences of that
>> hypotheses; In verifies or falsifies some empirical support of those
>> consequences.
>>
>> I am not certain, however, whether the epistemological sequence is really
>> an argument relevant for the category issue. Maybe they are independent
>> issues so that the sequence may be maintained even with the alternative
>> 1-Ab, 2-In, 3-De classification.
>>
>>
>>
>> Best
>>
>> Frederik
>>
>>
>>
>> *From: *"g...@gnusystems.ca" 
>> *Reply-To: *"g...@gnusystems.ca" 
>> *Date: *Sunday 3 September 2017 at 15:26
>> *To: *'Peirce-L' 
>> *Subject: *RE: [PEIRCE-L] Deduction, induction, abduction, categories
>>
>>
>>
>> Helmut, you wrote
>>
>> “Deduction has one mode: True. Induction has two modes: true and false.
>> Abduction has three modes: True, false, and nonsentic.”
>>
>> Actually all of these “modes” belong properly to deduction, or “necessary
>> reasoning,” where a proposition is either true or false; as for absurdity,
>> it plays a role in Peirce’s system of existential graphs, which handle only
>> deductive arguments, but doesn’t really enter into abduction.
>>
>>
>>
>> Most people would associate abduction with firstness and deduction with
>> thirdness.
>>
>>
>>
>> As for “metaphysics,” you might use the index of EP2 to get a better
>> sense of how Peirce uses the word, or just search the CP.
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> } The division of the perceived universe into parts and wholes is
>> convenient and may be necessary, but no necessity determines how it shall
>> be done. [G. Bateson] {
>>
>> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
>> *Sent:* 2-Sep-17 18:54
>> *To:* Peirce-L 
>> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Deduction, induction, abduction, categories
>>
>>
>>
>> Dear List Members,
>>
>>
>>
>> did Peirce assign the three kinds of inference to the categories? when I
>> think about them, I come to the conclusion, that deduction is firstness,
>> induction secondness, and abduction thirdness:
>>
>>
>>
>> First the classical way of assignment: Firstness has one mode, secondness
>> two, and thirdness three:
>>
>> The modes of inferences are possible outcomes, I think, as inferences are
>> about trying to find something out.
>>
>>
>>
>> Deduction has one mode: True. Induction has two modes: true and false.
>> Abduction has three modes: True, false, and nonsentic.
>>
>>
>>
>> Less sure argument in square brackets:
>>
>>
>>
>> [The other way of assignment is by me: Firstness is situated between past
>> and present, secondness between present and future, thirdness between past
>> and future:
>>
>>
>>
>> Deduction has premises from the past, and the conclusion is sure
>> knowledge now.
>>
>> Induction: The observation is completed now (status quo in the present),
>> the conclusion is anticipation (future).
>>
>> Abduction: Something has been somehow (past), similarity is anticipated
>> (future).]
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Helmut
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
>> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
>> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce
>> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Deduction, induction, abduction, categories

[Stephen C. Rose]

All through this, it seems to me that no form of logic can be tied to one
or two or three. If all thought is signs getting into specifying where they
are is impossible since they are everywhere.I see Peirce as an ethicist and
aesthetician who never got to the logical conclusion of how the
pragmaticist maxim would play out in the world. But he knew that he was
onto something and that it is not what Aristotle had in mind exactly.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sun, Sep 3, 2017 at 10:30 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt 
wrote:

> Dear All -
>
>
>
> To the question of category-classification of inference types:
>
> In Peirce's mature years, after 1900, he vacillated between two solutions,
> both having Abduction as First, but one version taking Induction as Second
> and Deduction as Third; the other vice versa.
>
> The 1-Ab, 2-De, 3-In version, however, seems to have become the most
> elaborated in the sense that here, Peirce developed proposals for the
> relevant 1-2-3 subdivisions: Corollarial vs. Theorematic for Deduction; and
> Crude vs. Qualitative vs. Quantitative for Induction.
>
> The Ab-De-In also follows his preferred epistemological sequence: Ab
> proposes a new hypothesis; De infers some of the ideal consequences of that
> hypotheses; In verifies or falsifies some empirical support of those
> consequences.
>
> I am not certain, however, whether the epistemological sequence is really
> an argument relevant for the category issue. Maybe they are independent
> issues so that the sequence may be maintained even with the alternative
> 1-Ab, 2-In, 3-De classification.
>
>
>
> Best
>
> Frederik
>
>
>
> *From: *"g...@gnusystems.ca" 
> *Reply-To: *"g...@gnusystems.ca" 
> *Date: *Sunday 3 September 2017 at 15:26
> *To: *'Peirce-L' 
> *Subject: *RE: [PEIRCE-L] Deduction, induction, abduction, categories
>
>
>
> Helmut, you wrote
>
> “Deduction has one mode: True. Induction has two modes: true and false.
> Abduction has three modes: True, false, and nonsentic.”
>
> Actually all of these “modes” belong properly to deduction, or “necessary
> reasoning,” where a proposition is either true or false; as for absurdity,
> it plays a role in Peirce’s system of existential graphs, which handle only
> deductive arguments, but doesn’t really enter into abduction.
>
>
>
> Most people would associate abduction with firstness and deduction with
> thirdness.
>
>
>
> As for “metaphysics,” you might use the index of EP2 to get a better sense
> of how Peirce uses the word, or just search the CP.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
>
>
> } The division of the perceived universe into parts and wholes is
> convenient and may be necessary, but no necessity determines how it shall
> be done. [G. Bateson] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
> *From:* Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
> *Sent:* 2-Sep-17 18:54
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Deduction, induction, abduction, categories
>
>
>
> Dear List Members,
>
>
>
> did Peirce assign the three kinds of inference to the categories? when I
> think about them, I come to the conclusion, that deduction is firstness,
> induction secondness, and abduction thirdness:
>
>
>
> First the classical way of assignment: Firstness has one mode, secondness
> two, and thirdness three:
>
> The modes of inferences are possible outcomes, I think, as inferences are
> about trying to find something out.
>
>
>
> Deduction has one mode: True. Induction has two modes: true and false.
> Abduction has three modes: True, false, and nonsentic.
>
>
>
> Less sure argument in square brackets:
>
>
>
> [The other way of assignment is by me: Firstness is situated between past
> and present, secondness between present and future, thirdness between past
> and future:
>
>
>
> Deduction has premises from the past, and the conclusion is sure knowledge
> now.
>
> Induction: The observation is completed now (status quo in the present),
> the conclusion is anticipation (future).
>
> Abduction: Something has been somehow (past), similarity is anticipated
> (future).]
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Helmut
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Deduction, induction, abduction, categories

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear All -

To the question of category-classification of inference types:
In Peirce's mature years, after 1900, he vacillated between two solutions, both 
having Abduction as First, but one version taking Induction as Second and 
Deduction as Third; the other vice versa.
The 1-Ab, 2-De, 3-In version, however, seems to have become the most elaborated 
in the sense that here, Peirce developed proposals for the relevant 1-2-3 
subdivisions: Corollarial vs. Theorematic for Deduction; and Crude vs. 
Qualitative vs. Quantitative for Induction.
The Ab-De-In also follows his preferred epistemological sequence: Ab proposes a 
new hypothesis; De infers some of the ideal consequences of that hypotheses; In 
verifies or falsifies some empirical support of those consequences.
I am not certain, however, whether the epistemological sequence is really an 
argument relevant for the category issue. Maybe they are independent issues so 
that the sequence may be maintained even with the alternative 1-Ab, 2-In, 3-De 
classification.

Best
Frederik

From: "g...@gnusystems.ca" 
Reply-To: "g...@gnusystems.ca" 
Date: Sunday 3 September 2017 at 15:26
To: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Deduction, induction, abduction, categories

Helmut, you wrote
“Deduction has one mode: True. Induction has two modes: true and false. 
Abduction has three modes: True, false, and nonsentic.”
Actually all of these “modes” belong properly to deduction, or “necessary 
reasoning,” where a proposition is either true or false; as for absurdity, it 
plays a role in Peirce’s system of existential graphs, which handle only 
deductive arguments, but doesn’t really enter into abduction.

Most people would associate abduction with firstness and deduction with 
thirdness.

As for “metaphysics,” you might use the index of EP2 to get a better sense of 
how Peirce uses the word, or just search the CP.

Gary f.


} The division of the perceived universe into parts and wholes is convenient 
and may be necessary, but no necessity determines how it shall be done. [G. 
Bateson] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
Sent: 2-Sep-17 18:54
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Deduction, induction, abduction, categories

Dear List Members,

did Peirce assign the three kinds of inference to the categories? when I think 
about them, I come to the conclusion, that deduction is firstness, induction 
secondness, and abduction thirdness:

First the classical way of assignment: Firstness has one mode, secondness two, 
and thirdness three:
The modes of inferences are possible outcomes, I think, as inferences are about 
trying to find something out.

Deduction has one mode: True. Induction has two modes: true and false. 
Abduction has three modes: True, false, and nonsentic.

Less sure argument in square brackets:

[The other way of assignment is by me: Firstness is situated between past and 
present, secondness between present and future, thirdness between past and 
future:

Deduction has premises from the past, and the conclusion is sure knowledge now.
Induction: The observation is completed now (status quo in the present), the 
conclusion is anticipation (future).
Abduction: Something has been somehow (past), similarity is anticipated 
(future).]

Best,
Helmut



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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Deduction, induction, abduction, categories

[gnox]

Helmut, you wrote

“Deduction has one mode: True. Induction has two modes: true and false. 
Abduction has three modes: True, false, and nonsentic.”

Actually all of these “modes” belong properly to deduction, or “necessary 
reasoning,” where a proposition is either true or false; as for absurdity, it 
plays a role in Peirce’s system of existential graphs, which handle only 
deductive arguments, but doesn’t really enter into abduction.

 

Most people would associate abduction with firstness and deduction with 
thirdness.

 

As for “metaphysics,” you might use the index of EP2 to get a better sense of 
how Peirce uses the word, or just search the CP.

 

Gary f.

 

 

} The division of the perceived universe into parts and wholes is convenient 
and may be necessary, but no necessity determines how it shall be done. [G. 
Bateson] {

http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] 
Sent: 2-Sep-17 18:54
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Deduction, induction, abduction, categories

 

Dear List Members,

 

did Peirce assign the three kinds of inference to the categories? when I think 
about them, I come to the conclusion, that deduction is firstness, induction 
secondness, and abduction thirdness:

 

First the classical way of assignment: Firstness has one mode, secondness two, 
and thirdness three:

The modes of inferences are possible outcomes, I think, as inferences are about 
trying to find something out.

 

Deduction has one mode: True. Induction has two modes: true and false. 
Abduction has three modes: True, false, and nonsentic.

 

Less sure argument in square brackets:

 

[The other way of assignment is by me: Firstness is situated between past and 
present, secondness between present and future, thirdness between past and 
future:

 

Deduction has premises from the past, and the conclusion is sure knowledge now.

Induction: The observation is completed now (status quo in the present), the 
conclusion is anticipation (future).

Abduction: Something has been somehow (past), similarity is anticipated 
(future).]

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 


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