Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.4

[Helmut Raulien]

List,

To me, feeling as firstness has nothing to do with pleasure, that would be secondness, or satisfaction, which would be thirdness. Feeling is a quality, pleasure a reaction, and satisfaction includes a mediation I would say. Why did Peirce mix these categories he himself had invented/discovered over and over to such a horrible piece of machismo? I guess he has had a problem about a woman rejecting him or something like that.

Best,

Helmut

 

 29. September 2017 um 14:59 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
 


Referring only to this section, my questions are based around:

1[ This outline can only refer to a single man, whose beliefs are 'determined' by his past experiences/learning. This is relativism,  BUT -

2] Are his actions 'more reasonable' - understanding reason as attempting to connect to truth.

After all - if his beliefs fall within the fallacies of being derived via Tenacity, A Priori, or Authority [Fixation of Belief] - then, does this fit with the agenda of thought being an act of Reason? Or is this single individual's thought instead alienated from the action of Reasoning?

Or, is Peirce's suggestion, with the last sentence of this selection, that man is endowed with a basic freedom, and this freedom enables not necessarily that particular individual but rather  'the community of men', so to speak, to use Reason to examine beliefs and so, eventually, to arrive at truth?

Edwina

 

On Fri 29/09/17 8:13 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:




Continuing from 1.3 (EP2:247, CP 1.594):

 

… All action in accordance with a determination is accompanied by a feeling that is pleasurable; but, whether the feeling at any instant is felt as pleasurable in that very instant or whether the recognition of it as pleasurable comes a little later is a question of fact difficult to make sure about. 

 

595. The argument turns on the feeling of pleasure, and therefore it is necessary, in order to judge of it, to get at the facts about that feeling as accurately as we can. In beginning to perform any series of acts which had been determined upon beforehand, there is a certain sense of joy, an anticipation and commencement of a relaxation of the tension of need, which we now become more conscious of than we had been before. In the act itself taking place at any instant, it may be that we are conscious of pleasure; although that is doubtful. Before the series of acts are done, we already begin to review them, and in that review we recognize the pleasurable character of the feelings that accompanied those acts. 

 

596. To return to my interview, as soon as it is over I begin to review it more carefully and I then ask myself whether my conduct accorded with my resolution. That resolution, as we agreed, was a mental formula. The memory of my action may be roughly described as an image. I contemplate that image and put the question to myself. Shall I say that that image satisfies the stipulations of my resolution, or not? The answer to this question, like the answer to any inward question, is necessarily of the nature of a mental formula. It is accompanied, however, by a certain quality of feeling which is related to the formula itself very much as the color of the ink in which anything is printed is related to the sense of what is printed. And just as we first become aware of the peculiar color of the ink and afterward ask ourselves whether it is agreeable or not, so in formulating the judgment that the image of our conduct does satisfy our previous resolution we are, in the very act of formulation, aware of a certain quality of  feeling,— the feeling of satisfaction,— and directly afterward recognize that that feeling was pleasurable. 

 

597. But now I may probe deeper into my conduct, and may ask myself whether it accorded with my general intentions. Here again there will be a judgment and a feeling accompanying it, and directly afterward a recognition that that feeling was pleasurable or painful. This judgment, if favorable, will probably afford less intense pleasure than the other; but the feeling of satisfaction which is pleasurable will be different and, as we say, a  deeper feeling. 

598. I may now go still further and ask how the image of my conduct accords with my ideals of conduct fitting to a man like me. Here will follow a new judgment with its accompanying feeling followed by a recognition of the pleasurable or painful character of that feeling. In any or all of these ways a man may criticize his own conduct; and it is essential to remark that it is not mere idle praise or blame such as writers who are not of the wisest often distribute among the personages of history. No indeed! It is approval or disapproval of the only respectable kind, that which will bear fruit in the future. Whether the man is satisfied with himself or dissatisfied, his nature will absorb the lesson like a sponge; and the next time he will tend to do better than he did before. 

 

599. In addition to these three 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Just testing

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Am 29.09.17 um 09:41 schrieb Armando Sercovich:

a1  b2



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.4

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Referring only to this section, my questions are based around:

1[ This outline can only refer to a single man, whose beliefs are
'determined' by his past experiences/learning. This is relativism, 
BUT - 

2] Are his actions 'more reasonable' - understanding reason as
attempting to connect to truth.

After all - if his beliefs fall within the fallacies of being
derived via Tenacity, A Priori, or Authority [Fixation of Belief] -
then, does this fit with the agenda of thought being an act of
Reason? Or is this single individual's thought instead alienated from
the action of Reasoning?

Or, is Peirce's suggestion, with the last sentence of this
selection, that man is endowed with a basic freedom, and this freedom
enables not necessarily that particular individual but rather  'the
community of men', so to speak, to use Reason to examine beliefs and
so, eventually, to arrive at truth?

Edwina
 On Fri 29/09/17  8:13 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Continuing from 1.3 (EP2:247, CP 1.594):
… All action in accordance with a determination is accompanied by
a feeling that is pleasurable; but, whether the feeling at any
instant is felt as pleasurable in that very instant or whether the
recognition of it as pleasurable comes a little later is a question
of fact difficult to make sure about.  
595. The argument turns on the feeling of pleasure, and therefore it
is necessary, in order to judge of it, to get at the facts about that
feeling as accurately as we can. In beginning to perform any series
of acts which had been determined upon beforehand, there is a certain
sense of joy, an anticipation and commencement of a relaxation of the
tension of need, which we now become more conscious of than we had
been before. In the act itself taking place at any instant, it may be
that we are conscious of pleasure; although that is doubtful. Before
the series of acts are done, we already begin to review them, and in
that review we recognize the pleasurable character of the feelings
that accompanied those acts.  
596. To return to my interview, as soon as it is over I begin to
review it more carefully and I then ask myself whether my conduct
accorded with my resolution. That resolution, as we agreed, was a
mental formula. The memory of my action may be roughly described as
an image. I contemplate that image and put the question to myself.
Shall I say that that image satisfies the stipulations of my
resolution, or not? The answer to this question, like the answer to
any inward question, is necessarily of the nature of a mental
formula. It is accompanied, however, by a certain quality of feeling
which is related to the formula itself very much as the color of the
ink in which anything is printed is related to the sense of what is
printed. And just as we first become aware of the peculiar color of
the ink and afterward ask ourselves whether it is agreeable or not,
so in formulating the judgment that the image of our conduct does
satisfy our previous resolution we are, in the very act of
formulation, aware of a certain quality of  feeling,— the feeling
of satisfaction,— and directly afterward recognize that that
feeling was pleasurable. 
597. But now I may probe deeper into my conduct, and may ask myself
whether it accorded with my general intentions. Here again there will
be a judgment and a feeling accompanying it, and directly afterward a
recognition that that feeling was pleasurable or painful. This
judgment, if favorable, will probably afford less intense pleasure
than the other; but the feeling of satisfaction which is pleasurable
will be different and, as we say, a  deeper feeling. 

598. I may now go still further and ask how the image of my conduct
accords with my ideals of conduct fitting to a man like me. Here will
follow a new judgment with its accompanying feeling followed by a
recognition of the pleasurable or painful character of that feeling.
In any or all of these ways a man may criticize his own conduct; and
it is essential to remark that it is not mere idle praise or blame
such as writers who are not of the wisest often distribute among the
personages of history. No indeed! It is approval or disapproval of
the only respectable kind, that which will bear fruit in the future.
Whether the man is satisfied with himself or dissatisfied, his nature
will absorb the lesson like a sponge; and the next time he will tend
to do better than he did before.  
599. In addition to these three self-criticisms of single series of
actions, a man will from time to time review his ideals. This process
is not a job that a man sits down to do and has done with. The
experience of life is continually contributing instances more or less
illuminative. These are digested first, not in the man's
consciousness, but in the depths of his reasonable being. The results
come to consciousness later. But meditation seems to agitate a mass of
tendencies 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.4

[Stephen C. Rose]

I've not seen a clearer set of signals from Peirce that we do experience
some satisfaction when we engage in a process of thought that results in
expressions and actions of a practical sort.  Though he does not speak of
logic in this passage can there be any doubt that the reason he celebrates
reason as a quality within us relates to the attainment of good?  If Peirce
had had a few more lifetimes I think he would have proposed universal
methodologies based on his sense of universal truths. In effect, that is
what the pragmaticist maxim prefigures and moves toward.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Fri, Sep 29, 2017 at 8:13 AM,  wrote:

> Continuing from 1.3 (EP2:247, CP 1.594):
>
>
>
> … All action in accordance with a determination is accompanied by a
> feeling that is pleasurable; but, whether the feeling at any instant is
> felt as pleasurable in that very instant or whether the recognition of it
> as pleasurable comes a little later is a question of fact difficult to make
> sure about.
>
>
>
> 595. The argument turns on the feeling of pleasure, and therefore it is
> necessary, in order to judge of it, to get at the facts about that feeling
> as accurately as we can. In beginning to perform any series of acts which
> had been determined upon beforehand, there is a certain sense of joy, an
> anticipation and commencement of a relaxation of the tension of need, which
> we now become more conscious of than we had been before. In the act itself
> taking place at any instant, it may be that we are conscious of pleasure;
> although that is doubtful. Before the series of acts are done, we already
> begin to review them, and in that review we recognize the pleasurable
> character of the feelings that accompanied those acts.
>
>
>
> 596. To return to my interview, as soon as it is over I begin to review
> it more carefully and I then ask myself whether my conduct accorded with my
> resolution. That resolution, as we agreed, was a mental formula. The memory
> of my action may be roughly described as an image. I contemplate that image
> and put the question to myself. Shall I say that that image satisfies the
> stipulations of my resolution, or not? The answer to this question, like
> the answer to any inward question, is necessarily of the nature of a mental
> formula. It is accompanied, however, by a certain quality of feeling which
> is related to the formula itself very much as the color of the ink in which
> anything is printed is related to the sense of what is printed. And just as
> we first become aware of the peculiar color of the ink and afterward ask
> ourselves whether it is agreeable or not, so in formulating the judgment
> that the image of our conduct does satisfy our previous resolution we are,
> in the very act of formulation, aware of a certain quality of *feeling*,—
> the feeling of satisfaction,— and directly afterward recognize that that
> feeling was pleasurable.
>
>
>
> 597. But now I may probe deeper into my conduct, and may ask myself
> whether it accorded with my general intentions. Here again there will be a
> judgment and a feeling accompanying it, and directly afterward a
> recognition that that feeling was pleasurable or painful. This judgment, if
> favorable, will probably afford less intense pleasure than the other; but
> the feeling of satisfaction which is pleasurable will be different and, as
> we say, a *deeper* feeling.
>
> 598. I may now go still further and ask how the image of my conduct
> accords with my ideals of conduct fitting to a man like me. Here will
> follow a new judgment with its accompanying feeling followed by a
> recognition of the pleasurable or painful character of that feeling. In any
> or all of these ways a man may criticize his own conduct; and it is
> essential to remark that it is not mere idle praise or blame such as
> writers who are not of the wisest often distribute among the personages of
> history. No indeed! It is approval or disapproval of the only respectable
> kind, that which will bear fruit in the future. Whether the man is
> satisfied with himself or dissatisfied, his nature will absorb the lesson
> like a sponge; and the next time he will tend to do better than he did
> before.
>
>
>
> 599. In addition to these three self-criticisms of single series of
> actions, a man will from time to time review his *ideals.* This process
> is not a job that a man sits down to do and has done with. The experience
> of life is continually contributing instances more or less illuminative.
> These are digested first, not in the man's consciousness, but in the depths
> of his reasonable being. The results come to consciousness later. But
> meditation seems to agitate a mass of tendencies and allow them more
> quickly to settle down so as to be really more conformed to what is fit for
> the man.
>
>
>
> 600. Finally, in addition to this personal meditation on the fitness of
> one's own ideals, which is of a practical nature, there are 

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.4

[gnox]

Continuing from 1.3 (EP2:247, CP 1.594):

 

. All action in accordance with a determination is accompanied by a feeling
that is pleasurable; but, whether the feeling at any instant is felt as
pleasurable in that very instant or whether the recognition of it as
pleasurable comes a little later is a question of fact difficult to make
sure about. 

 

595. The argument turns on the feeling of pleasure, and therefore it is
necessary, in order to judge of it, to get at the facts about that feeling
as accurately as we can. In beginning to perform any series of acts which
had been determined upon beforehand, there is a certain sense of joy, an
anticipation and commencement of a relaxation of the tension of need, which
we now become more conscious of than we had been before. In the act itself
taking place at any instant, it may be that we are conscious of pleasure;
although that is doubtful. Before the series of acts are done, we already
begin to review them, and in that review we recognize the pleasurable
character of the feelings that accompanied those acts. 

 

596. To return to my interview, as soon as it is over I begin to review it
more carefully and I then ask myself whether my conduct accorded with my
resolution. That resolution, as we agreed, was a mental formula. The memory
of my action may be roughly described as an image. I contemplate that image
and put the question to myself. Shall I say that that image satisfies the
stipulations of my resolution, or not? The answer to this question, like the
answer to any inward question, is necessarily of the nature of a mental
formula. It is accompanied, however, by a certain quality of feeling which
is related to the formula itself very much as the color of the ink in which
anything is printed is related to the sense of what is printed. And just as
we first become aware of the peculiar color of the ink and afterward ask
ourselves whether it is agreeable or not, so in formulating the judgment
that the image of our conduct does satisfy our previous resolution we are,
in the very act of formulation, aware of a certain quality of feeling,- the
feeling of satisfaction,- and directly afterward recognize that that feeling
was pleasurable. 

 

597. But now I may probe deeper into my conduct, and may ask myself whether
it accorded with my general intentions. Here again there will be a judgment
and a feeling accompanying it, and directly afterward a recognition that
that feeling was pleasurable or painful. This judgment, if favorable, will
probably afford less intense pleasure than the other; but the feeling of
satisfaction which is pleasurable will be different and, as we say, a deeper
feeling. 

598. I may now go still further and ask how the image of my conduct accords
with my ideals of conduct fitting to a man like me. Here will follow a new
judgment with its accompanying feeling followed by a recognition of the
pleasurable or painful character of that feeling. In any or all of these
ways a man may criticize his own conduct; and it is essential to remark that
it is not mere idle praise or blame such as writers who are not of the
wisest often distribute among the personages of history. No indeed! It is
approval or disapproval of the only respectable kind, that which will bear
fruit in the future. Whether the man is satisfied with himself or
dissatisfied, his nature will absorb the lesson like a sponge; and the next
time he will tend to do better than he did before. 

 

599. In addition to these three self-criticisms of single series of actions,
a man will from time to time review his ideals. This process is not a job
that a man sits down to do and has done with. The experience of life is
continually contributing instances more or less illuminative. These are
digested first, not in the man's consciousness, but in the depths of his
reasonable being. The results come to consciousness later. But meditation
seems to agitate a mass of tendencies and allow them more quickly to settle
down so as to be really more conformed to what is fit for the man. 

 

600. Finally, in addition to this personal meditation on the fitness of
one's own ideals, which is of a practical nature, there are the purely
theoretical studies of the student of ethics who seeks to ascertain, as a
matter of curiosity, what the fitness of an ideal of conduct consists in,
and to deduce from such definition of fitness what conduct ought to be.
Opinions differ as to the wholesomeness of this study. It only concerns our
present purpose to remark that it is in itself a purely theoretical inquiry,
entirely distinct from the business of shaping one's own conduct. Provided
that feature of it be not lost sight of, I myself have no doubt that the
study is more or less favorable to right living. 

 

601. I have thus endeavored to describe fully the typical phenomena of
controlled action. They are not every one present in every case. Thus, as I
have already mentioned, there is not always an opportunity to form a

[PEIRCE-L] Just testing

[Armando Sercovich]

a1  b2

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