I've not seen a clearer set of signals from Peirce that we do experience some satisfaction when we engage in a process of thought that results in expressions and actions of a practical sort. Though he does not speak of logic in this passage can there be any doubt that the reason he celebrates reason as a quality within us relates to the attainment of good? If Peirce had had a few more lifetimes I think he would have proposed universal methodologies based on his sense of universal truths. In effect, that is what the pragmaticist maxim prefigures and moves toward.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Fri, Sep 29, 2017 at 8:13 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Continuing from 1.3 (EP2:247, CP 1.594): > > > > … All action in accordance with a determination is accompanied by a > feeling that is pleasurable; but, whether the feeling at any instant is > felt as pleasurable in that very instant or whether the recognition of it > as pleasurable comes a little later is a question of fact difficult to make > sure about. > > > > 595. The argument turns on the feeling of pleasure, and therefore it is > necessary, in order to judge of it, to get at the facts about that feeling > as accurately as we can. In beginning to perform any series of acts which > had been determined upon beforehand, there is a certain sense of joy, an > anticipation and commencement of a relaxation of the tension of need, which > we now become more conscious of than we had been before. In the act itself > taking place at any instant, it may be that we are conscious of pleasure; > although that is doubtful. Before the series of acts are done, we already > begin to review them, and in that review we recognize the pleasurable > character of the feelings that accompanied those acts. > > > > 596. To return to my interview, as soon as it is over I begin to review > it more carefully and I then ask myself whether my conduct accorded with my > resolution. That resolution, as we agreed, was a mental formula. The memory > of my action may be roughly described as an image. I contemplate that image > and put the question to myself. Shall I say that that image satisfies the > stipulations of my resolution, or not? The answer to this question, like > the answer to any inward question, is necessarily of the nature of a mental > formula. It is accompanied, however, by a certain quality of feeling which > is related to the formula itself very much as the color of the ink in which > anything is printed is related to the sense of what is printed. And just as > we first become aware of the peculiar color of the ink and afterward ask > ourselves whether it is agreeable or not, so in formulating the judgment > that the image of our conduct does satisfy our previous resolution we are, > in the very act of formulation, aware of a certain quality of *feeling*,— > the feeling of satisfaction,— and directly afterward recognize that that > feeling was pleasurable. > > > > 597. But now I may probe deeper into my conduct, and may ask myself > whether it accorded with my general intentions. Here again there will be a > judgment and a feeling accompanying it, and directly afterward a > recognition that that feeling was pleasurable or painful. This judgment, if > favorable, will probably afford less intense pleasure than the other; but > the feeling of satisfaction which is pleasurable will be different and, as > we say, a *deeper* feeling. > > 598. I may now go still further and ask how the image of my conduct > accords with my ideals of conduct fitting to a man like me. Here will > follow a new judgment with its accompanying feeling followed by a > recognition of the pleasurable or painful character of that feeling. In any > or all of these ways a man may criticize his own conduct; and it is > essential to remark that it is not mere idle praise or blame such as > writers who are not of the wisest often distribute among the personages of > history. No indeed! It is approval or disapproval of the only respectable > kind, that which will bear fruit in the future. Whether the man is > satisfied with himself or dissatisfied, his nature will absorb the lesson > like a sponge; and the next time he will tend to do better than he did > before. > > > > 599. In addition to these three self-criticisms of single series of > actions, a man will from time to time review his *ideals.* This process > is not a job that a man sits down to do and has done with. The experience > of life is continually contributing instances more or less illuminative. > These are digested first, not in the man's consciousness, but in the depths > of his reasonable being. The results come to consciousness later. But > meditation seems to agitate a mass of tendencies and allow them more > quickly to settle down so as to be really more conformed to what is fit for > the man. > > > > 600. Finally, in addition to this personal meditation on the fitness of > one's own ideals, which is of a practical nature, there are the purely > theoretical studies of the student of ethics who seeks to ascertain, as a > matter of curiosity, what the *fitness* of an ideal of conduct consists > in, and to deduce from such definition of fitness what conduct ought to be. > Opinions differ as to the wholesomeness of this study. It only concerns our > present purpose to remark that it is in itself a purely theoretical > inquiry, entirely distinct from the business of shaping one's own conduct. > Provided that feature of it be not lost sight of, I myself have no doubt > that the study is more or less favorable to right living. > > > > 601. I have thus endeavored to describe fully the typical phenomena of > controlled action. *They are not every one present in every case.* Thus, > as I have already mentioned, there is not always an opportunity to form a > resolution. I have specially emphasized the fact that conduct is determined > by what precedes it in time, while the recognition of the pleasure it > brings follows after the action. Some may opine that this is not true of > what is called the pursuit of pleasure; and I admit that there is room for > their opinion while I myself incline to think, for example, that the > satisfaction of eating a good dinner is never a satisfaction in the present > instantaneous state, but always follows after it. I insist, at any rate, > that a *feeling,* as a mere appearance, can have no real power in itself > to produce any effect whatever, however indirectly. > > > > 602. My account of the facts, you will observe, leaves a man at full > liberty, no matter if we grant all that the necessitarians ask. That is, > the man *can,* or if you please is *compelled,* to *make his life more > reasonable.* What other distinct idea than that, I should be glad to > know, can be attached to the word liberty? > > > > > > http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903 > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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