Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Edwina, List,


I assume you are articulating your own view--which is shared by a number of 
materialist oriented philosophers and scientists including Hobbes, Boyle and 
others.


On my reading of the relevant texts, I believe Peirce argued against such a 
materialist position--even one that take the material realm to be an 
"articulation of Mind." It isn't obvious to me what the latter clause adds, but 
I am willing to be enlightened.  Here are four such lines of argument.


1. Arguments for the validity of deduction require at least a verbal definition 
of the real, where the character of the real is not exhausted by individuals of 
a material character--not even if one brings a conception of individuals like 
us with minds into that realm.


2. Arguments for the validity of induction and abduction require a real 
definition of the real, where that account adds yet more to the character of 
the real as generals (e.g., general properties, laws of nature, etc.) that 
govern the relations between what is possible and what is actual.


3. Having developed these two lines of argument within the context of a 
critical logic, Peirce argues for an account of the real as having the 
character of what is truly continuous as a regulative principle within 
methodeutic. Such a principle is necessary for the healthy development and 
robust communication of scientific theories of all sorts, including natural and 
social sciences.


4. With these arguments in hand, Peirce applies the principles of logic to the 
study of questions of metaphysics. Here, he forges a position that unifies 
elements of both realism and objective idealism.


These four strands of argument each seem to work against the claim that there 
isn't anything 'real' outside of the material world - even when we take the 
material world to be an articulation of Mind. One way of responding is to say 
that I'm reading Peirce wrong on one or more of these lines of argument. 
Another way to respond is to say that your position is different from Peirce's, 
and that he is wrong and you are right where there is disagreement. Or, there 
might some third way to respond. Let me know if one of these avenues fits with 
what you take yourself to be doing. As things stand, it isn't clear to me what 
you are doing in making such assertions, but my assumption that is fits the 
second option.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Edwina Taborsky 
Sent: Sunday, October 15, 2017 1:41 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview


I don't think that there is anything 'real' outside of the material world - and 
I understand the material world to be an articulation of Mind. [Again, I won't 
repeat 4.551]. I see the reality of Mind as articulated within/as the material 
world; Mind doesn't exist 'per se' outside of these existential instantiations.

Mathematics is an intellectual abstraction of this reality-as-existential.

I don't think you arrive at necessary reasoning, deduction, without having gone 
through the processes of abduction and induction. That is, since Deduction is 
operationally triadic, then, in a Necessary Deduction,  don't its premises have 
to be true?

For example, can I assume that a purely intellectual opinion/conclusion, 'the 
universe was created in one day"" - is a necessary deductive? The premises 
would be: 'the bible says so'...etc.

Or is it "Deduction is an argument whose Interpretant represents that it 
belongs to a general class of possible arguments precisely analogous which are 
such that in the long run of experience the greater part of those whose 
premises are true will have true conclusions" 2.267...Now, a

"Necessary Deductions are those which have nothing to do with any ratio of 
frequency but profess [or their interpretants profess for them] that from true 
premises they must invariably produce true conclusions" 2.267

That is - isn't Peirce's Objective Idealism firmly rooted in phenomenology; 
i.e., in experience- and these experiences have been shown, by repetition, to 
be true, such that one no longer requires further experience?

Edwina



On Sun 15/10/17 4:02 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:

Edwina,



Despite the accurate Peirce quotes, your last paragraph still confuses Truth 
with the real law that tends toward the truth. Peirce is clearly saying that 
this real law operates in any and every universe (domain, realm) which can be 
the object of a valid argument — including the purely imaginary realm of 
mathematics. It does not operate only in “the real material world” (as if only 
the material world were real). Actually, insofar as we are talking about the 
real law governing deduction, or “necessary reasoning,” we never know whether a 
conclusion is factual: “Necessary reasoning can never answer questions of fact. 
It has to assume its premisses

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

I don't think that there is anything 'real' outside of the material
world - and I understand the material world to be an articulation of
Mind. [Again, I won't repeat 4.551]. I see the reality of Mind as
articulated within/as the material world; Mind doesn't exist 'per se'
outside of these existential instantiations. 

Mathematics is an intellectual abstraction of this
reality-as-existential.

I don't think you arrive at necessary reasoning, deduction, without
having gone through the processes of abduction and induction. That
is, since Deduction is operationally triadic, then, in a Necessary
Deduction,  don't its premises have to be true?

For example, can I assume that a purely intellectual
opinion/conclusion, 'the universe was created in one day"" - is a
necessary deductive? The premises would be: 'the bible says
so'...etc. 

Or is it "Deduction is an argument whose Interpretant represents
that it belongs to a general class of possible arguments precisely
analogous which are such that in the long run of experience the
greater part of those whose premises are true will have true
conclusions" 2.267...Now, a 

"Necessary Deductions are those which have nothing to do with any
ratio of frequency but profess [or their interpretants profess for
them] that from true premises they must invariably produce true
conclusions" 2.267

That is - isn't Peirce's Objective Idealism firmly rooted in
phenomenology; i.e., in experience- and these experiences have been
shown, by repetition, to be true, such that one no longer requires
further experience?

Edwina
 On Sun 15/10/17  4:02 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Edwina,
 Despite the accurate Peirce quotes, your last paragraph still
confuses Truth with the real law that tends toward the truth. Peirce
is clearly saying that this real law operates in any and every
universe (domain, realm) which can be the object of a valid argument
— including the purely imaginary realm of mathematics. It does not
operate only in “the real material world” (as if only the
material world were  real). Actually, insofar as we are talking about
the real law governing deduction, or “necessary reasoning,” we
never know whether a conclusion is factual: “Necessary reasoning
can never answer questions of fact. It has to assume its premisses to
be true.” (That’s a quote from Lowell 2). 
 Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
 Sent: 15-Oct-17 13:39
 To:  peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
 Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
Gary, list:

Peirce wrote: "I have no objection to saying that in my opinion what
makes a reasoning sound is the real law that the general method which
that reasoning more or less consciously pursues does tend toward the
truth." And,  

"The very essence of an argument,— that which distinguishes it
from all other kinds of signs,— is that it professes to be the
representative of a general method of procedure tending toward the
truth. To say that this method tends toward the true is to say that
it is a real law that existences will follow."

An Argument is a semiosic process, and is as valid in the biological
realm as it is in the Seminar Room. The semiosic Argument functions as
a 'real law that existences will follow'. Therefore, the existence
that emerges/exists within this real law is 'the truth of that law'. 

That's how I see it. I don't confine 'Truth' to the Seminar Room of
rhetoric and human mental analysis; I think it operates in the real
material world.

Edwina
 On Sun 15/10/17 1:27 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca [1] sent: 

Edwina,
 Your first sentence introduces a bit of confusion. Peirce does not
say that truth is a is a real law that existences will follow; he
says that the “general method of procedure tending toward the
truth” is a real law that existences will follow. This method, or
law, is what makes a consequent follow from an antecedent. Every
argument implicitly claims to follow that general method, and if it
really does, then the argument is sound. But the “following” is
independent of the factual truth of the premisses. Peirce is
essentially asking us what it  means to say that one fact or idea
really follows from another, and in Lecture 2 he will give an answer
that analyzes the “following” (the inference process) into as
many small steps as possible. And he will do this for deductive,
mathematical, “necessary” reasoning, where the “facts” are
about mathematical objects which have no empirical existence in the
usual sense of “empirical.” 
In short, this law or method is not itself a fact, nor is it
“truth.” It is general, and its whole mode of being consists in
really governing a reasoning process so that “the conclusions of
that method really will be true, to the extent and in the manner in
which the argument pretends that they will.”  
Gary f.
  

Re: LEM Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.8

[John F Sowa]

Jerry,

I was making a narrow, noncontroversial point.


LEM plays a central role in triad, the logic of logic, the logic
of mathematics and the logic of science.


LEM is an assumption in many versions of logic.  If you prefer
a 3-valued logic, feel free to adopt it.  It's your choice.


[JFS]  You have to keep technical terms in logic distinct
from words in ordinary language that are spelled the same.


???  My view is rather different, perhaps because economic
considerations are suppressed.


This has nothing to do with economics.


If the usage of a word is not that of ordinary language, then one
is obligated to distinguish the technical usage and explain to
the reader what it means. CSP was very careless in this area ... 


I agree.  We might criticize Peirce's usage in a published version,
but we can't complain about what he wrote in his MSS.  They are
notes to himself.  He knew what he meant.


CSP often stated that chemistry and chemical names were intrinsic
to his logical terminology.


Yes.  For example, the word 'valence' comes from the Latin word
'valentia', which means power.  The chemists adopted it as a
technical term in chemistry.  Peirce drew an analogy with chemical
graphs to define graphs that represent "the atoms and molecule of
logic".  By means of that analogy, a technical term in chemistry
became a technical term in logic.


I agree that it is important to remember context, but this is possible
if and only if one is looking at at all possible interpretations of
“icons, indices and symbols” as used in the scientific community in
his age.


Again, we have to distinguish technical terms in any branch of science
from words in ordinary language.  When you draw an analogy in English,
the boundary of how much is carried over from one domain to another
is often unclear.  But in science, especially math & logic, the
definitions are very precise.  Nothing outside the definition id
relevant.

I'll grant that Peirce may have had other chemical associations in
the back of his mind, and they may have inspired further insights.
But until those insights are specified in formal definitions, they
are irrelevant to the math or logic.

John

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RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[gnox]

Edwina,

 

Despite the accurate Peirce quotes, your last paragraph still confuses Truth 
with the real law that tends toward the truth. Peirce is clearly saying that 
this real law operates in any and every universe (domain, realm) which can be 
the object of a valid argument — including the purely imaginary realm of 
mathematics. It does not operate only in “the real material world” (as if only 
the material world were real). Actually, insofar as we are talking about the 
real law governing deduction, or “necessary reasoning,” we never know whether a 
conclusion is factual: “Necessary reasoning can never answer questions of fact. 
It has to assume its premisses to be true.” (That’s a quote from Lowell 2). 

 

Gary f.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: 15-Oct-17 13:39
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

 

Gary, list:

Peirce wrote: "I have no objection to saying that in my opinion what makes a 
reasoning sound is the real law that the general method which that reasoning 
more or less consciously pursues does tend toward the truth." And, 

"The very essence of an argument,— that which distinguishes it from all other 
kinds of signs,— is that it professes to be the representative of a general 
method of procedure tending toward the truth. To say that this method tends 
toward the true is to say that it is a real law that existences will follow."

An Argument is a semiosic process, and is as valid in the biological realm as 
it is in the Seminar Room. The semiosic Argument functions as a 'real law that 
existences will follow'. Therefore, the existence that emerges/exists within 
this real law is 'the truth of that law'.

That's how I see it. I don't confine 'Truth' to the Seminar Room of rhetoric 
and human mental analysis; I think it operates in the real material world.

Edwina



 

On Sun 15/10/17 1:27 PM ,   g...@gnusystems.ca sent:

Edwina,

 

Your first sentence introduces a bit of confusion. Peirce does not say that 
truth is a is a real law that existences will follow; he says that the “general 
method of procedure tending toward the truth” is a real law that existences 
will follow. This method, or law, is what makes a consequent follow from an 
antecedent. Every argument implicitly claims to follow that general method, and 
if it really does, then the argument is sound. But the “following” is 
independent of the factual truth of the premisses. Peirce is essentially asking 
us what it means to say that one fact or idea really follows from another, and 
in Lecture 2 he will give an answer that analyzes the “following” (the 
inference process) into as many small steps as possible. And he will do this 
for deductive, mathematical, “necessary” reasoning, where the “facts” are about 
mathematical objects which have no empirical existence in the usual sense of 
“empirical.” 

 

In short, this law or method is not itself a fact, nor is it “truth.” It is 
general, and its whole mode of being consists in really governing a reasoning 
process so that “the conclusions of that method really will be true, to the 
extent and in the manner in which the argument pretends that they will.” 

 

Gary f.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: 15-Oct-17 10:30
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu  ; 
g...@gnusystems.ca  
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

 

Since truth "  is a real law that existences will follow." and that this is 
achieved via "the soundness of argument to consist in the facts of the case and 
not at all in whether the reasoner feels confidence in the argument or not" 
[this is a comment against subjective opinions] 

AND that this observation of the experienced facts is subject to the 
self-criticism of reasoning..AND that this reasoning operates within the 
reality of the Three Categories, derived from:

"I undertook to do was to go back to experience, in the sense of whatever we 
find to have been forced upon our minds,"  

Then, it seems to me that Peirce's analysis is 'rationally phenomenological' 
[objective idealism] - in the above sense, that reason must assure us that our 
opinions conform to the facts. After all, he also asserts that we cannot know 
the unknowable. This, to me, means that our capacity for sensual observation 
and our capacity for reasoning cannot, by us, by surmounted. We can only, 
ourselves, know what we can phenomenologically and rationally experience. There 
may indeed be 'facts' outside of our human capacities - but - we cannot Know 
them. 

Edwina



 

On Sun 15/10/17 6:56 AM ,  
 g...@gnusystems.ca 
sent:

[EP2:534] Four days after this lecture (Lowell 1), an anonymous listener sent 
Peirce the following question: “If not inconvenient for you, will you be kind 
enough to give tonight a summary— however brief— of your answer to the question 
‘What makes

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Gary, list:

Peirce wrote: "I have no objection to saying that in my opinion what
makes a reasoning sound is the real law that the general method which
that reasoning more or less consciously pursues does tend toward the
truth." And, 

"The very essence of an argument,— that which distinguishes it
from all other kinds of signs,— is that it professes to be the
representative of a general method of procedure tending toward the
truth. To say that this method tends toward the true is to say that
it is a real law that existences will follow."

An Argument is a semiosic process, and is as valid in the biological
realm as it is in the Seminar Room. The semiosic Argument functions as
a 'real law that existences will follow'. Therefore, the existence
that emerges/exists within this real law is 'the truth of that law'.

That's how I see it. I don't confine 'Truth' to the Seminar Room of
rhetoric and human mental analysis; I think it operates in the real
material world.

Edwina
 On Sun 15/10/17  1:27 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Edwina,
 Your first sentence introduces a bit of confusion. Peirce does not
say that truth is a is a real law that existences will follow; he
says that the “general method of procedure tending toward the
truth” is a real law that existences will follow. This method, or
law, is what makes a consequent follow from an antecedent. Every
argument implicitly claims to follow that general method, and if it
really does, then the argument is sound. But the “following” is
independent of the factual truth of the premisses. Peirce is
essentially asking us what it  means to say that one fact or idea
really follows from another, and in Lecture 2 he will give an answer
that analyzes the “following” (the inference process) into as
many small steps as possible. And he will do this for deductive,
mathematical, “necessary” reasoning, where the “facts” are
about mathematical objects which have no empirical existence in the
usual sense of “empirical.” 
In short, this law or method is not itself a fact, nor is it
“truth.” It is general, and its whole mode of being consists in
really governing a reasoning process so that “the conclusions of
that method really will be true, to the extent and in the manner in
which the argument pretends that they will.” 
Gary f.
 From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
 Sent: 15-Oct-17 10:30
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
Since truth "  is a real law that existences will follow." and that
this is achieved via "the soundness of argument to consist in the
facts of the case and not at all in whether the reasoner feels
confidence in the argument or not" [this is a comment against
subjective opinions] 

AND that this observation of the experienced facts is subject to the
self-criticism of reasoning..AND that this reasoning operates within
the reality of the Three Categories, derived from:

"I undertook to do was to go back to experience, in the sense of
whatever we find to have been forced upon our minds,"  

Then, it seems to me that Peirce's analysis is 'rationally
phenomenological' [objective idealism] - in the above sense, that
reason must assure us that our opinions conform to the facts. After
all, he also asserts that we cannot know the unknowable. This, to me,
means that our capacity for sensual observation and our capacity for
reasoning cannot, by us, by surmounted. We can only, ourselves, know
what we can phenomenologically and rationally experience. There may
indeed be 'facts' outside of our human capacities - but - we cannot
Know them. 

Edwina
 On Sun 15/10/17 6:56 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca [1] sent:

 [EP2:534] Four days after this lecture (Lowell 1), an anonymous
listener sent Peirce the following question: “If not inconvenient
for you, will you be kind enough to give tonight a summary— however
brief— of your answer to the question ‘What makes a Reasoning
Sound?’” Peirce prepared a response that he read at the beginning
of the third lecture. This response, found in MS 465, is as follows: 
My first duty this evening is to reply to a note which asks me to
give an explanation at my last lecture. The letter did not come to
hand until the following morning. The question asked is what my
answer in the first lecture was to the question “What makes a
Reasoning to be sound?” I had no intention of answering that
question in my first lecture, because I dislike to put forth opinions
until I am ready to prove them; and I had enough to do in the first
lecture to show what does not make reasoning to be sound. Besides in
this short course it seems better to skip such purely theoretical
questions. Yet since I am asked, I have no objection to saying that
in my opinion what makes a reasoning sound is the real law that the
general method which that reasoning more or l

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[gnox]

Edwina,

 

Your first sentence introduces a bit of confusion. Peirce does not say that 
truth is a is a real law that existences will follow; he says that the “general 
method of procedure tending toward the truth” is a real law that existences 
will follow. This method, or law, is what makes a consequent follow from an 
antecedent. Every argument implicitly claims to follow that general method, and 
if it really does, then the argument is sound. But the “following” is 
independent of the factual truth of the premisses. Peirce is essentially asking 
us what it means to say that one fact or idea really follows from another, and 
in Lecture 2 he will give an answer that analyzes the “following” (the 
inference process) into as many small steps as possible. And he will do this 
for deductive, mathematical, “necessary” reasoning, where the “facts” are about 
mathematical objects which have no empirical existence in the usual sense of 
“empirical.” 

 

In short, this law or method is not itself a fact, nor is it “truth.” It is 
general, and its whole mode of being consists in really governing a reasoning 
process so that “the conclusions of that method really will be true, to the 
extent and in the manner in which the argument pretends that they will.”

 

Gary f.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: 15-Oct-17 10:30
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

 

Since truth "  is a real law that existences will follow." and that this is 
achieved via "the soundness of argument to consist in the facts of the case and 
not at all in whether the reasoner feels confidence in the argument or not" 
[this is a comment against subjective opinions]

AND that this observation of the experienced facts is subject to the 
self-criticism of reasoning..AND that this reasoning operates within the 
reality of the Three Categories, derived from:

"I undertook to do was to go back to experience, in the sense of whatever we 
find to have been forced upon our minds," 

Then, it seems to me that Peirce's analysis is 'rationally phenomenological' 
[objective idealism] - in the above sense, that reason must assure us that our 
opinions conform to the facts. After all, he also asserts that we cannot know 
the unknowable. This, to me, means that our capacity for sensual observation 
and our capacity for reasoning cannot, by us, by surmounted. We can only, 
ourselves, know what we can phenomenologically and rationally experience. There 
may indeed be 'facts' outside of our human capacities - but - we cannot Know 
them.

Edwina



 

On Sun 15/10/17 6:56 AM ,   g...@gnusystems.ca sent:

[EP2:534] Four days after this lecture (Lowell 1), an anonymous listener sent 
Peirce the following question: “If not inconvenient for you, will you be kind 
enough to give tonight a summary— however brief— of your answer to the question 
‘What makes a Reasoning Sound?’” Peirce prepared a response that he read at the 
beginning of the third lecture. This response, found in MS 465, is as follows: 

 

My first duty this evening is to reply to a note which asks me to give an 
explanation at my last lecture. The letter did not come to hand until the 
following morning. The question asked is what my answer in the first lecture 
was to the question “What makes a Reasoning to be sound?” I had no intention of 
answering that question in my first lecture, because I dislike to put forth 
opinions until I am ready to prove them; and I had enough to do in the first 
lecture to show what does not make reasoning to be sound. Besides in this short 
course it seems better to skip such purely theoretical questions. Yet since I 
am asked, I have no objection to saying that in my opinion what makes a 
reasoning sound is the real law that the general method which that reasoning 
more or less consciously pursues does tend toward the truth. The very essence 
of an argument,— that which distinguishes it from all other kinds of signs,— is 
that it professes to be the representative of a general method of procedure 
tending toward the truth. To say that this method tends toward the true is to 
say that it is a real law that existences will follow. Now if that profession 
is true, and the conclusions of that method really will be true, to the extent 
and in the manner in which the argument pretends that they will, the argument 
is sound; if not, it is a false pretension and is unsound. I thus make the 
soundness of argument to consist in the facts of the case and not at all in 
whether the reasoner feels confidence in the argument or not. I may further say 
that there are three great classes of argument, Deductions, Inductions, and 
Abductions; and these profess to tend toward the truth in very different 
senses, as we shall see. I suppose this answers the question intended. However, 
it is possible that my correspondent did not intend to ask in what I think the 
soundn

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Since truth "  is a real law that existences will follow." and that
this is achieved via "the soundness of argument to consist in the
facts of the case and not at all in whether the reasoner feels
confidence in the argument or not" [this is a comment against
subjective opinions]

AND that this observation of the experienced facts is subject to the
self-criticism of reasoning..AND that this reasoning operates within
the reality of the Three Categories, derived from:

"I undertook to do was to go back to experience, in the sense of
whatever we find to have been forced upon our minds," 

Then, it seems to me that Peirce's analysis is 'rationally
phenomenological' [objective idealism] - in the above sense, that
reason must assure us that our opinions conform to the facts. After
all, he also asserts that we cannot know the unknowable. This, to me,
means that our capacity for sensual observation and our capacity for
reasoning cannot, by us, by surmounted. We can only, ourselves, know
what we can phenomenologically and rationally experience. There may
indeed be 'facts' outside of our human capacities - but - we cannot
Know them.

Edwina
 On Sun 15/10/17  6:56 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
[EP2:534] Four days after this lecture (Lowell 1), an anonymous
listener sent Peirce the following question: “If not inconvenient
for you, will you be kind enough to give tonight a summary— however
brief— of your answer to the question ‘What makes a Reasoning
Sound?’” Peirce prepared a response that he read at the beginning
of the third lecture. This response, found in MS 465, is as follows:  
My first duty this evening is to reply to a note which asks me to
give an explanation at my last lecture. The letter did not come to
hand until the following morning. The question asked is what my
answer in the first lecture was to the question “What makes a
Reasoning to be sound?” I had no intention of answering that
question in my first lecture, because I dislike to put forth opinions
until I am ready to prove them; and I had enough to do in the first
lecture to show what does not make reasoning to be sound. Besides in
this short course it seems better to skip such purely theoretical
questions. Yet since I am asked, I have no objection to saying that
in my opinion what makes a reasoning sound is the real law that the
general method which that reasoning more or less consciously pursues
does tend toward the truth. The very essence of an argument,— that
which distinguishes it from all other kinds of signs,— is that it
professes to be the representative of a general method of procedure
tending toward the truth. To say that this method tends toward the
true is to say that it is a real law that existences will follow. Now
if that profession is true, and the conclusions of that method really
will be true, to the extent and in the manner in which the argument
pretends that they will, the argument is sound; if not, it is a false
pretension and is unsound. I thus make the soundness of argument to
consist in the facts of the case and not at all in whether the
reasoner feels confidence in the argument or not. I may further say
that there are three great classes of argument, Deductions,
Inductions, and Abductions; and these profess to tend toward the
truth in very different senses, as we shall see. I suppose this
answers the question intended. However, it is possible that my
correspondent did not intend to ask in what I think the soundness of
reasoning consists, but by the question “What makes reasoning
sound?” he may mean “What causes men to reason right?” That
question I did substantially answer in my first lecture. Namely, to
begin with, when a boy or girl first begins to criticize his
inferences, and until he does that he does not reason, he finds that
he has already strong prejudices in favor of certain ways of arguing.
Those prejudices, whether they be inherited or acquired, were first
formed under the influence of the environing world, so that it is not
surprising that they are largely right or nearly right. He, thus, has
a basis to go upon. But if he has the habit of calling himself to
account for his reasonings, as all of us do more or less, he will
gradually come to reason much better; and this comes about through
his criticism, in the light of experience, of all the factors that
have entered into reasonings that were performed shortly before the
criticism. Occasionally, he goes back to the criticism of habits of
reasoning which have governed him for many years. That is my answer
to the second question.  
http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm [1] }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures
of 1903


Links:
--
[1] http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm

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[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[gnox]

[EP2:534] Four days after this lecture (Lowell 1), an anonymous listener
sent Peirce the following question: "If not inconvenient for you, will you
be kind enough to give tonight a summary- however brief- of your answer to
the question 'What makes a Reasoning Sound?'" Peirce prepared a response
that he read at the beginning of the third lecture. This response, found in
MS 465, is as follows: 

 

My first duty this evening is to reply to a note which asks me to give an
explanation at my last lecture. The letter did not come to hand until the
following morning. The question asked is what my answer in the first lecture
was to the question "What makes a Reasoning to be sound?" I had no intention
of answering that question in my first lecture, because I dislike to put
forth opinions until I am ready to prove them; and I had enough to do in the
first lecture to show what does not make reasoning to be sound. Besides in
this short course it seems better to skip such purely theoretical questions.
Yet since I am asked, I have no objection to saying that in my opinion what
makes a reasoning sound is the real law that the general method which that
reasoning more or less consciously pursues does tend toward the truth. The
very essence of an argument,- that which distinguishes it from all other
kinds of signs,- is that it professes to be the representative of a general
method of procedure tending toward the truth. To say that this method tends
toward the true is to say that it is a real law that existences will follow.
Now if that profession is true, and the conclusions of that method really
will be true, to the extent and in the manner in which the argument pretends
that they will, the argument is sound; if not, it is a false pretension and
is unsound. I thus make the soundness of argument to consist in the facts of
the case and not at all in whether the reasoner feels confidence in the
argument or not. I may further say that there are three great classes of
argument, Deductions, Inductions, and Abductions; and these profess to tend
toward the truth in very different senses, as we shall see. I suppose this
answers the question intended. However, it is possible that my correspondent
did not intend to ask in what I think the soundness of reasoning consists,
but by the question "What makes reasoning sound?" he may mean "What causes
men to reason right?" That question I did substantially answer in my first
lecture. Namely, to begin with, when a boy or girl first begins to criticize
his inferences, and until he does that he does not reason, he finds that he
has already strong prejudices in favor of certain ways of arguing. Those
prejudices, whether they be inherited or acquired, were first formed under
the influence of the environing world, so that it is not surprising that
they are largely right or nearly right. He, thus, has a basis to go upon.
But if he has the habit of calling himself to account for his reasonings, as
all of us do more or less, he will gradually come to reason much better; and
this comes about through his criticism, in the light of experience, of all
the factors that have entered into reasonings that were performed shortly
before the criticism. Occasionally, he goes back to the criticism of habits
of reasoning which have governed him for many years. That is my answer to
the second question. 

 

http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm }{ Peirce's Lowell Lectures of 1903

 


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.10

[gnox]

Jeff, you're quite right that Peirce's phenomenological practice, as a
search for the "elements of experience,"  can be traced back to very early
in his career. He says as much himself in a draft of his Carnegie
application (1902):

 

In May 1867 I presented to the Academy in Boston a paper of ten pages, or
about 4000 words, upon a New List of Categories. It was the result of full
two years' intense and incessant application. It surprises me today that in
so short a time I could produce a statement of that sort so nearly accurate,
especially when I look back at my notebooks and find by what an
unnecessarily difficult route I reached my goal. For this list of categories
differs from the lists of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel in attempting much more
than they. They merely took conceptions which they found at hand, already
worked out. Their labor was limited to selecting the conceptions, slightly
developing some of them, arranging them, and in Hegel's case, separating one
or two that had been confused with others. But what I undertook to do was to
go back to experience, in the sense of whatever we find to have been forced
upon our minds, and by examining it to form clear conceptions of its
radically different classes of elements, without relying upon any previous
philosophizing, at all. This was the most difficult task I ever ventured to
undertake.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: 15-Oct-17 03:02
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.10

 

John S, Gary F, List,

 

In response to Gary F's remarks about the first Lowell Lecture, John S says:
"His study of logic certainly does not grow out of phenomenology."

 

I tend to think that the conceptual point Gary F has made about the study of
the elements of the phenomena we might observe in common experience does
apply to the chronological development of Peirce's work in logic--including
the development of both the mathematical systems of logic and as well as the
normative theory of logic.

 

The simple fact that Peirce didn't use the term "phenomenology" to classify
this area of inquiry as a separate branch of philosophy in his early work
doesn't negate the fact that Peirce was engaged in the careful study of the
phenomena from early on in the early Harvard and Lowell lectures of 1865-6
and in "On a New List of the Categories".

 

This seems to be well supported by the point John makes next:  "But I would
guess that his experience in math, logic, and science guided the ways he
thought about everything -- including elements."

 

It was not just the results of Peirce's inquiries in math, logic and science
that guided the way he thought. Rather, the examination of the relations
involved in using diagrams to reason about questions in math and logic
served as a basis for his conclusions about the elemental categories of all
experience--and tended to confirm his earlier analyses of the elements
involved, for instance, in our common experience of such things as
spatiality, temporality, and the growth of our understanding.

 

--Jeff 

 

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.10

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

John S, Gary F, List,


In response to Gary F's remarks about the first Lowell Lecture, John S says:  
"His study of logic certainly does not grow out of phenomenology."


I tend to think that the conceptual point Gary F has made about the study of 
the elements of the phenomena we might observe in common experience does apply 
to the chronological development of Peirce's work in logic--including the 
development of both the mathematical systems of logic and as well as the 
normative theory of logic.


The simple fact that Peirce didn't use the term "phenomenology" to classify 
this area of inquiry as a separate branch of philosophy in his early work 
doesn't negate the fact that Peirce was engaged in the careful study of the 
phenomena from early on in the early Harvard and Lowell lectures of 1865-6 and 
in "On a New List of the Categories".


This seems to be well supported by the point John makes next:  "But I would 
guess that his experience in math, logic, and science guided the ways he 
thought about everything -- including elements."


It was not just the results of Peirce's inquiries in math, logic and science 
that guided the way he thought. Rather, the examination of the relations 
involved in using diagrams to reason about questions in math and logic served 
as a basis for his conclusions about the elemental categories of all 
experience--and tended to confirm his earlier analyses of the elements 
involved, for instance, in our common experience of such things as spatiality, 
temporality, and the growth of our understanding.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Saturday, October 14, 2017 12:35 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.10


John, list,



My comment wasn’t referring to the chronological order of these developments in 
Peirce’s work, but still, I put my point badly. “Grow” is the wrong word.



What I had in mind was that “the theory of the advancement of knowledge is not 
possible until the logician has first examined all the different elementary 
modes of getting at truth”; and “before it is possible to enter upon this 
business in any rational way, the first thing that is necessary is to examine 
thoroughly all the ways in which thought can be expressed”; and “this 
introductory part of logic is nothing but an analysis of what kinds of signs 
are absolutely essential to the embodiment of thought”; and the final step back 
to the absolute basics, as it were, is the analysis not only of signs, but of 
all phenomena, into their essential elements, the “formal elements of the 
phaneron.”



The chronological order is different; Peirce was working on logic since the age 
of 12; his main focus in the early 1890s was phenomenology, although he didn’t 
call it that until 1902; and his main work on semeiotic analysis was done in 
1903-08. But in his classification of sciences, as your diagram shows, 
phenomenology is the first division of philosophy, followed by the normative 
sciences, including logic (with its own three divisions).



The main reason I mention this ‘quest for the elementary’ is that I’m looking 
ahead to the first sentence of Lowell 2, which is: “Let us take up the subject 
of necessary reasoning, mathematical reasoning, with a view to making out what 
its elementary steps are and how they are put together.” Peirce consistently 
introduced his graphs with a similar statement of their purpose, which was not 
to facilitate reasoning but to analyze it into its simplest and smallest steps. 
This is consistent with his remark that EGs expressed "the atoms and molecules 
of logic"; and I see this as analogous to his work in semiotic and 
phenomenology, especially in this period around 1903.



Gary f.



-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
Sent: 14-Oct-17 11:45
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.10



On 10/14/2017 8:46 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

> Peirce’s study of logic seems to be a /quest for the elemental./ It

> grows out of his phenomenology, which aims to identify the...



It's unclear what "It" refers to.  His study of logic certainly does not grow 
out of phenomenology.  Therefore, "It" probably refers to the quest.



> “indecomposable elements” of the phaneron/phenomenon, and his logical

> graphs aim to ‘decompose’ the thought process into the simplest

> possible steps, the better to understand how arguments are ‘composed,



But I would guess that his experience in math, logic, and science guided the 
ways he thought about everything -- including elements.

He even said that his EGs expressed "the atoms and molecules of logic".



Since his writings on phenomenology and/or phaneroscopy appear rather late, 
they would probably be effects rather than causes.



John

-