RE: RE: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Stephen Jarosek]

Edwina, yes we do indeed disagree... but not on everything!

>”1] You seem to be separating Mind and Body and indeed, seem to privilege the 
>Body as having some kind of 'memory' of its nature [predisposition to run, 
>predisposition to fly]and seem to see the Brain as merely the repository 
>of memories of current experience.”

No, the very opposite. My perspective unites Mind and Body in a way that no 
genocentric or information-deterministic perspective ever can.

>”I'd like to know where/how the cells and organs of the Body store their 
>knowledge.”

They store knowledge in the same way that culture stores knowledge… e.g., 
recursion of habits as individuals go about their daily lives, making choices. 
There is no memory storage unit, in living systems, like what you find in a 
computer hard drive. But by the same token… I would like to know how your 
interpretation “processes” information. Where’s the computer? Where is said 
information stored? How does the genetic blueprint master-plan get implemented 
to define the brain’s functional specializations? This kind of centralized, 
top-down control, analogous to Russian centralized control, is not how nature 
works. Again… the entropy problem. The notion of a DNA blueprint that defines 
the brain’s functional specializations is complete nonsense, it’s not how 
nature works.

>”My point is that even a cell 'has a brain' in the sense that it has 
>Thirdness/Mind within its matter.”

On this, we seem to agree 100%. I discuss habituation and associative learning 
in neurons, at some length, in my 2001 Semiotica article.

>”… but the heart, the lungs and so on - all 'know' what to do.”

Hmmm… I don’t know what you mean. What about the medulla oblongata?

>”2] No- there is absolutely no way that the ancient Egyptians, Inca, Aztec 
>were ever in contact with each other. The similarities in belief and behaviour 
>were due, in my view, not to your suggestion of diffusion [which relies on a 
>single origin of a belief/behaviour] but on similarities of economic mode.”

I can’t comment, as I don’t know enough about the history. But then, what you 
are suggesting seems to be unfalsifiable conjecture. Similarities in economic 
mode? What does that mean? That’s open to a number of interpretations. 

>”3] I don't accept the tales of feral children.”

Reports of people raised in extreme circumstances, such as being raised in 
extreme isolation, are often well-documented. Other cases of people raised from 
infancy, by animals, are controversial and there is good reason to be 
skeptical… but some reports, like Jean Itard’s Wild boy of Aveyron, are 
credible. Other examples are not strictly "feral" but their extreme 
circumstances in upbringing merit a closer look... for example, Genie, Oxana 
Malaya, Kaspar Hauser. The video I’ve seen on Oxana Malay – not strictly 
meeting the definition of “feral” – does nonetheless raise compelling questions 
about imitation and the extent to which she incorporated doglike behavior. This 
is fascinating stuff. You dismiss it to your disadvantage.

>”4] I continue to support the view that the human species is primarily THE 
>species of symbolic thinking and imagination. No other species can do this - 
>and the result is that humans have the capacity to change their interactive 
>methods with the envt by technology rather than physiology.”

This is human exceptionalism on steroids… which I reject outright. Human 
exceptionalism is the source of a lot of problems. Christianity’s “man made in 
god’s image”. Man at the centre of the universe. Intelligent Design was onto 
something until it got into human exceptionalism… they even proclaim it on 
their website (last time I checked)! So disappointed to see ID take this route. 
It is in human exceptionalism that the notion of god as sky-daddy materializes. 
Christian crusades and all that.

>”5] I think that CAS and far-from-equilibrium systems do account for the 
>emergence of life. The more complex the organism, the less dissipation of 
>matter and energy.”

Unfalsifiable conjecture.

Regards



From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Monday, December 11, 2017 3:19 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca; g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; 'Mike 
Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek
Subject: Re: RE: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

 

Stephen, list:

I'll try to respond here to some of your points.

1] You seem to be separating Mind and Body and indeed, seem to privilege the 
Body as having some kind of 'memory' of its nature [predisposition to run, 
predisposition to fly]and seem to see the Brain as merely the repository of 
memories of current experience. I'd like to know where/how the cells and organs 
of the Body store their knowledge. 

My point is that even a cell 'has a brain' in the sense that it has 
Thirdness/Mind within its matter. The human brain is a highly specialized organ 
for enabling in particular symbolic thought - but the heart, the lungs and so 
on - a

[PEIRCE-L] Contexts and hypostatic abstraction (was Lowell lectures...

[John F Sowa]

Kirsti,

I changed the subject line to "Contexts in language and logic"

That was the title of the slides I cited, and I'm sorry that I
forgot to include the name of the directory, "talks".   Following
is the correct URL:  http://jfsowa.com/talks/contexts.pdf


So a little note on the wording in:



[JFS] In summary, the range of contexts for writing or using EGs is
as open ended as the contexts for using any other kinds of signs.
It's best to distinguish the act of drawing an EG from any use or
speech act, such as assertion.



Shouldn't the last word be "asserting", thus using the verb, not
the noun?  This may sound trifle, but I do think it is important
to make clear whether and when one is talking about an act, or
an entity.


The distinction between a verb form such as 'asserting' and a noun
such as 'assertion' is what Peirce called *hypostatic abstraction*.

To illustrate the point, Peirce used a term that Molière invented
as a joke in "Le Malade Imaginaire":


Quare Opium facit dormire: … Quia est in eo Virtus dormitiva.
Why does opium make one sleep:  Because in it is dormitive virtue.


Molière considered the term 'dormitive virtue' as a joke because
it doesn't explain anything.  Nominalists call it a meaningless name.

But Peirce said that the act of replacing the verb by the noun
leads to a hypothesis (hypostatic abstraction) that there exists
something that causes sleep.  That hypothesis led chemists to
discover morphine as the substance with dormitive virtue.

Further research led to a family of related chemicals named opioids.
Among those chemicals are natural hormones named endorphins (from
the phrase 'endogenous morphine'), which bind to opiate receptors
in the brain.

The act of turning a verb into a noun led chemists to search for
something named by that noun.  That research explains why opium has
dormitive virtue and why people become addicted to taking opioids.

And by the way, the English noun 'entity' is derived from the Latin
noun 'entitas', which is derived from the verb form 'ens' (being).

In Chinese, the same word form may be used as a noun, a verb, or
an adjective.  But in IndoEuropean languages, differences in the
word form affect the way people think and act about the referent.

John

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Re: RE: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Stephen - I pasted this from your link to Sheldrake's post on
morphic resonance:


---

The hypothesized properties of morphic fields at all levels of
complexity can be summarized as follows: 

1. ​They are self-organizing wholes. 

2. ​They have both a spatial and a temporal aspect, and organize
spatio-temporal patterns of vibratory or rhythmic activity. 

3. ​They attract the systems under their influence towards
characteristic forms and patterns of activity, whose
coming-into-being they organize and whose integrity they maintain.
The ends or goals towards which morphic fields attract the systems
under their influence are called attractors.  The pathways by which
systems usually reach these attractors are called chreodes. 

4. ​They interrelate and co-ordinate the morphic units or holons
that lie within them, which in turn are wholes organized by morphic
fields. Morphic fields contain other morphic fields within them in a
nested hierarchy or holarchy. 

5. ​They are structures of probability, and their organizing
activity is probabilistic. 

6. They contain a built-in memory given by self-resonance with a
morphic unit's own past and by morphic resonance with all previous
similar systems. This memory is cumulative. The more often particular
patterns of activity are repeated, the more habitual they tend to
become. 


 In my view, the above does not deny the reality of the brain in
those animals that have brains or the genetic role of organization of
matter.

 I consider the above outline to be what I refer to as
Thirdness-in-Secondness. It is a non-genetic mode of information
processing and is vital to information dynamics. It promotes
adaptation and networking.

The genetic process of information I referred to as
Thirdness-in-Firstness. It promotes stability and continuity of Type.

That is, it isn't one mode OR the other; it is both. One mode
enables flexible adaptive interaction; the other enables stability.

The brain articulates these information processes and the larger
brain enables symbolic communication.

I reject the notion, however, of diffusion and experience and the
Bucket-Theory of the Mind. 

Edwina
 On Mon 11/12/17  6:31 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au
sent:
1) EDWINA: I] Essentially, you seem to be saying that there is no
such thing as stored knowledge - which can be stored both genetically
and epigenetically. You seem to be saying, if I understand you
correctly, that continuity of behaviour exists only by imitation,
where, I presume, the young imitate the elders. This is equally a
hypothesis/conjectural. I would guess that your species introduces
new behaviour..by accident?...and if it is successful..others imitate
it? I wouldn't agree to that accidental hypothesis.. 
 Your idea of 'morphic resonance' [could you explain it
simply?]...seems to be rather similar to instinct/ communal
knowledge, i.e., stored general knowledge within the species.  
 STEPHEN: https://www.sheldrake.org/research/morphic-resonance [1]


Links:
--
[1] https://www.sheldrake.org/research/morphic-resonance

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Re: RE: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Stephen, list:

I'll try to respond here to some of your points.

1] You seem to be separating Mind and Body and indeed, seem to
privilege the Body as having some kind of 'memory' of its nature
[predisposition to run, predisposition to fly]and seem to see the
Brain as merely the repository of memories of current experience. I'd
like to know where/how the cells and organs of the Body store their
knowledge. 

My point is that even a cell 'has a brain' in the sense that it has
Thirdness/Mind within its matter. The human brain is a highly
specialized organ for enabling in particular symbolic thought - but
the heart, the lungs and so on - all 'know' what to do. 

A 'physiological predisposition' is Mind - within Matter.

Therefore - I don't separate Mind and Matter as you seem to do.

2] No- there is absolutely no way that the ancient Egyptians, Inca,
Aztec were ever in contact with each other. The similarities in
belief and behaviour were due, in my view, not to your suggestion of
diffusion [which relies on a single origin of a belief/behaviour] but
on similarities of economic mode.

3] I don't accept the tales of feral children.

4] I continue to support the view that the human species is
primarily THE species of symbolic thinking and imagination. No other
species can do this - and the result is that humans have the capacity
to change their interactive methods with the envt by technology rather
than physiology.

5] I think that CAS and far-from-equilibrium systems do account for
the emergence of life. The more complex the organism, the less
dissipation of matter and energy. 
Edwina
 On Mon 11/12/17  6:31 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au
sent:
1) EDWINA: I] Essentially, you seem to be saying that there is no
such thing as stored knowledge - which can be stored both genetically
and epigenetically. You seem to be saying, if I understand you
correctly, that continuity of behaviour exists only by imitation,
where, I presume, the young imitate the elders. This is equally a
hypothesis/conjectural. I would guess that your species introduces
new behaviour..by accident?...and if it is successful..others imitate
it? I wouldn't agree to that accidental hypothesis.. 
 Your idea of 'morphic resonance' [could you explain it
simply?]...seems to be rather similar to instinct/ communal
knowledge, i.e., stored general knowledge within the species.  
 STEPHEN: https://www.sheldrake.org/research/morphic-resonance [1]
  EDWINA: How does the self emerge? How does a newborn antelope know
how to suckle from its mother? How to run? It has no experience of
either action. How does a leaf 'know' how to expand; how does a
flower 'know' how to turn to the sun?
 STEPHEN: How the self emerges… through the experiences that wire
the neuroplastic brain. Refer to Pragmatism, neural plasticity and
mind-body unity.
 How a newborn antelope (or calf or cub of any species) knows
how to suckle from its mother… This is a particularly interesting
question, because it raises the question of the mother’s
involvement. There is the simple “rooting reflex” in the young,
but I also wonder whether the mothers of different species have a
direct part to play, by virtue of the need to be relieved of
accumulating milk, and the associated stimuli. Do mothers play any
active role in guiding the young to the source of milk (I just tried
googling on this, but without success)? If they do, then the question
of information determinism merits an even closer look. And now, having
said all this…  could it be that the rooting reflex is actually
physiologically based, and does not come from the brain at all? Like
the knee-jerk reflex, is it confined to the facial muscles and senses
of the infant and has no brain involvement at all, at least initially?
In other words, the infant is not acting on a knowing defined by
information, but on a physiological predisposition.
 How a newborn antelope learns to run… it has legs, it is
motivated to use its legs, and in an effort to use its legs it wires
its brain. It’s the same as when a newborn human infant gropes into
empty space, feeling its new hands, testing the nature of space… in
the course of doing all this, it is wiring its brain. Again, refer to
 Pragmatism, neural plasticity and mind-body unity.
 
 2) EDWINA: An example would be the populations in Egypt, Aztec,
Inca; none were ever in contact and yet - ALL developed symbolic
methods of storing information; i.e., some form of symbolic reference
system [writing] to store their information about harvests, beliefs,
rules. None were in contact with each other. Also all developed
architecture of 'high temples'. The commonalities, however, were that
all had high populations dependent on irrigation agriculture, which
requires a large passive work force. All also set up the Rulers as
God-Kings to effectively enslave t

Re: RE: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Stephen, list

Then, based on your outline below - you and I have a basic, profound
disagreement. You subscribe to the so-called 'Bucket View' of the
mind, which sees it as totally empty at birth, and which then is
'filled' with experience. I disagree and see it as a species-specific
organism which is pre-organized to acquire symbolic speech, to
function within anticipatory reasoning, and logical connections. The
societal system in which this individual is born then provides the
current actual modes of speech, beliefs and behaviour. 

The modes of behaviour are heavily dependent on the economic mode
[hunting/gathering; various different types of agriculture; different
types of industrialism] which is in turn networked to the biome [soil
arability, water, types of plants and animals] and the population
size that can be sustained.

Commonalities of behaviour among isolated populations are due, not
to diffusion - which would be impossible because of the isolation -
but to the similarities of the brain and the similarities of economic
mode.

I'd say therefore that we have HUGE differences in our analytic
framework.

Edwina
 On Mon 11/12/17  6:29 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au
sent:
Edwina, before we can proceed further, let us address one of my core
assumptions. Norman Doidge, in his 2007 book The brain that changes
itself, introduced the notion that experience “wires” the
neuroplastic brain. His interpretation was heavily dosed with
deterministic reductionism, and in this context, he interprets neural
plasticity as a add-on to a basically genocentric reductionism. But at
least he started something important.
 In the context of our debate, now, this is important because I am of
the view that neural plasticity is a comprehensive principle. It’s
not a mere “add-on” as  Doidge would interpret it. In other
words, there is no DNA blueprint that specifies the functional
specializations in the brain. It is experience and only experience
that “wires” the brain. To this end, I wrote my 2013 article,
Pragmatism, neural plasticity and mind-body unity [1]  that provides
ample and compelling evidence, by way of references, in support of my
thesis. The bottom line is that there is no information determinism,
there is no centralized, top-down directive based on a DNA blueprint
that directs how the brain should wire itself. The skull containing
the brain is much more like a bucket of bugs or an ant colony or a
swarm of bees or a city of people, than a computer.
 If we cannot come to an agreement on my bucket-of-bugs
interpretation, here, then further progress on our debate will be
limited. Having gotten that formality out of the way, let’s address
each of your points in my next post. 
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca [2]] 
 Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 10:09 PM
 To: tabor...@primus.ca [3]; g...@gnusystems.ca [4];
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [5]; 'Mike Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek
 Subject: Re: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Stephen, list: Thanks for your comments - See my replies below: 
 On Sun 10/12/17 2:35 PM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au
[6] sent:

1] EDWINA>” You say 'how a living entity, as a self, defines the
things that matter'. But how does the 'self' emerge? Exist? How does
it KNOW the 'things that matter'. After all - does a bird have to,
via its own self, learn which insects are food and which are
poisonous, or is there an innate stored knowledge base that provides
such information to the collective, of which that single bird is
merely one example?  ”
 STEPHEN; My position on this is that imitation plays just as vital a
role for birds. Furthermore, I am also receptive to Rupert
Sheldrake’s morphic resonance theory, because it is consistent with
the DNA nonlocality that I discuss in my article, Quantum Semiotics
[7]. The idea that knowledge of which insects are food and which are
poisonous is somehow stored in the genetic code, in the sense of
information determinism, is conjectural. The question of morphic
resonance (and DNA nonlocality) introduces another subconscious level
of choice-making, as an alternative to instinct in the sense of
information determinism. And what do you mean by “How does the
‘self’ emerge?” It emerges by experience, and experience wires
the neuroplastic brain (Norman Doidge, The Brain that Changes
Itself). 

EDWINA: I] Essentially, you seem to be saying that there is no such
thing as stored knowledge - which can be stored both genetically and
epigenetically. You seem to be saying, if I understand you correctly,
that continuity of behaviour exists only by imitation, where, I
presume, the young imitate the elders. This is equally a
hypothesis/conjectural. I would guess that your species introduces
new behaviour..by accident?...and if it is successful..others imitate
it? I wouldn't agree to that accidental hypothesis.. 

 Your idea of 'morphic res

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.3

[gnox]

List,

 

When Peirce introduces the subject of Thirdness, he often presents an
argument against the nominalistic denial of its reality. In this lecture, he
begins by conceding (even applauding) the value of skepticism in general,
but then argues that honest skepticism about the reality of "meaning in
things" would lead to a recognition of that reality, because the idea of it
would "shine out clearly" in a mind capable of overcoming its own prejudice
against it: he "will not allow petty intellectual predilections to blind him
to truth, which consists in the conformity of his thoughts to his purposes."
This is, for Peirce, an unusual way of defining truth, and sounds like a
rather crass form of pragmatism. But I think it's designed to appeal to
hard-headed skeptics about "spiritual truth," whose "purposes" should be to
apply severely critical thinking to all "intellectual predilections"
including their own. At the same time, Peirce's argument for recognition of
an irreducible "element of thought" in Nature (and not just in human minds)
seems to anticipate his "Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" five
years later, where the argument has weight because the idea is "instinctive"
(EP2:443). I wonder whether any of the skeptics in the audience found this
argument convincing.

 

Gary f.

 

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] 
Sent: 10-Dec-17 09:23
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.3

 

Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.2,

https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low
ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13882

 

 

There is a strong tendency in us all to be sceptical about there being any
real meaning or law in things. This scepticism is strongest in the most
masculine thinkers. I applaud scepticism with all my heart, provided it have
four qualities: first, that it be sincere and real doubt; second, that it be
aggressive; third, that it push inquiry; and fourth, that it stand ready to
acknowledge what it now doubts, as soon as the doubted element comes clearly
to light. To be angry with sceptics, who, whether they are aware of it or
not, are the best friends of spiritual truth, is a manifest sign that the
angry person is himself infected with scepticism,- not, however, of the
innocent and wholesome kind, that tries to bring truth to light, but of the
mendacious, clandestine, disguised, and conservative variety that is afraid
of truth, although truth merely means the way to attain one's purposes. If
the sceptics think that any account can be given of the phenomena of the
universe while they leave Meaning out of account, by all means let them go
ahead and try to do it. It is a most laudable and wholesome enterprise. But
when they go so far as to say that there is no such idea in our minds,
irreducible to anything else, I say to them, "Gentlemen, your strongest
sentiment, to which I subscribe with all my heart, is that a man worthy of
that name will not allow petty intellectual predilections to blind him to
truth, which consists in the conformity of his thoughts to his purposes. But
you know there is such a thing as a defect of candor of which one is not
oneself aware. You perceive, no doubt, that if there be an element of
thought irreducible to any other, it would be hard, on your principles, to
account for man's having it, unless he derived it from environing Nature.
But if, because of that, you were to turn your gaze away from an idea that
shines out clearly in your mind, you would be violating your principles in a
very much more radical way." 

 

http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce's Lowell Lectures of 1903

 


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RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Stephen Jarosek]

Jerry, my outline does not deny the role of chance (tychism). For example, 
discovery or invention… such as the discovery of America by Columbus or the 
invention of penicillin by Fleming. Discovery, whether accidental or planned, 
can have huge implications for cultural evolution. But one must distinguish 
between the chance events of tychism versus the principles and axioms that 
provide the foundations for one’s axiomatic framework… Information determinism, 
as a general principle or axiom, does not address entropy properly.

 

From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] 
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 9:46 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek
Cc: Edwina Taborsky; Gary Fuhrman; Peirce-L; Mike Bergman
Subject: Re: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

 

What’s so palpable about this ironic situation is that a claim is made by ones 
who claim Peirce, that the ‘self’ emerges by experience, while at the same 
time, denying accident in life.  Does not tychism also belong to the river of 
pragmatism?

 

That is, what does it matter what woman is for man when the purpose is always 
the child?

 

Predispositions?  I forget predispositions!

 

It is long ago that I experienced the reasons for mine opinions. Should I not 
have to be a cask of memory, if I also wanted to have my reasons with me?

 

Best,
Jerry Rhee

 

On Sun, Dec 10, 2017 at 1:39 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

Dear list:

 

“List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be helpful, I 
believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct. “

 

“A fish behaves exactly as I would behave if my body were that of a fish. Or, 
putting it another way… a man behaves as a woman would behave if her body were 
that of a man.”

 

__

 

"Such is the language of all fish," saidst thou; "what they do not fathom is 
unfathomable.”

 

“There is a strong tendency in us all to be sceptical about there being any 
real meaning or law in things.  This scepticism is strongest in the most 
masculine thinkers.”

 

Hth,

Jerry Rhee

 

On Sun, Dec 10, 2017 at 1:35 PM, Stephen Jarosek  wrote:

>” You say 'how a living entity, as a self, defines the things that matter'. 
>But how does the 'self' emerge? Exist? How does it KNOW the 'things that 
>matter'. After all - does a bird have to, via its own self, learn which 
>insects are food and which are poisonous, or is there an innate stored 
>knowledge base that provides such information to the collective, of which that 
>single bird is merely one example?”

My position on this is that imitation plays just as vital a role for birds. 
Furthermore, I am also receptive to Rupert Sheldrake’s morphic resonance 
theory, because it is consistent with the DNA nonlocality that I discuss in my 
article, Quantum Semiotics 
 
. The idea that knowledge of which insects are food and which are poisonous is 
somehow stored in the genetic code, in the sense of information determinism, is 
conjectural. The question of morphic resonance (and DNA nonlocality) introduces 
another subconscious level of choice-making, as an alternative to instinct in 
the sense of information determinism. And what do you mean by “How does the 
‘self’ emerge?” It emerges by experience, and experience wires the neuroplastic 
brain (Norman Doidge, The Brain that Changes Itself).

>”But this didn't explain how different isolated populations developed the same 
>technology or mode of behaviour/belief.”

Examples? I can’t really comment without specifics. HOW different are these 
different, isolated examples? For example, communities that were once connected 
but later become isolated from one another, will share the same predispositions 
in cultural logic, to go on to create the parallel technologies and beliefs. 
Predispositions are as relevant to cultures as they are to mind-bodies. A human 
mind-body (hands, vocal-cords) is predisposed to self-evident inventions like 
fire and the wheel, or even mud huts and tree huts and even pottery, across 
most cultures, even when they are isolated from one another.

>”that the FORM of matter, i.e., a particular body-shape predisposes the 
>organism as to its behaviour.”

The late Tomas Sebeok’s line of thinking basically parallels my own, when he 
attributes an ape’s inability to speak to the absence of vocal chords:
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/02/us/thomas-sebeok-81-debunker-of-ape-human-speech-theory.html

>”So - the wings of a bird will predispose it to fly - but that's not an 
>analysis in my view.”

What do you mean that it’s not an analysis? It’s a self-evident observation… 
like an axiom. Experience wires the neuroplastic brain (Norman Doidge), and a 
winged animal is predisposed to wiring its brain to fly. Furthermore, in many 
species of birds, young birds learn to fly from their parents. That is, they 
learn to apply their winged predispositions, from their parents. So again, 
imitation plays an important role, despite

RE: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Stephen Jarosek]

1) EDWINA: I] Essentially, you seem to be saying that there is no such thing as 
stored knowledge - which can be stored both genetically and epigenetically. You 
seem to be saying, if I understand you correctly, that continuity of behaviour 
exists only by imitation, where, I presume, the young imitate the elders. This 
is equally a hypothesis/conjectural. I would guess that your species introduces 
new behaviour..by accident?...and if it is successful..others imitate it? I 
wouldn't agree to that accidental hypothesis..

Your idea of 'morphic resonance' [could you explain it simply?]...seems to be 
rather similar to instinct/ communal knowledge, i.e., stored general knowledge 
within the species.  

STEPHEN: https://www.sheldrake.org/research/morphic-resonance

EDWINA: How does the self emerge? How does a newborn antelope know how to 
suckle from its mother? How to run? It has no experience of either action. How 
does a leaf 'know' how to expand; how does a flower 'know' how to turn to the 
sun?

STEPHEN: How the self emerges… through the experiences that wire the 
neuroplastic brain. Refer to Pragmatism, neural plasticity and mind-body unity.
How a newborn antelope (or calf or cub of any species) knows how to 
suckle from its mother… This is a particularly interesting question, because it 
raises the question of the mother’s involvement. There is the simple “rooting 
reflex” in the young, but I also wonder whether the mothers of different 
species have a direct part to play, by virtue of the need to be relieved of 
accumulating milk, and the associated stimuli. Do mothers play any active role 
in guiding the young to the source of milk (I just tried googling on this, but 
without success)? If they do, then the question of information determinism 
merits an even closer look. And now, having said all this… could it be that the 
rooting reflex is actually physiologically based, and does not come from the 
brain at all? Like the knee-jerk reflex, is it confined to the facial muscles 
and senses of the infant and has no brain involvement at all, at least 
initially? In other words, the infant is not acting on a knowing defined by 
information, but on a physiological predisposition.
How a newborn antelope learns to run… it has legs, it is motivated to 
use its legs, and in an effort to use its legs it wires its brain. It’s the 
same as when a newborn human infant gropes into empty space, feeling its new 
hands, testing the nature of space… in the course of doing all this, it is 
wiring its brain. Again, refer to Pragmatism, neural plasticity and mind-body 
unity.


2) EDWINA: An example would be the populations in Egypt, Aztec, Inca; none were 
ever in contact and yet - ALL developed symbolic methods of storing 
information; i.e., some form of symbolic reference system [writing] to store 
their information about harvests, beliefs, rules. None were in contact with 
each other. Also all developed architecture of 'high temples'. The 
commonalities, however, were that all had high populations dependent on 
irrigation agriculture, which requires a large passive work force. All also set 
up the Rulers as God-Kings to effectively enslave the population. 

As for your 'pre-disposition' of man - this seems to me to be based on the 
actuality of the human mind to 'REASON' and think and anticipate/plan/ and to 
imagine. This is specific to our species. 

STEPHEN: I can’t comment on your example with references to Egypt, Aztec, Inca, 
etc, because I don’t know enough about them. Having said that, though, similar 
patterns are observed in most of the earliest human cultures, including the 
European ones, eg., Vikings. Mind-body predispositions predispose humans to 
this kind of thing. And regarding the apparent parallels between Egypt, Aztec 
and Inca… can we be sure that visitors, no matter how rare they might be, don’t 
return back home marveling in awe of the spectacle that was observed in a 
strange, foreign land, and thus carry the seed to recreate the same kinds of 
monuments? It’s all very conjectural Edwina, and I’m not convinced. Having said 
all this, though… there is the equally conjectural morphic resonance that might 
account for intercultural parallels.


3) EDWINA; I disagree. The capacity to imagine, to anticipate, and thus to use 
symbolic imagery, is, in my view, the key to speech - whether it is in visual 
images or spoken word. The fact that the ape can't physiologically speak isn't 
the point; the ape can't imagine beyond a limited range.

STEPHEN: The capacity to imagine, anticipate and use symbolic imagery has been 
demonstrated across other species of animals. Corvids have been shown to be 
particularly smart in this regard. Human exceptionalism is seductive, but it 
trivializes the fact that anything that a human knows has been obtained not 
from lone cerebral smarts, but from the accumulated experiences

RE: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Stephen Jarosek]

Edwina, before we can proceed further, let us address one of my core 
assumptions. Norman Doidge, in his 2007 book The brain that changes itself, 
introduced the notion that experience “wires” the neuroplastic brain. His 
interpretation was heavily dosed with deterministic reductionism, and in this 
context, he interprets neural plasticity as a add-on to a basically genocentric 
reductionism. But at least he started something important.

In the context of our debate, now, this is important because I am of the view 
that neural plasticity is a comprehensive principle. It’s not a mere “add-on” 
as  Doidge would interpret it. In other words, there is no DNA blueprint that 
specifies the functional specializations in the brain. It is experience and 
only experience that “wires” the brain. To this end, I wrote my 2013 article, 
Pragmatism, neural plasticity and mind-body unity 
  that provides 
ample and compelling evidence, by way of references, in support of my thesis. 
The bottom line is that there is no information determinism, there is no 
centralized, top-down directive based on a DNA blueprint that directs how the 
brain should wire itself. The skull containing the brain is much more like a 
bucket of bugs or an ant colony or a swarm of bees or a city of people, than a 
computer.

If we cannot come to an agreement on my bucket-of-bugs interpretation, here, 
then further progress on our debate will be limited. Having gotten that 
formality out of the way, let’s address each of your points in my next post.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 10:09 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca; g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; 'Mike 
Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek
Subject: Re: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

 

Stephen, list: Thanks for your comments - See my replies below:



On Sun 10/12/17 2:35 PM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au sent:

1] EDWINA>” You say 'how a living entity, as a self, defines the things that 
matter'. But how does the 'self' emerge? Exist? How does it KNOW the 'things 
that matter'. After all - does a bird have to, via its own self, learn which 
insects are food and which are poisonous, or is there an innate stored 
knowledge base that provides such information to the collective, of which that 
single bird is merely one example? ”

STEPHEN; My position on this is that imitation plays just as vital a role for 
birds. Furthermore, I am also receptive to Rupert Sheldrake’s morphic resonance 
theory, because it is consistent with the DNA nonlocality that I discuss in my 
article, Quantum Semiotics 
 
. The idea that knowledge of which insects are food and which are poisonous is 
somehow stored in the genetic code, in the sense of information determinism, is 
conjectural. The question of morphic resonance (and DNA nonlocality) introduces 
another subconscious level of choice-making, as an alternative to instinct in 
the sense of information determinism. And what do you mean by “How does the 
‘self’ emerge?” It emerges by experience, and experience wires the neuroplastic 
brain (Norman Doidge, The Brain that Changes Itself).

EDWINA: I] Essentially, you seem to be saying that there is no such thing as 
stored knowledge - which can be stored both genetically and epigenetically. You 
seem to be saying, if I understand you correctly, that continuity of behaviour 
exists only by imitation, where, I presume, the young imitate the elders. This 
is equally a hypothesis/conjectural. I would guess that your species introduces 
new behaviour..by accident?...and if it is successful..others imitate it? I 
wouldn't agree to that accidental hypothesis..

 Your idea of 'morphic resonance' [could you explain it simply?]...seems to be 
rather similar to instinct/ communal knowledge, i.e., stored general knowledge 
within the species.  

 How does the self emerge? How does a newborn antelope know how to suckle from 
its mother? How to run? It has no experience of either action. How does a leaf 
'know' how to expand; how does a flower 'know' how to turn to the sun?

--

2] EDWINA; >”But this didn't explain how different isolated populations 
developed the same technology or mode of behaviour/belief.”

STEPHEN; Examples? I can’t really comment without specifics. HOW different are 
these different, isolated examples? For example, communities that were once 
connected but later become isolated from one another, will share the same 
predispositions in cultural logic, to go on to create the parallel technologies 
and beliefs. Predispositions are as relevant to cultures as they are to 
mind-bodies. A human mind-body (hands, vocal-cords) is predisposed to 
self-evident inventions like fire and the wheel, or even mud huts and tree huts 
and even pottery, across most