[PEIRCE-L] Re: Triad vs. Triadic Relation (was Direct experience and immediate object)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

 Jeff, List:

Again, I am shifting this exchange to the new thread.

First of all, CP 1.537 is from 1903, when Peirce still thought of semiosis
as an "infinite series" of Signs in both directions.  By 1906 (CP 4.536),
he recognized that some Signs *do not* have other Signs as their
Interpretants--they have feelings or exertions as their Interpretants
instead.  By 1907 ("Pragmatism"), he further recognized that even
intellectual Signs have "ultimate logical interpretants" that are *not *Signs;
rather, they are habits (or habit-changes).

Moving on, my initial answer to your question is as follows.

   - The II of the first Sign is internal to it.
   - The DI of the first Sign *is *the second Sign, which has its own II
   that is internal to it and not necessarily identical to the first Sign's II.
   - The FI of the first Sign is also the FI of the second Sign.
   - The second Sign may or may not have a DI; and if it does, that DI can
   be a feeling, an exertion, or a third Sign.

The II, DI, and FI are not three *parts *of one Interpretant, but three
*aspects* of it.  In my current model, the II is its Form, the DI is its
Matter, and the FI is its Entelechy.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
 - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 8:27 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Gary R, Jon S, Gary F, List,
>
> Here is a question. Consider the following definition of the sign, which
> is consistent with what Peirce says in a number of places:
>
> A sign stands *for *something *to *the idea which it produces, or modifies.
> Or, it is a vehicle conveying into the mind something from without. That for
> which it stands is called its *object; *that which it conveys, its
> *meaning; *and the idea to which it gives rise, its *interpretant. *The
> object of representation can be nothing but a representation of which the
> first representation is the interpretant. But an endless series of
> representations, each representing the one behind it, may be conceived to
> have an absolute object at its limit. The meaning of a representation can be
> nothing but a representation. In fact, it is nothing but the
> representation itself conceived as stripped of irrelevant clothing. But
> this clothing never can be completely stripped off; it is only changed
> for something more diaphanous. So there is an infinite regression here.
> Finally, the *interpretant is nothing but another representation to* *which
> the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its
> interpretant* *again. Lo, another infinite series*.
>
> For starters, let us focus on the last sentence, which I have highlighted
> in bold and underline. If an interpretant functions as a sign in relation
> to some further interpretant, what is the implication of saying that there
> are three interpretants, the immediate, dynamical and final? Peirce says
> that in the process of cognition by agents who are relatively
> self-controlled, that the sign is thought playing the part of firstness,
> while the object is thought playing the role of secondness, while
> the interpretant is thought playing the part of thirdness. (CP 1.537)
>
> If this sounds odd to you, especially when thinking about the object, then
> consider the case where the object is something like a number, which is an
> idealized object formed by a process of hypostatic abstraction. In this
> kind of case of hypostatic abstraction, which is not by any means limited
> to mathematical objects, what was once a predicate comes to serve as the
> object for some further interpretant. Having made this point about the
> object, let's set it to the side and focus on the relation between signs
> and interpretants.
>
> In order to keep things straight, let's label things by saying that the
> object, sign and interpretant in the first case are each labelled
> level (1), and in the next stage where the interpretant is now serving as a
> sign in relation to some further interpretant, the sign, object and
> interpretant are at level (2). What is the implication of describing the
> interpretant (at level 1) that also functions as a sign (at level 2) in
> this way? The interpretant in level (1) is thought playing the part of
> thirdness (i.e., a genuine triad) with respect to the sign that it is
> serving to interpret, but that same interpretant/sign at level (2) has the
> character of firstness (i.e., a monadic character) with respect to
> its level (2) interpretant.
>
> Here is the question:  what is the implication with respect to the
> character of the sign and interpretant at each level? That is, the
> interpretant at level (1) has three parts (immediate, dynamical and final)
> in its relation to the level (1) sign it interprets, but then it does not
> appear to have three parts when it is serving as a sign at 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Triad vs. Triadic Relation (was Direct experience and immediate object)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

 Gary R., List:

I am shifting this exchange to the new thread where I posted the diagram.

I would not (yet) say that the IO and II are *sufficient *to constitute the
Sign; there may still be some remainder when they are analytically
distinguished from it.  However, I have come to realize that we should *not
*use the term "Representamen" for that leftover part, because Peirce never
did--or even came close to doing so.

I do not understand why you find it peculiar that only one of the three
Interpretants is internal to the Sign.  After all, only one of the two
Objects is internal to the Sign.  Moreover, not *every *Interpretant of a
Sign is "a more developed version of that self-same Sign"; in *some *cases,
the DI is a feeling, and in others, it is an exertion (cf. CP 4.536;
1906).  Even when the DI *is *a Sign, it is a *different *Sign from the one
for which it serves as the Interpretant--i.e., it is external to that
*previous *Sign.  As for the FI, since it is a *would-be* that need
not *actually
*come to pass, it *cannot *be internal to the Sign.

I am speaking somewhat loosely here, because semiosis is a *continuous
*process;
we can break it down into these discrete stages only for the sake of
analysis.  As you may remember, the notion of overlapping was more apparent
in my earlier diagrams, in which I tried to represent the three Quasi-minds
involved in any instance of concrete semiosis--the Utterer, the
Interpreter, and the Commens as their intersection.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
 - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 7:33 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, list,
>
> After studying again the attachment of your model of semiosic
> determination you resent, I'm beginning to better understand what confused
> me about it earlier. I would recommend that anyone interested in this topic
> take another look at it as it has (at least for me) been much clarified
> through this recent discussion, but only, as it were, 'retrospectively'. My
> quarter hour or so study of your diagram today, again in light of this
> threaded discussion, finally allowed me to grasp what I hadn't quite
> comprehended about your model earlier.
>
> So, if I understand you correctly: 1. the Object certainly yet determines
> 2. the Sign which 3. determines possible Interpretant Signs.
>
> However, in your model 1. the Object which determines the Sign is the
> Dynamic Object, and 2. both the Immediate Object and the Immediate
> Interpretant are internal to the Sign and in some way constitute--*are *the
> Sign--which Sign 3. determines the other Interpretants. Is this correct?
>
> If so then there is the peculiarity that one of the Interpretants, the Ii,
> is internal to the Sign while the other possible Interpretants (the Id and
> If) are external to it. That the two Interpretants other than the Ii are
> diagrammed outside the Sign now becomes for me somewhat problematic since
> an Interpretant is itself a more developed version of that self-same Sign
> albeit tending toward meaning.
>
> 1909 | Essays on Meaning. Preface | MS [R] 640:9
>
> By the *Interpretant* of a Sign is meant all that the Sign can signify,
> mean, or itself convey of new, in contradistinction to what it may
> stimulate the observer to find out otherwise, as for example, by new
> experience, or by recollecting former experiences.
>
>
> and
>
> 1908 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 83
>
> It is usual and proper to distinguish two Objects of a Sign, the Mediate
> without, and the Immediate within the Sign. Its Interpretant is all that
> the Sign conveys: acquaintance with its Object must be gained by
> collateral experience.
>
>
> At the moment I think that there ought to be some kind of diagrammatic
> overlapping of the Sign and the more developed Sign which it determines,
> namely, its Interpretant Sign. Now the Id and If appear to be outside the
> Sign as much as is the DO, and I don't think that's quite right.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690*
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triad vs. Triadic Relation (was Direct experience and immediate object)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

The fourth bullet is not derived from any particular passage written by
Peirce; it is simply my own attempt to analyze the Sign and Interpretant in
any concrete instance of semiosis by means of Aristotle's four causes, with
the Correlates all conceptualized in terms of Form/Matter/Entelechy.

   - The Dynamic Object is the *Matter *that the Sign *denotes*.
   - The Immediate Object is the *Form *that the Sign *signifies*.
   - The Immediate Interpretant is the *Form *that a Sign-Replica
   *communicates*.
   - The Dynamic Interpretant is the *Matter *that a Sign-Replica
   *determines*.
   - The Final Interpretant is the *Entelechy *that the Sign *intends*.

As you may recall, I take at face value Peirce's statements in "New
Elements" that "a sign is not a real thing. It is of such a nature as to
exist in *replicas* ... The being of a sign is merely *being represented* ... A
sign is something that exists in replicas" (EP 2:303,311; 1904).  In other
words, I see them as pertaining to *all *Signs, such that there really are
no Qualisigns or Sinsigns as Peirce defined them in 1903 according to the
(ontological) Mode of Being of the Sign itself.  Instead, I have adopted
his later division into Tone/Token/Type according to the Sign's
(phaneroscopic) Mode of Apprehension or Possible Presentation.  I remain
open to being persuaded that this is mistake on my part, but so far I have
not encountered a convincing explanation of why Peirce would have used (and
emphasized) the broad term "sign" in those statements--even adding that he
was "Giving to the word *sign *the full scope that reasonably belongs to it
for logical purposes" (EP 2:303)--if he somehow meant them to apply more
narrowly, to only Legisigns or Symbols.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 4:01 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Jon S, List,
>
> You refer to sample texts for the sake of supporting the first three of
> the bulleted points, but no reference is provided for the fourth point. Do
> you, by chance, have textual references that I might consult in order to
> understand the seven points that are made:
>
>- (1) The efficient cause of the Sign is the DO,
>- (2) its formal cause is the IO, its material cause is the SR, and
>- (3) its final cause is mediating between the DO and the FI.
>- (4) The  efficient cause of the Interpretant is the SR,
>- (5) its formal cause is the II,
>- (6) its material cause is the DI, and
>- (7) its final cause is the FI.
>
> On a separate note, you might remove some possible confusion by inserting
> "Legisign" into the diagram and supporting discussion where you are clearly
> talking about signs that have the character of necessitants (i.e., general
> rules) in terms of the mode of their apprehension. That might help clarify,
> for instance, the kind of relation that holds between general legisigns and
> token sinsigns. Furthermore, one thing that seems missing from the diagram
> is some indication of where iconic qualisigns fit into the picture.
>
> --Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
> --
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* Monday, June 25, 2018 1:00 PM
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Triad vs. Triadic Relation (was Direct experience
> and immediate object)
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> No one is "blaming" anyone for anything.  I did (and still do) sincerely
> find the IO-R-II triad concept attractive, because of how it captures the
> nature of the IO and II as being *internal *to the Sign.
>
> In the end, the problem for me, as I have already explained, was one of
> terminological ethics--the inconsistency of using "Representamen" for a
> *component* of the Sign with the fact that Peirce *never *did so.  Again,
> perhaps we can come up with a *different *term of our own; but as far as
> I can tell, Peirce nowhere suggested *any *particular name for whatever
> is left of the Sign when the IO and II are analytically removed from it, or
> that such a move is even possible.
>
> Nor did he ever say that the DO is "within the definition of the full
> Sign"; on the contrary, he consistently described the DO as *external *to
> the Sign itself, such that they are two of the three Correlates (i.e.,
> subjects) in a *triadic relation*.  Despite your ongoing insistence
> otherwise, he also did not use "Sign" for "the full triadic process";
> instead, he called that "semiosis," and my current model of it--which
> remains open to correction and refinement--is summarized in the attached
> diagram (originally posted back in April) and as follows.
>
>- Every Sign *denotes *its Object (Matter/DO), *signifies *characters
>or qualities of that Object (Form/IO), and *determines *its

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jerry LR Chandler]

JAS, List:

Thank for clarifying the change of views of CSP wrt meaning of representamen  
and sign.

>From my scientific perspective, this substitution of the word sign for the 
>word represent amen appears to be a major change in his world view toward the 
>meaning of scientific symbol systems and the arrangement of predicates within 
>a lexical field.  

Necessary to abstract scientific activity is the expression of existence of 
objects as symbols that serve to substitute for the object itself.  CSP uses 
the sequence of terms thing, representamen, form. This sequence of terms, or an 
analogous sequence is essential to relating real (external) events to internal 
thought and subsequent scientific activity.  

Linguistically, the notion of “to re - present” is rather specific for the 
thing that is symbolically referenced in the term.  “Sign” does not connote in 
this sense, does it?

In my opinion, CSP’s appears to be abandoning realism and approaching sophism. 
So be it.

Cheers

Jerry

> On Jun 24, 2018, at 6:33 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Gary F., List:
> 
> Again, Peirce carefully distinguished between "Representamen" and "Sign" 
> until 1905, after which he seems to have used them interchangeably and 
> generally preferred "Sign."  Are you aware of any later writing in which he 
> explicitly maintained the previous distinction?
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Jon S.
> 
> On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 6:23 PM,  > wrote:
> Jon, list,
> 
> I’d like to remind you of what Peirce says in Lowell Lecture 3:
> 
> [[ I confine the word Representation to the operation of a sign or its 
> relation to the object for the interpreter of the representation. The 
> concrete subject that represents I call a sign or a representamen. I use 
> these two words, sign and representamen, differently. By a sign I mean 
> anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any way, as such 
> conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start with this 
> familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is essential to a 
> sign, and I define a representamen as being whatever that analysis applies 
> to. If therefore I have committed an error in my analysis, part of what I say 
> about signs will be false. For in that case a sign may not be a 
> representamen. The analysis is certainly true of the representamen, since 
> that is all that word means. Even if my analysis is correct, something may 
> happen to be true of all signs, that is of everything that, antecedently to 
> any analysis, we should be willing to regard as conveying a notion of 
> anything, while there might be something which my analysis describes of which 
> the same thing is not true. In particular, all signs convey notions to human 
> minds; but I know no reason why every representamen should do so.  ] CP 1.540]
> 
> So “representamen” was a term defined to be more general than “sign,” which 
> in this context (and in the Syllabus) determine their interpretants in human 
> minds. This was Peirce’s way of taking semiosis beyond the human. However, 
> most of his subsequent analysis of semiosis dealt with “conveyers of thought 
> familiarly known to us” (humans), simply because it is difficult to direct 
> attention to representamens that are not known to us, since they are quite 
> hard to find in the commens. Thus in most subsequent contexts, as you say, 
> the two terms are “effectively synonymous” in that they refer to the same 
> objects. However Peirce did distinguish between them, as you see above.
> 
> Gary f.
> 
> From: Jon Alan Schmidt  > 
> 
> Sent: 24-Jun-18 18:25
> To: Peirce-L mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object
> 
>  
> 
> Gary F., List:
>  
> Just to clarify, I no longer treat the Representamen as a "component" of the 
> Sign along with the IO and II.  As I noted to Gary R. a little while ago, I 
> have embraced Peirce's 1905 assessment that "Sign" is a preferable 
> alternative to "Representamen," such that the two terms are effectively 
> synonymous.
>  
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> 
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> 
> 
> 
> 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triad vs. Triadic Relation (was Direct experience and immediate object)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, List,


You refer to sample texts for the sake of supporting the first three of the 
bulleted points, but no reference is provided for the fourth point. Do you, by 
chance, have textual references that I might consult in order to understand the 
seven points that are made:


  *   (1) The efficient cause of the Sign is the DO,
  *   (2) its formal cause is the IO, its material cause is the SR, and
  *   (3) its final cause is mediating between the DO and the FI.
  *   (4) The  efficient cause of the Interpretant is the SR,
  *   (5) its formal cause is the II,
  *   (6) its material cause is the DI, and
  *   (7) its final cause is the FI.

On a separate note, you might remove some possible confusion by inserting 
"Legisign" into the diagram and supporting discussion where you are clearly 
talking about signs that have the character of necessitants (i.e., general 
rules) in terms of the mode of their apprehension. That might help clarify, for 
instance, the kind of relation that holds between general legisigns and token 
sinsigns. Furthermore, one thing that seems missing from the diagram is some 
indication of where iconic qualisigns fit into the picture.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Monday, June 25, 2018 1:00 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Triad vs. Triadic Relation (was Direct experience and 
immediate object)

Edwina, List:

No one is "blaming" anyone for anything.  I did (and still do) sincerely find 
the IO-R-II triad concept attractive, because of how it captures the nature of 
the IO and II as being internal to the Sign.

In the end, the problem for me, as I have already explained, was one of 
terminological ethics--the inconsistency of using "Representamen" for a 
component of the Sign with the fact that Peirce never did so.  Again, perhaps 
we can come up with a different term of our own; but as far as I can tell, 
Peirce nowhere suggested any particular name for whatever is left of the Sign 
when the IO and II are analytically removed from it, or that such a move is 
even possible.

Nor did he ever say that the DO is "within the definition of the full Sign"; on 
the contrary, he consistently described the DO as external to the Sign itself, 
such that they are two of the three Correlates (i.e., subjects) in a triadic 
relation.  Despite your ongoing insistence otherwise, he also did not use 
"Sign" for "the full triadic process"; instead, he called that "semiosis," and 
my current model of it--which remains open to correction and refinement--is 
summarized in the attached diagram (originally posted back in April) and as 
follows.

  *   Every Sign denotes its Object (Matter/DO), signifies characters or 
qualities of that Object (Form/IO), and determines its Interpretant 
(Entelechy/FI as unity of Matter/DI and Form/II); cf. EP 2:304 (1904).
  *   The DO determines the Sign relatively to the FI, while the Sign 
determines the FI in reference to the DO, such that the DO determines the FI 
through the mediation of the Sign; cf. EP 2:410 (1907).  This is a genuine 
triadic relation.
  *   The Sign-Replica is a medium for the communication of a Form (which it 
embodies representatively as the IO) from the DO (which embodies the Form 
entitatively) to the DI (which embodies the Form interpretatively as the II); 
cf. EP 2:477 and EP 2:544n22 (both 1906).  This is a degenerate triadic 
relation, such that it can be resolved into the dyadic DO-SR and SR-DI 
relations.
  *   The efficient cause of the Sign is the DO, its formal cause is the IO, 
its material cause is the SR, and its final cause is mediating between the DO 
and the FI.  The efficient cause of the Interpretant is the SR, its formal 
cause is the II, its material cause is the DI, and its final cause is the FI.

Notice that "Representamen" is completely absent here, because I now take it as 
synonymous/interchangeable with "Sign," as Peirce did in and after 1905.  You 
presumably disagree with all of this, because your interpretation of Peirce and 
your model of semiosis are very different, but I continue to see no need to 
rehash any of that further.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:

Jon, list

Good heavens - I didn't know that your adamant arguments for the triad of 
IO-R-II was due to any attempt on your part to 'reconcile with my model of 
semiosis'!!! I thought you were arguing for that triad because you believed in 
it as a valid model! After all - you were quite insistent on its validity, and 
openly rejecting my inclusion of the DO!

And I didn't know that you abandoned it - not because you didn't believe any 
longer in its validity - but because you couldn't use it to 'reconcile with my 
model'. So- I'm to blame both for your support for the model and also, for your 
abandoning it. Hmmm.

And the 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon, list

Good heavens - I didn't know that your adamant arguments for the
triad of IO-R-II was due to any attempt on your part to 'reconcile
with my model of semiosis'!!! I thought you were arguing for that
triad because you believed in it as a valid model! After all - you
were quite insistent on its validity, and openly rejecting my
inclusion of the DO!

And I didn't know that you abandoned it - not because you didn't
believe any longer in its validity - but because you couldn't use it
to 'reconcile with my model'. So- I'm to blame both for your support
for the model and also, for your abandoning it. Hmmm.

And the argument isn't over the term 'Sign' as differentiated from
the term  'Representamen'. Peirce does that already. And he readily
uses the term 'Sign' when he means the full triadic process - and
also - when he refers only to the action of mediation. Therefore, one
has to be careful when reading the text.

The argument is over the operative nature of the basic semiosic
triad - which I claim is DO- [IO/R/II]. 

Edwina
 On Mon 25/06/18  9:21 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I fought for the definition of the Sign as a triad of IO-R-II
because I hoped for a while that it might eventually be possible, on
that basis, to reconcile our two different models of semiosis.  It
became evident a few months ago that this is not the case, since we
still cannot even agree on how Peirce defined "Representamen." 
Consequently, I took a closer look at his usage and came to realize
what I stated below--in 1903, a Sign was a Representamen with a
mental interpretant; but by 1905, the two terms were basically
synonymous and interchangeable.  More to the point, nowhere in
Peirce's writings did he present the Representamen as a  component of
the Sign.  Therefore, in accordance with Peirce's ethics of
terminology, if one wishes to treat the Sign as a triad that includes
the IO, the II, and whatever is left over after those are "removed,"
one must come up with a new name for the latter; Peirce never called
it a "Representamen," or anything else as far as I can tell.
 Regards,
 Jon S.  
 On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 7:05 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS, list

I have to include myself with Gary R as  - in my 1stness - stunned
by your abandonment of defining the Sign itself as that triad of
II-R-II! You fought for just this definition, tooth and nail, for
months. I recall your chastising me for daring to include the DO
within the definition of the full Sign. And now, quietly, hidden in
the night, you casually tell us that you..some time ago...abandoned
this notion. 

Whew. 

Edwina
 On Sun 24/06/18  8:51 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
 Gary R., List:
 Are you perhaps referring to my abandonment of characterizing the
Sign itself as a triad of IO-R-II?  This goes back to the fact that
Peirce never distinguished the terms "Representamen" and "Sign" in
the specific way that such a model entails.  I still affirm that the
IO and II are internal to the Sign, while the DO and DI are external
to it; and below I quoted Peirce's statement that the two Objects
determine the Sign, which determines the three Interpretants; so I
suspect that this indeed boils down to "a terminological matter." 
 Does that clarify things?  If not, maybe I have just been staring at
the pixels on my rather small tablet screen for too many hours
consecutively. :-)
 Jon S. 
 On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 7:08 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
 Jon S, list,
  Well, I may be the only one on the list who is at all confused by
this, and indeed it may prove to be just a terminological matter.
Still, Peirce says in many, many places that what happens within the
sign is this tripartite process: The IO determines the Sign which 
determines some Interpretant Sign. You have stated that you reject
this internal structure (or am I wrong about that too?) 
 In any event, may I ask: How does this tripartite structure figure
in your thinking today without getting a "Where on earth are you,
etc." prologue to an response? :-)
 Best,
 Gary
 Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York718 482-5690
 On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 7:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
 Gary R., List:
 Where on earth are you getting the idea that my formulation abandons
the fundamental semiotic process, in which the Object determines the
Sign for its Interpretant?  I am sincerely baffled by this
suggestion.  Here is what I said.
 JAS:  a Sign denotes its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), signifies some
of that Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken
together, constitute its Immediate Object--and determines its
Interpretants to represent the unity of Matter and Form
(Entelechy/3ns).
 I am describing what the Sign does, not what the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, list,

Yes, I was referring to your comment--I don't recall exactly when your
wrote it--that *only* the dicisign has an immediate object. If you no
longer hold that position (or even if you do and do something like bracket
it for the nonce), then a lot of the 'debate' I would imagine can be ended.
I don't, however, recall your retracting that notion in this thread, an
interpretation which, at least for me, has colored this inquiry since it is
a rather controversial one as even Bellucci has written. That is, most
Peirce scholars don't hold it (Bellucci wrote that only he and Stjernfelt
do). You also at some point along the way strongly suggested that it is
Peirce's view. So those of us who don't hold it, aren't Fregeans, and feel
that we are yet Peirceans were, I believe, a bit taken a back. A novel view
which, apparently, only a very few scholars hold, requires some patience in
explicating, I would think. And as novel, as I recently commented, it is
the position which needs explaining and defending.

I am most decidedly sorry that I wasn't able to get the 'point' of your
last few messages, and when I have the time I will reread them. However,
language like "polemical," "engulfed," "prejudices," etc. thrown out when
all folk are trying to do is to understand is not, in my opinion, helpful.
And perhaps it made your 'point' even harder to grasp, casting a shadow, as
it were, over your more general argument.

I hope the list, including you, will continue to discuss the nature of the
immediate object, a question which most certainly has been difficult to get
a handle on in Peirce scholarship. Certainly Bellucci's and Stjernfelt's
work on it in relation to the dicisign ought help clarify the matter. As I
see it, it is a question of considerable importance in Peirce's semiotics,
and understanding it better can only deepen our understanding of semiosis.

In sum: I hope we can get back on track, discuss more of Bellucci's (and
your) thinking about Peirce's late semeiotic which is a topic of
considerable interest to many on this list, I believe. My sense is that you
still intend to drop out of the discussion for now to read more Peirce on
the topic. I too intend to do more reading both of late Peirce and Bellucci.

Best,

Gary R



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 12:01 PM,  wrote:

> Gary R,
>
> I apologize for giving the impression that I consider my reading of Peirce
> more legitimate than yours, or anyone’s. What I said was that *IF one
> reads any work of semiotic analysis as if it were a polemic*, one will
> miss the point of it. I still consider that conditional proposition true.
>
> You write that “while Bellucci's book "is not a polemic and does not try
> to 'prove' that the dicisign is the only sign class that has an immediate
> object," *you* have stated that it is.” I assume you mean that I’ve
> stated that the dicisign is the only sign class that has an immediate
> object. I may have said that at some point awhile back, but what I’ve said *in
> this thread* is that I consider that statement to be one pole of a
> polarizing debate in which I decline to participate. I never — until last
> night — wanted out of the *discussion *of the nature of the immediate
> object. I just wanted out of the *debate*, which inevitably turns into a
> cherry-picking contest.
>
> I do think, based on your responses, that you’ve missed the point of
> several posts of mine over the past few days, but that is surely my fault
> more than anyone else’s, and I see no way of clarifying those points
> without repeating myself. And I don’t think that would be a worthwhile
> contribution to the list.
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *Sent:* 25-Jun-18 10:33
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object
>
>
>
> Gary F, list,
>
>
>
> GF: [Bellucci's] book is not a polemic and does not try to “prove” that
> the dicisign is the only sign class that has an immediate object. If you
> pay close attention to what Peirce wrote about the immediate object in
> 1904-8, setting aside any prejudices you may have about what the immediate
> object of a sign is, you will see that there is no need to “prove” or
> disprove any such thing. But if you read Bellucci polemically, as if he
> were taking one side in the debate that you and Jon seem to be engulfed in,
> then you will surely miss his point (and Peirce’s), just as you’ve missed
> the point of my posts over the past few days.
>
> Gary, while Bellucci's book "is not a polemic and does not try to 'prove'
> that he dicisign is the only sign class that has an immediate object,"
> *you* have stated that it is. It seems to me that Bellucci's work and
> your thinking on the matter have been quite valuable in stimulating thought
> concerning the dicisign as well as the immediate object. I don't think that
> I or 

[PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

 https://twitter.com/stephencrose/status/1011282261528936449

This will get you to a just posted video that basically suggests that
science's current project of reducing quantum understanding to the limits
of the Copenhagen understanding is doomed longterm.

It seems to me Peirce long ago perceived quantum along with a lot of other
things. All with practical outcomes.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



Why are examples the go-cart of judgment?



*CALLARD:* I think many reasons, but one of them that pops to my head is
that often in philosophy, we’re trying to theorize some phenomenon. Say
we’re trying to theorize aspiration, trying to give a theory of it, or
weakness of will. The way we do it as philosophers is, we often use example
at least to lay out the problem: “Here’s an example of such and such.”

The problem with examples, though, is that they can collapse under
theoretical pressure. There’s a constant impulse to rewrite the example and
to say, “Oh, well, what was really going on was . . .” Essentially that
impulse comes from the fact that there are certain changes you could make
to the example that would make it theoretically easier to analyze.

There’s a need, I think, for examples that are going to be a bit tough in
response to that kind of pressure. One, it helps if you *didn’t* make the
example, and two, it helps if the person who *did* really understood the
thing that they’re talking about. I think literature gives us that.



https://medium.com/conversations-with-tyler/agnes-callard-tyler-cowen-philosophy-socrates-plato-literature-c70a73cd38eb



I hope this helps future conversation.



Best wishes,
Jerry R


On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 11:01 AM,  wrote:

> Gary R,
>
> I apologize for giving the impression that I consider my reading of Peirce
> more legitimate than yours, or anyone’s. What I said was that *IF one
> reads any work of semiotic analysis as if it were a polemic*, one will
> miss the point of it. I still consider that conditional proposition true.
>
> You write that “while Bellucci's book "is not a polemic and does not try
> to 'prove' that the dicisign is the only sign class that has an immediate
> object," *you* have stated that it is.” I assume you mean that I’ve
> stated that the dicisign is the only sign class that has an immediate
> object. I may have said that at some point awhile back, but what I’ve said *in
> this thread* is that I consider that statement to be one pole of a
> polarizing debate in which I decline to participate. I never — until last
> night — wanted out of the *discussion *of the nature of the immediate
> object. I just wanted out of the *debate*, which inevitably turns into a
> cherry-picking contest.
>
> I do think, based on your responses, that you’ve missed the point of
> several posts of mine over the past few days, but that is surely my fault
> more than anyone else’s, and I see no way of clarifying those points
> without repeating myself. And I don’t think that would be a worthwhile
> contribution to the list.
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *Sent:* 25-Jun-18 10:33
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object
>
>
>
> Gary F, list,
>
>
>
> GF: [Bellucci's] book is not a polemic and does not try to “prove” that
> the dicisign is the only sign class that has an immediate object. If you
> pay close attention to what Peirce wrote about the immediate object in
> 1904-8, setting aside any prejudices you may have about what the immediate
> object of a sign is, you will see that there is no need to “prove” or
> disprove any such thing. But if you read Bellucci polemically, as if he
> were taking one side in the debate that you and Jon seem to be engulfed in,
> then you will surely miss his point (and Peirce’s), just as you’ve missed
> the point of my posts over the past few days.
>
> Gary, while Bellucci's book "is not a polemic and does not try to 'prove'
> that he dicisign is the only sign class that has an immediate object,"
> *you* have stated that it is. It seems to me that Bellucci's work and
> your thinking on the matter have been quite valuable in stimulating thought
> concerning the dicisign as well as the immediate object. I don't think that
> I or Jon (or any of the list members who have participated in this thread)
> are "engulfed" in anything, and to suggest that we have "prejudices" in the
> matter is, well, untoward. Perhaps it is you who has prejudices. It may be
> that we have missed the point of your recent posts, but to say that we have
> missed Peirce's point, as you remark above, would suggest that your reading
> of Peirce's late work is correct and that our not acknowledging that is the
> problem. I don't see that I am prejudiced in this matter whatsoever and
> rather have been trying to see your (and Bellucci's) point as best I can.
> What more can I do in good faith?
>
> GF: My attempts to clear up misunderstandings having only led to more
> misunderstandings, I think it’s time for me to drop them and get back to
> reading Peirce, as I still have many open questions to ponder about what he
> was trying to do in 1903-08. My apologies for wasting your time in this
> thread.
>
> You have hardly wasted mine or anyone's time--quite the contrary. You have
> stimulated the thinking  of Jon S, Jeff D, Edwina, Helmut, me, and others.
> You have several times now said that you 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[gnox]

Gary R,

I apologize for giving the impression that I consider my reading of Peirce more 
legitimate than yours, or anyone’s. What I said was that IF one reads any work 
of semiotic analysis as if it were a polemic, one will miss the point of it. I 
still consider that conditional proposition true.

You write that “while Bellucci's book "is not a polemic and does not try to 
'prove' that the dicisign is the only sign class that has an immediate object," 
you have stated that it is.” I assume you mean that I’ve stated that the 
dicisign is the only sign class that has an immediate object. I may have said 
that at some point awhile back, but what I’ve said in this thread is that I 
consider that statement to be one pole of a polarizing debate in which I 
decline to participate. I never — until last night — wanted out of the 
discussion of the nature of the immediate object. I just wanted out of the 
debate, which inevitably turns into a cherry-picking contest.

I do think, based on your responses, that you’ve missed the point of several 
posts of mine over the past few days, but that is surely my fault more than 
anyone else’s, and I see no way of clarifying those points without repeating 
myself. And I don’t think that would be a worthwhile contribution to the list.

Gary f.

 

From: Gary Richmond  
Sent: 25-Jun-18 10:33
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

 

Gary F, list,

 

GF: [Bellucci's] book is not a polemic and does not try to “prove” that the 
dicisign is the only sign class that has an immediate object. If you pay close 
attention to what Peirce wrote about the immediate object in 1904-8, setting 
aside any prejudices you may have about what the immediate object of a sign is, 
you will see that there is no need to “prove” or disprove any such thing. But 
if you read Bellucci polemically, as if he were taking one side in the debate 
that you and Jon seem to be engulfed in, then you will surely miss his point 
(and Peirce’s), just as you’ve missed the point of my posts over the past few 
days.

Gary, while Bellucci's book "is not a polemic and does not try to 'prove' that 
he dicisign is the only sign class that has an immediate object," you have 
stated that it is. It seems to me that Bellucci's work and your thinking on the 
matter have been quite valuable in stimulating thought concerning the dicisign 
as well as the immediate object. I don't think that I or Jon (or any of the 
list members who have participated in this thread) are "engulfed" in anything, 
and to suggest that we have "prejudices" in the matter is, well, untoward. 
Perhaps it is you who has prejudices. It may be that we have missed the point 
of your recent posts, but to say that we have missed Peirce's point, as you 
remark above, would suggest that your reading of Peirce's late work is correct 
and that our not acknowledging that is the problem. I don't see that I am 
prejudiced in this matter whatsoever and rather have been trying to see your 
(and Bellucci's) point as best I can. What more can I do in good faith?

GF: My attempts to clear up misunderstandings having only led to more 
misunderstandings, I think it’s time for me to drop them and get back to 
reading Peirce, as I still have many open questions to ponder about what he was 
trying to do in 1903-08. My apologies for wasting your time in this thread.

You have hardly wasted mine or anyone's time--quite the contrary. You have 
stimulated the thinking  of Jon S, Jeff D, Edwina, Helmut, me, and others. You 
have several times now said that you wish to drop out of the discussion and, 
while I had hoped you wouldn't, that is your decision to make. But to suggest 
that this discussion has been a waste of time, that we just aren't "getting" 
what Peirce "was trying to do in 1903-08" but that you (and Bellucci) are, well 
to say that is indeed to end constructive dialogue in the matter (which seems 
quasi-settled in your mind despite your need to "get back to reading Peirce. . 
.to ponder about what he was trying to do in 1903-08"). 

If your "attempts to clear up misunderstandings" has "only led to more 
misunderstandings," then unless the failure is all on our part (and, recall, 
Jon has read the entire Bellucci book and has stated that he admires it and has 
learned a great deal from it; I have read only Chapter 8, but that seems to 
contain the principal argumentation re: the matter being discussed), then 
perhaps it is best for you to "get back to reading Peirce" in the interest of 
your "many open questions" about his late work in semeiotic. 

Meanwhile, I'd like to thank you for your beginning this thread given the 
thinking it has provoked in several (perhaps many) here, and hope that your 
continued reading of Peirce will lead you to an even stronger explication of 
his late semeiotic.

Best, 

Gary R

 

 




 

 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, list,

GF: [Bellucci's] book is not a polemic and does not try to “prove” that the
dicisign is the only sign class that has an immediate object. If you pay
close attention to what Peirce wrote about the immediate object in 1904-8,
setting aside any prejudices you may have about what the immediate object
of a sign is, you will see that there is no need to “prove” or disprove any
such thing. But if you read Bellucci polemically, as if he were taking one
side in the debate that you and Jon seem to be engulfed in, then you will
surely miss his point (and Peirce’s), just as you’ve missed the point of my
posts over the past few days.

Gary, while Bellucci's book "is not a polemic and does not try to 'prove'
that he dicisign is the only sign class that has an immediate object," *you*
have stated that it is. It seems to me that Bellucci's work and your
thinking on the matter have been quite valuable in stimulating thought
concerning the dicisign as well as the immediate object. I don't think that
I or Jon (or any of the list members who have participated in this thread)
are "engulfed" in anything, and to suggest that we have "prejudices" in the
matter is, well, untoward. Perhaps it is you who has prejudices. It may be
that we have missed the point of your recent posts, but to say that we have
missed Peirce's point, as you remark above, would suggest that your reading
of Peirce's late work is correct and that our not acknowledging that is the
problem. I don't see that I am prejudiced in this matter whatsoever and
rather have been trying to see your (and Bellucci's) point as best I can.
What more can I do in good faith?

GF: My attempts to clear up misunderstandings having only led to more
misunderstandings, I think it’s time for me to drop them and get back to
reading Peirce, as I still have many open questions to ponder about what he
was trying to do in 1903-08. My apologies for wasting your time in this
thread.

You have hardly wasted mine or anyone's time--quite the contrary. You have
stimulated the thinking  of Jon S, Jeff D, Edwina, Helmut, me, and others.
You have several times now said that you wish to drop out of the discussion
and, while I had hoped you wouldn't, that is your decision to make. But to
suggest that this discussion has been a waste of time, that we just aren't
"getting" what Peirce "was trying to do in 1903-08" but that you (and
Bellucci) are, well to say that is indeed to end constructive dialogue in
the matter (which seems quasi-settled in your mind despite your need to
"get back to reading Peirce. . .to ponder about what he was trying to do in
1903-08").

If your "attempts to clear up misunderstandings" has "only led to more
misunderstandings," then unless the failure is *all* on *our* part (and,
recall, Jon has read the entire Bellucci book and has stated that he
admires it and has learned a great deal from it; I have read only Chapter
8, but that seems to contain the principal argumentation re: the matter
being discussed), then perhaps it *is* best for you to "get back to reading
Peirce" in the interest of your "many open questions" about his late work
in semeiotic.

Meanwhile, I'd like to thank you for your beginning this thread given the
thinking it has provoked in several (perhaps many) here, and hope that your
continued reading of Peirce will lead you to an even stronger explication
of his late semeiotic.

Best,

Gary R






*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 7:08 AM,  wrote:

> Gary R, you wrote:
>
> Although I've clearly stated that I agree with you, Bellucci, and
> Stjernfel, that the dicisign is perhaps of particular importance in
> semiosis, I think that valorizing it by claiming that it is the only sign
> class that has an immediate object needs to be proved. You suggest that it
> has been so proved by Bellucci in his book.
>
> What I’ve said, more than once, is that Bellucci’s book follows the
> development of Peirce’s speculative grammar in chronological order, with
> very generous quotations from his manuscripts along the way and very astute
> commentary on them; and that part of his Chapter 8 deals with the emergence
> of the “immediate object” in that context. The question In that section “is
> the question of what on earth the immediate object of a sign is” (Bellucci
> p. 291). The book is not a polemic and does not try to “prove” that the
> dicisign is the only sign class that has an immediate object. If you pay
> close attention to what Peirce wrote about the immediate object in 1904-8,
> setting aside any prejudices you may have about what the immediate object
> of a sign is, you will see that there is no need to “prove” or disprove any
> such thing. But if you read Bellucci polemically, as if he were taking one
> side in the debate that you and Jon seem to be engulfed in, then you will
> surely miss his point (and Peirce’s), 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

I fought for the definition of the Sign as a triad of IO-R-II because I
hoped for a while that it might eventually be possible, on that basis, to
reconcile our two different models of semiosis.  It became evident a few
months ago that this is not the case, since we still cannot even agree on
how Peirce defined "Representamen."  Consequently, I took a closer look at
his usage and came to realize what I stated below--in 1903, a Sign was a
Representamen with a mental interpretant; but by 1905, the two terms were
basically synonymous and interchangeable.  More to the point, nowhere in
Peirce's writings did he present the Representamen as a *component *of the
Sign.  Therefore, in accordance with Peirce's ethics of terminology, if one
wishes to treat the Sign as a triad that includes the IO, the II, and
whatever is left over after those are "removed," one must come up with a
new name for the latter; Peirce never called it a "Representamen," or
anything else as far as I can tell.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 7:05 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, list
>
> I have to include myself with Gary R as  - in my 1stness - stunned by your
> abandonment of defining the Sign itself as that triad of II-R-II! You
> fought for just this definition, tooth and nail, for months. I recall your
> chastising me for daring to include the DO within the definition of the
> full Sign. And now, quietly, hidden in the night, you casually tell us that
> you..some time ago...abandoned this notion.
>
> Whew.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sun 24/06/18 8:51 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Gary R., List:
>
> Are you perhaps referring to my abandonment of characterizing the Sign
> itself as a triad of IO-R-II?  This goes back to the fact that Peirce never
> distinguished the terms "Representamen" and "Sign" in the specific way that
> such a model entails.  I still affirm that the IO and II are internal to
> the Sign, while the DO and DI are external to it; and below I quoted
> Peirce's statement that the two Objects determine the Sign, which
> determines the three Interpretants; so I suspect that this indeed boils
> down to "a terminological matter."
>
> Does that clarify things?  If not, maybe I have just been staring at the
> pixels on my rather small tablet screen for too many hours consecutively.
> :-)
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 7:08 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon S, list,
>>
>>
>> Well, I may be the only one on the list who is at all confused by this,
>> and indeed it may prove to be just a terminological matter. Still, Peirce
>> says in many, many places that what happens within the sign is this
>> tripartite process: The IO determines the Sign which determines some
>> Interpretant Sign. You have stated that you reject this internal structure
>> (or am I wrong about that too?)
>>
>> In any event, may I ask: How does this tripartite structure figure in
>> your thinking today without getting a "Where on earth are you, etc."
>> prologue to an response? :-)
>> [image: Blocked image]
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary
>>
>> Gary Richmond
>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
>> Communication Studies
>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
>> 718 482-5690
>>
>> On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 7:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Gary R., List:
>>>
>>> Where on earth are you getting the idea that my formulation abandons the
>>> fundamental semiotic process, in which the Object determines the Sign for
>>> its Interpretant?  I am sincerely baffled by this suggestion.  Here is what
>>> I said.
>>>
>>> JAS:  a Sign denotes its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), signifies some of
>>> that Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken together,
>>> constitute its Immediate Object--and determines its Interpretants to
>>> represent the unity of Matter and Form (Entelechy/3ns).
>>>
>>>
>>> I am describing what the Sign does, not what the Object does.  I am not
>>> at all somehow removing the Sign from its genuine triadic relation with the
>>> Object and Interpretant.  Peirce himself differentiated the two Objects and
>>> three Interpretants when he wrote, "the Dynamoid Object determines the
>>> Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which determines the
>>> Destinate Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which
>>> determines the Explicit Interpretant" (EP 2:481; 1908).
>>>
>>> As for Sign vs. Representamen, Peirce actually did say contradictory
>>> things in 1903 (when he gave the sunflower example) and 1905, because he
>>> changed his mind sometime during the interval between them--he decided
>>> that he no longer needed to use "Representamen," because "Sign" ended up
>>> suiting his original purpose after all.  I now agree with that decision.
>>> Notice that "Representamen" does not appear in the 1908 quote above, or
>>> anywhere else in those crucial December letters to Lady Welby.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon S.
>>>
>>> On 

[PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

I have to include myself with Gary R as  - in my 1stness - stunned
by your abandonment of defining the Sign itself as that triad of
II-R-II! You fought for just this definition, tooth and nail, for
months. I recall your chastising me for daring to include the DO
within the definition of the full Sign. And now, quietly, hidden in
the night, you casually tell us that you..some time ago...abandoned
this notion. 

Whew. 

Edwina
 On Sun 24/06/18  8:51 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary R., List:
 Are you perhaps referring to my abandonment of characterizing the
Sign itself as a triad of IO-R-II?  This goes back to the fact that
Peirce never distinguished the terms "Representamen" and "Sign" in
the specific way that such a model entails.  I still affirm that the
IO and II are internal to the Sign, while the DO and DI are external
to it; and below I quoted Peirce's statement that the two Objects
determine the Sign, which determines the three Interpretants; so I
suspect that this indeed boils down to "a terminological matter." 
 Does that clarify things?  If not, maybe I have just been staring at
the pixels on my rather small tablet screen for too many hours
consecutively. :-)
 Jon S. 
 On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 7:08 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
 Jon S, list,
  Well, I may be the only one on the list who is at all confused by
this, and indeed it may prove to be just a terminological matter.
Still, Peirce says in many, many places that what happens within the
sign is this tripartite process: The IO determines the Sign which 
determines some Interpretant Sign. You have stated that you reject
this internal structure (or am I wrong about that too?) 
 In any event, may I ask: How does this tripartite structure figure
in your thinking today without getting a "Where on earth are you,
etc." prologue to an response? :-)
 Best,
 Gary
 Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York718 482-5690
 On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 7:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
 Gary R., List:
 Where on earth are you getting the idea that my formulation abandons
the fundamental semiotic process, in which the Object determines the
Sign for its Interpretant?  I am sincerely baffled by this
suggestion.  Here is what I said.
 JAS:  a Sign denotes its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), signifies some
of that Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken
together, constitute its Immediate Object--and determines its
Interpretants to represent the unity of Matter and Form
(Entelechy/3ns).
 I am describing what the Sign does, not what the Object does.  I am
not at all somehow removing the Sign from its genuine triadic
relation with the Object and Interpretant.  Peirce himself
differentiated the two Objects and three Interpretants when he wrote,
"the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines
the Sign itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which
determines the Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit
Interpretant" (EP 2:481; 1908). 
 As for Sign vs. Representamen, Peirce actually did say contradictory
things in 1903 (when he gave the sunflower example) and 1905, because
he changed his mind sometime during the interval between them--he
decided that he no longer needed to use "Representamen," because
"Sign" ended up suiting his original purpose after all.  I now agree
with that decision.  Notice that "Representamen" does not appear in
the 1908 quote above, or anywhere else in those crucial December
letters to Lady Welby. 
 Regards,
 Jon S. 
 On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 5:43 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
 Jon S, list,
 Thanks.This was quite helpful. 
 But there remains the awkward fact of the Peirce formulation that
the Object determines the Sign for its Interpretant Sign. Does he
give up this formulation in the 20th century? If not, whether you
call it "Representamen" or "Sign," there seems to me the problem that
it would appear in your formulation that the IO takes the place of the
second moment of that triadic formulation. 
 According to Peirce in 1903, "A Sign is a Representamen with a
mental Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are
not Signs" (EP 2:273). 
 Of course you now would appear to reject that triadic formulation.
Since I very much like your reformulation, I'll have to think long
and hard on this. 
 Still, if, as Peirce says, there are "Representamens that are not
Signs" (like sunflowers turning toward the sun in Peirce's famous
example), then there would seem yet to be a distinction to be made
between Sign and Representamen. Yet in your note addressed to me and
just now to Gary F you say the Sign and Representamen are
"effectively synonymous." So, it appears to me that Peirce is perhaps
saying contradictory things when one looks from one quotation to
another on this not inconsequential 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[gnox]

Gary R, you wrote:

Although I've clearly stated that I agree with you, Bellucci, and Stjernfel, 
that the dicisign is perhaps of particular importance in semiosis, I think that 
valorizing it by claiming that it is the only sign class that has an immediate 
object needs to be proved. You suggest that it has been so proved by Bellucci 
in his book.

What I’ve said, more than once, is that Bellucci’s book follows the development 
of Peirce’s speculative grammar in chronological order, with very generous 
quotations from his manuscripts along the way and very astute commentary on 
them; and that part of his Chapter 8 deals with the emergence of the “immediate 
object” in that context. The question In that section “is the question of what 
on earth the immediate object of a sign is” (Bellucci p. 291). The book is not 
a polemic and does not try to “prove” that the dicisign is the only sign class 
that has an immediate object. If you pay close attention to what Peirce wrote 
about the immediate object in 1904-8, setting aside any prejudices you may have 
about what the immediate object of a sign is, you will see that there is no 
need to “prove” or disprove any such thing. But if you read Bellucci 
polemically, as if he were taking one side in the debate that you and Jon seem 
to be engulfed in, then you will surely miss his point (and Peirce’s), just as 
you’ve missed the point of my posts over the past few days.

My attempts to clear up misunderstandings having only led to more 
misunderstandings, I think it’s time for me to drop them and get back to 
reading Peirce, as I still have many open questions to ponder about what he was 
trying to do in 1903-08. My apologies for wasting your time in this thread.

Gary F.

 

From: Gary Richmond  
Sent: 24-Jun-18 19:09



Gary F, list,

GF: The point about a rheme is that it is not interpreted as being really 
affected by its object, but only “understood as representing such and such a 
kind of possible Object.” Give it an actual object by making it a part of a 
dicisign, and it will afford the depth component of the information conveyed by 
that dicisign. But in the absence of some part of the sign indicating what that 
information is about, it can’t be interpreted as informational.

Again, as I just wrote in response to Edwina, information about an Object 
"emerges"--it is not given completely even when, as you seem to be suggesting, 
a rheme is made part of a dicisign. Hardly. Perhaps it is even then quite 
unclear as to the information the rheme or, for that matter, the proposition, 
holds, and it may take the stringing of any number of propositions into 
arguments to get at the significant information. Although I've clearly stated 
that I agree with you, Bellucci, and Stjernfel, that the dicisign is perhaps of 
particular importance in semiosis, I think that valorizing it by claiming that 
it is the only sign class that has an immediate object needs to be proved. You 
suggest that it has been so proved by Bellucci in his book. I am not yet so 
convinced.

…


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