Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

2018-07-27 Thread Jerry Rhee
Dear John list,



Who, then, studies the real goal?



Best,

Jerry R


On Fri, Jul 27, 2018 at 9:16 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Helmut, Auke, and Jerry,
>
> HR
>
>> what does "normative" mean?
>>
>
> Note what Auke said:
>
>> Don’t confuse mathematical logic with normative logic.
>>
>
> See the attached cspsci.gif, which shows Peirce's classification
> of the sciences.  Note that the word 'logic' appears in two places:
>
>  1. On the left, formal logic is a branch of pure mathematics.
> In that sense, it is treated as pure theory that is independent
> of any application to any subject for any purpose.  It doesn't
> make any value judgments about the two truth values {T,F}.
>
>  2. In the middle, logic is used as a normative science to
> determine how people should reason in order to distinguish
> truth from falsity.
>
> JLRC
>
>> For normative science in general being the science of the laws of
>>> conformity of things to ends, esthetics considers those things whose
>>> ends are to embody qualities of feeling, ethics those things whose
>>> ends lie in action, and logic those things whose end is to represent
>>> something. (CP 5.121-124&129, EP 2:196-197&200; 1903)
>>>
>>
>> This is, perhaps, the most remarkable characterization of logic
>> I have ever read!
>>
>
> It would be unusual as a definition of a formal logic.  But Peirce
> was discussing normative logic as a subject that depends on ethics
> and esthetics to make value judgments about truth and falsity.
>
> HR
>
>> what is the separating difference between "relation to ends"
>> and "reality"
>>
>
> The word 'ends' is ambiguous.  In this use, Peirce is not talking
> about a spatial end point, but as the final goal or purpose of
> some action.  For a modern audience, it would be better to use
> the word 'goal' or 'purpose'.
>
> Re: The distinction of "relation to ends" and "reality":
>
> The natural sciences study reality (what there is).
> The normative sciences study goals (what should be).
>
> John
>
>
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

2018-07-27 Thread John F Sowa

Helmut, Auke, and Jerry,

HR

what does "normative" mean?


Note what Auke said:
Don’t confuse mathematical logic with normative logic. 


See the attached cspsci.gif, which shows Peirce's classification
of the sciences.  Note that the word 'logic' appears in two places:

 1. On the left, formal logic is a branch of pure mathematics.
In that sense, it is treated as pure theory that is independent
of any application to any subject for any purpose.  It doesn't
make any value judgments about the two truth values {T,F}.

 2. In the middle, logic is used as a normative science to
determine how people should reason in order to distinguish
truth from falsity.

JLRC

For normative science in general being the science of the laws of
conformity of things to ends, esthetics considers those things whose
ends are to embody qualities of feeling, ethics those things whose
ends lie in action, and logic those things whose end is to represent
something. (CP 5.121-124&129, EP 2:196-197&200; 1903)


This is, perhaps, the most remarkable characterization of logic
I have ever read!


It would be unusual as a definition of a formal logic.  But Peirce
was discussing normative logic as a subject that depends on ethics
and esthetics to make value judgments about truth and falsity.

HR

what is the separating difference between "relation to ends"
and "reality"


The word 'ends' is ambiguous.  In this use, Peirce is not talking
about a spatial end point, but as the final goal or purpose of
some action.  For a modern audience, it would be better to use
the word 'goal' or 'purpose'.

Re: The distinction of "relation to ends" and "reality":

The natural sciences study reality (what there is).
The normative sciences study goals (what should be).

John

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Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

2018-07-27 Thread Helmut Raulien
 
 

Supp: And what does "normative" mean? I guess that for people who tell us that humans have evolved from transparent lemurs, or that the earth is on a turtle shell of a turtle standing on a pile of more turtles, their view is regarded as normative for them too. And the theory of evolution, grounded on scientific hard facts, is not normative for quite many people, who choose to rather believe, that God has dug in the dinosaur bones as a mislead to test our faith, to exclude the non-believers. Or does the ISO (international standardising organisation) say which science is normative?

 




Jon, List,

I dont understand what is the separating difference between "relation to ends" and "reality", so I dont understand the difference between normative science and metaphysics. And if logic has the relation to representational ends, this is an ends too, so a subset of normative science. Though I cannot see which ends might be non-representational.

I thought, reality is the effects of anything, so also if something is or seems true, right, beautiful, or is related to any other ends. "Ends" to me sounds like thirdness, and a secondness-science would be a merely observing and describing science (of which I cannot find an example, maybe the first biologist, before she/he drew the first conclusion).

I remember having read somewhere that semiotics would be the new metaphysics. I intuitively had agreed, but obviously this is wrong, according to Peirce.

To me it still (in my lamentably persisting state of noncomprehension) seems, that logic is the science/metaphysics of true representation, or true ends, which would be deduction and complete induction.

Best, Helmut

 

 26. Juli 2018 um 23:21 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:


Helmut, List:

 

In Peirce's architectonic of the sciences, logic (i.e., semeiotic) is definitely not "a part of metaphysics"; it is instead one of the Normative Sciences.

 


CSP:  Philosophy has three grand divisions. The first is Phenomenology, which simply contemplates the Universal Phenomenon, and discerns its ubiquitous elements, Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, together perhaps with other series of categories. The second grand division is Normative Science, which investigates the universal and necessary laws of the relation of Phenomena to Ends, that is, perhaps, to Truth, Right, and Beauty. The third grand division is Metaphysics, which endeavors to comprehend the Reality of Phenomena ... 

For Phenomenology treats of the universal Qualities of Phenomena in their immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as phenomena. It, thus, treats of Phenomena in their Firstness.

Normative Science treats of the laws of the relation of phenomena to ends, that is, it treats of Phenomena in their Secondness.

Metaphysics, as I have just remarked, treats of Phenomena in their Thirdness ...


For normative science in general being the science of the laws of conformity of things to ends, esthetics considers those things whose ends are to embody qualities of feeling, ethics those things whose ends lie in action, and logic those things whose end is to represent something. (CP 5.121-124&129, EP 2:196-197&200; 1903)



 



Logic does not, or at least should not, presuppose a particular metaphysics; i.e., it takes no position on the Reality of any phenomena.  When metaphysical language is used to express logical concepts, it is a kind of hypostatic abstraction.

 

 



CSP:  The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind ourselves to an acceptance of it than we do when we use substantives such as "humanity," "variety," etc., and speak of them as if they were substances, in the metaphysical sense. (EP 2:304; 1904)



 
However, logic can and should furnish principles that are subsequently applied to metaphysics.

 




CSP:  Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being. (CP 1.487; c. 1896)



 

Retroduction, deduction, and induction all fall within the purview of logic as a Normative Science; metaphysics and the special sciences employ them in investigating the Reality of phenomena.

 

Regards,


 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt





 

On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 4:09 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:






Supp: I think, metaphysics are all assumed principles, and Kant has attempted (and succeded?) to pull some into the realm of logic, secure it, esp. by bridging the gap between individual and society (generality, universality) by showing that there are things an individual logically cannot want to be general. So according to Kant, some metaphysics is logical, and other not. But I guess, the 

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

2018-07-27 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, List,

I dont understand what is the separating difference between "relation to ends" and "reality", so I dont understand the difference between normative science and metaphysics. And if logic has the relation to representational ends, this is an ends too, so a subset of normative science. Though I cannot see which ends might be non-representational.

I thought, reality is the effects of anything, so also if something is or seems true, right, beautiful, or is related to any other ends. "Ends" to me sounds like thirdness, and a secondness-science would be a merely observing and describing science (of which I cannot find an example, maybe the first biologist, before she/he drew the first conclusion).

I remember having read somewhere that semiotics would be the new metaphysics. I intuitively had agreed, but obviously this is wrong, according to Peirce.

To me it still (in my lamentably persisting state of noncomprehension) seems, that logic is the science/metaphysics of true representation, or true ends, which would be deduction and complete induction.

Best, Helmut

 

 26. Juli 2018 um 23:21 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:


Helmut, List:

 

In Peirce's architectonic of the sciences, logic (i.e., semeiotic) is definitely not "a part of metaphysics"; it is instead one of the Normative Sciences.

 


CSP:  Philosophy has three grand divisions. The first is Phenomenology, which simply contemplates the Universal Phenomenon, and discerns its ubiquitous elements, Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, together perhaps with other series of categories. The second grand division is Normative Science, which investigates the universal and necessary laws of the relation of Phenomena to Ends, that is, perhaps, to Truth, Right, and Beauty. The third grand division is Metaphysics, which endeavors to comprehend the Reality of Phenomena ... 

For Phenomenology treats of the universal Qualities of Phenomena in their immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as phenomena. It, thus, treats of Phenomena in their Firstness.

Normative Science treats of the laws of the relation of phenomena to ends, that is, it treats of Phenomena in their Secondness.

Metaphysics, as I have just remarked, treats of Phenomena in their Thirdness ...


For normative science in general being the science of the laws of conformity of things to ends, esthetics considers those things whose ends are to embody qualities of feeling, ethics those things whose ends lie in action, and logic those things whose end is to represent something. (CP 5.121-124&129, EP 2:196-197&200; 1903)



 



Logic does not, or at least should not, presuppose a particular metaphysics; i.e., it takes no position on the Reality of any phenomena.  When metaphysical language is used to express logical concepts, it is a kind of hypostatic abstraction.

 

 



CSP:  The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind ourselves to an acceptance of it than we do when we use substantives such as "humanity," "variety," etc., and speak of them as if they were substances, in the metaphysical sense. (EP 2:304; 1904)



 
However, logic can and should furnish principles that are subsequently applied to metaphysics.

 




CSP:  Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being. (CP 1.487; c. 1896)



 

Retroduction, deduction, and induction all fall within the purview of logic as a Normative Science; metaphysics and the special sciences employ them in investigating the Reality of phenomena.

 

Regards,


 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt





 

On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 4:09 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:






Supp: I think, metaphysics are all assumed principles, and Kant has attempted (and succeded?) to pull some into the realm of logic, secure it, esp. by bridging the gap between individual and society (generality, universality) by showing that there are things an individual logically cannot want to be general. So according to Kant, some metaphysics is logical, and other not. But I guess, the common meaning of metaphysics means only the illogical, not deductively secured part?






List,

Gary, I don´t get the difference between metaphysics and logic: In´t logic a part of metaphysics? If "metaphysics" means "behind nature", I mean, logic is so. Wasn´ it so for Kant too: "Pure reason" (synonymous with "logic"?) is "transcendental" (synonymous with "metaphysical"?)

Or is logic the deductive part, and metaphysics the inductive and abductive part of assumed principles of nature? Or is logic the part of belief in nature´s principles gathered by the scientific method, while 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

2018-07-27 Thread Gary Richmond
Jerry, List,

Commenting on a Peirce quote Jon Schmidt posted:

For normative science in general being the science of the laws of
conformity of things to ends, esthetics considers those things whose ends
are to embody qualities of feeling, ethics those things whose ends lie in
action, and logic those things whose end is to represent something. (CP
5.121-124&129, EP 2:196-197&200; 1903)


Jerry wrote:

Please re-read the posts.

Those are CSP words.

The notion of logos is ancient, is it not?


Of course I know those are CSP's words, rather familiar ones at that. My
point, as well as Auke's, is that one needs to distinguish Peirce's
expanded normative science of logic as semeiotic from other(for example,
mathematical) logics. But in the context of Peirce's semeiotic, there's
nothing at all "remarkable" (your word) about the characterization of logic
in that quotation.

As for 'logos' as a concept, it has had so many meanings, uses, contexts,
etc. that perhaps all one can say definitively about it is, as you did,
that it's ancient.

Best,

Gary



*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Jul 27, 2018 at 6:06 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

>
> Gary, List:
>
> Please re-read the posts.
>
> Those are CSP words.
>
> The notion of logos is ancient, is it not?
>
> Cheers
> Jerry
>
>
> Sent from my iPad
>
> On Jul 26, 2018, at 10:25 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
> Jerry, Jon, list,
>
> Would it have seemed a less "remarkable characterization of logic" if Jon
> had written that "*logic as semeiotic [considers] those things whose end
> is to represent something"?*
>
> Peirce rather famously expands logic well beyond critical logic ("logic as
> logic" as he sometimes characterizes his 2nd branch of logic as semeiotic,
> the 1st being semeiotic grammar, the 3rd, methodeutic, or theoretical
> rhetoric, of which pragmaticism is itself a central feature in what could
> be characterized as a theory of inquiry).
>
> Peirce's logic as semeiotic is indeed a "remarkable characterization of
> logic"
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> *718 482-5690*
>
> On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 5:55 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>> On Jul 26, 2018, at 4:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> wrote:
>>
>> For normative science in general being the science of the laws of
>> conformity of things to ends, esthetics considers those things whose ends
>> are to embody qualities of feeling, ethics those things whose ends lie in
>> action, *and logic those things whose end is to represent something.*
>> (CP 5.121-124&129, EP 2:196-197&200; 1903) (my emphasis of phrase.)
>>
>>
>> This is, perhaps, the most remarkable characterization of logic I have
>> ever read!
>>
>> In particular, one might compare this definition with the descriptions of
>> set theory and the predicate logic of mathematics.
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Jerry
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -
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>> -l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
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[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:9260] Follow Biosemiotics on Facebook and Twitter!

2018-07-27 Thread Gary Richmond
FYI


-- Forwarded message --
From: Morten Tønnessen 
Date: Fri, Jul 27, 2018 at 7:06 AM
Subject: [biosemiotics:9260] Follow Biosemiotics on Facebook and Twitter!
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee


Dear all,

official social media accounts for Biosemiotics, our journal published by
Springer, have now been established. These are operated by Yogi Hendlin and
myself.

Twitter: https://twitter.com/Biosemiotics1
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/Biosemiotics

Do follow us, if you are already on either arena! Also, for the future,
please
consider sharing tweets and Facebook posts from the journal whenever you
deem
this to be relevant.

My best,

Morten
Lead Editor-in-Chief for Biosemiotics

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

2018-07-27 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

Gary, List:

Please re-read the posts.

Those are CSP words.

The notion of logos is ancient, is it not?

Cheers
Jerry


Sent from my iPad

> On Jul 26, 2018, at 10:25 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Jerry, Jon, list,
> 
> Would it have seemed a less "remarkable characterization of logic" if Jon had 
> written that "logic as semeiotic [considers] those things whose end is to 
> represent something"?
> 
> Peirce rather famously expands logic well beyond critical logic ("logic as 
> logic" as he sometimes characterizes his 2nd branch of logic as semeiotic, 
> the 1st being semeiotic grammar, the 3rd, methodeutic, or theoretical 
> rhetoric, of which pragmaticism is itself a central feature in what could be 
> characterized as a theory of inquiry). 
> 
> Peirce's logic as semeiotic is indeed a "remarkable characterization of 
> logic" 
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary
> 
> 
> 
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> 718 482-5690
> 
> 
>> On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 5:55 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>>  wrote:
>> List:
>> 
>>> On Jul 26, 2018, at 4:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> For normative science in general being the science of the laws of 
>>> conformity of things to ends, esthetics considers those things whose ends 
>>> are to embody qualities of feeling, ethics those things whose ends lie in 
>>> action, and logic those things whose end is to represent something. (CP 
>>> 5.121-124&129, EP 2:196-197&200; 1903) (my emphasis of phrase.)
>> 
>> This is, perhaps, the most remarkable characterization of logic I have ever 
>> read!
>> 
>> In particular, one might compare this definition with the descriptions of 
>> set theory and the predicate logic of mathematics.  
>> 
>> Cheers
>> 
>> Jerry
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> -
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>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

2018-07-27 Thread Jerry LR Chandler
Auke
Please explain the relationship between your suggestion and my comment.
Thanks
Jerry

Sent from my iPad

> On Jul 27, 2018, at 3:31 AM, Auke van Breemen  wrote:
> 
> Jerry,
>  
> Don’t confuse mathematical logic with normative logic.
>  
> Best,
>  
> Auke van Breemen
>  
> Van: Jerry LR Chandler  
> Verzonden: donderdag 26 juli 2018 23:55
> Aan: Peirce List 
> CC: Jon Alan Schmidt 
> Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification
>  
> List:
>  
> On Jul 26, 2018, at 4:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
>  
> For normative science in general being the science of the laws of conformity 
> of things to ends, esthetics considers those things whose ends are to embody 
> qualities of feeling, ethics those things whose ends lie in action, and logic 
> those things whose end is to represent something. (CP 5.121-124&129, EP 
> 2:196-197&200; 1903) (my emphasis of phrase.)
>  
> This is, perhaps, the most remarkable characterization of logic I have ever 
> read!
>  
> In particular, one might compare this definition with the descriptions of set 
> theory and the predicate logic of mathematics.  
>  
> Cheers
>  
> Jerry
>  
>  
> 
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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> 
> 
> 
> 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

2018-07-27 Thread Auke van Breemen
Jerry,

 

Don't confuse mathematical logic with normative logic. 

 

Best,

 

Auke van Breemen

 

Van: Jerry LR Chandler  
Verzonden: donderdag 26 juli 2018 23:55
Aan: Peirce List 
CC: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Depth and Signification

 

List:

 

On Jul 26, 2018, at 4:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote:

 

For normative science in general being the science of the laws of conformity
of things to ends, esthetics considers those things whose ends are to embody
qualities of feeling, ethics those things whose ends lie in action, and
logic those things whose end is to represent something. (CP 5.121-124&129,
EP 2:196-197&200; 1903) (my emphasis of phrase.)

 

This is, perhaps, the most remarkable characterization of logic I have ever
read!

 

In particular, one might compare this definition with the descriptions of
set theory and the predicate logic of mathematics.  

 

Cheers

 

Jerry

 

 


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