Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Stephen:

The nature of transcendence is an intriguing challenge in most disciplines 
because of the meaning of its L. root.

Can you clarify how transcendence relates to the scope and scale of predicates?

Cheers
Jerry

Sent from my iPad

> On Feb 4, 2019, at 5:30 AM, Stephen Curtiss Rose  wrote:
> 
> Transcendence is half a binary. Binaries are all suspect. Generally they can 
> be assumed to be one rather than two. Explicitly there is no way to assume a 
> creator without assuming that a triadic reality exists in which Love, for 
> example, is both what binary language calls transcendent and immanent. Other 
> suspect binaries are heart/mind and physical/metaphysical. To accept any half 
> as the truth is to miss what is the case. A triadic view would see such 
> "opposites" not as either-or's, but as part of the same universal sea which 
> we can perceive only in part and which we experience as evolving, 
>  
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
> 
> 
>> On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 2:13 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>> Helmut, list
>> 
>> I don't agree with any kind of transcendental force/agency - so, I wouldn't 
>> agree with either panentheism or theism, both of which assume an agential 
>> force that transcends time and space. My problem with pantheism, which does 
>> NOT have this transcendental agency but instead, refers o an 'immanent 
>> agent' , is - what is their definition of 'god'?
>> 
>> I don't think that psychology or semiotics can stop people from acting out 
>> their emotional natures!
>> 
>> Edwina
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> On Sun 03/02/19 1:57 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>> 
>> Edwina, list,
>> You wrote: "I think that the ills of society are caused by the human 
>> psychological nature - nothing to do with either religion or science and 
>> following either will not change the effects of a bad psychological nature. 
>> That is - the 'deadly sins' of greed, lust, pride , envy, gluttony, wrath 
>> and sloth are psychological and can only be dealt with by deliberate 
>> personal reasoning and action. Neither science nor religion plays any role."
>>  
>> I think, that these sins are of psychological and systemical and semiotic 
>> nature. Therefore, sciences like psychology, systems theory and semiotics 
>> can play a role. However, they cannot change human instinctive nature in the 
>> way that they (the sciences) could take away the reasons for these sins, but 
>> can help people (also people in leading positions) to reflect their 
>> proneness to them, how they can better overcome them and watch their own 
>> behaviour (civilize them).
>>  
>> Religions play the role, that they reduce the sins inside the belief 
>> community, but amplify them between the belief communities.
>>  
>> Separate theologies cannot help, I think, but some kind of meta-theology 
>> can. Atheists and theists will not change their beliefs, but to get them 
>> round the conference table, I think it is good to reduce (temporarily for 
>> this purpose) the God-concept to the common denominator "pantheism", or 
>> "panentheism". I think, "panentheism" is better, because it does not deny 
>> every kind of separatedness or otherness of God, so cannot be denounced by 
>> theists as completely atheistic.
>>  
>> Best,
>> Helmut
>>  
>>  03. Februar 2019 um 15:24 Uhr
>> "Edwina Taborsky"
>> wrote:
>>  
>> Gary R
>> 
>> 1] Just a comment on your view of the role of science and religion in a 
>> society.
>> 
>> I don't agree that the cause of the 'ills' of society is a 'limited view of 
>> god' or a chasm between science and religion. Such a viewpoint suggests that 
>> atheism, my view, 'contributes to the ills of society' - and of course I 
>> wouldn't agree with that.
>> 
>> Religion, of any type, is a belief system. You either believe in it - or 
>> not. There is no evidence. Its axioms are infallible and outside of debate. 
>> Science is subject to empirical objective and repeatable evidence - and its 
>> axioms are fallible.
>> 
>> I don't see how anything can 'bridge this gap'.
>> 
>> I think that the ills of society are caused by the human psychological 
>> nature - nothing to do with either religion or science and following either 
>> will not change the effects of a bad psychological nature. That is - the 
>> 'deadly sins' of greed, lust, pride , envy, gluttony, wrath and sloth are 
>> psychological and can only be dealt with by deliberate personal reasoning 
>> and action. Neither science nor religion plays any role.
>> 
>> And therefore - nothing to do with gunpowder, fossil fuels or Facebook. If 
>> mankind didn't have gunpowder - he's use spears, arrows and poisons...to 
>> deal with his greed, envy, wrath etc. Fossil fuels have enabled the growth 
>> of technologies that have benefited mankind - from medical care, to heating 
>> and cooling our homes, to better sanitation and health and water supplies, 
>> to enabling more people to be provided with food and care, and travel and so 
>> on. As for Facebook - no co

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Semiotic Argument for the Reality of God

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

Transcendence is half a binary. Binaries are all suspect. Generally they
can be assumed to be one rather than two. Explicitly there is no way to
assume a creator without assuming that a triadic reality exists in which
Love, for example, is both what binary language calls transcendent and
immanent. Other suspect binaries are heart/mind and physical/metaphysical.
To accept any half as the truth is to miss what is the case. A triadic view
would see such "opposites" not as either-or's, but as part of the same
universal sea which we can perceive only in part and which we experience as
evolving,

amazon.com/author/stephenrose


On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 2:13 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Helmut, list
>
> I don't agree with any kind of transcendental force/agency - so, I
> wouldn't agree with either panentheism or theism, both of which assume an
> agential force that transcends time and space. My problem with pantheism,
> which does NOT have this transcendental agency but instead, refers o an
> 'immanent agent' , is - what is their definition of 'god'?
>
> I don't think that psychology or semiotics can stop people from acting
> out their emotional natures!
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Sun 03/02/19 1:57 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>
> Edwina, list,
> You wrote: "I think that the ills of society are caused by the human
> psychological nature - nothing to do with either religion or science and
> following either will not change the effects of a bad psychological nature.
> That is - the 'deadly sins' of greed, lust, pride , envy, gluttony, wrath
> and sloth are psychological and can only be dealt with by deliberate
> personal reasoning and action. Neither science nor religion plays any role."
>
> I think, that these sins are of psychological and systemical and semiotic
> nature. Therefore, sciences like psychology, systems theory and semiotics
> can play a role. However, they cannot change human instinctive nature in
> the way that they (the sciences) could take away the reasons for these
> sins, but can help people (also people in leading positions) to reflect
> their proneness to them, how they can better overcome them and watch their
> own behaviour (civilize them).
>
> Religions play the role, that they reduce the sins inside the belief
> community, but amplify them between the belief communities.
>
> Separate theologies cannot help, I think, but some kind of meta-theology
> can. Atheists and theists will not change their beliefs, but to get them
> round the conference table, I think it is good to reduce (temporarily for
> this purpose) the God-concept to the common denominator "pantheism", or
> "panentheism". I think, "panentheism" is better, because it does not deny
> every kind of separatedness or otherness of God, so cannot be denounced by
> theists as completely atheistic.
>
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  03. Februar 2019 um 15:24 Uhr
> "Edwina Taborsky"
> wrote:
>
>
> Gary R
>
> 1] Just a comment on your view of the role of science and religion in a
> society.
>
> I don't agree that the cause of the 'ills' of society is a 'limited view
> of god' or a chasm between science and religion. Such a viewpoint suggests
> that atheism, my view, 'contributes to the ills of society' - and of course
> I wouldn't agree with that.
>
> Religion, of any type, is a belief system. You either believe in it - or
> not. There is no evidence. Its axioms are infallible and outside of debate.
> Science is subject to empirical objective and repeatable evidence - and its
> axioms are fallible.
>
> I don't see how anything can 'bridge this gap'.
>
> I think that the ills of society are caused by the human psychological
> nature - nothing to do with either religion or science and following either
> will not change the effects of a bad psychological nature. That is -
> the 'deadly sins' of greed, lust, pride , envy, gluttony, wrath and sloth
> are psychological and can only be dealt with by deliberate personal
> reasoning and action. Neither science nor religion plays any role.
>
> And therefore - nothing to do with gunpowder, fossil fuels or Facebook. If
> mankind didn't have gunpowder - he's use spears, arrows and poisons...to
> deal with his greed, envy, wrath etc. Fossil fuels have enabled the growth
> of technologies that have benefited mankind - from medical care, to
> heating and cooling our homes, to better sanitation and health and water
> supplies, to enabling more people to be provided with food and care, and
> travel and so on. As for Facebook - no comment...other than gossip is
> gossip.
>
> 2] I will not get into any discussion about JAS's view of god and Peirce -
> since I disagree with his interpretation and consider that his own personal
> theism plays a large role in that outline.
>
> My caution is that semiosis is a rational action, an action, as Peirce
> said, of Mind - and we should be careful how we define Mind.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Sat 02/02/19 11:54 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Jon, list,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alen,

 

I recognized your approach as similar to mine. I will respond short to two 
related issues:

1.  Your diagrammatic approach
2.  The issue of continuity and discrete points

 

André De Tienne suggested to mimic the EG’s in phenomenology, i.e. making 
diagrammatic representations which can be operated upon. I suggest to do the 
same with semiotics, using the semiotic terminology. It is from this 
perspective that I read your point, line, plane, spaces diagram. 

 

Let’s indeed assume the continuity of semiosis and relegate it to the space 
level. And, that we only isolate discrete instances for specific purposes.

This would mean that at the space level nothing is specified for a specific 
purpose yet. So, on the space level we look at the continuous process in very 
general terms, something like input – output. 

If we want to become specific we have to go to the plane on which the 
pheme’s/propositions can be specified, together with the specific purpose that 
guides our interest. At 
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-642-55355-4_3.pdf p. 27 
Fig. 3 you will find the way I would organize the plane at the most general 
plane level. At the bottom we have the indication of mayor (state in semiotics) 
and minor (effect in semiotics). At the top we have the specific purpose 
vaguely indicated.

 

We become more specific if we go from the plane to the line and points, see 
Fig. 1 at page 26. In this figure we may relate the plane to the space by 
assuming a line of identity orthogonally running through the index position, 
signifying the continuous input – output relation. On the plane itself we 
measure and become specific. Since Peirce entertains a notion of involvement 
(lower sign types/aspects are involved in the higher) and we are aiming at 
diagramming the doleme, we may assume all sign aspects involved in any doleme. 
Of course only if the specific result is to be reached. If not, some aspects 
will be failing. A case in point would be the occurrence of a type that is not 
familiar to the interpreting state. In this case the process would fail on the 
legisign aspect. Etc.

 

Along these lines, we could build a diagrammatic system that can be of 
practical use and operated upon.

 

Best,

 

Auke

 

 

 

 

 

 

Van: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Verzonden: zondag 3 februari 2019 20:30
Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

 

Auke, List:

 

AvB:  What we need is a semiotic definition of the (argument) delome. How can 
we explicate with the semiotic terminology the process of semiosis that is 
captured in logic by the term argument?

 

I agree with this general approach, and have sought to offer some suggestions 
that I hope are gesturing more or less in the right direction; in particular, 
my proposed diagram of Semes/Subjects as continuous lines, Phemes/Propositions 
as continuous planes, Delomes/Arguments as continuous spaces, and Instances as 
discrete points that we mark where these all coincide.  I believe that this 
last aspect conveniently reflects the fundamental unity of connected Signs; 
perhaps it is a corollary of Peirce's "theorem of the science of semeiotics" 
that if any Instances are connected, no matter how, the resulting system 
constitutes one Instance.

 

Returning to my original post on "Continuity of Semiosis"--just as the motion 
of any individual body is truly continuous, and we only mark discrete positions 
for specific purposes, the thought of any individual Quasi-mind (i.e., 
semiosis) is truly continuous, and we only isolate discrete Instances for 
specific purposes.  That includes when we decompose a Delome/Argument into 
Phemes/Propositions connected by a Logical Leading Principle, and a 
Pheme/Proposition into Semes/Subjects connected by a Continuous Predicate.


Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 7:05 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

List,

Some days ago we enjoyed the discussion of two related issues.
1. Is the Peircean semiotic terminology is too esoteric for the world at large
2. The value of Peircean semiotics is such that we need to use common language 
in order to have it achieve the influence it deserves.

I wonder whether this is the right way of looking at the problem. Maybe Short 
is right when he typifies Peirce's semiotic endeavor as much groping with 
little conclusions. If he is right it is not the esoteric terminology, that 
prevents semiotics the get the influence it ought to have. That terminology may 
prove to be technical language needed for a grammar of the speculative faculty, 
which is not confined to the mind according to Peirce, hence argument becomes 
delome.

If Short is ri

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

[Auke van Breemen]

Jerry,

 

In my opinion: Yours is a pretty good indication of what I would regard as the 
hard core of the research program, i.e. the three categories or a triadic 
approach.

 

Best,

 

Auke

 

Van: Jerry Rhee  
Verzonden: zondag 3 februari 2019 22:27
Aan: Auke van Breemen 
CC: John F Sowa ; Peirce-L 
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate

 

Auke, list,

 

I appreciate what you are doing.  

 As you say, you ignore D, E, F, G, H, I, J..  X, Y, Z, AA, BB, CC, etc..

 

.. these three kinds of consciousness are entirely unlike; 

.. that they are connected with the ideas of one, two, three which are the 
three elementary forms with which logical analysis has to deal.

 

One being the form of a simple idea, 

two that of an ordinary relative idea, and 

three the only simple form of combination of a direct union of more than two 
ideas..

 

I don't pretend that my argument that there are only three kinds of 
consciousness does more than raise a presumption by the precision with which I 
succeed in defining a great variety of terms without calling in any fourth 
element. 

 

It will remain for those who question the conclusion to find a term I cannot 
define with this apparatus.(~ CP 8.304)

 

one two three.. C A B.. already written.

 

Best,

Jerry R

 

On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 7:05 AM Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote:

List,

Some days ago we enjoyed the discussion of two related issues.
1. Is the Peircean semiotic terminology is too esoteric for the world at large
2. The value of Peircean semiotics is such that we need to use common language 
in order to have it achieve the influence it deserves.

I wonder whether this is the right way of looking at the problem. Maybe Short 
is right when he typifies Peirce's semiotic endeavor as much groping with 
little conclusions. If he is right it is not the esoteric terminology, that 
prevents semiotics the get the influence it ought to have. That terminology may 
prove to be technical language needed for a grammar of the speculative faculty, 
which is not confined to the mind according to Peirce, hence argument becomes 
delome.

If Short is right it is the lack of being a well defined research program 
(Lakatos) that is the problem and not the terms of the semiotic trade.

I hold it that the conclusion of the exchange between Jon Alen and John Sowa 
points in this direction:

JAS:
> I believe that we are now at the point where we will simply have to 
> accept our disagreement and move on.

John:
That is certainly true.  The evidence shows that Peirce defined a seme as a 
predicate or quasi-predicate.  Continuity cannot have any effect on that 
definition.  There is nothing more to say.

(To be clear about my position I side with Jon Alan on this issue)

Of course, given the value of Peirce's groping, it is worth considering his 
considerations, but in the end, if semiotics is the have any influence at all 
it is because it is transformed into a promising research program and not 
because of what Peirce did contribute to that enterprise. What we need is a 
semiotic definition of the (argument) delome. How can we explicate with the 
semiotic terminology the process of semiosis that is captured in logic by the 
term argument? 

In other words, if we look at Peirce's intellectual development we may find 
many different attempts to sort things out, we may look at the changes as 
improvements/distractions, but we must not forget that the different terms 
introduced may co-exist as different angles on the same object. Both 
possibilities can be pointed at in Peirce's writings. I think the 
experimentation with the first trichotomy of sign aspects delivers an example 
of differences in perspective:

On the terminological level Peirce experimented

He suggested:
A(1) potisign, (2) actisign, and (3) famisign,  as an alternative 
trichotomy for 
B   (1) qualisign, (2) sinsign and (3) legisign,but he also introduced
C   (1) tuone , (2) token and (3) type. 

In each of this cases he looks in my opinion at the matter from a different 
angle
With A we look at signs from the perspective of an interaction of an 
interpreting system and a sign, it opens up the communicative perspective,
With B we look at signs from the perspective of signs we find in our world, it 
opens up the sign structure perspective
With C. we look at signs from the perspective of the interpretation of a sign, 
how it affects the interpreting system, it associates signs with the 
phaneroscopic endeavour.

A legisign needs not to be a famisign for any given interpreter. The exchange 
Jon Alan and I had about the type could be resolved by taking recourse to the 
type-legisign distinction, by admitting Jan Alan is right in his interpretation 
of type, which is informed by phaneroscopic considerations, a similarity in 
tokens, and reserve legisign for my opinion which allows different tokens to be 
taken as the same. For instance wh