Jon Alen,
I recognized your approach as similar to mine. I will respond short to two related issues: 1. Your diagrammatic approach 2. The issue of continuity and discrete points André De Tienne suggested to mimic the EG’s in phenomenology, i.e. making diagrammatic representations which can be operated upon. I suggest to do the same with semiotics, using the semiotic terminology. It is from this perspective that I read your point, line, plane, spaces diagram. Let’s indeed assume the continuity of semiosis and relegate it to the space level. And, that we only isolate discrete instances for specific purposes. This would mean that at the space level nothing is specified for a specific purpose yet. So, on the space level we look at the continuous process in very general terms, something like input – output. If we want to become specific we have to go to the plane on which the pheme’s/propositions can be specified, together with the specific purpose that guides our interest. At https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-642-55355-4_3.pdf p. 27 Fig. 3 you will find the way I would organize the plane at the most general plane level. At the bottom we have the indication of mayor (state in semiotics) and minor (effect in semiotics). At the top we have the specific purpose vaguely indicated. We become more specific if we go from the plane to the line and points, see Fig. 1 at page 26. In this figure we may relate the plane to the space by assuming a line of identity orthogonally running through the index position, signifying the continuous input – output relation. On the plane itself we measure and become specific. Since Peirce entertains a notion of involvement (lower sign types/aspects are involved in the higher) and we are aiming at diagramming the doleme, we may assume all sign aspects involved in any doleme. Of course only if the specific result is to be reached. If not, some aspects will be failing. A case in point would be the occurrence of a type that is not familiar to the interpreting state. In this case the process would fail on the legisign aspect. Etc. Along these lines, we could build a diagrammatic system that can be of practical use and operated upon. Best, Auke Van: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Verzonden: zondag 3 februari 2019 20:30 Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A seme is a predicate or a quasi-predicate Auke, List: AvB: What we need is a semiotic definition of the (argument) delome. How can we explicate with the semiotic terminology the process of semiosis that is captured in logic by the term argument? I agree with this general approach, and have sought to offer some suggestions that I hope are gesturing more or less in the right direction; in particular, my proposed diagram of Semes/Subjects as continuous lines, Phemes/Propositions as continuous planes, Delomes/Arguments as continuous spaces, and Instances as discrete points that we mark where these all coincide. I believe that this last aspect conveniently reflects the fundamental unity of connected Signs; perhaps it is a corollary of Peirce's "theorem of the science of semeiotics" that if any Instances are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one Instance. Returning to my original post on "Continuity of Semiosis"--just as the motion of any individual body is truly continuous, and we only mark discrete positions for specific purposes, the thought of any individual Quasi-mind (i.e., semiosis) is truly continuous, and we only isolate discrete Instances for specific purposes. That includes when we decompose a Delome/Argument into Phemes/Propositions connected by a Logical Leading Principle, and a Pheme/Proposition into Semes/Subjects connected by a Continuous Predicate. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Sun, Feb 3, 2019 at 7:05 AM Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl <mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote: List, Some days ago we enjoyed the discussion of two related issues. 1. Is the Peircean semiotic terminology is too esoteric for the world at large 2. The value of Peircean semiotics is such that we need to use common language in order to have it achieve the influence it deserves. I wonder whether this is the right way of looking at the problem. Maybe Short is right when he typifies Peirce's semiotic endeavor as much groping with little conclusions. If he is right it is not the esoteric terminology, that prevents semiotics the get the influence it ought to have. That terminology may prove to be technical language needed for a grammar of the speculative faculty, which is not confined to the mind according to Peirce, hence argument becomes delome. If Short is right it is the lack of being a well defined research program (Lakatos) that is the problem and not the terms of the semiotic trade. I hold it that the conclusion of the exchange between Jon Alen and John Sowa points in this direction: JAS: > I believe that we are now at the point where we will simply have to > accept our disagreement and move on. John: That is certainly true. The evidence shows that Peirce defined a seme as a predicate or quasi-predicate. Continuity cannot have any effect on that definition. There is nothing more to say. (To be clear about my position I side with Jon Alan on this issue) Of course, given the value of Peirce's groping, it is worth considering his considerations, but in the end, if semiotics is the have any influence at all it is because it is transformed into a promising research program and not because of what Peirce did contribute to that enterprise. What we need is a semiotic definition of the (argument) delome. How can we explicate with the semiotic terminology the process of semiosis that is captured in logic by the term argument? In other words, if we look at Peirce's intellectual development we may find many different attempts to sort things out, we may look at the changes as improvements/distractions, but we must not forget that the different terms introduced may co-exist as different angles on the same object. Both possibilities can be pointed at in Peirce's writings. I think the experimentation with the first trichotomy of sign aspects delivers an example of differences in perspective: On the terminological level Peirce experimented He suggested: A (1) potisign, (2) actisign, and (3) famisign, as an alternative trichotomy for B (1) qualisign, (2) sinsign and (3) legisign, but he also introduced C (1) tuone , (2) token and (3) type. In each of this cases he looks in my opinion at the matter from a different angle With A we look at signs from the perspective of an interaction of an interpreting system and a sign, it opens up the communicative perspective, With B we look at signs from the perspective of signs we find in our world, it opens up the sign structure perspective With C. we look at signs from the perspective of the interpretation of a sign, how it affects the interpreting system, it associates signs with the phaneroscopic endeavour. A legisign needs not to be a famisign for any given interpreter. The exchange Jon Alan and I had about the type could be resolved by taking recourse to the type-legisign distinction, by admitting Jan Alan is right in his interpretation of type, which is informed by phaneroscopic considerations, a similarity in tokens, and reserve legisign for my opinion which allows different tokens to be taken as the same. For instance when we deal with the spoken and written forms. Familiarity may overcome differences in form by an established law; because two different forms raise the same symbol habitually. It acts as a same sign. Best, Auke van Breemen
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