Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, Jon S, List,


In order to ground the suggestions I made in a text, consider what Peirce says 
in MS 518 about the sheet of assertion. This manuscript is part of a larger 
project to explain the connections between the first principles of logical 
algebra and the EG.


§1. As the fundamental transformations of any algebra, if strict logical method 
is desired, choose indecomposable transformations. But an indecomposable 
transformation is either an omission or an insertion, since any other may be 
analyzed into an omission followed by an insertion.

§2. The algebraic symbols are written on the surface of paper, wherein it is 
assumed that a surface is capable of representing every logical relation. That 
the surface must be capable of iconically representing every logical relation 
is not evident; and though it is true, I shall not here have occasion to prove 
it.

We provide ourselves, therefore, with a surface which we call the sheet of 
assertion; and pretend to hold ourselves responsible for the truth of whatever 
we may write upon it.

But as long as it remains blank we are irresponsible. Hence, the first rule of 
transformation will be

Rule I. The whole of what is written on the sheet of assertion may be erased, 
without danger of falsehood.


Here is the passage I find particularly suggestive:  "That the surface must be 
capable of iconically representing every logical relation is not evident; and 
though it is true, I shall not here have occasion to prove it."


So, instead of saying that a diagrammatic system of logic depends upon certain 
relations being invisible, I would say that the system makes clear to us not 
only what has been explicitly asserted on a sheet--but also what can be 
asserted that is consistent with what has been thus far. As such, the blank 
sheet iconically represents all that is logically possible (1) at each 
indeterminate point and (2) on the surface as a whole within the given system 
of logical hypotheses.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Monday, April 8, 2019 7:22 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic


Jeff, Jon,

Thanks for your comments, all helpful! Though I may need more time to study 
yours, Jeff, and see how it relates to phaneroscopy.

I recall that Michael Polanyi wrote a book on The Tacit Dimension. Maybe that’s 
a good name for what the blank sheet of assertion represents.

Gary f.



From: Jeffrey Brian Downard 
Sent: 7-Apr-19 17:49
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic



Gary F, Jon S, List,



GF:  The iconicity of EGs avoids such verbal inconsistency by minimizing the 
use of words; but the system only works as a representation of Thought if we 
recognize the absence of lines as a mode of connection. The system appears to 
involve invisible icons!



Instead of describing the relations under consideration in terms of what is 
invisible, I would stress Peirce's point, made several times in NDDR, to the 
effect that the representation of every logical relation implies something 
about some type of inverse of the relation. Without getting into the details of 
the matter, allow me to gesture in the direction of the broader ideas that are 
in play.



In saying that a relation of agent and patient holds between relate and 
correlate that stand as dynamical dyads, it follows that the relation is not 
merely one of dyadic reference, and that is not a mere referential relation, 
and that is not a mere dyadic identity, etc. In other words, every assertion of 
some relation involves indefinitely many implications about what is and is not 
possible with respect to the converse of the relation--and so too with all 
other relations that are composed of such relations. Peirce takes the time to 
provide a nomenclature system inspired by the system used in organic chemistry 
in order to spell out what is and is not involved in the inverse or converse of 
progressively richer sorts of relations.



What follows from the blank sheet of assertion?  At every possible point where 
there is no assertion, the open space has implications that extend to any and 
every kind of relation that might, within a given system (e.g., such as the 
gamma graphs) be written on the sheet. As such, every possible point on any 
sheet of assertion involves all of the possible assertions that could be made 
at any point that are consistent with what is written elsewhere. If nothing has 
yet been scribed and the sheet is blank, that leaves a lot of possibilities.



What should we say about an assertion involving three nested cuts? For all of 
those points outside the outmost cut, there is no fourth or fifth cut. So too 
for the areas inside of the cuts. In addition to expressing what is positively 
the case, each assertion written in diagrammatic form also expre

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recovery from blindness (was Phaneroscopy and logic

[Dan Everett]

Kant is hard to pin down on these issues. I agree with your assessment Jeff, 
and I did order Smyth’s books that you mentioned (thanks!). But here is a bit 
of what I say of Kant in DMM:

"Apart from Kant's ontological commitments, I find this an appealing 
perspective. In fact it is easy to see the roots of American Pragmatism in 
Kant's writing, in particular in his views of realism and the limits of human 
knowledge.  Kant's notion of a priori categories are perhaps best translated in 
my terms into the idea of an inborn ability of humans to generalize and learn 
by any means. Kant rightly observed in effect that without a learner there is 
no learning. Thus humans must be born to be learners – individual humans have 
innate capacities to adjust to the world that they encounter (as all living 
creatures do). His view is that such learning is partially the application of 
highly specific categories to shape our perceptions. But statistical learners, 
even computer simulations, show that not all learning requires specific 
concepts.
Moreover, as we see later on, Kant's notions of the 
interrelationship between experience and intelligence fail to consider other 
mediators between the external world and the mind. First, like many before him, 
and most after him, Kant saw the mind rather than the individual as the locus 
of learning (which is why he had little to say about interactions between 
reasoning, emotions, and physiology). Second, Kant overlooked the richness of 
potential unconscious tacit knowledge, acquired during one's life – failing to 
recognize the vast amount of learning that is subliminal ("subceptive 
learning", Rogers (1996 [1961])).  Third, some of Kant's discussion of 
subjective vs. objective knowledge seems best recast in terms of emotion and 
perception, i.e. complementary modes of relating to an object, which may be 
objective or subjective and which do not follow from properties of the object 
itself but from the role of experience-based dark matter in our relationship to 
the world in which we live and form a part. For example, take his illustration 
of the perception of a house, in comments on Leibniz:

 

"The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for 
otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at 
all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be 
impossible or else at least would be nothing at all." (Kant B162)

 

Thus at once Kant writes off dark matter of the mind as "nothing at 
all" because it is not and often may not or even cannot be the object of "I 
think," nor is it simply representational. Obviously, "knowing-how," therefore, 
does not follow under a Kantian conception of apperception. But neither does 
knowledge of grammatical rules, taste in clothes, likes in foods, prelinguistic 
experiences as a child, muscle memory and so on. Kant's view of apperception 
therefore seems acutely inadequate …”

   

> On Apr 8, 2019, at 12:08 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> John, Dan, List,
> 
> In holding that our presentation of space as a whole has an a priori in 
> character, I do not believe that Kant was arguing in the first Critique that 
> we have a biological instinct to see things in a Euclidean way. Again, I 
> believe that Smyth's Forms of Intuition: an Historical Introduction to the 
> Transcendental Aesthetic provides an interpretation that is sensitive to the 
> texts and the sources from which Kant was drawing in developing these 
> arguments. It is worth noting that from early on (e.g., see "Questions 
> Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man"), Peirce interprets Kant's 
> account of our experience of space in a similar way and points out in a long 
> footnote that his own remarks about our perceptions involving spatiality and 
> temporality should not be interpreted as contrary to Kant's views on the main 
> points. 
> 
> Attributing to Kant the view that the a priori character of the presentation 
> of space implies that we have a biologically "instinctive" theory of space 
> that is inherently Euclidean in character runs directly at odds with the fact 
> that Kant was engaged in close discussions with Lambert who developed a 
> fairly extensive system of perspective geometry. In the transcendental 
> aesthetic, Kant is asking "what are the formal conditions for mapping in our 
> common sense and our scientific cognitions from one temporal or spatial 
> perspective onto another?" As far as I am able to determine, Peirce's 
> phenomenological theory is an attempt to generalize on this sort of question. 
> For both Kant and Peirce, biological explanations of what is or is not 
> instinctive will not answer philosophical questions about the formal 
> relations that are necessary for making valid inferences.
> 
> Having said that, I acknowledge that Peirce is keen to provide explanations 
> in philosophy that (a) fit with our common sense and 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recovery from blindness (was Phaneroscopy and logic

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

John, Dan, List,


In holding that our presentation of space as a whole has an a priori in 
character, I do not believe that Kant was arguing in the first Critique that we 
have a biological instinct to see things in a Euclidean way. Again, I believe 
that Smyth's Forms of Intuition: an Historical Introduction to the 
Transcendental Aesthetic provides an interpretation that is sensitive to the 
texts and the sources from which Kant was drawing in developing these 
arguments. It is worth noting that from early on (e.g., see "Questions 
Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man"), Peirce interprets Kant's 
account of our experience of space in a similar way and points out in a long 
footnote that his own remarks about our perceptions involving spatiality and 
temporality should not be interpreted as contrary to Kant's views on the main 
points.


Attributing to Kant the view that the a priori character of the presentation of 
space implies that we have a biologically "instinctive" theory of space that is 
inherently Euclidean in character runs directly at odds with the fact that Kant 
was engaged in close discussions with Lambert who developed a fairly extensive 
system of perspective geometry. In the transcendental aesthetic, Kant is asking 
"what are the formal conditions for mapping in our common sense and our 
scientific cognitions from one temporal or spatial perspective onto another?" 
As far as I am able to determine, Peirce's phenomenological theory is an 
attempt to generalize on this sort of question. For both Kant and Peirce, 
biological explanations of what is or is not instinctive will not answer 
philosophical questions about the formal relations that are necessary for 
making valid inferences.


Having said that, I acknowledge that Peirce is keen to provide explanations in 
philosophy that (a) fit with our common sense and (b) can be tested in the 
special sciences such as biology.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Dan Everett 
Sent: Monday, April 8, 2019 8:33:28 AM
To: John F Sowa
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recovery from blindness (was Phaneroscopy and logic

John,

Great stuff.

There is a huge amount of information that Kant was wrong about these things. 
Someone today mentioned Michael Polyani’s work on personal knowledge/tacit 
knowledge. And, at the risk of being a bore, there is my book, Dark Matter of 
the Mind: 
https://www.amazon.com/Dark-Matter-Mind-Articulated-Unconscious/dp/022607076X, 
in which I survey a lot of the literature, proposing my own theories (not as 
much interaction with Peirce as there should have been, I am sure).

There is also a point that Kant missed entirely and that Peirce had little 
chance to observe: cross-cultural variation.

Dan


On Apr 8, 2019, at 11:17 AM, John F Sowa 
mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:

This morning, I remembered some case studies of people who were
blind from early childhood and later recovered their sight.

Those studies cast doubt on Kant's claim that people have a
complete innate theory of space and time.  The brain may have
innate structure that facilitates learning about space and time,
but a lot of experience is necessary to fill in the details.

For example, Sydney Bradford lost his sight at age 10 months,
went to a school for the blind, and had a successful career
as a machinist.  He lived independently, could make his way
through traffic, and took public transportation to work.

Then at age 52, he had an operation that restored his sight.
Instead of being a confident, independent blind man, he became
a fearful, depressed man, who was terrified of crossing a street
in traffic, even with a friend holding his arm.

For a Wikipedia article about Sydney B. and others, see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recovery_from_blindness

For a 44-page article with much more detail about SB, see
http://www.richardgregory.org/papers/recovery_blind/recovery-from-early-blindness.pdf

By the way, that site has links to other articles by Richard G.
For example, see the attached "impossible" figure.  But it's
possible to construct an actual 3D object that looks like that.
See the article 
http://www.richardgregory.org/papers/brainmodels/illusions-and-brain-models_all.htm

Peirce wrote a lot about illusions, and he would have loved to see
that object.  It has implications about form, index, and percepts.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recovery from blindness (was Phaneroscopy and logic

[Dan Everett]

John,

Great stuff. 

There is a huge amount of information that Kant was wrong about these things. 
Someone today mentioned Michael Polyani’s work on personal knowledge/tacit 
knowledge. And, at the risk of being a bore, there is my book, Dark Matter of 
the Mind: 
https://www.amazon.com/Dark-Matter-Mind-Articulated-Unconscious/dp/022607076X 
,
 in which I survey a lot of the literature, proposing my own theories (not as 
much interaction with Peirce as there should have been, I am sure). 

There is also a point that Kant missed entirely and that Peirce had little 
chance to observe: cross-cultural variation. 

Dan


> On Apr 8, 2019, at 11:17 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> This morning, I remembered some case studies of people who were
> blind from early childhood and later recovered their sight.
> 
> Those studies cast doubt on Kant's claim that people have a
> complete innate theory of space and time.  The brain may have
> innate structure that facilitates learning about space and time,
> but a lot of experience is necessary to fill in the details.
> 
> For example, Sydney Bradford lost his sight at age 10 months,
> went to a school for the blind, and had a successful career
> as a machinist.  He lived independently, could make his way
> through traffic, and took public transportation to work.
> 
> Then at age 52, he had an operation that restored his sight.
> Instead of being a confident, independent blind man, he became
> a fearful, depressed man, who was terrified of crossing a street
> in traffic, even with a friend holding his arm.
> 
> For a Wikipedia article about Sydney B. and others, see
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recovery_from_blindness
> 
> For a 44-page article with much more detail about SB, see
> http://www.richardgregory.org/papers/recovery_blind/recovery-from-early-blindness.pdf
> 
> By the way, that site has links to other articles by Richard G.
> For example, see the attached "impossible" figure.  But it's
> possible to construct an actual 3D object that looks like that.
> See the article 
> http://www.richardgregory.org/papers/brainmodels/illusions-and-brain-models_all.htm
> 
> Peirce wrote a lot about illusions, and he would have loved to see
> that object.  It has implications about form, index, and percepts.
> 
> John
> 
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu 
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> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
> 
> 
> 
> 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recovery from blindness (was Phaneroscopy and logic

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

Nothing material is innate at least here. If we go with what wisdom and the
experience of many validate we are spirits/souls that continue occupying a
material frame. THat frame is amazing and wonderful but terminal. I am sure
Peirce would have shrunk form arguing for an afterlife that could be
described. But I am equally certain that he did not deny the possibility as
many binary-thinking folk do. It is part of the mystery which is universal
and which accounts for the degree of humility which is implicit in an arch
way in Peirce's texts.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose


On Mon, Apr 8, 2019 at 11:17 AM John F Sowa  wrote:

> This morning, I remembered some case studies of people who were
> blind from early childhood and later recovered their sight.
>
> Those studies cast doubt on Kant's claim that people have a
> complete innate theory of space and time.  The brain may have
> innate structure that facilitates learning about space and time,
> but a lot of experience is necessary to fill in the details.
>
> For example, Sydney Bradford lost his sight at age 10 months,
> went to a school for the blind, and had a successful career
> as a machinist.  He lived independently, could make his way
> through traffic, and took public transportation to work.
>
> Then at age 52, he had an operation that restored his sight.
> Instead of being a confident, independent blind man, he became
> a fearful, depressed man, who was terrified of crossing a street
> in traffic, even with a friend holding his arm.
>
> For a Wikipedia article about Sydney B. and others, see
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recovery_from_blindness
>
> For a 44-page article with much more detail about SB, see
>
> http://www.richardgregory.org/papers/recovery_blind/recovery-from-early-blindness.pdf
>
> By the way, that site has links to other articles by Richard G.
> For example, see the attached "impossible" figure.  But it's
> possible to construct an actual 3D object that looks like that.
> See the article
>
> http://www.richardgregory.org/papers/brainmodels/illusions-and-brain-models_all.htm
>
> Peirce wrote a lot about illusions, and he would have loved to see
> that object.  It has implications about form, index, and percepts.
>
> John
>

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[PEIRCE-L] Recovery from blindness (was Phaneroscopy and logic

[John F Sowa]

This morning, I remembered some case studies of people who were
blind from early childhood and later recovered their sight.

Those studies cast doubt on Kant's claim that people have a
complete innate theory of space and time.  The brain may have
innate structure that facilitates learning about space and time,
but a lot of experience is necessary to fill in the details.

For example, Sydney Bradford lost his sight at age 10 months,
went to a school for the blind, and had a successful career
as a machinist.  He lived independently, could make his way
through traffic, and took public transportation to work.

Then at age 52, he had an operation that restored his sight.
Instead of being a confident, independent blind man, he became
a fearful, depressed man, who was terrified of crossing a street
in traffic, even with a friend holding his arm.

For a Wikipedia article about Sydney B. and others, see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recovery_from_blindness

For a 44-page article with much more detail about SB, see
http://www.richardgregory.org/papers/recovery_blind/recovery-from-early-blindness.pdf

By the way, that site has links to other articles by Richard G.
For example, see the attached "impossible" figure.  But it's
possible to construct an actual 3D object that looks like that.
See the article 
http://www.richardgregory.org/papers/brainmodels/illusions-and-brain-models_all.htm


Peirce wrote a lot about illusions, and he would have loved to see
that object.  It has implications about form, index, and percepts.

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

[gnox]

Jeff, Jon,

Thanks for your comments, all helpful! Though I may need more time to study 
yours, Jeff, and see how it relates to phaneroscopy.

I recall that Michael Polanyi wrote a book on The Tacit Dimension. Maybe that’s 
a good name for what the blank sheet of assertion represents.

Gary f.

 

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard  
Sent: 7-Apr-19 17:49
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

 

Gary F, Jon S, List,

 

GF:  The iconicity of EGs avoids such verbal inconsistency by minimizing the 
use of words; but the system only works as a representation of Thought if we 
recognize the absence of lines as a mode of connection. The system appears to 
involve invisible icons!

 

Instead of describing the relations under consideration in terms of what is 
invisible, I would stress Peirce's point, made several times in NDDR, to the 
effect that the representation of every logical relation implies something 
about some type of inverse of the relation. Without getting into the details of 
the matter, allow me to gesture in the direction of the broader ideas that are 
in play. 

 

In saying that a relation of agent and patient holds between relate and 
correlate that stand as dynamical dyads, it follows that the relation is not 
merely one of dyadic reference, and that is not a mere referential relation, 
and that is not a mere dyadic identity, etc. In other words, every assertion of 
some relation involves indefinitely many implications about what is and is not 
possible with respect to the converse of the relation--and so too with all 
other relations that are composed of such relations. Peirce takes the time to 
provide a nomenclature system inspired by the system used in organic chemistry 
in order to spell out what is and is not involved in the inverse or converse of 
progressively richer sorts of relations. 

 

What follows from the blank sheet of assertion?  At every possible point where 
there is no assertion, the open space has implications that extend to any and 
every kind of relation that might, within a given system (e.g., such as the 
gamma graphs) be written on the sheet. As such, every possible point on any 
sheet of assertion involves all of the possible assertions that could be made 
at any point that are consistent with what is written elsewhere. If nothing has 
yet been scribed and the sheet is blank, that leaves a lot of possibilities. 

 

What should we say about an assertion involving three nested cuts? For all of 
those points outside the outmost cut, there is no fourth or fifth cut. So too 
for the areas inside of the cuts. In addition to expressing what is positively 
the case, each assertion written in diagrammatic form also expresses--and 
thereby allows us to see--what is and is not possible in terms of the converse 
relations.

 

--Jeff

 

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

 

  _  

From: Jon Alan Schmidt mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >
Sent: Sunday, April 7, 2019 1:06 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu  
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic 

 

Gary F., List:

 

Just a few quick responses to some of your comments over the last couple of 
days.

 

GF:  I hesitated over your statement that “a definition can only serve as an 
Immediate Interpretant,” because I don’t think that applies to a term defined 
for use in pure mathematics ...

 

Yes, I had in mind mainly linguistic Semes that purport to represent real 
Objects.  A definition in pure mathematics is more of a hypothetical stipulation

 

GF:  But it took me a while to recognize that the absence of lines is also a 
mode of connection, as Peirce says above, and that both of these are 
“degenerate Secundan,” i.e. symmetrical dyadic relations in which there is no 
reaction of one correlate upon the other where one is relatively active and the 
other relatively passive.

 

I agree that neither correlate is active or passive with respect to the 
other--that is what makes these relations symmetrical rather than 
asymmetric--but I think that it would be misleading to say on this basis that 
there is no reaction between them at all.  On the contrary, coexistence is 
precisely a form of reaction--"existence is that mode of being which consists 
in the resultant genuine dyadic relation of a strict individual with all the 
other such individuals of the same universe" (CP 6.336; 1908).

 

GF:  The iconicity of EGs avoids such verbal inconsistency by minimizing the 
use of words; but the system only works as a representation of Thought if we 
recognize the absence of lines as a mode of connection. The system appears to 
involve invisible icons!

 

I suggest that the Icons in question are invisible because their Objects are 
likewise invisible; i.e., invisibility is one of the respects in which the 
absence of lines resembles the mode of connection that constitutes coexistence. 
 Reca