Gary F, Jon S, List,

In order to ground the suggestions I made in a text, consider what Peirce says 
in MS 518 about the sheet of assertion. This manuscript is part of a larger 
project to explain the connections between the first principles of logical 
algebra and the EG.


§1. As the fundamental transformations of any algebra, if strict logical method 
is desired, choose indecomposable transformations. But an indecomposable 
transformation is either an omission or an insertion, since any other may be 
analyzed into an omission followed by an insertion.

§2. The algebraic symbols are written on the surface of paper, wherein it is 
assumed that a surface is capable of representing every logical relation. That 
the surface must be capable of iconically representing every logical relation 
is not evident; and though it is true, I shall not here have occasion to prove 
it.

We provide ourselves, therefore, with a surface which we call the sheet of 
assertion; and pretend to hold ourselves responsible for the truth of whatever 
we may write upon it.

But as long as it remains blank we are irresponsible. Hence, the first rule of 
transformation will be

Rule I. The whole of what is written on the sheet of assertion may be erased, 
without danger of falsehood.


Here is the passage I find particularly suggestive:  "That the surface must be 
capable of iconically representing every logical relation is not evident; and 
though it is true, I shall not here have occasion to prove it."


So, instead of saying that a diagrammatic system of logic depends upon certain 
relations being invisible, I would say that the system makes clear to us not 
only what has been explicitly asserted on a sheet--but also what can be 
asserted that is consistent with what has been thus far. As such, the blank 
sheet iconically represents all that is logically possible (1) at each 
indeterminate point and (2) on the surface as a whole within the given system 
of logical hypotheses.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354


________________________________
From: g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca>
Sent: Monday, April 8, 2019 7:22 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic


Jeff, Jon,

Thanks for your comments, all helpful! Though I may need more time to study 
yours, Jeff, and see how it relates to phaneroscopy.

I recall that Michael Polanyi wrote a book on The Tacit Dimension. Maybe that’s 
a good name for what the blank sheet of assertion represents.

Gary f.



From: Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>
Sent: 7-Apr-19 17:49
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic



Gary F, Jon S, List,



GF:  The iconicity of EGs avoids such verbal inconsistency by minimizing the 
use of words; but the system only works as a representation of Thought if we 
recognize the absence of lines as a mode of connection. The system appears to 
involve invisible icons!



Instead of describing the relations under consideration in terms of what is 
invisible, I would stress Peirce's point, made several times in NDDR, to the 
effect that the representation of every logical relation implies something 
about some type of inverse of the relation. Without getting into the details of 
the matter, allow me to gesture in the direction of the broader ideas that are 
in play.



In saying that a relation of agent and patient holds between relate and 
correlate that stand as dynamical dyads, it follows that the relation is not 
merely one of dyadic reference, and that is not a mere referential relation, 
and that is not a mere dyadic identity, etc. In other words, every assertion of 
some relation involves indefinitely many implications about what is and is not 
possible with respect to the converse of the relation--and so too with all 
other relations that are composed of such relations. Peirce takes the time to 
provide a nomenclature system inspired by the system used in organic chemistry 
in order to spell out what is and is not involved in the inverse or converse of 
progressively richer sorts of relations.



What follows from the blank sheet of assertion?  At every possible point where 
there is no assertion, the open space has implications that extend to any and 
every kind of relation that might, within a given system (e.g., such as the 
gamma graphs) be written on the sheet. As such, every possible point on any 
sheet of assertion involves all of the possible assertions that could be made 
at any point that are consistent with what is written elsewhere. If nothing has 
yet been scribed and the sheet is blank, that leaves a lot of possibilities.



What should we say about an assertion involving three nested cuts? For all of 
those points outside the outmost cut, there is no fourth or fifth cut. So too 
for the areas inside of the cuts. In addition to expressing what is positively 
the case, each assertion written in diagrammatic form also expresses--and 
thereby allows us to see--what is and is not possible in terms of the converse 
relations.



--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



________________________________

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>>
Sent: Sunday, April 7, 2019 1:06 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic



Gary F., List:



Just a few quick responses to some of your comments over the last couple of 
days.



GF:  I hesitated over your statement that “a definition can only serve as an 
Immediate Interpretant,” because I don’t think that applies to a term defined 
for use in pure mathematics ...



Yes, I had in mind mainly linguistic Semes that purport to represent real 
Objects.  A definition in pure mathematics is more of a hypothetical stipulation



GF:  But it took me a while to recognize that the absence of lines is also a 
mode of connection, as Peirce says above, and that both of these are 
“degenerate Secundan,” i.e. symmetrical dyadic relations in which there is no 
reaction of one correlate upon the other where one is relatively active and the 
other relatively passive.



I agree that neither correlate is active or passive with respect to the 
other--that is what makes these relations symmetrical rather than 
asymmetric--but I think that it would be misleading to say on this basis that 
there is no reaction between them at all.  On the contrary, coexistence is 
precisely a form of reaction--"existence is that mode of being which consists 
in the resultant genuine dyadic relation of a strict individual with all the 
other such individuals of the same universe" (CP 6.336; 1908).



GF:  The iconicity of EGs avoids such verbal inconsistency by minimizing the 
use of words; but the system only works as a representation of Thought if we 
recognize the absence of lines as a mode of connection. The system appears to 
involve invisible icons!



I suggest that the Icons in question are invisible because their Objects are 
likewise invisible; i.e., invisibility is one of the respects in which the 
absence of lines resembles the mode of connection that constitutes coexistence. 
 Recall that the blank Phemic Sheet represents "all that is tacitly taken for 
granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of their 
discussion" (CP 4.553; 1906).  That which is taken for granted--like 
coexistence as a relation that everything in the Universe has with everything 
else in the Universe--is invisible, unless and until we deliberately attend to 
it.



GF:  But you are quite right to point out that this usage of “empirical” is “a 
much broader notion of the term than often is used by classical British 
empiricists as well as contemporary empiricists of a more analytical 
orientation.” It is also much broader than the usage of Comte and the 
Positivists.



This is essentially the thesis of Aaron Bruce Wilson's book, Peirce's 
Empiricism:  Its Roots and Its Originality, which I recently reread.  It is 
quite informative as far as tracing the historical and philosophical background 
against which Peirce was operating.  Unfortunately, in my view Wilson makes 
some rather fundamental errors when it comes to Peirce's Semeiotic, most 
notably in his treatment of the Immediate Object.



Regards


Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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