Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Edwina Taborsky]

  BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }See
my responses below:
 On Tue 14/05/19  6:10 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 1} ET:  A problem that I have with the argument of JAS is that the
definition of the term of 'God' is ambiguous and even, missing. 
 JAS: In this context, I am quite obviously employing Peirce's own
straightforward definition of God as "the definable proper name,
signifying Ens necessarium: in my belief Really creator of all three
Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452, EP 2:434; 1908).
 EDWINA That is not a definition but an assertion - yet to be defined
and argued.
 2] ET:  ... I disagree with JAS's claim that 'if the entire universe
is a Sign, then what is its Object' - I presume that by 'Object', he
refers to 'God'.
  JAS: It was not a claim, but a question, to which I then suggested
an answer.  Peirce affirmed that the entire Universe is a Sign, and
that every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself. The
conclusion that necessarily follows is that the entire Universe is
determined by an Object other than itself.  My question was, what is
that Object?  It clearly cannot be anything within the Universe, so
it must be something that transcends the Universe.  Peirce's
definition of God, as quoted above, fits the bill; especially when we
also take into account his emphatic  denials, in four different
manuscript drafts, that God is anything "immanent in" Nature or the
three Universes.
 EDWINA  I disagree with your conclusion that 'necessarily follows'
"is that the entire Universe is determined by an Object other than
itself". As Peirce said - the 'whole universe is a Sign' - and where
does he argue that there is anything OUTSIDE of the universe?
Furthermore, although every Sign is determined by an Object other
than itself - this 'Object' is itself a Sign. There are no 'free and
non-semiotic objects' within the universe. 
 Peirce's definition of God is not as a 'necessity' - which is not a
definition of God's attributes, but is comparable to 'that analogue
of mind' 6.502]. And furthermore, he outlines this 'mind' not as an
external object to the semiosic universe, and not as 'the creator of
the universe' but as a force NOW creating the universe' - 6.505,
which puts that force-of-God firmly WITHIN the universe and thus,
firmly within the semiosic process. As Peirce says "we must regard
Creative Activity as an inseparable attribute of God' 6.506. Again, I
understand that this puts the 'force-of-God within the semiosic
universe. 
 3. JAS: Of course, anyone is free to deny that the entire Universe
is determined by an Object other than itself.  This just logically
requires also denying either that the Universe is a Sign or that
every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself (or both),
and thereby deviating from Peirce's own explicitly stated views. 
 EDWINA No - I disagree with your view of semiosis. Semiosis is an
ongoing interactional process - which includes the external Object.
This external Object to a Sign does not determine the Sign in a
linear fashion [unless we are talking about a mechanical interaction]
 but interactively informs and is informed by the Sign - to produce
another Object/Sign. That external Object is itself functioning
within the semiosic process. There are NO separate non-semiosic
objects in the universe. 
 4] ET:  "A disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of
time, since all that it is destined to think is fully in its being at
any and every previous time" 6.490. But Peirce further explains pure
mind "as creative of thought, must, so far as it is manifested in
time, appear as having a character related to the habit-taking
capacity". And that means - within time. 
 JAS: Pure mind is not itself within time--that would be a
self-contradiction, since Peirce had just said (as quoted) that pure
mind has its being out of time--but it is manifested in time, which
is not the same thing.
 EDWINA  No- Peirce did not consider that Pure Mind was a reality;
thinking about such is a pure intellectual abstraction. Instead, he
specifically said: Pure mind, as creative of thought, must, so far as
it is manifested in time, appear as having a character related to the
habit-taking capacity" 6.490. 
 5] ET:  And - 'the three universes must actually be absolutely
necessary results of a state of utter nothingness'. [6.490] 
 JAS: I interpret this as part of a reductio ad absurdum, which
demonstrates that without necessary being (Ens necessarium), there
would be no being at all.  The only absolutely necessary result of a
state of utter nothingness is ... utter nothingness.  For the long
version, see my online paper [1] in Signs - International Journal of
Semiotics .
 EDWINA  I have a different interpretation. As Peirce says 'the three
universes must be absolutely necessary results of a state of utter
nothingness.6.490, which, to me, means that the three
universes/categorical modes are,  all three,  log

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  A problem that I have with the argument of JAS is that the definition
of the term of 'God' is ambiguous and even, missing.


In this context, I am quite obviously employing Peirce's own
straightforward definition of God as "*the *definable proper name,
signifying *Ens necessarium*: in my belief Really creator of all three
Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452, EP 2:434; 1908).

ET:  ... I disagree with JAS's claim that 'if the entire universe is a
Sign, then what is its Object' - I presume that by 'Object', he refers to
'God'.


It was not a claim, but a question, to which I then suggested an answer.
Peirce affirmed that the entire Universe is a Sign, and that every Sign is
determined by an Object other than itself. The conclusion that *necessarily
*follows is that the entire Universe is determined by an Object other than
itself.  My question was, what is that Object?  It clearly cannot be
anything *within *the Universe, so it must be something that *transcends *the
Universe.  Peirce's definition of God, as quoted above, fits the bill;
especially when we also take into account his emphatic *denials*, in four
different manuscript drafts, that God is anything "immanent in" Nature or
the three Universes.

Of course, anyone is free to *deny *that the entire Universe is determined
by an Object other than itself.  This just logically requires *also *denying
*either *that the Universe is a Sign *or *that every Sign is determined by
an Object other than itself (or both), and thereby deviating from Peirce's
own explicitly stated views.

ET:  "A disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time, since
all that it is destined to think is fully in its being at any and every
previous time" 6.490. But Peirce further explains pure mind "as creative of
thought, must, so far as it is manifested in time, appear as having a
character related to the habit-taking capacity". And that means - within
time.


Pure mind is not itself *within* time--that would be a self-contradiction,
since Peirce had just said (as quoted) that pure mind has its being *out of
*time--but it is *manifested *in time, which is not the same thing.

ET:  And - 'the three universes must actually be absolutely necessary
results of a state of utter nothingness'.


I interpret this as part of a *reductio ad absurdum*, which demonstrates
that without *necessary *being (*Ens necessarium*), there would be no being *at
all*.  The only absolutely necessary result of a state of utter nothingness
is ... utter nothingness.  For the long version, see my online paper
 in *Signs - International
Journal of Semiotics*.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 12:16 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, List
>
> A problem that I have with the argument of JAS is that the definition of
> the term of 'God' is ambiguous and even, missing.. I know that JAS as a
> theist probably has a specific definition in his mind when he writes the
> term. I, as an atheist, have a different definition - and prefer the
> analogy that Peirce used, which is 'Mind'.
>
> What is Mind? It is certainly not an Object - that is, I disagree with
> JAS's claim that 'if the entire universe is a Sign, then what is its
> Object' - I presume that by 'Object', he refers to 'God'. To my
> understanding of the Peircean semiosis, Mind is the rationalization of
> energy into matter - and, as such, Mind cannot exist 'per se' outside of
> Matter. That is, the entire universe as a semiosic process, has no Dynamic
> Object; it generates its own DOs in the semiosic process.
>
> "A disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time, since all
> that it is destined to think is fully in its being at any and every
> previous time" 6.490. But Peirce further explains pure mind "as creative of
> thought, must, so far as it is manifested in time, appear as having a
> character related to the habit-taking capacity". And that means - within
> time.
>
> And - 'the three universes must actually be absolutely necessary results
> of a state of utter nothingness'. This state of 'utter nothingness' is NOT
> an object and is not Mind. Mind emerges with Matter,  within the functions
> of the three universes/ categorical modes.
>
> Therefore, my definition of the term of 'God' is quite different, I
> suspect, from that of JAS - and I am not convinced that the JAS definition
> - which is not clear - aligns with the Peircean definition.
>
> Edwina Taborsky
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

GF:  ... I don’t see our interpretations, considered as interpretants, to
be *final *in any sense;


I agree, and did not mean to imply otherwise; all of our *actual
*interpretations
are *Dynamic *Interpretants.  Again, the Final Interpretant is "that
which *would
finally *be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the
matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached" (CP
8.184, EP 2:496; 1909 Feb 26), or "the effect the Sign *would *produce upon
any mind upon which the circumstances should permit it to work out its full
effect" (SS 110; 1909 Mar 14).  The point is that the Ultimate Opinion
would *include *knowledge of God, since that is what it *means *to say that
God is *real*.

GF:  ... the Universe *includes *all of us, all our thoughts and actions,
and I don’t see how anyone can be both a part and an interpreter *of the
same Sign*.


I understand this objection and need to think about it some more.  My
initial response is that according to Peirce, every interpreter is a
Quasi-mind, every Quasi-mind is a Sign, and interpretation consists in
additional Signs *further determining* a Quasi-mind.  Moreover, as I
already pointed out, neither an utterer nor an interpreter is *essential *to
a Sign; only an Object and an Interpretant.  I suspect that the resolution
is connected with recognizing the *continuity *of the Universe as an
ongoing "inferential process" of semeiosis, "working out its conclusions in
living realities" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193; 1903); in that sense, *every *effect
that the Universe *actually *has on us is a Dynamic Interpretant of it as a
Sign.

GF:  I also wonder how we can justify designating any of our knowledge as
“knowledge of God.” (If all knowledge is knowledge of God, then “of God” is
simply redundant.)


I am not suggesting that "all knowledge is knowledge of God," nor that our
knowledge of God is *certain *or by any means *complete*.

CSP:  The hypothesis of God is a peculiar one, in that it supposes an
infinitely incomprehensible object, although every hypothesis, as such,
supposes its object to be truly conceived in the hypothesis. This leaves
the hypothesis but one way of understanding itself; namely, as vague but as
true so far as it is definite, and as continually tending to define itself
more and more, and without limit. (CP 6.466, EP 2:439; 1908)


General revelation is only adequate for the knowledge that God is *real*,
along with knowledge of *some *of His attributes--e.g., "those usually
ascribed to Him, omniscience, omnipotence, infinite benignity, and a Being *not
*immanent in the Universes of Matter, Mind, and Ideas, but the Sole Creator
of every content of them without exception" (R 843:15[1]; 1908).

GF:  You ask, “Is there such a thing as an unintentional or purposeless
Sign--i.e., one that has no *final *cause, and thus no Final Interpretant?”
My immediate answer is, Of course there is such a thing; it’s what is known
as a “natural sign,” such as an event which becomes a sign only because
someone interprets it as representing something else in some way.


On the contrary, my understanding is that if there is no Final
Interpretant, then there is no Sign at all.  If an event is *capable *of
being interpreted as representing something else in some way, then there is
an effect that it "*would *produce upon any mind upon which the
circumstances should permit it to work out its full effect."

Since you acknowledge your disagreement with Peirce about the entire
Universe having a purpose, I will not belabor that point.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 8:45 AM  wrote:

> Jon, Jeff, list,
>
> Jeff, the set of “hypotheses” you've presented here seem quite compatible
> with Peirce's ideas about the ‘development of concrete reasonableness.’ But
> i put the quote marks around “hypotheses” because i regard that idea not as
> a testable hypothesis but as a regulative principle for the logic of
> pragmatism. To me it has the flavor of that 19th-century optimism which I
> do find in Peirce but not in my own feelings or beliefs.
>
> Jon, you have “suggested that knowledge of God is the Final Interpretant
> of the Universe as a Sign, so *all of us* are its interpreters.” This
> doesn’t work for me because I don’t see our interpretations, considered as
> interpretants, to be *final* in any sense; also because the Universe
> *includes* all of us, all our thoughts and actions, and I don’t see how
> anyone can be both a part and an interpreter *of the same Sign*. I also
> wonder how we can justify designating any of our knowledge as “knowledge of
> God.” (If *all* knowledge is knowledge of God, then “of God” is simply
> redundant.)
>
> Those quotes from R280 are very interesting, though, as they add other
> dimensions to the *semantics* of EGs. (By *semantics* I mean the
> rela

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic and Tetradic relations

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, Gary F, John S, List,


Let me offer a brief response to the objection Jon S. raised earlier.


JD:  I take the expression of the conditional (i.e., expressed in the EGs by a 
scroll)  to involve a genuinely triadic relation because there is a law that 
governs the relation.


Jon S:  What is the warrant for taking every relation that is governed by a law 
to be genuinely triadic on that sole basis?  On the contrary, most (if not all) 
dyadic relations that we encounter in experience are governed by laws in some 
way, but we still classify them as dyadic because they have exactly two 
correlates; the law itself is not a third correlate.

CSP:  Any dynamic action--say, the attraction by one particle of another--is in 
itself dyadic. It is governed by a law; but that law no more furnishes a 
correlate to the relation than the vote of a legislator which insures a bill's 
becoming a statute makes him a participator in the blow of the swordsman who, 
in obedience to the warrant issued after conviction according to that statute, 
strikes off the head of a condemned man. (CP 6.330; 1908)


Jon S: Even a degenerate dyadic relation is governed by a law; e.g., the 
hardness of a diamond consists in the truth of the conditional proposition that 
if it were to be rubbed with another substance, it would resist scratching.  
Are there any passages in Peirce's writings where he characterized a relation 
with exactly two correlates as triadic?

Jeff D:  Most of the relations that we encounter in experience are rich and 
complex. Consider the experience of one billiard ball A colliding with another 
B in accordance with the law of inertia LI. We can abstract from the law of 
inertia and attend solely to the dynamical relation between A and B as existing 
individuals. There is a fact about each. A is in motion, and then it collides 
with B, which was stationary. As a result, B moves. That can be treated as a 
dynamical dyadic relation that is formally ordered such that A is agent and B 
is patient. Considered in this way, we treat the dyadic relation between them 
as a mere matter of brute force.

Alternately, we can consider the relation between the fact that A was moving 
and B was stationary, and then the later fact that B was put into motion as a 
result of the collision as being governed by the law of inertia (LI). According 
to Peirce's classification of relations in "The Logic of Mathematics,...), this 
is a genuinely triadic relation of fact. All such genuinely triadic relations 
of fact are governed by some kind of law. On my interpretation of the text, the 
law of inertia functions as the third correlate in the triadic relation. We can 
analyze the relation in a number of ways, here is a simple version:  A 
determines B to accelerate in accord with LI.

A fuller analysis would involve a closer look at LI.  Newton's account of this 
law takes the following form:  Force of inertia=mass*acceleration. How does the 
law of inertia govern the relations between the facts concerning A and B? The 
first fact attributes qualities to each (i.e., each billiard ball has a 
position at the first time, such that A is in motion heading towards the other 
ball and B is not in motion). The second fact attributes a different set of 
qualities to each. The law governs the changes in those facts so that there is 
a general regularity that governs other possible interactions between any 
masses of this type.

Notice what Peirce says about inertia as a dynamical law insofar as it is 
explained by Newton in his theory of physics:


As to the common aversion to recognizing thought as an active factor in the 
real world, some of its causes are easily traced. In the first place, people 
are persuaded that everything that happens in the material universe is a motion 
completely determined by inviolable laws of dynamics; and that, they think, 
leaves no room for any other influence. But the laws of dynamics stand on quite 
a different footing from the laws of gravitation, elasticity, electricity, and 
the like. The laws of dynamics are very much like logical principles, if they 
are not precisely that. They only say how bodies will move after you have said 
what the forces are. They permit any forces, and therefore any motions. Only, 
the principle of the conservation of energy requires us to explain certain 
kinds of motions by special hypotheses about molecules and the like. Thus, in 
order that the viscosity of gases should not disobey that law we have to 
suppose that gases have a certain molecular constitution. Setting dynamical 
laws to one side, then, as hardly being positive laws, but rather mere formal 
principles, we have only the laws of gravitation, elasticity, electricity, and 
chemistry. Now who will deliberately say that our knowledge of these laws is 
sufficient to make us reasonably confident that they are absolutely eternal and 
immutable, and that they escape the great law of evolution?


The main difference that I s

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, Jon S, John S, List,



GF: the set of “hypotheses” you've presented here seem quite compatible with 
Peirce's ideas about the ‘development of concrete reasonableness.’ But i put 
the quote marks around “hypotheses” because i regard that idea not as a 
testable hypothesis but as a regulative principle for the logic of pragmatism. 
To me it has the flavor of that 19th-century optimism which I do find in Peirce 
but not in my own feelings or beliefs.


JD:  For both Peirce and Kant, the regulative principles for scientific inquiry 
are akin to practical postulates. They are general rules that are adopted for 
the sake of regulating our conduct. In addition to regulating inquiry, they may 
also function as explanatory hypotheses that can be tested against common 
experience in metaphysics and against specialized forms of observation in the 
special sciences. Peirce affirms this in "The Logic of Mathematics, an 
attempt..." when he claims that Metaphysics consists in the results of the 
absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but 
as truths of being." [CP 1.486]

I'd like better to understand how Peirce's account of the law of metaphysics is 
modeled on his account of the law of logic. Here is the summary statement of 
the three clauses in each of those laws.

Law of Logic:

Monadic clause: is that fact is in its existence perfectly definite. Inquiry 
properly carried on will reach some definite and fixed result or approximate 
indefinitely toward that limit. Every subject is existentially determinate with 
respect to each predicate.

Dyadic clause: there are two and but two possible determinations of each 
subject with reference to each predicate, the affirmative and the negative. Not 
only is the dyadic character manifest by the double determination, but also by 
the double prescription; first that the possibilities are two at least, and 
second that they are two at most. The determination is not both affirmative and 
negative, but it is either one or the other. A third limiting form of 
determination belongs to any subject [with regard] to [some other] one whose 
mode of existence is of a lower order, [the limiting case involving] a relative 
zero, related to the subjects of the affirmation and the negation as an 
inconsistent hypothesis is to a consistent one.

Triadic clause:  the triadic clause of the law of logic recognizes three 
elements in truth, (a) the idea, or predicate, (b) the fact or subject, (c) the 
thought which originally put them together and recognizes they are together; 
from whence many things result, especially a threefold inferential process 
which either first follows the order of involution from living thought or 
ruling law, and existential case under the condition of the law to the 
predication of the idea of the law in that case [abduction]; or second, 
proceeds from the living law and the inherence of the idea of that law in an 
existential case, to the subsumption of that case and to the condition of the 
law [deductive demonstration]; or third, proceeds from the subsumption of an 
existential case under the condition of a living law, and the inherence of the 
idea of that law in that case to the living law itself [induction]. Thus the 
law of logic governs the relations of different predicates of one subject. [CP 
1.485]


Law of metaphysics:

Monadic clause:  accordingly, it is to be assumed that the universe has an 
explanation, the function of which, like that of every logical explanation, is 
to unify its observed variety. It follows that the root of all being is One; 
and so far as different subjects have a common character they partake of an 
identical being. This, or something like this, is the monadic clause of the law.

Dyadic clause:  second, drawing a general induction from all observed facts, we 
find all realization of existence lies in opposition, such as attractions, 
repulsions, visibilities, and centres of potentiality generally. »The very 
hyssop on the wall grows in that chink because the whole universe could not 
prevent its growing.« This is, or is a part of, a dyadic clause of the law.



Triadic clause:  under the third clause, we have, as a deduction from the 
principle that thought is the mirror of being, the law that the end of being 
and highest reality is the living impersonation of the idea that evolution 
generates. Whatever is real is the law of something less real. [CP 1.486]

What are the implications of there being three clauses for both of these laws? 
Does the division into three clauses provide us with any suggestions for 
thinking about the manner in which laws govern facts? The last assertion in the 
third clause is interesting. It seems to reflect the idea that laws form an 
interconnected system, and they govern the relations between individual facts 
in virtue of such systematic relations between laws of differing degrees of 
generality.

What guidance does this regulative principle offer wit

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, List

A problem that I have with the argument of JAS is that the
definition of the term of 'God' is ambiguous and even, missing.. I
know that JAS as a theist probably has a specific definition in his
mind when he writes the term. I, as an atheist, have a different
definition - and prefer the analogy that Peirce used, which is
'Mind'. 

What is Mind? It is certainly not an Object - that is, I disagree
with JAS's claim that 'if the entire universe is a Sign, then what is
its Object' - I presume that by 'Object', he refers to 'God'. To my
understanding of the Peircean semiosis, Mind is the rationalization
of energy into matter - and, as such, Mind cannot exist 'per se'
outside of Matter. That is, the entire universe as a semiosic
process, has no Dynamic Object; it generates its own DOs in the
semiosic process. 

"A disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time,
since all that it is destined to think is fully in its being at any
and every previous time" 6.490. But Peirce further explains pure mind
"as creative of thought, must, so far as it is manifested in time,
appear as having a character related to the habit-taking capacity".
And that means - within time. 

And - 'the three universes must actually be absolutely necessary
results of a state of utter nothingness'. This state of 'utter
nothingness' is NOT an object and is not Mind. Mind emerges with
Matter,  within the functions of the three universes/ categorical
modes.

Therefore, my definition of the term of 'God' is quite different, I
suspect, from that of JAS - and I am not convinced that the JAS
definition - which is not clear - aligns with the Peircean
definition.

Edwina Taborsky
 On Tue 14/05/19 11:57 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 John, List:
 Peirce wrote that "the Universe is a vast representamen" (CP 5.119,
EP 2:193; 1903), which "is perfused with signs, if it is not composed
exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394; 1906).  That sounds to me
like "the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its
occurrence carries with it," which is " a perfect sign, in the sense
that it involves the present existence of no other sign except such
as are ingredients of itself" (EP 2:545n25; 1906); especially in
light of EP 2:304 (1904), which explicitly equates "the ideal sign
which should be quite  perfect" with "that Universe in its aspect as
a sign."  It goes without saying that connecting the dots in this
particular way is my own interpretation, but I consider it to be
fully consistent with the texts themselves.
 I did not claim that my Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of
God is unavoidable; I said that it furnishes what seems to me to be
the unavoidable  answer to the specific question that I had just
posed--if the entire Universe is a Sign, then what is its Object?  I
provided various quotes back in February [1] amply demonstrating that
Peirce endorsed both of my premisses; my contribution in this case was
merely colligating them, and thereby making the necessity of the
conclusion evident.  Of course, Peirce also unambiguously affirmed
the Reality of God as the creator of all three Universes of
Experience in the very first sentence of "A Neglected Argument" (CP
6.452, EP 2:434; 1908), so that should not be controversial at all. 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3] 
 On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 5:29 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
 On 5/12/2019 5:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
 > I made a case on-List that what Peirce described as "the perfect
Sign" 
 > in R 283 (partially published as EP 2:545n25; 1906) is the
Universe.
 If Peirce had meant that, it's likely that he would have said so.
 The absence of such a statement is good reason for doubting that
 CSP would have made any such claim.
 You're entitled to your opinion on the subject.  You may, if you
 wish, say that you were inspired by something Peirce wrote.  But
 that inspiration is an opinion of JAS, not of CSP.
 > It seems to me that the unavoidable answer is a straightforward
 > restatement of my Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of God.
 > ... In other words, God's purpose in uttering the Universe is
 > the revelation of Himself.
 Since Peirce wrote many MSS about God, the universe, and semeiotic,
 he would certainly have noticed some "unavoidable" argument that
 related them.  The absence of any such argument in any MSS is
 strong evidence that it is avoidable.
 John


Links:
--
[1] https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2019-02/msg2.html
[2] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[3] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[4]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'s...@bestweb.net\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click o

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

Peirce wrote that "the Universe is a vast representamen" (CP 5.119, EP
2:193; 1903), which "is perfused with signs, if it is not composed
exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394; 1906).  That sounds to me like "the
aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its occurrence carries
with it," which is "a *perfect* sign, in the sense that it involves the
present existence of no other sign except such as are ingredients of
itself" (EP 2:545n25; 1906); especially in light of EP 2:304 (1904), which
*explicitly *equates "the ideal sign which should be quite perfect" with
"that Universe in its aspect as a sign."  It goes without saying that
connecting the dots in this particular way is my own interpretation, but I
consider it to be fully consistent with the texts themselves.

I did not claim that my Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of God is
unavoidable; I said that it furnishes what seems to me to be the
unavoidable *answer *to the specific *question *that I had just posed--if
the entire Universe is a Sign, then what is its Object?  I provided various
quotes back in February
 amply
demonstrating that Peirce endorsed both of my premisses; my contribution in
this case was merely colligating them, and thereby making the *necessity *of
the conclusion evident.  Of course, Peirce also unambiguously affirmed the
Reality of God as the creator of all three Universes of Experience in the
very first sentence of "A Neglected Argument" (CP 6.452, EP 2:434; 1908),
so that should not be controversial at all.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 5:29 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 5/12/2019 5:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> > I made a case on-List that what Peirce described as "the perfect Sign"
> > in R 283 (partially published as EP 2:545n25; 1906) is the Universe.
>
> If Peirce had meant that, it's likely that he would have said so.
> The absence of such a statement is good reason for doubting that
> CSP would have made any such claim.
>
> You're entitled to your opinion on the subject.  You may, if you
> wish, say that you were inspired by something Peirce wrote.  But
> that inspiration is an opinion of JAS, not of CSP.
>
> > It seems to me that the unavoidable answer is a straightforward
> > restatement of my Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of God.
> > ... In other words, God's purpose in uttering the Universe is
> > the revelation of Himself.
>
> Since Peirce wrote many MSS about God, the universe, and semeiotic,
> he would certainly have noticed some "unavoidable" argument that
> related them.  The absence of any such argument in any MSS is
> strong evidence that it is avoidable.
>
> John
>

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

[gnox]

Jon, Jeff, list,

Jeff, the set of “hypotheses” you've presented here seem quite compatible with 
Peirce's ideas about the ‘development of concrete reasonableness.’ But i put 
the quote marks around “hypotheses” because i regard that idea not as a 
testable hypothesis but as a regulative principle for the logic of pragmatism. 
To me it has the flavor of that 19th-century optimism which I do find in Peirce 
but not in my own feelings or beliefs. 

Jon, you have “suggested that knowledge of God is the Final Interpretant of the 
Universe as a Sign, so all of us are its interpreters.” This doesn’t work for 
me because I don’t see our interpretations, considered as interpretants, to be 
final in any sense; also because the Universe includes all of us, all our 
thoughts and actions, and I don’t see how anyone can be both a part and an 
interpreter of the same Sign. I also wonder how we can justify designating any 
of our knowledge as “knowledge of God.” (If all knowledge is knowledge of God, 
then “of God” is simply redundant.)

Those quotes from R280 are very interesting, though, as they add other 
dimensions to the semantics of EGs. (By semantics I mean the relations between 
the symbols and rules of EGs and the user’s collateral experience; John Sowa 
seems to mean something else by that term, and I’m still puzzled by that usage.)

You ask, “Is there such a thing as an unintentional or purposeless Sign--i.e., 
one that has no final cause, and thus no Final Interpretant?” My immediate 
answer is, Of course there is such a thing; it’s what is known as a “natural 
sign,” such as an event which becomes a sign only because someone interprets it 
as representing something else in some way. To say that everything in nature 
happens intentionally or purposefully is to beg the theological question. 

The fact that there are final causes in nature does not imply that the whole of 
nature has a final cause. We only learn of final causes inductively: by 
observing what a process typically produces in its typical context, usually 
over many iterations, we learn to regard that generalized production as the 
guiding purpose of that process. But that learning can’t apply to the whole 
process we call the Universe, because we have not yet seen even one iteration 
of it completed. Therefore we have no good reason to assume that the Universe 
has a purpose. Likewise the Universe is the context of all acts of meaning, 
whether they are intentional acts or not; but nothing, not even the Universe, 
can be its own context. For these reasons I do indeed regard the Universe 
itself as meaningless. I am well aware that I’m in disagreement with Peirce on 
this point; I regard his beliefs about Universal purpose as more religious than 
scientific — that is, as neither verifiable nor refutable.

 

Gary f.

 

} I surrender to the belief that my knowing is a small part of a wider 
integrated knowing that knits the entire biosphere or creation. [G. Bateson] {

  http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Sent: 13-May-19 12:59
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

 

Gary F., List:

 

GF:  If all thought is dialogic, as Peirce said, is the Universe as Sign an 
internal dialogue (God talking to himself)?

 

That is an interesting question, and Peirce even commented on it at least once, 
although the jumbled state of the relevant manuscript images makes the date 
uncertain.

 

CSP:  ... that mysterious thing called Reason ... apparently only has its being 
in communications. The Book of Genesis says, “God said, Let there be light!” 
and there was light. To whom or to what did God say it? The whole thing is 
mysterious. Of course, it does not mean that God spoke either in English or in 
Hebrew or with any air vibrations at all. But it does seem to mean that in 
communication of some kind there may lurk, without any brute force, a 
persuasive power that can even create such a world-boon as light. (R 
514:59-60[47-48])

 

He simply acknowledged the mystery here, consistent with the opening sentences 
of both the Book of Genesis and the Gospel of John.

 

In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was 
without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the 
Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. And God said, Let there be 
light: and there was light. And God saw the light, that it was good: and God 
divided the light from the darkness. And God called the light Day, and the 
darkness he called Night. And the evening and the morning were the first day. 
(Genesis 1:1-5; KJV)

 

In the beginning was the Word [logos], and the Word was with God, and the Word 
was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him; 
and without him was not any thing made that was made. In him was life; and the 
life was the light of men. And the light shineth in darknes