Gary F, Jon S, John S, List,
GF: the set of “hypotheses” you've presented here seem quite compatible with Peirce's ideas about the ‘development of concrete reasonableness.’ But i put the quote marks around “hypotheses” because i regard that idea not as a testable hypothesis but as a regulative principle for the logic of pragmatism. To me it has the flavor of that 19th-century optimism which I do find in Peirce but not in my own feelings or beliefs. JD: For both Peirce and Kant, the regulative principles for scientific inquiry are akin to practical postulates. They are general rules that are adopted for the sake of regulating our conduct. In addition to regulating inquiry, they may also function as explanatory hypotheses that can be tested against common experience in metaphysics and against specialized forms of observation in the special sciences. Peirce affirms this in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt..." when he claims that Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being." [CP 1.486] I'd like better to understand how Peirce's account of the law of metaphysics is modeled on his account of the law of logic. Here is the summary statement of the three clauses in each of those laws. Law of Logic: Monadic clause: is that fact is in its existence perfectly definite. Inquiry properly carried on will reach some definite and fixed result or approximate indefinitely toward that limit. Every subject is existentially determinate with respect to each predicate. Dyadic clause: there are two and but two possible determinations of each subject with reference to each predicate, the affirmative and the negative. Not only is the dyadic character manifest by the double determination, but also by the double prescription; first that the possibilities are two at least, and second that they are two at most. The determination is not both affirmative and negative, but it is either one or the other. A third limiting form of determination belongs to any subject [with regard] to [some other] one whose mode of existence is of a lower order, [the limiting case involving] a relative zero, related to the subjects of the affirmation and the negation as an inconsistent hypothesis is to a consistent one. Triadic clause: the triadic clause of the law of logic recognizes three elements in truth, (a) the idea, or predicate, (b) the fact or subject, (c) the thought which originally put them together and recognizes they are together; from whence many things result, especially a threefold inferential process which either first follows the order of involution from living thought or ruling law, and existential case under the condition of the law to the predication of the idea of the law in that case [abduction]; or second, proceeds from the living law and the inherence of the idea of that law in an existential case, to the subsumption of that case and to the condition of the law [deductive demonstration]; or third, proceeds from the subsumption of an existential case under the condition of a living law, and the inherence of the idea of that law in that case to the living law itself [induction]. Thus the law of logic governs the relations of different predicates of one subject. [CP 1.485] Law of metaphysics: Monadic clause: accordingly, it is to be assumed that the universe has an explanation, the function of which, like that of every logical explanation, is to unify its observed variety. It follows that the root of all being is One; and so far as different subjects have a common character they partake of an identical being. This, or something like this, is the monadic clause of the law. Dyadic clause: second, drawing a general induction from all observed facts, we find all realization of existence lies in opposition, such as attractions, repulsions, visibilities, and centres of potentiality generally. »The very hyssop on the wall grows in that chink because the whole universe could not prevent its growing.« This is, or is a part of, a dyadic clause of the law. Triadic clause: under the third clause, we have, as a deduction from the principle that thought is the mirror of being, the law that the end of being and highest reality is the living impersonation of the idea that evolution generates. Whatever is real is the law of something less real. [CP 1.486] What are the implications of there being three clauses for both of these laws? Does the division into three clauses provide us with any suggestions for thinking about the manner in which laws govern facts? The last assertion in the third clause is interesting. It seems to reflect the idea that laws form an interconnected system, and they govern the relations between individual facts in virtue of such systematic relations between laws of differing degrees of generality. What guidance does this regulative principle offer with respect to formulating hypotheses in the special sciences? Let's consider a test case. Here are two competing hypotheses about the nature of time and space in the science of cosmology? First hypothesis: in the last lecture of RLT, Peirce formulates a cosmological hypothesis to the effect that real space may have evolved from a system of infinite dimensions that were not clearly separated, one from the other. Those dimensions were vague in character. Over time, as the real character of space and time evolved, the dimensions of the universe differentiated, one from another. Second hypothesis: initially, space and time had a finite number of dimensions. Perhaps, initially, there was but one point with no freedom of movement. Over time, space evolved to have one dimension, where infinitesimally small things had one degree of freedom of movement in a single temporal dimension. As things evolved further, additional spatial dimensions emerged until things settled down to three spatial and one temporal dimension--which is the sort of space in which we live here on earth. Here is an interesting observation about the spatial relations that are found when energetic particles are brought together in a plasma state at high temperatures. These temperatures are akin what might have been prevalent in an early phase of the universe when there was a relatively continuous plasma spread through space and time. https://www.space.com/42729-quark-gluon-plasma-blobs.html Early Universe 'Soup' Cooked Up in Weird Plasma Blobs | Space<https://www.space.com/42729-quark-gluon-plasma-blobs.html> www.space.com Researchers have re-created tiny blobs of the same primordial 'soup' that made up the early universe. Do these two hypotheses generate different explanations of the observations? Why do we find that (i) one particle give rise to a circular spatial pattern, (ii) two particles givesrise to an elliptical spatial pattern, and (iii) three particles give rise to a triangular spatial pattern? If we seek to explain the phenomena, we should take note of the initial continuity of space and time that are posited in Peirce's hypothesis and the initial discontinuity of the dimensions that are posited in the competing hypothesis. Note that the explanation offered in the article appeals to the common experience of tossing rocks in a pond and watching the ripples spread. Should we assume that really small things, like quarks and gluons, behave like rocks tossed into the water? What could possibly justify such a leap? Similarly, we have a common experience of floating with our heads just above the surface in a pond and feeling what a wave of pressure when it moves through the water. As such, we understand that the ripples on the surface are like a two-dimensional image of a three-dimensional spatial phenomena. Can we draw on these common experiences to distinguish what might follow from each of the hypotheses? What is the difference between claiming that the present character of the space and time with which we are familiar on earth either (1) differentiated from an undifferentiated space and time of infinite dimensions or (2) emerged from a space and time of a smaller number of finite dimensions? On Peirce's account, the fundamental law for explaining the evolution of temporal and spatial order consists of a tendency for (a) qualities (e.g., spin, charge, magnitude of energy) to spread based on the basis of a peculiar relation of affectibility and (b) for those facts that do occur to increase the odds of those facts happening again in the future. Explaining the interaction of these strong forces with the shape of space that is due to gravitation is an outstanding problem in physics. Does it help to suggest that nature may operate according to a law of resemblance and contiguity that governs phenomena in a manner akin to patterns of abductive and inductive inferences? --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca> Sent: Tuesday, May 14, 2019 6:45 AM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited Jon, Jeff, list, Jeff, the set of “hypotheses” you've presented here seem quite compatible with Peirce's ideas about the ‘development of concrete reasonableness.’ But i put the quote marks around “hypotheses” because i regard that idea not as a testable hypothesis but as a regulative principle for the logic of pragmatism. To me it has the flavor of that 19th-century optimism which I do find in Peirce but not in my own feelings or beliefs. Jon, you have “suggested that knowledge of God is the Final Interpretant of the Universe as a Sign, so all of us are its interpreters.” This doesn’t work for me because I don’t see our interpretations, considered as interpretants, to be final in any sense; also because the Universe includes all of us, all our thoughts and actions, and I don’t see how anyone can be both a part and an interpreter of the same Sign. I also wonder how we can justify designating any of our knowledge as “knowledge of God.” (If all knowledge is knowledge of God, then “of God” is simply redundant.) Those quotes from R280 are very interesting, though, as they add other dimensions to the semantics of EGs. (By semantics I mean the relations between the symbols and rules of EGs and the user’s collateral experience; John Sowa seems to mean something else by that term, and I’m still puzzled by that usage.) You ask, “Is there such a thing as an unintentional or purposeless Sign--i.e., one that has no final cause, and thus no Final Interpretant?” My immediate answer is, Of course there is such a thing; it’s what is known as a “natural sign,” such as an event which becomes a sign only because someone interprets it as representing something else in some way. To say that everything in nature happens intentionally or purposefully is to beg the theological question. The fact that there are final causes in nature does not imply that the whole of nature has a final cause. We only learn of final causes inductively: by observing what a process typically produces in its typical context, usually over many iterations, we learn to regard that generalized production as the guiding purpose of that process. But that learning can’t apply to the whole process we call the Universe, because we have not yet seen even one iteration of it completed. Therefore we have no good reason to assume that the Universe has a purpose. Likewise the Universe is the context of all acts of meaning, whether they are intentional acts or not; but nothing, not even the Universe, can be its own context. For these reasons I do indeed regard the Universe itself as meaningless. I am well aware that I’m in disagreement with Peirce on this point; I regard his beliefs about Universal purpose as more religious than scientific — that is, as neither verifiable nor refutable. Gary f. } I surrender to the belief that my knowing is a small part of a wider integrated knowing that knits the entire biosphere or creation. [G. Bateson] { http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: 13-May-19 12:59 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited Gary F., List: GF: If all thought is dialogic, as Peirce said, is the Universe as Sign an internal dialogue (God talking to himself)? That is an interesting question, and Peirce even commented on it at least once, although the jumbled state of the relevant manuscript images makes the date uncertain. CSP: ... that mysterious thing called Reason ... apparently only has its being in communications. The Book of Genesis says, “God said, Let there be light!” and there was light. To whom or to what did God say it? The whole thing is mysterious. Of course, it does not mean that God spoke either in English or in Hebrew or with any air vibrations at all. But it does seem to mean that in communication of some kind there may lurk, without any brute force, a persuasive power that can even create such a world-boon as light. (R 514:59-60[47-48]) He simply acknowledged the mystery here, consistent with the opening sentences of both the Book of Genesis and the Gospel of John. In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. And God said, Let there be light: and there was light. And God saw the light, that it was good: and God divided the light from the darkness. And God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night. And the evening and the morning were the first day. (Genesis 1:1-5; KJV) In the beginning was the Word [logos], and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him; and without him was not any thing made that was made. In him was life; and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not. (John 1:1-5; KJV) Perhaps recognizing the Universe as a Sign uttered by God, with Himself as its Object, ultimately requires something along the lines of the Trinitarian conception. GF: If not, who is the interpreter of the Sign-Universe uttered by God? I already suggested that knowledge of God is the Final Interpretant of the Universe as a Sign, so all of us are its interpreters. Peirce alluded to this when discussing EGs in several different early drafts for "The Basis of Pragmaticism." CSP: The Graphist is really Plastic Nature, or the Artifex of Nature; and the special permissions are the experiences given to the interpreter of Nature, to the man, to which he is at liberty to attend, or not to attend at all, or to attend and immediately put out of sight, as he will. Or, although he may have neglected it at the time he is at any later time, and in any connection, warranted in recalling whatever experience may have ever warranted him in believing. (R 280:69-70[23-24]) CSP: We further conceive that this feigned sensible state of things is the icon or emblem of a mental state of things. Namely, the immense surface with the graphs scribed upon it is the image of the interpreter’s experience, while the sheet of assertion, his field of view is the image of his field of attention. His experience is forced upon him, while he attends to what he pleases, if he puts forth sufficient effort. The Graphist must be regarded as corresponding to the "Plastic Nature" of Cudworth, or else to the Artifex of Nature. (R 280:82-83[29-30]) CSP: [The sheet of assertion is] the mirror of the interpreter’s mind, and through that it is the sign of what the Graphist authorizes. Now the graphist, as the author of truth (for we have seen that falsity is what he forbids and truth what he permits) and source of all the interpreter’s knowledge must be recognized as being either Plastic Nature or the Artifex of Nature. The universe is simply the collective whole of all things to the assertion of whose existence the Graphist interposes no veto, or extends a positive permission. (R 280:86[29]) What exactly did Peirce mean by "Plastic Nature" in this context? Fortunately, we do not have to speculate, since he spelled it out succinctly in another manuscript. CSP: In England, however, the doctrine of a plastic nature, or a blind agent intermediate between God and the world was somewhat prevalent ... Cudworth in particular advocated this doctrine. (R 870:36; 1901) Moreover, he went on after the last quotation above to argue at some length that both the Graphist and the Interpreter must be persons, concluding as follows. CSP: ... the Graphist-mind and interpreter-mind must have all the characters of personal intellects possessed of moral natures. But it is not to be forgotten that the Graphist, whom we now speak of as a person, is such a person that the truth and being of the things that are objects of thought, consist in his assent to their being. (R 280:90[33]) In summary, the Graphist corresponds to the person whose assent is necessary and sufficient for any proposition to be true--either God Himself as the Artifex (maker) of Nature, or His "blind agent" Plastic Nature--while the Interpreter corresponds to any human or (presumably) other finite personal mind. The "immense surface" represents the latter's entire experience that is "forced upon him," while the Sheet of Assertion represents that person's field of attention at a particular moment--again, a hypothetical instantaneous state that is an artificial creation of thought for the purpose of describing the real and continuous "inferential process" of semeiosis. GF: Is the Creation of the three Universes intentional? Why should we assume that it has any purpose at all, given that it has no context? (Maybe it is Pure Play.) Is there such a thing as an unintentional or purposeless Sign--i.e., one that has no final cause, and thus no Final Interpretant? That would require it to be meaningless, since "that is meant which is intended or purposed" (CP 5.165, EP 2:214; 1903). On the contrary, just as every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself, likewise every Sign determines an Interpretant--or at least, it would do so under the right circumstances. CSP: If a sign has no interpreter, its interpretant is a "would be," i.e., is what it would determine in the interpreter if there were one. (EP 2:409; 1907). Moreover, Peirce held that every Sign ultimately has the same purpose. CSP: The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe ... The "Truth," the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign. (EP 2:304; 1904) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 7:50 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote: Jon, to continue your argument with some follow-up questions: If all thought is dialogic, as Peirce said, is the Universe as Sign an internal dialogue (God talking to himself)? If not, who is the interpreter of the Sign-Universe uttered by God? Is the Creation of the three Universes intentional? Why should we assume that it has any purpose at all, given that it has no context? (Maybe it is Pure Play.) Gary f.
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