Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Hi Charles:

Well, this form of response is inadequate to address the substantial issue at 
question.

>From a personal perspective, I have over five decades of experience as a 
>chemist.  I am simply saying that the language of chemistry is not formed in 
>the way the semantics of other natural languages are formed.  I come to this 
>conclusion from decades of efforts attempting to explain chemical reasoning to 
>non-chemists  - particularly mathematicians and physicists.  I have a few 
>scars from my failures to communicate!  :-). 

As for markedness theory, I read widely in a range of reference materials 
during the fist decade of this century, historical as well as modern and 
developed a reasonable understanding of “markedness theory.”  

If markedness theory serves the social / academic purposes of linguists, fine.  

At the same time, several of your rhetoric claims are “over the top” and not 
very close to the theory itself.  
The metaphor for “gravity” could be omitted without changing markedness theory, 
could it not? 

As far as I am aware, Michael Shapiro’s work does not address the science of 
chemistry or any other of the natural sciences, all of which require 
idiosyntactic association of idiopathic assertions to relate semantics to 
mathematics.  

Have you studied the linguistic developments of mathematics?  I have looked at 
a good bit.  It is totally bizarre!  
It would be totally unfair to assert that mathematical language is based on 
scientific ignorance, it just appears that way.
A classic example is B. Russell’s notion of the logical composition of ‘atomic 
sentences’ into 'molecular sentences'.  

At least, that is my understanding of the conundrums raised by CSP’s texts.  
That being said, I think one essential notion of understanding CSP rhetoric is 
his introduction of “abductive” logic as derivative from the latin case (and 
Finnish).  This usage is widespread in the semantics of chemistry. 

Perhaps the socialistic linguistic theories are open to further developments?

Cheers

Jerry 



> On Nov 23, 2020, at 6:38 PM, Charles Pyle  wrote:
> 
> Hi Jerry,
>  
> It is not my hypothesis. The linguistic theory of markedness has been around 
> since at least the 1930’s. Since then it has been tested against a vast body 
> of data from a huge number of languages by generations of linguists. 
> Nevertheless, as with so much of linguistics, markedness theory seems not to 
> have come to the attention of the rest of the academic world, let alone the 
> civilian world.
>  
> If you do a google search on “markedness theory” you will find a lot of 
> information. The top item returned to me just now had a nice statement about 
> the beginning of markedness theory.
>  
> begin quote
> Markedness Theory proposes that in the languages of the world certain 
> linguistic elements are more basic, natural, and frequent (unmarked) than 
> others which are referred to as marked. The concept of Markedness is first 
> proposed by the Prague School scholars Nikolai Sergeyevich Trubetzkoy and 
> Roman Jakobson.
> https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c855/a0ad0e00662ee7b813c6d332f7374ef221e4.pdf
>  
> 
> end quote
>  
> There is also an informative Wikipedia page: 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markedness 
> 
>  
> As to falsification of the hypothesis, as I said it has been subject to 
> extensive empirical testing.
>  
> As to the relation between markedness theory and Peirce, again numerous 
> scholars in many different fields have explored the relationship.
>  
> Michael Shapiro is a well-known scholar of markedness theory and he has been 
> active on this list for many years. See this article for example.
> https://cspeirce.iupui.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/shapiro/shapiro-mclc.pdf 
> 
>  
> Finally, I note that markedness theory in no way vitiates Peirce’s doctrine 
> of the tripartite nature of the sign. And the idea that there is a truth that 
> is prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s 
> thinking.
>  
> Cheers,
> Charles Pyle
>  
>  
>  
> From: Jerry LR Chandler  
> Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 6:57 PM
> To: Charles Pyle 
> Cc: Peirce List 
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
>  
> Hi Charles
>  
> Your post below left me stone cold!
>  
> One counter example to your hypothesis (conjecture?) is the language of 
> chemistry.
> It is built on positive evidence and reproducible empirical observations. The 
> propositional webs of inferences of chemical structures is one of the several 
> facets of chemical logic that CSP exploited in constructing his philosophies. 
>  
> The sensory properties of matter are fixed by experience.  Taste and smell 
> are remembered and associated with activities and events. The timelessness of 
> chemical names, such as 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Edwinia:

> On Nov 23, 2020, at 7:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> My understanding of Peirce is that there is nothing outside of semiosis!

This is not my understanding of CSP realism.

I recall a text that, roughly speaking,  asserts that signs are “emanations” of 
“sin-signs” as objects. Objects that are the same as legisigns and are the 
necessary sources the qualisigns (observations / measurements).   This does not 
deny the possibilities that all interpretants are semiotic relatives. 

Some line of reasoning along these lines is necessary if any sense at all is to 
be made of the scientific foundations of pragmaticism.

Cheers

Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of 
the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Hi Charles

Your post below left me stone cold!

One counter example to your hypothesis (conjecture?) is the language of 
chemistry.
It is built on positive evidence and reproducible empirical observations. The 
propositional webs of inferences of chemical structures is one of the several 
facets of chemical logic that CSP exploited in constructing his philosophies. 

The sensory properties of matter are fixed by experience.  Taste and smell are 
remembered and associated with activities and events. The timelessness of 
chemical names, such as water, or sugar or gold or…. are deeply embedded in 
human communication.

Chemical language grows from these positive impressions of sensory experiences 
on feelings / emotions.  The connections between chemical receptor encoded 
directly from the chemical genetic structures and the chemical circumstances is 
firmly grounded in decades of experience and centuries of experience.  The 
consistency of the chemical language has remained unchallenged for centuries.  

What separates the acquisition of chemical language from other languages? 

What, if any, role does Popperian falsification theory play in your assertions?

Cheers

Jerry

> On Nov 22, 2020, at 6:14 PM, Charles Pyle  wrote:
> 
> Hi Helmut,
>  
> Yes, as you surmise. I think it is reasonable to take this as a refinement of 
> Spencer-Brown. Let me explain it a little further.  
>  
> The space in which language grows is a kind of gravitational field where 
> truth is the center from which language arises in the form of marks each of 
> which is an elaboration of some prior, and each mark is a sign of falsity. 
> Thus the structure of language arises layer by layer as a structure of 
> falsity. The more marked, the more false. And it is a gravitational space 
> because the false tends by its nature to fall apart and reveal the 
> underlying, whether it is only a relatively less false underlying layer, or 
> the ultimate underlying layer of truth itself. Because of the nature of the 
> relation between truth and falsity, falsity must be continually reinforced, 
> repaired, defended, etc. or it will fall apart.  
>  
> In terms of markedness, truth is unmarked and unmarkable. Truth is silent. 
> Every element of language arises from some prior by elaborating on the prior. 
> Thus the first event in the arising of language is the production of a sound 
> that interrupts silence and in doing so creates the derivative ground on 
> which language is elaborated. The most unmarked vowel, the most open vowel, 
> the most sonorant vowel is a. So in theory we can hypothecate a as the first 
> mark which establishes the space of language as deviant from truth.
>  
> Both truth and its manifestation as silence are actual continuities. Sound is 
> a kind of false continuity. It sounds like a continuity. But it has a 
> beginning and an end, whereas silence was already there before the sound 
> begins, and it will be there after the sound ends. Silence is even there 
> during the sound: sound consists of a rapid sequence of pulses of energy; 
> between each of the pulses of energy is a brief gap that has the 
> characteristics of silence, i.e. the absence of sound. Sound is a kind of 
> continuity of discontinuity. You can clearly see this in a sonographic 
> analysis of sound. And here we can also see how it is that the very ground of 
> language is deviant from sound, seeking to interrupt the continuity of truth 
> by means of a faux continuity, and thus is essentially a sign of falsity. 
>  
> Given this fundamental ground,  the next logical step would be to mark the 
> vocalic ground continuity by its opposite, that is, to interrupt the 
> continuity, which is done in language by a consonant resulting in such basic 
> infantile linguistic forms as ama, aba, aka, ata, etc. Driven by factors of 
> timing these are often morphed into mama, baba, kaka, tata, etc. From here 
> phonologically the vowel space is further divided into at least three 
> elements naturally occupying the extreme margins of the vocalic space 
> resulting in a vowel inventory of a, i, u. And of course these can be further 
> divided. Consonants are similarly elaborated by the logic of opposition. 
> Roman Jakobson provided the classical explanation of this process of 
> development here:
> Jakobson, Roman. 1968.  Child Language Aphasia and Phonological Universals, 
> Janua Linguarum, Series Minor, 72, Moutoun, The Hague.
>  
> And I reframed his explanation in the context of Peirce’s theory of signs in 
> “Wild Language” which can be found 
> here:https://umich.academia.edu/CharlesPyle 
> 
>  
> Charles Pyle 
>  
> From: Helmut Raulien  
> Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2020 4:25 PM
> To: Charles Pyle 
> Cc: Peirce-L 
> Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
>  
> Charles,
> wow, interesting! I think about it. By first glance it seems to me like a 
> linguistic elaboration of Spencer-Brown. Do all 

[PEIRCE-L] Prior to Semiosis? (was multiple-valued logic)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Charles, List:

The post below seems to reflect the unfortunately common confusion of
Peirce's numerical names for his categories with the notions of logical and
temporal sequence. It was not his view that 1ns comes first, 2ns comes
second, and 3ns comes third. On the contrary, he very clearly held that all
three are irreducible, such that one cannot *evolve *2ns from 1ns, or *evolve
*3ns from 1ns and 2ns. Instead, 3ns *involves *2ns and 1ns, and 2ns *involves
*1ns; and all three categories are always operative within our existing
universe.

CSP: I chiefly insist upon continuity, or Thirdness, and, in order to
secure to thirdness its really commanding function, I find it indispensable
fully [to] recognize that it is a third, and that Firstness, or chance, and
Secondness, or Brute reaction, are other elements, without the independence
of which Thirdness would not have anything upon which to operate. (CP
6.202, 1898)


With respect to collateral experience/observation, Peirce's point is that
no sign by itself can communicate what *dynamical *object it denotes to
someone who has no previous acquaintance with that object. The sign can
only *identify *its object, and the interpreter must already be capable of
recognizing it by virtue of the *immediate *object. There is nothing "prior
to semiosis" here, just an analysis of one aspect of semiosis itself.

CSP: But in any case the reference of a sign to its object merely serves
the purpose of identification; namely, the identification of the actual or
supposed previous experience with which the new meaning, conveyed in the
sign, is to be attached. (R 318v1A:172-173[17-18], 1907).

CSP: The sole function of the object is identification; by which I mean
that if any part or concomitant of the sign specially or separately
represents the object rather than the meaning, it is to show that not any
other than this very object is that to which the sign refers; so that
either both the utterer (or putter forth,) and the interpreter must be
already familiarly acquainted with the object and well understand that the
other is so at the time of the communication of the sign, (as when we talk
of the universe or of the prehistoric,) or else the object must be
exhibited (as in a geometrical diagram, or a snipping from a textile
fabric,) or else the interpreter's attention must be forcibly drawn to the
object (as by the gleam of a light-house, or by a driver's shout of "hi,
there!") or else directions must be given for acquiring sufficient
acquaintance with the object for its identification, (as when we talk of
"the second cataract of the Nile,") or else the object must remain
indefinite (as when Longfellow taught the world that 'All things are not as
they seem.') (R 318v1B:98-99[14-15], 1907)


As for the sheet of assertion representing truth, I already addressed that
from one perspective in my other post this evening. Here I will simply add
that truth is prior to any valid *deductive *argumentation in the trivial
sense that the truth of the conclusion follows necessarily from the truth
of the premisses. However, "Abduction ... is the only logical operation
which introduces any new idea; for induction does nothing but determine a
value, and deduction merely evolves the necessary consequences of a pure
hypothesis" (CP 5.171, EP 2:216, 1903). That is why truth *per se* always
lies in the future, as the ideal end of inquiry whose method properly
includes all three forms of reasoning.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 8:09 PM Charles Pyle  wrote:

> Edwina, list:
>
>
>
> I don’t have access to my Peirce data right now, but I do disagree with
> the claim that Peirce does not allow for something prior to semiosis. I
> happened on the following quote from Peirce in some notes, but it doesn’t
> identify the source. It seems to me that Peirce is talking here about
> something prior to semiosis.
>
>
>
> ---begin quote
>
> The idea of the absolutely First must be entirely separated from all
> conception of or reference to anything else; for what involves a second is
> itself a second to that second. The First must therefore be present and
> immediate, so as not to be second to a representation. It must be fresh and
> new, for if old it is second to its former state. It must be initiative,
> original, spontaneous, and free; otherwise it is second to a determining
> cause. It is also something vivid and conscious; so only it avoids being
> the object of some sensation. It precedes all synthesis and all
> differentiation; it has no unity and no parts. It cannot be articulately
> thought: assert it, and it has already lost its characteristic innocence;
> for assertion always implies a denial of something else. Stop to think of
> it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his
> eyes to it, before he had 

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Charles, list

1] The categorical mode of Firstness is not an a priori Truth but an
essential part of semiosis.

2] Direct experience functions within semiosis - with the Dynamic
Object being mediated into an Interpretant

3] There is no such 'thing' or 'force' as an a priori Truth within
Peircean semiosis. 

Edwina
 On Tue 24/11/20  2:09 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv sent:
Edwina, list: 
I don’t have access to my Peirce data right now, but I do disagree
with the claim that Peirce does not allow for something prior to
semiosis. I happened on the following quote from Peirce in some
notes, but it doesn’t identify the source.  It seems to me that
Peirce is talking here about something prior to semiosis.   
---begin quote 

The idea of the absolutely First must be entirely separated from all
conception of or reference to anything else; for what involves a
second is itself a second to that second. The  First must therefore
be present and immediate, so as not to be second to a representation.
It must be fresh and new, for if old it is second to its former state.
It must be initiative, original, spontaneous, and free; otherwise it
is second to a determining  cause. It is also something vivid and
conscious; so only it avoids being the object of some sensation. It
precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; it has no unity and
no parts. It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has
already lost its  characteristic innocence; for assertion always
implies a denial of something else. Stop to think of it, and it has
flown! What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to
it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious of
his own  existence – that is first, present, immediate, fresh, new,
initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and
evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must be false
to it. 

---end quote 
Here too, I wonder what Peirce could mean here by direct experience,
collateral experience, and self-experience, if not something prior to
semiosis. 

---begin quote 

1908 [c.] | Letters to Lady Welby | MS [R] L463:14:  "A Sign may
bring before the Mind, a new hypothesis, or a sentiment, a quality, a
respect, a degree, a thing, an event, a law, etc.  But it never can
convey anything to a person who has  not had a direct experience or
at least original self-experience of the same object, collateral
experience." 

---end quote 
Same here. As I read this and similar statements, he envisions a
mode of knowing that is outside of the system of signs.  

---begin quote 

I do not mean by "collateral observation" acquaintance with the
system of signs. What is so gathered is not  COLLATERAL. It is on the
contrary the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign.
(CP 8.179, EP 2:494, 1909) 

---end quote 
And finally, as I recall in defining existential graphs Peirce held
that the sheet of assertion represents truth, the context within
which assertions are inscribed.  
Regards, 

Charles Pyle 
From: Edwina Taborsky  
 Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 8:11 PM
 To: Jerry LR Chandler ; Charles Pyle 
 Cc: Peirce List 
 Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic  
Charles, list: 

I don't see how you can assert that, " there is a truth that is
prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s
thinking. " 

My understanding of Peirce is that there is nothing outside of
semiosis! 'the entire universe - not merely the universe of
existents, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as
'the truth' - that all this universe is perfused with signs, if  it
is not composed exclusively of signs' 5.449f.  [That is - there is no
'force' aka truth, that is prior to or outside of semiosis]. 

"Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object, ITS
object, mind you" 5.554. [Truth is obviously operative within the
semiosic process - not prior to it].  

And the methods of attaining this truth [the conformity of a
representamen to its object] - is via..induction, deduction,
abduction.  

I understand that you are a Buddhist - which does indeed, posit an a
priori Truth - but I don't find any such concepts within the work of
Peirce. Such a view would greatly change the power of semiosis,
reducing it to almost a mechanical function.  

Edwina
 On Tue 24/11/20 12:38 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv [1] sent:  

Hi Jerry, 
It is not my hypothesis. The linguistic theory of markedness has
been around since at least the 1930’s. Since then it has been
tested against a vast body of data from a huge number of languages by
generations of linguists. Nevertheless,  as with so much of
linguistics, markedness theory seems not to have come to the
attention of the rest of the academic 

[PEIRCE-L] Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Charles, List:

I would like to offer a few remarks prompted by your interesting post over
the weekend.

CP: Similarly, while many people would not regard it as self-evident that
truth is prior to falsity, I hold that it is, and have argued as such in
various publications. In keeping with the order of this asymmetry truth is
unmarked and falsity is marked.


Helmut later brought up Peirce's entitative graphs, but when several of
those are scribed on the sheet, the claim is merely that at least one of
them is true, while all the others could be false. By contrast, in his
existential graphs, everything scribed on the sheet is asserted to be
(jointly) true. In fact, the *blank *sheet represents the inexhaustible
continuum of true propositions that one could *potentially *assert, perhaps
analogous to the "silence" of truth from a linguistic standpoint. Moreover,
Peirce himself recognizes that deductively inferring one truth from another
is *primitive *as represented in existential graphs by the scroll, while
falsity is an additional concept that is *derived *upon recognizing that
absurdity follows from some propositions as represented by a scroll with a
blackened inner close.

CSP: It was forced upon the logician’s attention that a certain development
of reasoning was possible before, or as if before, the concept of *falsity *had
ever been framed, or any recognition of such a thing as a false assertion
had ever taken place. Probably every human being passes through such a
grade of intellectual life, which may be called the state of paradisaical
logic, when reasoning takes place but when the idea of falsity, whether in
assertion or in inference, has never been recognized. But it will soon be
recognized that not every assertion is true; and that once recognized, as
soon as one notices that if a certain thing were true, every assertion
would be true, one at once rejects the antecedent that leads to that absurd
consequence. (R 669:18-19[16-17], 31 May 1911)


As Peirce notes shortly after the quoted passage, as well as elsewhere in
his writings, a simple cut or shaded area for negation comes about only
when the blackened inner close of a scroll is imagined to be
infinitesimally small. In at least that specific sense, while it may not
quite be self-evident, I agree that "truth is prior to falsity." However, I
must take issue with your statement today that "truth is prior to semiosis"
and that this "is consistent with Peirce's thinking." On the contrary, for
him truth is the *ideal end* of semiosis--that at which it aims, the
ultimate opinion that *would *be affirmed by an infinite community as the
result of infinite inquiry. Logic as semeiotic is a normative science
precisely because it reveals how we *ought *to think, just in case adopting
only true beliefs is our objective in the long run.

CP: For example, the conventional view holds that the past is first, the
present it next, and then comes the future. But to the contrary language
presupposes that the present is first and the past is second. This contrary
view does make sense, however, in that we experience things first in the
present, and then they become past. We take a picture in the present, but
it instantly becomes past. In keeping with this experiential view the
language universal is that the past is marked in relation to the present.
Thus look vs look+ed.


In terms of Peirce's categories, we can certainly observe ways in which the
present corresponds to 1ns, the past to 2ns, and the future to 3ns. In
particular, this matches up directly with how in semiosis the sign itself
corresponds to 1ns, its object to 2ns, and its interpretant to 3ns--not as
metaphysical modes, but as the different correlates of a genuine triadic
relation such that further analysis yields two objects and three
interpretants in accordance with Robert Marty's podium diagram. "The object
and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates of the sign; the
one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign" (EP 2:410, 1907).
Relative to the sign, the genuine (dynamical) object is in the past, while
the genuine (final) and degenerate (dynamical) interpretants are in the
future; but the degenerate (immediate) object and doubly degenerate
(immediate) interpretant are present in the sign itself.

Hence both semiosis and time conform to Gary Richmond's categorial vector
of determination (2ns→1ns→3ns), reflecting how the entire universe is
itself a sign, specifically an argument--"a vast representamen, a great
symbol of God’s purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities"
(CP 5.119, EP 2:193, 1903). I explore this further, as well as how each of
Gary's other five vectors can be applied to different aspects of time, in
my recent "Temporal Synechism" paper (https://rdcu.be/b9xVm).

   - aspiration (2ns→3ns→1ns) - Our experience (2ns) of the past provides
   our knowledge (3ns) at the present, which is our basis for making
   conjectures (1ns) about the future.
   - process 

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic

[Charles Pyle]

Edwina, list:

I don’t have access to my Peirce data right now, but I do disagree with the 
claim that Peirce does not allow for something prior to semiosis. I happened on 
the following quote from Peirce in some notes, but it doesn’t identify the 
source. It seems to me that Peirce is talking here about something prior to 
semiosis.

---begin quote
The idea of the absolutely First must be entirely separated from all conception 
of or reference to anything else; for what involves a second is itself a second 
to that second. The First must therefore be present and immediate, so as not to 
be second to a representation. It must be fresh and new, for if old it is 
second to its former state. It must be initiative, original, spontaneous, and 
free; otherwise it is second to a determining cause. It is also something vivid 
and conscious; so only it avoids being the object of some sensation. It 
precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; it has no unity and no parts. 
It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its 
characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something 
else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on the 
day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had 
become conscious of his own existence – that is first, present, immediate, 
fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and 
evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it.
---end quote

Here too, I wonder what Peirce could mean here by direct experience, collateral 
experience, and self-experience, if not something prior to semiosis.
---begin quote
1908 [c.] | Letters to Lady Welby | MS [R] L463:14:  "A Sign may bring before 
the Mind, a new hypothesis, or a sentiment, a quality, a respect, a degree, a 
thing, an event, a law, etc.  But it never can convey anything to a person who 
has not had a direct experience or at least original self-experience of the 
same object, collateral experience."
---end quote

Same here. As I read this and similar statements, he envisions a mode of 
knowing that is outside of the system of signs.
---begin quote
I do not mean by "collateral observation" acquaintance with the system of 
signs. What is so gathered is not COLLATERAL. It is on the contrary the 
prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign. (CP 8.179, EP 2:494, 
1909)
---end quote

And finally, as I recall in defining existential graphs Peirce held that the 
sheet of assertion represents truth, the context within which assertions are 
inscribed.

Regards,
Charles Pyle


From: Edwina Taborsky 
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 8:11 PM
To: Jerry LR Chandler ; Charles Pyle 

Cc: Peirce List 
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic


Charles, list:

I don't see how you can assert that, " there is a truth that is prior to 
semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s thinking. "

My understanding of Peirce is that there is nothing outside of semiosis! 'the 
entire universe - not merely the universe of existents, the universe which we 
are all accustomed to refer to as 'the truth' - that all this universe is 
perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs' 5.449f.  [That 
is - there is no 'force' aka truth, that is prior to or outside of semiosis].

"Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object, ITS object, mind 
you" 5.554. [Truth is obviously operative within the semiosic process - not 
prior to it].

And the methods of attaining this truth [the conformity of a representamen to 
its object] - is via..induction, deduction, abduction.

I understand that you are a Buddhist - which does indeed, posit an a priori 
Truth - but I don't find any such concepts within the work of Peirce. Such a 
view would greatly change the power of semiosis, reducing it to almost a 
mechanical function.

Edwina



On Tue 24/11/20 12:38 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv 
sent:
Hi Jerry,

It is not my hypothesis. The linguistic theory of markedness has been around 
since at least the 1930’s. Since then it has been tested against a vast body of 
data from a huge number of languages by generations of linguists. Nevertheless, 
as with so much of linguistics, markedness theory seems not to have come to the 
attention of the rest of the academic world, let alone the civilian world.

If you do a google search on “markedness theory” you will find a lot of 
information. The top item returned to me just now had a nice statement about 
the beginning of markedness theory.

begin quote
Markedness Theory proposes that in the languages of the world certain 
linguistic elements are more basic, natural, and frequent (unmarked) than 
others which are referred to as marked. The concept of Markedness is first 
proposed by the Prague School scholars Nikolai Sergeyevich Trubetzkoy and Roman 
Jakobson.

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Charles, list:

I don't see how you can assert that, " there is a truth that is
prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s
thinking. "

My understanding of Peirce is that there is nothing outside of
semiosis! 'the entire universe - not merely the universe of
existents, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as
'the truth' - that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is
not composed exclusively of signs' 5.449f.  [That is - there is no
'force' aka truth, that is prior to or outside of semiosis].

"Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object, ITS
object, mind you" 5.554. [Truth is obviously operative within the
semiosic process - not prior to it]. 

And the methods of attaining this truth [the conformity of a
representamen to its object] - is via..induction, deduction,
abduction. 

I understand that you are a Buddhist - which does indeed, posit an a
priori Truth - but I don't find any such concepts within the work of
Peirce. Such a view would greatly change the power of semiosis,
reducing it to almost a mechanical function. 

Edwina
 On Tue 24/11/20 12:38 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv sent:
Hi Jerry, 
It is not my hypothesis. The linguistic theory of markedness has
been around since at least the 1930’s. Since then it has been
tested against a vast body of data from a huge number of languages by
generations of linguists. Nevertheless,  as with so much of
linguistics, markedness theory seems not to have come to the
attention of the rest of the academic world, let alone the civilian
world.  
If you do a google search on “markedness theory” you will find a
lot of information. The top item returned to me just now had a nice
statement about the beginning of markedness theory. 
begin quote 

Markedness Theory proposes that in the languages of the world 
certain linguistic elements are more basic, natural, and frequent
(unmarked) than others which are referred to as marked. The concept
of Markedness is first proposed by the Prague School scholars Nikolai
Sergeyevich Trubetzkoy and Roman Jakobson.  


https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c855/a0ad0e00662ee7b813c6d332f7374ef221e4.pdf
[1] 

end quote 
There is also an informative Wikipedia page: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markedness [2] 
As to falsification of the hypothesis, as I said it has been subject
to extensive empirical testing.  
As to the relation between markedness theory and Peirce, again
numerous scholars in many different fields have explored the
relationship.  
Michael Shapiro is a well-known scholar of markedness theory and he
has been active on this list for many years. See this article for
example.  


https://cspeirce.iupui.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/shapiro/shapiro-mclc.pdf
[3] 
Finally, I note that markedness theory in no way vitiates Peirce’s
doctrine of the tripartite nature of the sign. And the idea that there
is a truth that is prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is
consistent with Peirce’s thinking.  
Cheers, 

Charles Pyle 
From: Jerry LR Chandler  
 Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 6:57 PM
 To: Charles Pyle 
 Cc: Peirce List 
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic   
Hi Charles  
Your post below left me stone cold!   
One counter example to your hypothesis (conjecture?) is the language
of chemistry.   

It is built on positive evidence and reproducible empirical
observations. The propositional webs of inferences of chemical
structures is one of the several facets of chemical logic that CSP
exploited in constructing his philosophies.
The sensory properties of matter are fixed by experience.  Taste and
smell are remembered and associated with activities and events. The
timelessness of chemical names, such as water, or sugar or gold
or…. are deeply embedded in human communication.   
Chemical language grows from these positive impressions of sensory
experiences on feelings / emotions.  The connections between chemical
receptor encoded directly from the chemical genetic structures and the
chemical circumstances is firmly  grounded in decades of experience
and centuries of experience.  The consistency of the chemical
language has remained unchallenged for centuries. 
What separates the acquisition of chemical language from other
languages?
What, if any, role does Popperian falsification theory play in your
assertions?   
Cheers   
Jerry  
On Nov 22, 2020, at 6:14 PM, Charles Pyle  wrote:  
Hi Helmut,   
Yes, as you surmise. I think it is reasonable to take this as a
refinement of Spencer-Brown. Let me explain it a little further. 
The space in which language grows is a kind of gravitational field
where truth is the center from which language arises in the 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic

[Charles Pyle]

Hi Jerry,

It is not my hypothesis. The linguistic theory of markedness has been around 
since at least the 1930’s. Since then it has been tested against a vast body of 
data from a huge number of languages by generations of linguists. Nevertheless, 
as with so much of linguistics, markedness theory seems not to have come to the 
attention of the rest of the academic world, let alone the civilian world.

If you do a google search on “markedness theory” you will find a lot of 
information. The top item returned to me just now had a nice statement about 
the beginning of markedness theory.

begin quote
Markedness Theory proposes that in the languages of the world certain 
linguistic elements are more basic, natural, and frequent (unmarked) than 
others which are referred to as marked. The concept of Markedness is first 
proposed by the Prague School scholars Nikolai Sergeyevich Trubetzkoy and Roman 
Jakobson.
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c855/a0ad0e00662ee7b813c6d332f7374ef221e4.pdf
end quote

There is also an informative Wikipedia page: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markedness

As to falsification of the hypothesis, as I said it has been subject to 
extensive empirical testing.

As to the relation between markedness theory and Peirce, again numerous 
scholars in many different fields have explored the relationship.

Michael Shapiro is a well-known scholar of markedness theory and he has been 
active on this list for many years. See this article for example.
https://cspeirce.iupui.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/shapiro/shapiro-mclc.pdf

Finally, I note that markedness theory in no way vitiates Peirce’s doctrine of 
the tripartite nature of the sign. And the idea that there is a truth that is 
prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s thinking.

Cheers,
Charles Pyle



From: Jerry LR Chandler 
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 6:57 PM
To: Charles Pyle 
Cc: Peirce List 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic

Hi Charles

Your post below left me stone cold!

One counter example to your hypothesis (conjecture?) is the language of 
chemistry.
It is built on positive evidence and reproducible empirical observations. The 
propositional webs of inferences of chemical structures is one of the several 
facets of chemical logic that CSP exploited in constructing his philosophies.

The sensory properties of matter are fixed by experience.  Taste and smell are 
remembered and associated with activities and events. The timelessness of 
chemical names, such as water, or sugar or gold or…. are deeply embedded in 
human communication.

Chemical language grows from these positive impressions of sensory experiences 
on feelings / emotions.  The connections between chemical receptor encoded 
directly from the chemical genetic structures and the chemical circumstances is 
firmly grounded in decades of experience and centuries of experience.  The 
consistency of the chemical language has remained unchallenged for centuries.

What separates the acquisition of chemical language from other languages?

What, if any, role does Popperian falsification theory play in your assertions?

Cheers

Jerry


On Nov 22, 2020, at 6:14 PM, Charles Pyle 
mailto:char...@pyle.tv>> wrote:

Hi Helmut,

Yes, as you surmise. I think it is reasonable to take this as a refinement of 
Spencer-Brown. Let me explain it a little further.

The space in which language grows is a kind of gravitational field where truth 
is the center from which language arises in the form of marks each of which is 
an elaboration of some prior, and each mark is a sign of falsity. Thus the 
structure of language arises layer by layer as a structure of falsity. The more 
marked, the more false. And it is a gravitational space because the false tends 
by its nature to fall apart and reveal the underlying, whether it is only a 
relatively less false underlying layer, or the ultimate underlying layer of 
truth itself. Because of the nature of the relation between truth and falsity, 
falsity must be continually reinforced, repaired, defended, etc. or it will 
fall apart.

In terms of markedness, truth is unmarked and unmarkable. Truth is silent. 
Every element of language arises from some prior by elaborating on the prior. 
Thus the first event in the arising of language is the production of a sound 
that interrupts silence and in doing so creates the derivative ground on which 
language is elaborated. The most unmarked vowel, the most open vowel, the most 
sonorant vowel is a. So in theory we can hypothecate a as the first mark which 
establishes the space of language as deviant from truth.

Both truth and its manifestation as silence are actual continuities. Sound is a 
kind of false continuity. It sounds like a continuity. But it has a beginning 
and an end, whereas silence was already there before the sound begins, and it 
will be there after the sound ends. Silence is even there during the sound: 
sound consists of a rapid sequence of pulses 

Aw: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Supplement: But perhaps this comparison with objective (or ontological) models is not even necessary, as it might be enough to go from subjectivity to intersubjectivity. I must read your texts, Charles, maybe it is in them.

I just am thinking, is the falsity in language due to what I would call "classification fallacy"? That is, if one suggests an XOR, where there is an OR? Suggesting a taxonomy where there in fact is a composition? A spoken word or sound, a legisign, (mis)represents a part of the outside continuum for a distinct discreteness.

For this fallacy there are many rethoric moves as examples, when e.g. a politican says: "Instead of doing A, we should better do B" (like helping refugeees and also improving their home situations), when in fact both actions are necessary. Or saying: "He married her for her money, not because of love", when in fact he married her for both, and maybe more reasons.

On the other hand, I dont think, that every word is false by commiting a classification fallacy. For example the word "horse" is not a fallacy, because the taxonomy exists in reality too, although a horse can interbreed with a donkey, but the resulting mule is infertile, so there is no continuum between horses and donkeys neither in reality.

 



Charles, Edwina, List,

 

I understand the falsity-truth distinction abstractly, because Spencer-Brown´s calculus is isomorphic with Peirce´s Entitive Graphs, and the cut in them is, translated to Boolean, a "NOT". The truth of the unmarked space then would not be ultimate, but original truth.

 

I think, S.-Brown´s calculus suits well to linguistics, because speech is a constructive action of a subject, and the said calculus is also subjective and constructivistic, it starts with the imperative "Draw a distinction". I guess that here mostly the commander and the obeyer is the same subject, as both decider and acter.

 

So I think, that this model is constructivistic and subjective. I wonder how to compare this model and make it come close with other models, e.g existentialistic ones, or ones that claim objectivity. I am suspecting, that this compartison might show, that a distinction, especially a re-entry can be blurred and dissolved, or elsehow conditioned.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

23. November 2020 um 15:59 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:



Sounds rather Buddhist - ie, 'ultimate truth which is empty of concrete characteristics - vs -provisional or concrete instantiations..

I don't see this as Peircean - for all three categories [1ns, 2ns and 3ns] are necessarily functional in his Realism. And his Objective Idealism includes matter with the idea.

Edwina
 

On Mon 23/11/20 12:14 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv sent:




Hi Helmut,

 

Yes, as you surmise. I think it is reasonable to take this as a refinement of Spencer-Brown. Let me explain it a little further.  

 

The space in which language grows is a kind of gravitational field where truth is the center from which language arises in the form of marks each of which is an elaboration of some prior, and each mark is a sign of falsity. Thus the structure of language arises layer by layer as a structure of falsity. The more marked, the more false. And it is a gravitational space because the false tends by its nature to fall apart and reveal the underlying, whether it is only a relatively less false underlying layer, or the ultimate underlying layer of truth itself. Because of the nature of the relation between truth and falsity, falsity must be continually reinforced, repaired, defended, etc. or it will fall apart.  

 

In terms of markedness, truth is unmarked and unmarkable. Truth is silent. Every element of language arises from some prior by elaborating on the prior. Thus the first event in the arising of language is the production of a sound that interrupts silence and in doing so creates the derivative ground on which language is elaborated. The most unmarked vowel, the most open vowel, the most sonorant vowel is a. So in theory we can hypothecate a as the first mark which establishes the space of language as deviant from truth.

 

Both truth and its manifestation as silence are actual continuities. Sound is a kind of false continuity. It sounds like a continuity. But it has a beginning and an end, whereas silence was already there before the sound begins, and it will be there after the sound ends. Silence is even there during the sound: sound consists of a rapid sequence of pulses of energy; between each of the pulses of energy is a brief gap that has the characteristics of silence, i.e. the absence of sound. Sound is a kind of continuity of discontinuity. You can clearly see this in a sonographic analysis of sound. And here we can also see how it is that the very ground of language is deviant from sound, seeking to interrupt the continuity of truth by means of a faux continuity, and thus is essentially a sign of falsity.

 

Given this fundamental ground,  the next logical step would be 

Aw: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic

[Helmut Raulien]

Charles, Edwina, List,

 

I understand the falsity-truth distinction abstractly, because Spencer-Brown´s calculus is isomorphic with Peirce´s Entitive Graphs, and the cut in them is, translated to Boolean, a "NOT". The truth of the unmarked space then would not be ultimate, but original truth.

 

I think, S.-Brown´s calculus suits well to linguistics, because speech is a constructive action of a subject, and the said calculus is also subjective and constructivistic, it starts with the imperative "Draw a distinction". I guess that here mostly the commander and the obeyer is the same subject, as both decider and acter.

 

So I think, that this model is constructivistic and subjective. I wonder how to compare this model and make it come close with other models, e.g existentialistic ones, or ones that claim objectivity. I am suspecting, that this compartison might show, that a distinction, especially a re-entry can be blurred and dissolved, or elsehow conditioned.

 

Best, Helmut

 
 

23. November 2020 um 15:59 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:



Sounds rather Buddhist - ie, 'ultimate truth which is empty of concrete characteristics - vs -provisional or concrete instantiations..

I don't see this as Peircean - for all three categories [1ns, 2ns and 3ns] are necessarily functional in his Realism. And his Objective Idealism includes matter with the idea.

Edwina
 

On Mon 23/11/20 12:14 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv sent:




Hi Helmut,

 

Yes, as you surmise. I think it is reasonable to take this as a refinement of Spencer-Brown. Let me explain it a little further.  

 

The space in which language grows is a kind of gravitational field where truth is the center from which language arises in the form of marks each of which is an elaboration of some prior, and each mark is a sign of falsity. Thus the structure of language arises layer by layer as a structure of falsity. The more marked, the more false. And it is a gravitational space because the false tends by its nature to fall apart and reveal the underlying, whether it is only a relatively less false underlying layer, or the ultimate underlying layer of truth itself. Because of the nature of the relation between truth and falsity, falsity must be continually reinforced, repaired, defended, etc. or it will fall apart.  

 

In terms of markedness, truth is unmarked and unmarkable. Truth is silent. Every element of language arises from some prior by elaborating on the prior. Thus the first event in the arising of language is the production of a sound that interrupts silence and in doing so creates the derivative ground on which language is elaborated. The most unmarked vowel, the most open vowel, the most sonorant vowel is a. So in theory we can hypothecate a as the first mark which establishes the space of language as deviant from truth.

 

Both truth and its manifestation as silence are actual continuities. Sound is a kind of false continuity. It sounds like a continuity. But it has a beginning and an end, whereas silence was already there before the sound begins, and it will be there after the sound ends. Silence is even there during the sound: sound consists of a rapid sequence of pulses of energy; between each of the pulses of energy is a brief gap that has the characteristics of silence, i.e. the absence of sound. Sound is a kind of continuity of discontinuity. You can clearly see this in a sonographic analysis of sound. And here we can also see how it is that the very ground of language is deviant from sound, seeking to interrupt the continuity of truth by means of a faux continuity, and thus is essentially a sign of falsity.

 

Given this fundamental ground,  the next logical step would be to mark the vocalic ground continuity by its opposite, that is, to interrupt the continuity, which is done in language by a consonant resulting in such basic infantile linguistic forms as ama, aba, aka, ata, etc. Driven by factors of timing these are often morphed into mama, baba, kaka, tata, etc. From here phonologically the vowel space is further divided into at least three elements naturally occupying the extreme margins of the vocalic space resulting in a vowel inventory of a, i, u. And of course these can be further divided. Consonants are similarly elaborated by the logic of opposition. Roman Jakobson provided the classical explanation of this process of development here:

Jakobson, Roman. 1968.  Child Language Aphasia and Phonological Universals, Janua Linguarum, Series Minor, 72, Moutoun, The Hague.

 

And I reframed his explanation in the context of Peirce’s theory of signs in “Wild Language” which can be found here: https://umich.academia.edu/CharlesPyle

 

Charles Pyle

 



From: Helmut Raulien
Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2020 4:25 PM
To: Charles Pyle
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic



 



Charles,



wow, interesting! I think about it. By first glance it seems to me like a linguistic elaboration of 

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 Sounds rather Buddhist - ie, 'ultimate truth which is empty of
concrete characteristics - vs -provisional or concrete
instantiations..

I don't see this as Peircean - for all three categories [1ns, 2ns
and 3ns] are necessarily functional in his Realism. And his Objective
Idealism includes matter with the idea. 

Edwina
 On Mon 23/11/20 12:14 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv sent:
Hi Helmut, 
Yes, as you surmise. I think it is reasonable to take this as a
refinement of Spencer-Brown. Let me explain it a little further.   
The space in which language grows is a kind of gravitational field
where truth is the center from which language arises in the form of
marks each of which is an elaboration of some prior, and each mark is
a sign of falsity. Thus the structure  of language arises layer by
layer as a structure of falsity. The more marked, the more false. And
it is a gravitational space because the false tends by its nature to
fall apart and reveal the underlying, whether it is only a relatively
less false underlying  layer, or the ultimate underlying layer of
truth itself. Because of the nature of the relation between truth and
falsity, falsity must be continually reinforced, repaired, defended,
etc. or it will fall apart.   
In terms of markedness, truth is unmarked and unmarkable. Truth is
silent. Every element of language arises from some prior by
elaborating on the prior. Thus the first event in the arising of
language is the production of a sound that interrupts  silence and in
doing so creates the derivative ground on which language is
elaborated. The most unmarked vowel, the most open vowel, the most
sonorant vowel is a. So in theory we can hypothecate a as the first
mark which establishes the space of language as  deviant from truth. 
Both truth and its manifestation as silence are actual continuities.
Sound is a kind of false continuity. It sounds like a continuity. But
it has a beginning and an end, whereas silence was already there
before the sound begins, and it  will be there after the sound ends.
Silence is even there during the sound: sound consists of a rapid
sequence of pulses of energy; between each of the pulses of energy is
a brief gap that has the characteristics of silence, i.e. the absence
of sound. Sound  is a kind of continuity of discontinuity. You can
clearly see this in a sonographic analysis of sound. And here we can
also see how it is that the very ground of language is deviant from
sound, seeking to interrupt the continuity of truth by means of a
faux  continuity, and thus is essentially a sign of falsity.  
Given this fundamental ground,  the next logical step would be to
mark the vocalic ground continuity by its opposite, that is, to
interrupt the continuity, which is done in language by a consonant
resulting in such basic infantile linguistic  forms as ama, aba, aka,
ata, etc. Driven by factors of timing these are often morphed into
mama, baba, kaka, tata, etc. From here phonologically the vowel space
is further divided into at least three elements naturally occupying
the extreme margins of the  vocalic space resulting in a vowel
inventory of a, i, u. And of course these can be further divided.
Consonants are similarly elaborated by the logic of opposition. Roman
Jakobson provided the classical explanation of this process of
development here: 

Jakobson, Roman. 1968.  Child Language Aphasia and Phonological
Universals, Janua Linguarum, Series Minor, 72, Moutoun, The Hague.  
And I reframed his explanation in the context of Peirce’s theory
of signs in “Wild Language” which can be found here:
https://umich.academia.edu/CharlesPyle [1] 
Charles Pyle  
From: Helmut Raulien  
 Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2020 4:25 PM
 To: Charles Pyle 
 Cc: Peirce-L 
 Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic   
Charles,   

wow, interesting! I think about it. By first glance it seems to me
like a linguistic elaboration of Spencer-Brown. Do all polarities
come from a marked starting point, looking  out for an opposite in
unmarked space?   

I apologize to everybody "conservative". Please see my use of the
term confined within the example I gave, and not generalized to its
political meaning. Or replaced with "conventional"  or "formerly
conventional".   
Best, Helmut   
22. November 2020 um 22:06 Uhr
  "Charles Pyle" 
 wrote: 

Helmut, 
Speaking as a linguist, I must point out that the view of language
you take in the paragraph I quote below is profoundly  mistaken. 
--begin quote from Helmut-- 

The conservative concept of sexuality is male-female, so binary,
like black-white, hot-cold, right-wrong, up-down,  open-closed,
well-unwell. When somebody claims for him*herself to belong to a
third gender, conservative people see, that this way their world is
made more complicated and harder to grasp, they feel a