[PEIRCE-L] The 1913 EGs are identical to the 1911 EGs

[John F. Sowa]

On 8 November 1913, Peirce described a version of EGs that is identical
to the 1911 version.  See the copy below.  My summary:

A
universe of discourse is described by the graphs scribed on a sheet
of assertion (AKA phemic sheet).  The structure and meaning of an EG
is
determined by five conventions [plus a default convention 0]:

0. Conjunction (AND) is the implicit logical operator that relates
the
graphs scribed in any area.

1. The existential
quantifier (there exists something) is represented
by a heavy dot.

2. A heavy dot extended to a heavy line asserts the identity of
the
objects denoted at each end.

3. A bifurcation of a
line (a ligature) to form a teridentity asserts
the co-identity of
the objects denoted at the three ends.

4. Shading an area
negates whatever is scribed in that area.

5. Evaluation of a
nest of negations proceeds from the outside-in
(endoporeutic).  This
implies that a nest of two negations, such as
"not-(A
not-B)", is equivalent to a conditional "if A then B".

This confirms my reply to Francesco on June 10.  In that note,
I
showed that any logical or philosophical idea expressed in or
explained by any EGs prior to June 1911 could be expressed or
explained as well or better by the EGs of R670 and L231.  Since
Peirce's version of 1913 is identical to the 1911 EGs, the more
complete specification of L231 would be his best and final version.

John

-


Peirce
described a version of EGs in the excerpt dated 8 November 1913
of
"Letters to F. A. Woods" (L477, July 1911 to December 1913):

Of course, not only are two terms often connected by a bond of
relational identity as in "son's wife" (represented by the
graph (Fig...)
and in "wife's son" (Fig...) but also every
term is bound to the real
universe, though in my graphs this is only
represented by the term's
being scribed on the sheet, which denotes
the universe.  Then only about
four conventions more complete the
definition of the method of
representation.  These are:

First, that a heavy dot stands for something or a real object.

Second, dot prolonged into a heavy line asserts the identity of the
objects denoted by its extremities.

Third, a node of point of
bifurcation of such a line asserts the
co-identity of the three ends;
and co-identity is the more usual meaning
of the word 'and'. 
(Fig...)

Fourth, shading an area of the phemic sheet denies
whatever is scribed
on that area.

Fifth, the
interpretation proceeds endogenously [endoporeutic].  That
is, Fig...
means "It is false that A is false while B is true", i.e.
"If A is true so is B" and the interpretation is not B is true
and A is
false which would be an exogenous interpretation, i.e.
beginning in the
inside and proceeding outward.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Off List: Differential Logic

[Gary Richmond]

Jon,

I asked you quite politely off List today, as I did several months ago and
several months before, that you try to frame your posts such that a reader
could see how your posts might more clearly be seen as Peirce-related, not
of course excluding messages related to the development of his philosophy
semeiotic, and logic in the 20th and 21st century. I wrote off List:

Please find a way to bring your very many posts around to Peirce, and when
there are those that can't be brought around, please omit Peirce-L from the
address. Again, Peirce-L is not a repository for everything and anything
pertaining to logic, to every bit of your work, for example, with cactus
graphs. And, in truth, I've seen so very much of this before.


Your posts are typically sent not only to this address but to these
addresses as well, Peirce-L being 4th on the list:

Cybernetic Communications ,
Laws of Form ,
Ontolog Forum ,
Peirce List ,
Structural Modeling ,
SysSciWG 


Many years ago Joe Ransdell similarly repeatedly asked you on and off List
to make an attempt to relate your posts more directly to Peirce. When you
adamantly refused to do so, he finally found it necessary to remove you
from the List (one of only two people he ever removed to my knowledge;
perhaps Ben Udell can correct me if I'm wrong).

After Joe passed a decade ago and I became moderator of the List you re
joined and, in truth, I was glad to see you back. At first it seemed that
you were indeed attempting to make your posts Peirce-related, by which I
mean what Joe Ransdell included on the Peirce-L page on Arisbe under the
sub-heading, "What is relevant to post and discuss here?"

There is no standing agenda except the promotion of philosophical
conversation of the sort which one would expect from people with a special
interest in Peirce and of other communication in support of that. Thus
discussion should be Peirce-related but not necessarily on Peirce, and the
working test for relevance would simply be a plausible explanation of why
the topic in question should be under discussion on a list called
"PEIRCE-L: The Philosophy of Charles Peirce", given that people subscribe
to such lists with some more or less definite expectations about
subject-matter in mind.


So, I am merely asking you, now on List, that you try to do just that. I
don't think I'm being unreasonable any more than Joe Ransdell was.

Sincerely,

Gary Richmond (writing as List moderator)


“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 8:00 PM Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Dear Gary,
>
> Everything I have done in this area for the last 2021 – 1967 = 54 years is
> strongly related to Peirce and what his logic makes possible in ways no
> other approach does. That does not mean the natural development of this
> line of inquiry ends with Peirce’s last writings, anymore than any other
> live tradition ends with the passing of its pioneers.
>
> If you have questions about the relation of my contributions to Peircean
> thought and pragmatism in general then I would be more than pleased to
> respond to them on List.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
>
> On Jun 17, 2021, at 7:02 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
> off List,
>
> Jon,
>
> Please find a way to bring your very many posts around to Peirce, and when
> there are those that can't be brought around, please omit Peirce-L from the
> address. Again, Peirce-L is not a repository for everything and anything
> pertaining to logic, to every bit of your work, for example, with cactus
> graphs. And, in truth, I've seen so very much of this before.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Gary
>
> “Let everything happen to you
> Beauty and terror
> Just keep going
> No feeling is final”
> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 6:45 PM Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>
>> Cf: Differential Logic • 4
>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/03/26/differential-logic-4/
>>
>> Differential Expansions of Propositions
>> ===
>>
>> https://oeis.org/wiki/Differential_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Part_1#Differential_Expansions_of_Propositions
>>
>> Bird’s Eye View
>> ===
>>
>> https://oeis.org/wiki/Differential_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Part_1#Bird.27s_Eye_View
>>
>> An efficient calculus for the realm of logic represented by boolean
>> functions
>> and elementary propositions makes it feasible to compute the finite
>> differences
>> and the differentials of those functions and propositions.
>>
>> For example, consider a proposition of the form “p and q”
>> graphed as two letters attached to a root node, as shown below.
>>
>> Figure 1.  Cactus Graph Existential p and q
>>
>> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Off List: Differential Logic

[Jon Awbrey]

Dear Gary, 

Everything I have done in this area for the last 2021 – 1967 = 54 years is 
strongly related to Peirce and what his logic makes possible in ways no other 
approach does. That does not mean the natural development of this line of 
inquiry ends with Peirce’s last writings, anymore than any other live tradition 
ends with the passing of its pioneers.  

If you have questions about the relation of my contributions to Peircean 
thought and pragmatism in general then I would be more than pleased to respond 
to them on List. 

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

> On Jun 17, 2021, at 7:02 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> off List,
> 
> Jon, 
> 
> Please find a way to bring your very many posts around to Peirce, and when 
> there are those that can't be brought around, please omit Peirce-L from the 
> address. Again, Peirce-L is not a repository for everything and anything 
> pertaining to logic, to every bit of your work, for example, with cactus 
> graphs. And, in truth, I've seen so very much of this before.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Gary
> 
> 
> “Let everything happen to you
> Beauty and terror
> Just keep going
> No feeling is final”
> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
> 
> 
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 6:45 PM Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>> Cf: Differential Logic • 4
>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/03/26/differential-logic-4/
>> 
>> Differential Expansions of Propositions
>> ===
>> https://oeis.org/wiki/Differential_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Part_1#Differential_Expansions_of_Propositions
>> 
>> Bird’s Eye View
>> ===
>> https://oeis.org/wiki/Differential_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Part_1#Bird.27s_Eye_View
>> 
>> An efficient calculus for the realm of logic represented by boolean functions
>> and elementary propositions makes it feasible to compute the finite 
>> differences
>> and the differentials of those functions and propositions.
>> 
>> For example, consider a proposition of the form “p and q”
>> graphed as two letters attached to a root node, as shown below.
>> 
>> Figure 1.  Cactus Graph Existential p and q
>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/03/cactus-graph-existential-p-and-q.jpg
>> 
>> Written as a string, this is just the concatenation “p q”.
>> 
>> The proposition pq may be taken as a boolean function f(p, q)
>> having the abstract type f : B × B → B, where B = {0, 1} is
>> read in such a way that 0 means false and 1 means true.
>> 
>> Imagine yourself standing in a fixed cell of the corresponding
>> venn diagram, say, the cell where the proposition pq is true,
>> as shown in the following Figure.
>> 
>> Figure 2.  Venn Diagram p and q
>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/03/venn-diagram-p-and-q.jpg
>> 
>> Now ask yourself:  What is the value of the proposition pq
>> at a distance of dp and dq from the cell pq where you are
>> standing?
>> 
>> Don't think about it — just compute:
>> 
>> Figure 3.  Cactus Graph (p, dp)(q, dq)
>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/03/cactus-graph-pdpqdq-1.jpg
>> 
>> The cactus formula (p, dp)(q, dq) and its corresponding graph arise
>> by replacing p with p + dp and q with q + dq in the boolean product
>> or logical conjunction pq and writing the result in the two dialects
>> of cactus syntax.  This follows because the boolean sum p + dp is
>> equivalent to the logical operation of exclusive disjunction, which
>> parses to a cactus graph of the following form.
>> 
>> Figure 4.  Cactus Graph (p, dp)
>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/03/cactus-graph-pdp-1.jpg
>> 
>> Next question:  What is the difference between the value of
>> the proposition pq over there, at a distance of dp and dq from
>> where you are standing, and the value of the proposition pq where
>> you are, all expressed in the form of a general formula, of course?
>> The answer takes the following form.
>> 
>> Figure 5.  Cactus Graph ((p, dp)(q, dq), pq)
>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/03/cactus-graph-pdpqdqpq-1.jpg
>> 
>> There is one thing I ought to mention at this point:  Computed over B,
>> plus and minus are identical operations.  This will make the relation
>> between the differential and the integral parts of the appropriate
>> calculus slightly stranger than usual, but we will get into that later.
>> 
>> Last question, for now:  What is the value of this expression from your
>> current standpoint, that is, evaluated at the point where pq is true?
>> Well, replacing p with 1 and q with 1 in the cactus graph amounts to
>> erasing the labels p and q, as shown below.
>> 
>> Figure 6.  Cactus Graph (( , dp)( , dq), )
>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/03/cactus-graph-dp-dq-1-1.jpg
>> 
>> And this is equivalent to the following graph.
>> 
>> Figure 7.  Cactus Graph ((dp)(dq))
>> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Differential Logic

[Jon Awbrey]

Cf: Differential Logic • 4
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/03/26/differential-logic-4/

Differential Expansions of Propositions
===
https://oeis.org/wiki/Differential_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Part_1#Differential_Expansions_of_Propositions

Bird’s Eye View
===
https://oeis.org/wiki/Differential_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Part_1#Bird.27s_Eye_View

An efficient calculus for the realm of logic represented by boolean functions
and elementary propositions makes it feasible to compute the finite differences
and the differentials of those functions and propositions.

For example, consider a proposition of the form “p and q”
graphed as two letters attached to a root node, as shown below.

Figure 1.  Cactus Graph Existential p and q
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/03/cactus-graph-existential-p-and-q.jpg

Written as a string, this is just the concatenation “p q”.

The proposition pq may be taken as a boolean function f(p, q)
having the abstract type f : B × B → B, where B = {0, 1} is
read in such a way that 0 means false and 1 means true.

Imagine yourself standing in a fixed cell of the corresponding
venn diagram, say, the cell where the proposition pq is true,
as shown in the following Figure.

Figure 2.  Venn Diagram p and q
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/03/venn-diagram-p-and-q.jpg

Now ask yourself:  What is the value of the proposition pq
at a distance of dp and dq from the cell pq where you are
standing?

Don't think about it — just compute:

Figure 3.  Cactus Graph (p, dp)(q, dq)
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/03/cactus-graph-pdpqdq-1.jpg

The cactus formula (p, dp)(q, dq) and its corresponding graph arise
by replacing p with p + dp and q with q + dq in the boolean product
or logical conjunction pq and writing the result in the two dialects
of cactus syntax.  This follows because the boolean sum p + dp is
equivalent to the logical operation of exclusive disjunction, which
parses to a cactus graph of the following form.

Figure 4.  Cactus Graph (p, dp)
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/03/cactus-graph-pdp-1.jpg

Next question:  What is the difference between the value of
the proposition pq over there, at a distance of dp and dq from
where you are standing, and the value of the proposition pq where
you are, all expressed in the form of a general formula, of course?
The answer takes the following form.

Figure 5.  Cactus Graph ((p, dp)(q, dq), pq)
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/03/cactus-graph-pdpqdqpq-1.jpg

There is one thing I ought to mention at this point:  Computed over B,
plus and minus are identical operations.  This will make the relation
between the differential and the integral parts of the appropriate
calculus slightly stranger than usual, but we will get into that later.

Last question, for now:  What is the value of this expression from your
current standpoint, that is, evaluated at the point where pq is true?
Well, replacing p with 1 and q with 1 in the cactus graph amounts to
erasing the labels p and q, as shown below.

Figure 6.  Cactus Graph (( , dp)( , dq), )
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/03/cactus-graph-dp-dq-1-1.jpg

And this is equivalent to the following graph.

Figure 7.  Cactus Graph ((dp)(dq))
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/03/cactus-graph-dpdq-1.jpg

We have just met with the fact
that the differential of the AND
is the OR of the differentials.

• p and q ---Diff---> dp or dq

Figure 8.  Cactus Graph pq Diff ((dp)(dq))
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/03/cactus-graph-pq-diff-dpdq-1.jpg

It will be necessary to develop a more refined analysis of
that statement directly, but that is roughly the nub of it.

If the form of the above statement reminds you of De Morgan's rule,
it is no accident, as differentiation and negation turn out to be
closely related operations.  Indeed, one can find discussions of
logical difference calculus in the Boole–De Morgan correspondence
and Peirce also made use of differential operators in a logical
context, but the exploration of these ideas has been hampered by
a number of factors, not the least of which has been the lack of
a syntax adequate to handle the complexity of expressions evolving
in the process.

Note.  Due to the large number of Figures I won't attach them here,
but see the blog post linked at top of the page for the Figures and
also for the proper math formatting.

Regards,

Jon
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Readings about Semeiotic (was Readings about Phaneroscopy)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Tom, List:

I agree that the phaneron includes whatever is or could be present to the
mind "in any way whatsoever." Here is something that Peirce says about
predicates (and subjects).

CSP: Experience is first forced upon us in the form of a flow of images.
Thereupon thought makes certain assertions. It professes to pick the image
into pieces and to detect in it certain characters. This is not literally
true. The image has no parts, least of all predicates. Thus predication
involves precisive abstraction [elsewhere *precission*]. Precisive
abstraction creates predicates. Subjectal [elsewhere *hypostatic*]
abstraction creates subjects. Both predicates and subjects are creations of
thought. (NEM 3:917, 1904)


The question that sometimes comes up is whether we are still practicing
phaneroscopy once we start *interpreting *the phaneron by predicating
attributes of it. The very first word of this excerpt is *experience*, the
aspect of the phaneron that is "forced upon us" as "a flow of images,"
which we convert into predicates and subjects as "creations of thought,"
implying semiosis throughout. On the other hand, "predication involves
precisive abstraction," and as we will be discussing later in the slow read
of De Tienne's slides, prescission is an indispensable tool of phaneroscopy.

Perhaps you could elaborate on the two questions that you posed, hopefully
prompting some further reflection and discussion.

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 11:24 AM Thomas Gollier  wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> From the quotes you provide, and how I remember understanding it, the
> *phaneron *seems to be anything that is
> "in any way whatsoever." But that would mean that it's impossible to
> attribute any particular predicate to it without
> falling short of what it is?  Seems a lot like Parmenides' notion of being
> at this point?
>
> Tom
>
>>
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[PEIRCE-L] Readings about Semeiotic (was Readings about Phaneroscopy)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut, list

I don't think anyone is defining reality or truth as dependent on
humans' perception. But Peirce himself wrote about truth, that it is
"the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
investigate" 5.407. But at the same time, Peirce's theory of
fallibilism and continuity seems to weaken this claim!

We can acknowledge that: "Reality is independent of its being 'as it
is regardless of what you or I may think about it" 5.432. this removes
reality from any notion of subjectivism or nominalism. 

And we can also acknowledge in 1.175 "the reality of things consists
in their persistent forcing themselves upon our recognition'. This is
a factor not merely of the externality of secondness but also of our
awareness of thirdness or regularity.

 The question then moves to the truth of our investigations and
experiences of reality- and here it becomes more difficult.. And we
must acknowledge that outline in the search for truth in 5.407-8
which is based on the scientific method. But at the same time,
fallibilism and continuity [see outline in 1.172] suggests tha thist 
"absolute exactitude can never be known" .

Does this suggest that reality is independent of us but that the
ultimate truth about these experiences seem to be unattainable but
have to instead be acknowledged by us as a compromise between the
certainties developed by the scientific method and the acknowledgment
of both continuity [which involves change and evolution] and
fallibilism?

Edwina
 On Thu 17/06/21  2:12 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Edwina, Auke, List   I think there are different definitions (of
truth and reality), without being contradictionary definitions. I
dont think that "one definition defines it as the result of OUR
actions of investigation", that would be anthropocentric /
nominalistic. Peirce wrote it in the "would-be"- form: It is not the
result, but it "would be" the result of an impossible
thought-experiment. Reality is independent of humans, but if humans
were almighty (infinite inquiry, infinite group of inquirers), what
they are not, then it would be the result, which it is not. So in
reality reality is independent.   Best Helmut17. Juni 2021 um
16:34 Uhr
  "Edwina Taborsky" 
 wrote:  

  List 

What disagreement with Peirce? My point was to examine the quotes by
Peirce, selected by both JAS and Auke. They focused on different
definitions of reality and truth. 

I don't think that the differences can be defined as between 'those
which are verbal' vs 'those which are pragmatic'. Both acknowledge
that a real object is 'real' - regardless of 'what you or I may think
about it' 5.432. So, how do I see the difference? 

The JAS selections focus on the requirement, I think, for an
additional step to define 'the real'; namely, an investigation, 'by
all who investigate',  that concludes that this object is truthfully
represented 'in this opinion'. 

The quotes provided by JAS are indicative of the scientific method
.The intentionality, if I may use the term,  of dealing with these
objects rests within the mankind-who-investigate. Reality is defined
as that-which is-true after our investigations. 

But Auke's quotes show us a different aspect of reality, apart from
its being, after investigation, defined as true. His quotes - and I
emphasize that both JAS and Auke provided Peircean quotes ... puts
some intentionality - an inaccurate word I admit - upon reality;
namely, that 'the reality of things consists in their persistent
forcing themselves upon our recognition'. 

That's what is interesting in these definitions of reality; one
definition defines it as the result of OUR actions of investigation
and our evaluation of these investigations; the other definition
defines it as the result of the external world's persistence in
interaction with us. 

Both are obviously valid. I'm not sure how I would term or define
the two approaches. 

Edwina 
 On Thu 17/06/21 9:59 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:   Edwina, Auke, List:   I appreciate the honest acknowledgment
of disagreement with Peirce. However, nothing that I quoted from him
"relies on man to define truth." There is no inconsistency whatsoever
between his definitions of reality at the second and third grades of
clarity, which I summarize as follows.  
*Verbal definition of reality - that which is as it is regardless
of what anyone thinks about it. 
*Pragmatistic definition of reality - that which would be
affirmed in the ultimate opinion after infinite inquiry by an
infinite community. 

   Note that the latter describes a regulative ideal, not an actual
achievement, so it does not rely on man to define truth (or reality)
at all. It simply expresses the "cheerful hope" that our
investigations of reality, if carried out far enough in a sincere
spirit of seeking the truth, would 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] From phaneroscopy to semeiotic to normative logic (was readings

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, John, List,

JFS: I renamed the subject line to emphasize the stages prior to the
derivation of the three branches of normative logic.


JAS: According to Peirce, the only "stages" between phaneroscopy and the
normative science of logic as semeiotic are the other two normative
sciences, esthetics and ethics.

GR: That's correct. John's assertion that "The first stages of phaneroscopy
apply formal logic to derive the phenomenological categories and the
hypoicons" and his insertion of "formal logic" into phaneroscopy in his
diagram of the classification of sciences has *no* support in Peirce and
does not appear in his own diagrams and outlines of that classification.

JFS:  The first stages of phaneroscopy apply formal logic to derive the
phenomenological categories and the hypoicons.


JAS: According to Peirce, phaneroscopy has no branches [. . .]

GR: Yes. But De Tienne and I have independently put forth the idea that the
further development of Peirce's science of phenomenology may come
to include two additional branches. In his paper, "Iconoscopy Between
Phaneroscopy and Semeiotic" (
https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/rssi/2013-v33-n1-2-3-rssi02379/1035282ar/)
De Tienne posits a yet undeveloped branch of phenomenology, *iconoscopy*,
to follow phanersocopy; and I have suggested that a third branch might also
eventually be developed, namely, what I've discussed as *trichotomic
category theory* in several papers and on this List. Of course both of
these possible branches of phenomenology go beyond the pure practice of
phaneroscopy which Peirce outlines. However, this possible development and
expansion of phaneroscopy is a topic that I hope we'll consider much later
in the slow read of De Tienne's slide presentation, and especially as we
approach the anatomy of that 'science egg' which De Tienne sees Peirce's
phenomenology as currently being. Jon continued:

JAS: It indeed applies formal/mathematical logic (*logica utens*) to derive
the categories, but not the hypoicons--those are derived in speculative
grammar, the first branch of the normative science of logic as
semeiotic (*logica
docens*).


GR: While I agree that the hypoicons are most certainly not derived in
phenomenology but, rather, in logic as semeiotic, I think that it's best to
say that a "formal/mathematical logic" *employs* a *logica utens *to derive
the categories in mathematics; that is, it shouldn't be identified with it.

GR: However, I think that the notion that formal logic derives the
categories, while surely true for pure mathematics, is not exactly so for
the first cenoscopic science, phaneroscopy/ phenomenology. In a pdf of
quotations by Peirce and some valuable comments by various Peirce scholars
which De Tienne sent to Jon, Gary Fuhrman, and me yesterday, one item
argues that mathematics and phaneroscopy discover the categories
"independently." I would tend to strongly agree. Indeed, in one place
Peirce argues that the three categories are 'first' discovered in
phenomenology and only later confirmed in mathematics through valency
theory and the reduction thesis, these representing the 'simplest
mathematics' in pure mathematics. In short, the original phaneroscopist,
Peirce, observes much more than 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns in the phaneron which,
I'd argue, cannot be reduced to those three seen as monad, dyad, and triad
(as they are in pure mathematics). So, while I am in general agreement with
Jon's remarks, I can't wholly agree with his stating that "None of this is
even remotely controversial among Peirce scholars." But I am in full
agreement with his final remark.

JAS: Again, any classification of the sciences that situates "formal
semeiotic" as a branch of phaneroscopy is not *Peirce's* classification of
the sciences. After all, "nobody can claim that anything other than an
exact quotation is what Peirce intended."


The last quotation is, of course, something that John himself wrote.

I have myself been at pains to make it clear that De Tienne's and my
suggestions as to the possible development of phenomenology in the 21st
century most certainly "go beyond'' anything Peirce wrote, while I believe
they are not incompatible with his writings on phaneroscopy/ phenomenology.

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Wed, Jun 16, 2021 at 10:05 AM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> John, List:
>
> JFS: I renamed the subject line to emphasize the stages prior to the
> derivation of the three branches of normative logic.
>
>
> According to Peirce, the only "stages" between phaneroscopy and the
> normative science of logic as semeiotic are the other two normative
> sciences, esthetics and ethics.
>
> JFS:  The first stages of phaneroscopy apply formal logic to derive the
> phenomenological categories and the hypoicons.
>
>
> 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Readings about Semeiotic (was Readings about Phaneroscopy)

[Helmut Raulien]

 


Edwina, Auke, List

 

I think there are different definitions (of truth and reality), without being contradictionary definitions. I dont think that "one definition defines it as the result of OUR actions of investigation", that would be anthropocentric / nominalistic. Peirce wrote it in the "would-be"- form: It is not the result, but it "would be" the result of an impossible thought-experiment. Reality is independent of humans, but if humans were almighty (infinite inquiry, infinite group of inquirers), what they are not, then it would be the result, which it is not. So in reality reality is independent.

 

Best

Helmut

 

17. Juni 2021 um 16:34 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:




List

What disagreement with Peirce? My point was to examine the quotes by Peirce, selected by both JAS and Auke. They focused on different definitions of reality and truth.

I don't think that the differences can be defined as between 'those which are verbal' vs 'those which are pragmatic'. Both acknowledge that a real object is 'real' - regardless of 'what you or I may think about it' 5.432. So, how do I see the difference?

The JAS selections focus on the requirement, I think, for an additional step to define 'the real'; namely, an investigation, 'by all who investigate',  that concludes that this object is truthfully represented 'in this opinion'.

The quotes provided by JAS are indicative of the scientific method .The intentionality, if I may use the term,  of dealing with these objects rests within the mankind-who-investigate. Reality is defined as that-which is-true after our investigations.

But Auke's quotes show us a different aspect of reality, apart from its being, after investigation, defined as true. His quotes - and I emphasize that both JAS and Auke provided Peircean quotes ... puts some intentionality - an inaccurate word I admit - upon reality; namely, that 'the reality of things consists in their persistent forcing themselves upon our recognition'.

That's what is interesting in these definitions of reality; one definition defines it as the result of OUR actions of investigation and our evaluation of these investigations; the other definition defines it as the result of the external world's persistence in interaction with us.

Both are obviously valid. I'm not sure how I would term or define the two approaches.

Edwina

 



 

On Thu 17/06/21 9:59 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:



Edwina, Auke, List:

 

I appreciate the honest acknowledgment of disagreement with Peirce. However, nothing that I quoted from him "relies on man to define truth." There is no inconsistency whatsoever between his definitions of reality at the second and third grades of clarity, which I summarize as follows.



	Verbal definition of reality - that which is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it.
	Pragmatistic definition of reality - that which would be affirmed in the ultimate opinion after infinite inquiry by an infinite community.




Note that the latter describes a regulative ideal, not an actual achievement, so it does not rely on man to define truth (or reality) at all. It simply expresses the "cheerful hope" that our investigations of reality, if carried out far enough in a sincere spirit of seeking the truth, would eventually be self-correcting. For more on this, I once again highly recommend Robert Lane's recent book,  Peirce on Realism and Idealism (https://books.google.com/books/about/Peirce_on_Realism_and_Idealism.html?id=yKpCDwAAQBAJ).

 

As for Auke's post quoted below, I agree completely with Gary F.'s response (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-06/msg00126.html ).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 8:12 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


List

I think that Auke has brought up a vital analysis of 'what is reality'.

JAS provided us with Peirce quotations that asserted that 'what is true' is reality. I have a problem with such a definition, because it relies on man to define truth and I consider allotting mankind such a role is problematic. [indeed, dare I say, almost nominalistic].

I prefer the Peirce quotations selected by Auke, which put reality out of the control of man's thoughts and return it to the external world.

And as Auke added: "Real is that what is independent of individual thought" [And I'd even add, of many individual thoughts for the collective can be wrong]. Auke adds: "it is because of this independence of individual thought that we can talk about the truth of propositions. Or the veracity of a phanerosocpic exercise".

Agreed; thanks.

Edwina

On Thu 17/06/21 2:08 AM , "Auke van Breemen"  peirce-l@list.iupui.edu sent:


Jon,

CP 1. 175 The reality of things consists in their persistent forcing themselves upon our recognition.

CP 1.325 In the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Differential Logic

[Jon Awbrey]

Cf: Differential Logic • Discussion 5
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/06/17/differential-logic-discussion-5/

Re: Laws of Form
https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/topic/differential_logic/83557540
::: Lyle Anderson ( https://groups.io/g/lawsofform/message/330 )


The differential proposition dA is one we use to describe
a change of state (or a state of change) from A to (A) or
the reverse.



Does this mean that if A is the proposition “The sky is blue”,
then dA would be the statement “The sky is not blue”?  Don't
you already have a notation for this in A and (A) ?  From
where does “state” and “change of state” come in relation
to a proposition?


Dear Lyle,

The differential variable dA : X → B = {0, 1} is a derivative variable,
a qualitative analogue of a velocity vector in the quantitative realm.

Let's say x ϵ R is a real value giving the membrane potential
in a particular segment of a nerve cell's axon and A : R → B
is a categorical variable predicating whether the site is in
the activated state, A(x) = 1, or not, A(x) = 0.  We observe
the site at discrete intervals, a few milliseconds apart, and
obtain the following data.

• At time t₁ the site is in a resting state, A(x) = 0.
• At time t₂ the site is in an active state, A(x) = 1.
• At time t₃ the site is in a resting state, A(x) = 0.

On current information we have no way of predicting the state at
time t₂ from the state at time t₁ but we know action potentials
are inherently transient so we can fairly well guess the state
of change at time t₂ is dA = 1, in other words, about to be
changing from A to (A).  The site's qualitative “position”
and “velocity” at time t₂ can now be described by means
of the compound proposition A dA.

Resources
=

Logic Syllabus
https://oeis.org/wiki/Logic_Syllabus

Logical Graphs
https://oeis.org/wiki/Logical_Graphs

Minimal Negation Operators
https://oeis.org/wiki/Minimal_negation_operator

Differential Logic
https://oeis.org/wiki/Differential_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Overview
https://oeis.org/wiki/Differential_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Part_1
https://oeis.org/wiki/Differential_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Part_2
https://oeis.org/wiki/Differential_Logic_%E2%80%A2_Part_3
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Readings about Semeiotic (was Readings about Phaneroscopy)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}List

What disagreement with Peirce? My point was to examine the quotes by
Peirce, selected by both JAS and Auke. They focused on different
definitions of reality and truth.

I don't think that the differences can be defined as between 'those
which are verbal' vs 'those which are pragmatic'. Both acknowledge
that a real object is 'real' - regardless of 'what you or I may think
about it' 5.432. So, how do I see the difference?

The JAS selections focus on the requirement, I think, for an
additional step to define 'the real'; namely, an investigation, 'by
all who investigate',  that concludes that this object is truthfully
represented 'in this opinion'. 

The quotes provided by JAS are indicative of the scientific method
.The intentionality, if I may use the term,  of dealing with these
objects rests within the mankind-who-investigate. Reality is defined
as that-which is-true after our investigations.

But Auke's quotes show us a different aspect of reality, apart from
its being, after investigation, defined as true. His quotes - and I
emphasize that both JAS and Auke provided Peircean quotes ... puts
some intentionality - an inaccurate word I admit - upon reality;
namely, that 'the reality of things consists in their persistent
forcing themselves upon our recognition'. 

That's what is interesting in these definitions of reality; one
definition defines it as the result of OUR actions of investigation
and our evaluation of these investigations; the other definition
defines it as the result of the external world's persistence in
interaction with us. 

Both are obviously valid. I'm not sure how I would term or define
the two approaches. 

Edwina
 On Thu 17/06/21  9:59 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, Auke, List:
 I appreciate the honest acknowledgment of disagreement with Peirce.
However, nothing that I quoted from him "relies on man to define
truth." There is no inconsistency whatsoever between his definitions
of reality at the second and third grades of clarity, which I
summarize as follows.
*Verbal definition of reality - that which is as it is regardless
of what anyone thinks about it. 
*Pragmatistic definition of reality - that which would be
affirmed in the ultimate opinion after infinite inquiry by an
infinite community.

Note that the latter describes a regulative ideal, not an actual
achievement, so it does not rely on man to define truth (or reality)
at all. It simply expresses the "cheerful hope" that our
investigations of reality, if carried out far enough in a sincere
spirit of seeking the truth, would eventually be self-correcting. For
more on this, I once again highly recommend Robert Lane's recent book,
 Peirce on Realism and Idealism
(https://books.google.com/books/about/Peirce_on_Realism_and_Idealism.html?id=yKpCDwAAQBAJ
[1]).
 As for Auke's post quoted below, I agree completely with Gary F.'s
response
(https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-06/msg00126.html [2]
).
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4] 
 On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 8:12 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
List

I think that Auke has brought up a vital analysis of 'what is
reality'. 

JAS provided us with Peirce quotations that asserted that 'what is
true' is reality. I have a problem with such a definition, because it
relies on man to define truth and I consider allotting mankind such a
role is problematic. [indeed, dare I say, almost nominalistic]. 

I prefer the Peirce quotations selected by Auke, which put reality
out of the control of man's thoughts and return it to the external
world. 

And as Auke added: "Real is that what is independent of individual
thought" [And I'd even add, of many individual thoughts for the
collective can be wrong]. Auke adds: "it is because of this
independence of individual thought that we can talk about the truth
of propositions. Or the veracity of a phanerosocpic exercise".

Agreed; thanks.

Edwina

On Thu 17/06/21  2:08 AM , "Auke van Breemen" 
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [6] sent:
Jon,

CP 1. 175 The reality of things consists in their persistent forcing
themselves upon our recognition.
CP 1.325 In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the
real is that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as
somethingotherthan the mind's creation.

This quote comes from your recent reponse to Edwina:

CSP: That which any true proposition asserts is real , in the sense
of being as it is regardless of what you or I may think about it. (CP
5.432, EP 2:343, 1905) 

And here we see what the relation is between propositions and
reality.In short: Real is that what is 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Readings about Semeiotic (was Readings about Phaneroscopy)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, Auke, List:

I appreciate the honest acknowledgment of disagreement with Peirce.
However, nothing that I quoted from him "relies on man to define truth."
There is no inconsistency whatsoever between his definitions of reality at
the second and third grades of clarity, which I summarize as follows.

   - Verbal definition of reality - that which is as it is regardless of
   what anyone thinks about it.
   - Pragmatistic definition of reality - that which would be affirmed in
   the ultimate opinion after infinite inquiry by an infinite community.

Note that the latter describes a regulative ideal, not an actual
achievement, so it does not rely on man to define truth (or reality) at
all. It simply expresses the "cheerful hope" that our investigations of
reality, if carried out far enough in a sincere spirit of *seeking *the
truth, would eventually be self-correcting. For more on this, I once again
highly recommend Robert Lane's recent book, *Peirce on Realism and Idealism*
 (
https://books.google.com/books/about/Peirce_on_Realism_and_Idealism.html?id=yKpCDwAAQBAJ
).

As for Auke's post quoted below, I agree completely with Gary F.'s response
(https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-06/msg00126.html).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 8:12 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> List
>
> I think that Auke has brought up a vital analysis of 'what is reality'.
>
> JAS provided us with Peirce quotations that asserted that 'what is true'
> is reality. I have a problem with such a definition, because it relies on
> man to define truth and I consider allotting mankind such a role is
> problematic. [indeed, dare I say, almost nominalistic].
>
> I prefer the Peirce quotations selected by Auke, which put reality out of
> the control of man's thoughts and return it to the external world.
>
> And as Auke added: "Real is that what is independent of individual
> thought" [And I'd even add, of many individual thoughts for the collective
> can be wrong]. Auke adds: "it is because of this independence of individual
> thought that we can talk about the truth of propositions. Or the veracity
> of a phanerosocpic exercise".
>
> Agreed; thanks.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Thu 17/06/21 2:08 AM , "Auke van Breemen" peirce-l@list.iupui.edu sent:
>
> Jon,
>
> CP 1. 175 The reality of things consists in their persistent forcing
> themselves upon our recognition.
>
> CP 1.325 In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real
> is that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something
> otherthan the mind's creation.
>
> This quote comes from your recent reponse to Edwina:
>
> CSP: That which any true proposition asserts is real, in the sense of
> being as it is regardless of what you or I may think about it. (CP 5.432,
> EP 2:343, 1905)
>
> And here we see what the relation is between propositions and reality.
> In short: Real is that what is independed of individual thought. And it is
> because of this independence of individual thought that we can talk about
> the truth of propositions. Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize.
>
> Best,
>
> Auke
>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Readings about Semeiotic (was Readings about Phaneroscopy)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

List

I think that Auke has brought up a vital analysis of 'what is
reality'. 

JAS provided us with Peirce quotations that asserted that 'what is
true' is reality. I have a problem with such a definition, because it
relies on man to define truth and I consider allotting mankind such a
role is problematic. [indeed, dare I say, almost nominalistic]. 

I prefer the Peirce quotations selected by Auke, which put reality
out of the control of man's thoughts and return it to the external
world.

And as Auke added: "Real is that what is independent of individual
thought" [And I'd even add, of many individual thoughts for the
collective can be wrong]. Auke adds: "it is because of this
independence of individual thought that we can talk about the truth
of propositions. Or the veracity of a phanerosocpic exercise".

Agreed; thanks.

Edwina

Edwina
 On Thu 17/06/21  2:08 AM , "Auke van Breemen"
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu sent:
Jon,
CP 1. 175 The reality of things consists in their persistent forcing
themselves upon our recognition.

CP 1.325 In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the
real is that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as
somethingotherthan the mind's creation.

This quote comes from your recent reponse to Edwina:

CSP: That which any true proposition asserts is real, in the sense
of being as it is regardless of what you or I may think about it. (CP
5.432, EP 2:343, 1905) 

And here we see what the relation is between propositions and
reality.

can talk about the truth of propositions. Or the veracity of a
pheneroscopic excercizeIn short: Real is that what is independed of
individual thought. And it is because of this independence of
individual thought that we .

Best,

Auke
 Op 16 juni 2021 om 16:31 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt : 
 Auke, Edwina, List: 
 AvB: The dynamical object of science is reality.
 The dynamical object of every true proposition is reality, but as De
Tienne's slide 4 (posted yesterday) hints at the very bottom,
phaneroscopists are "pre-truthists." Again, the subject matter of
phaneroscopy is whatever is or could be present to the mind,
including imagination and hallucination.
  AvB: If you were right, the different sciences would be concerned
with different realities.
 Phaneroscopy is not concerned with the reality of phenomena at all,
only their appearances; that is what differentiates it from
metaphysics. It is also not limited to the study of signs, but
examines any and every kind of phenomenon; that is what
differentiates it from semeiotic.
  Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
  On Wed, Jun 16, 2021 at 7:38 AM Edwina Taborsky <
tabor...@primus.ca [3]> wrote: 
Auke, list

Exactly. Splitting up areas into separate domains might give one the
feeling of being-in-control, but the dynamic object of science,
namely, reality - has been lost - within all the unconnected
immediate objects entrapped in each classification. 

Edwina

On Wed 16/06/21 3:54 AM , "Auke van Breemen" peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
[4] sent:
Jon,

You wrote:
It is not just the method of analysis that is different for each
science within Peirce's classification, but also the object of study.
Phaneroscopy examines  whatever is or could be present to the mind.
Semeiotic studies only signs and semiosis.

--

The dynamical object of science is reality. The branches of the
sciences deliver immediate objects of that dynamical object. If you
were right, the different sciences would be concerned with different
realities. But then, how could an involved branch provide the
principles for the next branch?

Best,

Auke _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
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Links:
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[gnox]

Helmut, Auke, list,

I think Helmut’s point is well taken (though perhaps a bit overstated): it’s 
very difficult to have a dialogue with someone who reacts so violently to a 
word (or other part of a sign) that they lose the ability to focus on the 
object of the sign or the subject under discussion. Consequently I don’t think 
either Jon or Edwina can be blamed for driving Cathy away from the discussion; 
neither of them could have guessed that their use of the word “embodied” would 
have such an effect on her.

Auke, I hope you don’t mind if I import your post from the other thread, 
because it does have a bearing on phaneroscopy. Here it is complete:

[[ Jon,

CP 1. 175 The reality of things consists in their persistent forcing themselves 
upon our recognition.

CP 1.325 In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is 
that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other than 
the mind's creation.

This quote comes from your recent reponse to Edwina:

CSP: That which any true proposition asserts is real, in the sense of being as 
it is regardless of what you or I may think about it. (CP 5.432, EP 2:343, 1905)

And here we see what the relation is between propositions and reality.

In short: Real is that what is independed of individual thought. And it is 
because of this independence of individual thought that we can talk about the 
truth of propositions. Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize. ]]

GF: This is all accurate and to the point, except your last sentence. It is the 
predominance of Secondness that separates logic as a normative science from 
phaneroscopy, which for Peirce is a positive but not normative science. 
“Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition, because 
what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness. 

CSP: Phenomenology treats of the universal Qualities of Phenomena in their 
immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as phenomena. It, thus, treats of 
Phenomena in their Firstness (CP 5.122, 1903).

GF: The Firstness of Secondness is what Peirce called “dyadic consciousness.” 
But in phenomenology, we don’t talk about “what is independent of individual 
thought,” because the existence of individual thinkers does not appear in the 
direct consciousness of the phaneroscopist. That is why Peircean phaneroscopy 
pointedly ignores the differences between individual minds and treats all 
possible minds as one mind.

CSP: Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron I 
mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to 
the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not. 
If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these 
questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those features of 
the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times and to all 
minds. (CP 1.284, 1905)

CSP: I propose to use the word Phaneron as a proper name to denote the total 
content of any one consciousness (for any one is substantially any other), the 
sum of all we have in mind in any way whatever, regardless of its cognitive 
value. (EP2:362, 1905)

GF: If you say this is unrealistic, you are exactly right. Reality is not an 
issue in phenomenology/phaneroscopy. The issue is the elements of the phaneron, 
also known as the “universal categories.”

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu   
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 17-Jun-21 02:57
To: jonalanschm...@gmail.com  

List,

 

the term "red flag" is a red flag for me. When I hear or read it, I suspect 
people at work, who are not interested in a fair discussion, but in 
tribalistically separating the discussers in one group of the good ones, and 
one of the bad ones, identifying the bad ones due to their use of the wrong 
codes. I said "I suspect", to try to avoid the paradoxon of doing the same now. 
Though I know it sounds as if I am. That is because if once this sort of 
manichaeism is started, it is hard to stop.

I am not completely against identity politics, but against essentialism. It 
originally is a rightist domain. Sadly, some leftists too do not pay enough 
attention that the defence of discriminated identity groups does not switch 
into essentialism.

 

Best

Helmut

 

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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Helmut Raulien]

 


List,

 

the term "red flag" is a red flag for me. When I hear or read it, I suspect people at work, who are not interested in a fair discussion, but in tribalistically separating the discussers in one group of the good ones, and one of the bad ones, identifying the bad ones due to their use of the wrong codes. I said "I suspect", to try to avoid the paradoxon of doing the same now. Though I know it sounds as if I am. That is because if once this sort of manichaeism is started, it is hard to stop.

I am not completely against identity politics, but against essentialism. It originally is a rightist domain. Sadly, some leftists too do not pay enough attention that the defence of discriminated identity groups does not switch into essentialism.

 

Best

Helmut

 

 17. Juni 2021 um 03:41 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:



Gary R., List:
 



CT: As I was contemplating whether or not I was in the right place by having joined the list, someone then used the term embodied, and that made my mind up for me.  .  The term 'embodied' is now a red flag for me."

GR: I may have used it in commenting on Merleau-Ponty, but I don't just now recall.



 

For the record, there were three posts yesterday that included the term "embodied," and none of them were yours.

 



JAS: In accordance with CP 2.276 (quoted below), I understand "hypoicon" to be Peirce's term for any embodied sign that is primarily iconic, a sinsign/token that represents its object by qualitatively resembling it and does not otherwise indicate what that object is.

 



JAS: These are distinctions between different classes of hypoicons--images, diagrams, and metaphors, respectively--rather than having anything to do with distinguishing a hypoicon from an icon. Again, my understanding of the latter is that a hypoicon is simply an embodied iconic sign.

 



ET: Firstness doesn't function per se but refers to an interactional stimulus that has to be embodied, as a 'mode of being', even though it is completely without awareness or consciousness. ..which would bring in Secondness.



 

Cathy did not disclose which of these (perhaps all of them) she found so problematic, but Peirce himself frequently employs "embodied" or "embodiment"--a total of 63 times in CP. That being the case, why would anyone who is genuinely seeking to understand and apply his thought consider it to be a "red flag," let alone evidence supporting the allegation that "Plato and Descartes influences" are "a little too entrenched here"? I asked Cathy off-List first thing this morning if she would mind elaborating on what she meant by that on-List remark, and she replied that she would do so "as time permits," but so far I have not received any further clarification.



 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Wed, Jun 16, 2021 at 7:31 PM Gary Richmond  wrote:









Edwina, List,

Edwina wrote: Incredible - someone joins the list and then leaves it, and gives their reason for leaving with a critique  - and instead of examining why she left the list, ie, examining the validity of her critique - you turn her comments into a rather vicious attack on me.

GR: What vicious attack? The thrust of my earlier post was this: "It is you [Edwina] who keeps making the claim that certain members of the List express Cartesian and, especially, Platonic ideas. But you have not been able to support that claim because it is empty and patently false." It is your comment, "I think that Cathy's leaving this list, and her critique of it [Cartesian, Platonic] should not be overlooked," which prompted my response. What 'critique'? She didn't support reason -- such as it was -- with any explanation, argumentation; she didn't cite messages which had led her to that view, etc. And so, I decided not to overlook why she left so abruptly after such a promising start.

Edwina: Instead - you should be asking HER what SHE sees as Cartesian and Platonic, and what she sees as confined - since SHE is the one who made those statements. Have you asked her? Why do you think she thought this way?  Or are you just brushing her off as you do with me?

GR: (1) I did indeed ask her to expand on why she decided to leave the List in several off List exchanges today (see brief excerpts below); (2) I didn't "brush her off" at all. What a weird and, if not exactly 'vicious', certainly baseless and untoward thing to say. And I don't believe anyone else has ever accused me of being vicious (I am not vicious) -- it seems to me that making such accusations is your way of dealing with virtually any criticism coming your way; (3) I don't "brush you off" and, my engaging you in this exchange is an _expression_, if not exactly, proof of that. I do tend to disagree with you on many phenomenological, semeiotic, pragmatic, and metaphysical positions 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Readings about Semeiotic (was Readings about Phaneroscopy)

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon,


CP 1. 175 The reality of things consists in their persistent forcing themselves 
upon our recognition.

CP 1.325 In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is 
that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as somethingotherthan 
the mind's creation.

This quote comes from your recent reponse to Edwina:

CSP: That which any true proposition asserts is real, in the sense of being as 
it is regardless of what you or I may think about it. (CP 5.432, EP 2:343, 1905)

And here we see what the relation is between propositions and reality.

In short: Real is that what is independed of individual thought. And it is 
because of this independence of individual thought that we can talk about the 
truth of propositions. Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize.

Best,

Auke


> Op 16 juni 2021 om 16:31 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Auke, Edwina, List:
> 
> 
> > > AvB: The dynamical object of science is reality.
> > 
> > > 
> The dynamical object of every true proposition is reality, but as De 
> Tienne's slide 4 (posted yesterday) hints at the very bottom, phaneroscopists 
> are "pre-truthists." Again, the subject matter of phaneroscopy is whatever is 
> or could be present to the mind, including imagination and hallucination.
> 
> 
> > > AvB: If you were right, the different sciences would be 
> concerned with different realities.
> > 
> > > 
> Phaneroscopy is not concerned with the reality of phenomena at all, only 
> their appearances; that is what differentiates it from metaphysics. It is 
> also not limited to the study of signs, but examines any and every kind of 
> phenomenon; that is what differentiates it from semeiotic.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Christianhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Wed, Jun 16, 2021 at 7:38 AM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca 
> mailto:tabor...@primus.ca > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > Auke, list
> > 
> > Exactly. Splitting up areas into separate domains might give one 
> > the feeling of being-in-control, but the dynamic object of science, namely, 
> > reality - has been lost - within all the unconnected immediate objects 
> > entrapped in each classification.
> > 
> > Edwina
> > 
> > On Wed 16/06/21 3:54 AM , "Auke van Breemen" 
> > peirce-l@list.iupui.edu mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu sent:
> > 
> > > > > 
> > > Jon,
> > > 
> > > You wrote:
> > > 
> > > It is not just the method of analysis that is different for 
> > > each science within Peirce's classification, but also the object of 
> > > study. Phaneroscopy examines whatever is or could be present to the mind. 
> > > Semeiotic studies only signs and semiosis.
> > > 
> > > --
> > > 
> > > The dynamical object of science is reality. The branches of 
> > > the sciences deliver immediate objects of that dynamical object. If you 
> > > were right, the different sciences would be concerned with different 
> > > realities. But then, how could an involved branch provide the principles 
> > > for the next branch?
> > > 
> > > Best,
> > > 
> > > Auke
> > > 
> > > > > 
> > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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