[PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopic Analysis (was A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, Edwina, List:

I continue to be puzzled by the special authority that is seemingly being
given to quotations from R 1345 (c. 1896), as if it were Peirce's
definitive text on any subject that it addresses, overriding anything that
he wrote before it or after it. Is there a good reason for treating it this
way?

In any case, here it reflects a peculiar usage of "representamen" that
applies to all three correlates of "the triad," the name of which is
"representation" (not "sign"). What Peirce would later call "phanerons" or
"prebits" are divided categorially into *quales *(1ns); *reagents *(2ns),
which can either act as agents or be acted upon as patients; and
*representamens
*(3ns), which can serve as either "vehicles of meaning," "natural objects,"
or interpretants. Reagents can always be prescinded from representamens,
and quales can always be prescinded from reagents and from representamens.

Hence, although Peirce omits any distinct science of phenomenology or
phaneroscopy from the preliminary classifications that he presents in this
particular manuscript, he is clearly employing what he would eventually
identify as phenomenological or phaneroscopic analysis.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Oct 24, 2021 at 12:40 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Robert, list
>
> That's an excellent outline of the triad and the definition of the
> Representamen. and of the Intentional Interpretant and the need for the
> Commens. And by the way, this section from Peirce includes a definition of
> the Dynamic Object, which is, exactly as I've said before, not an external
> object on its own, but is "the dynamical object does not mean something out
> of the mind. It means something forced upon the mind in perception, but
> including more than perception reveals. It is an object of actual
> Experience' EP2:478
>
> Exactly as I've previously outlined. I won't comment on the other issues
> because I think I've made my views quite clear many times before - and they
> are not in line with those of Gary R, JAS or Gary F - and this thread
> hasn't been set up as a discussion but as a debate.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sun 24/10/21 6:40 AM , robert marty robert.mart...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Gary R, List,
> I refer to the definition of the representamen (the number 76 of
> https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM)  resituated in
> its original broader context on page 34 of MS 1345:
>
>
>   MS1345_034
>
> ",entation [1] <#m_578724956437646480__ftn1> ; and an object which forms
> one of such a triad and has for his characteristics is called a
> Representamen.
>
> Art.8 Division 7. A Quale can, as such, be considered from only one point
> of view.
>
>   A Reagent can be considered from two formal points of view,
> namely, as affected by the reaction, and so as Patient, and as affecting
> the complementary factor, and so as Agent.
>
>  'A Representamen can be considered from three formal points of
> view, namely, first as the substance of the representation, or the Vehicle
> of the Meaning, which is common to the three representamens of the
> triad,  second as the quasi agent in the representation, conformity to
> which its Truth, that is, as the Natural Object, and third, as the
> quasi-patient in the representation, or that whether modification makes it
> Intelligence, and this may be called the Interpretant. Thus, in looking
> at a map, the map itself is the Vehicle, the country represented in the 
> Natural
> Object, and the idea excited in the mind is the Interpretant.' (partie 
> reproduite
> en def 76)
>
> Furthermore, every representamen may be considered as a reagent, its
> intellectual characteristic neglected; and both representamen and reagent
> may be considered as quales, their relative character being neglected. This
> we do, for example, when we say that the word man has three letters."
>
> From this definition, it follows that the "intentional interpretant"
> ("here is the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the
> mind of the utterer", EP2 478 ) not being observable, cannot be a Natural
> Object. It can only give place to endless inquiries, except perhaps that
> science evolving, it allows to read in the brain of the utterer objective
> characters of the determination of this mind.
>
>  Indeed,
>
> "The point to remember is, that whatever we say of ideas as they are in
> consciousness is said of something unknowable in its immediacy. The only
> thought that is really present to us is a thought we can neither think
> about nor talk about. "Of thine eye I am eyebeam," says the Sphinx. We have
> no reason to deny the dicta of introspection, but we have to remember that
> they are all results of association, are all theoretical, bits of
> instinctive psychology. We accept them, but not as literally true; only as
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

I apologize for the length of this post, but the thread is already getting
a lot of my wheels turning.

GF: The Immediate/Dynamic/Final triad of interpretants may be the basic one
for logic, but that doesn't render the other triads useless.


I agree, and I have even written a paper that has been accepted for
publication by *Semiotica*, entitled "Peirce's Evolving Interpretants,"
which discusses three such trichotomies--immediate/dynamical/final,
emotional/energetic/logical, and intentional/effectual/communicational. I
will post a link and the abstract whenever it appears online.

GF: ... an Intentional Interpretant as Peirce defines it can be internal *both
*to the sign itself and to the utterer, so that it is an Immediate
Interpretant *as well as* an Intentional Interpretant.


Any interpretant is always an interpretant *of a particular sign*, because
it must be *determined by* that sign in order to be *its *interpretant. I
take Peirce's point in the Logic Notebook entry to be that what he had been
calling "the intentional interpretant" is *not *determined in any way by
the sign that is *currently *being communicated from the utterer to the
interpreter. Again, as "a determination of the mind of the utterer," I
believe that it is instead a dynamical interpretant of a *previous *sign.
The interpreter thus has no direct access to it and can only apprehend it
to the extent that it is "betrayed" (Peirce's word) in the sign itself as
the *immediate *interpretant. The second definition of "betray" in Google's
online dictionary is "unintentionally reveal; be evidence of," so a sign
"betrays" the utterer's intention only insofar as the sign serves as *evidence
of* that intention, regardless of whether the utterer intended his/her
intention to be so revealed.

GF: The same Immediate Interpretant of the same sign can also be part of
the interpreter's internal context, as his more or less intuitive sense of
what the utterer's intention was in uttering the sign.


As I see it, the immediate interpretant is always internal to the *sign*.
As I have said before, in the case of a text, it is the range of
*possible *understandings
in accordance with the definitions of the words that comprise it, along
with their arrangement in accordance with the syntax and other rules of
grammar for the language in which it is written. A reader's *dynamical
*interpretant
of the text, his/her *actual *understanding of it--whether an "intuitive
sense" or a result of subsequent reflection--*ought *to be a sincere
attempt to discern the author's intended meaning, not in the abstract, but *as
expressed in the text*. In the words of William J. Abraham (
https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1421=asburyjournal,
p.20), "Hermeneutics is not so much the study of what an author intended as
the study of what the author achieved. If meaning has an equivalence, it is
to be located less in intention and more in achievement."

Accordingly, I now recognize that the author's intention is *not *the final
interpretant--again, the *ideal aim* of interpretation, how the sign
*necessarily
would be* understood after infinite inquiry by an infinite community. Instead,
it seems to me that there is a sense in which the author's intention
is the *object
*of the text as a sign, much like the object of the command to "ground
arms" is "the will of the officer" (CP 5.473, 1907). Again, Peirce
describes the intentional interpretant as "a determination of the mind of
the utterer," and he similarly describes the object as "the essential
ingredient of the utterer" (EP 2:404, 1907), going on to add the following.

CSP: For, after all, collateral observation, aided by imagination and
thought, will usually result in some idea, though this need not be
particularly determinate; but may be indefinite in some regards and general
in others. Such an apprehension, approaching, however distantly, that of
the Object strictly so called, ought to be, and usually is, termed the
"immediate object" of the sign in the intention of its utterer. (EP 2:409,
1907)


As I see it, the immediate object is also always internal to the *sign*.
However, in a communicative context, the *commens *is "that mind into which
the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any
communication should take place" (EP 2:478, 1906). What is its essential
ingredient? "It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a
quasi-mind" (EP 2:391, 1906). "Moreover, signs require at least two
Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer *and a *Quasi-interpreter*; and although
these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they must
nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, *welded*" (CP
4.551, 1906). In other words, the sign itself "fuses" or "welds" the
otherwise distinct minds of the utterer and interpreter into "one mind"
such that the immediate object and interpretant, being internal to the
sign, are also internal to this "commind."

GF: 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Gary, Jack, list,


There have been many really good notions floating about in the past few
days-

most of which I’d prefer to be silent about.


However, given how much this particular notion can be of use to us,

I feel compelled to bring attention to it.


To the extent that we prefer not to be hypocrites,

and I mean hypocritical in the sense of, it is better to remember to do as
we preach,

and not merely as a political tactic of flinging accusations given we are
all blameworthy,

I find your selection of this following Peirce statement to be extremely
pertinent to our oft-called plea for improving list-relations.


Here is what you quoted:


*CSP: Nor must any synechist say, ‘I am altogether myself, and not at all
you.’ *

*If you embrace synechism, you must abjure this metaphysics of wickedness. *


*In the first place, your neighbors are, in a measure, yourself, and in far
greater measure than, *

*without deep studies in psychology, you would believe. *

*Really, the selfhood you like to attribute to yourself is, for the most
part, *

*the vulgarest delusion of vanity. *

*In the second place, all men who resemble you and are in analogous
circumstances are, in a measure, yourself, though not quite in the same way
in which your neighbors are you. (EP2:2, CP 7:571, 1894)*


Now, what is phaneroscopy such that we are being concretely reasonable
under such circumstances?


Let us remind ourselves of this moment every time we fail,

for we will do so, again and again,

because this is *us*.


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Sun, Oct 24, 2021 at 12:33 PM  wrote:

> Jon, I’m with you on this, except maybe for one detail. You quoted
> Peirce’s Logic Notebook:
>
> CSP: The Immediate Interpretant is the Interpretant represented,
> explicitly or implicitly, in the sign itself. I have thus omitted the
> *intended *interpretant. So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign,
> it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed,
> it may be the Interpretant of *another *sign, but it is in no sense the
> interpretant of *that *sign. (R 339:414[276r], 1906 Apr 2)
>
> I wouldn't say that this entry means that he “abandoned” the term
> “Intentional Interpretant” introduced in his letter to Welby. Peirce
> introduced three or four sets of Interpretants, and I think he used them
> for different analytical purposes, so that they might well overlap in their
> reference to a given situation. In the Welby letter, Peirce is focused on
> the *communicative* function of signs. In the Logic Notebook entry he
> seems to be more focused on, well, logic (as semeiotic). The
> Immediate/Dynamic/Final triad of interpretants may be the basic one for
> logic, but that doesn't render the other triads useless.
>
> Semiotically, if both utterer and interpreter of a sign have their own
> internal contexts for the external (“published”) sign – as is generally the
> case in verbal communication between humans – an Intentional Interpretant
> as Peirce defines it can be internal *both* to the sign itself and to the
> utterer, so that it is an Immediate Interpretant *as well as* an
> Intentional Interpretant. The same Immediate Interpretant of the same sign
> can also be part of the interpreter's internal context, as his more or less
> intuitive sense of what the utterer's intention was in uttering the sign.
>
> If a semiosic process is *continuous*, as you have argued in another
> thread, then the boundaries between sign and interpretant are artifacts of
> analysis: they are not as real as the process of which they are parts. On
> the psychological side, Peirce asserted that the boundaries between
> *people* are likewise indeterminate and arbitrary:
>
>
>
> CSP: Nor must any synechist say, ‘I am altogether myself, and not at all
> you.’ If you embrace synechism, you must abjure this metaphysics of
> wickedness. In the first place, your neighbors are, in a measure, yourself,
> and in far greater measure than, without deep studies in psychology, you
> would believe. Really, the selfhood you like to attribute to yourself is,
> for the most part, the vulgarest delusion of vanity. In the second place,
> all men who resemble you and are in analogous circumstances are, in a
> measure, yourself, though not quite in the same way in which your neighbors
> are you. (EP2:2, CP 7:571, 1894)
>
>
>
> Peirce also recognized that persons are themselves signs, so that a
> continuous semiosic process can very well involve both. How else would
> communication between people by means of signs be possible? This synechism
> also has a phenomenological basis, which Peirce recognized in his early
> work (long before he started using the term “phenomenology”):
>
>
>
> CSP: … whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some
> feeling, image, conception, or other representation, which serves as a
> sign. But it follows from our own existence (which is proved by the
> occurrence of ignorance and error) that everything which is 

[PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Robert, list

That's an excellent outline of the triad and the definition of the
Representamen. and of the Intentional Interpretant and the need for
the Commens. And by the way, this section from Peirce includes a
definition of the Dynamic Object, which is, exactly as I've said
before, not an external object on its own, but is "the dynamical
object does not mean something out of the mind. It means something
forced upon the mind in perception, but including more than
perception reveals. It is an object of actual Experience' EP2:478 

Exactly as I've previously outlined. I won't comment on the other
issues because I think I've made my views quite clear many times
before - and they are not in line with those of Gary R, JAS or Gary F
- and this thread hasn't been set up as a discussion but as a debate.

Edwina
 On Sun 24/10/21  6:40 AM , robert marty robert.mart...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary R, List,I refer to the definition of the representamen (the
number 76 of 
https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM [1]) 
resituated in its original broader context on page 34 of MS 1345: 
 
   MS1345_034  

",entation [1] ; and an object which forms one of such a triad and
has for his characteristics is called a Representamen. 

Art.8 Division 7. A Quale can, as such, be considered from only one
point of view. 

  A Reagent can be considered from two formal points of
view, namely, as affected by the reaction, and so as Patient, and as
affecting the complementary factor, and so as Agent. 

 'A Representamen can be considered from three formal points
of view, namely, first as the substance of the representation, or the
Vehicle of the Meaning, which is common to the three representamens
of the triad,  second as the quasi agent in the representation,
conformity to which its Truth, that is, as the Natural Object, and
third, as the quasi-patient in the representation, or that whether
modification makes it Intelligence, and this may be called the
Interpretant. Thus, in looking at a map, the map itself is the
Vehicle, the country represented in the Natural Object, and the idea
excited in the mind is the Interpretant.' (partie reproduite en def
76) 

Furthermore, every representamen may be considered as a reagent, its
intellectual characteristic neglected; and both representamen and
reagent may be considered as quales, their relative character being
neglected. This we do, for example, when we say that the word man has
three letters."

From this definition, it follows that the "intentional interpretant"
("here is the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of
the mind of the utterer", EP2 478 ) not being observable, cannot be a
Natural Object. It can only give place to endless inquiries, except
perhaps that science evolving, it allows to read in the brain of the
utterer objective characters of the determination of this mind.

   Indeed, 

"The point to remember is, that whatever we say of ideas as they are
in consciousness is said of something unknowable in its immediacy. The
only thought that is really present to us is a thought we can neither
think about nor talk about. "Of thine eye I am eyebeam," says the
Sphinx. We have no reason to deny the dicta of introspection, but we
have to remember that they are all results of association, are all
theoretical, bits of instinctive psychology. We accept them, but not
as literally true; only as expressive of the impression which has
naturally been made upon our understanding. "( CP 7.425)[emphasize
mine}

If this is the case for introspection, it is, a fortiori, the case
for extrospection!  

A famous example is provided by the misadventure of Ferdinand de
Saussure  

"In a letter dated July 14, 1906, Ferdinand de Saussure, after
several months of research devoted to the study of the Saturnian,
this enigmatic verse which does not obey any known scheme of
classical metrics and of which he believes he has finally succeeded
in piercing the mystery, writes in a state of excitement:
 '..I can announce to you that I now hold the victory on all the
line. I have spent two months interrogating the monster, and groping
against it, but for the last three days I have been using only heavy
artillery [...] it is through alliteration that I have managed to
hold the key to the Saturnian, which is more complicated than we
imagined. The whole phenomenon of alliteration [...] that we noticed
in Saturnian, is only an insignificant part of a more general
phenomenon, or rather absolutely total. The totality of the syllables
of each Saturnian verse obeys a law of alliteration, from the first
syllable to the last; and without a single consonant [...] a single
vowel [...] a single quantity of vowel, is 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[gnox]

Jon, I’m with you on this, except maybe for one detail. You quoted Peirce’s 
Logic Notebook:

CSP: The Immediate Interpretant is the Interpretant represented, explicitly or 
implicitly, in the sign itself. I have thus omitted the intended interpretant. 
So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate 
Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of 
another sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of that sign. (R 
339:414[276r], 1906 Apr 2)

I wouldn't say that this entry means that he “abandoned” the term “Intentional 
Interpretant” introduced in his letter to Welby. Peirce introduced three or 
four sets of Interpretants, and I think he used them for different analytical 
purposes, so that they might well overlap in their reference to a given 
situation. In the Welby letter, Peirce is focused on the communicative function 
of signs. In the Logic Notebook entry he seems to be more focused on, well, 
logic (as semeiotic). The Immediate/Dynamic/Final triad of interpretants may be 
the basic one for logic, but that doesn't render the other triads useless.

Semiotically, if both utterer and interpreter of a sign have their own internal 
contexts for the external (“published”) sign – as is generally the case in 
verbal communication between humans – an Intentional Interpretant as Peirce 
defines it can be internal both to the sign itself and to the utterer, so that 
it is an Immediate Interpretant as well as an Intentional Interpretant. The 
same Immediate Interpretant of the same sign can also be part of the 
interpreter's internal context, as his more or less intuitive sense of what the 
utterer's intention was in uttering the sign.

If a semiosic process is continuous, as you have argued in another thread, then 
the boundaries between sign and interpretant are artifacts of analysis: they 
are not as real as the process of which they are parts. On the psychological 
side, Peirce asserted that the boundaries between people are likewise 
indeterminate and arbitrary:

 

CSP: Nor must any synechist say, ‘I am altogether myself, and not at all you.’ 
If you embrace synechism, you must abjure this metaphysics of wickedness. In 
the first place, your neighbors are, in a measure, yourself, and in far greater 
measure than, without deep studies in psychology, you would believe. Really, 
the selfhood you like to attribute to yourself is, for the most part, the 
vulgarest delusion of vanity. In the second place, all men who resemble you and 
are in analogous circumstances are, in a measure, yourself, though not quite in 
the same way in which your neighbors are you. (EP2:2, CP 7:571, 1894)

 

Peirce also recognized that persons are themselves signs, so that a continuous 
semiosic process can very well involve both. How else would communication 
between people by means of signs be possible? This synechism also has a 
phenomenological basis, which Peirce recognized in his early work (long before 
he started using the term “phenomenology”):

 

CSP: … whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some feeling, 
image, conception, or other representation, which serves as a sign. But it 
follows from our own existence (which is proved by the occurrence of ignorance 
and error) that everything which is present to us is a phenomenal manifestation 
of ourselves. This does not prevent its being a phenomenon of something without 
us, just as a rainbow is at once a manifestation both of the sun and of the 
rain. When we think, then, we ourselves, as we are at that moment, appear as a 
sign. (EP1:38)

 

The rainbow is at once a sign of realities “without us” and a “phenomenal 
manifestation of ourselves.” Our perception of it is both objective and 
subjective. For a synechist semiotician, then, there should be no problem 
seeing an Intentional Interpretant as also an Immediate Interpretant internal 
to the sign. The “boundaries” between signs, like those between organisms and 
their environments, are permeable by nature.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 23-Oct-21 19:10
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting 
texts

 

Gary R., List:

 

I fully agree.

 

GR: If we abandon this ideal of objectivity -- which, of course, can never be 
perfectly or exactly realized -- we are left with nothing that serves as a 
standard for assessing actual interpretations.

 

Again, the ultimate standard for different dynamical interpretants of a 
particular sign, including a text, is its final or normal interpretant, which 
is final in the sense of a final cause and normal in the sense of normative. 
Peirce defines it as the "effect that would be produced on the mind by the Sign 
after sufficient development of thought" (CP 8.343, EP 2:482, 1908); "that 
which would finally be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration 
of the matter were carried so 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY]

Gary, List

Thanks, that's very well written. I agree with much of this more nuanced 
interpretation.

Jack


From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Sunday, October 24, 2021 2:57 PM
To: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] A key principle of normative semeiotic for 
interpreting texts


Jack, the pragmatic use of the final interpretant is that it serves as an ideal 
for each author and each reader to aim at: the Truth of the matter. It is not 
merely the last dynamic interpretant in the series; it is more like a 
mathematical limit, or like the final cause of a process, to use the 
Aristotelian term.

Think of the dialogue between writers and readers as a single continuous 
semiosic process. It differs from a real-time, in-person dialogue because there 
are long time gaps (and cultural gaps) between author and reader. The semiosic 
process has to bridge these gaps somehow; otherwise its continuity is lost. 
Even an in-person dialogue will break down if one of the partners does not 
trust the other to be aiming at the truth of the matter, and thinks that his 
utterances are otherwise motivated.

If we start with a text uttered by Peirce in, say, 1903, we trust that what he 
“had in mind” (i.e. the content of the text) was a sign purporting to think 
something true about some subject matter, which is the object of that sign. And 
we must presume that the text is another sign of the same object. The explicit 
text was presumably co-determined by (1) the dynamic object which was part of a 
context external to Peirce and (2) the context into which his perception of the 
object came, the context constituted by his habits of thought at the time, 
coupled with his intention to speak the truth about the object.

In order to approach a final interpretant of it — the truth which is 
independent of any individual interpreter — each dynamic interpretant of that 
text-sign in the chain (or rather network) following it (both temporally and 
logically) must be another sign of the same dynamic object. “Objectivity” is 
simply the interpreter’s habit of keeping his attention on that object, even 
though the text gives him only a “hint” (the immediate object) of what it is. 
Of course the dynamic interpretant is co-determined by the internal context of 
the interpreter, just as the original text was co-determined by the author’s 
habits and intentions. All interpretations are fallible. But if the reader does 
not share the author’s attention to the dynamic object, so that it is a focal 
point in the commens which author and reader share, then that object is remote 
from the determination of the dynamic interpretant, and the interpreter is left 
with nothing to go on except the reaction to the text determined by his own 
habits and intuitions. This is what we call a “subjective” reading.

Gary f.



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY
Sent: 23-Oct-21 19:36
To: Peirce-L ; Gary Richmond 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] A key principle of normative semeiotic for 
interpreting texts



Or, to put it another way if there were such an "objectivity" possible, 
students would not read Plato and Aristotle, they would read the logically 
"objective" meaning which we should, by now, have come to possess (which brings 
me back to final interpretant - two and half millennia is not enough to produce 
"objective" scholarly consensus, then what pragmatic use does the "final 
interpretant" actually have?





Jack



From: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>>
Sent: Sunday, October 24, 2021 12:22 AM
To: Peirce-L mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>; Gary 
Richmond mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>>
Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for 
interpreting texts





This, in turn, leads to the error of denying that there is any such thing as an 
objectively correct (or objectively incorrect) reading of a text. In terms Gary 
Fuhrman recently used, this mistaken view has the internal context of the 
interpreter govern over the external context that is shared with the utterer.



Gary, list,



What is an objectively correct reading of a text? Wouldn't it merely be one 
which reproduced the text entirely without adding or removing anything to/from 
it?



We can have objectively correct renderings of mathematical principles, but when 
we move to normative language, we would be lying to ourselves if we assumed we 
could always retrieve the author's intent within objectively scientific degrees 
of accuracy. Such is rarely (if ever) possible.



The object is experienced subjectively, and the subject (re)produces the object 
from these conditions. There cannot be an absolutely "objective" reading of a 
text (especially regarding intent). If there is, I have yet to encounter it 
(and suspect only people who agree with each other in every respect 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[gnox]

Jack, the pragmatic use of the final interpretant is that it serves as an
ideal for each author and each reader to aim at: the Truth of the matter. It
is not merely the last dynamic interpretant in the series; it is more like a
mathematical limit, or like the final cause of a process, to use the
Aristotelian term.

Think of the dialogue between writers and readers as a single continuous
semiosic process. It differs from a real-time, in-person dialogue because
there are long time gaps (and cultural gaps) between author and reader. The
semiosic process has to bridge these gaps somehow; otherwise its continuity
is lost. Even an in-person dialogue will break down if one of the partners
does not trust the other to be aiming at the truth of the matter, and thinks
that his utterances are otherwise motivated.

If we start with a text uttered by Peirce in, say, 1903, we trust that what
he "had in mind" (i.e. the content of the text) was a sign purporting to
think something true about some subject matter, which is the object of that
sign. And we must presume that the text is another sign of the same object.
The explicit text was presumably co-determined by (1) the dynamic object
which was part of a context external to Peirce and (2) the context into
which his perception of the object came, the context constituted by his
habits of thought at the time, coupled with his intention to speak the truth
about the object. 

In order to approach a final interpretant of it - the truth which is
independent of any individual interpreter - each dynamic interpretant of
that text-sign in the chain (or rather network) following it (both
temporally and logically) must be another sign of the same dynamic object.
"Objectivity" is simply the interpreter's habit of keeping his attention on
that object, even though the text gives him only a "hint" (the immediate
object) of what it is. Of course the dynamic interpretant is co-determined
by the internal context of the interpreter, just as the original text was
co-determined by the author's habits and intentions. All interpretations are
fallible. But if the reader does not share the author's attention to the
dynamic object, so that it is a focal point in the commens which author and
reader share, then that object is remote from the determination of the
dynamic interpretant, and the interpreter is left with nothing to go on
except the reaction to the text determined by his own habits and intuitions.
This is what we call a "subjective" reading. 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY
Sent: 23-Oct-21 19:36
To: Peirce-L ; Gary Richmond

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] A key principle of normative semeiotic
for interpreting texts

 

Or, to put it another way if there were such an "objectivity" possible,
students would not read Plato and Aristotle, they would read the logically
"objective" meaning which we should, by now, have come to possess (which
brings me back to final interpretant - two and half millennia is not enough
to produce "objective" scholarly consensus, then what pragmatic use does the
"final interpretant" actually have?

 

 

Jack 

  _  

From: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> >
Sent: Sunday, October 24, 2021 12:22 AM
To: Peirce-L mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >;
Gary Richmond mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> >
Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic
for interpreting texts 

 





This, in turn, leads to the error of denying that there is any such thing as
an objectively correct (or objectively incorrect) reading of a text. In
terms Gary Fuhrman recently used, this mistaken view has the internal
context of the interpreter govern over the external context that is shared
with the utterer.

 

Gary, list,

 

What is an objectively correct reading of a text? Wouldn't it merely be one
which reproduced the text entirely without adding or removing anything
to/from it? 

 

We can have objectively correct renderings of mathematical principles, but
when we move to normative language, we would be lying to ourselves if we
assumed we could always retrieve the author's intent within objectively
scientific degrees of accuracy. Such is rarely (if ever) possible. 

 

The object is experienced subjectively, and the subject (re)produces the
object from these conditions. There cannot be an absolutely "objective"
reading of a text (especially regarding intent). If there is, I have yet to
encounter it (and suspect only people who agree with each other in every
respect have encountered such a thing). There are of course interpretations
of texts which we think of as being better than others - but I'm not "sold"
on the "final interpretant" of Peirce in a semeiotic system wherein all
evolves continuously (what is final?). 

 

Best

 

Jack

 

  _  

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu
  mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > on behalf of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[robert marty]

Gary R, List,
I refer to the definition of the representamen (the number 76 of
https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM)  resituated in
its original broader context on page 34 of MS 1345:


   MS1345_034

*",entation[1] <#_ftn1> ; **and an object which forms one of such a triad
and has for his characteristics is called a Representamen.*

*Art.8 Division 7. A Quale can, as such, be considered from only one point
of view.*

*  A Reagent can be considered from two formal points of view,
namely, as affected by the reaction, and so as Patient, and as affecting
the complementary factor, and so as Agent.*

 'A Representamen can be considered from three formal points of
view, namely, first as the substance of the representation, or the *Vehicle*
o*f* the *Meaning,* which is common to the three representamens of the
triad,  second as the quasi agent in the representation, conformity to
which its *Truth,* that is, as the *Natural Object, *and third, as the
quasi-patient in the representation, or that whether modification makes it
*Intelligence*, and this may be called the *Interpretant*. Thus, in looking
at a map, the map itself is the *Vehicle*, the country represented in
the *Natural
Object*, and the idea excited in the mind is the *Interpretant.'
*(partie reproduite
en def 76)

*Furthermore, every representamen may be considered as a reagent, its
intellectual characteristic neglected; and both representamen and reagent
may be considered as quales, their relative character being neglected. This
we do, for example, when we say that the word man has three letters.*"

>From this definition, it follows that the "intentional interpretant" ("here
is the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of
the utterer", EP2 478 ) not being observable, cannot be a Natural Object.
It can only give place to endless inquiries, except perhaps that science
evolving, it allows to read in the brain of the utterer objective
characters of the determination of this mind.

 Indeed,

*"The point to remember is, that whatever we say of ideas as they are in
consciousness is said of something unknowable in its immediacy. The only
thought that is really present to us is a thought we can neither think
about nor talk about. "Of thine eye I am eyebeam," says the Sphinx. We have
no reason to deny the dicta of introspection, but we have to remember that
they are all results of association, are all theoretical, bits of
instinctive psychology. We accept them, but not as literally true; only as
expressive of the impression which has naturally been made upon our
understanding. *"( CP 7.425)[emphasize mine}

If this is the case for introspection, it is, a fortiori, the case for
extrospection!

A famous example is provided by the misadventure of Ferdinand de Saussure

"I

*n a letter dated July 14, 1906, Ferdinand de Saussure, after several
months of research devoted to the study of the Saturnian, this enigmatic
verse which does not obey any known scheme of classical metrics and of
which he believes he has finally succeeded in piercing the mystery, writes
in a state of excitement:'..I can announce to you that I now hold the
victory on all the line. I have spent two months interrogating the monster,
and groping against it, but for the last three days I have been using only
heavy artillery [...] it is through alliteration that I have managed to
hold the key to the Saturnian, which is more complicated than we imagined.
The whole phenomenon of alliteration [...] that we noticed in Saturnian, is
only an insignificant part of a more general phenomenon, or rather
absolutely total. The totality of the syllables of each Saturnian verse
obeys a law of alliteration, from the first syllable to the last; and
without a single consonant [...] a single vowel [...] a single quantity of
vowel, is scrupulously taken into account. The result is so surprising that
one is inclined to wonder above all how the authors of these verses [...]
could have had the time to indulge in such a headache: for it is a real
Chinese game...'*
* The euphoria of the discovery will be followed by uncertainty,
discouragement and even - we can guess it by reading the correspondence of
the master with his disciple and confidant Antoine Meillet - a form of
weariness which, in spite of the state of progress of his investigation
with, in total, a hundred of handwritten notebooks devoted to the subject,
will make him give up the publication of his research, definitively
abandoned in 1909"*

This is an example of impossible research because no scientific criteria
can be applied to it, notably the simple verification that its object
exists as a natural object. Saussure's Chinese game was nothing more than
an intellectual construction that did not resist the evaluation of his
peers, and for good reason, no one could hold the rules of this game.

Consequently, it seems to me that those "*on and off this List"* who think
that the goal "*in the