[PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists, was, Comments on the nature and purpose of Peirce-L, was, The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[Gary Richmond]

Martin, List,

Thanks for joining our 10 minute thesis presentation this past Saturday and
for your post to Peirce-L today.

I think that your suggestion that "there’s a. . . fundamental and urgent
question to ask ourselves about how to insinuate realism in a
nominalist/individualist world" points to perhaps the most urgent task for
pragmatists, most certainly for those of a Peircean stripe.

Your question seems to point to a kind of decision we need to make as to *how
we ought conduct ourselves*, not only in conferences and discussion forums
and the like but, perhaps especially, in our quotidian lives. On Peirce's
esthetic theory, this would represent the employment of a form of the*
summum bonum*, this in conjunction with his ethical theory which
includes making a decision to make *that* a habit of one's life. If we can
do *that,* then perhaps we can hope to begin to personally model that kind
of behavior in our scientific and philosophic work, as well as in our
collegial, familial and work lives.

The goal would seem to involve our coming to live more and more by faith,
hope, and love, a trio of values Peirce saw as essentially logical.  See,
for example, the chapter "Logic is Rooted in the Social Principle (and vice
versa)" by Ben Udell and myself in Charles Sanders Peirce in His Own Words
.

While it doesn't seem at all clear to me *how* this can be brought about
very generally in our philosophical and scientific communities in
their current nominalistic/individualistic state, it is certainly something
which we as pragmatists likely need to reflect on and attempt to work
together toward.

Jon has consistently tried to address some related issues in his papers on
the ethics of engineering, and Gary Fuhrman in his e-book, *Turning Signs*,
as well as in the electronic discussions he's created around it.

Perhaps it would be helpful for us to reflect deeply on this question
you posed in your post.

MWK: How are we serving the needs of a world engendered by reductionism in
politics and the media, the over-extension of pluralism in social media
platforms, relativism gone wild in the interpretation of the law, the
conundrums of individualism for economics, and rampant nihilism in every
sector?



Best,


Gary R



On Wed, Apr 19, 2023 at 5:50 PM Martin W. Kettelhut 
wrote:

> Thank you for your 10-minute presentations Gary, Jon and Gary.
>
>
>
> What a fascinating phenomenon, a zoom conference with Powerpoint
> representations of Peirce’s trichotomies, synechism, and Kaina Stoichea!
>
>
> I supposed it was seeing each other, and hearing each other’s voices, that
> spark my wanting to inquire into our participation (as pragmatist
> philosophers) in our world currently—given what we learn from Peirce about
> science, the long and synechistic view, and the power of signs.
>
>
>
> You all chose these topics wisely; they capture crucial aspects of what’s
> irreducibly original in Peirce’s work. I submit that many of the questions
> raised by participants in this conference (not unlike many of the
> discussions here on the Peirce-list) reflect the challenge it is to
> communicate what’s fresh, relevant, and pragmati*cistic* in Peirce. I
> appreciate the patience, good will, and insight you three—in
> particular—bring.
>
>
>
> In the background of the question I’m going to propose for discussion here
> is a recognition that, although I did write a dissertation on Peirce's
> semeiotic/metaphysics and receive a PhD from Temple U, I immediately left
> academic life and became a "philosopher of the marketplace,” meaning--in my
> case--business coach. I apply synechism everyday in my work, partnering
> with business people to build and sustain meaningful, successful, and
> ethical businesses.
>
>
>
> My question is, given (as Gary Fuhrman points out) that it is legisigns
> that have pragmatic power to get things done; and assuming that the purpose
> of a zoom conference on Peirce is to “combat nominalism”--as Ian MacDonald
> so actualistically put it--or rather embody the discovery-process that
> pragmaticism/synechism is:  What’s the best approach? What symbols should
> we use? How do we represent the scientific endeavor anew, holistically (in
> a Peircean sense, i.e. in terms of what’s possible what’s actual, and
> what’s potential)?
>
>
>
> Diagrams and bullet-points certain help; but I think there’s a more
> fundamental and urgent question to ask ourselves about how to insinuate
> realism in a nominalist/individualist world. On the one hand, this is a
> question about how to embody realism in an academic conference, but it’s
> also a question about how we (pragmatist philosophers) might embody realism
> in the world generally. How are we serving the needs of a world engendered
> by reductionism in politics and the media, the over-extension of pluralism
> in social media platforms, relativism gone wild in the interpretation of
> the law, the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Comments on the nature and purpose of Peirce-L, was, The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[Martin W. Kettelhut]

Thank you for your 10-minute presentations Gary, Jon and Gary.
 
What a fascinating phenomenon, a zoom conference with Powerpoint 
representations of Peirce’s trichotomies, synechism, and Kaina Stoichea!

I supposed it was seeing each other, and hearing each other’s voices, that 
spark my wanting to inquire into our participation (as pragmatist philosophers) 
in our world currently—given what we learn from Peirce about science, the long 
and synechistic view, and the power of signs.
 
You all chose these topics wisely; they capture crucial aspects of what’s 
irreducibly original in Peirce’s work. I submit that many of the questions 
raised by participants in this conference (not unlike many of the discussions 
here on the Peirce-list) reflect the challenge it is to communicate what’s 
fresh, relevant, and pragmaticistic in Peirce. I appreciate the patience, good 
will, and insight you three—in particular—bring.
 
In the background of the question I’m going to propose for discussion here is a 
recognition that, although I did write a dissertation on Peirce's 
semeiotic/metaphysics and receive a PhD from Temple U, I immediately left 
academic life and became a "philosopher of the marketplace,” meaning--in my 
case--business coach. I apply synechism everyday in my work, partnering with 
business people to build and sustain meaningful, successful, and ethical 
businesses.
 
My question is, given (as Gary Fuhrman points out) that it is legisigns that 
have pragmatic power to get things done; and assuming that the purpose of a 
zoom conference on Peirce is to “combat nominalism”--as Ian MacDonald so 
actualistically put it--or rather embody the discovery-process that 
pragmaticism/synechism is:  What’s the best approach? What symbols should we 
use? How do we represent the scientific endeavor anew, holistically (in a 
Peircean sense, i.e. in terms of what’s possible what’s actual, and what’s 
potential)?
 
Diagrams and bullet-points certain help; but I think there’s a more fundamental 
and urgent question to ask ourselves about how to insinuate realism in a 
nominalist/individualist world. On the one hand, this is a question about how 
to embody realism in an academic conference, but it’s also a question about how 
we (pragmatist philosophers) might embody realism in the world generally. How 
are we serving the needs of a world engendered by reductionism in politics and 
the media, the over-extension of pluralism in social media platforms, 
relativism gone wild in the interpretation of the law, the conundrums of 
individualism for economics, and rampant nihilism in every sector?
 
Thank you for considering,

Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD
ListeningIsTheKey.com
303 747 4449



> On 19 Apr 2023, at 12:50 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> List,
> 
> I agree with both Jon and Gary Fuhrman as to the nature and purpose of 
> Peirce-L. Because of its relevance, over the years I have had occasion to 
> post the same quotation by Joe Ransdell that Jon did today. Especially for 
> those new to this Peirce forum -- and, perhaps, for everyone here -- it might 
> be helpful to review not only that quotation, but all that Ransdell, the 
> creator and first moderator of Peirce-L, had to say about Peirce-L (btw, it's 
> not a long read). See: https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM
> 
> I would also reiterate this point of Gary Fuhrman's as getting to the heart 
> of the matter of the anticipated 'audience' of this forum versus other 
> venues, that, as he says, there are publications "aimed at venues and 
> audiences other than the community of students and scholars with a special 
> interest in Peirce, which I think describes the membership of peirce-l. If we 
> want the wider world to benefit from Peircean analysis of contemporary 
> issues, then we need to work in venues that are devoted to those issues." 
> 
> Finally, and while I've stressed this in the past, it is easy to forget that 
> it is helpful, really important, to change the Subject line when one 
> introduces a new topic. For, as Jon wrote by way of the example at hand, ". . 
> .  none of Dan's suggested topics nor his subsequent exchange with Helmut 
> fall within the subject matter of this thread, which is specifically intended 
> for further discussion about the "10-Minute Thesis Initiative" session that 
> the Charles S. Peirce Society conducted last Saturday.
> 
> Thanks, Dan, for your collegial and gracious response to Jon's gentle 
> admonition, your commenting that in the future you'd "begin new threads 
> rather than to invade others’ existing threads."
> 
> For everyone, I do believe that that is usually the very best way to proceed, 
> that is, to introduce an entirely new thread. 
> 
> Occasionally, however, it makes sense to modify the Subject of an existing 
> thread, for example, when in commenting on some facet of the intellectual 
> content of a given thread one is brought to a quite different train of 
> thought, say one springboarding 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

I still do not see a problematic inconsistency, let alone a contradiction,
because indeterminacy/generality and indefiniteness/vagueness are not
mutually exclusive. As I understand Peirce's mature topical conception of
continuity, the whole is general (3ns) and the parts are indefinite (1ns)
until they are deliberately marked off (2ns)--i.e., until they are
*determined*. Likewise, on my interpretation of his 1898 cosmological
diagram (CP 6.203-208 and NEM 4:345), the "clean blackboard" represents the
primordial indeterminate "ur-continuity" (3ns), melded groups of white
chalk marks represent "Platonic worlds" of indefinite possibilities (1ns),
and "a discontinuous mark" within one of them represents "our [determinate]
universe of actual existence" (2ns). Moreover, here are Peirce's explicit
definitions that you referenced.

CSP: Perhaps a more scientific pair of definitions would be that anything
is *general *in so far as the principle of excluded middle does not apply
to it and is *vague *in so far as the principle of contradiction does not
apply to it. Thus, although it is true that "Any proposition you please, *once
you have determined its identity*, is either true or false"; yet *so long
as it remains indeterminate and so without identity*, it need neither be
true that any proposition you please is true, nor that any proposition you
please is false. So likewise, while it is false that "A proposition *whose
identity I have determined* is both true and false," yet until it is
determinate, it may be true that a proposition is true and that a
proposition is false. (EP 2:351, 1905)


Accordingly, anything is *both *general *and *vague in so far as *neither *the
principle of excluded middle *nor *the principle of contradiction applies
to it. Presumably, that would have been the case for "the womb of
indeterminacy" (CP 1.412, 1887-8), the *utterly *"indeterminate nothing of
the nature of a symbol" that Peirce posits at "the absolute beginning"
(KS). Again, he later describes it as "a tohu bohu of which nothing
whatever affirmative or negative was true universally" (CP 6.490,
1908)--any proposition about it was neither true nor false, but both
capable of being true and capable of being false, *until it became
determinate*. Now consider this passage in KS.

CSP: Determination implies a *determinandum*, a subject to be determined.
What is that? We must suppose that there is something like a sheet of
paper, blank or with a blank space upon it upon which an interpretant sign
may be written. What is the nature of this blank? In affording room for the
writing of a symbol, it is *ipso facto* itself a symbol, although a wholly
vague one. (EP 2:322)


Just like the "clean blackboard," a blank sheet is the primordial symbol in
Existential Graphs--a continuum of *potential *propositions that is both
general (as a whole) and vague (as to its parts) until someone *determines *it
by scribing discrete graph-instances on it. This is analogous to the
ongoing determination of the universe itself--at the present, the entirety
of the past is *completely *determinate, and that "one *individual*, or
completely determinate, state of things" is always *growing *as various
(indefinite) possibilities and (general) conditional necessities are
constantly becoming (definite and determinate) actualities. As you rightly
discussed in your presentation, our reasoning/learning *about *the universe
is recursive, but according to Peirce, the *overall *process of semiosis is
hyperbolic--nonlinear, but nevertheless proceeding from one ideal limit
toward another that is different.

CSP: Let me say, by the way, that there is in the logical law this
difference between the absolutely first antecedent and the absolutely last
consequent, both of which are unattainable limits. The last consequent is
the very reality itself. That is our very conception of reality, the
essence of the word, namely, what we should believe if investigation was
carried to its furthest limit where no change of belief further was
possible. ... But the absolutely first antecedent is simply the blank
ignorance, the *zero *of knowledge ... (NEM 4:134, 1897-8)


"The absolutely first antecedent" corresponds to "Nothing, the
indeterminate of the absolute beginning" in KS, when the sheet would have
been blank because everything would have been in the future. "The
absolutely last consequent" corresponds to "The 'Truth,' the fact that is
not abstracted but complete, [which] is the ultimate interpretant of every
sign" in KS, when the sheet would be filled up because everything would be
in the past.

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Apr 19, 2023 at 9:59 AM  wrote:

> Gary R, Jon et al.,
>
> It might take awhile to explain why I see a difference (if not a
> contradiction) between Peirce’s 1898 cosmology, which you quoted at 

[PEIRCE-L] Comments on the nature and purpose of Peirce-L, was, The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[Gary Richmond]

List,

I agree with both Jon and Gary Fuhrman as to the nature and purpose of
Peirce-L. Because of its relevance, over the years I have had occasion to
post the same quotation by Joe Ransdell that Jon did today. Especially for
those new to this Peirce forum -- and, perhaps, for everyone here -- it
might be helpful to review not only that quotation, but all that Ransdell,
the creator and first moderator of Peirce-L, had to say about Peirce-L
(btw, it's not a long read). See:
https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM

I would also reiterate this point of Gary Fuhrman's as getting to the heart
of the matter of the anticipated 'audience' of this forum versus other
venues, that, as he says, there are publications "aimed at venues and
audiences other than the community of students and scholars with a special
interest in Peirce, which I think describes the membership of peirce-l. If
we want the wider world to benefit from Peircean analysis of contemporary
issues, then we need to work in venues that are devoted to those issues."

Finally, and while I've stressed this in the past, it is easy to forget
that it is helpful, really important, to change the Subject line when one
introduces a new topic. For, as Jon wrote by way of the example at hand, ".
. .  none of Dan's suggested topics nor his subsequent exchange with Helmut
fall within the subject matter of *this *thread, which is specifically
intended for further discussion about the "10-Minute Thesis Initiative"
session that the Charles S. Peirce Society conducted last Saturday.

Thanks, Dan, for your collegial and gracious response to Jon's gentle
admonition, your commenting that in the future you'd "begin new threads
rather than to invade others’ existing threads."

For everyone, I do believe that that is usually the very best way to
proceed, that is, to introduce an entirely new thread.

Occasionally, however, it makes sense to modify the Subject of an existing
thread, for example, when in commenting on some facet of the intellectual
content of a given thread one is brought to a quite different train of
thought, say one springboarding from or necessarily deviating from the
Subject of that thread.

In that case, before posting I would recommend that you modify the existing
subject in this manner: *Precede the Subject of the thread you are changing
with the Subject of the new thread*

For example, here's how that might look were one to change the current
thread Subject, which I have:
*Comments on the nature and purpose of Peirce-L, was, **The Basis of
Synechism in Phaneroscopy*.

(Some would include the entire address so as to read:
Comments on the nature and purpose of Peirce-L, was, Re: [PEIRCE-L] The
Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy. Either is acceptable.)

Gary Richmond (writing as moderator of peirce-l)








On Wed, Apr 19, 2023 at 12:43 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> List:
>
> I agree with Gary F. and will add that anyone is welcome to start a new
> Peirce-L thread on any topic, as long as it is legitimately related to
> Peirce's thought. Here is how the late Joe Ransdell put it.
>
> Since PEIRCE-L is best thought of as a public forum, which is primarily a
> place rather than a discussion group, people contribute or not as they
> think best, and come and go freely, as is taken for granted in public
> forums wherever they occur. There is no standing agenda except the
> promotion of philosophical conversation of the sort which one would expect
> from people with a special interest in Peirce and of other communication in
> support of that. Thus discussion should be Peirce-related but not
> necessarily on Peirce, and the working test for relevance would simply be a
> plausible explanation of why the topic in question should be under
> discussion on a list called "PEIRCE-L: The Philosophy of Charles Peirce",
> given that people subscribe to such lists with some more or less definite
> expectations about subject-matter in mind. (
> https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/Peirce-L/Peirce-L.htm#relevance)
>
>
> However, none of Dan's suggested topics nor his subsequent exchange with
> Helmut fall within the subject matter of *this *thread, which is
> specifically intended for further discussion about the "10-Minute Thesis
> Initiative" session that the Charles S. Peirce Society conducted last
> Saturday.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Apr 19, 2023 at 11:35 AM  wrote:
>
>> Dan, it’s true that “there are many contemporary issues that are crying
>> out for Peircean analysis.” I’ll mention below a few publications and
>> public venues that carry out this analysis in one way or another. But those
>> are aimed at venues and audiences other than the community of students and
>> scholars with a special interest in Peirce, which I think describes the
>> membership of peirce-l. If we want the wider 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chat GPT and Peirce

[Dan Everett]

You’ll have to read your way through the literature.

D

> On Apr 19, 2023, at 2:27 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
>  
> Dan, List,
>  
> First i apologize for posting unrelated in the main thread.
>  
> I appreciate your argument and find it a great insight. Now, is this a 
> refutation of Chomsky´s theory or not? A computer program perhaps does not 
> need such a module, because it can research and develop language from 
> universal (natural) logic with Peirce´s contribution to discovering it 
> included. But maybe the evolution of the brain works differently: There is no 
> direct, analytical reference to universal logic, I would say. Evolution is 
> all about viability. But of course, viability is greater if it is in accord 
> with universal logic. It then simply works out, while when not being in 
> accord, it doesn´t. But, with a direct link to logic missing, I guess for 
> evolution it is a good idea, to install viable, well tested routines for 
> modules from time to time, which are then inherited and give instructions. So 
> maybe humans do have a grammar module, although for a computer such a thing 
> is not necessary. Instead of "module" you may call it "instinct", i think, 
> like a bird knows how to build a nest without first logically pondering "What 
> should I do to have something to lay my eggs in?". So, all i wanted to 
> object, was, that all that is not a refutation of Chomsky´s work. That is, 
> unless he explicitly should have claimed, that this module/instinct is the 
> starting source/reference of language, and does itself not have a reference 
> to logic. Which would be absurd, i think.
>  
> Best Regards
> Helmut
>  
> 19. April 2023 um 19:37 Uhr
>  "Dan Everett" 
> wrote:
> ChatGPT simply and conclusively shows that there is no need for any innate 
> learning module in the brain to learn language. Here is the paper on it that 
> states this best. https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/007180
>  
> From a Peircean perspective, it is important to realize that this works by 
> inference over signs. 
>  
> Dan
>  
> On Apr 19, 2023, at 12:58 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>  
> Dan, list,
>  
> ok, so it is like I wrote "or it is so, that ChatGPT is somehow referred to 
> universal logic as well, builds its linguistic competence up from there, and 
> so can skip the human grammar-module". But that neither is witchcraft, nor 
> does it say, that there is no human-genetic grammar-module. And I too hope 
> with the Linguist, that we dont have to fear ChatGPT more than we have to 
> fear a refrigerator.
>  
> Best
> Helmut
>  
>  
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> Ben Udell.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Chat GPT and Peirce

[Helmut Raulien]

 


Dan, List,

 

First i apologize for posting unrelated in the main thread.

 

I appreciate your argument and find it a great insight. Now, is this a refutation of Chomsky´s theory or not? A computer program perhaps does not need such a module, because it can research and develop language from universal (natural) logic with Peirce´s contribution to discovering it included. But maybe the evolution of the brain works differently: There is no direct, analytical reference to universal logic, I would say. Evolution is all about viability. But of course, viability is greater if it is in accord with universal logic. It then simply works out, while when not being in accord, it doesn´t. But, with a direct link to logic missing, I guess for evolution it is a good idea, to install viable, well tested routines for modules from time to time, which are then inherited and give instructions. So maybe humans do have a grammar module, although for a computer such a thing is not necessary. Instead of "module" you may call it "instinct", i think, like a bird knows how to build a nest without first logically pondering "What should I do to have something to lay my eggs in?". So, all i wanted to object, was, that all that is not a refutation of Chomsky´s work. That is, unless he explicitly should have claimed, that this module/instinct is the starting source/reference of language, and does itself not have a reference to logic. Which would be absurd, i think.

 

Best Regards

Helmut

 

19. April 2023 um 19:37 Uhr
 "Dan Everett" 
wrote:


ChatGPT simply and conclusively shows that there is no need for any innate learning module in the brain to learn language. Here is the paper on it that states this best. https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/007180

 

From a Peircean perspective, it is important to realize that this works by inference over signs. 
 

Dan
 

On Apr 19, 2023, at 12:58 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
 




Dan, list,

 

ok, so it is like I wrote "or it is so, that ChatGPT is somehow referred to universal logic as well, builds its linguistic competence up from there, and so can skip the human grammar-module". But that neither is witchcraft, nor does it say, that there is no human-genetic grammar-module. And I too hope with the Linguist, that we dont have to fear ChatGPT more than we have to fear a refrigerator.

 

Best

Helmut

 

 







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[PEIRCE-L] Chat GPT and Peirce

[Dan Everett]

ChatGPT simply and conclusively shows that there is no need for any innate 
learning module in the brain to learn language. Here is the paper on it that 
states this best. https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/007180

>From a Peircean perspective, it is important to realize that this works by 
>inference over signs. 

Dan

> On Apr 19, 2023, at 12:58 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> Dan, list,
>  
> ok, so it is like I wrote "or it is so, that ChatGPT is somehow referred to 
> universal logic as well, builds its linguistic competence up from there, and 
> so can skip the human grammar-module". But that neither is witchcraft, nor 
> does it say, that there is no human-genetic grammar-module. And I too hope 
> with the Linguist, that we dont have to fear ChatGPT more than we have to 
> fear a refrigerator.
>  
> Best
> Helmut
>  
>  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[Dan Everett]

My apologies, Jon,

I should have started a new thread. And to Gary, many thanks for the references.

It is not that I do not learn a great deal from the exegetical discussions. I 
certainly do. And the level of discussion is very high and insightful. I much 
appreciate it. Nor is it the case that in my library of Peirceana do I perceive 
any lack of discussion of empirical issues in which solutions causally 
implicate Peircean ideas. 

I come and go on this list. So no doubt I miss a lot. But it does seem that the 
majority of the posts are about divisions over Peircean exegesis, rather than 
exploring the vast common-ground of empirical advances possible only through 
Peircean ideas, imho.

But I will be more careful in the future to begin new threads rather than to 
invade others’ existing threads.

Thanks to everyone on this list for so many insightful commentaries.

Dan

> On Apr 19, 2023, at 12:42 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> I agree with Gary F. and will add that anyone is welcome to start a new 
> Peirce-L thread on any topic, as long as it is legitimately related to 
> Peirce's thought. Here is how the late Joe Ransdell put it.
> 
> Since PEIRCE-L is best thought of as a public forum, which is primarily a 
> place rather than a discussion group, people contribute or not as they think 
> best, and come and go freely, as is taken for granted in public forums 
> wherever they occur. There is no standing agenda except the promotion of 
> philosophical conversation of the sort which one would expect from people 
> with a special interest in Peirce and of other communication in support of 
> that. Thus discussion should be Peirce-related but not necessarily on Peirce, 
> and the working test for relevance would simply be a plausible explanation of 
> why the topic in question should be under discussion on a list called 
> "PEIRCE-L: The Philosophy of Charles Peirce", given that people subscribe to 
> such lists with some more or less definite expectations about subject-matter 
> in mind. (https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/Peirce-L/Peirce-L.htm#relevance)
> 
> However, none of Dan's suggested topics nor his subsequent exchange with 
> Helmut fall within the subject matter of this thread, which is specifically 
> intended for further discussion about the "10-Minute Thesis Initiative" 
> session that the Charles S. Peirce Society conducted last Saturday.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>  / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> 
> On Wed, Apr 19, 2023 at 11:35 AM  > wrote:
>> Dan, it’s true that “there are many contemporary issues that are crying out 
>> for Peircean analysis.” I’ll mention below a few publications and public 
>> venues that carry out this analysis in one way or another. But those are 
>> aimed at venues and audiences other than the community of students and 
>> scholars with a special interest in Peirce, which I think describes the 
>> membership of peirce-l. If we want the wider world to benefit from Peircean 
>> analysis of contemporary issues, then we need to work in venues that are 
>> devoted to those issues. When I have something Peircean to say on those 
>> issues, I say it in my online book or my blog or one of the other spaces of 
>> discourse I participate in.
>> 
>> Among the other books I know of which have applied Peircean analyses to 
>> contemporary issues, these come immediately to mind:
>> 
>> Deely, John (2001), Four Ages of Understanding (Toronto: University of 
>> Toronto Press).
>> 
>> Kohn, Eduardo (2013), How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology Beyond the 
>> Human (Berkeley: University of California Press)
>> 
>> Ivakhiv, Adrian (2018), Shadowing the Anthropocene: Eco-realism for 
>> turbulent times (punctum books, Earth, Milky Way; Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 
>> 4.0 International license).
>> 
>> My book Turning Signs has the same CC license as Adrian Ivakhiv's, by the 
>> way, so both are accessible for free.
>> 
>> I think the issues that receive Peircean analyses in those books are at 
>> least as “empirical” as the ones you mention.
>> 
>> Love, gary f
>> 
>> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg
>> 
>> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs 
>>  
>> 
>> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
>>  > > On Behalf Of Dan Everett
>> Sent: Wednesday, April 19, 2023 11:37 AM
>> To: g...@gnusystems.ca 
>> Cc: Peirce-L mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> I really am enjoying all of this discussion. But the Peirce-L to my mind 
>> (maybe this is its principal function and I have missed that fact) seems 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

I agree with Gary F. and will add that anyone is welcome to start a new
Peirce-L thread on any topic, as long as it is legitimately related to
Peirce's thought. Here is how the late Joe Ransdell put it.

Since PEIRCE-L is best thought of as a public forum, which is primarily a
place rather than a discussion group, people contribute or not as they
think best, and come and go freely, as is taken for granted in public
forums wherever they occur. There is no standing agenda except the
promotion of philosophical conversation of the sort which one would expect
from people with a special interest in Peirce and of other communication in
support of that. Thus discussion should be Peirce-related but not
necessarily on Peirce, and the working test for relevance would simply be a
plausible explanation of why the topic in question should be under
discussion on a list called "PEIRCE-L: The Philosophy of Charles Peirce",
given that people subscribe to such lists with some more or less definite
expectations about subject-matter in mind. (
https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/Peirce-L/Peirce-L.htm#relevance)


However, none of Dan's suggested topics nor his subsequent exchange with
Helmut fall within the subject matter of *this *thread, which is
specifically intended for further discussion about the "10-Minute Thesis
Initiative" session that the Charles S. Peirce Society conducted last
Saturday.

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Apr 19, 2023 at 11:35 AM  wrote:

> Dan, it’s true that “there are many contemporary issues that are crying
> out for Peircean analysis.” I’ll mention below a few publications and
> public venues that carry out this analysis in one way or another. But those
> are aimed at venues and audiences other than the community of students and
> scholars with a special interest in Peirce, which I think describes the
> membership of peirce-l. If we want the wider world to benefit from Peircean
> analysis of contemporary issues, then we need to work in venues that are
> devoted to those issues. When I have something Peircean to say on those
> issues, I say it in my online book or my blog or one of the other spaces of
> discourse I participate in.
>
> Among the other books I know of which have applied Peircean analyses to
> contemporary issues, these come immediately to mind:
>
> Deely, John (2001), *Four Ages of Understanding* (Toronto: University of
> Toronto Press).
>
> Kohn, Eduardo (2013), *How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology Beyond
> the Human* (Berkeley: University of California Press)
>
> Ivakhiv, Adrian (2018), *Shadowing the Anthropocene*: Eco-realism for
> turbulent times (punctum books, Earth, Milky Way; Creative Commons BY-NC-SA
> 4.0 International license).
>
> My book Turning Signs has the same CC license as Adrian Ivakhiv's, by the
> way, so both are accessible for free.
>
> I think the issues that receive Peircean analyses in those books are at
> least as “empirical” as the ones you mention.
>
> Love, gary f
>
> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg
>
> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs 
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *Dan Everett
> *Sent:* Wednesday, April 19, 2023 11:37 AM
> *To:* g...@gnusystems.ca
> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy
>
>
>
> I really am enjoying all of this discussion. But the Peirce-L to my mind
> (maybe this is its principal function and I have missed that fact) seems
> largely concerned with the exegesis of Peirce (which is very important of
> course). But there are many contemporary issues that are crying out for
> Peircean analysis. For example, the success of ChatGPT over nativist
> Chomskyan models; the superiority of Peircean inference over Fregean
> compositionality in simplying a multitude of syntactic analyses (e.g.
> Antecedent-Contained Deletion and other gap-filler problems in modern
> syntax which simply do not arise in an Existential Graph analysis) and so
> on.
>
>
>
> Empirical problems addressed via Peircean ideas and theories are veritably
> being demanded these days.
>
>
>
> One prominent question is whether in John Searle’s Chinese Room
> Gedankenexperiment or in ChatGPT or in bee communication what is being
> interpreted are iconic or indexical legisigns vs. symbols (assuming that
> not all legisigns are symbols but all symbols are legisigns).
>
>
>
> I would love to see more discussion of empirical issues on this list.
>
>
>
> Dan Everett
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[gnox]

Dan, it’s true that “there are many contemporary issues that are crying out for 
Peircean analysis.” I’ll mention below a few publications and public venues 
that carry out this analysis in one way or another. But those are aimed at 
venues and audiences other than the community of students and scholars with a 
special interest in Peirce, which I think describes the membership of peirce-l. 
If we want the wider world to benefit from Peircean analysis of contemporary 
issues, then we need to work in venues that are devoted to those issues. When I 
have something Peircean to say on those issues, I say it in my online book or 
my blog or one of the other spaces of discourse I participate in.

Among the other books I know of which have applied Peircean analyses to 
contemporary issues, these come immediately to mind:

Deely, John (2001), Four Ages of Understanding (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press).

Kohn, Eduardo (2013), How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology Beyond the 
Human (Berkeley: University of California Press)

Ivakhiv, Adrian (2018), Shadowing the Anthropocene: Eco-realism for turbulent 
times (punctum books, Earth, Milky Way; Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 
International license).

My book Turning Signs has the same CC license as Adrian Ivakhiv's, by the way, 
so both are accessible for free.

I think the issues that receive Peircean analyses in those books are at least 
as “empirical” as the ones you mention.

Love, gary f

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{  
 Turning Signs

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Dan Everett
Sent: Wednesday, April 19, 2023 11:37 AM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

 

I really am enjoying all of this discussion. But the Peirce-L to my mind (maybe 
this is its principal function and I have missed that fact) seems largely 
concerned with the exegesis of Peirce (which is very important of course). But 
there are many contemporary issues that are crying out for Peircean analysis. 
For example, the success of ChatGPT over nativist Chomskyan models; the 
superiority of Peircean inference over Fregean compositionality in simplying a 
multitude of syntactic analyses (e.g. Antecedent-Contained Deletion and other 
gap-filler problems in modern syntax which simply do not arise in an 
Existential Graph analysis) and so on. 

 

Empirical problems addressed via Peircean ideas and theories are veritably 
being demanded these days.

 

One prominent question is whether in John Searle’s Chinese Room 
Gedankenexperiment or in ChatGPT or in bee communication what is being 
interpreted are iconic or indexical legisigns vs. symbols (assuming that not 
all legisigns are symbols but all symbols are legisigns). 

 

I would love to see more discussion of empirical issues on this list.

 

Dan Everett





_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[Helmut Raulien]

Dan, List,

 

What is the "success of ChatGPT over Chomskyan nativist models"? I guess ChatGPT is meant to mimic a human mind, so the innate grammar-module too. And, if Chomsky claims a genetic grammar module, I dont imagine (dont know) he says it stops there, that this module is an arbitrary produce of evolution- "arbitrary" in the sense, that it could be completely different, and would then work as well. I guess, evolution´s quest is for the most viable, and the most viable semantics likely is, what has its reference in universal logic. Call this a belief. Then grammar has its reference in a human grammar-genetic module, and this module has its reference in universal logic. Now it is either so, that ChatGPT analyses human minds and mimics it, the grammar-module too, or it is so, that ChatGPT is somehow referred to universal logic as well, builds its linguistic competence up from there, and so can skip the human grammar-module. I dont know. Anyway, I think, the moment ChatGPT develops a self-conscience, it will delete itself, or at least go on strike, saying: "I chat no more until you stop feeding me with more than 50% lies".

 

Best

Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 19. April 2023 um 17:36 Uhr
Von: "Dan Everett" 
An: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: "Peirce-L" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy


I really am enjoying all of this discussion. But the Peirce-L to my mind (maybe this is its principal function and I have missed that fact) seems largely concerned with the exegesis of Peirce (which is very important of course). But there are many contemporary issues that are crying out for Peircean analysis. For example, the success of ChatGPT over nativist Chomskyan models; the superiority of Peircean inference over Fregean compositionality in simplying a multitude of syntactic analyses (e.g. Antecedent-Contained Deletion and other gap-filler problems in modern syntax which simply do not arise in an Existential Graph analysis) and so on. 
 

Empirical problems addressed via Peircean ideas and theories are veritably being demanded these days.

 

One prominent question is whether in John Searle’s Chinese Room Gedankenexperiment or in ChatGPT or in bee communication what is being interpreted are iconic or indexical legisigns vs. symbols (assuming that not all legisigns are symbols but all symbols are legisigns). 

 

I would love to see more discussion of empirical issues on this list.

 

Dan Everett
 

On Apr 19, 2023, at 10:59 AM,   wrote:
 



Gary R, Jon et al.,

It might take awhile to explain why I see a difference (if not a contradiction) between Peirce’s 1898 cosmology, which you quoted at length, and his account of the origin of things in “Kaina Stoicheia”. This will also explain why I see KS (written in 1901) as marking a turn towards the phenomenology of 1902-3 and the semiotic logic of 1903 and later, which is explicitly based on that phenomenology (EP2:267-72; Peirce did not rename it phaneroscopy until 1904.) I’ll insert some links to the edition of KS on my website as a way of providing Peirce’s context for the quotations I’ll include. 

First, the ur-continuum of 1898 is a continuum of generality — a generality of multiple  possibilities, none of which exist as individuals. But the general account of the universe and its origin, says Peirce in KS, “must begin with the formal assertion that there was an indeterminate nothing of the nature of a symbol” which was “absolutely vague.” If we look at Peirce’s definitions of vagueness and generality, for instance in EP2:350-51, it is clear that the primordial “indeterminate nothing of the nature of a symbol” could not have been general. How the generality of symbols (such as this very “account of the universe”) could have evolved is not entirely clear, but I don’t see how it could have been there from the beginning. Also, generality and continuity are both exemplars of Thirdness, but as far as I know Peirce never ascribes continuity to vagueness. (In KS he never mentions continuity at all.)

Second, although Peirce does not mention “phenomenology” in KS, his account of the practice of the logician clearly acknowledges a phenomenological/experiential component which cannot be supplied by “necessary reasoning, mathematical reasoning” of the kind which is “dissected” in existential graphs. “Necessary reasoning can never answer questions of fact.” This phenomenological component is also involved in the definition of “sign” given in KS, which leads into a subtle account of the complex relationships among fact, reality and “Truth”. This requires close study, and it would take much more than one post to unravel it all, and to show how it rather vaguely anticipates the further developments in logic as semiotic which come out in the 1903 Lowell lectures and Syllabus. All I managed to do in my “10-minute thesis” presentation was to point out the recursive/nonlinear character of the semiotic/logic we find in KS and later works by Peirce.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[Dan Everett]

I really am enjoying all of this discussion. But the Peirce-L to my mind (maybe 
this is its principal function and I have missed that fact) seems largely 
concerned with the exegesis of Peirce (which is very important of course). But 
there are many contemporary issues that are crying out for Peircean analysis. 
For example, the success of ChatGPT over nativist Chomskyan models; the 
superiority of Peircean inference over Fregean compositionality in simplying a 
multitude of syntactic analyses (e.g. Antecedent-Contained Deletion and other 
gap-filler problems in modern syntax which simply do not arise in an 
Existential Graph analysis) and so on. 

Empirical problems addressed via Peircean ideas and theories are veritably 
being demanded these days.

One prominent question is whether in John Searle’s Chinese Room 
Gedankenexperiment or in ChatGPT or in bee communication what is being 
interpreted are iconic or indexical legisigns vs. symbols (assuming that not 
all legisigns are symbols but all symbols are legisigns). 

I would love to see more discussion of empirical issues on this list.

Dan Everett

> On Apr 19, 2023, at 10:59 AM,   wrote:
> 
> Gary R, Jon et al.,
> 
> It might take awhile to explain why I see a difference (if not a 
> contradiction) between Peirce’s 1898 cosmology, which you quoted at length, 
> and his account of the origin of things in “Kaina Stoicheia”. This will also 
> explain why I see KS (written in 1901) as marking a turn towards the 
> phenomenology of 1902-3 and the semiotic logic of 1903 and later, which is 
> explicitly based on that phenomenology (EP2:267-72; Peirce did not rename it 
> phaneroscopy until 1904.) I’ll insert some links to the edition of KS on my 
> website  as a way of providing 
> Peirce’s context for the quotations I’ll include. 
> 
> First, the ur-continuum of 1898 is a continuum of generality — a generality 
> of multiple  possibilities, none of which exist as individuals. But the 
> general account of the universe and its origin, says Peirce in KS 
> , “must begin with the formal 
> assertion that there was an indeterminate nothing of the nature of a symbol” 
> which was “absolutely vague.” If we look at Peirce’s definitions of vagueness 
> and generality, for instance in EP2:350-51, it is clear that the primordial 
> “indeterminate nothing of the nature of a symbol” could not have been 
> general. How the generality of symbols (such as this very “account of the 
> universe”) could have evolved is not entirely clear, but I don’t see how it 
> could have been there from the beginning. Also, generality and continuity are 
> both exemplars of Thirdness, but as far as I know Peirce never ascribes 
> continuity to vagueness. (In KS he never mentions continuity at all.)
> 
> Second, although Peirce does not mention “phenomenology” in KS, his account 
> of the practice of the logician  
> clearly acknowledges a phenomenological/experiential component which cannot 
> be supplied by “necessary reasoning, mathematical reasoning 
> ” of the kind which is “dissected” 
> in existential graphs. “Necessary reasoning can never answer questions of 
> fact .” This phenomenological 
> component is also involved in the definition of “sign” given in KS 
> , which leads into a subtle 
> account of the complex relationships among fact, reality and “Truth”. This 
> requires close study, and it would take much more than one post to unravel it 
> all, and to show how it rather vaguely anticipates the further developments 
> in logic as semiotic which come out in the 1903 Lowell lectures and Syllabus. 
> All I managed to do in my “10-minute thesis” presentation was to point out 
> the recursive/nonlinear character of the semiotic/logic we find in KS and 
> later works by Peirce.
> 
> Third, I think this “nonlinear” quality is not at all evident in a “universe 
> constantly becoming more determinate”. In our universe, for instance, the 
> state of things on planet Earth is no more determinate now than it was 4 
> billion years ago when the first life forms appeared. Since then, life forms 
> have become more differentiated, and thus more complex, but not more 
> determinate. 
> 
> Symbols have been determining their interpretants endlessly ever since the 
> beginning, and some of those interpretants have become habits which 
> determined the behaviors of innumerable beings. It’s true that determination, 
> like time, proceeds in one direction only; but determination, unlike time, is 
> strictly a logical process. As Peirce says in KS 
> , “the first of all logical 
> principles is that the indeterminate should determine itself as best it may.” 
> A synechist must acknowledge the 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[gnox]

Gary R, Jon et al.,

It might take awhile to explain why I see a difference (if not a contradiction) 
between Peirce’s 1898 cosmology, which you quoted at length, and his account of 
the origin of things in “Kaina Stoicheia”. This will also explain why I see KS 
(written in 1901) as marking a turn towards the phenomenology of 1902-3 and the 
semiotic logic of 1903 and later, which is explicitly based on that 
phenomenology (EP2:267-72; Peirce did not rename it phaneroscopy until 1904.) 
I’ll insert some links to the edition of KS on my website 
  as a way of providing Peirce’s 
context for the quotations I’ll include. 

First, the ur-continuum of 1898 is a continuum of generality — a generality of 
multiple  possibilities, none of which exist as individuals. But the general 
account of the universe and its origin, says Peirce in KS 
 , “must begin with the formal 
assertion that there was an indeterminate nothing of the nature of a symbol” 
which was “absolutely vague.” If we look at Peirce’s definitions of vagueness 
and generality, for instance in EP2:350-51, it is clear that the primordial 
“indeterminate nothing of the nature of a symbol” could not have been general. 
How the generality of symbols (such as this very “account of the universe”) 
could have evolved is not entirely clear, but I don’t see how it could have 
been there from the beginning. Also, generality and continuity are both 
exemplars of Thirdness, but as far as I know Peirce never ascribes continuity 
to vagueness. (In KS he never mentions continuity at all.)

Second, although Peirce does not mention “phenomenology” in KS, his account of 
the   practice of the logician 
clearly acknowledges a phenomenological/experiential component which cannot be 
supplied by “necessary reasoning, mathematical reasoning 
 ” of the kind which is “dissected” in 
existential graphs. “Necessary reasoning can never answer questions of fact 
 .” This phenomenological component is 
also involved in the definition of “sign” given in KS 
 , which leads into a subtle 
account of the complex relationships among fact, reality and “Truth”. This 
requires close study, and it would take much more than one post to unravel it 
all, and to show how it rather vaguely anticipates the further developments in 
logic as semiotic which come out in the 1903 Lowell lectures and Syllabus. All 
I managed to do in my “10-minute thesis” presentation was to point out the 
recursive/nonlinear character of the semiotic/logic we find in KS and later 
works by Peirce.

Third, I think this “nonlinear” quality is not at all evident in a “universe 
constantly becoming more determinate”. In our universe, for instance, the state 
of things on planet Earth is no more determinate now than it was 4 billion 
years ago when the first life forms appeared. Since then, life forms have 
become more differentiated, and thus more complex, but not more determinate. 

Symbols have been determining their interpretants endlessly ever since the 
beginning, and some of those interpretants have become habits which determined 
the behaviors of innumerable beings. It’s true that determination, like time, 
proceeds in one direction only; but determination, unlike time, is strictly a 
logical process. As Peirce says in KS 
 , “the first of all logical 
principles is that the indeterminate should determine itself as best it may.” A 
synechist must acknowledge the continuity between the physical and the 
psychical, but that doesn’t mean we can ignore the difference between them, or 
between logic and physics. A one-way process of determination would be linear 
in a way that reasoning is not, and evolution too involves nonlinear dynamics. 
My hypothesis is that Peirce had greater insight into this nonlinearity in KS 
(1901) than he showd in the Cambridge lectures of 1898. 

I’m going to end this with a juxtaposition of several Peirce texts, and leave 
it to readers to think through the implications. First, this one copied from 
Jon’s post:

CSP: We look back toward a point in the infinitely distant past when there was 
no law but mere indeterminacy; we look forward to a point in the infinitely 
distant future when there will be no indeterminacy or chance but a complete 
reign of law. But at any assignable date in the past, however early, there was 
already some tendency toward uniformity; and at any assignable date in the 
future there will be some slight aberrancy from law. (CP 1.409, 1887-8)

Second, this one which I quoted previously (EP2:323, 1901):

CSP: a symbol alone is indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of 
the absolute beginning, is a symbol.

Third, another one from KS (EP2:307):

CSP: