Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

You and I seem to be more or less on the same page here, along with Martin
in light of his helpful clarification that avoiding "originalism" and
"endism" simply means recognizing that inquiry has no definite beginning or
end--just like the universe in Peirce's cosmology, and consistent with his
thoroughgoing synechism that precludes *any *singularities within a true
continuum such as time (CP 1.498, c. 1896; CP 6.210, 1898; CP 1.274-275,
1902). Attached are two relevant diagrams that I included in my "Temporal
Synechism" paper--the first (Figure3.tiff) showing the relations between
the three different conic sections and the line at infinity in projective
geometry, and the second (Figure5.tiff) showing how a hyperbolic continuum
is mapped to two parallel lines of infinite length. As Peirce explains ...

CSP: I may mention that my chief avocation in the last 10 years has been to
develop my cosmology. This theory is that the evolution of the world is
*hyperbolic*, that is, proceeds from one state of things in the infinite
past, to a different state of things in the infinite future. The state of
things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the nothingness of which
consists in the total absence of regularity. The state of things in the
infinite future is death, the nothingness of which consists in the complete
triumph of law and absence of all spontaneity. Between these, we have on *our
*side a state of things in which there is some absolute spontaneity counter
to all law, and some degree of conformity to law, which is constantly on
the increase owing to the growth of *habit*. ... As to the part of time on
the further side of eternity which leads back from the infinite future to
the infinite past, it evidently proceeds by contraries. (CP 8.317, 1891)


Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Apr 25, 2023 at 4:10 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> wrote:

> Gary F., Jon S, all,
>
> I take Peirce's argument for the triad of ideals—aesthetic, ethical and
> logical--to start with an analysis of our ordinary conception of having an
> end and then asking:  what is necessary for an end to be ultimate? In his
> discussion of the topological character of the relationship between the
> starting and ending points of inquiry, he appears to be exploring an
> analogy between the cognitive evolution of intelligent beings like us and
> the cosmological evolution of the universe. As such, there is an analogy
> between the logical conceptions of the starting and ending points inquiry
> and the starting and ending points of the cosmos.
>
> How should we understand the conception of what is ultimate as an end?
> Consider what Peirce is trying to articulate when when offers the
> topological model at CP 6.581
>
> Philosophy tries to understand. In so doing, it is committed to the
> assumption that things are intelligible, that the process of nature and the
> process of reason are one. Its explanation must be derivation. Explanation,
> derivation, involve suggestion of a starting-point--starting-point in its
> own nature not requiring explanation nor admitting of derivation. Also,
> there is suggestion of goal or stopping-point, where the process of reason
> and nature is perfected. A principle of movement must be assumed to be
> universal. It cannot be supposed that things ever actually reached the
> stopping-point, for there movement would stop and the principle of movement
> would not be universal; and similarly with the starting-point.
> Starting-point and stopping-point can only be ideal, like the two points
> where the hyperbola leaves one asymptote and where it joins the other.
>
> In regard to the principle of movement, three philosophies are possible.
>
> 1. Elliptic philosophy. Starting-point and stopping-point are not even
> ideal. Movement of nature recedes from no point, advances towards no point,
> has no definite tendency, but only flits from position to position.
>
> 2. Parabolic philosophy. Reason or nature develops itself according to one
> universal formula; but the point toward which that development tends is the
> very same nothingness from which it advances.
>
> 3. Hyperbolic philosophy. Reason marches from premisses to conclusion;
> nature has ideal end different from its origin.
> The aim, I think, is fairly clearly stated. He is using the topological
> model in an effort to clarify the conception of a principle of movement.
> Our conception of growth in our understanding—such that progress is really
> possible--stands in need of clarification both because it is vague and
> because we are prone to doubt its legitimacy for our *logica utens*. As
> such, the aim is to frame a clearer hypothesis about the principle of
> movement in the philosophical theory of logic (i.e., our *logica docens*).
> As Gary F. is pointing out, the ideal 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Summum Bonum and Determination (was A question for pragmatists)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

Put another way, "the pragmaticist does not make the *summum bonum* to
consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of evolution
whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those generals which
were just now said to be *destined*, which is what we strive to express in
calling them *reasonable*" (CP 5.433, EP 2:343, 1905); and "Existence,
then, is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other characteristics
it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate" (CP 6.349, 1902).
So, the growth of concrete reasonableness is the ongoing existential
embodiment of real generals, i.e., the conversion of indeterminate
conditional necessities into determinate individual actualities as the
contingent future is constantly becoming the accomplished past at the
nascent present.

Thanks again,

Jon

On Tue, Apr 25, 2023 at 12:46 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary F., List:
>
> I did not claim "that absolute determinacy is the ideal *summum bonum*,"
> I said that according to Peirce, concrete reasonableness is the *summum
> bonum* and utter determinacy is the state that the universe *would *reach
> as an ideal limit in the infinite future, but never actually *will *reach.
> This follows from his statement in KS, as quoted during your 10-minute
> presentation, that "the first of all logical principles is that the
> indeterminate should determine itself as best it may" (EP 2:324). The
> corresponding "perfect knowledge" is what an infinite community *would 
> *believe
> after infinite inquiry--again, an ideal limit, not an actual achievement.
>
> Of course, the choice of concrete reasonableness as the *summum bonum* is
> not at all arbitrary. Peirce describes it as "a state of things that 
> *reasonably
> recommends itself in itself* aside from any ulterior consideration" (CP
> 5.130, EP 2:201, 1903), "the state of things which is most admirable in
> itself regardless of any ulterior reason" (CP 1.611, EP 2:253, 1903), and
> "that which is objectively admirable without any ulterior reason" (CP
> 1.191, EP 2:260, 1903). In summary, "The only desirable object which is
> quite satisfactory in itself without any ulterior reason for desiring it,
> is the reasonable itself. I do not mean to put this forward as a
> demonstration; because, like all demonstrations about such matters, it
> would be a mere quibble, a sheaf of fallacies. I maintain simply that it is
> an experiential truth" (CP 8.140, EP 2:60, 1901).
>
> As we have discussed in the past, I understand "the perfect sign" that
> Peirce describes in EP 2:545n25 (1906) to be the entire universe; "perfect"
> in this context is roughly synonymous with "complete," not "flawless." As a
> quasi-mind, he says that it "must evidently have, like anything else, its
> special qualities of susceptibility to determination"; or as he puts it
> elsewhere, "The quasi-mind is itself a sign, a determinable sign" (SS 195,
> 1906). As such, it is constantly becoming *more *determinate, which is
> not at all synonymous with being "increasingly mindless." Again, the ideal
> limit of *utter *determinacy will never *actually *be reached--"an
> absolutely perfect, rational, and symmetrical system, in which mind is at
> last crystallized in the infinitely distant future" (CP 6.33, EP 1:297,
> 1891).
>
> Best I can tell, Peirce's "reduction to three of the possible sentiments
> toward the whole of the universe" is not a trichotomy in accordance with
> his three categories. Instead, it is an application of a
> mathematical/logical principle that he discusses in several other
> writings--any sequence is either elliptical, parabolic, or hyperbolic based
> on whether the closed curve representing it in projective geometry
> intersects the line representing infinity at zero, one, or two points. I
> discuss this in detail, including its implications for time and cosmology,
> in sections 6-7 of my "Temporal Synechism" paper. As I said before, our
> reasoning/learning *about *the universe is recursive, but the *overall 
> *process
> of semiosis is hyperbolic--from the dynamical object through the sign
> toward the final interpretant, just like time flows from the past through
> the present toward the future.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Tue, Apr 25, 2023 at 8:44 AM  wrote:
>
>> Jon, I think that’s a fair description of Peirce’s views (at that stage
>> of his life anyway). But you’ve given no reason why you or anyone else
>> *should* share the view that absolute determinacy is the ideal *summum
>> bonum*, or is *better* than a less determinate state of things, *or*
>> that the universe really tends to move in that direction.
>>
>> The choice of utter determinacy as the highest esthetic value is utterly
>> arbitrary. It would also entail the death of *semiosis* (along with
>> everything that has any 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F., Jon S, all,

I take Peirce's argument for the triad of ideals—aesthetic, ethical and 
logical--to start with an analysis of our ordinary conception of having an end 
and then asking:  what is necessary for an end to be ultimate? In his 
discussion of the topological character of the relationship between the 
starting and ending points of inquiry, he appears to be exploring an analogy 
between the cognitive evolution of intelligent beings like us and the 
cosmological evolution of the universe. As such, there is an analogy between 
the logical conceptions of the starting and ending points inquiry and the 
starting and ending points of the cosmos.

How should we understand the conception of what is ultimate as an end? Consider 
what Peirce is trying to articulate when when offers the topological model at 
CP 6.581


Philosophy tries to understand. In so doing, it is committed to the assumption 
that things are intelligible, that the process of nature and the process of 
reason are one. Its explanation must be derivation. Explanation, derivation, 
involve suggestion of a starting-point--starting-point in its own nature not 
requiring explanation nor admitting of derivation. Also, there is suggestion of 
goal or stopping-point, where the process of reason and nature is perfected. A 
principle of movement must be assumed to be universal. It cannot be supposed 
that things ever actually reached the stopping-point, for there movement would 
stop and the principle of movement would not be universal; and similarly with 
the starting-point. Starting-point and stopping-point can only be ideal, like 
the two points where the hyperbola leaves one asymptote and where it joins the 
other.



In regard to the principle of movement, three philosophies are possible.

1. Elliptic philosophy. Starting-point and stopping-point are not even ideal. 
Movement of nature recedes from no point, advances towards no point, has no 
definite tendency, but only flits from position to position.

2. Parabolic philosophy. Reason or nature develops itself according to one 
universal formula; but the point toward which that development tends is the 
very same nothingness from which it advances.

3. Hyperbolic philosophy. Reason marches from premisses to conclusion; nature 
has ideal end different from its origin.

The aim, I think, is fairly clearly stated. He is using the topological model 
in an effort to clarify the conception of a principle of movement. Our 
conception of growth in our understanding—such that progress is really 
possible--stands in need of clarification both because it is vague and because 
we are prone to doubt its legitimacy for our logica utens. As such, the aim is 
to frame a clearer hypothesis about the principle of movement in the 
philosophical theory of logic (i.e., our logica docens). As Gary F. is pointing 
out, the ideal stopping point can "only be ideal." At that ideal limit, the 
"movement would stop and the principle of movement would not be universal." (my 
emphasis) The same holds for the ideal starting point.

My hunch is that Peirce is using the topological model for the theory of logic 
to help establish the sorts of proportions that are important for the sake of 
inductively ascertaining the likelihood that a given hypothesis is true or 
false--within some margin of error. As such, the topological model serves as 
the basis of a measure of degrees of error for our inquiries generally. Drawing 
out the connections between the topological, projective (i.e., proportion) and 
metrical conceptions would take some work.

Yours,

Jeff








From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Tuesday, April 25, 2023 6:44 AM
To: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists


Jon, I think that’s a fair description of Peirce’s views (at that stage of his 
life anyway). But you’ve given no reason why you or anyone else should share 
the view that absolute determinacy is the ideal summum bonum, or is better than 
a less determinate state of things, or that the universe really tends to move 
in that direction.

The choice of utter determinacy as the highest esthetic value is utterly 
arbitrary. It would also entail the death of semiosis (along with everything 
that has any life in it), and since all thought and all knowledge is in signs, 
it would be the end of knowledge. If that is what you mean by “perfect 
knowledge,” why would it be esthetically preferable to the “perfect sign” as 
Peirce describes it? If the perfect 
sign is a “quasi-mind,” then an increasingly determinate universe would be 
increasingly mindless. Is that really an optimistic outlook?

Besides, if the laws of nature are evolving, as Peirce held, why wouldn’t the 
ideal summum bonum also be evolving?

The “cheerful hope” of the pure scientist that her investigations will lead the 
greater community closer to the 

[PEIRCE-L] Summum Bonum and Determination (was A question for pragmatists)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

I did not claim "that absolute determinacy is the ideal *summum bonum*," I
said that according to Peirce, concrete reasonableness is the *summum bonum*
and utter determinacy is the state that the universe *would *reach as an
ideal limit in the infinite future, but never actually *will *reach. This
follows from his statement in KS, as quoted during your 10-minute
presentation, that "the first of all logical principles is that the
indeterminate should determine itself as best it may" (EP 2:324). The
corresponding "perfect knowledge" is what an infinite community *would *believe
after infinite inquiry--again, an ideal limit, not an actual achievement.

Of course, the choice of concrete reasonableness as the *summum bonum* is
not at all arbitrary. Peirce describes it as "a state of things that
*reasonably
recommends itself in itself* aside from any ulterior consideration" (CP
5.130, EP 2:201, 1903), "the state of things which is most admirable in
itself regardless of any ulterior reason" (CP 1.611, EP 2:253, 1903), and
"that which is objectively admirable without any ulterior reason" (CP
1.191, EP 2:260, 1903). In summary, "The only desirable object which is
quite satisfactory in itself without any ulterior reason for desiring it,
is the reasonable itself. I do not mean to put this forward as a
demonstration; because, like all demonstrations about such matters, it
would be a mere quibble, a sheaf of fallacies. I maintain simply that it is
an experiential truth" (CP 8.140, EP 2:60, 1901).

As we have discussed in the past, I understand "the perfect sign" that
Peirce describes in EP 2:545n25 (1906) to be the entire universe; "perfect"
in this context is roughly synonymous with "complete," not "flawless." As a
quasi-mind, he says that it "must evidently have, like anything else, its
special qualities of susceptibility to determination"; or as he puts it
elsewhere, "The quasi-mind is itself a sign, a determinable sign" (SS 195,
1906). As such, it is constantly becoming *more *determinate, which is not
at all synonymous with being "increasingly mindless." Again, the ideal
limit of *utter *determinacy will never *actually *be reached--"an
absolutely perfect, rational, and symmetrical system, in which mind is at
last crystallized in the infinitely distant future" (CP 6.33, EP 1:297,
1891).

Best I can tell, Peirce's "reduction to three of the possible sentiments
toward the whole of the universe" is not a trichotomy in accordance with
his three categories. Instead, it is an application of a
mathematical/logical principle that he discusses in several other
writings--any sequence is either elliptical, parabolic, or hyperbolic based
on whether the closed curve representing it in projective geometry
intersects the line representing infinity at zero, one, or two points. I
discuss this in detail, including its implications for time and cosmology,
in sections 6-7 of my "Temporal Synechism" paper. As I said before, our
reasoning/learning *about *the universe is recursive, but the *overall *process
of semiosis is hyperbolic--from the dynamical object through the sign
toward the final interpretant, just like time flows from the past through
the present toward the future.

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Apr 25, 2023 at 8:44 AM  wrote:

> Jon, I think that’s a fair description of Peirce’s views (at that stage of
> his life anyway). But you’ve given no reason why you or anyone else
> *should* share the view that absolute determinacy is the ideal *summum
> bonum*, or is *better* than a less determinate state of things, *or* that
> the universe really tends to move in that direction.
>
> The choice of utter determinacy as the highest esthetic value is utterly
> arbitrary. It would also entail the death of *semiosis* (along with
> everything that has any life in it), and since all thought and all
> knowledge is in signs, it would be the end of knowledge. If that is what
> you mean by “perfect knowledge,” why would it be esthetically preferable to
> the “perfect sign” as Peirce describes it
> ? If the perfect sign is a
> “quasi-mind,” then an increasingly determinate universe would be
> increasingly mindless. Is that really an optimistic outlook?
>
> Besides, if the laws of nature are evolving, as Peirce held, why wouldn’t
> the ideal *summum bonum* also be evolving?
>
> The “cheerful hope” of the pure scientist that her investigations will
> lead the greater community closer to the whole truth is a psychological
> characteristic that can’t be reasonably extrapolated to the ultimate
> purpose of the universe — or even to the esthetic ideal of pragmatism, in
> my opinion. It’s a concession by Peirce to linear thinking. And I think his
> reduction to three of the possible sentiments toward the whole of the
> universe one 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[gnox]

Jon, I think that’s a fair description of Peirce’s views (at that stage of his 
life anyway). But you’ve given no reason why you or anyone else should share 
the view that absolute determinacy is the ideal summum bonum, or is better than 
a less determinate state of things, or that the universe really tends to move 
in that direction. 

The choice of utter determinacy as the highest esthetic value is utterly 
arbitrary. It would also entail the death of semiosis (along with everything 
that has any life in it), and since all thought and all knowledge is in signs, 
it would be the end of knowledge. If that is what you mean by “perfect 
knowledge,” why would it be esthetically preferable to the “perfect sign” as 
Peirce describes it  ? If the perfect 
sign is a “quasi-mind,” then an increasingly determinate universe would be 
increasingly mindless. Is that really an optimistic outlook?

Besides, if the laws of nature are evolving, as Peirce held, why wouldn’t the 
ideal summum bonum also be evolving?

The “cheerful hope” of the pure scientist that her investigations will lead the 
greater community closer to the whole truth is a psychological characteristic 
that can’t be reasonably extrapolated to the ultimate purpose of the universe — 
or even to the esthetic ideal of pragmatism, in my opinion. It’s a concession 
by Peirce to linear thinking. And I think his reduction to three of the 
possible sentiments toward the whole of the universe one instance where he 
“forces divisions to a Procrustean bed of trichotomy” (CP1.568).

Love, gary

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} Now we never can know precisely what we mean by any description whatever. 
[Peirce, CP 7.119] {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{  
 Turning Signs

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Monday, April 24, 2023 9:05 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

 

Gary F., List:

 

I doubt that Peirce's use of "sentiments" in R 953 in exactly the same as when 
he says elsewhere that reasoning is subordinate to sentiment in matters of 
vital importance. On my reading, he is simply anticipating his later 
recognition of esthetics as the normative science that "considers those things 
whose ends are to embody qualities of feeling" (CP 5.129, EP 2:200, 1903), 
aligning meliorism with the identification of concrete reasonableness as the 
summum bonum and its constant growth as the ongoing process of creation. The 
beginning and the end are ideal limits, not actual events, and the latter state 
is "better than" the former in the specific sense that it is utterly 
determinate instead of utterly indeterminate, corresponding to perfect 
knowledge instead of blank ignorance.

 

CSP: The Meliorist view is that there are in the first place certain real 
facts, which are as they are quite independently of what you or I or any man 
many think about them. Secondly, truth, being the agreement of our assertions 
with those facts, is something definitely one way, and not otherwise. Thirdly, 
observation and reflection, stimulated by an eager desire to ascertain that 
truth, gradually lead minds toward it, so that, though ignorance and error 
always remain in reference to each question, yet they become gradually 
dispelled. (R 953:7-8[6-7], c. 1899)

 

By contrast, pessimism identifies "eternal nothingness" as the summum bonum, 
and epicureanism effectively denies that there is any summum bonum at all. My 
James/Rorty interlocuters seem to fall into the latter camp, embracing "tragic 
pluralism" as inevitable because they believe that some value conflicts are 
genuinely unresolvable in principle.

 

Thanks,

 

Jon

 

On Mon, Apr 24, 2023 at 6:50 PM mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
> wrote:

Jon and other folks in this thread,

[Sorry about the disappearing text in my previous send of this, I copied some 
text from PDF and forgot I had to change the color manually.]

Doesn’t it seem a bit inconsistent for Peirce to argue about “what our 
sentiments toward things in general should be,” when he usually argues that 
“sentiments” are less fallible than our reasoning, precisely because they are 
products of evolution rather than logic?

Personally i have no doubt that the universe is in a continuous state of 
change, or in Peirce’s terms, “the universe has on the whole a definite 
tendency toward a state of things” different from any past state of things. (In 
other words I believe that time is real.) But I see no reason to believe that 
it has either beginning or end, or that some future state of things will be 
better than any past state. And that applies not only to the observable 
universe but to the universe of “human knowledge,” as far as I can see. I’m 
inclined to think that Peirce’s view on that was just a symptom of that 
overconfident 19th-century European-American optimism that 

[PEIRCE-L] LUW April 26 - Probability Logics for Reasoning About Quantum Observations

[jean-yves beziau]

The next session of the Logica Universalis Webinar will take place
Wednesday April 26 at 4pm CET

Speaker: Angelina Ilic Stepic
http://www.mi.sanu.ac.rs/novi_sajt/research/projects/AI4TrustBC/participants.php
Title of the talk: Probability Logics for Reasoning About Quantum
Observations
https://www.springer.com/journal/11787/

Associate Organization:  Logica Universalis Association
http://www.logica-universalis.org/LUAD
presented by its president Jean-Yves Beziau

Chair: Andrei Rodin
https://philomatica.org/andrei_rodin/
Editorial member LU

Everybody is welcome to attend. Access here:
https://cassyni.com/events/J7w6bwhMw1MnxGEUvG9o1w
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