Re: [PEIRCE-L] nonlinear semiotics

[Dan Everett]

THanks, Gary. I certainly agree that Peirce believed in what we would now call 
embodied cognition. Enactive cognition (which is related to older work by JJ 
Gibson and his “resonance theory” - which I also discuss in the forthcoming 
book) is a step further. I have given this a lot of thought. But it is still 
not clear to me how enactive cognition can make a place for thinking in signs.

Dan

> On May 14, 2023, at 9:45 AM,   wrote:
> 
> Thanks for your comments, Dan. What I was trying to show, in a nutshell, is 
> that Peirce anticipated what is now called an “enactive” approach to 
> cognition, as defined by Varela here in Turning Signs 
> <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/mdl.htm#fncc>. I think it is obvious that this 
> approach is closely related to pragmatism and pragmaticism as a theory of 
> meaning. And I would guess that your forthcoming book will bring out the 
> linguistic aspects of this.
> 
> I should mention, however, that the “enactive” approach emerged from 
> developments in neuroscience and cognitive psychology since Peirce’s time 
> (developments which were themselves anticipated by John Dewey). This might 
> seem to compromise Peirce’s insistence on keeping the sciences of logic and 
> psychology (and linguistics too) well separated. Yet he does devote some 
> parts of “Kaina Stoicheia” (which purports to be about “new elements” of 
> logic itself) to both psychology and linguistics. Maybe Peirce’s own 
> “unscientific” use of the term “logic” 
> <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/blr.htm#lognat> accounts for the discrepancy.
> 
> Love, gary f.
> 
> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg
> 
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
> Behalf Of Dan Everett
> Sent: Saturday, May 13, 2023 10:44 AM
> To: g...@gnusystems.ca
> Cc: Peirce-L 
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] nonlinear semiotics
>  
> 
> Really excellent stuff, Gary.
> 
>  
> 
> In training perception in the context of semiotics, in my forthcoming (2024) 
> Charles Peirce and the Philosophy of Linguistics, I discuss how culture plays 
> a role in learning new perceptual categories, looking at how Amazonian 
> hunter-gatherers learn to perceive 2-D images (photographs), going from being 
> unable to perceive much at all about them to seeing them clearly based on 
> evolving experience and discrimination. 
> 
>  
> 
> I like the interpretations you provide.
> 
>  
> 
> Dan
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> On May 13, 2023, at 10:27 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> List,
>> 
>> I’m attaching a PDF of the slideshow used in my “10-minute thesis” 
>> presentation last month to a Zoom session hosted by the Charles S. Peirce 
>> Society, in case there is further interest in it. My thesis was that 
>> “Peircean semiosis is a continuous nonlinear process involving recursive 
>> functions and (sometimes nested) feedback loops.” I illustrated this by 
>> mapping several Peirce texts onto diagrams representing the flow of “logical 
>> energy” (Peirce’s term in EP2:241, CP5.212).
>> 
>> I should mention that my “thesis” was abstracted, as it were, from a close 
>> study of Peirce’s “Kaina Stoicheia 
>> <https://gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm>” (c. 1901, despite the c.1904 
>> date given in EP2:300). In this curious paper Peirce sets out to explain 
>> “the logic of mathematics,” but instead of doing that in the “mathematical 
>> style” exemplified by Euclid’s Elements, works it out in terms of logic as 
>> semiotic. (He does not use the term “semiotic”, however, nor does he refer 
>> to “triadic relations” in this paper.) He concludes by working out the 
>> metaphysical and cosmological implications of a logic based on this semiotic 
>> foundation. I think “Kaina Stoicheia” is worth a close look in its own 
>> right, beyond my “10-minute thesis,” if other list members are interested. 
>> 

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[PEIRCE-L] Learning to see 2D images; training semiotics

[Dan Everett]

For anyone interested in the idea that photographic images are not innately 
perceived, but learned: 
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0110225

Dan_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] nonlinear semiotics

[Dan Everett]

Really excellent stuff, Gary.In training perception in the context of semiotics, in my forthcoming (2024) Charles Peirce and the Philosophy of Linguistics, I discuss how culture plays a role in learning new perceptual categories, looking at how Amazonian hunter-gatherers learn to perceive 2-D images (photographs), going from being unable to perceive much at all about them to seeing them clearly based on evolving experience and discrimination. I like the interpretations you provide.DanOn May 13, 2023, at 10:27 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:List,I’m attaching a PDF of the slideshow used in my “10-minute thesis” presentation last month to a Zoom session hosted by the Charles S. Peirce Society, in case there is further interest in it. My thesis was that “Peircean semiosis is a continuous nonlinear process involving recursive functions and (sometimes nested) feedback loops.” I illustrated this by mapping several Peirce texts onto diagrams representing the flow of “logical energy” (Peirce’s term in EP2:241, CP5.212).I should mention that my “thesis” was abstracted, as it were, from a close study of Peirce’s “Kaina Stoicheia” (c. 1901, despite the c.1904 date given in EP2:300). In this curious paper Peirce sets out to explain “the logic of mathematics,” but instead of doing that in the “mathematical style” exemplified by Euclid’s Elements, works it out in terms of logic as semiotic. (He does not use the term “semiotic”, however, nor does he refer to “triadic relations” in this paper.) He concludes by working out the metaphysical and cosmological implications of a logic based on this semiotic foundation. I think “Kaina Stoicheia” is worth a close look in its own right, beyond my “10-minute thesis,” if other list members are interested. Love, gary f.Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg} Owing to general causes, logic always must be far behind the practice of leading minds. [Peirce, BD ’Method’] {https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and co-managed by him and Ben Udell._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chat GPT, Peirce, Wittgenstein, CLRU, Halliday, Firth

[Dan Everett]

To this I would add that the linguist that seems closest to Peirce overall is Kenneth L. Pike. Pike’s very influential concepts of “etic” and “emic” are very close to Peirce’s secondness and thirdness, respectively. Pike also believed that triadic, what he called Tagmemic, analysis was the basis of all behavior. He was very influenced by Pragmatism.John Dewey’s office was down the hall at Columbia from Franz Boas’s (foundational in American linguistics and anthropology). He influenced Boas (and vice-versa) and through Boas’s student, Edward Sapir, Sapir’s friend/mentee, Kenneth L. Pike, and through Pike me, since Pike was a good friend of mine and my first linguistics professor. I didn’t mention markedness because although Jakobson made a big deal of it, it is not considered theoretically significant by most linguists today. Chomsky referred to Peirce as “my favorite philosopher” though ironically it is hard to imagine a theory less compatible with Peirce’s than Chomsky’s.The thing about LLMs is that they are largely a red herring. Yes, they are now used. But many researchers are already pursuing more realistic models to provide models of child-language learning. A couple of the earliest dissertations I advised in the computational linguistics program at Carnegie Mellon were on computational modeling of language learning. It continues to be a hot topic.But the Turing Test and most of the work in computational linguistics over the years have been done in ignorance of Peirce.  (I even had one colleague break off all contact with me when he heard I was writing two books on Peirce, claiming that he did not want as a friend anyone who would dedicate any time to that" silliness.”)DanOn Apr 21, 2023, at 6:56 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:Gary R,  Dan,  Helmut,I added more items to the subject line because they're relevant to the way Peirce's writings are related to the first two.Re Gary's comment about "marked":  Languages have various options for using words and grammatical features.  The most common or default option is said to be "unmarked", and less common options are said to be "marked" because there is some additional "mark" which may be just a change of intonation.Re GPT:  I'll be giving a talk on that subject in May.  See the attached abstract.  I'm still making slides for that talk, and I'll post the slides on my web site in May.Re Chomsky:  He has denounced the Large Language Models (LLMs) that are the foundation for ChatGPT and related systems.  But the majority of people working in the cognitive sciences (Philosophy, psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology) ignore Chomsky. He did have a very strong influence on cognitive science in the 1960s.  But in the late '60s and '70s, he devoted his time to polemics against the Vietnam war.  After that war, he started the "linguistics wars" against his former students who had deviated from the party line.  But Chomsky and many other linguists had said that they had been influenced by Peirce.A major leader of the old school, Roman Jakobson, was even more strongly influenced by Peirce, and he summarized Chomsky's work in one line: "Syntax without semantics is meaningless."Re Wittgenstein:  There are many connections between Peirce, Lady Welby, Frank Ramsey, Ogden & Richards, and Ludwig W. Jaime Nubiola presents a detailed analysis of the issues: https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/nubiola/SCHOLAR.HTMRe CLRU:  The Cambridge Language Research Unit was founded by Margaret Masterman, who had been one of the six students of Wittgenstein's whose notes were used as the basis for the Brown book. Her approach, which she called post-Wittgensteinian, rejects Chomsky's emphasis on syntax and is more compatible with Peirce. For a review of the issues, see https://aclanthology.org/J06-4005/Re Michael Halliday:  He had learned Chinese during his service in WWII.  After the war, he studied Chinese linguistics in China. In the 1950s, he was a lecturer in Chinese at Cambridge, where he also participated in the CLRU discussions, especially on issuses of machine translation (MT). He then went to the University of London to earn a PhD in linguistics with Firth as his adviser.The book Construing Experience Through Meaning by Halliday and Matthiessen covers a broad range of issues that are compatible with Peirce.  Instead of an ontology with Entity as the top node, they put Phenomenon at the top, with three branches labeled Element, Figure, and System.  Their examples of those three branches correspond to Peirce's Semes, Phemes, and Delomes. Although they mention Saussure, but not Peirce, they use the word semiotic, and many of their classifications have three branches that roughly correspond to Peirce's trichotomies.For a review of that book, see https://jfsowa.com/pubs/halliday.pdf . For a copy of the book itself, see 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chat GPT and Peirce

[Dan Everett]

Helmut,

There are only two claims here, one by Chomsky and one by Peirce.Although both 
use the term ‘instinct’  and ‘innate,’ these mean quite different things for 
both of them (there is a tendency to interpret Peirce’s (Hume’s, Locke’s, etc) 
use of “instinct” (and many other terms) anachronistically). 

In any case, Chomsky claims that language is not learned, in fact that it 
cannot be learned. It is “acquired” via innate structure that emerges via 
triggering via the environment. 

Peirce claims that all knowledge, ontogenetic or phylogenetic (but that is 
often/usually misinterpreted as well) is gained via inference over signs.

What ChatGPT has done (and the Piantadosi article is crucial to seeing this 
clearly, so I assume you have read it) is to show that language structures AND 
their meanings can be learned by inference over signs. ChatGPT does rely on LLM 
(Large Language Models) and children do not, but work is already being done to 
produce the results based on more realistic data bases. 

Now if any system can learn a language via inference over signs, Chomsky is 
wrong. QED. 

The question that arises, however, is whether ChatGPT (or computers in Searle’s 
Chinese Room Gedanken experiment) are inferring over indexes and icons or also 
symbols (human language is differentiated from all other communication system 
via the open-ended cultural production of symbols). This also challenges the 
Turing Test, as Searle points out when he also argues that a computer’s 
“understanding” is based on inference of indexes and icons rather than symbols 
(though he does not use such terms).

I discuss these points at length in my forthcoming book and I will be giving a 
talk on this at Google’s headquarters in July.

Another benefit of Peirce’s philosophy over standard linguistics comes into 
view when we consider what I call “Frege’s error.” As we all know Peirce and 
Frege were developing propositional and first-order logic nearly 
simultaneously. However, Frege’s axiom-based system proposes a crucial role for 
the Fregean concept of compositionality in language, whereas Peirce’s 
Existential Graphs provide an inferential, non-compositional model of meaning. 
In my forthcoming work (and in a few talks I have given recently in pro-Fregean 
linguistics departments (which is pretty much all linguistics departments) I 
argue that compositionality is too weak (it cannot extend beyond the 
sentence/proposition) and too strong (it creates faux problems such as the 
veritable core of most formal linguistics, “gap-filler” analyses, e.g. movement 
rules) whereas inferentialism provides the best coverage. 

Peirce’s inferentialism is similar to, but much more general, than Brandom’s 
inferentialism (also as developed by Peregrin). So Peirce, in my analysis, is 
right at the center of current debates on the nature of human language. I also 
make this point in my 2017 book, How Language Began (and Homo erectus scholar 
Larry Barham and I make this point based on much more archaeological evidence 
from Homo erectus sites: 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10816-020-09480-9

All best,

Dan 

> On Apr 20, 2023, at 4:47 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> Dan, if I would read all of Chomsky´s, and would not find him claiming, that 
> his genetic grammar-module is not based on logic, then I would have to quote 
> all he ever has written. The other way round would be easier. And: Refutation 
> is a strong accusation, and I think the prosecutor has the burden of proof.
> Best, Helmut
>  
>  
> Gesendet: Mittwoch, 19. April 2023 um 20:28 Uhr
> Von: "Dan Everett" 
> An: "Helmut Raulien" 
> Cc: g...@gnusystems.ca, "Peirce-L" 
> Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chat GPT and Peirce
> You’ll have to read your way through the literature.
>  
> D
>  
> On Apr 19, 2023, at 2:27 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>  
>  
> Dan, List,
>  
> First i apologize for posting unrelated in the main thread.
>  
> I appreciate your argument and find it a great insight. Now, is this a 
> refutation of Chomsky´s theory or not? A computer program perhaps does not 
> need such a module, because it can research and develop language from 
> universal (natural) logic with Peirce´s contribution to discovering it 
> included. But maybe the evolution of the brain works differently: There is no 
> direct, analytical reference to universal logic, I would say. Evolution is 
> all about viability. But of course, viability is greater if it is in accord 
> with universal logic. It then simply works out, while when not being in 
> accord, it doesn´t. But, with a direct link to logic missing, I guess for 
> evolution it is a good idea, to install viable, well tested routines for 
> modules from time to time, which are then inherited and give instructions. So 
> maybe humans do have a grammar module, although for a computer such

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chat GPT and Peirce

[Dan Everett]

You’ll have to read your way through the literature.

D

> On Apr 19, 2023, at 2:27 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
>  
> Dan, List,
>  
> First i apologize for posting unrelated in the main thread.
>  
> I appreciate your argument and find it a great insight. Now, is this a 
> refutation of Chomsky´s theory or not? A computer program perhaps does not 
> need such a module, because it can research and develop language from 
> universal (natural) logic with Peirce´s contribution to discovering it 
> included. But maybe the evolution of the brain works differently: There is no 
> direct, analytical reference to universal logic, I would say. Evolution is 
> all about viability. But of course, viability is greater if it is in accord 
> with universal logic. It then simply works out, while when not being in 
> accord, it doesn´t. But, with a direct link to logic missing, I guess for 
> evolution it is a good idea, to install viable, well tested routines for 
> modules from time to time, which are then inherited and give instructions. So 
> maybe humans do have a grammar module, although for a computer such a thing 
> is not necessary. Instead of "module" you may call it "instinct", i think, 
> like a bird knows how to build a nest without first logically pondering "What 
> should I do to have something to lay my eggs in?". So, all i wanted to 
> object, was, that all that is not a refutation of Chomsky´s work. That is, 
> unless he explicitly should have claimed, that this module/instinct is the 
> starting source/reference of language, and does itself not have a reference 
> to logic. Which would be absurd, i think.
>  
> Best Regards
> Helmut
>  
> 19. April 2023 um 19:37 Uhr
>  "Dan Everett" 
> wrote:
> ChatGPT simply and conclusively shows that there is no need for any innate 
> learning module in the brain to learn language. Here is the paper on it that 
> states this best. https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/007180
>  
> From a Peircean perspective, it is important to realize that this works by 
> inference over signs. 
>  
> Dan
>  
> On Apr 19, 2023, at 12:58 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>  
> Dan, list,
>  
> ok, so it is like I wrote "or it is so, that ChatGPT is somehow referred to 
> universal logic as well, builds its linguistic competence up from there, and 
> so can skip the human grammar-module". But that neither is witchcraft, nor 
> does it say, that there is no human-genetic grammar-module. And I too hope 
> with the Linguist, that we dont have to fear ChatGPT more than we have to 
> fear a refrigerator.
>  
> Best
> Helmut
>  
>  
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[PEIRCE-L] Chat GPT and Peirce

[Dan Everett]

ChatGPT simply and conclusively shows that there is no need for any innate 
learning module in the brain to learn language. Here is the paper on it that 
states this best. https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/007180

>From a Peircean perspective, it is important to realize that this works by 
>inference over signs. 

Dan

> On Apr 19, 2023, at 12:58 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> Dan, list,
>  
> ok, so it is like I wrote "or it is so, that ChatGPT is somehow referred to 
> universal logic as well, builds its linguistic competence up from there, and 
> so can skip the human grammar-module". But that neither is witchcraft, nor 
> does it say, that there is no human-genetic grammar-module. And I too hope 
> with the Linguist, that we dont have to fear ChatGPT more than we have to 
> fear a refrigerator.
>  
> Best
> Helmut
>  
>  
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[Dan Everett]

My apologies, Jon,

I should have started a new thread. And to Gary, many thanks for the references.

It is not that I do not learn a great deal from the exegetical discussions. I 
certainly do. And the level of discussion is very high and insightful. I much 
appreciate it. Nor is it the case that in my library of Peirceana do I perceive 
any lack of discussion of empirical issues in which solutions causally 
implicate Peircean ideas. 

I come and go on this list. So no doubt I miss a lot. But it does seem that the 
majority of the posts are about divisions over Peircean exegesis, rather than 
exploring the vast common-ground of empirical advances possible only through 
Peircean ideas, imho.

But I will be more careful in the future to begin new threads rather than to 
invade others’ existing threads.

Thanks to everyone on this list for so many insightful commentaries.

Dan

> On Apr 19, 2023, at 12:42 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> I agree with Gary F. and will add that anyone is welcome to start a new 
> Peirce-L thread on any topic, as long as it is legitimately related to 
> Peirce's thought. Here is how the late Joe Ransdell put it.
> 
> Since PEIRCE-L is best thought of as a public forum, which is primarily a 
> place rather than a discussion group, people contribute or not as they think 
> best, and come and go freely, as is taken for granted in public forums 
> wherever they occur. There is no standing agenda except the promotion of 
> philosophical conversation of the sort which one would expect from people 
> with a special interest in Peirce and of other communication in support of 
> that. Thus discussion should be Peirce-related but not necessarily on Peirce, 
> and the working test for relevance would simply be a plausible explanation of 
> why the topic in question should be under discussion on a list called 
> "PEIRCE-L: The Philosophy of Charles Peirce", given that people subscribe to 
> such lists with some more or less definite expectations about subject-matter 
> in mind. (https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/Peirce-L/Peirce-L.htm#relevance)
> 
> However, none of Dan's suggested topics nor his subsequent exchange with 
> Helmut fall within the subject matter of this thread, which is specifically 
> intended for further discussion about the "10-Minute Thesis Initiative" 
> session that the Charles S. Peirce Society conducted last Saturday.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Wed, Apr 19, 2023 at 11:35 AM  <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote:
>> Dan, it’s true that “there are many contemporary issues that are crying out 
>> for Peircean analysis.” I’ll mention below a few publications and public 
>> venues that carry out this analysis in one way or another. But those are 
>> aimed at venues and audiences other than the community of students and 
>> scholars with a special interest in Peirce, which I think describes the 
>> membership of peirce-l. If we want the wider world to benefit from Peircean 
>> analysis of contemporary issues, then we need to work in venues that are 
>> devoted to those issues. When I have something Peircean to say on those 
>> issues, I say it in my online book or my blog or one of the other spaces of 
>> discourse I participate in.
>> 
>> Among the other books I know of which have applied Peircean analyses to 
>> contemporary issues, these come immediately to mind:
>> 
>> Deely, John (2001), Four Ages of Understanding (Toronto: University of 
>> Toronto Press).
>> 
>> Kohn, Eduardo (2013), How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology Beyond the 
>> Human (Berkeley: University of California Press)
>> 
>> Ivakhiv, Adrian (2018), Shadowing the Anthropocene: Eco-realism for 
>> turbulent times (punctum books, Earth, Milky Way; Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 
>> 4.0 International license).
>> 
>> My book Turning Signs has the same CC license as Adrian Ivakhiv's, by the 
>> way, so both are accessible for free.
>> 
>> I think the issues that receive Peircean analyses in those books are at 
>> least as “empirical” as the ones you mention.
>> 
>> Love, gary f
>> 
>> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg
>> 
>> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/>
>>  
>> 
>> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
>> <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[Dan Everett]

I really am enjoying all of this discussion. But the Peirce-L to my mind (maybe 
this is its principal function and I have missed that fact) seems largely 
concerned with the exegesis of Peirce (which is very important of course). But 
there are many contemporary issues that are crying out for Peircean analysis. 
For example, the success of ChatGPT over nativist Chomskyan models; the 
superiority of Peircean inference over Fregean compositionality in simplying a 
multitude of syntactic analyses (e.g. Antecedent-Contained Deletion and other 
gap-filler problems in modern syntax which simply do not arise in an 
Existential Graph analysis) and so on. 

Empirical problems addressed via Peircean ideas and theories are veritably 
being demanded these days.

One prominent question is whether in John Searle’s Chinese Room 
Gedankenexperiment or in ChatGPT or in bee communication what is being 
interpreted are iconic or indexical legisigns vs. symbols (assuming that not 
all legisigns are symbols but all symbols are legisigns). 

I would love to see more discussion of empirical issues on this list.

Dan Everett

> On Apr 19, 2023, at 10:59 AM,   wrote:
> 
> Gary R, Jon et al.,
> 
> It might take awhile to explain why I see a difference (if not a 
> contradiction) between Peirce’s 1898 cosmology, which you quoted at length, 
> and his account of the origin of things in “Kaina Stoicheia”. This will also 
> explain why I see KS (written in 1901) as marking a turn towards the 
> phenomenology of 1902-3 and the semiotic logic of 1903 and later, which is 
> explicitly based on that phenomenology (EP2:267-72; Peirce did not rename it 
> phaneroscopy until 1904.) I’ll insert some links to the edition of KS on my 
> website <https://gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm> as a way of providing 
> Peirce’s context for the quotations I’ll include. 
> 
> First, the ur-continuum of 1898 is a continuum of generality — a generality 
> of multiple  possibilities, none of which exist as individuals. But the 
> general account of the universe and its origin, says Peirce in KS 
> <https://gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm#4y>, “must begin with the formal 
> assertion that there was an indeterminate nothing of the nature of a symbol” 
> which was “absolutely vague.” If we look at Peirce’s definitions of vagueness 
> and generality, for instance in EP2:350-51, it is clear that the primordial 
> “indeterminate nothing of the nature of a symbol” could not have been 
> general. How the generality of symbols (such as this very “account of the 
> universe”) could have evolved is not entirely clear, but I don’t see how it 
> could have been there from the beginning. Also, generality and continuity are 
> both exemplars of Thirdness, but as far as I know Peirce never ascribes 
> continuity to vagueness. (In KS he never mentions continuity at all.)
> 
> Second, although Peirce does not mention “phenomenology” in KS, his account 
> of the practice of the logician <https://gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm#4g> 
> clearly acknowledges a phenomenological/experiential component which cannot 
> be supplied by “necessary reasoning, mathematical reasoning 
> <https://gnusystems.ca/Lowell2.htm#ncrsn>” of the kind which is “dissected” 
> in existential graphs. “Necessary reasoning can never answer questions of 
> fact <https://gnusystems.ca/Lowell2.htm#xfct>.” This phenomenological 
> component is also involved in the definition of “sign” given in KS 
> <https://gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm#1>, which leads into a subtle 
> account of the complex relationships among fact, reality and “Truth”. This 
> requires close study, and it would take much more than one post to unravel it 
> all, and to show how it rather vaguely anticipates the further developments 
> in logic as semiotic which come out in the 1903 Lowell lectures and Syllabus. 
> All I managed to do in my “10-minute thesis” presentation was to point out 
> the recursive/nonlinear character of the semiotic/logic we find in KS and 
> later works by Peirce.
> 
> Third, I think this “nonlinear” quality is not at all evident in a “universe 
> constantly becoming more determinate”. In our universe, for instance, the 
> state of things on planet Earth is no more determinate now than it was 4 
> billion years ago when the first life forms appeared. Since then, life forms 
> have become more differentiated, and thus more complex, but not more 
> determinate. 
> 
> Symbols have been determining their interpretants endlessly ever since the 
> beginning, and some of those interpretants have become habits which 
> determined the behaviors of innumerable beings. It’s true that determination, 
> like time, proceeds in one direction only; but determination, unlike time, is 
> strictly a logical process. As

Re: [PEIRCE-L] online talk: 3:30 EST 3/24 - Rocco Gangle, Logic from Scratch: A Philosophical Approach to C. S. Peirce’s Diagrammatic First-Order Logic

[Dan Everett]

I had the same questions.

Dan Everett


> On Mar 23, 2023, at 10:42 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Just to clarify, since those of us in the United States are now observing 
> Daylight Savings Time rather than Standard Time, is this event starting 
> tomorrow at 3:30 PM EDT? At what time is it expected to end?
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Tue, Mar 21, 2023 at 7:50 AM Ben Udell  <mailto:baud...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> Forwarded from Dr. Thomas Adajian, including time correction to 3:30 EST. - 
>> B.U.
>> 
>> SUBJECT: online talk: 3:30 EST 3/24 -  Rocco Gangle, Logic from Scratch: A 
>> Philosophical Approach to C. S. Peirce’s Diagrammatic First-Order Logic 
>> FROM: Adajian, Thomas - adajiatr
>> 
>> Logic from Scratch: A Philosophical Approach to C. S. Peirce’s Diagrammatic 
>> First-Order Logic
>> 
>> Rocco Gangle, Center for Diagrammatic and Computational Philosophy, Endicott 
>> College
>> 
>> This presentation introduces the “alpha” and “beta” levels of EG, 
>> corresponding to classical propositional and first-order logic with equality 
>> respectively. Peirce’s diagrammatic graphical notation represents logical 
>> operators with elementary topological structures in the plane, namely closed 
>> curves and continuous lines. Deductive rules are then specified in terms of 
>> writing, erasing and copying certain topologically connected components of 
>> the logical graphs in determinate ways. Remarkably, the same writing, 
>> erasing and copying rules carry over essentially from the “alpha” to the 
>> “beta” level, establishing a deeper continuity between propositional and 
>> first-order logic than is often considered. In addition to introducing the 
>> system of EG and showing how mathematical tools drawn from elementary 
>> category theory can aid in formalizing Peirce’s system rigorously, this 
>> presentation will emphasize links between Peirce’s diagrammatic logical 
>> notation and other aspects of his philosophical thought, particularly his 
>> semiotics and his metaphysics of continuity. What is the specifically 
>> philosophical importance of Peirce’s diagrammatic logic? It provides insight 
>> into the origins of logical thinking by showing how logical form emerges 
>> naturally from minimal constructions of continuity and discontinuity. It 
>> teaches us how to build up logic from scratch.
>> 
>> Meeting ID 818 4891 1790 
>> Passcode 906010 
>> https://jmu-edu.zoom.us/j/81848911790?pwd=R0xweXRNN201WTJCT3lVNkswdVdtUT09
>> 
>> Dr. Thomas Adajian
>> 
>> philosophy program 
>> dept. of philosophy & religion -msc 8006 
>> james madison university 
>> harrisonburg, va  22807
>> 
>> jmu logic and reasoning institute
>> 
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Symbols and Syntax (was Genuinely triadic relations, laws and symbols)

[Dan Everett]

Jon,

No, we are talking about the same thing: a relationship that he considered 
logical, but in fact not. This has nothing to do with the English verb per se, 
but with the logical structure of any act of giving that includes three surface 
arguments. The point is that Peirce got the *logic* of giving wrong -  for any 
language.

Dan

Sent from my iPad

> On Apr 22, 2019, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Dan, Jeff, List:
> 
> DE:  I am saying simply that in some cases of lexical analysis modern 
> mathematical logic has tools at its disposal that enable analyses empirically 
> superior to the the common picture of the valency of some verbs.
> 
> Again, we are talking about two different things.  When Peirce repeatedly 
> characterized giving as irreducibly triadic, he was not referring to the 
> English verb, but rather a specific logical relation--which is more 
> fundamental than, and thus independent of, its expression in any particular 
> language or other Sign System.  In an Existential Graph, no matter what 
> symbol we use to label the Spot for that relation, it will always have 
> exactly three Pegs.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
>> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 3:11 AM Dan Everett  wrote:
>> Jeff,
>> 
>> Let's not read too much into what I said. I am not claiming that triadic 
>> relations are reduceable (at least not in all cases) to dyadic relations. 
>> Not at all in fact. Nor am I urging the thesis that Quine, Church, Turing, 
>> etc. are superior in any way to Peirce. 
>> 
>> I am saying simply that in some cases of lexical analysis modern 
>> mathematical logic has tools at its disposal that enable analyses 
>> empirically superior to the the common picture of the valency of some 
>> verbs,. Having said that, it may simply be that Peirce's comments on 'give' 
>> hold at the level of transitivity, though perhaps not at the level of 
>> valency. I am still thinking about that possibilty. 
>> 
>> Peirce may have made mistakes in many places. This should not bother anyone, 
>> though, so long as the mistakes are not at a level that threaten his overall 
>> program. I certainly do not believe that any improvements in modern logic 
>> and math threaten Peirce's program.
>> 
>> Church invented the lambda calculus, identical in power to a universal 
>> Turing machine.(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lambda_calculus) That is a 
>> significant discovery/invention/advance. But this in no way means that 
>> Church or Turing or Quine were superior to Peirce or that their systems 
>> should be taken over his. It means nothing more than that these tools of 
>> modern logic, in conjunction with modern linguistics research, offer 
>> insights into *some* areas of language that Peirce could not have achieved 
>> (and did not). But nothing that they did invalidates his triadic system, his 
>> theory of semiotics, etc. 
>> 
>> Some verbs operate differently than Peirce thought, at least at the level of 
>> semantic decomposition, even though their syntactic behavior may conform 
>> well to his predictions. Not a threat to him. But perhaps a tool for better 
>> understanding him in modern terms.
>> 
>> The issues are nuanced. But I believe that sorting through them ultimately 
>> makes Peirce more relevant than ever to our understanding of language, 
>> logic, etc.
>> 
>> Dan
>>> On Apr 21, 2019, at 9:28 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard 
>>>  wrote:
>>> 
>>> Dan, List,
>>> 
>>> I, for one, don't share your view that Peirce missed the boat on this one. 
>>> In making the assertion, are you claiming that modern mathematical logic 
>>> demonstrates that relations that might appear to be genuinely triadic--- 
>>> such as giving, or mediating or thinking--can be entirely reduced to dyadic 
>>> relations using logical resources that do not, themselves, employ those 
>>> very relations? Or, are you saying that this has been shown in modern 
>>> philosophical logic? 
>>> 
>>> In both areas of inquiry, I do not think the matter is--by any 
>>> means--somehow now settled. Here, at the beginning of the 21st century, 
>>> there are plenty of reasons to doubt the assertions of Quine, Church, 
>>> Turing, et al, on this matter.
>>> 
>>> Yours,
>>> 
>>> Jeff
>>> 
>>> Jeffrey Downard
>>> Associate Professor
>>> Department of Philosophy
>>&g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Symbols and Syntax (was Genuinely triadic relations, laws and symbols)

[Dan Everett]

Jeff,

Let's not read too much into what I said. I am not claiming that triadic 
relations are reduceable (at least not in all cases) to dyadic relations. Not 
at all in fact. Nor am I urging the thesis that Quine, Church, Turing, etc. are 
superior in any way to Peirce. 

I am saying simply that in some cases of lexical analysis modern mathematical 
logic has tools at its disposal that enable analyses empirically superior to 
the the common picture of the valency of some verbs,. Having said that, it may 
simply be that Peirce's comments on 'give' hold at the level of transitivity, 
though perhaps not at the level of valency. I am still thinking about that 
possibilty. 

Peirce may have made mistakes in many places. This should not bother anyone, 
though, so long as the mistakes are not at a level that threaten his overall 
program. I certainly do not believe that any improvements in modern logic and 
math threaten Peirce's program.

Church invented the lambda calculus, identical in power to a universal Turing 
machine.(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lambda_calculus 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lambda_calculus>) That is a significant 
discovery/invention/advance. But this in no way means that Church or Turing or 
Quine were superior to Peirce or that their systems should be taken over his. 
It means nothing more than that these tools of modern logic, in conjunction 
with modern linguistics research, offer insights into *some* areas of language 
that Peirce could not have achieved (and did not). But nothing that they did 
invalidates his triadic system, his theory of semiotics, etc. 

Some verbs operate differently than Peirce thought, at least at the level of 
semantic decomposition, even though their syntactic behavior may conform well 
to his predictions. Not a threat to him. But perhaps a tool for better 
understanding him in modern terms.

The issues are nuanced. But I believe that sorting through them ultimately 
makes Peirce more relevant than ever to our understanding of language, logic, 
etc.

Dan



> On Apr 21, 2019, at 9:28 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> Dan, List,
> 
> I, for one, don't share your view that Peirce missed the boat on this one. In 
> making the assertion, are you claiming that modern mathematical logic 
> demonstrates that relations that might appear to be genuinely triadic--- such 
> as giving, or mediating or thinking--can be entirely reduced to dyadic 
> relations using logical resources that do not, themselves, employ those very 
> relations? Or, are you saying that this has been shown in modern 
> philosophical logic? 
> 
> In both areas of inquiry, I do not think the matter is--by any means--somehow 
> now settled. Here, at the beginning of the 21st century, there are plenty of 
> reasons to doubt the assertions of Quine, Church, Turing, et al, on this 
> matter.
> 
> Yours,
> 
> Jeff
> 
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> 
> 
> From: Dan Everett 
> Sent: Sunday, April 21, 2019 11:47 AM
> To: Jon Alan Schmidt
> Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Symbols and Syntax (was Genuinely triadic relations, 
> laws and symbols)
>  
> Yes, Jon, but Peirce was wrong.
> 
> These lexical decompositions are done by logicians. 
> 
> Peirce unfortunately missed the boat on this and there is no solution from 
> logic, because it is logic that points out the errors of Peirce's view of 
> giving.
> 
> I will discuss this at length in my in-progress biography of Peirce, but also 
> point to the overarching utility of his view in the notion of the 
> interpretant.
> 
> He doesn't have to get everything right. The architectonic matters more than 
> a few errors in specific solutions.
> 
> Dan
> 
>> On Apr 21, 2019, at 2:44 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> 
>> Dan, List:
>> 
>> Peirce was first and foremost a logician, not a linguist; and from a 
>> strictly logical/semeiotic standpoint, the relation that we call "giving" in 
>> English is irreducibly triadic.  In fact, Peirce repeatedly held it up as a 
>> paradigmatic example of just such a relation.  Moreover, according to his 
>> classification of the sciences, the principles of the Normative 
>> Sciences--including Logic as Semeiotic--are more fundamental than those of 
>> any Special Science, including linguistics.  Hence the triadicity of the 
>> relation that we call "giving" is independent of itsexpression in English, 
>> or in any other particular language or Sign System.
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Luthera

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Symbols and Syntax (was Genuinely triadic relations, laws and symbols)

[Dan Everett]

Yes, Jon, but Peirce was wrong.

These lexical decompositions are done by logicians. 

Peirce unfortunately missed the boat on this and there is no solution from 
logic, because it is logic that points out the errors of Peirce's view of 
giving.

I will discuss this at length in my in-progress biography of Peirce, but also 
point to the overarching utility of his view in the notion of the interpretant.

He doesn't have to get everything right. The architectonic matters more than a 
few errors in specific solutions.

Dan

> On Apr 21, 2019, at 2:44 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Dan, List:
> 
> Peirce was first and foremost a logician, not a linguist; and from a strictly 
> logical/semeiotic standpoint, the relation that we call "giving" in English 
> is irreducibly triadic.  In fact, Peirce repeatedly held it up as a 
> paradigmatic example of just such a relation.  Moreover, according to his 
> classification of the sciences, the principles of the Normative 
> Sciences--including Logic as Semeiotic--are more fundamental than those of 
> any Special Science, including linguistics.  Hence the triadicity of the 
> relation that we call "giving" is independent of its expression in English, 
> or in any other particular language or Sign System.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Sun, Apr 21, 2019 at 1:31 AM Dan Everett  <mailto:danleveret...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> Folks,
> 
> Lexical semantics is a large field and there are various positions 
> specialists take on exactly how word-meanings are best to be characterized. 
> For example, most scholars (not all), argue that there is no simple verb 'to 
> give' but that this English verb is characterized by a representation along 
> the lines of:
> Anna gave Max a book.
> 
> 
> give: lambda z lambda y lambda x lamba e act(x) & become poss(y,z)(e) 
> 
> ('lambda' is of course the lambda operator)
> 
> In other words, any verb, in this case 'give' is broken down into more basic 
> components. No language is required to have a verb that is exactly like the 
> English verb 'to give' but if it does, it must be composed of these finer 
> predicates, so that the triadic semantics of 'to give' (English) is 
> derivative, not basic (though the combinations of these basic predicates in 
> this form will in fact produce a di-transitive or "triadic" syntax). 
> 
> Some linguists would refer to the number of lexical arguments as the valency 
> of the verb and the number of syntactic arguments as the transitivity of the 
> verb (noun, etc). 
> 
> And this can vary radically across languages. 
> 
> For example, in the Piraha language that I have worked on for decades, there 
> are only about 90 or so distinct verb roots (which are not to be confused 
> with verb stems, in turn not to be confused with verbs, and not to be 
> confused with lexical representations). So to produce a verb like 'bring 
> back' (corresponding roughly to a single verb such as 'return', as in 'return 
> the screwdriver when you're finished') in Piraha the actual verb might be: 
> 'go-turn-carry-aspectual distinction affixes...' (i.e. a verb stem composed 
> of several verb roots plus a number of affixes playing derivative semantic 
> roles). 
> 
> In a language like English with an extremely simple verbal morphology 
> (maximum of five forms - sing, sang, sung, sings, singing) this is 
> deceptively easy. In Spanish a verb would have 30-50 forms. But in Piraha 
> (not uncommon for polysynthetic languages of the Americas) each verb can have 
> as many as 65,000 forms (sixty-five thousand). And there simply is no way to 
> compare predicates ilke "give" one-to-one with any Piraha verb. 
> 
> If we consider a basic English-conceived/interpreted predicate like 'give' 
> then of course it is difficult to imagine that it wouldn't have three 
> arguments, e.g. a giver, a thing given, and a recipient. But this simple 
> conception does not manifest itself in all languages. So for example, 
> abstracting away from the much greater complexity of Piraha verbal 
> morphology, there simply is no simple verb 'to give' in the language. There 
> is a combination of verb roots that means, roughly, 'x transfers y to z with 
> the expectation that z will transfer b to x' That is, the concept of giving 
> requires reciprocity in Piraha (a hunter-gatherer culture). 
> 
> In the case of Amele that I mentioned earlier, there is NO verb 'to give.' 
> One can find, for example, 'John app

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Symbols and Syntax (was Genuinely triadic relations, laws and symbols)

[Dan Everett]

Thanks, Edwina. 

Here is a video of me showing a group of 500 or so linguists how to learn a 
language with no language in common: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sYpWp7g7XWU 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sYpWp7g7XWU>

The other part, the cultural and cognitive infrastructure, is even harder. That 
is really what the task boils down to - living with the people, taking notes, 
experiments, analyzing their stories, etc. It is one reason that there is no 
quick way to figure it all out. Of course, because the Pirahas speak no other 
language, this meant that I was never able to ask them to explain things to me 
in Portuguese. I had to learn their language to learn their culture and their 
culture to learn their language. 

Dan

> On Apr 21, 2019, at 9:00 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Dan, list
> 
> A really splendid argument. Many thanks.
> 
> It would also be interesting to explore how many of the hunter-gatherer 
> languages follow the Piraha linguistic format, since 'sharing' is a basic 
> socioeconomic mode in most such societies.
> 
> How easy is it then, for someone from a socioeconomic mode that functions 
> very differently from another - to not only learn a new language, but also, 
> learn the cognitive infrastructure that grounds that language?
> 
> Edwina
> 
>  
> 
> On Sun 21/04/19 2:31 AM , Dan Everett danleveret...@gmail.com sent:
> 
> Folks,
> 
> Lexical semantics is a large field and there are various positions 
> specialists take on exactly how word-meanings are best to be characterized. 
> For example, most scholars (not all), argue that there is no simple verb 'to 
> give' but that this English verb is characterized by a representation along 
> the lines of:
> 
> Anna gave Max a book.
> 
> 
> give: lambda z  lambda y lambda x lamba  e act(x) &  become poss(y,z)( e) 
> 
> ('lambda' is of course the lambda operator)
> 
> 
> In other words, any verb, in this case 'give' is broken down into more basic 
> components. No language is required to have a verb that is exactly like the 
> English verb 'to give' but if it does, it must be composed of these finer 
> predicates, so that the triadic semantics of 'to give' (English) is 
> derivative, not basic (though the combinations of these basic predicates in 
> this form will in fact produce a di-transitive or "triadic" syntax). 
> 
> Some linguists would refer to the number of lexical arguments as the valency 
> of the verb and the number of syntactic arguments as the transitivity of the 
> verb (noun, etc). 
> 
> And this can vary radically across languages. 
> 
> For example, in the Piraha language that I have worked on for decades, there 
> are only about 90 or so distinct verb roots (which are not to be confused 
> with verb stems, in turn not to be confused with verbs, and not to be 
> confused with lexical representations). So to produce a verb like 'bring 
> back' (corresponding roughly to a single verb such as 'return', as in 'return 
> the screwdriver when you're finished') in Piraha the actual verb might be: 
> 'go-turn-carry-aspectual distinction affixes...' (i.e. a verb stem composed 
> of several verb roots plus a number of affixes playing derivative semantic 
> roles). 
> 
> In a language like English with an extremely simple verbal morphology 
> (maximum of five forms - sing, sang, sung, sings, singing) this is 
> deceptively easy. In Spanish a verb would have 30-50 forms. But in Piraha 
> (not uncommon for polysynthetic languages of the Americas) each verb can have 
> as many as 65,000 forms (sixty-five thousand). And there simply is no way to 
> compare predicates ilke "give" one-to-one with any Piraha verb. 
> 
> If we consider a basic English-conceived/interpreted predicate like 'give' 
> then of course it is difficult to imagine that it wouldn't have three 
> arguments, e.g. a giver, a thing given, and a recipient. But this simple 
> conception does not manifest itself in all languages. So for example, 
> abstracting away from the much greater complexity of Piraha verbal 
> morphology, there simply is no simple verb 'to give' in the language. There 
> is a combination of verb roots that means, roughly, 'x transfers y to z with 
> the expectation that z will transfer b to x' That is, the concept of giving 
> requires reciprocity in Piraha (a hunter-gatherer culture). 
> 
> In the case of Amele that I mentioned earlier, there is NO verb 'to give.' 
> One can find, for example, 'John apple Bill' with no verb and in the right 
> context imply that 'John gave an apple to Bill.' But there is no actual verb 
> translated 'give' in the language. 
> 
> All languages are severely *underdetermined* meaning that the predicates of 
> the language do not fully 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Symbols and Syntax (was Genuinely triadic relations, laws and symbols)

[Dan Everett]

sition.  Cain, first:  that is not 
> only a Subject of the Proposition, but is the principal Subject of the 
> Assertion which a historian would naturally make.  But in the Proposition 
> Cain and Abel are, as Subjects, on one footing precisely (or almost 
> precisely, for Cain is preponderant in causality).  But besides these, 
> "killed" = committed murder upon, is a third Subject, since no study of the 
> words alone, without extraneous experience, would enable the Ad[d]ressee to 
> understand it.  What, then, is left to serve as Predicate?  Nothing but the 
> flow of causation.  It is true that we are more acquainted even with that in 
> Experience.  When we see a babe in its cradle bending its arms this way and 
> that, while a smile of exultation plays upon its features, it is making 
> acquaintance with the flow of causation.  So acquaintance with the flow of 
> causation so early as to make it familiar before speech is so far acquired 
> that an assertion can be syntactically framed, and it is embodied in the 
> syntax of every tongue.  However, it is not because of this physiological 
> fact, that it becomes proper to draw the line between Subjects and Predicate 
> here; neither is it because of the psychical fact that human minds naturally 
> think in a way broadly (i.e. a little) similar to the forms of syntax; nor is 
> it even because of the metaphysical truth, that the order of syntax is the 
> law of Time and of Becoming.  This is proved by the facts, first, that it is 
> necessary that the Reasonings by which we discover and defend the orders of 
> Causation, of human thought, of time, and of becoming, themselves presuppose 
> the recognition of the corresponding order in syntax; and secondly, by this, 
> that it has not been the order [of] time, or Causation, or the structure of 
> the human mind, nor human anatomy and physiology that have, any or all of 
> them, determined that that ought to be the order of syntax that in fact ought 
> to be so, but precisely the contrary, it is the fact that the order of Syntax 
> ought to be as in fact it ought to be that has determined, first, Real Being 
> and Time to take the same form, and then, that it should become natural to 
> the mind and should be the pattern of physical action. (R 664:10-13; 1910 Nov 
> 26-27)
>  
> It seems to me--and Peirce, apparently--that another reason why syntax 
> requires little memory is simply because it is relatively natural, generally 
> reflecting "the flow of causation" that we discover long before we achieve 
> competence in any language.  By contrast, symbols are ultimately arbitrary, 
> requiring the acquisition of myriad habits for even rudimentary employment in 
> thought and communication.
>  
> In any case, with Peirce I see the primary distinction here as being between 
> subjects that denote Objects (as Semes) and continuous predicates that 
> signify Interpretants (within Propositions).  There is no limit to the 
> potential number of different words or other symbols that we could devise and 
> memorize to serve as the former, but only a handful of syntactical 
> configurations are sufficient to express the latter, since they represent 
> indecomposable logical relations.  We can stipulate the proper linear 
> sequence of words for this purpose, often supplemented by additional words; 
> or we can adopt even more iconic Signs, such as Spots with certain 
> arrangements of Pegs attached to other Spots by means of Lines, all scribed 
> on a two-dimensional Sheet.
>  
> Regards,
>  
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 
> On Fri, Apr 19, 2019 at 1:20 PM Dan Everett  <mailto:danleveret...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> The most common word order among the world's 7000+ languages is Sub Obj Verb. 
> But I have worked on languages in the Amazon that are SOV, VSO, VOS, OSV, 
> SVO, and OVS. I have written full grammars of two of them. A propositions can 
> serve as predicates of higher propositions in some languages. Syntactic 
> variation is intense. 
>  
> On another note, neurolinguistics research by Evelina Fedorenko and her 
> colleagues at MIT's Brain and Cognitivie Sciences Department shows that 
> language networks in the brain are built primarily around words/symbols, with 
> syntax parasitic on words, which I independently predict in my book and 
> recent work on the origin of language. Also Steve Piantadosi (Berkeley 
> Psychology) has shown that all the memory needed for much of language is 
> about 1.5 megabytes, a small amount,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Genuinely triadic relations, laws and symbols

[Dan Everett]

Language is not organic chemistry.

Here is Ev's paper on the language network: 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4091770/ 
<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4091770/> (one of them)

Here is Steve's paper: 
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/03/190327134547.htm 
<https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/03/190327134547.htm>

These are pretty pristene results. 

My own work, in How Language Began and in a new paper that Larry Barham and I 
just submitted on tools and symbols in the lower paleolithic, offer similar 
evidence.

Symbols are basic. Syntax is derivative according to these research programs. I 
outline a series of grammatical steps in the book and in the paper with Barham 
that explains how this works.

Dan

> On Apr 19, 2019, at 3:50 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  
> wrote:
> 
> Dan, List:
>> On Apr 19, 2019, at 1:20 PM, Dan Everett > <mailto:danleveret...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> 
>> Also Steve Piantadosi (Berkeley Psychology) has shown that all the memory 
>> needed for much of language is about 1.5 megabytes, a small amount, with the 
>> amount of memory required for syntax neglible, more evidence that symbols 
>> drive syntax.
> 
> If this is true then it is in stark contrast with the symbolic 
> representations of organic chemistry.  The words are limited to the 92 
> elements of the table of elements and the syntax grows, very roughly 
> speaking, factorially with count of the number of symbols of molecular 
> formula and the complete graph representing all the nuclei and electrons of 
> the molecular formula.  
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry
> 
> 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Genuinely triadic relations, laws and symbols

[Dan Everett]

The most common word order among the world's 7000+ languages is Sub Obj Verb. 
But I have worked on languages in the Amazon that are SOV, VSO, VOS, OSV, SVO, 
and OVS. I have written full grammars of two of them. A propositions can serve 
as predicates of higher propositions in some languages. Syntactic variation is 
intense. 

On another note, neurolinguistics research by Evelina Fedorenko and her 
colleagues at MIT's Brain and Cognitivie Sciences Department shows that 
language networks in the brain are built primarily around words/symbols, with 
syntax parasitic on words, which I independently predict in my book and recent 
work on the origin of language. Also Steve Piantadosi (Berkeley Psychology) has 
shown that all the memory needed for much of language is about 1.5 megabytes, a 
small amount, with the amount of memory required for syntax neglible, more 
evidence that symbols drive syntax.

Dan 

> On Apr 19, 2019, at 2:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> 
> Yes, and the location of the predicate in the sentence is also interesting. 
> For example, in classical ancient Chinese, the verb was at the end [as it is 
> in Latin]. I thought this implied that whatever was going on in the full 
> sentence, i.e, subject and object, involved both as co-agents in the action. 
> What was interesting is how this ancient Chinese format eventually gave way 
> to the modern mode where the verb is between the subject and object.
> 
> Edwina
>  
> 
> On Fri 19/04/19 1:42 PM , Dan Everett danleveret...@gmail.com sent:
> 
> By the way, predicates in natural languages can vary for cultural reasons. 
> For example, "to give" in most languages is triadic, but it is dyadic in 
> Amele of New Guinea (as I discuss in Language: The Cultural Tool).
> 
> Dan
> 
>> On Apr 19, 2019, at 1:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> Edwina, List:
>> 
>> Giving and representing/mediating are both triadic relations, but they are 
>> not the same triadic relation; in fact, they are not even isomorphic triadic 
>> relations.  I suppose that instead we can compare giving to determining, 
>> which better reflects "the flow of causation" in semeiosis--Sue stands in 
>> the relation of giving, of a book, to a child; the Object stands in the 
>> relation of determining, of a Sign, to an Interpretant.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> This treats determining as triadic, rather than dyadic, consistent with 
>> Peirce's definition that a Sign "is both determined by the object relatively 
>> to the interpretant, and determines the interpretant in reference to the 
>> object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the 
>> object through the mediation of this 'sign'" (EP 2:410; 1907). Notice, 
>> though, that the book corresponds to the Sign, rather than to either the 
>> Object or the Interpretant--which makes sense, since a book is a medium for 
>> the communication of a text from one person to another, and a Sign is a 
>> medium for the communication of a Form from an Object to an Interpretant.
>> 
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
>> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
>> On Fri, Apr 19, 2019 at 10:35 AM Edwina Taborsky > 
>> wrote:
>> John, list
>> 
>> What if one were to diagram your suggestion of: Sue gives child a book - into
>> 
>> DO=bookwhich is then transformed from its identity and domain [a 
>> bookstore], by the semiosic action of the triadic Sign, as held by the 
>> Representamen-and-its action, which is: Sue-Who-Gives into
>> 
>> DI= book, which is now in a different domain and identity: that of the Child 
>> [who is also a semiosic triad which includes a Representamen].
>> 
>> Edwina
>> 
>> 
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>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Genuinely triadic relations, laws and symbols

[Dan Everett]

By the way, predicates in natural languages can vary for cultural reasons. For 
example, "to give" in most languages is triadic, but it is dyadic in Amele of 
New Guinea (as I discuss in Language: The Cultural Tool).

Dan

> On Apr 19, 2019, at 1:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Edwina, List:
> 
> Giving and representing/mediating are both triadic relations, but they are 
> not the same triadic relation; in fact, they are not even isomorphic triadic 
> relations.  I suppose that instead we can compare giving to determining, 
> which better reflects "the flow of causation" in semeiosis--Sue stands in the 
> relation of giving, of a book, to a child; the Object stands in the relation 
> of determining, of a Sign, to an Interpretant.
> 
> 
> 
> This treats determining as triadic, rather than dyadic, consistent with 
> Peirce's definition that a Sign "is both determined by the object relatively 
> to the interpretant, and determines the interpretant in reference to the 
> object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the 
> object through the mediation of this 'sign'" (EP 2:410; 1907). Notice, 
> though, that the book corresponds to the Sign, rather than to either the 
> Object or the Interpretant--which makes sense, since a book is a medium for 
> the communication of a text from one person to another, and a Sign is a 
> medium for the communication of a Form from an Object to an Interpretant.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> 
> On Fri, Apr 19, 2019 at 10:35 AM Edwina Taborsky  > wrote:
> John, list
> 
> What if one were to diagram your suggestion of: Sue gives child a book - into
> 
> DO=bookwhich is then transformed from its identity and domain [a 
> bookstore], by the semiosic action of the triadic Sign, as held by the 
> Representamen-and-its action, which is: Sue-Who-Gives into
> 
> DI= book, which is now in a different domain and identity: that of the Child 
> [who is also a semiosic triad which includes a Representamen].
> 
> Edwina
> 
> 
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> 
> 
> 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Genuinely triadic relations, laws and symbols

[Dan Everett]

Thanks very much, Ben.

If it is 60% drawings, then we are down to 10 million words. 

I suspect the answer is somewhere in the middle of 25 and 10 million.

Dan

> On Apr 17, 2019, at 7:43 PM, Ben Udell  wrote:
> 
> Gary, Dan,
> 
> The 100,000-page estimate comes from Joe Ransdell.  
> 
> The manuscript material now (1997) comes to more than a hundred thousand 
> pages. These contain many pages of no philosophical interest, but the number 
> of pages on philosophy certainly number much more than half of that. Also, a 
> significant but unknown number of manuscripts have been lost.
> 
> "Some Leading Ideas of Peirce's Semiotic", end note 2 
> http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/leading.htm#note2 
>  , 
> 1997 revision of 1977 version in Semiotica 19, 1977, pp. 157–178.
> 
> However, someone wrote that around 60% of Peirce's surviving pages contain 
> mostly of drawings. I can't remember who said that, but I think that it was 
> somebody involved with the German project of dealing with Peirce's drawings . 
> Aud Sissel Hoel didn't say it in her April 2, 2010 blog post on the Peirce 
> Archive project at Picture Act and Embodiment 
> 
> https://web.archive.org/web/20110707185056/http://www.audsisselhoel.com/wordpress/?p=69
>  
> 
> Maybe it was in one of the PDFs for Das bildnerische Denken: Charles S. 
> Peirce.   [Visual Thinking: Charles S. Peirce] that the publisher took offline
> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/newbooks.htm#engel_queisner_viola 
> 
> Best, Ben
> 
> On 4/17/2019 5:15 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>> Dan, List,
>> 
>> Thanks, Dan. I had a feeling that if anyone would take up that 
>> challenge--and meet it--it would be you. I would have expected a very large 
>> number of words, but not that large a number! Btw, how did you come to 
>> assume 100,000 pages? Have I seen that estimate somewhere before?
>> 
>> OK, here's an absolutely impossible back of an envelope calculation to try 
>> to estimate: How many diagrams did Peirce produce? Not just EGs, but all 
>> sorts of diagrams. This is impossible to calculate, I would imagine, because 
>> some things which, while they would appear to be in verbal form may, in 
>> fact, diagrams of a sort. In addition, some diagrams are so complex that 
>> they may include other diagrams: diagrams within diagrams.
>> 
>> Additionally, one might also try to calculate how many words accompanied 
>> those many diagrams in the interest of explaining aspects of them?
>> 
>> I suppose with a great deal of research one could sort of estimate the 
>> number, but perhaps not. Meanwhile, I know that you, Dan, are currently busy 
>> researching other matters of considerably more importance. So, I'd like to 
>> immediately discourage you from even thinking about attempting these 
>> additional calculations!
>> 
>> Best,
>> 
>> Gary
>> 
>> 
>> Gary Richmond
>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
>> Communication Studies
>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 4:56 PM Daniel L Everett > > wrote:
>> A back of the envelope calculation is that CSP wrote app 25 million words. I 
>> assume 10 pages at 25 lines to a page 10 words to a line. 
>> 
>> But in that neighborhood. Some published papers were much denser some 
>> handwritten pages much less. 
>> 
>> Dan
>> 
>> Sent from my iPhone
>> 
>> On Apr 17, 2019, at 16:47, Gary Richmond > > wrote:
>> 
>>> John, Edwina, Jeff, List,
>>> 
>>> John wrote:
>>> 
>>> JS: Peirce frequently said that he thinks in diagrams and that he has
>>> considerable difficulty in translating his thoughts into words.
>>> 
>>> I'm not sure how frequently he said it, but Peirce certainly did say it, 
>>> and no doubt he thought essentially in diagrams. There are several on this 
>>> list, including me, who have commented that they too tend to think in 
>>> diagrams, and this may not be as rare an occurrence as I once thought it 
>>> was. On the other hand, it is possible that few have thought so completely, 
>>> deeply and well in diagrams as did CSP, and his creation and development of 
>>> Existential Graphs can surely be offered into 'evidence' as 'Exhibit 1'.  
>>> 
>>> On the other hand, Peirce certainly wrote a tremendous amount of words! 
>>> (I'm sure there is someone on the list who can quickly calculate 
>>> approximately how many just in the sources available to us in print.)
>>> 
>>> JS: When Peirce or anybody else is doing diagrammatic reasoning, some
>>> words may be helpful as explanations.  But as soon as we are clear
>>> about what the features of the diagram refer to, the words become
>>> irrelevant.  If the words create confusion, replace them with better
>>> words.  But when 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Income for Benjamin Peirce

[Dan Everett]

Sorry, please forget this posting. 

Figured it out.

> On Apr 16, 2019, at 4:22 PM, Dan Everett  wrote:
> 
> Folks,
> 
> I wonder if someone on this list could help me out. I have gone through Sarah 
> Hunt Mills Peirce's family ledger for 1858 and totalled up all expenditures I 
> could find, from groceries to rent. These expenses look consistent across the 
> years she kept the ledger, but I have not added up all months' expenditures. 
> These expenditures come out to (very roughly) $8,000 per year in 1858 dollars 
> or roughly $240,000.00 in 2019 dollars.
> 
> However, although Benjamin Peirce was one of Harvard's highest paid 
> professors (he earned more than Asa Gray and Louis Agassiz), earning only 
> $300 per annum less than James Walker, Harvard's president, Harvard still 
> only lists his annual salary as $2,200 (rougly $60,000.00 in 2019 dollars). 
> 
> Peirce was not yet the head of the Coast Survey, so he did not have that 
> income. I am sure he must have had other sources of income, but so far have 
> not been able to identify any.
> 
> I am wondering if anyone on this list might know of non-Harvard income that 
> Benjamin and Sarah had at this time (Charley was 19).
> 
> Sarah came from a well-to-do family, but I don't think that accounts for the 
> huge discrepancy.
> 
> One possibility that I am looking into is that Harvard shared income taken in 
> by departments with their professors, on top of their salaries. 
> 
> Other than that, I am somewhat stymied. 
> 
> Any suggestions?
> 
> Dan Everett
> 
> 
> **
> Dan Everett
> daneverettbooks.com <http://daneverettbooks.com/>
> 
> 
> 
> 


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[PEIRCE-L] Income for Benjamin Peirce

[Dan Everett]

Folks,

I wonder if someone on this list could help me out. I have gone through Sarah 
Hunt Mills Peirce's family ledger for 1858 and totalled up all expenditures I 
could find, from groceries to rent. These expenses look consistent across the 
years she kept the ledger, but I have not added up all months' expenditures. 
These expenditures come out to (very roughly) $8,000 per year in 1858 dollars 
or roughly $240,000.00 in 2019 dollars.

However, although Benjamin Peirce was one of Harvard's highest paid professors 
(he earned more than Asa Gray and Louis Agassiz), earning only $300 per annum 
less than James Walker, Harvard's president, Harvard still only lists his 
annual salary as $2,200 (rougly $60,000.00 in 2019 dollars). 

Peirce was not yet the head of the Coast Survey, so he did not have that 
income. I am sure he must have had other sources of income, but so far have not 
been able to identify any.

I am wondering if anyone on this list might know of non-Harvard income that 
Benjamin and Sarah had at this time (Charley was 19).

Sarah came from a well-to-do family, but I don't think that accounts for the 
huge discrepancy.

One possibility that I am looking into is that Harvard shared income taken in 
by departments with their professors, on top of their salaries. 

Other than that, I am somewhat stymied. 

Any suggestions?

Dan Everett


**
Dan Everett
daneverettbooks.com





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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recovery from blindness (was Phaneroscopy and logic

[Dan Everett]

Great points, John. 

I call Peirce’s notion of “innate” “phylogentic habits.” (I think he says 
something similar)

But unlike what a number of people mean by “innate” today, Peirce’s philosophy 
doesn’t require innate conceptual content. That would not be in great conflict 
with his system, if evidence were there, but his system requires only general 
kinds of emotions, recognitions, general biases, to work.

Yes, too bad Kant couldn’t have read Darwin. I imagine he would have done great 
things with those ideas. 

Dan

Sent from my iPad

> On Apr 9, 2019, at 9:51 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Jeff and Dan,
> 
> We have to distinguish "a priori" in a logical sense from "innate" in
> a biological sense.  Peirce interpreted the word 'innate' as learned
> from the experience of previous generations.  That may be a priori
> for an individual, but it's a posteriori for the species.
> 
> JBD
>> It is worth noting that from early on (e.g., see "Questions Concerning
>> Certain Faculties Claimed for Man"), Peirce interprets Kant's account
>> of our experience of space in a similar way
> 
> Yes, but he was critical about assuming synthetic a priori assumptions
> without any justification.  Note the footnote on EP 1:14,
>> Kant's successors, however, have not been content with his doctrine.
>> Nor ought they to have been... The problem is... how universal propo-
>> sitions appearing to be synthetical can be evolved by thought alone.
> 
> In a letter to William James in 1905 (NEM 3:813-814), he wrote
>> our notion of time as a _single_ continuum, so that tomorrow morning
>> is a sort of proper name (which daily changes its denotation).  How
>> fundamental Kant made this circumstance in his philosophy without
>> the slightest attempt to analyze it! ... What more did Kant mean
>> by calling time _Anschauung_? ... he never that I remember offers the
>> least proof of it; and I should like to know how he supposed himself
>> to know this.
> 
> DE
>> Kant's notion of a priori categories are perhaps best translated in
>> my terms into the idea of an inborn ability of humans to generalize
>> and learn by any means.
> 
> Yes.  But in reading Kant and Peirce, it's important to remember
> Darwin (1859).  Kant published his Critique in 1787, and Peirce
> wrote those criticisms in 1868 and 1905.
> 
> Does Smyth say anything about these issues?
> 
> John
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recovery from blindness (was Phaneroscopy and logic

[Dan Everett]

John,

Great stuff. 

There is a huge amount of information that Kant was wrong about these things. 
Someone today mentioned Michael Polyani’s work on personal knowledge/tacit 
knowledge. And, at the risk of being a bore, there is my book, Dark Matter of 
the Mind: 
https://www.amazon.com/Dark-Matter-Mind-Articulated-Unconscious/dp/022607076X 
,
 in which I survey a lot of the literature, proposing my own theories (not as 
much interaction with Peirce as there should have been, I am sure). 

There is also a point that Kant missed entirely and that Peirce had little 
chance to observe: cross-cultural variation. 

Dan


> On Apr 8, 2019, at 11:17 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> This morning, I remembered some case studies of people who were
> blind from early childhood and later recovered their sight.
> 
> Those studies cast doubt on Kant's claim that people have a
> complete innate theory of space and time.  The brain may have
> innate structure that facilitates learning about space and time,
> but a lot of experience is necessary to fill in the details.
> 
> For example, Sydney Bradford lost his sight at age 10 months,
> went to a school for the blind, and had a successful career
> as a machinist.  He lived independently, could make his way
> through traffic, and took public transportation to work.
> 
> Then at age 52, he had an operation that restored his sight.
> Instead of being a confident, independent blind man, he became
> a fearful, depressed man, who was terrified of crossing a street
> in traffic, even with a friend holding his arm.
> 
> For a Wikipedia article about Sydney B. and others, see
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recovery_from_blindness
> 
> For a 44-page article with much more detail about SB, see
> http://www.richardgregory.org/papers/recovery_blind/recovery-from-early-blindness.pdf
> 
> By the way, that site has links to other articles by Richard G.
> For example, see the attached "impossible" figure.  But it's
> possible to construct an actual 3D object that looks like that.
> See the article 
> http://www.richardgregory.org/papers/brainmodels/illusions-and-brain-models_all.htm
> 
> Peirce wrote a lot about illusions, and he would have loved to see
> that object.  It has implications about form, index, and percepts.
> 
> John
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

[Dan Everett]

John,

I agree with you on this. A significant difference between Peirce’s a priori 
and Kant’s is that Kant’s is necessarily not derived from experience. Peirce 
did, as you say, allow that some things might be prior to experience, but one 
gets the feeling that he would be quite happy if it could be shown that they 
were not, apart from logical constraints. One strong difference between 
Peirce’s use of the term “universal grammar” and Chomsky’s later use of the 
same phrase (going back to the Modistae, as readers of this list know) is that 
for Peirce universal/speculative grammar is neither nature nor nurture. I think 
that he would have been pleased with any demonstration that showed the same for 
non-logically required categories. 

I discuss Kant’s work in my book, Dark Matter of the Mind, where I argue that 
there is no innate knowledge. 

“Duty” “respect” even things like colors are largely cultural constructs, in a 
way that I believe fits in quite well with Peirce’s phaneroscopy.

I am not aware of any statement in Peirce’s architectonic where innate, a 
priori knowledge plays a crucial causal role for building his philosophy. 

Like Hume’s use of “instinct” Peirce’s use of that term (or phylogentic habits) 
does not necessarily support nativism as widely conceived in contemporary 
literature. 

- Dan

Sent from my iPad

> On Apr 7, 2019, at 3:29 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
>> On 4/7/2019 1:59 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
>> As an example of an /a priori/ element in moral cognition, consider the role 
>> of the /feeling/ of respect in deliberation about the what is required as a 
>> matter of duty. As an example of an a priori element in aesthetic judgment, 
>> consider the condition of seeking harmony in the experience of the 
>> beautiful. As an example of an /a priori/ element in mathematical cognition, 
>> consider the role of the intuition of the whole of ideal space in 
>> geometrical reasoning.
>> In each case, I tend to think that Peirce agrees with Kant that these are /a 
>> priori/ and not merely /a posteriori/ elements in our practical, aesthetic 
>> and mathematical cognition.
> 
> That's an interesting argument.  But I recall something Peirce said
> about that issue (but it would require quite a bit of search to find
> exactly where).
> 
> He said that Kant's Critik drV was his basic training in philosophy
> (when he was 16).  But he diverged from Kant about what is a priori.
> Peirce admitted that there are probably some innate tendencies and
> preferences that determine value judgments.  But experience (i.e.,
> informal phaneroscopy) is essential to develop the details.
> 
> John
> 
> 
> 
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> 
> 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Dan Everett]

I agree with Edwina on ad hominem arguments (based on a person’s worth or 
unworth in a given subject). But as I have said before here, one must be able 
to distinguish interpretations based on their practical results. All terms have 
to be interpreted in light of the pragmatic maxim. Straying away from that 
moves into Popperian concerns about essentialism, which is usually pointless. 

A terminological dispute that cannot be resolved via an experiment or via some 
other form of data  is of lesser importance. 

Dan

> On Apr 1, 2019, at 8:37 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> JAS - with regard to your post - who do you think should be the authorities 
> who decide on, as you say, what is 'an accurate understanding of Peirce's 
> work'??? Is there some kind of - oh, upper level hierarchy of Peircean 
> scholars, who are set up [how? by whom?]  to decide on what is 'such an 
> accurate understanding"??? What happens if these elites decide that your 
> research 'does not show an accurate understanding'? Is it deemed - 
> 'unPeircean'?
> 
> As for newcomers to Peirce's work, don't you think that they should be 
> allowed to read and interpret Peirce's work on their own - rather than being 
> told to accept The Right Way To Think About Peirce by this set of assumed 
> Peircean authorities?
> 
> And as for disagreement - as I've always said - I'm fine with that. That's 
> the whole point of a list where we are all equal explorers. However, being 
> told that one's views are 'unPeircean' is not disagreement. It is the setting 
> up of one person as the Ultimate Authority/Gatekeeper - and the other person 
> is defined as an ignoramus.
> 
> Edwina
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
> On Mon 01/04/19 7:43 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com 
>  sent:
> 
> Edwina, List:
> 
> ET:  ... IF this particular Peirce list itself has no interest in examining 
> how Peirce's work can be used in the pragmatic 'real' world - then, why am I 
> even bothering to wish such a thing?
> 
> The antecedent of this conditional is false.  Plenty of List participants 
> have expressed their desire to foster such applications, and I have actually 
> done so myself within my profession of structural engineering; but the 
> starting point must be an accurate understanding of Peirce's work.
> 
> ET:  I don't like to see Peirce 'publicized' so to speak, via an important 
> list - as functioning only in that one area that this small group are focused 
> on.  Peircean semiosis is much more than this - and I don't think we should 
> accept such a reduction.
> 
> What is posted on-List is whatever List members freely choose to post.  Those 
> of us with strong interest in Peirce's philosophical views just happen to be 
> the ones who post the most these days; and we should not be deterred from 
> continuing to have such discussions, either.  There is plenty of room on the 
> List for all kinds of topics, as long as they pertain in some way to Peirce's 
> thought--which is not much of a limitation, given the breadth of his 
> competence.
> 
> ET:  Furthermore - newcomers to Peirce should, I think, be made aware of the 
> pragmatic functionality of the Peircean analytic frame - as I have outlined - 
> and how it can be extended, as Peirce himself did, into examining the real 
> existential world.
> 
> Newcomers to Peirce should first be made aware of Peirce's own analytic 
> frame, including his typically very precise terminology.  Then they will be 
> in a position to compare it with various adjustments and alternatives, such 
> as what you have outlined.
> 
> ET:  So- just because I am met with either silence or hostility by a few ...
> 
> Disagreement is not hostility.  This is an open forum, where anyone is 
> welcome to state any opinion related to Peirce--as long as they do so 
> respectfully, and are willing and able to back it up with evidence.  For 
> example, I have repeatedly expressed and defended my opinion that some of 
> what you characterize as "the Peircean analytic frame" is inconsistent with 
> Peirce's own texts.  I stand by that opinion, which is not an insult--after 
> all, I have acknowledged that some of  my own current views about Speculative 
> Grammar are not identical to Peirce's.
> 
> I have every right to compare what anyone else writes with what Peirce wrote, 
> and then to point out what I see as obvious discrepancies--and others have 
> every right to do the same with what I write.  In fact, I see that as a major 
> purpose of the List--enabling participants to compare notes, and hopefully 
> help each other come to a better understanding of Peirce.  No one is 
> infallible, including Peirce himself, as he would have been the first to 
> insist; and accordingly, no one should block the way of inquiry by treating 
> their own pronouncements as somehow immune from well-founded criticism.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Dan Everett]

This seems very exciting to me, Edwina. It fits exactly my own view of Peirce 
as coming up with ideas for empirical purposes. Even if someone were to think 
that you were stretching Peirce’s words (I don’t), it wouldn’t change the 
usefulness of what you are doing, I suspect. 

Thanks for sharing this stuff.

Dan

> On Apr 1, 2019, at 1:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> I'm continuing with my interest in the pragmatics of Peircean semiosis; that 
> is, the use of the Peircean analytic infrastructure to examine the dynamic 
> operations within the organic chemical, the biological, the societal 
> [economic systems, population behaviour] - and the cognitive  [which includes 
> AI].
> 
> Basically, it's all about 'information processing' , which includes the 
> self-organization of an organism's capacity and actions of knowledge 
> development and maintenance, , adaptation of knowledge and behaviour, 
> anticipation tactics, entropy problems and so on.
> 
> Peirce provided us with an analytic infrastructure than enables us to examine 
> the complexity within these actions. That is, his basic informational format 
> is the semiosic triad of O-R-I, BUT, this triad is further broken down into 
> more intricate 'nodal sites', and we end up with six: DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. Such 
> a framework enables more information transformation at each nodal site.
> 
> In addition - Peirce provided the three categories of Firstness, Secondness 
> and Thirdness - which are modes of organization of data/information. BUT 
> again, he increased the complexity capacity of these three modes by 
> introducing their so-called 'degenerate' forms: So- we have 1-1, 2-2 AND 2-1. 
> Then, we have 3-3 AND 3-1 and 3-2. Note that Thirdness, the action of 
> knowledge storage has THREE methods to carry out this action: iconic, 
> indexical and symbolic. That's a powerful tool.
> 
> Then, there are the ten basic classes of Signs - [2:254] - which explain the 
> triads from the simple ''feeling' to the complex cognitive.  Put this all 
> together and I maintain that Peirce has provided a powerful analytic 
> framework for examining the dynamics - and it IS a dynamical operation - of 
> information generation, adaptation, evolution and storage. These can, I 
> suggest, be moved into the broader scientific world - and would be, I think, 
> of great benefit.
> 
> I'd like to refer to two articles as examples of how this Peircean framework 
> could be put to use. I provide examples from  two reputable journals: 
> Biosystems and Entropy. I note that neither deal with self-published works; 
> the articles must go through a peer-review and revision process.
> 
> The first article, from Biosystems, refers to the analogy between the 
> biological realm and the work being done in AI.The focus is on 'Anticipation' 
> - which is an ability generated by the mode of Thirdness. Understanding this 
> mode and that there are THREE modes of Thirdness [which I have elsewhere 
> referred to as strong and weak anticipation] would be, I suggest, of great 
> benefit in the development of AI.
> 
> The second article, from Entropy, also refers to the realm of Thirdness - to 
> enable 'Interpretants/Understanding'. Again, this work sets up the act of 
> 'anticipation' - and again, is focused on the development of AI.
> 
> Essentially, my suggestion is that the complex framework of Peircean semiosis 
> - with those Six nodal sites, those Six modal actions and ten classes - 
> provides a powerful tool for the examination of complex processes in the real 
> pragmatic world.
> 
> Edwina
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 1]Anticipation: Beyond synthetic biology and cognitive robotics
> 
> Author links open overlay panelSlawomir J. Nasuto 
> Yoshikatsu
>  Hayashi 
> 
> https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biosystems.2016.07.011 
> 
> open access
> Abstract
> The aim of this paper is to propose that current robotic 
> 
>  technologies cannot have intentional states any more than is feasible within 
> the sensorimotor variant of embodied cognition. It argues that anticipation 
> is an emerging concept that can provide a bridge between both the deepest 
> philosophical theories about the nature of life and cognition and the 
> empirical biological and cognitive sciences steeped in reductionist and 
> Newtonian conceptions of causality 
> .
>  
> 
> 2] The Understanding Capacity and Information Dynamics in the Human Brain
> Yan M. Yufik  
> <>
> Virtual Structures Research, Inc., Potomac, MD 20854, USA
> Received: 23 December 2018 / Revised: 8 March 2019 / 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The pragmatics of Peirce

[Dan Everett]

I agree with Edwina . Peirce himself left strong indications that some of his 
finer terminological distinctions were likely to be unimportant for research 
purposes, which was his main concern. 

Always the point was to use his ideas to do empirical work.

The kind of article that Edwina links to is a beautiful example of the kind of 
thing that would have really interested Peirce. 

I think of Peircean terminology as a beanstalk he planted. It grew far too 
large in many ways. But the science, the math, the logic, these are the things 
of true lasting importance. 

Dan 

Sent from my iPad

> On Mar 30, 2019, at 9:45 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> In my view, the basis of Peirce is not which term is to be used when and 
> where - although I acknowledge that such a descriptive outline can be 
> fascinating for some - but my view is that Peirce is really 'all about 
> pragmatics'; i.e., the powerful functionality of his analytic framework when 
> used in examining and explaining our real world, its operation and our 
> interactions with that world. This analytic framework - which functions 
> regardless of the terms used - is, to me, 'the basic Peirce' - and can be of 
> great insight in many disciplines.
> 
>  Here is an example. My minimal computer skills didn't allow me to copy more 
> than once - so, I've left out the vital title and authors. It's in the online 
> journal Entropy. The link below should get anyone interested to the site. My 
> point is NOT to open discussion on the actual article - but to show how the 
> Peircean analytic framework, which to me, consists of that dynamic triad 
> [O-R-I] with its subsets and the powerful three categories -  is the basic 
> pragmatic infrastructure of our entire world.
> 
> The article below is about information dynamics - and - note the terms of 
> 'majority-logic decoding' [another term for 3ns???], and 'single unit 
> transformations' [2ns???]...and entropy [1ns??] ….And non-equilibrium  
> dynamics [the triadic semiosic process??]
> 
> ""We investigate the performance of majority-logic decoding in both 
> reversible and finite-time information erasure processes performed on 
> macroscopic bits that contain N microscopic binary units. While we show that 
> for reversible erasure protocols single-unit transformations are more 
> efficient than majority-logic decoding, the latter is found to offer several 
> benefits for finite-time erasure processes: Both the minimal erasure duration 
> for a given erasure and the minimal erasure error for a given erasure 
> duration are reduced, if compared to a single unit. Remarkably, the 
> majority-logic decoding is also more efficient in both the small-erasure 
> error and fast-erasure region. These benefits are also preserved under the 
> optimal erasure protocol that minimizes the dissipated heat. Our work 
> therefore shows that majority-logic decoding can lift the 
> precision-speed-efficiency trade-off in information erasure processes. View 
> Full-Text
> 
> Keywords: finite-time information erasure; majority-logic decoding; 
> nonequilibrium thermodynamics
> 
> Edwina
> 
> 
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> 
> 
> 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The danger of destroying Peirce's semeiotic (was Ambiguities...

[Dan Everett]

This has been a useful discussion (not that it should end of course). 

Larry Barham (University of Liverpool, Department of Archaeology) and I have 
finished a long paper (just submitted) on the evidence that lower Paleolithic 
tools manufactured by Homo Erectus were simultaneously icons, indexes, and 
symbols. We then argue that if that is correct they had language (since syntax 
is itself a combination of icon, index, and symbol + a varied range of 
computational properties). 

Peirce used the term Universal Grammar in 1865 and his version of UG (like 
Chomsky’s nearly a century later) had recursion. The difference is that 
Peirce’s recursion was semantic (interpretants of interpretants)  whereas 
Chomsky’s is syntactic. Peirce’s recursion works better for understanding a 
number of modern languages, as well as language evolution (I and a co-author 
point this out in a review article to appear in Language). 

Understanding the various nuances of his work is therefore vital to grasping 
its contemporary significance (as readers here know) - in some ways especially 
for understanding language and its evolution -  and I am grateful to this list 
for continuing to host such illuminating discussions.

Dan


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