Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists
Dear Jon & everyone following this string, You ask what I mean by originalism and endism in the context of practical deliberation. Quick review of where we’re at...Science is an open system, based on probabilities. And, according to Peirce, the evolving practice of science is guided by three sentiments. As experimenters share their results, they must first have a genuine interest—call it charity--toward the community of experimenters. Secondly, to establish her theory, a scientist must exhibit a kind of faith or devotion to having her results corroborated by other scientists. And thirdly, if those results continue to hold ad infinitum, as the scientist hopes, we say her theory is true. One of the things that stirred me most when I first started reading Peirce’s account of the scientific method was not only that the practice of science extends infinitely into the future as hypotheses continue to be (dis)confirmed, but that it also has no beginning. “This ideal first is the particular thing-in-itself, the absolute and unchanging truth of the matter. It does not exist as such. That is, there is no thing or fact which is in-itself in the sense of not being relative to mind, though things which are relative to the mind doubtless are, apart from that relation.” (I apologize I don’t have the paragraph number--I’m away from my materials at the moment—but it’s CP5.3teens) Not only does the practice of science extend infinitely into the future as hypotheses continue to be (dis)confirmed, but it also has no beginning. Even the most primitive of first conceptions have prototypes, precedents, and histories; there are bundles of shared interests, habits and commitments that inform them. And by dint of these factors upon it, the hopeful initiative with which anyone might endeavor to reiterate an action or thought she takes as primeval—however pure her method of practical deliberation--can only serve to vary it, and thereby bury aboriginality. It’s by weighing the relevance of past precedents and others’ interests to our needs that we can create our best choices. It seems to me crucial to pragmatism to grok not only that there is no scientific practice independent of charitable, devoted, and hopeful theory, but there is also no theory independent of the practices that inform it. Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD ListeningIsTheKey.com 303 747 4449  > On 21 Apr 2023, at 7:49 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Martin, List: > > Indeed, I have argued in publications about structural engineering > (https://www.structuremag.org/?p=10373) and cognitive mathematics > (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44982-7_25-1) that the logic of inquiry as > explicated by Peirce can be adapted to outline the logic of ingenuity that > engineers use rigorously and everyone uses informally for practical > deliberation--imagining possibilities, assessing alternatives, and choosing > one of them to actualize. > > Could you please elaborate on your last statement below? I am not sure > exactly what you mean by "originalism" and "endism" in this context. > > Thanks, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Thu, Apr 20, 2023 at 8:34 PM Martin W. Kettelhut <mailto:mkettel...@msn.com>> wrote: >> Thank you, Jon. You nailed the essence of the inquiry in leadership I’m >> conducting. >> >> Which leads me to say, more generally that whether we’re looking at life as >> consumers or voters, family- or community members, and we want to go about >> it pragmatically, then we want to about it as inquirers, i.e. employing the >> scientific method, and for Peirce: >> >> To inquire into the true nature of reality, you’ve got to have genuine >> (charitable) interest in the results others get running the same experiments >> you do. If your findings are unique, then they cannot be considered >> generally true. A business, too, is an experiment of sorts, and as business >> people we must ask, “What is the impact my work makes on the community?" >> >> We must also have faith that our discoveries will be corroborated by others. >> This means that, e.g. in disputes, it’s more productive to focus on seeking >> to understand, rather than being quarrelsome. >> >> And it is in the nature of pragmatist inquiry to hope that our findings will >> continue to be (dis)confirmed ad infinitum, i.e. that they are real. So we >> need to watch our tendency to both originalism and endism. >> >> With respect, >> >> Martin > _ _ _ _
Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists
oward some describable condition of >> things. These thinkers consequently prescribe for us what they consider as >> an infallible recipe for being happy, if one only has the strength of mind >> to take the medicine, namely, to bring your desires into conformity with the >> general course of nature. ... Since the maxim of happiness is to recognize >> and accept the truth, they declare that contempt for the ego and love for >> the community of soul is the truest and happiest sentiment. (R 953, no date) >> >> This might be the closest that Peirce ever comes to endorsing a version of >> natural law theory, especially in conjunction with my suggestion that the >> complete revelation of God is the overall final interpretant of the entire >> universe as a sign, i.e., the "describable condition of things" toward which >> "there is a general tendency throughout the universe." Accordingly, "to >> bring your desires into conformity with the general course of nature" would >> then amount to bringing your desires into conformity with the revealed >> character of God Himself, along with your actions and beliefs. >> >> Regarding leadership, I think that it makes a lot of sense to frame it as >> drawing followers toward a designated goal as a final cause (3ns), instead >> of the all-too-common approach of pushing them toward it as an efficient >> cause (2ns). This allows appropriate flexibility in the means that they can >> employ to reach the specified end, as opposed to dictating every step along >> the way. >> >> Thanks, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> >> On Thu, Apr 20, 2023 at 10:14 AM Martin W. Kettelhut > <mailto:mkettel...@msn.com>> wrote: >>> I appreciate your response, Gary. >>> >>> Yes, serving our world as pragmatists is fundamentally about leading our >>> lives as expressions of the summum bonum, and the passages from Peirce’s >>> papers rooting the logic of probability in the "social impulse” are at the >>> core of the book I’m writing on leadership as triadically relational (vs >>> leadership as traditionally conceived, namely as characteristics of an >>> individual): >>> >>> Leader (qua essential way of being) - Follower(s)/Led (qua actual object) - >>> Future (qua indeterminate interpretant). >>> >>> I’m a big fan of your and Ben’s chapter in "Peirce in His Own Words" on >>> this topic. It’s an inspiration for my book, in fact. >>> >>> I’d be honored if given the opportunity at some point to offer a >>> presentation on the book I’m writing, working title: "Listening for >>> Leadership: Three Essential Sentiments [Love, Faith, Hope]." >>> >>> Yours sincerely, >>> >>> Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD >>> ListeningIsTheKey.com >>> 303 747 4449 >>>> On 19 Apr 2023, at 11:04 PM, Gary Richmond >>> <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Martin, List, >>>> >>>> Thanks for joining our 10 minute thesis presentation this past Saturday >>>> and for your post to Peirce-L today. >>>> >>>> I think that your suggestion that "there’s a. . . fundamental and urgent >>>> question to ask ourselves about how to insinuate realism in a >>>> nominalist/individualist world" points to perhaps the most urgent task for >>>> pragmatists, most certainly for those of a Peircean stripe. >>>> >>>> Your question seems to point to a kind of decision we need to make as to >>>> how we ought conduct ourselves, not only in conferences and discussion >>>> forums and the like but, perhaps especially, in our quotidian lives. On >>>> Peirce's esthetic theory, this would represent the employment of a form of >>>> the summum bonum, this in conjunction with his ethical theory which >>>> includes making a decision to make that a habit of one's life. If we can >>>> do that, then perhaps we can hope to begin to personally model that kind >>>> of behavior in our scientific and philosophic work, as well as in our >>>> collegial, familial and work lives. >>>> >>>> The goal woul
Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists
This might be the closest that Peirce ever comes to endorsing a version of > natural law theory, especially in conjunction with my suggestion that the > complete revelation of God is the overall final interpretant of the entire > universe as a sign, i.e., the "describable condition of things" toward which > "there is a general tendency throughout the universe." Accordingly, "to bring > your desires into conformity with the general course of nature" would then > amount to bringing your desires into conformity with the revealed character > of God Himself, along with your actions and beliefs. > > Regarding leadership, I think that it makes a lot of sense to frame it as > drawing followers toward a designated goal as a final cause (3ns), instead of > the all-too-common approach of pushing them toward it as an efficient cause > (2ns). This allows appropriate flexibility in the means that they can employ > to reach the specified end, as opposed to dictating every step along the way. > > Thanks, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Thu, Apr 20, 2023 at 10:14 AM Martin W. Kettelhut <mailto:mkettel...@msn.com>> wrote: >> I appreciate your response, Gary. >> >> Yes, serving our world as pragmatists is fundamentally about leading our >> lives as expressions of the summum bonum, and the passages from Peirce’s >> papers rooting the logic of probability in the "social impulse” are at the >> core of the book I’m writing on leadership as triadically relational (vs >> leadership as traditionally conceived, namely as characteristics of an >> individual): >> >> Leader (qua essential way of being) - Follower(s)/Led (qua actual object) - >> Future (qua indeterminate interpretant). >> >> I’m a big fan of your and Ben’s chapter in "Peirce in His Own Words" on this >> topic. It’s an inspiration for my book, in fact. >> >> I’d be honored if given the opportunity at some point to offer a >> presentation on the book I’m writing, working title: "Listening for >> Leadership: Three Essential Sentiments [Love, Faith, Hope]." >> >> Yours sincerely, >> >> Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD >> ListeningIsTheKey.com >> 303 747 4449 >>> On 19 Apr 2023, at 11:04 PM, Gary Richmond >> <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>> >>> Martin, List, >>> >>> Thanks for joining our 10 minute thesis presentation this past Saturday and >>> for your post to Peirce-L today. >>> >>> I think that your suggestion that "there’s a. . . fundamental and urgent >>> question to ask ourselves about how to insinuate realism in a >>> nominalist/individualist world" points to perhaps the most urgent task for >>> pragmatists, most certainly for those of a Peircean stripe. >>> >>> Your question seems to point to a kind of decision we need to make as to >>> how we ought conduct ourselves, not only in conferences and discussion >>> forums and the like but, perhaps especially, in our quotidian lives. On >>> Peirce's esthetic theory, this would represent the employment of a form of >>> the summum bonum, this in conjunction with his ethical theory which >>> includes making a decision to make that a habit of one's life. If we can do >>> that, then perhaps we can hope to begin to personally model that kind of >>> behavior in our scientific and philosophic work, as well as in our >>> collegial, familial and work lives. >>> >>> The goal would seem to involve our coming to live more and more by faith, >>> hope, and love, a trio of values Peirce saw as essentially logical. See, >>> for example, the chapter "Logic is Rooted in the Social Principle (and vice >>> versa)" by Ben Udell and myself in Charles Sanders Peirce in His Own Words >>> <https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9781614516415/html>. >>> >>> While it doesn't seem at all clear to me how this can be brought about very >>> generally in our philosophical and scientific communities in their current >>> nominalistic/individualistic state, it is certainly something which we as >>> pragmatists likely need to reflect on and attempt to work together toward. >>> >>> Jon has consistently tried to address som
Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists, was, Comments on the nature and purpose of Peirce-L, was, The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy
I appreciate your response, Gary. Yes, serving our world as pragmatists is fundamentally about leading our lives as expressions of the summum bonum, and the passages from Peirce’s papers rooting the logic of probability in the "social impulse” are at the core of the book I’m writing on leadership as triadically relational (vs leadership as traditionally conceived, namely as characteristics of an individual): Leader (qua essential way of being) - Follower(s)/Led (qua actual object) - Future (qua indeterminate interpretant). I’m a big fan of your and Ben’s chapter in "Peirce in His Own Words" on this topic. It’s an inspiration for my book, in fact. I’d be honored if given the opportunity at some point to offer a presentation on the book I’m writing, working title: "Listening for Leadership: Three Essential Sentiments [Love, Faith, Hope]." Yours sincerely, Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD ListeningIsTheKey.com 303 747 4449  > On 19 Apr 2023, at 11:04 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Martin, List, > > Thanks for joining our 10 minute thesis presentation this past Saturday and > for your post to Peirce-L today. > > I think that your suggestion that "there’s a. . . fundamental and urgent > question to ask ourselves about how to insinuate realism in a > nominalist/individualist world" points to perhaps the most urgent task for > pragmatists, most certainly for those of a Peircean stripe. > > Your question seems to point to a kind of decision we need to make as to how > we ought conduct ourselves, not only in conferences and discussion forums and > the like but, perhaps especially, in our quotidian lives. On Peirce's > esthetic theory, this would represent the employment of a form of the summum > bonum, this in conjunction with his ethical theory which includes making a > decision to make that a habit of one's life. If we can do that, then perhaps > we can hope to begin to personally model that kind of behavior in our > scientific and philosophic work, as well as in our collegial, familial and > work lives. > > The goal would seem to involve our coming to live more and more by faith, > hope, and love, a trio of values Peirce saw as essentially logical. See, for > example, the chapter "Logic is Rooted in the Social Principle (and vice > versa)" by Ben Udell and myself in Charles Sanders Peirce in His Own Words > <https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9781614516415/html>. > > While it doesn't seem at all clear to me how this can be brought about very > generally in our philosophical and scientific communities in their current > nominalistic/individualistic state, it is certainly something which we as > pragmatists likely need to reflect on and attempt to work together toward. > > Jon has consistently tried to address some related issues in his papers on > the ethics of engineering, and Gary Fuhrman in his e-book, Turning Signs, as > well as in the electronic discussions he's created around it. > > Perhaps it would be helpful for us to reflect deeply on this question you > posed in your post. > > MWK: How are we serving the needs of a world engendered by reductionism in > politics and the media, the over-extension of pluralism in social media > platforms, relativism gone wild in the interpretation of the law, the > conundrums of individualism for economics, and rampant nihilism in every > sector? > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > > On Wed, Apr 19, 2023 at 5:50 PM Martin W. Kettelhut <mailto:mkettel...@msn.com>> wrote: >> Thank you for your 10-minute presentations Gary, Jon and Gary. >> >> What a fascinating phenomenon, a zoom conference with Powerpoint >> representations of Peirce’s trichotomies, synechism, and Kaina Stoichea! >> >> I supposed it was seeing each other, and hearing each other’s voices, that >> spark my wanting to inquire into our participation (as pragmatist >> philosophers) in our world currently—given what we learn from Peirce about >> science, the long and synechistic view, and the power of signs. >> >> You all chose these topics wisely; they capture crucial aspects of what’s >> irreducibly original in Peirce’s work. I submit that many of the questions >> raised by participants in this conference (not unlike many of the >> discussions here on the Peirce-list) reflect the challenge it is to >> communicate what’s fresh, relevant, and pragmaticistic in Peirce. I >> appreciate the patience, good will, and insight you three—in >> particular—bring. >> >> In the background of the question I’m going to propose for discussion here >> is a recognition that, although I did w
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Comments on the nature and purpose of Peirce-L, was, The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy
Thank you for your 10-minute presentations Gary, Jon and Gary. What a fascinating phenomenon, a zoom conference with Powerpoint representations of Peirce’s trichotomies, synechism, and Kaina Stoichea! I supposed it was seeing each other, and hearing each other’s voices, that spark my wanting to inquire into our participation (as pragmatist philosophers) in our world currently—given what we learn from Peirce about science, the long and synechistic view, and the power of signs. You all chose these topics wisely; they capture crucial aspects of what’s irreducibly original in Peirce’s work. I submit that many of the questions raised by participants in this conference (not unlike many of the discussions here on the Peirce-list) reflect the challenge it is to communicate what’s fresh, relevant, and pragmaticistic in Peirce. I appreciate the patience, good will, and insight you three—in particular—bring. In the background of the question I’m going to propose for discussion here is a recognition that, although I did write a dissertation on Peirce's semeiotic/metaphysics and receive a PhD from Temple U, I immediately left academic life and became a "philosopher of the marketplace,” meaning--in my case--business coach. I apply synechism everyday in my work, partnering with business people to build and sustain meaningful, successful, and ethical businesses. My question is, given (as Gary Fuhrman points out) that it is legisigns that have pragmatic power to get things done; and assuming that the purpose of a zoom conference on Peirce is to “combat nominalism”--as Ian MacDonald so actualistically put it--or rather embody the discovery-process that pragmaticism/synechism is: What’s the best approach? What symbols should we use? How do we represent the scientific endeavor anew, holistically (in a Peircean sense, i.e. in terms of what’s possible what’s actual, and what’s potential)? Diagrams and bullet-points certain help; but I think there’s a more fundamental and urgent question to ask ourselves about how to insinuate realism in a nominalist/individualist world. On the one hand, this is a question about how to embody realism in an academic conference, but it’s also a question about how we (pragmatist philosophers) might embody realism in the world generally. How are we serving the needs of a world engendered by reductionism in politics and the media, the over-extension of pluralism in social media platforms, relativism gone wild in the interpretation of the law, the conundrums of individualism for economics, and rampant nihilism in every sector? Thank you for considering, Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD ListeningIsTheKey.com 303 747 4449  > On 19 Apr 2023, at 12:50 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > List, > > I agree with both Jon and Gary Fuhrman as to the nature and purpose of > Peirce-L. Because of its relevance, over the years I have had occasion to > post the same quotation by Joe Ransdell that Jon did today. Especially for > those new to this Peirce forum -- and, perhaps, for everyone here -- it might > be helpful to review not only that quotation, but all that Ransdell, the > creator and first moderator of Peirce-L, had to say about Peirce-L (btw, it's > not a long read). See: https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM > > I would also reiterate this point of Gary Fuhrman's as getting to the heart > of the matter of the anticipated 'audience' of this forum versus other > venues, that, as he says, there are publications "aimed at venues and > audiences other than the community of students and scholars with a special > interest in Peirce, which I think describes the membership of peirce-l. If we > want the wider world to benefit from Peircean analysis of contemporary > issues, then we need to work in venues that are devoted to those issues." > > Finally, and while I've stressed this in the past, it is easy to forget that > it is helpful, really important, to change the Subject line when one > introduces a new topic. For, as Jon wrote by way of the example at hand, ". . > . none of Dan's suggested topics nor his subsequent exchange with Helmut > fall within the subject matter of this thread, which is specifically intended > for further discussion about the "10-Minute Thesis Initiative" session that > the Charles S. Peirce Society conducted last Saturday. > > Thanks, Dan, for your collegial and gracious response to Jon's gentle > admonition, your commenting that in the future you'd "begin new threads > rather than to invade others’ existing threads." > > For everyone, I do believe that that is usually the very best way to proceed, > that is, to introduce an entirely new thread. > > Occasionally, however, it makes sense to modify the Subject of an e
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Formal Logics for a General Universe
Jon, I always love your posts to the Peirce List. Thank you for asking after the best ways to think about the generality of reality in Peircean terms. Besides the two-valued intuitionistic logic, three-valued triadic logic, and four-valued Ł-modal logics, Peirce give us the language the “Three Sentiments Indispensably Required of Logic” (CP2.652-5) in terms of which to talk about the generality and vagueness of the universe we inhabit. LOVE, or interest in the community, is the most foundational sentiment required of real inquiry. When, for example, I see that the main roads are jammed (and consider either remaining in the traffic jam or taking another route), and decide to take the back roads downtown to work, I do so charitably assuming that most people will still use the main road; for if everyone abandoned the main artery and took the back way, then it would become jammed instead. If I discover that most people had the same idea, then there’d be more love in staying the usual course. Employing the scientific method, I have FAITH that if you did the same experiment, you’d get similar results. Pfizer, Moderna, Johnson&Johnson all ran a multitude of trials before announcing (not that their vaccines were either 100% effective or that that were not effective) that they had faith in their vaccines, meaning that a satisfactory percentage of a large number of cases successfully immunized subjects against covid. We can have HOPE that loving and faithful souls will continue inquiring into the same and other questions forever, thereby (dis)confirming what we believe to be true. Peirce points out (CP2.654) that, “…[D]eath makes the number of our risks, of our inferences, finite, and so makes their mean result uncertain. The very idea of probability and of reasoning rests on the assumption that this number [the mean result of our risks] is indefinitely great…It seems to me that we are driven to this, that logicality inexorably requires that our interests shall not be limited. They must not stop at our own fate, but must embrace the whole community. This community, again, must not be limited, but must extend to all races of beings with whom we can come into immediate or mediate intellectual relation. It must reach, however vaguely, beyond this geological epoch, beyond all bounds. He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole world, is, as it seems to me, illogical in all his inferences, collectively. Logic is rooted in the social principle.” Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD ListeningIsTheKey.com 303 747 4449 > On 9 Apr 2022, at 8:41 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > List: > > According to Peirce, classical logic as implemented using the Alpha > (propositional) and Beta (first-order predicate) parts of his Existential > Graphs (EG) is applicable only to a universe of discourse that is definite, > individual, and real. > > CSP: The sheet on which the graphs are written (called the sheet of > assertion), as well as each portion of it, is a graph asserting that a > recognized universe is definite (so that no assertion can be both true and > false of it), individual (so that any assertion is either true or false of > it), and real (so that what is true or false of it is independent of any > judgment of man or men, unless it be that of the creator of the universe, in > case this is fictive); any graph written upon this sheet is thereby asserted > of that universe; and any multitude of graphs written disconnectedly upon the > sheet are all asserted of the universe. (R 491:29, 1903) > > However, he also maintains that reality itself is general rather than > strictly individual, such that some assertions are legitimately indeterminate. > > CSP: To speak of the actual state of things implies a great assumption, > namely that there is a perfectly definite body of propositions which, if we > could only find them out, are the truth, and that everything is really either > true or in positive conflict with the truth. This assumption, called the > principle of excluded middle, I consider utterly unwarranted, and do not > believe it. (NEM 3:758, 1893) > > CSP: No doubt there is an assumption involved in speaking of the actual state > of things ... namely, the assumption that reality is so determinate as to > verify or falsify every possible proposition. This is called the principle of > excluded middle. ... I do not believe it is strictly true. (NEM 3:759-760, > 1893) > > In these passages, Peirce refers to the "great assumption" that every > proposition is either true or false as "the principle of excluded middle." > However, in today's standard logical terminology, this is instead designated > as the semantic principle of bivalence and distinguished from the (so-called) > law of excluded middle, which is
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper
Thank you, Edwina. I haven’t read "Object Knowledge." Even in "The Open Society and it’s Enemies” there is a slipperiness in the way Popper defends “methodological nominalism,” which (in his words) “Instead of aiming at finding out what a thing really is, and at defining its true nature…aims at describing how a thing behaves in various circumstances, and especially, whether there are any regularities in its behavior. In other words, methodological nominalism sees the aim of science in the description of the thing and events our experience, and in an ‘explanation’ of these events, i.e. their description with the help of universal laws. And it sees in our language, and especially in those of its rules which distinguish properly constructed sentences and inferences for a mere heap of words, the great instrument of scientific description; words it considers rather as subsidiary tools for this task, and not as names of essences.” Of course here we see his plaidoyer against Plato, but one wonders how universal laws are to be recognized and used to ‘help explain events’ if (as Popper continues) “The methodological nominalist will never think that a question like ‘What is energy?’ or ‘What is movement?’ or ‘What is an atom?’ is an important question for physics; but he will attach importance to a question like ‘How can the energy of the sun be made useful?’ or ‘How does a planet move? or “Under what conditions does an atom radiate light?’ And to those philosophers who tell him that before having answered the ‘what is’ question he cannot hope to give any exact answers to any of the ‘how’ questions, he will reply, if at all, by pointing out that he much prefers that modest degree of exactness which he can achieve by his methods to the pretentious muddle which they have achieved by theirs.” (p 32) The slipperiness is around induction, meaning how we get from individual observations to laws of science. In "Logik der Forschung,” (1935) Popper said that the problem of induction is insurmountable, and that science is not in fact based on inductive inferences at all. Popper said that science proceeds by making bold conjectures, and then attempting to falsify those conjectures. So, induction gets accounted for by deduction, i.e.: the hypothesis is falsified by modus tollens. Popper is desperately trying to avoid Hume’s problem within the same individualist logic; whereas Peirce accounts for the validity of induction by his “social theory of logic.” (“Four Incapacities…,’ “Fixation of Belief,” and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”) Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD ListeningIsTheKey.com 303 747 4449 > On 7 Oct 2021, at 11:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Martin, List > > Now, that's a surprising comment - with regard to my view of Popper. I've > always considered him to be against a certain type of realism, in particular, > the external to the universe of 'divine forms', so to speak, of such as Plato > . But his Third World, to my understanding, was not nominalism but realism - > an evolving, natural 'sets of laws'. I understood him to describe himself as > a metaphysical realist [Objective Knowledge, p 40, footnote. And "I propose > to accept realism as the only sensible hypothesis [p 42]. > > One has to consider what he means by this 'realism'. It's, again, certainly > not Plato's external-to-the-universe Forms, which was, according to Popper, > essentially a religious world [153-4]. I'd say it's comparable to Peirce's > Thirdness, the realm of developed and developing habits/laws.This is a > rational, logical realm, the realm of 'intelligibles, or of ideas in the > objective sense'. [p 154] > > The first world is the physical world; the second world is the subjective > world, of subjective or personal experiences..and the third world is the > realm of 'arguments, logical relations' etc. > > So- my reading of Popper is that I wouldn't really describe him as a > nominalist - because of this third world he focuses on. > > Edwina > > > > On Thu 07/10/21 11:54 AM , "Martin W. Kettelhut" mkettel...@msn.com sent: > > Dear Edwina and Margaretha, > > Having acknowledged similarities between Popper and Peirce, we must reckon > with the fact that Popper is a proud nominalist, whereas Peirce is a > thorough-going realist. There are many implications, not the least of which > is that Popper dismisses truth in the long run; he says that all we’ve got is > truth in a certain context (like a chemistry lab, or an atomic accelerator). > Popper is afraid that a realist commitment to truth = closedness, or > truth-with-an-agenda. Unlike Peirce, Popper could not negotiate generality or > continuity. > > Martin W. Ke
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper
Dear Edwina and Margaretha, Having acknowledged similarities between Popper and Peirce, we must reckon with the fact that Popper is a proud nominalist, whereas Peirce is a thorough-going realist. There are many implications, not the least of which is that Popper dismisses truth in the long run; he says that all we’ve got is truth in a certain context (like a chemistry lab, or an atomic accelerator). Popper is afraid that a realist commitment to truth = closedness, or truth-with-an-agenda. Unlike Peirce, Popper could not negotiate generality or continuity. Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD > On 7 Oct 2021, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > 2] I have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that Popper's Third > World has strong comparisons with Peirce's Thirdness….he even sets it up as > analogous with the biological realm of knowledge. [See his Objective > Knowledge]. And I think that Popper's emphasis on openness, as in The Open > Society, where he rejects historicism and destiny for an essentially open and > unknown complexity of interactions -- is similar to Peirce. That is, Popper > accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness and Thirdness] in the > development of a society. Responding to On Thu 07/10/21 9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com <mailto:mahe3...@gmail.com> sent: List, How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the connection between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
