Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's classifications of the sciences
John, list You wrote: "Those dependencies are important to emphasize, especially for anyone who might claim that ontology is prima philosophia." I do not see how those who take ontology as the first philosophy could be convinced with this diagram, because in it, metaphysics is presented rather as the last philosophy, instead. Without giving up the idea of the primacy of metaphysical foundation, all these dependencies seem just epistemic confusions. In earlier mail you wrote: "Yes. There are two partial orders. The solid lines show how one science is more general (covers a broader range) than another. The dotted lines show dependencies (one science borrows or adopts principles from another). It's possible to emphasize either one." I am not sure if there are really two orders, but this appearance seems to follow from the way you have drawn your diagram, if we pay attention to the reasons for those dotted lines. They come from Peirce's idea what distinguishes (and identifies their content!) mathematical, philosophical, and "empirical" sciences: the kind of observation that they are based on. Mathematician observes "imagined objects", philosopher "those universal phenomena which saturate all experience through and through so that they cannot escape us" (EP 2:37, 1898), and Special scientist focuses his observation to the details of some special phenomenon. So because anything that can be found real can also be merely "imagined" (independently on its reality), it is always possible to draw a mathematical structure out of it, i.e. some mathematical concepts and structures are present in any other science (and therefore "nature appears to US as written in the language of mathematics"). To some extent similarly, philosophical concepts should be somehow included in every theory in special science, because it observes the features of "universal phenomena" that should be present in any special phenomena. But from such principle follows severe restrictions to the content of philosophical sciences (most of all to metaphysics) and their application to special sciences (e.g. in which sense psychology is dependent on logic). -Tommi -- *** "Cousins to the ameba that we are, how could we know for certain?" - Donald T. Campbell ******* University of Tampere Faculty of Social Sciences - Philosophy Tommi Vehkavaara FI-33014 University of Tampere, Finland Phone: +358-50-3186122 (work), +358-45-2056109 (home) e-mail: tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi homepage: http://people.uta.fi/~attove https://uta-fi.academia.edu/TommiVehkavaara *** - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's classification of the sciences
Dear John, and list >John: Before getting into the details, I'd like to emphasize that >my primary interest in drawing CSPscience.jpg is in the >dotted lines that show dependencies among the sciences. > >>Tommi: Peirce's classification of sciences with the definitions of the different sciences was once for me one of the keys that systematized my reading of Peirce's other writings and >>made them much more understandable. >John: I saw your classification, and it looks very good. It's >much more detailed about the many branches of science: http://people.uta.fi/~attove/peirce_systems3.PDF <http://people.uta.fi/%7Eattove/peirce_systems3.PDF> > >That's important for classification. But I wanted to emphasize >the dependencies to show the minimal content that is required >in the top levels of an ontology. See below for a copy of the >note I sent to Ontolog Forum. I think that these dependencies are indeed one of the main points in Peirce's classification, but it does not wipe off the question what exactly are classified. Although Peirce's classification is in my opinion the classification of practicies of inquiry, there is a connection to ontology, because the criteria of classification is "abstractness of objects": “I would classify sciences […] in the order of abstractness of their objects, so that each science may largely rest for its principles upon those above it in the scale while drawing its data in part from those below it.” (EP 2:35, 1898.) However, one reservation: question is about abstractness of the objects of research, and objects of research are not necessarily objects in ontological sense, or if they are this seems to require rather peculiar ontological commitments (that Simons at least would not accept). Yours, -Tommi -- *** "Cousins to the ameba that we are, how could we know for certain?" - Donald T. Campbell ******* University of Tampere Faculty of Social Sciences - Philosophy Tommi Vehkavaara FI-33014 University of Tampere Finland Phone: +358-50-3186122 (work), +358-45-2056109 (home) e-mail: tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi homepage: http://people.uta.fi/~attove https://uta-fi.academia.edu/TommiVehkavaara *** - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's classification of the sciences
Dear Jerry, list
It is not quite clear to me what you are referring to by terms
retrospective and synthetic philosophy - I suppose that you refer to the
difference of philosophia prima and ultima (according to Peirce).
On 28.8.2017 21:20, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
Tommi, List:
Your post bring to the front (at least for me) a central problem of
philosophy, especially of synthetic philosophy in contrast to
retrospective philosophy. EP 2:372.
On Aug 28, 2017, at 9:45 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara
mailto:tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi>> wrote:
CP 1.232 "Now if we are to classify the sciences, it is highly
desirable that we should begin with a definite notion of what we mean
by a science; and in view of what has been said of natural
classification, it is plainly important that our notion of science
should be a notion of science as it lives and not a mere abstract
definition….
The best translation of {epistémé} is "comprehension." It is the
ability to define a thing in such a manner that all its properties
shall be corollaries from its definition." (From "Minute logic", 1902)
Similar division of different senses of the term "science" can be
found also in EP 2:372 (1906).
The challenge, at least to me, is to reconcile the classification of
the sciences today, in light of EP 2 : 373.
During the past century, the methodologies of the sciences have
spanned the gap between the quali - signs of atoms and molecules and
macroscopic reality, such as the use of MRI to illuminate the interior
processes of the human body. The logic of scaling between electrical
phenomena (such as MRI data) and human health experience is often
possible now. Thus, the synthetic philosophy of science has
integrated our *comprehension* of knowledge within an *amplitive logic
that copulates concepts from multiple special sciences (ideoscopy).*
I am not aware of the details of these, but this sounds me rather a
reduction or redefinition of experiential concepts.
This leads me to the question:
What is *now* a pragmatic classification of the sciences that is
consistent with *synthetic* philosophy?
I think that two questions are important in such questions: 1. what
exactly are classified (practices, theories, objects of research, or
something else) and 2. what is the purpose of classifying sciences. My
own current thought is that the main reason for Peirce's classification
was to argue for those dotted lines in John's diagram, i.e. for
dependencies between different studies, also that these dependencies
form a partially hierarchical structure:
“It borrows its idea from Comte’s classification; namely, the idea that
one science depends upon another for fundamental principles, but does
not furnish such principles to that other.” (CP 1.180, 1903.)
But about synthetic philosophy or philosophia ultima, I am not sure if
every cross-disciplinary studies should be classified under synthetic
philosophy. I am tempted to think that this classification of sciences
is not after all a classification of disciplines, but of individual
inquiries, what kind of observation, evidence, argumentation, etc. each
one is based on. But there are cross-disciplinary disciplines in which
many writings seem to fullfill Peircean criteria of synthetic
philosophy, e.g. cognition science, biosemiotics and cognitive semiotics
(if it is intending to be more than mere psychology).
Or, are nearly all CSP scholars satisfied with the simplistic notions
of retrospective sciences that have been trimmed to fit the
Procrustean bed of mathematical predicate logic?
It appears to me that synthetic philosophy absolutely requires a
Tarskian approach to the copulation of the meta-languages such that
the sciences can be integrated (as the example of the role of MRI in
medicine indicates.)
About these, I do not understand how predicate logic or Tarskian
meta-language structure have anything to do with these issues, it seems
to me that they are certain a priori ontological commitments that are
more problematic (some of them are implicitly drawn from the language
and model-theory of predicate logic).
Yours,
-Tommi
Cheers
Jerry
--
***
"Cousins to the ameba that we are, how could we know for certain?"
- Donald T. Campbell
***
University of Tampere
Faculty of Social Sciences - Philosophy
Tommi Vehkavaara
FI-33014 University of Tampere
Finland
Phone: +358-50-3186122 (work), +358-45-2056109 (home)
e-mail: tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi
homepage: http://people.uta.fi/~attove
https://uta-fi.academia.edu/TommiVehkavaara
***
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's classification of the sciences
Dear John, Gary F., and list
Peirce's classification of sciences with the definitions of the
different sciences was once for me one of the keys that systematized my
reading of Peirce's other writings and made them much more understandable.
On issue that have puzzled my mind is to which extent Peirce's own 100
years old classification is any more accurate, or how it should be
redrawn so that it would describe contemporary relations of sciences. My
main comment to John's diagram concern this title "knowledge" that is
classified. I would like to support Gary's suggestion that "Inquiry" is
more proper term in that place.
Gary:
I think at the very top I might put "Inquiry" instead of "Knowledge,"
but it's not a change I'd fight for.
John:
In my first version, I put "The Sciences" at the top. One reason
why I chose 'knowledge' is that I plan to use the diagram for some
discussions in Ontolog Forum, where most people know very little
about Peirce. But 'knowledge representation' is a common term.
"Knowledge" or "knowledge representation" may be understood so that this
classification would be a classification of theories or doctrines (i.e.
of propositions), while (at least in my understanding) Peirce almost
explicitly denied that sciences should be defined and classified
according to their results, instead the "essence of science" should be
its "life", i.e. inquiry:
CP 1.232 "Now if we are to classify the sciences, it is highly desirable
that we should begin with a definite notion of what we mean by a
science; and in view of what has been said of natural classification, it
is plainly important that our notion of science should be a notion of
science as it lives and not a mere abstract definition. Let us remember
that science is a pursuit of living men, and that its most marked
characteristic is that when it is genuine, it is in an incessant state
of metabolism and growth. If we resort to a dictionary, we shall be told
that it is systematized knowledge. Most of the classifications of the
sciences have been classifications of systematized and established
knowledge — which is nothing but the exudation of living science; — as
if plants were to be classified according to the characters of their
gums. Some of the classifications do even worse than that, by taking
science in the sense attached by the ancient Greeks, especially
Aristotle, to the word {epistémé}. A person can take no right view of
the relation of ancient to modern science unless he clearly apprehends
the difference between what the Greeks meant by {epistémé} and what we
mean by knowledge. The best translation of {epistémé} is
"comprehension." It is the ability to define a thing in such a manner
that all its properties shall be corollaries from its definition." (From
"Minute logic", 1902)
Similar division of different senses of the term "science" can be found
also in EP 2:372 (1906).
It seems to me that "Knowledge" could be the top term to be classified,
if it is equipped with an explanation that it is actually about
"knowledge acquisition", i.e. about processes, not about momentary
doctrines or beliefs.
Yours,
Tommi Vehkavaara
--
***
"Cousins to the ameba that we are, how could we know for certain?"
- Donald T. Campbell
***
University of Tampere
Faculty of Social Sciences - Philosophy
Tommi Vehkavaara
FI-33014 University of Tampere
Finland
Phone: +358-50-3186122 (work), +358-45-2056109 (home)
e-mail: tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi
homepage: http://people.uta.fi/~attove
https://uta-fi.academia.edu/TommiVehkavaara
***
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8465] Re: Natural Propositions
Jerry, You wrote (26 Apr 2015 17:14:19) More specifically, consider CSP's letter to Lady Welby, p. 7, Oct. 12, 1904. and his clear distinction between Firstness and Secondness. "Secondness is that mode of being of that which is such as it is, without respect to a second but regardless of any third." In this sentence, the critical rhetoric terms are the words Secondness and the second. The direct implication of this sentence is that the two-ness of Secondness is indicative of a difference - the difference that makes a difference in the terminology of Bateson. Tommi: First, is the quote correct: "...without respect to a second..." which sounds very odd if the Secondness is talked about? Secondly, at least I have always seen Bateson's idea of information as a difference that makes difference as one clear example of triadic relation or "Thirdness" if you like. The first difference already contains a first that differs from some second someway and the difference that is made is the third (a meaning if you like). Yours, -Tommi -- *** "Cousins to the ameba that we are, how could we know for certain?" - Donald T. Campbell *** University of Tampere School of Social Sciences and Humanities - Philosophy Tommi Vehkavaara FI-33014 University of Tampere Finland Phone: +358-50-3186122 (work), +358-45-2056109 (home) e-mail: tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi homepage: http://people.uta.fi/~attove https://uta-fi.academia.edu/TommiVehkavaara *** - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams
Edwina If I can see right you are disagreeing with Peirce, then. However, I have a suspicion that there is not much real disagreements, but you just use words differently as me (or Peirce). I can easily agree that "Generals (...) are not akin to discrete matter" or that "we don't directly experience them as 'things-in-themselves'. A general is not a separate existentiality." But your statement that "We extract/synthesize generals within our direct empirical experience via our reasoning/cognition" I do not think is the whole story when it comes to Peirce's logical theory of perception (in 1903). That is (approximately) what happens in abductive reasoning, but its limit case, the formation of perceptual judgment is not reasoned because there is no self-control, nor question about its validity - it is always valid about the percept. Yours, -tommi Edwina wrote: Tommi, I'm going to continue to disagree. Generals, which are Thirdness, are not akin to discrete matter in a mode of Secondness. Peirce is following Aristotle in asserting that we know the world only through our direct experience of it. BUT - as he said: 'the idea of meaning is irreducible to those of quality and reaction' (1.345) which is the 'directly perceptual'. That is, within our direct experiences, we can, by 'mind' (and I mean 'mind' in a broad sense) understand generals. This is not reductionism. But since generals are laws, then, they are a 'matter of thought and meaning' 1.345) . These are 'relations of reason' (1.365) and not of fact (sensual experience of Secondness). So, 'intelligibility or reason objectified, is what makes Thirdness genuine' 1.366. We extract/synthesize generals within our direct empirical experience via our reasoning/cognition - since generals are as noted, an act of Mind - but we don't directly experience them as 'things-in-themselves'. A general is not a separate existentiality. Dear Edwina That is Peirce's conception that "perceptual judgments contain elements of generality, so that Thirdness is directly perceived" presented in his Harvard lectures (that Frederik too refers to): A bit larger quote from EP 2:223-24: "I do not think it is possible fully to comprehend the problem of the merits of pragmatism without recognizing these three truths: first, that there are no conceptions which are not given to us in perceptual judgments, so that we may say that all our ideas are perceptual ideas. This sounds like sensationalism. But in order to maintain this position, it is necessary to recognize, second, that perceptual judgments contain elements of generality, so that Thirdness is directly perceived; and finally, I think it of great importance to recognize, third, that the abductive faculty, whereby we divine the secrets of nature, is, as we may say, a shading off, a gradation of that which in its highest perfection we call perception." Yours, -Tommi On Apr 24, 2015, at 8:24 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara mailto:tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi>> wrote: Dear Frederik It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith) conception about "fallible apriori" categories like food, organism, etc. could be compatible with Peirce's conception of pragmatism, at least as formulated and argued in Peirce's Harvard lectures 1903: “The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason.” (EP 2:241, CP 5.212, 1903) For me at least this appears rather as a quite explicit denial that there could be room for a priori concepts or categories (and mathematics included), if by a priori is meant prior to senses. I cannot see how Peirce's idea that we are able to observe real generals directly, could change the situation in any way, because our access to generals (whether real or not) has nevertheless perceptual origin. So it is not clear what is your position here, is it that you favor the fallible a priori -doctrine over this Peirce's idea about the logical role of perception in cognition, or do you think they have no differing practical consequences, i.e. that they mean the same. Or perhaps you think that Peirce changed his view in this matter later so that his more mature view would be compatible? This is part of the greater problem that bothers me concerning the scope and applicability of Peirce's doctrine of signs and such (positive) metaphysics as he describes its source, but I will not go to these now. Yours, -Tommi You wrote as a response to Howard: FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the categories food and poison are a priori, not which substances are nourishing or poisonous for the single type
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams
Sorry Jeff, and all I did not meant to say anything about Kant's views, my comments were just too fast reactions of the misunderstanding of Jons comment that was a response to my query how the talk about fallible a priori structures could be compatible with Peirce's idea that all the elements of thought have their origin in (someone's) perception. In my simple mind from this principle the universal fallibilism (concerning all knowledge including logic and even mathematics) follows but also that nothing cognitively accessible to us cannot be completely prior to senses. I must confess that I have found this idea attractive and plausible hypothesis, though recently I have founs some reasons to doubt its universality, but these reasons have nothing to do with the question of aprioricity but with representationality. About Kant, sure I believe tha Kant was transforming Leibnizian school metaphysics to his transcendental philosophy, but I have only secondary interest on history of ideas or actual use of theoretical terms. However I admit that certain amout of historical studies do benefit the understanding of philosophical concepts. Yours, -Tommi Lainaus Jeff Downard: You appear to interpret what Kant was doing by working with conceptions of the a priori and the thing in itself very differently from the way I understand the texts. For starters, I hope that we can agree that Kant was working within a tradition that took Leibniz as a central influence. So, for starters, you might look at what Kant is doing as he critically examines Leibniz's central theses and arguments. Here is a nice introduction to this kind of historical reading of Kant: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com On Apr 24, 2015, at 9:31 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara wrote: Jon, list On 24.4.2015 15:58, Jon Awbrey wrote: Tommi, List, The fact that we know the world via perceptions and representations does not mean that the world is constructed of reduces to perceptions and representations. Of course not, but I guess you suggest that a priori here refers to underlying metaphysical structure (object of sign) that is known or represented, but then 1. what is fallible is not this "a priori" structure but just our representations of it 2. such a priori seems to be quite close to Kantian "Ding in itself" (except that some of such Dings in itself are known) 3. This move to transform the scope of "a priori" from conceptions to Dings in itself (or to reality) seems to lead to the conception that it is logic that is dependent on metaphysical a priori structures and not vice versa as Kant and Peirce quite consistently argued (and Peirce argued, perhaps more controversially, that even Aristotle had that view). But perhaps I am just too indoctrinated by Kantian-Hegelian (and Peircean as I would say) idea of transcendental mediation that I do not see the benefit of such an idea of a priori. Yours, -Tommi Regards, Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com On Apr 24, 2015, at 8:24 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara wrote: Dear Frederik It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith) conception about "fallible apriori" categories like food, organism, etc. could be compatible with Peirce's conception of pragmatism, at least as formulated and argued in Peirce's Harvard lectures 1903: “The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason.” (EP 2:241, CP 5.212, 1903) For me at least this appears rather as a quite explicit denial that there could be room for a priori concepts or categories (and mathematics included), if by a priori is meant prior to senses. I cannot see how Peirce's idea that we are able to observe real generals directly, could change the situation in any way, because our access to generals (whether real or not) has nevertheless perceptual origin. So it is not clear what is your position here, is it that you favor the fallible a priori -doctrine over this Peirce's idea about the logical role of perception in cognition, or do you think they have no differing practical consequences, i.e. that they mean the same. Or perhaps you think that Peirce changed his view in this matter later so that his more mature view would be compatible? This is part of the greater problem that bothers me concerning the scope and applicability of Peirce's doctrine of signs and such (positive) metaphysics as he describes its source, but I will not go to these now. Yours, -Tommi You wrote as a response to Howard: FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the categories food and poison are a priori, not which substances are nourishing or poisonous for the single type of organism. HP: I would say your statement that food and poison are a priori categories is only a p
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams
Jon ok, my hypothesis what you meant was false, and you can forgot my too fast associations with Ding an sich selbst. But then I just did not get what was your point, because I was just quesstioning asking the about Fredrik's idea of food as 'biological a priori', if I did not get even that wrong. -Tommi Lainaus Jon Awbrey : Tommi, List, Not in the least. The à priori is a category of logic and methodology — it refers to the axiomatic method of constructing representations — not a category of metaphysics or ontology. This is the meaning of fallibilism and the point of hypostatic abstractions. Peirce had no brief against things-in-themselves, it is only inconceivable or unknowable things-in-themselves that he excised. Regards, Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com On Apr 24, 2015, at 9:31 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara wrote: Jon, list On 24.4.2015 15:58, Jon Awbrey wrote: Tommi, List, The fact that we know the world via perceptions and representations does not mean that the world is constructed of reduces to perceptions and representations. Of course not, but I guess you suggest that a priori here refers to underlying metaphysical structure (object of sign) that is known or represented, but then 1. what is fallible is not this "a priori" structure but just our representations of it 2. such a priori seems to be quite close to Kantian "Ding in itself" (except that some of such Dings in itself are known) 3. This move to transform the scope of "a priori" from conceptions to Dings in itself (or to reality) seems to lead to the conception that it is logic that is dependent on metaphysical a priori structures and not vice versa as Kant and Peirce quite consistently argued (and Peirce argued, perhaps more controversially, that even Aristotle had that view). But perhaps I am just too indoctrinated by Kantian-Hegelian (and Peircean as I would say) idea of transcendental mediation that I do not see the benefit of such an idea of a priori. Yours, -Tommi Regards, Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com On Apr 24, 2015, at 8:24 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara wrote: Dear Frederik It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith) conception about "fallible apriori" categories like food, organism, etc. could be compatible with Peirce's conception of pragmatism, at least as formulated and argued in Peirce's Harvard lectures 1903: “The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason.” (EP 2:241, CP 5.212, 1903) For me at least this appears rather as a quite explicit denial that there could be room for a priori concepts or categories (and mathematics included), if by a priori is meant prior to senses. I cannot see how Peirce's idea that we are able to observe real generals directly, could change the situation in any way, because our access to generals (whether real or not) has nevertheless perceptual origin. So it is not clear what is your position here, is it that you favor the fallible a priori -doctrine over this Peirce's idea about the logical role of perception in cognition, or do you think they have no differing practical consequences, i.e. that they mean the same. Or perhaps you think that Peirce changed his view in this matter later so that his more mature view would be compatible? This is part of the greater problem that bothers me concerning the scope and applicability of Peirce's doctrine of signs and such (positive) metaphysics as he describes its source, but I will not go to these now. Yours, -Tommi You wrote as a response to Howard: FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the categories food and poison are a priori, not which substances are nourishing or poisonous for the single type of organism. HP: I would say your statement that food and poison are a priori categories is only a proposition. It is not an argument. I agree that your realist mental construct of an abstract or universal category like food is logically irrefutable (except to me it violates parsimony). So I will only restate the empiricist's concept of food as whatever organisms actually eat that keeps them alive. In evolutionary terms survival is the only pragmatic test. How do logic and universal categories explain anything more? FS: I think we have been through this before. You say "Food as whatever organisms actually eat" - but this IS a universal category. It does not refer to empirical observations, individual occurrences, protocol sentences, measurements in time and space, all that which empiricism should be made from. It even involves another universal, that of "organism". It is no stranger than that. So I see no parsimony on your part. I see that you deny the existence of the universals y
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams
Edwina wrote: Tommi- that's an interesting conclusion of yours - which is, to me, puzzling. To my understanding, Thirdness, which is the domain of generals, is not directly accessible by the senses; we cannot 'observe generals directly'. And these generals are, in addition, evolving from the past into the future - and we cannot directly observe either the past nor the future. Dear Edwina That is Peirce's conception that "perceptual judgments contain elements of generality, so that Thirdness is directly perceived" presented in his Harvard lectures (that Frederik too refers to): A bit larger quote from EP 2:223-24: "I do not think it is possible fully to comprehend the problem of the merits of pragmatism without recognizing these three truths: first, that there are no conceptions which are not given to us in perceptual judgments, so that we may say that all our ideas are perceptual ideas. This sounds like sensationalism. But in order to maintain this position, it is necessary to recognize, second, that perceptual judgments contain elements of generality, so that Thirdness is directly perceived; and finally, I think it of great importance to recognize, third, that the abductive faculty, whereby we divine the secrets of nature, is, as we may say, a shading off, a gradation of that which in its highest perfection we call perception." Yours, -Tommi On Apr 24, 2015, at 8:24 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara <mailto:tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi>> wrote: Dear Frederik It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith) conception about "fallible apriori" categories like food, organism, etc. could be compatible with Peirce's conception of pragmatism, at least as formulated and argued in Peirce's Harvard lectures 1903: “The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason.” (EP 2:241, CP 5.212, 1903) For me at least this appears rather as a quite explicit denial that there could be room for a priori concepts or categories (and mathematics included), if by a priori is meant prior to senses. I cannot see how Peirce's idea that we are able to observe real generals directly, could change the situation in any way, because our access to generals (whether real or not) has nevertheless perceptual origin. So it is not clear what is your position here, is it that you favor the fallible a priori -doctrine over this Peirce's idea about the logical role of perception in cognition, or do you think they have no differing practical consequences, i.e. that they mean the same. Or perhaps you think that Peirce changed his view in this matter later so that his more mature view would be compatible? This is part of the greater problem that bothers me concerning the scope and applicability of Peirce's doctrine of signs and such (positive) metaphysics as he describes its source, but I will not go to these now. Yours, -Tommi You wrote as a response to Howard: FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the categories food and poison are a priori, not which substances are nourishing or poisonous for the single type of organism. HP: I would say your statement that food and poison are a priori categories is only a proposition. It is not an argument. I agree that your realist mental construct of an abstract or universal category like food is logically irrefutable (except to me it violates parsimony). So I will only restate the empiricist's concept of food as whatever organisms actually eat that keeps them alive. In evolutionary terms survival is the only pragmatic test. How do logic and universal categories explain anything more? FS: I think we have been through this before. You say "Food as whatever organisms actually eat" - but this IS a universal category. It does not refer to empirical observations, individual occurrences, protocol sentences, measurements in time and space, all that which empiricism should be made from. It even involves another universal, that of "organism". It is no stranger than that. So I see no parsimony on your part. I see that you deny the existence of the universals you yourself are using. -- *** "Cousins to the ameba that we are, how could we know for certain?" - Donald T. Campbell ******* University of Tampere School of Social Sciences and Humanities - Philosophy Tommi Vehkavaara FI-33014 University of Tampere Finland Phone: +358-50-3186122 (work), +358-4
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams
Jon, list On 24.4.2015 15:58, Jon Awbrey wrote: Tommi, List, The fact that we know the world via perceptions and representations does not mean that the world is constructed of reduces to perceptions and representations. Of course not, but I guess you suggest that a priori here refers to underlying metaphysical structure (object of sign) that is known or represented, but then 1. what is fallible is not this "a priori" structure but just our representations of it 2. such a priori seems to be quite close to Kantian "Ding in itself" (except that some of such Dings in itself are known) 3. This move to transform the scope of "a priori" from conceptions to Dings in itself (or to reality) seems to lead to the conception that it is logic that is dependent on metaphysical a priori structures and not vice versa as Kant and Peirce quite consistently argued (and Peirce argued, perhaps more controversially, that even Aristotle had that view). But perhaps I am just too indoctrinated by Kantian-Hegelian (and Peircean as I would say) idea of transcendental mediation that I do not see the benefit of such an idea of a priori. Yours, -Tommi Regards, Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com On Apr 24, 2015, at 8:24 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara <mailto:tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi>> wrote: Dear Frederik It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith) conception about "fallible apriori" categories like food, organism, etc. could be compatible with Peirce's conception of pragmatism, at least as formulated and argued in Peirce's Harvard lectures 1903: “The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason.” (EP 2:241, CP 5.212, 1903) For me at least this appears rather as a quite explicit denial that there could be room for a priori concepts or categories (and mathematics included), if by a priori is meant prior to senses. I cannot see how Peirce's idea that we are able to observe real generals directly, could change the situation in any way, because our access to generals (whether real or not) has nevertheless perceptual origin. So it is not clear what is your position here, is it that you favor the fallible a priori -doctrine over this Peirce's idea about the logical role of perception in cognition, or do you think they have no differing practical consequences, i.e. that they mean the same. Or perhaps you think that Peirce changed his view in this matter later so that his more mature view would be compatible? This is part of the greater problem that bothers me concerning the scope and applicability of Peirce's doctrine of signs and such (positive) metaphysics as he describes its source, but I will not go to these now. Yours, -Tommi You wrote as a response to Howard: FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the categories food and poison are a priori, not which substances are nourishing or poisonous for the single type of organism. HP: I would say your statement that food and poison are a priori categories is only a proposition. It is not an argument. I agree that your realist mental construct of an abstract or universal category like food is logically irrefutable (except to me it violates parsimony). So I will only restate the empiricist's concept of food as whatever organisms actually eat that keeps them alive. In evolutionary terms survival is the only pragmatic test. How do logic and universal categories explain anything more? FS: I think we have been through this before. You say "Food as whatever organisms actually eat" - but this IS a universal category. It does not refer to empirical observations, individual occurrences, protocol sentences, measurements in time and space, all that which empiricism should be made from. It even involves another universal, that of "organism". It is no stranger than that. So I see no parsimony on your part. I see that you deny the existence of the universals you yourself are using. -- *** "Cousins to the ameba that we are, how could we know for certain?" - Donald T. Campbell ******* University of Tampere School of Social Sciences and Humanities - Philosophy Tommi Vehkavaara FI-33014 University of Tampere Finland Phone: +358-50-3186122 (work), +358-45-2056109 (home) e-mail:tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi homepage:http://people.uta.fi/~attove https://uta-fi.academia.edu/TommiVehkavaara *** -- *
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8389] Re: Natural Propositions,
Dear Frederik It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith) conception about "fallible apriori" categories like food, organism, etc. could be compatible with Peirce's conception of pragmatism, at least as formulated and argued in Peirce's Harvard lectures 1903: “The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason.” (EP 2:241, CP 5.212, 1903) For me at least this appears rather as a quite explicit denial that there could be room for a priori concepts or categories (and mathematics included), if by a priori is meant prior to senses. I cannot see how Peirce's idea that we are able to observe real generals directly, could change the situation in any way, because our access to generals (whether real or not) has nevertheless perceptual origin. So it is not clear what is your position here, is it that you favor the fallible a priori -doctrine over this Peirce's idea about the logical role of perception in cognition, or do you think they have no differing practical consequences, i.e. that they mean the same. Or perhaps you think that Peirce changed his view in this matter later so that his more mature view would be compatible? This is part of the greater problem that bothers me concerning the scope and applicability of Peirce's doctrine of signs and such (positive) metaphysics as he describes its source, but I will not go to these now. Yours, -Tommi You wrote as a response to Howard: FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the categories food and poison are a priori, not which substances are nourishing or poisonous for the single type of organism. HP: I would say your statement that food and poison are a priori categories is only a proposition. It is not an argument. I agree that your realist mental construct of an abstract or universal category like food is logically irrefutable (except to me it violates parsimony). So I will only restate the empiricist's concept of food as whatever organisms actually eat that keeps them alive. In evolutionary terms survival is the only pragmatic test. How do logic and universal categories explain anything more? FS: I think we have been through this before. You say "Food as whatever organisms actually eat" - but this IS a universal category. It does not refer to empirical observations, individual occurrences, protocol sentences, measurements in time and space, all that which empiricism should be made from. It even involves another universal, that of "organism". It is no stranger than that. So I see no parsimony on your part. I see that you deny the existence of the universals you yourself are using. -- *** "Cousins to the ameba that we are, how could we know for certain?" - Donald T. Campbell *** University of Tampere School of Social Sciences and Humanities - Philosophy Tommi Vehkavaara FI-33014 University of Tampere Finland Phone: +358-50-3186122 (work), +358-45-2056109 (home) e-mail:tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi homepage:http://people.uta.fi/~attove https://uta-fi.academia.edu/TommiVehkavaara *** - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
