Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

[JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY]

Jon, List,

If you can merely explain to me How a representation of a thing in itself can 
be except that the thing is in itself is represented and thus beyond the 
representation as that thing is in itself even whilst represented (formally) 
and I will concede my position immediately. This, to my mind, and research, 
simply cannot be. If it can be such that you can represent a thing in itself, 
as it is in itself, then I will admit scholarly defeat in this productive 
argument.

For we all agree that the thing exists in itself, or that the thing in itself 
exists, but differ as to whether we can represent it as it is in itself (this 
is how narrowly we've managed, collectively, to bring the debate in).

That's all I ask. And if you think you've explained it already, I merely ask 
you for the requisite patience to tolerate my lack of understanding and explain 
it one last time.

Best

Jack





From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Monday, June 12, 2023 11:46 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the 
Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

Jack, List:

JRKC: There is no Peircean Semeiotic, whatsoever - without the Kantian thing in 
itself. ... It isn't possible for Peircean Semeiotic to be coherent except that 
thing in itself exists beyond all possible cognition.

The pioneer of Peircean semeiotic strongly disagrees, and so do most (maybe 
all) of his successors in that field. Your claims continue to reflect a 
fundamental misunderstanding of it, which you are apparently unwilling to 
acknowledge, let alone correct.

JRKC: All objects in themselves - O - are experienced individually, "refracted" 
or "represented" ("copied", Kant says) and thus, within cognition never can be 
as they are in themselves for the in itself is the very derivational "source" 
of the "copy/representational".

Again, a cognition of an external thing is not a copy or reproduction of that 
thing, nor is it identical to that thing. It is a representation (sign) of that 
thing, which is why a solid grasp of Peircean semeiotic and its peculiar 
terminology is a prerequisite for engaging in productive dialogue on this 
subject.

JRKC: The thing/object exists to/for people, but as individuals, we never 
derive the same "copy" of the thing, even the same thing.

Again, "copy" is an inaccurate term in this context. Different people routinely 
perceive the same external thing, but their percepts are different signs of 
that same external thing, i.e., they are determined by the same dynamical 
object.

JRKC: Right, but all they perceive, all we perceive, is necesarily 
differentiated representation of the "same" object.

No, what we perceive are not representations of an external thing, we directly 
perceive that external thing itself. The percept is a representation (sign) 
determined by that dynamical object, and the resulting perceptual judgment is 
the dynamical interpretant that the percept determines. In any actual situation 
where all the perceivers have fallible habits of interpretation, which are 
different, their perceptual judgments as dynamical interpretants can likewise 
be different. However, in the ideal situation where all the perceivers would 
have infallible habits of interpretation--e.g., an infinite community after 
infinite investigation--all their perceptual judgments as dynamical 
interpretants would match the final interpretant, thus representing the 
external thing as it is in itself.

JRKC: Yes, but those things we cognize - physical - are necessarily independent 
of that cognition. In themselves. That's the categorical error people are 
making here.

On the contrary, not one participant in this discussion is making that 
"categorical error"--again, no one is disputing that external things are 
independent of any actual cognitions or other representations of them. The 
dynamical object determines any sign that represents it, but the sign does not 
affect its dynamical object in any way. Nevertheless, this does not entail that 
external things cannot possibly be cognized or otherwise represented as they 
really are.

JRKC: But if the object is cognizable as it is in itself, (thus not in itself 
at all, in the Kantian sense), then there are no "copies" qua "representations" 
which differ according to individuality (according to "different perceptual 
perspectives and faculties").

No, this is false. Again, the fact that we do not actually cognize the object 
as it is in itself (multiple dynamical interpretants) does not entail that we 
cannot possibly cognize the object as it is in itself (one final interpretant). 
Again, this is what makes logic as semeiotic a normative science--the goal of 
sincere inquiry is to conform all our dynamical interpretants of signs to their 
final interpretants, such that all our cognitions about external things would 
ultimately represent them as they are in 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

[JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY]

John, Jon, list,
I suggest that Jack should study Peirce's writings about phaneroscopy, the 
normative sciences, cognition, and scientific methodology. I'm sure that the 
rest of us can suggest passages in Peirce's writings he should consider.

Absolutely, John. This is a "framing" issue. It wouldn't bother me in the 
slightest if my thesis explores the inability to cognize things as they are, 
and then explores the problems with that position (and we have had an immense 
back and forth over these very nuances). Whatever the truth is, (closest to 
it), is that which must decide, now, for me, within the analytical/academic 
frame.

That is why I truly welcome all suggestions. Even if I disagree, now, in the 
tradition of Socratic Heurism, the disagreement is worthwhile we arrive at some 
form of consensus regarding the truth of the matter. That is why I ask @Jon 
Alan Schmidt for materials, which I know he 
knows far better than I do, regarding "interpretants" and "dynamical objects". 
I need to study certain Peircean nuance for I have the Kantian nuance already.

Now, I'm with you - you are closer to intermediary here - but not against any 
person, just against/for a "position" (which is the spirit of all debate 
really).

That is, this - academia - can get bitter at times, and I am guilty of that, 
too, but that's not the overarching theological principle (to my mind, or, I 
think, to most or all people here).

Jack

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of John F Sowa 
Sent: Tuesday, June 13, 2023 5:24 AM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt ; Peirce-L 

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the 
Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

Jon and Jack,

I believe that there is a way out of this impasse.   Although I agree that 
Jon's conclusion is correct, I believe that we have to state the issues of 
perception, cognition, and semeiotic with more precision,   In particular, it's 
essential to state the issues in terms of Peirce's first three sciences:  (1) 
Pure mathematics, which includes mathematical logic; (2) phaneroscopy, which 
receives an uninterpreted mental experience prior to any application of signs 
of any kind; and (3) the normative sciences of (3a) esthetics (beauty); (3b) 
ethics (goodness); and (3c) logic as semeiotic (truth).

Following are the two critical statements by Jack and Jon:

JRKC:  All objects in themselves - O - are experienced individually, 
"refracted" or "represented" ("copied", Kant says) and thus, within cognition 
never can be as they are in themselves for the in itself is the very 
derivational "source" of the "copy/representational".

JAS:  Again, a cognition of an external thing is not a copy or reproduction of 
that thing, nor is it identical to that thing. It is a representation (sign) of 
that thing, which is why a solid grasp of Peircean semeiotic and its peculiar 
terminology is a prerequisite for engaging in productive dialogue on this 
subject.

I agree with Jon.  But it's important to distinguish the role of the first two 
sciences, which precede semeiotic.  Mathematics provides and open-ended supply 
of structural patterns (in Peirce's terms, diagrams or even stereoscopic moving 
images).   The senses provide mental experience from all five senses of 
external stimuli and all internal stimuli.  That experience, which Peirce 
called the phaneron is not a representation of anything.  It just is a 
primitive, completely uninterpreted experience.  The first step of phaneroscopy 
is to retrieve or generate new mathematical patterns or retrieve previous 
(habitual) patterns that correspond (as accurately as possible in just a few 
milliseconds) to the patterns in the phaneron.

Peirce called that initial pattern an uninterpreted icon.  The icon is a sign 
prior to any recognition.  The interpretation of the icon as a token of some 
type in the next stage is performed by the normative sciences.  At the end of 
that stage the token is recognized and evaluated as a sign of the beauty, 
goodness, and truth of the object that was perceived.

Note that the phrase "in itself" never occurs in this explanation.  Nobody ever 
thinks about whether they have seen an object in itself.  Their main concern is 
whether it's a familiar (habitual) sign of something they know from previous 
experience, a new instance of a familiar type, or a new type they are seeing 
for the first time.  The question about a "thing in itself" would never occur 
to anybody except a philosopher or perhaps a scientist.

Since Peirce was both a philosopher and a scientist, we should ask how he would 
explain that process of perception and interpretation.   I suggest that Jack 
should study Peirce's writings about phaneroscopy, the normative sciences, 
cognition, and scientific methodology.  I'm sure that the rest of us can 
suggest passages in Peirce's writings he should consider.

At no step along the way does a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

[John F Sowa]

Jon and Jack,

I believe that there is a way out of this impasse.   Although I agree that 
Jon's conclusion is correct, I believe that we have to state the issues of 
perception, cognition, and semeiotic with more precision,   In particular, it's 
essential to state the issues in terms of Peirce's first three sciences:  (1) 
Pure mathematics, which includes mathematical logic; (2) phaneroscopy, which 
receives an uninterpreted mental experience prior to any application of signs 
of any kind; and (3) the normative sciences of (3a) esthetics (beauty); (3b) 
ethics (goodness); and (3c) logic as semeiotic (truth).

Following are the two critical statements by Jack and Jon:

JRKC:  All objects in themselves - O - are experienced individually, 
"refracted" or "represented" ("copied", Kant says) and thus, within cognition 
never can be as they are in themselves for the in itself is the very 
derivational "source" of the "copy/representational".

JAS:  Again, a cognition of an external thing is not a copy or reproduction of 
that thing, nor is it identical to that thing. It is a representation (sign) of 
that thing, which is why a solid grasp of Peircean semeiotic and its peculiar 
terminology is a prerequisite for engaging in productive dialogue on this 
subject.

I agree with Jon.  But it's important to distinguish the role of the first two 
sciences, which precede semeiotic.  Mathematics provides and open-ended supply 
of structural patterns (in Peirce's terms, diagrams or even stereoscopic moving 
images).   The senses provide mental experience from all five senses of 
external stimuli and all internal stimuli.  That experience, which Peirce 
called the phaneron is not a representation of anything.  It just is a 
primitive, completely uninterpreted experience.  The first step of phaneroscopy 
is to retrieve or generate new mathematical patterns or retrieve previous 
(habitual) patterns that correspond (as accurately as possible in just a few 
milliseconds) to the patterns in the phaneron.

Peirce called that initial pattern an uninterpreted icon.  The icon is a sign 
prior to any recognition.  The interpretation of the icon as a token of some 
type in the next stage is performed by the normative sciences.  At the end of 
that stage the token is recognized and evaluated as a sign of the beauty, 
goodness, and truth of the object that was perceived.

Note that the phrase "in itself" never occurs in this explanation.  Nobody ever 
thinks about whether they have seen an object in itself.  Their main concern is 
whether it's a familiar (habitual) sign of something they know from previous 
experience, a new instance of a familiar type, or a new type they are seeing 
for the first time.  The question about a "thing in itself" would never occur 
to anybody except a philosopher or perhaps a scientist.

Since Peirce was both a philosopher and a scientist, we should ask how he would 
explain that process of perception and interpretation.   I suggest that Jack 
should study Peirce's writings about phaneroscopy, the normative sciences, 
cognition, and scientific methodology.  I'm sure that the rest of us can 
suggest passages in Peirce's writings he should consider.

At no step along the way does a question about an unobservable Ding an sich or 
an unknowable noumenon arise.  That is a concept that normal people, including 
highly educated scientists and philosophers, never find useful or perplexing.  
If Kant had never mentioned the idea, it's highly unlikely that anybody else 
would ever notice it or be puzzled by it.

It's a concept that does not explain or clarify anything.  It's just a useless 
puzzle for idle minds.

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 

Jack, List:

JRKC: There is no Peircean Semeiotic, whatsoever - without the Kantian thing in 
itself. ... It isn't possible for Peircean Semeiotic to be coherent except that 
thing in itself exists beyond all possible cognition.

The pioneer of Peircean semeiotic strongly disagrees, and so do most (maybe 
all) of his successors in that field. Your claims continue to reflect a 
fundamental misunderstanding of it, which you are apparently unwilling to 
acknowledge, let alone correct.

JRKC: All objects in themselves - O - are experienced individually, "refracted" 
or "represented" ("copied", Kant says) and thus, within cognition never can be 
as they are in themselves for the in itself is the very derivational "source" 
of the "copy/representational".

Again, a cognition of an external thing is not a copy or reproduction of that 
thing, nor is it identical to that thing. It is a representation (sign) of that 
thing, which is why a solid grasp of Peircean semeiotic and its peculiar 
terminology is a prerequisite for engaging in productive dialogue on this 
subject.

JRKC: The thing/object exists to/for people, but as individuals, we never 
derive the same "copy" of the thing, even the same thing.

Again, "copy" is an inaccurate term 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jack, List:

JRKC: There is no Peircean Semeiotic, whatsoever - without the Kantian
thing in itself. ... It isn't possible for Peircean Semeiotic to be
coherent except that thing in itself exists beyond all possible cognition.


The pioneer of Peircean semeiotic strongly disagrees, and so do most (maybe
all) of his successors in that field. Your claims continue to reflect a
fundamental misunderstanding of it, which you are apparently unwilling to
acknowledge, let alone correct.

JRKC: All objects in themselves - O - are experienced individually,
"refracted" or "represented" ("copied", Kant says) and thus, within
cognition never can be as they are in themselves for the in itself is the
very derivational "source" of the "copy/representational".


Again, a cognition of an external thing is not a *copy *or *reproduction *of
that thing, nor is it *identical *to that thing. It is a
*representation *(sign)
of that thing, which is why a solid grasp of Peircean semeiotic and its
peculiar terminology is a prerequisite for engaging in productive dialogue
on this subject.

JRKC: The thing/object exists to/for people, but as individuals, we never
derive the same "copy" of the thing, even the same thing.


Again, "copy" is an inaccurate term in this context. Different people
routinely perceive the same external thing, but their percepts are
different *signs *of that same external thing, i.e., they are determined by
the same dynamical object.

JRKC: Right, but all they perceive, all we perceive, is necesarily
differentiated representation of the "same" object.


No, what we perceive are not *representations *of an external thing, we
directly perceive that external thing *itself*. The percept is a
representation (sign) determined by that dynamical object, and the
resulting perceptual judgment is the dynamical interpretant that the
percept determines. In any *actual *situation where all the perceivers
have *fallible
*habits of interpretation, which are different, their perceptual judgments
as dynamical interpretants can likewise be different. However, in the *ideal
*situation where all the perceivers would have *infallible *habits of
interpretation--e.g., an infinite community after infinite
investigation--all their perceptual judgments as dynamical interpretants
would match the *final *interpretant, thus representing the external thing
as it is in itself.

JRKC: Yes, but those things we cognize - physical - are necessarily
independent of that cognition. In themselves. That's the categorical error
people are making here.


On the contrary, not one participant in this discussion is making that
"categorical error"--again, no one is disputing that external things are
independent of any *actual *cognitions or other representations of them.
The dynamical object determines any sign that represents it, but the sign
does not affect its dynamical object in any way. Nevertheless, this does
not entail that external things cannot *possibly *be cognized or otherwise
represented as they really are.

JRKC: But if the object is cognizable as it is in itself, (thus not in
itself at all, in the Kantian sense), then there are no "copies" qua
"representations" which differ according to individuality (according to
"different perceptual perspectives and faculties").


No, this is false. Again, the fact that we do not *actually *cognize the
object as it is in itself (multiple dynamical interpretants) does not
entail that we cannot *possibly* cognize the object as it is in itself (one
final interpretant). Again, this is what makes logic as semeiotic a *normative
*science--the goal of sincere inquiry is to *conform *all our dynamical
interpretants of signs to their final interpretants, such that all our
cognitions about external things would *ultimately *represent them as they
are in themselves, if the investigation were carried out far enough.

JRKC: I have traced the nuance precisely, in longer form, yet to be
published, as to where Peirce goes categorically wrong ... he is wrong
insofar as he says you can cognize the thing in itself. It's just not true.


I have traced the nuance precisely, throughout this lengthy exchange,
available in the online List archive for anyone to review, as to where Cody
goes categorically wrong. He is wrong insofar as he says that it is
impossible *in principle* to cognize the thing in itself. It's just not
true.

As these deliberately parallel statements reflect, we are at an impasse,
having laid out our views and the reasoning behind them to the best of our
ability. I am glad that we have managed to stay polite and respectful, but
at this point, I am tired of repeating myself, and my guess is that you
feel the same. As a concluding summary from my standpoint, I offer these
passages, some of which I have quoted previously.

CSP: Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of
logical [i.e., semeiotic] principles not merely as regulatively valid, but
as truths of being. Accordingly, it is to be 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

[John F Sowa]

Jack,

All the discussion in this list has given you a huge amount of material for 
your thesis.  I'll admit that some of the arguments did not refute the claim 
about an incognizable Ding an sich.

JRKC:  "There is no Peircean Semeiotic, whatsoever - without the Kantian thing 
in itself. The object as thing must be in itself beyond all possible cognition 
and experience."

But I'll reformulate the issues in a way that is consistent with Peirce and 
with all the valid observations that anyone has mentioned during the debates in 
this thread:

JFS:  "Peirce's semeiotic is a theory of the ways that living organisms 
perceive and conceive physical things in an open-ended variety of ways.  No 
single perception can derive all possible information about a physical thing, 
but there is no reason for assuming that physical things have any incognizable 
aspects that would forever be hidden from discovery by scientific methodology."

This statement avoids putting the word "not" in front of your original 
statement.   It just avoids making any claims about the existence or 
nonexistence of something that is truly unknowable.

Does it really exist?  Yes, but only in the imagination of Kant and his true 
believers.

John
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Supplement: How can you represent the absence of representation? You can, by calling it "nothing". But that cannot be true. So it is possible to represent something that isn´t there, that is a falsity. So you cannot believe in representation. So you cannot prove anything by showing how or how not it may be represented. You can never know, whether something is a true representation, or just a presentation. I don´t believe in a presentation, that I don´t have presented myself, would Churchill say.



Jack, list,

 

I am not the one able to forgive you using the term "silicon valley idiots", because I cannot see any unjustifiedness of this term. I am happy, that you are so clearly opposed against my fear, which is caused initially by buddhism, and amplified by Hollywood blockbuster, er, -ism. I also see, that "nothing" cannot exist, i think, with this aspect, Hegel was right. I hope, that all the digital nonsensism, that is contemporarily going around, will soon "self-implode". When where I usually live will be face recognition like in China, i will paint my face before going out. Still i don´t understand, what you mean by "angle": Is this a metaphor of a lever which reqires a fixed point and, and, if actuated, does a movement that opens an angle? Then the first premiss would not be an angle, but a fixed point, is that so? Anyway, I feel the same reluctance like you do, but always am open minded towards any paranoia. Then i always need a second opinion to exclude it. One last question: What is superior, and in which aspect, to deduction?

 

Best

 

Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Sonntag, 11. Juni 2023 um 18:54 Uhr
Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" 
An: "Helmut Raulien" 
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" , "s...@bestweb.net" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))





 
If these program parts would develop an intelligence comparable to our´s, would they see, that they are just program parts consisting of ones and zeroes?


Well then they would never have an intelligence comparable to humans. For life - organic - has no innate "angles" as such and no one can prove that it does (i.e., the lack of proof is because it has no angles to begin with). The concept of "angle" is received aposteriori and then, via mathematic, becomes standard. All mathematic, even that part which pretends or thinks it isn't of the angle, is of the angle.

 

My point: there can be no equivalent to the organic (this hybrid scenario you see silicon valley idiots, forgive the term, promoting is degenerative). It's of the cyborg manifesto but without the warning against.

 

As for the Matrix, that simulacra scenario is itself a fallacy. That fallacy, dualist, in nature, (I explicate it elsewhere), is such that it never can exist (if made, it will self-implode).

 

But my petulant diatribe aside, "nothing would be real, all would be an illusion". "Nothing" is itself a relational concept (it cannot exist). How can you represent the absence of representation? It's not even a negative term, it's just "not true". But if we assume illusory, then the existence of the illusory is a "reality".

 

As for proof: I only use deduction because people, in philosophy, tend to use it. I think it far too "square" in all honesty to understand the greater nuances. But then there are logical modes which are superior (and which I am learning continuously).

 

The "if... then..." format is irritating. "If the sun exists". You're right: why "if"? Propositional logic - yes, but it's apriori. Thus to transcend propositional logic is what I am trying to do (but even the non-linear has an irritatingly linear form to it).

 

Best

 

Jack

 

 

 

 


From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: Sunday, June 11, 2023 5:42 PM
To: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
Cc: Peirce-L ; Jon Alan Schmidt ; s...@bestweb.net 
Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

 




 


Jack, list,

 

A proof must resist all "If"s. Can it resist the following, quite weird "If"? There are evolution experiments with computers. Program parts with the ability to interact and to learn are implemented in a virtual, let´s say, matrix. If these program parts would develop an intelligence comparable to our´s, would they see, that they are just program parts consisting of ones and zeroes? Maybe not? And maybe we are such program parts? Maybe on a quantum computer? I hope not, but what if? Then nothing would be in itself, nothing would be real, all would be an illusion. Like the buddhists say, they like it that way, I don´t. But, by them, the suspicion is there. But might it be proven, if it was so, or disproven if it wasn´t?


 

Best

 

Helmut


Gesendet: Sonntag, 11. Juni 2023 um 16:29 Uhr
Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" 
An: "Peirce-L" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" , "s...@bestweb.net" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

[Helmut Raulien]

Jack, list,

 

I am not the one able to forgive you using the term "silicon valley idiots", because I cannot see any unjustifiedness of this term. I am happy, that you are so clearly opposed against my fear, which is caused initially by buddhism, and amplified by Hollywood blockbuster, er, -ism. I also see, that "nothing" cannot exist, i think, with this aspect, Hegel was right. I hope, that all the digital nonsensism, that is contemporarily going around, will soon "self-implode". When where I usually live will be face recognition like in China, i will paint my face before going out. Still i don´t understand, what you mean by "angle": Is this a metaphor of a lever which reqires a fixed point and, and, if actuated, does a movement that opens an angle? Then the first premiss would not be an angle, but a fixed point, is that so? Anyway, I feel the same reluctance like you do, but always am open minded towards any paranoia. Then i always need a second opinion to exclude it. One last question: What is superior, and in which aspect, to deduction?

 

Best

 

Helmut

 
 

Gesendet: Sonntag, 11. Juni 2023 um 18:54 Uhr
Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" 
An: "Helmut Raulien" 
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" , "s...@bestweb.net" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))





 
If these program parts would develop an intelligence comparable to our´s, would they see, that they are just program parts consisting of ones and zeroes?


Well then they would never have an intelligence comparable to humans. For life - organic - has no innate "angles" as such and no one can prove that it does (i.e., the lack of proof is because it has no angles to begin with). The concept of "angle" is received aposteriori and then, via mathematic, becomes standard. All mathematic, even that part which pretends or thinks it isn't of the angle, is of the angle.

 

My point: there can be no equivalent to the organic (this hybrid scenario you see silicon valley idiots, forgive the term, promoting is degenerative). It's of the cyborg manifesto but without the warning against.

 

As for the Matrix, that simulacra scenario is itself a fallacy. That fallacy, dualist, in nature, (I explicate it elsewhere), is such that it never can exist (if made, it will self-implode).

 

But my petulant diatribe aside, "nothing would be real, all would be an illusion". "Nothing" is itself a relational concept (it cannot exist). How can you represent the absence of representation? It's not even a negative term, it's just "not true". But if we assume illusory, then the existence of the illusory is a "reality".

 

As for proof: I only use deduction because people, in philosophy, tend to use it. I think it far too "square" in all honesty to understand the greater nuances. But then there are logical modes which are superior (and which I am learning continuously).

 

The "if... then..." format is irritating. "If the sun exists". You're right: why "if"? Propositional logic - yes, but it's apriori. Thus to transcend propositional logic is what I am trying to do (but even the non-linear has an irritatingly linear form to it).

 

Best

 

Jack

 

 

 

 


From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: Sunday, June 11, 2023 5:42 PM
To: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
Cc: Peirce-L ; Jon Alan Schmidt ; s...@bestweb.net 
Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

 




 


Jack, list,

 

A proof must resist all "If"s. Can it resist the following, quite weird "If"? There are evolution experiments with computers. Program parts with the ability to interact and to learn are implemented in a virtual, let´s say, matrix. If these program parts would develop an intelligence comparable to our´s, would they see, that they are just program parts consisting of ones and zeroes? Maybe not? And maybe we are such program parts? Maybe on a quantum computer? I hope not, but what if? Then nothing would be in itself, nothing would be real, all would be an illusion. Like the buddhists say, they like it that way, I don´t. But, by them, the suspicion is there. But might it be proven, if it was so, or disproven if it wasn´t?


 

Best

 

Helmut


Gesendet: Sonntag, 11. Juni 2023 um 16:29 Uhr
Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" 
An: "Peirce-L" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" , "s...@bestweb.net" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))





 
There is no point in wasting time and paper (or electrons) in arguing about the details.


John, whilst I agree in spirit, I do think it is necessary in practice. For the details are categorically fundamental here.

 

That is, there either is an object which can be cognized as it is in itself, or there is an object in itself which can never be cognized as it is in itself.

 

I set myself the task, then, of proving the necessary inference that the object as it is in itself cannot be 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

[Helmut Raulien]

 


Jack, list,

 

A proof must resist all "If"s. Can it resist the following, quite weird "If"? There are evolution experiments with computers. Program parts with the ability to interact and to learn are implemented in a virtual, let´s say, matrix. If these program parts would develop an intelligence comparable to our´s, would they see, that they are just program parts consisting of ones and zeroes? Maybe not? And maybe we are such program parts? Maybe on a quantum computer? I hope not, but what if? Then nothing would be in itself, nothing would be real, all would be an illusion. Like the buddhists say, they like it that way, I don´t. But, by them, the suspicion is there. But might it be proven, if it was so, or disproven if it wasn´t?


 

Best

 

Helmut


Gesendet: Sonntag, 11. Juni 2023 um 16:29 Uhr
Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" 
An: "Peirce-L" , "Jon Alan Schmidt" , "s...@bestweb.net" 
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))





 
There is no point in wasting time and paper (or electrons) in arguing about the details.


John, whilst I agree in spirit, I do think it is necessary in practice. For the details are categorically fundamental here.

 

That is, there either is an object which can be cognized as it is in itself, or there is an object in itself which can never be cognized as it is in itself.

 

I set myself the task, then, of proving the necessary inference that the object as it is in itself cannot be cognized (this was not something I had intended to do, it merely came, naturally, as it were, from a series of related, but not precisely the same, necessities [academic/personal).

 

I take the canon, as it were, then, as a structure. And it - the in itself - will either live or die by its necessity of explaining (necessarily) those core elements of the human sciences/arts which I am empirically setting about re-arranging. For example, poverty of stimulus, within an already extant analysis cannot be - insofar as I can see/logically prove - except that the thing in itself is (and that poverty of stimulus is, now, proven, to me, here, I mean, is not in doubt [within a Peircean assonant framework, too]).

 

Thus, I wish to avoid all bickering - honestly, and we are all perhaps guilty of that from time to time - but the minor details here are major categorical issues which explicate the very nuance which thus ignites the very realm of inquiry we all aspire to.

 

Best

 

Jack

 

 


From: John F Sowa 
Sent: Sunday, June 11, 2023 6:02 AM
To: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY ; Peirce-L ; Jon Alan Schmidt 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

 




Jack, Jeff, Jon, John Shook, List,

 

Peirce had a very high regard for Kant.  The disagreement about the Ding-an-sich or noumenon is based on just one fundamental principle:  whether there is any aspect of the universe that is inherently unknowable.

 

Peirce was willing to admit that there were some things or some aspects of observable things that were unobservable by human senses because they were too big, too small, too far away, or unobservable by human senses.   However, he had over a century more information about the possibilities of scientific methodology  (or his own methodeutic and pragmaticism). 

 

He would admit (with Kant) that some aspects of things might be unobservable by the science of his day.  But he would not admit that there was anything that could never be known by whatever scientific methods could be developed in the future.

 

I believe that is all you have to say.  Just leave it as an open question.  Science has made enormous progress in the century after Peirce, but there are still huge amounts of unknown aspects about any living thing from a bacterium on up.  There is no point in wasting time and paper (or electrons) in arguing about the details.

 

John

 

 


From: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" 
Sent: 6/10/23 8:42 PM
To: Peirce-L , Jon Alan Schmidt , JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

 

Additionally:


"There is therefore only one way possible for my intuition to precede the actuality of the object and occur as an a priori cognition, namely if it contains nothing else except the form of sensibility, which in me as subject precedes all actual impressions through which I am affected by objects." -Kant: (§9)).
 

The above is what Peirce calls a diagrammatic icon insofar as Kant's thesis recurs, isomorphic, with respect to the below:

 

If the representation of the thing (in itself) contains only the physical form of the thing (in itself) as "representation/copy", then we may understand precisely why it is that Peircean Semeiotic, vis-a-vis generation/determination of interpretants and objects, which, structurally, correspond precisely to the below - via Marty's various writings, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

[JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY]

Jon, John, list,


There is no Peircean Semeiotic, whatsoever - without the Kantian thing in 
itself. The object as thing must be in itself beyond all possible cognition and 
experience.



H1)O(H2
H1[O'])O(H2[O']
-

)=experience, necessarily mediated, thus "representation/frame". "(" is but the 
corollary.
-

Now, all H1 to all possible Os = sui generis, the same structure.
All H2 to all possible Os = sui generis, the same structure.

All objects in themselves - O - are experienced individually, "refracted" or 
"represented" ("copied", Kant says) and thus, within cognition never can be as 
they are in themselves for the in itself is the very derivational "source" of 
the "copy/representational". It can be no simpler than that.


The very fact of difference is necessities by the conditions of existence (as 
Kant says). This means that we can understand individuality, even reproduction, 
insofar as we posit the thing in itself and its necessity. Cogito is 
aposteriori relative to this: to the very conditions for the possibility of 
existence (which we understand only through the physical appearance of things, 
represented to us/by us/through us, but necessarily not as they are in 
themselves even within these representations: cognitions which are 
object-derivational, never "object [thing] as it is in itself".

Peirce cannot posit the generation of interpretants/objects which correspond to 
semeiotic except that the above is true. It isn't possible for Peircean 
Semeiotic to be coherent except that thing in itself exists beyond all possible 
cognition. We can cognize that the thing in itself necessarily is, but we can 
never cognize what/how said thing (in itself) is in itself. For as we cognize 
any object, Peirce understands via [individual] representational modalities, we 
refract this individually - as many times as you like - wherein we make 
"copies" (representational) of the "object" as it is in itself which can only 
happen if it is in itself. Thus, axiomatic never alters.

The thing/object exists to/for people, but as individuals, we never derive the 
same "copy" of the thing, even the same thing. We may approximate something 
like consensus: fire is hot. Every person would seem to concur. But the 
capacity to agree, here, is necessitated by concurrence of individual 
experience of an objective quality which has to exist beyond the subjective 
representation of it.

1:The two different [humans] do not perceive two different "copies" of object 
1, they both directly perceive the very same object 1 itself.
2:However, their different perceptual perspectives and faculties give

them two different representations of object 1.



JAS:
1: The two different [humans] do not perceive two different "copies" of object 
1, they both directly perceive the very same object 1 itself.
2: However, their different perceptual perspectives and faculties give them two 
different representations of object 1.

Right, but all they perceive, all we perceive, is necesarily differentiated 
representation of the "same" object. What difference is there between these 
"two different representations" and the Kantian "copies" in the above?


"no one is disputing that those external things exist independently of those 
perceptions, cognitions, or other representations of them."

Yes, but those things we cognize - physical - are necessarily independent of 
that cognition. In themselves. That's the categorical error people are making 
here.

I mean, what is direct perception if via direct perception "different 
[individual] perspectives" necessitate "[individual] representations" of the 
same object? How does that differ from the thing in itself?


Consider:


H1)O(H2
H1[O'])O(H2[O']
---

Two perspectives, direct, but necessarily "individual" (thus mediated) of the 
"object":
"-- H1)O(H2 --".

Now, two "individual representations" of the "same" object: H1[1O'])O(H2[2O']

If "two different [people] do not perceive two different "copies" of [the 
object "O"], but [each] directly perceive the very same object [O] [as it is 
in] itself, then, how are "two different representations" [individual] of the 
"same" object, therefore necessitated?

For if the object is in itself, you can see, structurally and logically, why it 
is that Peirce's entire schema works. But if the object is cognizable as it is 
in itself, (thus not in itself at all, in the Kantian sense), then there are no 
"copies" qua "representations" which differ according to individuality 
(according to "different perceptual perspectives and faculties").

Peirce is unwilling to pay the Kantian price but insofar as I can tell his 
entire schema cannot work, at all, (which it does, btw), unless you understand 
the necessity of that price (and thus I understand his admission of it, whether 
people agree or not, as his own understanding of Kant as actually accurate).

I have traced the nuance precisely, in longer form,