Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity: explaining time, space and other sorts of laws

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS:  By 1911, he realized that his earlier terminology was an obstacle,
not an aid to understanding.  To emphasize the necessary and sufficient
core, he deliberately discarded most of his earlier terms.


He realized that *some*, perhaps even *much*, of his earlier terminology
was an obstacle; but obviously not *all *of it.

JFS:  Peirce had been following Clifford's terminology by using the words
'spot' and 'line', but I suspect that by 1911 he was aware that common
usage was moving away from that terminology.  That may be one reason why he
did not use the word 'spot' in 1911.


He did not use "Spot" in the letter to Mr. Kehler, but he did use it in
both R 669 and R 670, written only days earlier.  Technically, something is
not a Graph as defined by Clifford (and Sylvester) unless it includes both
Spots and Lines.

JFS:  In presenting EGs, Peirce made one fatal mistake.  He did not show
the mapping from Alpha and Beta to his algebraic notation of 1885.


Not systematically, which indeed would have likely been more effective than
the 55 pages of "Prolegomena" turned out to be; but there are some
manuscripts where he expressed the same Propositions using both notations,
side by side.

JFS:  A peg is not a predicate.  It's a point on a symbol that represents a
relation.  If the relation is N-adic that symbol will have N pegs where
lines of identity may be attached.


As I just posted in the other thread, Lines of Identity denote indefinite
individuals, Spots (words) denote general concepts, and Pegs signify
continuous predicates by which EGs as Propositions *attribute *concepts
(Spots) to individuals (Lines).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 12:14 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> > JFS:  I like the word peg, since it's iconic, and it doesn't
> > conflict with any term in Peirce's writings, modern logic,
> > linguistics, or mathematics.
> >
> > JAS:  So do I; and I also like the words Graph, Spot, and Line
> > for similar reasons.  As we have discussed before, Peirce
> > consistently employed these in accordance with his ethics of
> > terminology.
>
> No.  That does not follow from Peirce's ethics of terminology.
> Peirce frequently changed his definitions during his career.
>
> But those changes did not violate his ethical principles.
> He made the point that the person who coins a new term is bound
> by those principles *if and only if* other people adopt and use
> that term.
>
> For EGs, nobody but Peirce adopted his terminology during his
> lifetime.   By 1911, he realized that his earlier terminology
> was an obstacle, not an aid to understanding.  To emphasize the
> necessary and sufficient core, he deliberately discarded most
> of his earlier terms.
>
> To respect Peirce's decision, those terms should be relegated
> to footnotes or to scholarly analyses of his development.
>
> > [CSP] I show that the only way is to make the spots represent
> > relations and the lines the correlates.
> >
> > [JAS] it confirms my eventual decision to give up on straightforwardly
> > interpreting Spots as subjects and Lines as predicates.  It even
> > conforms to how we routinely use diagrams in structural engineering
> > -- Lines represent members, Spots (nodes) represent connections.
>
> Four comments:
>
>   1. Thank you for acknowledging that point.
>
>   2. But it's important to note that Peirce's algebraic notation
>  of 1885, with some alternate symbols by Peano, has become the
>  universal standard for predicate calculus.
>
>   3. Peirce was aware of those developments, and he did make some
>  concessions to the trends in his own choice of vocabulary in
>  later years.  For example, he was using the word 'relation'
>  instead of 'relative'.
>
>   4. Your own use of the word 'node' in "Spots (nodes)" shows the
>  need for clarification for a modern audience.  Peirce had been
>  following Clifford's terminology by using the words 'spot' and
>  'line', but I suspect that by 1911 he was aware that common
>  usage was moving away from that terminology.  That may be
>  one reason why he did not use the word 'spot' in 1911.
>
> In presenting EGs, Peirce made one fatal mistake.  He did not
> show the mapping from Alpha and Beta to his algebraic notation
> of 1885.  By 1900, all the major logicians and their students
> were using Peirce's algebra as presented by Schröder and Peano.
>
> As Peirce said many times, he did not think in words.  He thought
> directly in diagrams and the operations upon them.  Logicians from
> Boole to the 21st c think in terms of algebraic diagrams.  In order
> to get them to understand the power of 2D diagrams, the words are
> irrelevant.  The only thing that matters is the mapping from the
> 1D algebra to and from the 2D (or 3D) graphs.
>
> > [JFS] Since I'm trying to convert m

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity: explaining time, space and other sorts of laws

[Helmut Raulien]

List,

 

I just have read a book from Francois Jullien: "There is no such thing as a cultural identity". I think it fits to the graphs topic: The main thesis is, that "distance" is often conflated with "distinction". Cultures and cultural traits may have a distance, and in between this distance interesting things happen. But they are not a matter of distinction, classification, and "identity", rather of resources accessible by everybody, also by  those who are strangers to the regarded culture. So there is no "cut" in between.

 

In my terms, I would say, that this is a matter of classification versus composition. Classes have a cut in between, while composition in an EG is symbolized just by adjoining elements. But in a composition the elements may have a smaller or larger distance between them. But this distance is not symolized in EGs. Maybe it might be?

 

Helmut

 

 

 

 

 

03. Mai 2019 um 17:01 Uhr

 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:

 







John, List:

 




JFS:  I like the word peg, since it's iconic, and it doesn't conflict with any term in Peirce's writings, modern logic, linguistics, or mathematics.




 

So do I; and I also like the words Graph, Spot, and Line for similar reasons.  As we have discussed before, Peirce consistently employed these in accordance with his ethics of terminology.

 






CSP:  By a graph (a word overworked of late years), I, for my part, following my friends Clifford and Sylvester, the introducers of the term, understand in general a diagram composed principally of spots and of lines connecting certain of the spots. (CP 4.535; 1906)






 

He elsewhere cited Kempe, as well, but made a major adjustment when developing Entitative Graphs and then Existential Graphs.

 






CSP:  I show that Kempe’s method could never satisfactorily represent a proposition in the logic of relatives. The reason is that Kempe attempts to make the spots of his diagrams represent the objects and the lines connecting them the relations. I show that the only way is to make the spots represent relations and the lines the correlates. This is the illuminating, and altogether original, and far from obvious key to the problem. (letter to F. C. Russell; 1896 July 16)






 

I just came across this passage yesterday, and needless to say, it confirms my eventual decision to give up on straightforwardly interpreting Spots as subjects and Lines as predicates.  It even conforms to how we routinely use diagrams in structural engineering--Lines represent members, Spots (nodes) represent connections.  However, I still maintain that the meaning of any discrete predicate (Spot) can be analyzed into a hypostatically abstracted subject (word) and a continuous predicate (Peg); more to come on that in the other thread.

 










JFS:  Since I'm trying to convert modern logicians to Peirce's notation, I have to juggle both sets of terms.  I prefer to think in terms of the symbols and minimize the number of words used to describe them.










 

Understood; as I have repeatedly acknowledged, that approach makes sense for your purposes.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt






 


On Thu, May 2, 2019 at 10:39 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

On 5/2/2019 11:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> He did not talk about predicates, either.  That eliminates yet another
> word.  In fact, he simply stated, "Every word makes an assertion," and
> "By a '/graph/' I mean /the way/ in which a given assertion is scribed"
> (NEM 3:162-163).  On the other hand, I find it noteworthy that he /did
> /talk about subjects--"Indivisible graphs usually carry '/pegs/' which
> are places on their periphery appropriated to denote, each of them, one
> of the subjects of the graph" (NEM 3:164).

That's fine.   Modern terminology uses the word 'argument'
instead of 'subject', but both words are overused for
different purposes.

I like the word peg, since it's iconic, and it doesn't
conflict with any term in Peirce's writings, modern logic,
linguistics, or mathematics.

In modern (20th - 21st c) terminology, the word 'predicate'
is usually used as the name of a relation.  The relation is
the abstract entity, and the predicate is a name for it.

Since I'm trying to convert modern logicians to Peirce's
notation, I have to juggle both sets of terms.  I prefer
to think in terms of the symbols and minimize the number
of words used to describe them.

John






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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity: explaining time, space and other sorts of laws

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS:  I like the word peg, since it's iconic, and it doesn't conflict with
any term in Peirce's writings, modern logic, linguistics, or mathematics.


So do I; and I also like the words Graph, Spot, and Line for similar
reasons.  As we have discussed before, Peirce consistently employed these
in accordance with his ethics of terminology.

CSP:  By a *graph *(a word overworked of late years), I, for my part,
following my friends Clifford and Sylvester, the introducers of the term,
understand in general a diagram composed principally of spots and of lines
connecting certain of the spots. (CP 4.535; 1906)


He elsewhere cited Kempe, as well, but made a major adjustment when
developing Entitative Graphs and then Existential Graphs.

CSP:  I show that Kempe’s method could never satisfactorily represent a
proposition in the logic of relatives. The reason is that Kempe attempts to
make the spots of his diagrams represent the objects and the lines
connecting them the relations. I show that the only way is to make the
spots represent relations and the lines the correlates. This is the
illuminating, and altogether original, and far from obvious key to the
problem. (letter to F. C. Russell; 1896 July 16)


I just came across this passage yesterday, and needless to say, it confirms
my eventual decision to give up on straightforwardly interpreting Spots as
subjects and Lines as predicates.  It even conforms to how we routinely use
diagrams in structural engineering--Lines represent members, Spots (nodes)
represent connections.  However, I still maintain that the *meaning
*of any *discrete
*predicate (Spot) can be analyzed into a *hypostatically abstracted*
subject (word) and a *continuous *predicate (Peg); more to come on that in
the other thread.

JFS:  Since I'm trying to convert modern logicians to Peirce's notation, I
have to juggle both sets of terms.  I prefer to think in terms of the
symbols and minimize the number of words used to describe them.


Understood; as I have repeatedly acknowledged, that approach makes sense
for your purposes.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, May 2, 2019 at 10:39 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 5/2/2019 11:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> > He did not talk about predicates, either.  That eliminates yet another
> > word.  In fact, he simply stated, "Every word makes an assertion," and
> > "By a '/graph/' I mean /the way/ in which a given assertion is scribed"
> > (NEM 3:162-163).  On the other hand, I find it noteworthy that he /did
> > /talk about subjects--"Indivisible graphs usually carry '/pegs/' which
> > are places on their periphery appropriated to denote, each of them, one
> > of the subjects of the graph" (NEM 3:164).
>
> That's fine.   Modern terminology uses the word 'argument'
> instead of 'subject', but both words are overused for
> different purposes.
>
> I like the word peg, since it's iconic, and it doesn't
> conflict with any term in Peirce's writings, modern logic,
> linguistics, or mathematics.
>
> In modern (20th - 21st c) terminology, the word 'predicate'
> is usually used as the name of a relation.  The relation is
> the abstract entity, and the predicate is a name for it.
>
> Since I'm trying to convert modern logicians to Peirce's
> notation, I have to juggle both sets of terms.  I prefer
> to think in terms of the symbols and minimize the number
> of words used to describe them.
>
> John
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity: explaining time, space and other sorts of laws

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS:  That is important.  Do you have a citation?


The work is still in preparation for publication, so I am not yet at
liberty to cite it.  I was working from memory earlier, and reviewing it
now, it does not actually explain the basis for the revised dating to
1911.  The timing of the letter to Mr. Kehler only days after the writing
of R 669 and R 670, and the switch from Cuts to shading between the latter
two manuscripts, are my own observations.

JFS:  In the 2D EGs of 1911 (NEM 3:162-169), he attached lines to words
that named predicates.  He did not talk about spots.  That eliminates one
more word.


He did not talk about predicates, either.  That eliminates yet another
word.  In fact, he simply stated, "Every word makes an assertion," and "By
a '*graph*' I mean *the way* in which a given assertion is scribed" (NEM
3:162-163).  On the other hand, I find it noteworthy that he *did *talk
about subjects--"Indivisible graphs usually carry '*pegs*' which are places
on their periphery appropriated to denote, each of them, one of the
subjects of the graph" (NEM 3:164).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, May 2, 2019 at 9:25 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> That is important.  Do you have a citation?
>
> JAS
> > I recently came across some research suggesting that the manuscript
> > pages for Peirce's "tutorial" on EGs were misfiled with R 514, and
> > do not actually date to 1909; rather, he likely wrote the material
> > either shortly before or at the same time as his June 22, 1911 letter
> > to Mr. Kehler.
>
> Since Peirce was always revising and restating his earlier writings,
> I had assumed that R 514 contained material from 1909 *plus* any
> revisions that he made while he was preparing the clean copy for
> his 1911 letter.  Peirce could never resist that temptation.
>
> JAS
> > I referred to Peirce's direct analogy between continuous motion and
> > semeiosis vs. discrete positions/instants and definite Propositions.
>
> Peirce's writings about continuity were based on mathematical
> axioms, many of which he discovered before or independently of
> Dedekind and Cantor.  The mappings from one version to another
> are precise applications of the axioms, not vague analogies.
>
> JAS
> > It seems safe to assume that what he had in mind for
> > "stereoscopic moving pictures" would have taken full
> > advantage of this conceptual correspondence.
>
> Yes.  But the term "conceptual correspondence" is too vague.
> Note what he said in NEM 3:191,
>
> CSP
> > I am convinced there is a far better [way of thinking], capable of
> > wonders; but the great cost of the apparatus forbids my learning it.
> > It consists in thinking in stereoscopic moving pictures.  Of course
> > one might substitute the real objects moving in solid space; and
> > that might not be so very unreasonably costly.
>
> Just looking at any movie in 1911 would be sufficient to give
> him an idea of a vague correspondence.  But when Peirce talked
> about "learning it", he meant writing a precise specification
> for moving objects in space.
>
> I believe that one reason why he made the drastic simplification
> in his terminology of 1911 is that he deleted any word that could
> not be generalized to 3D or moving 3D.
>
> He could generalize a shaded area to a shaded 3D region, but
> there is no way to generalize the recto and verso of a sheet
> with cuts that that allow a line on one side to "abut" a line
> on the other side.
>
> I suspect that he deleted the word 'spot' in 1911 because he was
> thinking of solid objects in his 3D graphs.  It was simpler to
> attach a line to an object (or some part of an object) than to
> attach it to a spot adjacent to that object.  In the 2D EGs of 1911
> (NEM 3:162-169), he attached lines to words that named predicates.
> He did not talk about spots.  That eliminates one more word.
>
> John
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity: explaining time, space and other sorts of laws

[John F Sowa]

Jon,

That is important.  Do you have a citation?

JAS

I recently came across some research suggesting that the manuscript
pages for Peirce's "tutorial" on EGs were misfiled with R 514, and
do not actually date to 1909; rather, he likely wrote the material
either shortly before or at the same time as his June 22, 1911 letter
to Mr. Kehler.


Since Peirce was always revising and restating his earlier writings,
I had assumed that R 514 contained material from 1909 *plus* any
revisions that he made while he was preparing the clean copy for
his 1911 letter.  Peirce could never resist that temptation.

JAS
I referred to Peirce's direct analogy between continuous motion and 
semeiosis vs. discrete positions/instants and definite Propositions.


Peirce's writings about continuity were based on mathematical
axioms, many of which he discovered before or independently of
Dedekind and Cantor.  The mappings from one version to another
are precise applications of the axioms, not vague analogies.

JAS

It seems safe to assume that what he had in mind for
"stereoscopic moving pictures" would have taken full
advantage of this conceptual correspondence.


Yes.  But the term "conceptual correspondence" is too vague.
Note what he said in NEM 3:191,

CSP

I am convinced there is a far better [way of thinking], capable of
wonders; but the great cost of the apparatus forbids my learning it.
It consists in thinking in stereoscopic moving pictures.  Of course
one might substitute the real objects moving in solid space; and
that might not be so very unreasonably costly.


Just looking at any movie in 1911 would be sufficient to give
him an idea of a vague correspondence.  But when Peirce talked
about "learning it", he meant writing a precise specification
for moving objects in space.

I believe that one reason why he made the drastic simplification
in his terminology of 1911 is that he deleted any word that could
not be generalized to 3D or moving 3D.

He could generalize a shaded area to a shaded 3D region, but
there is no way to generalize the recto and verso of a sheet
with cuts that that allow a line on one side to "abut" a line
on the other side.

I suspect that he deleted the word 'spot' in 1911 because he was
thinking of solid objects in his 3D graphs.  It was simpler to
attach a line to an object (or some part of an object) than to
attach it to a spot adjacent to that object.  In the 2D EGs of 1911
(NEM 3:162-169), he attached lines to words that named predicates.
He did not talk about spots.  That eliminates one more word.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity: explaining time, space and other sorts of laws

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

I did not say anything (yet) about continuous *predicates*; I referred to
Peirce's direct analogy between continuous *motion* and *semeiosis *vs.
discrete *positions/instants* and definite *Propositions*.  It seems safe
to assume that what he had in mind for "stereoscopic moving pictures" would
have taken full advantage of this conceptual correspondence.

I agree with what you quoted and stated below about the Line of Identity,
and it also applies to the Blank as the Graph of Coexistence; these always
have room for additional attachments, and thus are really representations
of *teridentity *and *tercoexistence*.  There are other continuous
predicates that only qualify as such because they cannot be further
analyzed into a subject and a *different *predicate--possessing a character
or belonging to a class/collection, represented by the single Peg of a
monadic Spot; and standing in a relation, represented by the multiple Pegs
of a dyadic or higher Spot.

FYI, I recently came across some research suggesting that the manuscript
pages for Peirce's "tutorial" on EGs were *misfiled *with R 514, and do not
actually date to 1909; rather, he likely wrote the material either shortly
before or at the same time as his June 22, 1911 letter to Mr. Kehler.  This
makes a lot of sense, given his abrupt shift from presenting Cuts as thin
oval lines in R 669 (May 25 - June 2) to instead advocating shading in R
670 (June 7-17).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, May 2, 2019 at 4:39 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 5/2/2019 11:09 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> > I intend to explore further the analogy that he drew between this
> > and continuous semeiosis vs. definite Propositions, which amount to
> > instantaneous snapshots of Arguments as captured by EGs on a Sheet
> > of Assertion.
>
> The continuous predicates have nothing to do with time or motion.
>
> For example, on p. NEM 3:164, Peirce wrote
> > The line of identity can be regarded as a graph composed of any
> > number of dyads "——is——" or as a single dyad.
>
> Continuity implies that the following graphs are synonymous:
>
> rose——red,  rose——is——red,  rose——is——is——is——is——red.
>
> But all three state logically equivalent propositions.  They
> describe a snapshot of a red rose.  The same principle holds
> for all other continuous predicates:  the graphs before and
> after any replacement of an ordinary predicate with a continuous
> predicate are logically equivalent.
>
> To represent time and motion in three dimensions, Peirce very
> much wanted to generalize the graphs to stereoscopic moving
> pictures.  See NEM 3:191 in the same letter to Mr. Kehler.
>
> For copies of those pages, see http://jfsowa.com/peirce/eg1911.pdf
>
> John
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity: explaining time, space and other sorts of laws

[John F Sowa]

On 5/2/2019 11:09 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
I intend to explore further the analogy that he drew between this 
and continuous semeiosis vs. definite Propositions, which amount to 
instantaneous snapshots of Arguments as captured by EGs on a Sheet 
of Assertion.


The continuous predicates have nothing to do with time or motion.

For example, on p. NEM 3:164, Peirce wrote

The line of identity can be regarded as a graph composed of any
number of dyads "——is——" or as a single dyad.


Continuity implies that the following graphs are synonymous:

   rose——red,  rose——is——red,  rose——is——is——is——is——red.

But all three state logically equivalent propositions.  They
describe a snapshot of a red rose.  The same principle holds
for all other continuous predicates:  the graphs before and
after any replacement of an ordinary predicate with a continuous
predicate are logically equivalent.

To represent time and motion in three dimensions, Peirce very
much wanted to generalize the graphs to stereoscopic moving
pictures.  See NEM 3:191 in the same letter to Mr. Kehler.

For copies of those pages, see http://jfsowa.com/peirce/eg1911.pdf

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity: explaining time, space and other sorts of laws

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, Stephen R., List:

For the record, I was not *bemoaning *Peirce's unawareness of Einstein's
insights or seeking to compare the greatness of the two men.  On the
contrary, I was simply pointing out that Peirce did not *need *Einstein in
order to recognize the more fundamental reality of *motion *through
continuous space-time vs. discrete *positions *in space at discrete
*instants *in time, which are *entia rationis*.  In the other thread, I
intend to explore further the analogy that he drew between this and
continuous semeiosis vs. definite Propositions, which amount to
instantaneous snapshots of Arguments as captured by EGs on a Sheet of
Assertion.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, May 1, 2019 at 7:20 PM Stephen Curtiss Rose 
wrote:

> You are on the mark. Peirce had it and your summary points to the pillars
> of his understanding. Quantum science is still iffy at bottom and the
> reason if that it cannot be encompassed by existing scientific method. But
> I do not think Peirce would have batted an eyelash. He was waiting for just
> such a proof of chance and his semiotics seems to be clearly to suggest the
> vague underpinnings of things now being batted about about the prevalence
> of information. Peirce is largely ignored by theologians save perhaps the
> late Daniel Day Williams with whom I studied anon. Glad to see this post. I
> do not think Jon's gist really is that far off but your points are girders
> in the basic structure of Peirce's thought.
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Wed, May 1, 2019 at 7:07 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
>> Hello Jon S, List,
>>
>> Let me start here:   "As Peirce recognized, despite not having the
>> benefit of Einstein's insights, Zeno's famous paradoxes are dissolved by
>> understanding *continuous *motion through space-time as a more
>> fundamental reality than *discrete *positions in space and/or moments in
>> time."
>>
>> Over the years, several of my colleagues have expressed a similar
>> sentiment:  if only Peirce had been around to see Einstein's great
>> discoveries concerning the special and general theories of relativity, then
>> he would have been in a much better position to understand the nature of
>> these things.
>>
>> My initial reaction to such expressions is that Peirce's fundamental
>> hypotheses concerning the nature of time and space--and the relations
>> between them--may very well run deeper and look further towards the
>> future than what Einstein had to offer.  Taking the discussion in lecture 8
>> of RLT as a starting point for a discussion, consider the following:
>>
>>
>>1.  As far as we are able to glean from his writings, Einstein does
>>not appear to accept the reality of chance.  In fact, he argues
>>against it. Peirce, on the other hand, holds that an appeal to the reality
>>of chance along with a tendency for relations between qualities and
>>habitual patterns of order to grow can explain how space, time and
>>the laws that govern them might have evolved.
>>2. Einstein does not appear to offer an adequate explanatory
>>hypothesis concerning the origins of the spatial and temporal relations
>>that hold between the kinetic energy that is initially distributed through
>>space shortly after the big bang. Peirce does offer a hypothesis, and I
>>find it somewhat plausible. More to the point, it seems especially
>>productive as compared to other competing hypotheses. The hypothesis is
>>that, from an initial condition of homogeneous possibility, the infinitude
>>of spatial and temporal dimensions differentiated and unfolded by a
>>process of the vague becoming more determinate. Homogeneity grows into
>>heterogeneity. From chance, order grows.
>>3. From an initial condition of enormous potential (e.g., much
>>concentrated potential energy), how did particles, nuclei, stars, atoms,
>>molecules, etc. come to be as natural kinds? Starting with the
>>explosion of the initial relatively mass-less force "particles"
>>radiating as distributed fields (e.g., photons and gluons), more stable
>>configurations of particle-like configurations of energy having
>>qualities of spin and charge were attracted to one another based on
>>the complementary character of their respective qualities. What law is at
>>work? Call it the law of mind, if you will. Or, call it the law governing
>>the association of the different qualities that energy may take based
>>on their respective relations of attractability and affectability.
>>
>>
>> While Peirce's grand hypotheses concerning the nature of time, space and
>> the initial spread of kinetic energy are more vague than the explanations
>> Einstein was able to offer, I think there may be principled limits to kinds
>> of mathem

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity: explaining time, space and other sorts of laws

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, list

Yes - David Bohm has some interesting theories about the 'implicate
order'. Fits in with Peirce, I think.

Paul Davies also had some interesting books [and edited collections]
on this.

Edwina
 On Thu 02/05/19 10:55 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 On 5/1/2019 7:06 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: 
 > Peirce's fundamental hypotheses concerning the nature of time 
 > and space--and the relations between them--may very well run 
 > deeper and look further towards the future than what Einstein 
 > had to offer. 
 To a large extent that is true.  Peirce knew that the orbit 
 of Mercury did not conform to Newton's theory of gravitation. 
 Newton claimed that the gravitational field follows an 
 inverse-square law. 
 But Peirce noted that the exponent for Mercury was not 2, but 2.01. 
 Many physicists claimed that was just an error in measurement, but 
 Peirce insisted that any error in the measurements was much less 
 than 0.5%.  And he was right. 
 Peirce also suspected that space was only approximately Euclidean. 
 He wanted to get funding to determine whether the sum of the 
 angles of a triangle at astronomical distances was precisely 
 180 degrees.  But the funding was denied. 
 Peirce also believed that the fundamental laws of physics had 
 evolved over time.  Today's theories predict that the four 
 fundamental forces (gravity, electromagnetism, and the strong 
 and weak nuclear forces) were indeed different at the time of 
 the Big Bang and shortly thereafter. 
 > Einstein does not appear to accept the reality of chance. 
 > In fact, he argues against it. 
 Yes.  Einstein never accepted the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. 
 In 1905, he wrote the fundamental paper that showed that light was 
 quantized in little packets (later called photons).   But he never 
 accepted the Heisenberg uncertainty principle or the claims that 
 the underlying laws of quantum mechanics are probabilistic. 
 > Call it the law of mind, if you will. Or, call it the law
governing 
 > the association of the different qualities that energy may take
based 
 > on their respective relations of attractability and affectability.

 David Bohm was a physicist who published fundamental research on 
 quantum mechanics and a widely-used textbook on QM.  But he also 
 published some intriguing ideas related to those issues.  Among 
 them, see  

http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/DavidBohm-WholenessAndTheImplicateOrder.pdf
[1] 
 John 


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/parse.php?redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gci.org.uk%2FDocuments%2FDavidBohm-WholenessAndTheImplicateOrder.pdf

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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity: explaining time, space and other sorts of laws

[John F Sowa]

On 5/1/2019 7:06 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:

Peirce's fundamental hypotheses concerning the nature of time
and space--and the relations between them--may very well run
deeper and look further towards the future than what Einstein
had to offer.


To a large extent that is true.  Peirce knew that the orbit
of Mercury did not conform to Newton's theory of gravitation.
Newton claimed that the gravitational field follows an
inverse-square law.

But Peirce noted that the exponent for Mercury was not 2, but 2.01.
Many physicists claimed that was just an error in measurement, but
Peirce insisted that any error in the measurements was much less
than 0.5%.  And he was right.

Peirce also suspected that space was only approximately Euclidean.
He wanted to get funding to determine whether the sum of the
angles of a triangle at astronomical distances was precisely
180 degrees.  But the funding was denied.

Peirce also believed that the fundamental laws of physics had
evolved over time.  Today's theories predict that the four
fundamental forces (gravity, electromagnetism, and the strong
and weak nuclear forces) were indeed different at the time of
the Big Bang and shortly thereafter.


Einstein does not appear to accept the reality of chance.
In fact, he argues against it.


Yes.  Einstein never accepted the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.
In 1905, he wrote the fundamental paper that showed that light was
quantized in little packets (later called photons).   But he never
accepted the Heisenberg uncertainty principle or the claims that
the underlying laws of quantum mechanics are probabilistic.


Call it the law of mind, if you will. Or, call it the law governing
the association of the different qualities that energy may take based
on their respective relations of attractability and affectability.


David Bohm was a physicist who published fundamental research on
quantum mechanics and a widely-used textbook on QM.  But he also
published some intriguing ideas related to those issues.  Among
them, see 
http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/DavidBohm-WholenessAndTheImplicateOrder.pdf


John

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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity: explaining time, space and other sorts of laws

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

amazon.com/author/stephenrose


-- Forwarded message -
From: Stephen Curtiss Rose 
Date: Wed, May 1, 2019 at 8:19 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity: explaining time, space and other sorts
of laws
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard 


You are on the mark. Peirce had it and your summary points to the pillars
of his understanding. Quantum science is still iffy at bottom and the
reason if that it cannot be encompassed by existing scientific method. But
I do not think Peirce would have batted an eyelash. He was waiting for just
such a proof of chance and his semiotics seems to be clearly to suggest the
vague underpinnings of things now being batted about about the prevalence
of information. Peirce is largely ignored by theologians save perhaps the
late Daniel Day Williams with whom I studied anon. Glad to see this post. I
do not think Jon's gist really is that far off but your points are girders
in the basic structure of Peirce's thought.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose


On Wed, May 1, 2019 at 7:07 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Hello Jon S, List,
>
>
> Let me start here:   "As Peirce recognized, despite not having the
> benefit of Einstein's insights, Zeno's famous paradoxes are dissolved by
> understanding *continuous *motion through space-time as a more
> fundamental reality than *discrete *positions in space and/or moments in
> time."
>
>
> Over the years, several of my colleagues have expressed a similar
> sentiment:  if only Peirce had been around to see Einstein's great
> discoveries concerning the special and general theories of relativity, then
> he would have been in a much better position to understand the nature of
> these things.
>
>
> My initial reaction to such expressions is that Peirce's fundamental
> hypotheses concerning the nature of time and space--and the relations
> between them--may very well run deeper and look further towards the
> future than what Einstein had to offer.  Taking the discussion in lecture 8
> of RLT as a starting point for a discussion, consider the following:
>
>
>
>1.  As far as we are able to glean from his writings, Einstein does
>not appear to accept the reality of chance.  In fact, he argues
>against it. Peirce, on the other hand, holds that an appeal to the reality
>of chance along with a tendency for relations between qualities and
>habitual patterns of order to grow can explain how space, time and the
>laws that govern them might have evolved.
>2. Einstein does not appear to offer an adequate explanatory
>hypothesis concerning the origins of the spatial and temporal relations
>that hold between the kinetic energy that is initially distributed through
>space shortly after the big bang. Peirce does offer a hypothesis, and I
>find it somewhat plausible. More to the point, it seems especially
>productive as compared to other competing hypotheses. The hypothesis is
>that, from an initial condition of homogeneous possibility, the infinitude
>of spatial and temporal dimensions differentiated and unfolded by a
>process of the vague becoming more determinate. Homogeneity grows into
>heterogeneity. From chance, order grows.
>3. From an initial condition of enormous potential (e.g., much
>concentrated potential energy), how did particles, nuclei, stars, atoms,
>molecules, etc. come to be as natural kinds? Starting with the
>explosion of the initial relatively mass-less force "particles"
>radiating as distributed fields (e.g., photons and gluons), more stable
>configurations of particle-like configurations of energy having
>qualities of spin and charge were attracted to one another based on
>the complementary character of their respective qualities. What law is at
>work? Call it the law of mind, if you will. Or, call it the law governing
>the association of the different qualities that energy may take based
>on their respective relations of attractability and affectability.
>
>
> While Peirce's grand hypotheses concerning the nature of time, space and
> the initial spread of kinetic energy are more vague than the explanations
> Einstein was able to offer, I think there may be principled limits to kinds
> of mathematical relations that may be fruitfully applied to the explanation
> of such basic laws as principles in our theories. In the study of the
> continuity of spatial and temporal relations, we move back from metrical
> geometries, to projective (as Einstein did), and focus our attention on the
> methods used in the study of topology. If we are trying to explain how
> space comes to have the metrical characters that it does (locally or
> globally), then Peirce appears t

[PEIRCE-L] Continuity: explaining time, space and other sorts of laws

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hello Jon S, List,


Let me start here:   "As Peirce recognized, despite not having the benefit of 
Einstein's insights, Zeno's famous paradoxes are dissolved by understanding 
continuous motion through space-time as a more fundamental reality than 
discrete positions in space and/or moments in time."


Over the years, several of my colleagues have expressed a similar sentiment:  
if only Peirce had been around to see Einstein's great discoveries concerning 
the special and general theories of relativity, then he would have been in a 
much better position to understand the nature of these things.


My initial reaction to such expressions is that Peirce's fundamental hypotheses 
concerning the nature of time and space--and the relations between them--may 
very well run deeper and look further towards the future than what Einstein had 
to offer.  Taking the discussion in lecture 8 of RLT as a starting point for a 
discussion, consider the following:


  1.   As far as we are able to glean from his writings, Einstein does not 
appear to accept the reality of chance.  In fact, he argues against it. Peirce, 
on the other hand, holds that an appeal to the reality of chance along with a 
tendency for relations between qualities and habitual patterns of order to grow 
can explain how space, time and the laws that govern them might have evolved.
  2.  Einstein does not appear to offer an adequate explanatory hypothesis 
concerning the origins of the spatial and temporal relations that hold between 
the kinetic energy that is initially distributed through space shortly after 
the big bang. Peirce does offer a hypothesis, and I find it somewhat plausible. 
More to the point, it seems especially productive as compared to other 
competing hypotheses. The hypothesis is that, from an initial condition of 
homogeneous possibility, the infinitude of spatial and temporal dimensions 
differentiated and unfolded by a process of the vague becoming more 
determinate. Homogeneity grows into heterogeneity. From chance, order grows.
  3.  From an initial condition of enormous potential (e.g., much concentrated 
potential energy), how did particles, nuclei, stars, atoms, molecules, etc. 
come to be as natural kinds? Starting with the explosion of the initial 
relatively mass-less force "particles" radiating as distributed fields (e.g., 
photons and gluons), more stable configurations of particle-like configurations 
of energy having qualities of spin and charge were attracted to one another 
based on the complementary character of their respective qualities. What law is 
at work? Call it the law of mind, if you will. Or, call it the law governing 
the association of the different qualities that energy may take based on their 
respective relations of attractability and affectability.

While Peirce's grand hypotheses concerning the nature of time, space and the 
initial spread of kinetic energy are more vague than the explanations Einstein 
was able to offer, I think there may be principled limits to kinds of 
mathematical relations that may be fruitfully applied to the explanation of 
such basic laws as principles in our theories. In the study of the continuity 
of spatial and temporal relations, we move back from metrical geometries, to 
projective (as Einstein did), and focus our attention on the methods used in 
the study of topology. If we are trying to explain how space comes to have the 
metrical characters that it does (locally or globally), then Peirce appears to 
be on the right track in pointing out that the question of "why four 
dimensions, or 6, 12, or 16?" is the prior question. What is more, it doesn't 
look like the answer to that question can be given separately from explaining 
how the qualities of what is in space (e.g., the fields, particles, waves, or 
what have you) come to stand in stable relations to each other. In turn, we can 
ask:  does Peirce's hypotheses concerning the dimensionality of space and time 
help to explain the laws articulated in the general theory of relativity. If 
they do, then that would be a remarkable thing. What is more, do they help to 
correct what might be some possible errors in the expression of those laws in 
the general theory? Cosmologists working today on the relation between time and 
space (e.g., Lee Smolin) seem to suggest that the answer to both questions is 
"Yes."

In effect, what is the grand hypothesis that Peirce offers as the guess at the 
riddle? Let me state the question and the answer simply. Question:  what are 
fundamental laws governing all growth of order in the cosmos ranging from 
physical, to chemical, biological and human social systems? Answer:  the grand 
laws governing the evolution of all things are the laws of logic, together with 
the law of chance and the law of continuity. As human beings, we are fallible 
in our understanding of those laws. Our representations of the laws of logic 
function as guiding principles that govern our inquiry--and our co