RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.10
Jeff, you're quite right that Peirce's phenomenological practice, as a search for the "elements of experience," can be traced back to very early in his career. He says as much himself in a draft of his Carnegie application (1902): In May 1867 I presented to the Academy in Boston a paper of ten pages, or about 4000 words, upon a New List of Categories. It was the result of full two years' intense and incessant application. It surprises me today that in so short a time I could produce a statement of that sort so nearly accurate, especially when I look back at my notebooks and find by what an unnecessarily difficult route I reached my goal. For this list of categories differs from the lists of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel in attempting much more than they. They merely took conceptions which they found at hand, already worked out. Their labor was limited to selecting the conceptions, slightly developing some of them, arranging them, and in Hegel's case, separating one or two that had been confused with others. But what I undertook to do was to go back to experience, in the sense of whatever we find to have been forced upon our minds, and by examining it to form clear conceptions of its radically different classes of elements, without relying upon any previous philosophizing, at all. This was the most difficult task I ever ventured to undertake. Gary f. From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] Sent: 15-Oct-17 03:02 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.10 John S, Gary F, List, In response to Gary F's remarks about the first Lowell Lecture, John S says: "His study of logic certainly does not grow out of phenomenology." I tend to think that the conceptual point Gary F has made about the study of the elements of the phenomena we might observe in common experience does apply to the chronological development of Peirce's work in logic--including the development of both the mathematical systems of logic and as well as the normative theory of logic. The simple fact that Peirce didn't use the term "phenomenology" to classify this area of inquiry as a separate branch of philosophy in his early work doesn't negate the fact that Peirce was engaged in the careful study of the phenomena from early on in the early Harvard and Lowell lectures of 1865-6 and in "On a New List of the Categories". This seems to be well supported by the point John makes next: "But I would guess that his experience in math, logic, and science guided the ways he thought about everything -- including elements." It was not just the results of Peirce's inquiries in math, logic and science that guided the way he thought. Rather, the examination of the relations involved in using diagrams to reason about questions in math and logic served as a basis for his conclusions about the elemental categories of all experience--and tended to confirm his earlier analyses of the elements involved, for instance, in our common experience of such things as spatiality, temporality, and the growth of our understanding. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.10
John S, Gary F, List, In response to Gary F's remarks about the first Lowell Lecture, John S says: "His study of logic certainly does not grow out of phenomenology." I tend to think that the conceptual point Gary F has made about the study of the elements of the phenomena we might observe in common experience does apply to the chronological development of Peirce's work in logic--including the development of both the mathematical systems of logic and as well as the normative theory of logic. The simple fact that Peirce didn't use the term "phenomenology" to classify this area of inquiry as a separate branch of philosophy in his early work doesn't negate the fact that Peirce was engaged in the careful study of the phenomena from early on in the early Harvard and Lowell lectures of 1865-6 and in "On a New List of the Categories". This seems to be well supported by the point John makes next: "But I would guess that his experience in math, logic, and science guided the ways he thought about everything -- including elements." It was not just the results of Peirce's inquiries in math, logic and science that guided the way he thought. Rather, the examination of the relations involved in using diagrams to reason about questions in math and logic served as a basis for his conclusions about the elemental categories of all experience--and tended to confirm his earlier analyses of the elements involved, for instance, in our common experience of such things as spatiality, temporality, and the growth of our understanding. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 From: g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca> Sent: Saturday, October 14, 2017 12:35 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.10 John, list, My comment wasn’t referring to the chronological order of these developments in Peirce’s work, but still, I put my point badly. “Grow” is the wrong word. What I had in mind was that “the theory of the advancement of knowledge is not possible until the logician has first examined all the different elementary modes of getting at truth”; and “before it is possible to enter upon this business in any rational way, the first thing that is necessary is to examine thoroughly all the ways in which thought can be expressed”; and “this introductory part of logic is nothing but an analysis of what kinds of signs are absolutely essential to the embodiment of thought”; and the final step back to the absolute basics, as it were, is the analysis not only of signs, but of all phenomena, into their essential elements, the “formal elements of the phaneron.” The chronological order is different; Peirce was working on logic since the age of 12; his main focus in the early 1890s was phenomenology, although he didn’t call it that until 1902; and his main work on semeiotic analysis was done in 1903-08. But in his classification of sciences, as your diagram shows, phenomenology is the first division of philosophy, followed by the normative sciences, including logic (with its own three divisions). The main reason I mention this ‘quest for the elementary’ is that I’m looking ahead to the first sentence of Lowell 2, which is: “Let us take up the subject of necessary reasoning, mathematical reasoning, with a view to making out what its elementary steps are and how they are put together.” Peirce consistently introduced his graphs with a similar statement of their purpose, which was not to facilitate reasoning but to analyze it into its simplest and smallest steps. This is consistent with his remark that EGs expressed "the atoms and molecules of logic"; and I see this as analogous to his work in semiotic and phenomenology, especially in this period around 1903. Gary f. -Original Message- From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] Sent: 14-Oct-17 11:45 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.10 On 10/14/2017 8:46 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Peirce’s study of logic seems to be a /quest for the elemental./ It > grows out of his phenomenology, which aims to identify the... It's unclear what "It" refers to. His study of logic certainly does not grow out of phenomenology. Therefore, "It" probably refers to the quest. > “indecomposable elements” of the phaneron/phenomenon, and his logical > graphs aim to ‘decompose’ the thought process into the simplest > possible steps, the better to understand how arguments are ‘composed, But I would guess that his experience in math, logic, and science guided the ways he thought about everything -- including elements. He even said that his EGs expressed "the atoms and molecules of logic". Since his writings on phenom
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.10
On 10/14/2017 8:46 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Peirce’s study of logic seems to be a /quest for the elemental./ It grows out of his phenomenology, which aims to identify the... It's unclear what "It" refers to. His study of logic certainly does not grow out of phenomenology. Therefore, "It" probably refers to the quest. “indecomposable elements” of the phaneron/phenomenon, and his logical graphs aim to ‘decompose’ the thought process into the simplest possible steps, the better to understand how arguments are ‘composed, But I would guess that his experience in math, logic, and science guided the ways he thought about everything -- including elements. He even said that his EGs expressed "the atoms and molecules of logic". Since his writings on phenomenology and/or phaneroscopy appear rather late, they would probably be effects rather than causes. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.10
List, This conclusion of Lowell Lecture 1 sets the stage, as it were, for the rest of the series. The emphasis is on theory. Methodeutic, or methodology as we call it now, which must be based on Critic, which studies the properties of the different classes of arguments as "elementary modes of getting at truth." But Critic "cannot be undertaken until the whole structure of signs, especially of general signs, has been thoroughly investigated." Since the goal is a logic which is "valid for all minds," and not only human minds, it can't be based on psychology, or on human language: semeiotic or "Speculative Grammar ought not to confine its studies to those conventional signs of which language is composed, but that it will do well to widen its field of view so as to take into consideration also kinds of signs which, not being conventional, are not of the nature of language." Peirce followed this up in the lecture series and even more in the "Syllabus", part of which was printed to accompany the lectures (EP2:258-299). Peirce's study of logic seems to be a quest for the elemental. It grows out of his phenomenology, which aims to identify the "indecomposable elements" of the phaneron/phenomenon, and his logical graphs aim to 'decompose' the thought process into the simplest possible steps, the better to understand how arguments are 'composed,' i.e. how they grow from the most elementary signs. He even ventures the "opinion that we ought not to limit ourselves to signs but ought to take account of certain objects more or less analogous to signs." He seems to follow this up (though not very far) in the "Syllabus" (EP2:273, CP 2.274), with the suggestion that "there may be Representamens that are not Signs," i.e. "quasi-signs" that do not have "mental Interpretants." But of this we get only a hint. After this lecture, someone in the audience sent Peirce a note asking him to sum up its content as an answer to the question in its title. Peirce gave this summary at the beginning of Lowell 3, and I'll post it tomorrow as a way of looking back at Lowell 1 as a whole. Then we'll start Lowell 2 sometime next week. Gary f. From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] Sent: 12-Oct-17 06:54 To: 'Peirce List' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.10 Conclusion of Lowell Lecture 1 (EP2:256-7): The ultimate purpose of the logician is to make out the theory of how knowledge is advanced. Just as there is a chemical theory of dyeing which is not exactly the art of dyeing, and there is a theory of thermodynamics which is quite different from the art of constructing heat-engines; so Methodeutic, which is the last goal of logical study, is the theory of the advancement of knowledge of all kinds. But this theory is not possible until the logician has first examined all the different elementary modes of getting at truth and especially all the different classes of arguments, and has studied their properties so far as these properties concern [the] power of the arguments as leading to the truth. This part of logic is called Critic. But before it is possible to enter upon this business in any rational way, the first thing that is necessary is to examine thoroughly all the ways in which thought can be expressed. For since thought has no being except in so far as it will be embodied, and since the embodiment of thought is a sign, the business of logical critic cannot be undertaken until the whole structure of signs, especially of general signs, has been thoroughly investigated. This is substantially acknowledged by logicians of all schools. But the different schools conceive of the business quite differently. Many logicians conceive that the inquiry trenches largely upon psychology, depends upon what has been observed about the human mind, and would not necessarily be true for other minds. Much of what they say is unquestionably false of many races of mankind. But I, for my part, take little stock in a logic that is not valid for all minds, inasmuch as the logicality of a given argument, as I have said, does not depend on how we think that argument, but upon what the truth is. Other logicians endeavoring to steer clear of psychology, as far as possible, think that this first branch of logic must relate to the possibility of knowledge of the real world and upon the sense in which it is true that the real world can be known. This branch of philosophy, called epistemology, or Erkenntnislehre, is necessarily largely metaphysical. But I, for my part, cannot for an instant assent to the proposal to base logic upon metaphysics, inasmuch as I fully agree with Aristotle, Duns Scotus, Kant, and all the profoundest metaphysicians that metaphysics can, on the contrary, have no secure basis except that which the science of logic affords. I, therefore, take a position quite s
[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.10
Conclusion of Lowell Lecture 1 (EP2:256-7):
The ultimate purpose of the logician is to make out the theory of how
knowledge is advanced. Just as there is a chemical theory of dyeing which is
not exactly the art of dyeing, and there is a theory of thermodynamics which
is quite different from the art of constructing heat-engines; so
Methodeutic, which is the last goal of logical study, is the theory of the
advancement of knowledge of all kinds. But this theory is not possible until
the logician has first examined all the different elementary modes of
getting at truth and especially all the different classes of arguments, and
has studied their properties so far as these properties concern [the] power
of the arguments as leading to the truth. This part of logic is called
Critic. But before it is possible to enter upon this business in any
rational way, the first thing that is necessary is to examine thoroughly all
the ways in which thought can be expressed. For since thought has no being
except in so far as it will be embodied, and since the embodiment of thought
is a sign, the business of logical critic cannot be undertaken until the
whole structure of signs, especially of general signs, has been thoroughly
investigated. This is substantially acknowledged by logicians of all
schools. But the different schools conceive of the business quite
differently. Many logicians conceive that the inquiry trenches largely upon
psychology, depends upon what has been observed about the human mind, and
would not necessarily be true for other minds. Much of what they say is
unquestionably false of many races of mankind. But I, for my part, take
little stock in a logic that is not valid for all minds, inasmuch as the
logicality of a given argument, as I have said, does not depend on how we
think that argument, but upon what the truth is. Other logicians endeavoring
to steer clear of psychology, as far as possible, think that this first
branch of logic must relate to the possibility of knowledge of the real
world and upon the sense in which it is true that the real world can be
known. This branch of philosophy, called epistemology, or Erkenntnislehre,
is necessarily largely metaphysical. But I, for my part, cannot for an
instant assent to the proposal to base logic upon metaphysics, inasmuch as I
fully agree with Aristotle, Duns Scotus, Kant, and all the profoundest
metaphysicians that metaphysics can, on the contrary, have no secure basis
except that which the science of logic affords. I, therefore, take a
position quite similar to that of the English logicians, beginning with
Scotus himself, in regarding this introductory part of logic as nothing but
an analysis of what kinds of signs are absolutely essential to the
embodiment of thought. I call it, after Scotus, Speculative Grammar. I fully
agree, however, with a portion of the English school,- a school I may
observe which now has a large and most influential and scientific following
in Germany,- I agree, I say, with a portion of this school without thereby
coming into positive conflict with the others, in thinking that this
Speculative Grammar ought not to confine its studies to those conventional
signs of which language is composed, but that it will do well to widen its
field of view so as to take into consideration also kinds of signs which,
not being conventional, are not of the nature of language. In fact, as a
point of theory, I am of opinion that we ought not to limit ourselves to
signs but ought to take account of certain objects more or less analogous to
signs. In practice, however, I have paid little attention to these
quasi-signs.
Thus there are, in my view of the subject, three branches of logic:
Speculative Grammar, Critic, and Methodeutic.
http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm }{ Peirce's Lowell Lectures of 1903
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