Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Clark Goble]

(Sorry - been swamped so I’ve not said much)

> On Apr 1, 2017, at 12:53 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Some new words may be useful, but there's already an overabundance
> of terminology from several millennia of philosophy, most of which
> Peirce replaced with a new set of terms.  That is the theme of the
> following article:

This seems quite true. My experience in trying to explain Peirce to people with 
a philosophical background is that the terminology is a big barrier. I 
understand why Peirce coined so many neologisms but it isn’t ultimately a good 
thing in many ways.

> On Apr 1, 2017, at 8:38 AM, Stephen Jarosek  wrote:
> 
> I am 100% with you on this. I just did a synonym search on imitation, without 
> luck. I think we need to invent a new word to more accurately describe this 
> replication and sharing of signs/behavior.


While it’s not exactly the same thing, the existing word of meme is probably 
close enough to do the job. I don’t think we need a new word.


> On Mar 31, 2017, at 2:18 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> With the aim of sharpening the point, Peirce seems to suggest that, for the 
> sake of explaining the cosmos, it is important to ask how degenerate forms of 
> these relations might have grown into more genuine forms of the relations.

As I’ve noted a few times, Peirce’s explanations largely come from 
neoplatonism. That’s of course a pretty controversial position to say the 
least. I’m also not quite convinced that his cosmology is really necessary for 
the rest of his thought. It’s enough to simply talk about acquiring habits and 
leave the cosmology there. The degenerate forms become genuine as habits 
enabling that genuineness arise.



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RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Stephen Jarosek]

Edwina, in a previous comment, you stated, “I'd use the term 'Sign' [capital S] 
to mean, I think, what you mean by a 'holon'.“

While I wholly agree with your point, my reference to holon as a mind-body is 
also helpful one to keep in mind, because it draws attention to the 
relationship between the mind-body and pragmatism. That is, the body provides 
very specific “tools” that predispose an entity to making very specific choices 
from its ecosystem. So, where you consider a bacterium to be a “semiosic 
materialization of Mind” you must surely also be inferring the mind-body 
predispositions in which it manifests… ie, its physical structure and chemical 
properties.

A mind-body is a sign, but the body is also the toolkit that extracts from 
infinite possibility the very specific things that matter, and that become 
defined in the mind-body’s world-view. For example, sex across species and 
gender roles in culture… and chemical reactions in molecules. As I am not a 
scholar studying Peirce in detail, am I perhaps over-stating the already 
obvious?

sj



From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Sunday, April 2, 2017 8:16 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca; Stephen Jarosek; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; John F Sowa
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was 
semantic problem with the term)

 

John, list: As you say - you've evaded the issue. 

My own interest is in examining the 'rational materialization of Mind' - each 
of which I consider a Sign, or rather, a Sign-process, since nothing is static. 
So, rather than saying that a single bacterium 'has' a quasi-mind, I'd consider 
that bacterium to be a semiosic materialization of Mind. The brain is not the 
same as Mind. 

Edwina

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On Sun 02/04/17 12:00 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:

On 4/2/2017 11:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: 
> I like your terms and yes, Peirce has indeed used all of them. 
> My question is: What would your definition be of a 'sign'? 
> You use it often in the chart but it has no definition. 

I'm glad that you approve of the choice of terms. 

Re definition of sign: I agree with all of Peirce's definitions. 
He used different words and phrases on various occasions, but I 
believe that they are consistent ways of expressing the fundamental 
relationships. 

In "Signs and Reality", I quoted one of them (CP 2.228), but it uses 
the word 'person', which would exclude computers. Later, I quoted 
“Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain” (CP 4.551). 
And I also believe that his term 'quasi-mind' is important for 
biosemiotics and computer systems. 

In short, I evaded the issue. But I think that Peirce also evaded 
the issue -- for a very good reason: Within a particular formal 
system (axioms in some version of logic), it's possible to state 
necessary and sufficient conditions that cover all and every use 
of a term within that system. 

But the question of how or whether a particular formal theory 
applies to some aspect of the real world is an empirical issue. 
Nobody knows what kinds of quasi-minds might exist somewhere 
in the universe. 

Even within our own brains, neuroscientists are constantly 
discovering unexpected features. If a single bacterium could 
be considered to have a quasi-mind, what about a single neuron 
in the brain? A single eukaryotic cell has several organelles, 
derived from more primitive cells that have been "swallowed" 
and incorporated into the larger cell. Are those organelles 
also "quasi-minds"? 

Marvin Minsky coined the term 'Society of Mind'. Are our brains 
societies of billions of quasi-minds (neurons), each of which is 
a society of even smaller quasi-minds? 

John 



 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[John F Sowa]

Edwina, Gary, and Jon,

ET

So, rather than saying that a single bacterium 'has' a quasi-mind,
I'd consider that bacterium to be a semiosic materialization of Mind.
The brain is not the same as Mind.


Peirce would certainly agree that the brain is not the same as mind,
and so would I.  But when Peirce coined the term 'quasi-mind', I
believe that he was recognizing the continuum of life forms from
bacteria to mammals, humans, and perhaps beyond.  He also related
the origin of the first genuine Thirdness to the origin of life.

That would imply that the earliest marks could not be interpreted
as signs until some minds or quasi-minds came along.  But because
of the finite speed of light, many of those early marks can be
interpreted by intelligent beings with powerful telescopes.

GR

While 'Mark' is probably an improvement on 'Qualisign', it strikes
me as suggesting something more existential (so, relating more to 2ns
than to 1ns) than an alternative term Peirce also used, namely, "Tone."


JAS

it is fresh in my mind that [JFS] prefers "mark" to "tone" because
of the latter's auditory connotation.


I agree with Jon.  Also note Peirce's letter to Lady Welby (EP 2.488)
where Peirce writes "I formerly called a Potisign Tinge or Tone".

Then at the bottom of the page, he writes
"I think Potisign Actisign Famisign
might be called Mark Token Type(?)"

That seems to be his last word on the topic (unless anyone can
find a later MS).  Note that he formerly used two words 'tinge'
for a visual qualisign or 'tone' for an auditory qualisign.

But he seems to use 'mark' for both.  In English, the word 'mark'
is more general, since one could say "Mark my words" -- in which
the words could be spoken, written, or merely contemplated.

GR

'Assertion' seems to me to gloss over the distinction between
a 'Proposition' and an 'Assertion'...


There is a huge difference between a proposition that is quoted
and contemplated, and a proposition that is used to communicate.

The reason why I used the word 'assertion' is that the table
for the triple trichotomy had the phrase "A sign of actual
existence" in that box.  That seemed to suggest a proposition
that was used to assert the existence of something.

However, I went to check EP 2.292, where I found the following
phrase: "a Dicisign or Dicent sign (that is, a proposition or
a quasi-proposition)".

That is clear evidence that Peirce intended "proposition".
Therefore, I'll revise that table (and the article signs.pdf)
to replace 'assertion' with 'proposition'.  I'll post a new
version tomorrow.

Thanks for the comment.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

I just re-read John's paper yesterday, so it is fresh in my mind that he
prefers "mark" to "tone" because of the latter's auditory connotation.
Perhaps you are thinking of the RLT lectures, where Peirce described our
existing universe as "a discontinuous mark" (2ns).  Of course, he also
referred to the initial pure possibilities (1ns) as "marks" on the
blackboard, and in such cases it was not the mark *itself* that was a
discontinuity, but its *boundary*.  Perhaps we should thus conceive of a
Qualisign as a mark with no such boundary.

I agree that "proposition" is preferable to "assertion" for a Dicent
Symbol.  The latter seems to pertain more to the *other *Sign-Interpretant
relation, where the Sign is urged (2ns) rather than presented (1ns) or
submitted (3ns).  Peirce assigned Rheme/Dicent/Argument to the S-If
relation and presented/urged/submitted (or Suggestive/Imperative/Indicative)
to the S-Id relation, yet noted in a 1904 letter to Lady Welby (L 463,
http://www.unav.es/gep/Welby12.10.04.html) that only an Argument may be
submitted, an Argument or Dicent may be urged, and a Rheme can only be
presented.  This implies that Rheme/Dicent/Argument comes *before
*presented/urged/submitted
in the order of determination, and T. L. Short came to same conclusion
in *Peirce's
Theory of Signs*; but it seems to me that the S-If relation should come
*after *the S-Id relation.  I also think that Rheme/Dicent/Argument as how
the Interpretant represents the Sign (EP 2:291) is more consistent with
"the Manner of Appeal to the Dynamic Interpretant," while
presented/urged/submitted seems like a better fit for "the Nature of the
Influence of the Sign" (EP 2:490).

Consequently, my current working hypothesis is instead to associate
Rheme/Dicent/Argument with S-Id and presented/urged/submitted with S-If.  I
recognize that this is a clear deviation from Peirce, but it makes the most
sense to me right now, and my impression is that he never managed to work
out the various Interpretant trichotomies (let alone their proper sequence)
to his own complete satisfaction anyway.  I would certainly welcome
feedback on this adjustment, which only affects the 10-trichotomy/66-sign
classification, not the 3-trichotomy/10-sign classification.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 2, 2017 at 2:37 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> John S, List,
>
> While I very much approve of your project of making Peircean semeiotic
> terminology more accessible to those unlikely to plunge into the
> philosophical/semeiotic literature associated with Peirce's semeiotic, I do
> have a couple of questions related to two of the terms you've chosen.
>
> 1. While 'Mark' is probably an improvement on 'Qualisign', it strikes me
> as suggesting something more existential (so, relating more to 2ns than to
> 1ns) than an alternative term Peirce also used, namely, "Tone." Employing
> 'Tone' here would also provide a kind of mnemonic device since, in relation
> to the Sign itself (your, 1. Material) one would have 3 'T's, namely, Tone,
> Token, and Type. So the question is, why did you settle on 'Mark' rather
> than 'Tone'?
>
> 2. 'Assertion' seems to me to gloss over the distinction between a
> 'Proposition' and an 'Assertion'. As, for example, Joe Ransdell argued,
> there is a subtle difference between the two: A 'Proposition' is a
> statement of which one can ask if is it true or false, while an 'Assertion"
> is a statement which claims to be true.
>
> So, "The sun is shining" is a proposition (which is not an assertion),
> while if I step out of my apartment and see that "The sun is shining," the
> context makes it clear that I am asserting this to be true. So, again, why
> did you settle on 'Assertion' rather than 'Proposition' in your chart of 9?
> (I would note that Frederik Stjernfelt in his book, *Natural Propositions*,
> which was our last slow read, employs the terminology of 'Propostion' and
> 'Dicisign' fairly interchangably).
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Sun, Apr 2, 2017 at 10:53 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>
>> On 4/2/2017 4:54 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:
>>
>>> imitation is so central that perhaps a case can be made
>>> for a more accurate representation of what we really mean.
>>>
>>
>> I certainly agree.
>>
>> But I would make a distinction between Peirce's fundamental
>> terminology and the open-ended variety of terms that can be
>> explained in terms of the fundamentals.  I have no objection
>> to using his system to define 'imitation' or any other word
>> that may be useful.
>>
>> In my article "Signs and Reality", I was addressing readers
>> who have been using an open-ended variety 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Gary Richmond]

John S, List,

While I very much approve of your project of making Peircean semeiotic
terminology more accessible to those unlikely to plunge into the
philosophical/semeiotic literature associated with Peirce's semeiotic, I do
have a couple of questions related to two of the terms you've chosen.

1. While 'Mark' is probably an improvement on 'Qualisign', it strikes me as
suggesting something more existential (so, relating more to 2ns than to
1ns) than an alternative term Peirce also used, namely, "Tone." Employing
'Tone' here would also provide a kind of mnemonic device since, in relation
to the Sign itself (your, 1. Material) one would have 3 'T's, namely, Tone,
Token, and Type. So the question is, why did you settle on 'Mark' rather
than 'Tone'?

2. 'Assertion' seems to me to gloss over the distinction between a
'Proposition' and an 'Assertion'. As, for example, Joe Ransdell argued,
there is a subtle difference between the two: A 'Proposition' is a
statement of which one can ask if is it true or false, while an 'Assertion"
is a statement which claims to be true.

So, "The sun is shining" is a proposition (which is not an assertion),
while if I step out of my apartment and see that "The sun is shining," the
context makes it clear that I am asserting this to be true. So, again, why
did you settle on 'Assertion' rather than 'Proposition' in your chart of 9?
(I would note that Frederik Stjernfelt in his book, *Natural Propositions*,
which was our last slow read, employs the terminology of 'Propostion' and
'Dicisign' fairly interchangably).

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Sun, Apr 2, 2017 at 10:53 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 4/2/2017 4:54 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:
>
>> imitation is so central that perhaps a case can be made
>> for a more accurate representation of what we really mean.
>>
>
> I certainly agree.
>
> But I would make a distinction between Peirce's fundamental
> terminology and the open-ended variety of terms that can be
> explained in terms of the fundamentals.  I have no objection
> to using his system to define 'imitation' or any other word
> that may be useful.
>
> In my article "Signs and Reality", I was addressing readers
> who have been using an open-ended variety of terminology
> from several millennia of philosophy to design ontologies
> for computer systems.  I was trying to make several points:
>
>  1. The philosophical terminology is large and growing.
> It was developed by many different authors, who often use
> the terms in diverse, sometimes inconsistent ways.
>
>  2. The short book I cited (by David Armstrong) was addressed
> to *graduate students* in philosophy.  But most computer
> scientists who need to use ontology have little background
> in philosophy.  They would not read such a book, and they
> would not learn enough from it to use those words precisely.
>
>  3. However, everybody who uses an applied ontology knows and
> uses some notation for logic (or a computer notation that
> has a well-defined logical foundation).
>
>  4. As a pioneer in modern logic, Peirce developed terminology
> that is compatible with the versions of logic used for computer
> systems.  It provides a broader and more systematic foundation
> for defining the categories of applied ontologies.
>
>  5. Therefore, my goal in that article was to extract a convenient
> subset of Peirce's terminology that could be taught to students
> who know some notation for logic, but have little or no training
> in philosophy.
>
>  6. My claim is that Peirce's triple trichotomy (attached table),
> together with any notation for logic that students already
> know, is sufficient for teaching a course on applied ontology.
> (Note that I replaced 5 of the terms with more familiar terms
> that Peirce used in other writings.)
>
> I would hope that students would continue to study more by Peirce
> and other philosophers.  But I believe that applied ontology on
> a Peircean foundation would be a more solid basis than what they
> are studying today.  See http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf .
>
> John
>
>
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, list: As you say - you've evaded the issue. 

My own interest is in examining the 'rational materialization of
Mind' - each of which I consider a Sign, or rather, a Sign-process,
since nothing is static. So, rather than saying that a single
bacterium 'has' a quasi-mind, I'd consider that bacterium to be a
semiosic materialization of Mind. The brain is not the same as Mind. 

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Sun 02/04/17 12:00 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 On 4/2/2017 11:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: 
 > I like your terms and yes, Peirce has indeed used all of them. 
 > My question is:  What would your definition be of a 'sign'? 
 > You use it often in the chart but it has no definition. 
 I'm glad that you approve of the choice of terms. 
 Re definition of sign:  I agree with all of Peirce's definitions. 
 He used different words and phrases on various occasions, but I 
 believe that they are consistent ways of expressing the fundamental 
 relationships. 
 In "Signs and Reality", I quoted one of them (CP 2.228), but it uses

 the word 'person', which would exclude computers.  Later, I quoted 
 “Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain” (CP 4.551). 
 And I also believe that his term 'quasi-mind' is important for 
 biosemiotics and computer systems. 
 In short, I evaded the issue.  But I think that Peirce also evaded 
 the issue -- for a very good reason:  Within a particular formal 
 system (axioms in some version of logic), it's possible to state 
 necessary and sufficient conditions that cover all and every use 
 of a term within that system. 
 But the question of how or whether a particular formal theory 
 applies to some aspect of the real world is an empirical issue. 
 Nobody knows what kinds of quasi-minds might exist somewhere 
 in the universe. 
 Even within our own brains, neuroscientists are constantly 
 discovering unexpected features.  If a single bacterium could 
 be considered to have a quasi-mind, what about a single neuron 
 in the brain?  A single eukaryotic cell has several organelles, 
 derived from more primitive cells that have been "swallowed" 
 and incorporated into the larger cell.  Are those organelles 
 also "quasi-minds"? 
 Marvin Minsky coined the term 'Society of Mind'.  Are our brains 
 societies of billions of quasi-minds (neurons), each of which is 
 a society of even smaller quasi-minds? 
 John 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[John F Sowa]

On 4/2/2017 11:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

I like your terms and yes, Peirce has indeed used all of them.
My question is:  What would your definition be of a 'sign'?
You use it often in the chart but it has no definition.


I'm glad that you approve of the choice of terms.

Re definition of sign:  I agree with all of Peirce's definitions.
He used different words and phrases on various occasions, but I
believe that they are consistent ways of expressing the fundamental
relationships.

In "Signs and Reality", I quoted one of them (CP 2.228), but it uses
the word 'person', which would exclude computers.  Later, I quoted
“Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain” (CP 4.551).
And I also believe that his term 'quasi-mind' is important for
biosemiotics and computer systems.

In short, I evaded the issue.  But I think that Peirce also evaded
the issue -- for a very good reason:  Within a particular formal
system (axioms in some version of logic), it's possible to state
necessary and sufficient conditions that cover all and every use
of a term within that system.

But the question of how or whether a particular formal theory
applies to some aspect of the real world is an empirical issue.
Nobody knows what kinds of quasi-minds might exist somewhere
in the universe.

Even within our own brains, neuroscientists are constantly
discovering unexpected features.  If a single bacterium could
be considered to have a quasi-mind, what about a single neuron
in the brain?  A single eukaryotic cell has several organelles,
derived from more primitive cells that have been "swallowed"
and incorporated into the larger cell.  Are those organelles
also "quasi-minds"?

Marvin Minsky coined the term 'Society of Mind'.  Are our brains
societies of billions of quasi-minds (neurons), each of which is
a society of even smaller quasi-minds?

John

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 John - I like your terms and yes, Peirce has indeed used all of
them. My question is: What would you definition be of a 'sign'? You
use it often in the chart but it has no definition.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Sun 02/04/17 10:53 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 On 4/2/2017 4:54 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote: 
 > imitation is so central that perhaps a case can be made 
 > for a more accurate representation of what we really mean. 
 I certainly agree. 
 But I would make a distinction between Peirce's fundamental 
 terminology and the open-ended variety of terms that can be 
 explained in terms of the fundamentals.  I have no objection 
 to using his system to define 'imitation' or any other word 
 that may be useful. 
 In my article "Signs and Reality", I was addressing readers 
 who have been using an open-ended variety of terminology 
 from several millennia of philosophy to design ontologies 
 for computer systems.  I was trying to make several points: 
   1. The philosophical terminology is large and growing. 
  It was developed by many different authors, who often use 
  the terms in diverse, sometimes inconsistent ways. 
   2. The short book I cited (by David Armstrong) was addressed 
  to *graduate students* in philosophy.  But most computer 
  scientists who need to use ontology have little background 
  in philosophy.  They would not read such a book, and they 
  would not learn enough from it to use those words precisely. 
   3. However, everybody who uses an applied ontology knows and 
  uses some notation for logic (or a computer notation that 
  has a well-defined logical foundation). 
   4. As a pioneer in modern logic, Peirce developed terminology 
  that is compatible with the versions of logic used for computer

  systems.  It provides a broader and more systematic foundation 
  for defining the categories of applied ontologies. 
   5. Therefore, my goal in that article was to extract a convenient 
  subset of Peirce's terminology that could be taught to students

  who know some notation for logic, but have little or no
training 
  in philosophy. 
   6. My claim is that Peirce's triple trichotomy (attached table), 
  together with any notation for logic that students already 
  know, is sufficient for teaching a course on applied ontology. 
  (Note that I replaced 5 of the terms with more familiar terms 
  that Peirce used in other writings.) 
 I would hope that students would continue to study more by Peirce 
 and other philosophers.  But I believe that applied ontology on 
 a Peircean foundation would be a more solid basis than what they 
 are studying today.  See http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf [1] . 
 John 


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/parse.php?redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jfsowa.com%2Fpubs%2Fsigns.pdf

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[John F Sowa]

On 4/2/2017 4:54 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:

imitation is so central that perhaps a case can be made
for a more accurate representation of what we really mean.


I certainly agree.

But I would make a distinction between Peirce's fundamental
terminology and the open-ended variety of terms that can be
explained in terms of the fundamentals.  I have no objection
to using his system to define 'imitation' or any other word
that may be useful.

In my article "Signs and Reality", I was addressing readers
who have been using an open-ended variety of terminology
from several millennia of philosophy to design ontologies
for computer systems.  I was trying to make several points:

 1. The philosophical terminology is large and growing.
It was developed by many different authors, who often use
the terms in diverse, sometimes inconsistent ways.

 2. The short book I cited (by David Armstrong) was addressed
to *graduate students* in philosophy.  But most computer
scientists who need to use ontology have little background
in philosophy.  They would not read such a book, and they
would not learn enough from it to use those words precisely.

 3. However, everybody who uses an applied ontology knows and
uses some notation for logic (or a computer notation that
has a well-defined logical foundation).

 4. As a pioneer in modern logic, Peirce developed terminology
that is compatible with the versions of logic used for computer
systems.  It provides a broader and more systematic foundation
for defining the categories of applied ontologies.

 5. Therefore, my goal in that article was to extract a convenient
subset of Peirce's terminology that could be taught to students
who know some notation for logic, but have little or no training
in philosophy.

 6. My claim is that Peirce's triple trichotomy (attached table),
together with any notation for logic that students already
know, is sufficient for teaching a course on applied ontology.
(Note that I replaced 5 of the terms with more familiar terms
that Peirce used in other writings.)

I would hope that students would continue to study more by Peirce
and other philosophers.  But I believe that applied ontology on
a Peircean foundation would be a more solid basis than what they
are studying today.  See http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf .

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Stephen Jarosek]

On the one hand I agree with you, John. Perhaps there is greater value in 
sticking with the word imitation, for example, but emphasizing its nuances to 
the scholars. I can accept that.

However, the more I think about it, imitation is so central that perhaps a case 
can be made for a more accurate representation of what we really mean. Even 
Richard Dawkins accepts imitation as utterly vital for understanding culture, 
in the memetic theory that he developed. But as we realize, what he means by 
imitation is very different to what we mean. He means imitation as some kind of 
instinct for copying, "programmed" into the brain... an adaptive response to 
environmental pressures... an almost trivial after-thought that plays second 
fiddle to selfish genes. But what we mean by imitation is very, very 
different... it relates to the core of being, pragmatism, knowing how to be, 
overcoming entropy, and how existence is even possible.

But yes, I agree with you... as unsatisfactory as the term might be, at least 
it resonates with what the mainstream easily understands. And anyways, it is 
the nature of signs to change their meaning with history and learning, and so 
we can envisage a more enlightened, revised interpretation down the track. 
Imitation it is then :)

sj

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
Sent: Saturday, April 1, 2017 8:53 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic 
problem with the term)

Edwina, Stephen, list,

I don't disagree with the points you're addressing, but I'm concerned about the 
proliferation of terminology.

Formal logic and linguistics (Chomsky, Montague, Kamp, Partee and their PhD 
students) have had little success for AI and natural language understanding.  
The next generation of students adopted statistics and neural networks.

I believe that Peirce's insights are an excellent foundation for relating and 
integrating all those areas -- the new and the old.

We have an opportunity for bringing Peirce into the mainstream of cognitive 
science (philosophy, psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, 
neuroscience, and anthropology).  Peirce was a pioneer in developing the 
foundations for all those areas.

Edwina
> And I'd also agree that imitation is vital, but I'd define such an 
> action more through the development of common GENERAL habits-of-form 
> and behaviour than pure active imitation or direct copying.

Stephen
> I am 100% with you on this. I just did a synonym search on imitation, 
> without luck. I think we need to invent a new word to more accurately 
> describe this replication and sharing of signs/behavior.

Some new words may be useful, but there's already an overabundance of 
terminology from several millennia of philosophy, most of which Peirce replaced 
with a new set of terms.  That is the theme of the following article:

Signs and Reality
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf

Criterion for any new terminology:  Will it make Peirce's writings more 
accessible to people who come from other traditions?

John


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[John F Sowa]

Edwina, Stephen, list,

I don't disagree with the points you're addressing, but I'm
concerned about the proliferation of terminology.

Formal logic and linguistics (Chomsky, Montague, Kamp, Partee
and their PhD students) have had little success for AI and natural
language understanding.  The next generation of students adopted
statistics and neural networks.

I believe that Peirce's insights are an excellent foundation for
relating and integrating all those areas -- the new and the old.

We have an opportunity for bringing Peirce into the mainstream of
cognitive science (philosophy, psychology, linguistics, artificial
intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology).  Peirce was a
pioneer in developing the foundations for all those areas.

Edwina

And I'd also agree that imitation is vital, but I'd define such an
action more through the development of common GENERAL habits-of-form
and behaviour than pure active imitation or direct copying.


Stephen

I am 100% with you on this. I just did a synonym search on imitation,
without luck. I think we need to invent a new word to more accurately
describe this replication and sharing of signs/behavior.


Some new words may be useful, but there's already an overabundance
of terminology from several millennia of philosophy, most of which
Peirce replaced with a new set of terms.  That is the theme of the
following article:

Signs and Reality
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf

Criterion for any new terminology:  Will it make Peirce's writings
more accessible to people who come from other traditions?

John

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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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RE: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Stephen Jarosek]

>”And I'd also agree that imitation is vital, but I'd define such an action 
>more through the development of common GENERAL habits-of-form and behaviour 
>than pure active imitation or direct copying.”

I am 100% with you on this. I just did a synonym search on imitation, without 
luck. I think we need to invent a new word to more accurately describe this 
replication and sharing of signs/behavior.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Saturday, April 1, 2017 2:30 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca; 'Jon Alan Schmidt'; 'Jeffrey Brian Downard'; Stephen 
Jarosek
Cc: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis 
(Was semantic problem with the term)

 

Stephen - interesting outline. 

 

I'd use the term 'Sign' [capital S] to mean, I think, what you mean by a 
'holon'.

 

And I agree with your notion of non-local  'entanglement' which I would refer 
to as 'informational networking'. It is also non-local.

 

And I'd also agree that imitation is vital, but I'd define such an action more 
through the development of common GENERAL habits-of-form and behaviour than 
pure active imitation or direct copying.

 

Edwina

-- 
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
largest alternative telecommunications provider. 

http://www.primus.ca 

On Sat 01/04/17 3:48 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au sent:

List,

Regarding the Peircean categories in matter, here are the starting assumptions 
that I work with:

1)  First, a couple of definitions: A HOLON is a mind-body. Every living 
organism, as a mind-body, is a holon. Furthermore, IMITATION is an important 
category of pragmatism. Every organism “learns how to be” through imitation;

2)  The Peircean categories relate to holons. Pragmatism requires a 
mind-body in order to define the things that matter;

3)  An atom or a molecule is a holon;

4)  In the video Inner Life of the Cell <https://youtu.be/FzcTgrxMzZk> , 
what I observe is less chemical reactions (in the conventional, linear, 
materialist sense) than it is a whole ecosystem at the molecular level.

 

In the persistence of atoms and molecules across time, we encounter Peirce’s 
description of matter as  “mind hide-bound in habit,” so we have no argument 
there. But what about pragmatism, or the other categories? From a 
semiotic/pragmatic perspective, how does an atom or molecule define the things 
that matter? 

This is where entanglement (nonlocality) enters the picture. My conjecture is 
that atoms and molecules “know” their proper conduct, or properties, through 
entanglement. Entanglement is their imitation. A molecular “mind-body” has its 
predispositions (secondness, or association) and motivations (firstness), and 
it will act on them as per the video clip… but it can only “know how to be” 
through entanglement. Knowing how to be, I guess, relates in the first instance 
to firstness.

It is along these lines that I base my DNA entanglement thesis: 
https://www.academia.edu/29626663/DNA_ENTANGLEMENT_THE_EVIDENCE_MOUNTS


Imitation plays such an important role in pragmatism and defining the things 
that matter. Even for atoms and molecules. Imitation is perhaps the most 
important antidote to entropy… no let me rephrase that… imitation is perhaps 
central to overcoming entropy. A species sharing identical mind-bodies with 
identical predispositions is one thing, but there are so many possibilities in 
those predispositions that a shared consensus in behavior… imitation… is 
required to enable an ecosystem to hang together. We see this especially in 
human cultures… same mind-bodies, but totally different cultures. Imitation 
whittles down infinite possibility to pragmatic, tangible reality.

sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca 
 ] 
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 11:33 PM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt; tabor...@primus.ca 
 ; Jeffrey Brian 
Downard
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was 
semantic problem with the term)

 


Jeff, list: I agree; I have written about how the relations - as I call them, 
the Six Relations of:

Firstness -as- Firstness, i.e., genuine Firstness 

Secondness -as- Secondness; i.e., genuine Secondness

Thirdness-as-Thirdness, i.e., genuine Thirdness

Secondness-as-Firstness, i.e., degenerate Secondness, or Secondness operating 
within a mode also of Firstness

Thirdness-as Firstness, i.e., degenerate Thirdness

Thirdness-as- Secondness

 

I've written about how these Six Relations - and I agree that ALL of them are 
vital - operate to enable particular matter, diversity of matter, stability of 
type etc. 

I could send you, off list, a paper on this. I don't see posting it on this 
list.

 

I would question, however, whether dyadic 'things' were primary, as you seem to 
sug

Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Stephen - interesting outline. 
I'd use the term 'Sign' [capital S] to mean, I think, what you mean
by a 'holon'.
And I agree with your notion of non-local  'entanglement' which I
would refer to as 'informational networking'. It is also non-local.
And I'd also agree that imitation is vital, but I'd define such an
action more through the development of common GENERAL habits-of-form
and behaviour than pure active imitation or direct copying.
Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Sat 01/04/17  3:48 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au
sent:
List,
 Regarding the Peircean categories in matter, here are the starting
assumptions that I work with:

 1)  First, a couple of definitions: A HOLON is a mind-body.
Every living organism, as a mind-body, is a holon. Furthermore,
IMITATION is an important category of pragmatism. Every organism
“learns how to be” through imitation;

 2)  The Peircean categories relate to holons. Pragmatism
requires a mind-body in order to define the things that matter;

 3)  An atom or a molecule is a holon;

 4)  In the video Inner Life of the Cell [1], what I observe is
less chemical reactions (in the conventional, linear, materialist
sense) than it is a whole ecosystem at the molecular level.
In the persistence of atoms and molecules across time, we encounter
Peirce’s description of matter as  “mind hide-bound in habit,”
so we have no argument there. But what about pragmatism, or the other
categories? From a semiotic/pragmatic perspective, how does an atom or
molecule define the things that matter? 
 This is where entanglement (nonlocality) enters the picture. My
conjecture is that atoms and molecules “know” their proper
conduct, or properties, through entanglement. Entanglement is their
imitation. A molecular “mind-body” has its predispositions
(secondness, or association) and motivations (firstness), and it will
act on them as per the video clip… but it can only “know how to
be” through entanglement. Knowing how to be, I guess, relates in
the first instance to firstness.
 It is along these lines that I base my DNA entanglement thesis: 

https://www.academia.edu/29626663/DNA_ENTANGLEMENT_THE_EVIDENCE_MOUNTS
[2]
 Imitation plays such an important role in pragmatism and defining
the things that matter. Even for atoms and molecules. Imitation is
perhaps the most important antidote to entropy… no let me rephrase
that… imitation is perhaps central to overcoming entropy. A species
sharing identical mind-bodies with identical predispositions is one
thing, but there are so many possibilities in those predispositions
that a shared consensus in behavior… imitation… is required to
enable an ecosystem to hang together. We see this especially in human
cultures… same mind-bodies, but totally different cultures.
Imitation whittles down infinite possibility to pragmatic, tangible
reality.
 sj
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca [3]] 
 Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 11:33 PM
 To: Jon Alan Schmidt; tabor...@primus.ca [4]; Jeffrey Brian Downard
 Cc: Peirce-L
 Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological
Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)
 Jeff, list: I agree; I have written about how the relations - as I
call them, the Six Relations of:

Firstness -as- Firstness, i.e., genuine Firstness 

Secondness -as- Secondness; i.e., genuine Secondness

Thirdness-as-Thirdness, i.e., genuine Thirdness

Secondness-as-Firstness, i.e., degenerate Secondness, or Secondness
operating within a mode also of Firstness

Thirdness-as Firstness, i.e., degenerate Thirdness

Thirdness-as- Secondness
I've written about how these Six Relations - and I agree that ALL of
them are vital - operate to enable particular matter, diversity of
matter, stability of type etc. 

I could send you, off list, a paper on this. I don't see posting it
on this list.
I would question, however, whether dyadic 'things' were primary, as
you seem to suggest, and only later evolved to include the triad. I
think the triad is primal.
Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
  http://www.primus.ca [5] 
 On Fri 31/03/17 4:18 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu [6] sent:

Edwina, Jon S, List, 
With the aim of sharpening the point, Peirce seems to suggest that,
for the sake of explaining the cosmos, it is important to ask how
degenerate forms of these relations might have grown into more
genuine forms of the relations.
As such, the question is not simply one of how, as you seem to be
putting it, sim

RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Stephen Jarosek]

I forgot to mention some assumptions in my thought experiment:

1)  Identicality – to be perfectly identical is to be entangled;

2)  Recoherence – there is no such thing as decoherence –but there is 
recoherence when an atom/molecule reconnects with previous states.

 

From: Stephen Jarosek [mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au] 
Sent: Saturday, April 1, 2017 9:49 AM
To: tabor...@primus.ca; 'Jon Alan Schmidt'; 'Jeffrey Brian Downard'
Cc: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was 
semantic problem with the term)

 

List,

Regarding the Peircean categories in matter, here are the starting assumptions 
that I work with:

1)  First, a couple of definitions: A HOLON is a mind-body. Every living 
organism, as a mind-body, is a holon. Furthermore, IMITATION is an important 
category of pragmatism. Every organism “learns how to be” through imitation;

2)  The Peircean categories relate to holons. Pragmatism requires a 
mind-body in order to define the things that matter;

3)  An atom or a molecule is a holon;

4)  In the video Inner Life of the Cell <https://youtu.be/FzcTgrxMzZk> , 
what I observe is less chemical reactions (in the conventional, linear, 
materialist sense) than it is a whole ecosystem at the molecular level.

 

In the persistence of atoms and molecules across time, we encounter Peirce’s 
description of matter as  “mind hide-bound in habit,” so we have no argument 
there. But what about pragmatism, or the other categories? From a 
semiotic/pragmatic perspective, how does an atom or molecule define the things 
that matter? 

This is where entanglement (nonlocality) enters the picture. My conjecture is 
that atoms and molecules “know” their proper conduct, or properties, through 
entanglement. Entanglement is their imitation. A molecular “mind-body” has its 
predispositions (secondness, or association) and motivations (firstness), and 
it will act on them as per the video clip… but it can only “know how to be” 
through entanglement. Knowing how to be, I guess, relates in the first instance 
to firstness.

It is along these lines that I base my DNA entanglement thesis: 
https://www.academia.edu/29626663/DNA_ENTANGLEMENT_THE_EVIDENCE_MOUNTS


Imitation plays such an important role in pragmatism and defining the things 
that matter. Even for atoms and molecules. Imitation is perhaps the most 
important antidote to entropy… no let me rephrase that… imitation is perhaps 
central to overcoming entropy. A species sharing identical mind-bodies with 
identical predispositions is one thing, but there are so many possibilities in 
those predispositions that a shared consensus in behavior… imitation… is 
required to enable an ecosystem to hang together. We see this especially in 
human cultures… same mind-bodies, but totally different cultures. Imitation 
whittles down infinite possibility to pragmatic, tangible reality.

sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 11:33 PM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt; tabor...@primus.ca; Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was 
semantic problem with the term)

 


Jeff, list: I agree; I have written about how the relations - as I call them, 
the Six Relations of:

Firstness -as- Firstness, i.e., genuine Firstness

Secondness -as- Secondness; i.e., genuine Secondness

Thirdness-as-Thirdness, i.e., genuine Thirdness

Secondness-as-Firstness, i.e., degenerate Secondness, or Secondness operating 
within a mode also of Firstness

Thirdness-as Firstness, i.e., degenerate Thirdness

Thirdness-as- Secondness

 

I've written about how these Six Relations - and I agree that ALL of them are 
vital - operate to enable particular matter, diversity of matter, stability of 
type etc.

I could send you, off list, a paper on this. I don't see posting it on this 
list.

 

I would question, however, whether dyadic 'things' were primary, as you seem to 
suggest, and only later evolved to include the triad. I think the triad is 
primal.

 

Edwina


-- 
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
largest alternative telecommunications provider. 

http://www.primus.ca 

On Fri 31/03/17 4:18 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:

Edwina, Jon S, List,

 

With the aim of sharpening the point, Peirce seems to suggest that, for the 
sake of explaining the cosmos, it is important to ask how degenerate forms of 
these relations might have grown into more genuine forms of the relations.

 

As such, the question is not simply one of how, as you seem to be putting it, 
simple firsts, second and thirds started to grow together--or of how one simple 
element might have preceded the other in some sense. Rather, using the more 
sophisticated classification of types of seconds and thirds that Peirce 
provides in a number of places, t

RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Stephen Jarosek]

List,

Regarding the Peircean categories in matter, here are the starting assumptions 
that I work with:

1)  First, a couple of definitions: A HOLON is a mind-body. Every living 
organism, as a mind-body, is a holon. Furthermore, IMITATION is an important 
category of pragmatism. Every organism “learns how to be” through imitation;

2)  The Peircean categories relate to holons. Pragmatism requires a 
mind-body in order to define the things that matter;

3)  An atom or a molecule is a holon;

4)  In the video Inner Life of the Cell <https://youtu.be/FzcTgrxMzZk> , 
what I observe is less chemical reactions (in the conventional, linear, 
materialist sense) than it is a whole ecosystem at the molecular level.

 

In the persistence of atoms and molecules across time, we encounter Peirce’s 
description of matter as  “mind hide-bound in habit,” so we have no argument 
there. But what about pragmatism, or the other categories? From a 
semiotic/pragmatic perspective, how does an atom or molecule define the things 
that matter? 

This is where entanglement (nonlocality) enters the picture. My conjecture is 
that atoms and molecules “know” their proper conduct, or properties, through 
entanglement. Entanglement is their imitation. A molecular “mind-body” has its 
predispositions (secondness, or association) and motivations (firstness), and 
it will act on them as per the video clip… but it can only “know how to be” 
through entanglement. Knowing how to be, I guess, relates in the first instance 
to firstness.

It is along these lines that I base my DNA entanglement thesis: 
https://www.academia.edu/29626663/DNA_ENTANGLEMENT_THE_EVIDENCE_MOUNTS


Imitation plays such an important role in pragmatism and defining the things 
that matter. Even for atoms and molecules. Imitation is perhaps the most 
important antidote to entropy… no let me rephrase that… imitation is perhaps 
central to overcoming entropy. A species sharing identical mind-bodies with 
identical predispositions is one thing, but there are so many possibilities in 
those predispositions that a shared consensus in behavior… imitation… is 
required to enable an ecosystem to hang together. We see this especially in 
human cultures… same mind-bodies, but totally different cultures. Imitation 
whittles down infinite possibility to pragmatic, tangible reality.

sj



 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 11:33 PM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt; tabor...@primus.ca; Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was 
semantic problem with the term)

 


Jeff, list: I agree; I have written about how the relations - as I call them, 
the Six Relations of:

Firstness -as- Firstness, i.e., genuine Firstness

Secondness -as- Secondness; i.e., genuine Secondness

Thirdness-as-Thirdness, i.e., genuine Thirdness

Secondness-as-Firstness, i.e., degenerate Secondness, or Secondness operating 
within a mode also of Firstness

Thirdness-as Firstness, i.e., degenerate Thirdness

Thirdness-as- Secondness

 

I've written about how these Six Relations - and I agree that ALL of them are 
vital - operate to enable particular matter, diversity of matter, stability of 
type etc.

I could send you, off list, a paper on this. I don't see posting it on this 
list.

 

I would question, however, whether dyadic 'things' were primary, as you seem to 
suggest, and only later evolved to include the triad. I think the triad is 
primal.

 

Edwina


-- 
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
largest alternative telecommunications provider. 

http://www.primus.ca 

On Fri 31/03/17 4:18 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:

Edwina, Jon S, List,

 

With the aim of sharpening the point, Peirce seems to suggest that, for the 
sake of explaining the cosmos, it is important to ask how degenerate forms of 
these relations might have grown into more genuine forms of the relations.

 

As such, the question is not simply one of how, as you seem to be putting it, 
simple firsts, second and thirds started to grow together--or of how one simple 
element might have preceded the other in some sense. Rather, using the more 
sophisticated classification of types of seconds and thirds that Peirce 
provides in a number of places, the question I'm asking is how things having 
the character of essential or inherential dyads might have evolved into 
relational dyads of diversity, or of how qualitative relational dyads might 
have evolved into dynamical dyads--and how more genuine types of triads might 
have evolved from those that were relatively vague.

 

This, I think, is a better way of framing the questions coming out of his work 
in phenomenology and semiotics. From this work, we are supposed to derive the 
resources needed to frame better hypotheses in metaphysics and, in turn, in the 
special sciences.

 

--Jeff

 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 Jeff, list: I agree; I have written about how the relations - as I
call them, the Six Relations of:

Firstness -as- Firstness, i.e., genuine Firstness

Secondness -as- Secondness; i.e., genuine Secondness

Thirdness-as-Thirdness, i.e., genuine Thirdness

Secondness-as-Firstness, i.e., degenerate Secondness, or Secondness
operating within a mode also of Firstness

Thirdness-as Firstness, i.e., degenerate Thirdness

Thirdness-as- Secondness
I've written about how these Six Relations - and I agree that ALL of
them are vital - operate to enable particular matter, diversity of
matter, stability of type etc.

I could send you, off list, a paper on this. I don't see posting it
on this list.
I would question, however, whether dyadic 'things' were primary, as
you seem to suggest, and only later evolved to include the triad. I
think the triad is primal.
Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Fri 31/03/17  4:18 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:
Edwina, Jon S, List, 
With the aim of sharpening the point, Peirce seems to suggest that,
for the sake of explaining the cosmos, it is important to ask how
degenerate forms of these relations might have grown into more
genuine forms of the relations. 
As such, the question is not simply one of how, as you seem to be
putting it, simple firsts, second and thirds started to grow
together--or of how one simple element might have preceded the other
in some sense. Rather, using the more sophisticated classification 
of types of seconds and thirds that Peirce provides in a number of
places, the question I'm asking is how things having the character of
essential or inherential dyads might have evolved into relational
dyads of diversity, or of how qualitative relational  dyads might
have evolved into dynamical dyads--and how more genuine types of
triads might have evolved from those that were relatively vague. 
This, I think, is a better way of framing the questions coming out
of his work in phenomenology and semiotics. From this work, we are
supposed to derive the resources needed to frame better hypotheses in
metaphysics and, in turn, in the special sciences. 
--Jeff 
Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354   
-
 From: Edwina Taborsky 
 Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 12:57 PM
 To: Jon Alan Schmidt; Jeffrey Brian Downard
 Cc: Peirce-L
 Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis
(Was semantic problem with the term) 

Jeff, list - I'll continue to reject that Thirdness  preceded
1stness and 2ndness. I think that ALL THREE are primordial BUT - the
'big bang' action, so to speak, began with Firstness, followed by the
particularity of Secondness, followed by the habit-taking  of
Thirdness. But by this, I do NOT say that Firstness was primordial.
Just that the first expression of the Three Primordial Modes...was
Firstness.  
Agree, that most certainly, the development of Mind-into-Matter was
not by mechanical bits sticking together, but by the indeterminate
becoming determinate. BUT - I'd add that one must never ignore the
power of dissipation and Firstness, which rejects pure  determinates
and constantly includes deviations from the norm - and - dissipation
of the normative habits. 
Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca [1] 
 On Fri 31/03/17 2:23 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:
Hi Jon S., List, 
You say:  If the tendency to take habits was truly "original," then
it seems to me that 3ns must have preceded 1ns  and 2ns in some
sense.  This is consistent with Peirce's remarks about "super-order"
in the first additament to the article (CP 6.490; 1908), as well as
the blackboard diagram in the final RLT lecture (1898); hence the
notion of primordial 3ns or "ur-continuity"  that we have discussed
on the List in the past.
For my part, it tend to think that Peirce has a remarkably rich set
of resources to draw from for the sake of working out how the various
formal and material elements--studied in both phenomenology and
semiotics--might  be combined in the conceptions he is employing in
formulating these hypotheses concerning the origins of order in the
cosmos. So, for instance, one might think of triadic relations that
embody vague sorts of order for the third part of a genuine triad,
and  dyadic individuals that are just possibles--like essential and
inherential dyads and triads as the "subjects" that are governed by
such primordial forms of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Clark Goble]

I don’t have time to chime in right now Edwina due to work but I’ll hopefully 
have some comments Monday.


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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

How about that!  I will even accept your amendment, since every Dynamic
Interpretant is a distinct occurrence.

Thanks,

Jon

On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 3:08 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list - we agree on something! I agree with your outline of the three
> Interpretants!
>
>  Although I would quibble with the definition of the Final Interpretant as
> " the habitual effect that a Sign would produce; e.g., through repetition
> of a particular Dynamic Interpretant."  I vew the Final Interpretant as the
> generalities [which has similarities, I supposed, to your 'habitual
> effect']but I would say 'through repetition of MULTIPLE Dynamic
> Interpretants'.  That is, I view the Final Interpretant as an effect of
> many semiosic processes.
>
> Edwina
>
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Fri 31/03/17 3:30 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Helmut, List:
>
> I agree that "habit" is broader for Peirce than "a gradual approximation
> process."
>
> "Effete" is just an antiquated synonym for "weak" or "degenerate."  Of
> course, Peirce elsewhere referred to matter as "partially deadened mind,"
> which gets at the same basic idea.
>
> There are different notions about what the Immediate, Dynamic, and Final
> Interpretants are, which obviously affects what else they might be.  My
> current working theory is that the Immediate Interpretant is a range of 
> possible
> effects that a Sign may produce, the Dynamic Interpretant is any actual
> effect that a Sign does produce, and the Final Interpretant is the habitual
> effect that a Sign would produce; e.g., through repetition of a
> particular Dynamic Interpretant.  With these definitions, they would not
> really be amenable to your suggestions.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 1:46 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>
>> List,
>> Jeffrey, I too had problems with that. Now I think, that Peirce uses the
>> term "habit" in a broader sense: Usually, when I hear or read "habit" I
>> think of a gradual approximation process. This cannot be the case with
>> conservation of energy, because exact conservation cannot be approached: If
>> in all reactions, physical and chemical, only a little energy was lost or
>> won, then the universe would freeze or explode in an instant, I guess. A
>> similar problem is the fine tunedness of constants. But Peircean habit also
>> may be saltatory, and includes emergences, I guess.
>> "Effete" sounds a bit pejatorive to me, I rather think of matter as
>> condensed or precipitated mind, but "effete" I accept for correct of course.
>>
>> Edwina, you wrote, that a dynamical interpretant of one sign may work as
>> a dynamical object for another. Do you think, that also an immediate
>> interpretant and a final one may become a dynamical object? My guess is,
>> that immediate interpretants become concepts, dynamical interpretants
>> become material things, and final interpretants become topics that have
>> happened or been in the past (all for DynObjs).
>>
>> Best,
>> Helmut
>>
>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Edwina, Jon S, List,


With the aim of sharpening the point, Peirce seems to suggest that, for the 
sake of explaining the cosmos, it is important to ask how degenerate forms of 
these relations might have grown into more genuine forms of the relations.


As such, the question is not simply one of how, as you seem to be putting it, 
simple firsts, second and thirds started to grow together--or of how one simple 
element might have preceded the other in some sense. Rather, using the more 
sophisticated classification of types of seconds and thirds that Peirce 
provides in a number of places, the question I'm asking is how things having 
the character of essential or inherential dyads might have evolved into 
relational dyads of diversity, or of how qualitative relational dyads might 
have evolved into dynamical dyads--and how more genuine types of triads might 
have evolved from those that were relatively vague.


This, I think, is a better way of framing the questions coming out of his work 
in phenomenology and semiotics. From this work, we are supposed to derive the 
resources needed to frame better hypotheses in metaphysics and, in turn, in the 
special sciences.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Edwina Taborsky 
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 12:57 PM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt; Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was 
semantic problem with the term)


Jeff, list - I'll continue to reject that Thirdness  preceded 1stness and 
2ndness. I think that ALL THREE are primordial BUT - the 'big bang' action, so 
to speak, began with Firstness, followed by the particularity of Secondness, 
followed by the habit-taking of Thirdness. But by this, I do NOT say that 
Firstness was primordial. Just that the first expression of the Three 
Primordial Modes...was Firstness.


Agree, that most certainly, the development of Mind-into-Matter was not by 
mechanical bits sticking together, but by the indeterminate becoming 
determinate. BUT - I'd add that one must never ignore the power of dissipation 
and Firstness, which rejects pure determinates and constantly includes 
deviations from the norm - and - dissipation of the normative habits.


Edwina

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This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
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On Fri 31/03/17 2:23 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:

Hi Jon S., List,


You say:  If the tendency to take habits was truly "original," then it seems to 
me that 3ns must have preceded 1ns and 2ns in some sense.  This is consistent 
with Peirce's remarks about "super-order" in the first additament to the 
article (CP 6.490; 1908), as well as the blackboard diagram in the final RLT 
lecture (1898); hence the notion of primordial 3ns or "ur-continuity" that we 
have discussed on the List in the past.


For my part, it tend to think that Peirce has a remarkably rich set of 
resources to draw from for the sake of working out how the various formal and 
material elements--studied in both phenomenology and semiotics--might be 
combined in the conceptions he is employing in formulating these hypotheses 
concerning the origins of order in the cosmos. So, for instance, one might 
think of triadic relations that embody vague sorts of order for the third part 
of a genuine triad, and dyadic individuals that are just possibles--like 
essential and inherential dyads and triads as the "subjects" that are governed 
by such primordial forms of what is general. (see "On The Logic of Mathematics; 
an attempt")


Remember, the primary movement in the explanatory process is that of showing 
how, through processes of diversification and specification, something that has 
its origins in a homogeneous sort of vague-uralt potentiality might evolve. It 
is not primarily by a process of adding little elemental atomic bits together 
that things grow, but by a process of the indeterminate becoming determinate 
that the cosmos evolves.


Hope that helps.


Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 10:16 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic 
problem with the term)

Jeff, List:

What I find interesting about that quote from "A Guess at the Riddle" (1887-8) 
is the often-overlooked implication that "the principle of habit" (3ns) already 
had to be in place and operative in order to bring about the "second flash," 
which "was in some sense after the first, because resulting from it."  Peirce 
only belatedl

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 Jeffrey, list. Yes, although of course Prigogine and Peirce lived at
different times, I think that Prigogine was trying to address several
principles that Peirce was also addressing; namely:
1) entropy or dissipation; and

2) habit-taking, continuity or self-organization.
Peirce's answer to the first is to introduce the mode of Firstness,
which is always intruding its actions into a seemingly stable systems
and thus, enabling diversity; and his answer to the second, of
habit-taking and self-organization within these habits, is to
introduce the mode of Thirdness.
I think that Prigogine was rejecting the random mechanical nature of
entropy as it was used in early Darwinian outlines - and Peirce
certainly rejects that view as well. And Peirce's habits, of course,
have little to nothing to do with 'natural selection' as a
stabilizing force for continuity of type.
Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Fri 31/03/17 12:46 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:
Edwina, Clark, Jon S, List, 
Let's make a comparison for the sake of framing a question in the
special science of cosmological physics. Does Peirce's explanatory
principle  help to address  the kinds of questions that Ilya
Prigogine  is trying to answer about the irreversibility of
thermodynamical systems? Once again, here is the quote in which
Peirce describes the principle:   “out  of the womb of
indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by
the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the
principle of habit there would have been a second flash…..” (CP, 
1.412)  
See: Prigogine, Ilya (1961). Introduction  to Thermodynamics of
Irreversible Processes (Second ed.). New York: Interscience. 
If Peirce is addressing the same sort of question, then are the
Prigogine  and Peirce explaining the irreversibility of such
thermodynamical processes in the same general way? Or, is Peirce
trying to answer a set of prior questions. For instance, one might
infer from the quote above taken together with Peirce says in the
last of  the lectures in Reasoning and the Logic of Things (including
the suggestive draft versions) that Peirce is interested in more
general questions about what makes any sort of process ordered so
that it is irreversible--including, for example, the "unfolding"  of
the dimensions of quality as well as those of space and the order of
time. 
Prigogine's general strategy is to provide an account of what makes 
some complex systems chaotic. Then, he tries to explain how some
chaotic systems can evolve in a manner that is self-organizing. The
explanation draws on the conception of a dissipative structure. As
such, a comparison between the two might help us better  understand
how to frame competing hypotheses concerning the evolution of order
in such systems--including forms of order that are irreversible in
one way or another. 
--Jeff 
Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354   
-
 From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
 Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 8:53 AM
 To: tabor...@primus.ca; CLARK GOBLE
 Cc: Peirce-L
 Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was
semantic problem with the term) Edwina, Clark, List: 
  Thank you for beginning what promises to be an interesting
discussion.  I might offer some comments later, but for now I am
simply starting a new thread, because I think that the topic warrants
doing so. 
  Regards, 
  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer,
Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [1]  
   
 On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 10:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky   wrote:
Clark - OK - I'll put in a long comment here on how I see the
non-philosophical aspects of Peirce's work. Thanks for your
encouragement to do so. 

Basic axioms: that our universe operates as
energy-transforming-to-matter, or ‘things’ [Peirce used the term
‘things’ often]  via semiosic actions. 
* 

 The emergence of Matter: Peirce: 1.412 “out of the womb of
indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by
the principle  of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the
principle of habit there would have been a second flash…..” The
point here is that matter emerged as differentiated and also, as then
connected by habits and by kinetic interaction. 
The origin of Material matter: 1.362 “the starting point of the
universe, God the Creator is the Absolute First; the terminus of the
universe, God completely revealed,  is the Absolute Second; every
state of the universe at a measurable point of time is the
third……..If your creed

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon, list - again [and I'm stunned] - we agree. I agree with the
arrangement of 1stness-3rdness-2ndness.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Fri 31/03/17  3:40 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Understood, and I think we agree that within our existing universe,
all three Categories are involved in every phenomenon.  Again,
though, Peirce attributed the "second flash" to "the principle of
habit," which is 3ns rather than 2ns.  Interestingly, this
arrangement of the Categories (1ns→3ns→2ns) is consistent with
the next passage that you quoted ...
  CSP:  The starting-point of the universe, God the Creator, is the
Absolute First; the terminus of the universe, God completely
revealed, is the Absolute Second; every state of the universe at a
measurable point of time is the third. (CP 1.362; 1887-8)
 ... which also echoes the diagram that Jeff introduced in another
thread, presenting inquiry as a similarly hyperbolic process.
 Thanks,
 Jon  
 On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 2:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon, list - yes, I know that you view that 'tendency to take habits'
as preceding 1stness and 2ndness. I have no intention of trying to
persuade you otherwise. 

However -  I view all three as equally primordial. There is no way
that any of them could function without the other.  BUT - I do
consider that the first 'flash' was an action of Firstness; the
second was an action of Secondness..and then, habits emerged in
actuality. BUT - all three are necessary and thus primordial. I do
not subscribe to YOUR view that Thirdness has a priority or privilege
in the primordial set. Again - I consider that all three modes are
primordial. 

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca [2] 
 On Fri 31/03/17  1:16 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[3] sent:
 Jeff, List:
 What I find interesting about that quote from "A Guess at the
Riddle" (1887-8) is the often-overlooked implication that "the
principle of habit" (3ns) already had to be in place and operative in
order to bring about the "second flash," which "was in some sense
after the first, because resulting from it."  Peirce only belatedly
recognized this himself; in one of the early manuscript drafts of "A
Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (1908), he referred to the
notion that the habit-taking tendency brought about the laws of nature
as "my original hypothesis," and then made this comment about it. 
 CSP:  But during the long years which have elapsed since the
hypothesis first suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed
that faulty features of the original hypothesis have been brought [to]
my attention by others and have struck me in my own meditations …
Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that there must have been some
original tendency to take habits which did not arise according to my
hypothesis … (R 842) 
 If the tendency to take habits was truly "original," then it seems
to me that 3ns must have preceded 1ns and 2ns in some sense.  This is
consistent with Peirce's remarks about "super-order" in the first
additament to the article (CP 6.490; 1908), as well as the blackboard
diagram in the final RLT lecture (1898); hence the notion of
primordial 3ns or "ur-continuity" that we have discussed on the List
in the past.
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [4] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [5]  
 On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 11:46 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  wrote:
Edwina, Clark, Jon S, List, 

Let's make a comparison for the sake of framing a question in the
special science of cosmological physics. Does Peirce's explanatory
principle  help to address  the kinds of questions that Ilya
Prigogine  is trying to answer about the irreversibility of
thermodynamical systems? Once again, here is the quote in which
Peirce describes the principle:   “out  of the womb of
indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by
the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the
principle of habit there would have been a second flash…..” (CP, 
1.412)
See: Prigogine, Ilya (1961). Introduction  to Thermodynamics of
Irreversible Processes (Second ed.). New York: Interscience. 
If Peirce is addressing the same sort of question, then are the
Prigogine  and Peirce explaining the irreversibility of such
thermodynamical processes in the same general way? Or, is Peirce
trying to answer a set of prior questions. For instance, one might
infer from the quote above taken together with Peirce says in the
last of  the lectures in Reasoning and the Logic of Things (in

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon, list - we agree on something! I agree with your outline of the
three Interpretants!

 Although I would quibble with the definition of the Final
Interpretant as " the habitual effect that a Sign would produce;
e.g., through repetition of a particular Dynamic Interpretant."  I
vew the Final Interpretant as the generalities [which has
similarities, I supposed, to your 'habitual effect']but I would
say 'through repetition of MULTIPLE Dynamic Interpretants'.  That is,
I view the Final Interpretant as an effect of many semiosic processes.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Fri 31/03/17  3:30 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Helmut, List:
 I agree that "habit" is broader for Peirce than "a gradual
approximation process."
 "Effete" is just an antiquated synonym for "weak" or "degenerate." 
Of course, Peirce elsewhere referred to matter as "partially deadened
mind," which gets at the same basic idea.
 There are different notions about what the Immediate, Dynamic, and
Final Interpretants are, which obviously affects what  else they
might be.  My current working theory is that the Immediate
Interpretant is a range of possible effects that a Sign may produce,
the Dynamic Interpretant is any actual effect that a Sign does
produce, and the Final Interpretant is the habitual effect that a
Sign would produce; e.g., through repetition of a particular Dynamic
Interpretant.  With these definitions, they would not really be
amenable to your suggestions.
  Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 1:46 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
 List,Jeffrey, I too had problems with that. Now I think, that Peirce
uses the term "habit" in a broader sense: Usually, when I hear or read
"habit" I think of a gradual approximation process. This cannot be the
case with conservation of energy, because exact conservation cannot be
approached: If in all reactions, physical and chemical, only a little
energy was lost or won, then the universe would freeze or explode in
an instant, I guess. A similar problem is the fine tunedness of
constants. But Peircean habit also may be saltatory, and includes
emergences, I guess. "Effete" sounds a bit pejatorive to me, I rather
think of matter as condensed or precipitated mind, but "effete" I
accept for correct of course. Edwina, you wrote, that a dynamical
interpretant of one sign may work as a dynamical object for another.
Do you think, that also an immediate interpretant and a final one may
become a dynamical object? My guess is, that immediate interpretants
become concepts, dynamical interpretants become material things, and
final interpretants become topics that have happened or been in the
past (all for DynObjs).  Best,Helmut 


Links:
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[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'h.raul...@gmx.de\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Jeff, list - I'll continue to reject that Thirdness  preceded
1stness and 2ndness. I think that ALL THREE are primordial BUT - the
'big bang' action, so to speak, began with Firstness, followed by the
particularity of Secondness, followed by the habit-taking of
Thirdness. But by this, I do NOT say that Firstness was primordial.
Just that the first expression of the Three Primordial Modes...was
Firstness. 
Agree, that most certainly, the development of Mind-into-Matter was
not by mechanical bits sticking together, but by the indeterminate
becoming determinate. BUT - I'd add that one must never ignore the
power of dissipation and Firstness, which rejects pure determinates
and constantly includes deviations from the norm - and - dissipation
of the normative habits.
Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Fri 31/03/17  2:23 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:
Hi Jon S., List, 
You say:  If the tendency to take habits was truly "original," then
it seems to me that 3ns must have preceded 1ns  and 2ns in some
sense.  This is consistent with Peirce's remarks about "super-order"
in the first additament to the article (CP 6.490; 1908), as well as
the blackboard diagram in the final RLT lecture (1898); hence the
notion of primordial 3ns or "ur-continuity"  that we have discussed
on the List in the past.
For my part, it tend to think that Peirce has a remarkably rich set
of resources to draw from for the sake of working out how the various
formal and material elements--studied in both phenomenology and 
semiotics--might be combined in the conceptions he is employing in
formulating these hypotheses concerning the origins of order in the
cosmos. So, for instance, one might think of triadic relations that
embody vague sorts of order for the third part of a genuine  triad,
and dyadic individuals that are just possibles--like essential and
inherential dyads and triads as the "subjects" that are governed by
such primordial forms of what is general. (see "On The Logic of
Mathematics; an attempt") 
Remember, the primary movement in the explanatory process is that of
showing how, through processes of diversification and specification,
something that has its origins in a homogeneous sort of vague-uralt 
potentiality might evolve. It is not primarily by a process of adding
little elemental atomic bits together that things grow, but by a
process of the indeterminate becoming determinate that the cosmos
evolves.  
Hope that helps. 
Jeff 
Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354   
-
 From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
 Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 10:16 AM
 To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
 Cc: Peirce-L
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis
(Was semantic problem with the term) Jeff, List: 
  What I find interesting about that quote from "A Guess at the
Riddle" (1887-8) is the often-overlooked implication that "the
principle of habit" (3ns) already had to be in place and operative in
order to bring about the "second flash," which "was in some  sense
after the first, because resulting from it."  Peirce only belatedly
recognized this himself; in one of the early manuscript drafts of "A
Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (1908), he referred to the
notion that the habit-taking tendency brought  about the laws of
nature as "my original hypothesis," and then made this comment about
it. 
   CSP:  But during the long years which have elapsed since the
hypothesis first suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed
that faulty features of the original hypothesis have been brought [to]
my attention by others and have struck me in my own  meditations …
Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that there must have been some
original tendency to take habits which did not arise according to my
hypothesis … (R 842)  
  If the tendency to take habits was truly "original," then it seems
to me that 3ns must have preceded 1ns and 2ns in some sense.  This is
consistent with Peirce's remarks about "super-order" in the first
additament to the article (CP 6.490; 1908), as well as the blackboard
diagram in the final RLT lecture (1898); hence the notion of
primordial  3ns or "ur-continuity" that we have discussed on the List
in the past.
  Regards, 
  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer,
Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [1]  
   
 On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 11:46 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard   wrote:
Edwina, Clark, Jon S, List, 

Let's make a compariso

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

Understood, and I think we agree that *within *our existing universe, all
three Categories are involved in every phenomenon.  Again, though, Peirce
attributed the "second flash" to "the principle of habit," which is 3ns
rather than 2ns.  Interestingly, this arrangement of the Categories
(1ns→3ns→2ns) is consistent with the next passage that you quoted ...

CSP:  The starting-point of the universe, God the Creator, is the Absolute
First; the terminus of the universe, God completely revealed, is the
Absolute Second; every state of the universe at a measurable point of time
is the third. (CP 1.362; 1887-8)


... which also echoes the diagram that Jeff introduced in another thread,
presenting inquiry as a similarly hyperbolic process.

Thanks,

Jon

On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 2:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list - yes, I know that you view that 'tendency to take habits' as
> preceding 1stness and 2ndness. I have no intention of trying to persuade
> you otherwise.
>
> However -  I view all three as equally primordial. There is no way that
> any of them could function without the other.  BUT - I do consider that the
> first 'flash' was an action of Firstness; the second was an action of
> Secondness..and then, habits emerged in actuality. BUT - all three are
> necessary and thus primordial. I do not subscribe to YOUR view that
> Thirdness has a priority or privilege in the primordial set. Again - I
> consider that all three modes are primordial.
>
> Edwina
>
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Fri 31/03/17 1:16 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Jeff, List:
>
> What I find interesting about that quote from "A Guess at the Riddle"
> (1887-8) is the often-overlooked implication that "the principle of habit"
> (3ns) already had to be in place and operative in order to bring about the
> "second flash," which "was in some sense after the first, because resulting
> from it."  Peirce only belatedly recognized this himself; in one of the
> early manuscript drafts of "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God"
> (1908), he referred to the notion that the habit-taking tendency brought
> about the laws of nature as "my original hypothesis," and then made this
> comment about it.
>
> CSP:  But during the long years which have elapsed since the hypothesis
> first suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed that faulty
> features of the original hypothesis have been brought [to] my attention by
> others and have struck me in my own meditations … Professor Ogden Rood
> pointed out that there must have been some original tendency to take habits
> which did not arise according to my hypothesis … (R 842)
>
>
> If the tendency to take habits was truly "original," then it seems to me
> that 3ns must have preceded 1ns and 2ns in some sense.  This is
> consistent with Peirce's remarks about "super-order" in the first
> additament to the article (CP 6.490; 1908), as well as the blackboard
> diagram in the final RLT lecture (1898); hence the notion of primordial 3ns
> or "ur-continuity" that we have discussed on the List in the past.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 11:46 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
>> Edwina, Clark, Jon S, List,
>>
>> Let's make a comparison for the sake of framing a question in the special
>> science of cosmological physics. Does Peirce's explanatory principle  help
>> to address the kinds of questions that Ilya Prigogine is trying to
>> answer about the irreversibility of thermodynamical systems? Once again,
>> here is the quote in which Peirce describes the principle:   “out of the
>> womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by
>> the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the
>> principle of habit there would have been a second flash…..” (CP,  1.412)
>>
>> See: Prigogine, Ilya (1961). Introduction to Thermodynamics of
>> Irreversible Processes (Second ed.). New York: Interscience.
>>
>> If Peirce is addressing the same sort of question, then are the Prigogine
>> and Peirce explaining the irreversibility of such thermodynamical processes
>> in the same general way? Or, is Peirce trying to answer a set of prior
>> questions. For instance, one might infer from the quote above taken
>> together with Peirce says in the last of the lectures in Reasoning and the
>> Logic of Things (including the suggestive draft versions) that Peirce is
>> interested in more general questions about what makes any sort of process
>> ordered so that it is irreversible--including, for example, the "unfolding"
>> of the dimensions of quality as well as those of space and the order of
>> time.
>>
>> Prigogine's gener

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, List:

I agree that "habit" is broader for Peirce than "a gradual approximation
process."

"Effete" is just an antiquated synonym for "weak" or "degenerate."  Of
course, Peirce elsewhere referred to matter as "partially deadened mind,"
which gets at the same basic idea.

There are different notions about what the Immediate, Dynamic, and Final
Interpretants are, which obviously affects what *else *they might be.  My
current working theory is that the Immediate Interpretant is a range
of *possible
*effects that a Sign *may *produce, the Dynamic Interpretant is any *actual*
effect that a Sign *does* produce, and the Final Interpretant is the *habitual
*effect that a Sign *would *produce; e.g., through repetition of a
particular Dynamic Interpretant.  With these definitions, they would not
really be amenable to your suggestions.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 1:46 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> List,
> Jeffrey, I too had problems with that. Now I think, that Peirce uses the
> term "habit" in a broader sense: Usually, when I hear or read "habit" I
> think of a gradual approximation process. This cannot be the case with
> conservation of energy, because exact conservation cannot be approached: If
> in all reactions, physical and chemical, only a little energy was lost or
> won, then the universe would freeze or explode in an instant, I guess. A
> similar problem is the fine tunedness of constants. But Peircean habit also
> may be saltatory, and includes emergences, I guess.
> "Effete" sounds a bit pejatorive to me, I rather think of matter as
> condensed or precipitated mind, but "effete" I accept for correct of course.
>
> Edwina, you wrote, that a dynamical interpretant of one sign may work as a
> dynamical object for another. Do you think, that also an immediate
> interpretant and a final one may become a dynamical object? My guess is,
> that immediate interpretants become concepts, dynamical interpretants
> become material things, and final interpretants become topics that have
> happened or been in the past (all for DynObjs).
>
> Best,
> Helmut
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon, list - yes, I know that you view that 'tendency to take habits'
as preceding 1stness and 2ndness. I have no intention of trying to
persuade you otherwise. 

However -  I view all three as equally primordial. There is no way
that any of them could function without the other.  BUT - I do
consider that the first 'flash' was an action of Firstness; the
second was an action of Secondness..and then, habits emerged in
actuality. BUT - all three are necessary and thus primordial. I do
not subscribe to YOUR view that Thirdness has a priority or privilege
in the primordial set. Again - I consider that all three modes are
primordial.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Fri 31/03/17  1:16 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Jeff, List:
 What I find interesting about that quote from "A Guess at the
Riddle" (1887-8) is the often-overlooked implication that "the
principle of habit" (3ns) already had to be in place and operative in
order to bring about the "second flash," which "was in some sense
after the first, because resulting from it."  Peirce only belatedly
recognized this himself; in one of the early manuscript drafts of "A
Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (1908), he referred to the
notion that the habit-taking tendency brought about the laws of nature
as "my original hypothesis," and then made this comment about it. 
 CSP:  But during the long years which have elapsed since the
hypothesis first suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed
that faulty features of the original hypothesis have been brought [to]
my attention by others and have struck me in my own meditations …
Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that there must have been some
original tendency to take habits which did not arise according to my
hypothesis … (R 842) 
 If the tendency to take habits was truly "original," then it seems
to me that 3ns must have preceded 1ns and 2ns in some sense.  This is
consistent with Peirce's remarks about "super-order" in the first
additament to the article (CP 6.490; 1908), as well as the blackboard
diagram in the final RLT lecture (1898); hence the notion of
primordial 3ns or "ur-continuity" that we have discussed on the List
in the past.
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 11:46 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  wrote:
Edwina, Clark, Jon S, List, 

Let's make a comparison for the sake of framing a question in the
special science of cosmological physics. Does Peirce's explanatory
principle  help to address  the kinds of questions that Ilya
Prigogine  is trying to answer about the irreversibility of
thermodynamical systems? Once again, here is the quote in which
Peirce describes the principle:   “out  of the womb of
indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by
the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the
principle of habit there would have been a second flash…..” (CP, 
1.412)
See: Prigogine, Ilya (1961). Introduction  to Thermodynamics of
Irreversible Processes (Second ed.). New York: Interscience. 
If Peirce is addressing the same sort of question, then are the
Prigogine  and Peirce explaining the irreversibility of such
thermodynamical processes in the same general way? Or, is Peirce
trying to answer a set of prior questions. For instance, one might
infer from the quote above taken together with Peirce says in the
last of  the lectures in Reasoning and the Logic of Things (including
the suggestive draft versions) that Peirce is interested in more
general questions about what makes any sort of process ordered so
that it is irreversible--including, for example, the "unfolding"  of
the dimensions of quality as well as those of space and the order of
time. 
Prigogine's general strategy is to provide an account of what makes 
some complex systems chaotic. Then, he tries to explain how some
chaotic systems can evolve in a manner that is self-organizing. The
explanation draws on the conception of a dissipative structure. As
such, a comparison between the two might help us better  understand
how to frame competing hypotheses concerning the evolution of order
in such systems--including forms of order that are irreversible in
one way or another. 

--Jeff   Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354 [4] 


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'jeffrey.down...@nau.edu\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[4] http://webmail.primus.ca/tel:(928)%20523-8354

-

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi Jon S., List,


You say:  If the tendency to take habits was truly "original," then it seems to 
me that 3ns must have preceded 1ns and 2ns in some sense.  This is consistent 
with Peirce's remarks about "super-order" in the first additament to the 
article (CP 6.490; 1908), as well as the blackboard diagram in the final RLT 
lecture (1898); hence the notion of primordial 3ns or "ur-continuity" that we 
have discussed on the List in the past.


For my part, it tend to think that Peirce has a remarkably rich set of 
resources to draw from for the sake of working out how the various formal and 
material elements--studied in both phenomenology and semiotics--might be 
combined in the conceptions he is employing in formulating these hypotheses 
concerning the origins of order in the cosmos. So, for instance, one might 
think of triadic relations that embody vague sorts of order for the third part 
of a genuine triad, and dyadic individuals that are just possibles--like 
essential and inherential dyads and triads as the "subjects" that are governed 
by such primordial forms of what is general. (see "On The Logic of Mathematics; 
an attempt")


Remember, the primary movement in the explanatory process is that of showing 
how, through processes of diversification and specification, something that has 
its origins in a homogeneous sort of vague-uralt potentiality might evolve. It 
is not primarily by a process of adding little elemental atomic bits together 
that things grow, but by a process of the indeterminate becoming determinate 
that the cosmos evolves.


Hope that helps.


Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 10:16 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic 
problem with the term)

Jeff, List:

What I find interesting about that quote from "A Guess at the Riddle" (1887-8) 
is the often-overlooked implication that "the principle of habit" (3ns) already 
had to be in place and operative in order to bring about the "second flash," 
which "was in some sense after the first, because resulting from it."  Peirce 
only belatedly recognized this himself; in one of the early manuscript drafts 
of "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (1908), he referred to the 
notion that the habit-taking tendency brought about the laws of nature as "my 
original hypothesis," and then made this comment about it.

CSP:  But during the long years which have elapsed since the hypothesis first 
suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed that faulty features of 
the original hypothesis have been brought [to] my attention by others and have 
struck me in my own meditations … Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that there 
must have been some original tendency to take habits which did not arise 
according to my hypothesis … (R 842)

If the tendency to take habits was truly "original," then it seems to me that 
3ns must have preceded 1ns and 2ns in some sense.  This is consistent with 
Peirce's remarks about "super-order" in the first additament to the article (CP 
6.490; 1908), as well as the blackboard diagram in the final RLT lecture 
(1898); hence the notion of primordial 3ns or "ur-continuity" that we have 
discussed on the List in the past.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 11:46 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Edwina, Clark, Jon S, List,

Let's make a comparison for the sake of framing a question in the special 
science of cosmological physics. Does Peirce's explanatory principle  help to 
address the kinds of questions that Ilya Prigogine is trying to answer about 
the irreversibility of thermodynamical systems? Once again, here is the quote 
in which Peirce describes the principle:   “out of the womb of indeterminacy, 
we must say that there would have come something, by the principle of 
Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there 
would have been a second flash…..” (CP,  1.412)

See: Prigogine, Ilya (1961). Introduction to Thermodynamics of Irreversible 
Processes (Second ed.). New York: Interscience.

If Peirce is addressing the same sort of question, then are the Prigogine and 
Peirce explaining the irreversibility of such thermodynamical processes in the 
same general way? Or, is Peirce trying to answer a set of prior questions. For 
instance, one might infer from the quote above take

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

What I find interesting about that quote from "A Guess at the Riddle"
(1887-8) is the often-overlooked implication that "the principle of habit"
(3ns) already had to be in place and operative in order to bring about the
"second flash," which "was in some sense after the first, because resulting
from it."  Peirce only belatedly recognized this himself; in one of the
early manuscript drafts of "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God"
(1908), he referred to the notion that the habit-taking tendency brought
about the laws of nature as "my original hypothesis," and then made this
comment about it.

CSP:  But during the long years which have elapsed since the hypothesis
first suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed that faulty
features of the original hypothesis have been brought [to] my attention by
others and have struck me in my own meditations … Professor Ogden Rood
pointed out that there must have been some original tendency to take habits
which did not arise according to my hypothesis … (R 842)


If the tendency to take habits was truly "original," then it seems to me
that 3ns must have *preceded* 1ns and 2ns in some sense.  This is
consistent with Peirce's remarks about "super-order" in the first
additament to the article (CP 6.490; 1908), as well as the blackboard
diagram in the final RLT lecture (1898); hence the notion of primordial 3ns
or "ur-continuity" that we have discussed on the List in the past.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 11:46 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Edwina, Clark, Jon S, List,
>
> Let's make a comparison for the sake of framing a question in the special
> science of cosmological physics. Does Peirce's explanatory principle  help
> to address the kinds of questions that Ilya Prigogine is trying to answer
> about the irreversibility of thermodynamical systems? Once again, here is
> the quote in which Peirce describes the principle:   “out of the womb of
> indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by the
> principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of
> habit there would have been a second flash…..” (CP,  1.412)
>
> See: Prigogine, Ilya (1961). *Introduction to Thermodynamics of
> Irreversible Processes* (Second ed.). New York: Interscience.
>
> If Peirce is addressing the same sort of question, then are the Prigogine
> and Peirce explaining the irreversibility of such thermodynamical processes
> in the same general way? Or, is Peirce trying to answer a set of prior
> questions. For instance, one might infer from the quote above taken
> together with Peirce says in the last of the lectures in Reasoning and the
> Logic of Things (including the suggestive draft versions) that Peirce is
> interested in more general questions about what makes any sort of process
> ordered so that it is irreversible--including, for example, the "unfolding"
> of the dimensions of quality as well as those of space and the order of
> time.
>
> Prigogine's general strategy is to provide an account of what makes some
> complex systems chaotic. Then, he tries to explain how some chaotic systems
> can evolve in a manner that is self-organizing. The explanation draws on
> the conception of a dissipative structure. As such, a comparison between
> the two might help us better understand how to frame competing hypotheses
> concerning the evolution of order in such systems--including forms of order
> that are irreversible in one way or another.
>
> --Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Edwina, Clark, Jon S, List,


Let's make a comparison for the sake of framing a question in the special 
science of cosmological physics. Does Peirce's explanatory principle  help to 
address the kinds of questions that Ilya Prigogine is trying to answer about 
the irreversibility of thermodynamical systems? Once again, here is the quote 
in which Peirce describes the principle:   “out of the womb of indeterminacy, 
we must say that there would have come something, by the principle of 
Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there 
would have been a second flash…..” (CP,  1.412)


See: Prigogine, Ilya (1961). Introduction to Thermodynamics of Irreversible 
Processes (Second ed.). New York: Interscience.


If Peirce is addressing the same sort of question, then are the Prigogine and 
Peirce explaining the irreversibility of such thermodynamical processes in the 
same general way? Or, is Peirce trying to answer a set of prior questions. For 
instance, one might infer from the quote above taken together with Peirce says 
in the last of the lectures in Reasoning and the Logic of Things (including the 
suggestive draft versions) that Peirce is interested in more general questions 
about what makes any sort of process ordered so that it is 
irreversible--including, for example, the "unfolding" of the dimensions of 
quality as well as those of space and the order of time.


Prigogine's general strategy is to provide an account of what makes some 
complex systems chaotic. Then, he tries to explain how some chaotic systems can 
evolve in a manner that is self-organizing. The explanation draws on the 
conception of a dissipative structure. As such, a comparison between the two 
might help us better understand how to frame competing hypotheses concerning 
the evolution of order in such systems--including forms of order that are 
irreversible in one way or another.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 8:53 AM
To: tabor...@primus.ca; CLARK GOBLE
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic 
problem with the term)

Edwina, Clark, List:

Thank you for beginning what promises to be an interesting discussion.  I might 
offer some comments later, but for now I am simply starting a new thread, 
because I think that the topic warrants doing so.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 10:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:

Clark - OK - I'll put in a long comment here on how I see the non-philosophical 
aspects of Peirce's work. Thanks for your encouragement to do so.

Basic axioms: that our universe operates as energy-transforming-to-matter, or 
‘things’ [Peirce used the term ‘things’ often]  via semiosic actions.

  1.  The emergence of Matter: Peirce: 1.412 “out of the womb of indeterminacy, 
we must say that there would have come something, by the principle of 
Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there 
would have been a second flash…..” The point here is that matter emerged as 
differentiated and also, as then connected by habits and by kinetic interaction.

The origin of Material matter: 1.362 “the starting point of the universe, God 
the Creator is the Absolute First; the terminus of the universe, God completely 
revealed, is the Absolute Second; every state of the universe at a measurable 
point of time is the third……..If your creed is that the whole universe is 
approaching in the infinitely distance future a state having a general 
character different from that toward which we look back in the infinitely 
distance past, you make the absolute to consist in two distinct real points and 
are an evolutionist”

I consider the term ‘God’ to be a synonym for Mind. See Peirce’s analysis – and 
I’ll only refer to a few:

“Mind is a propositional function of the widest possible universe, such that 
its values are the meanings of all signs whose actual effects are in effective 
interconnection” [ 4.550].

NOTE: I note the term function which to me suggests that Mind is an action and 
a process. I note also the term signs which to me cannot refer simply to the 
representamen but to the whole articulated triad.

4.551: “Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the 
work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world”….But as 
there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be 
thought without Signs. “

Note: Sign is capitalized in the original. And Peirce also suggests being 
car

[PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, Clark, List:

Thank you for beginning what promises to be an interesting discussion.  I
might offer some comments later, but for now I am simply starting a new
thread, because I think that the topic warrants doing so.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 10:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Clark - OK - I'll put in a long comment here on how I see the
> non-philosophical aspects of Peirce's work. Thanks for your encouragement
> to do so.
>
> Basic axioms: that our universe operates as energy-transforming-to-matter,
> or ‘things’ [Peirce used the term ‘things’ often]  via semiosic actions.
>
>1.
>
>The emergence of Matter: Peirce: 1.412 “out of the womb of
>indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by the
>principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of
>habit there would have been a second flash…..” The point here is that
>matter emerged as differentiated and also, as then connected by habits and
>by kinetic interaction.
>
> The origin of Material matter: 1.362 “the starting point of the universe,
> God the Creator is the Absolute First; the terminus of the universe, God
> completely revealed, is the Absolute Second; every state of the universe at
> a measurable point of time is the third……..If your creed is that the whole
> universe is approaching in the infinitely distance future a state having a
> general character different from that toward which we look back in the
> infinitely distance past, you make the absolute to consist in two distinct
> real points and are an evolutionist”
>
> I consider the term ‘God’ to be a synonym for Mind. See Peirce’s analysis
> – and I’ll only refer to a few:
>
> “Mind is a propositional function of the widest possible universe, such
> that its values are the meanings of all signs whose actual effects are in
> effective interconnection” [ 4.550].
>
> NOTE: I note the term function which to me suggests that Mind is an
> action and a process. I note also the term signs which to me cannot refer
> simply to the representamen but to the whole articulated triad.
>
> 4.551: “Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in
> the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical
> world”….But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so
> there cannot be thought without Signs. “
>
> Note: Sign is capitalized in the original. And Peirce also suggests being
> careful lest we set up a “danger that our system may not represent every
> variety of non-human thought”. I take this to mean that his system is
> intended to represent every variety of non-human thought – and therefore,
> one does not require to go FIRST to the study of human thought to
> understand and use Peircean semiosis in the non-human realm. And I note his
> comments on protoplasm and crystals etc – which I won’t repeat here as the
> post would be too long - and it's already long enough!
>
> Therefore, the Absolute First, understood as Feeling, but not the
> sensational view of that term, but  as a primeval Will. [Again- I can
> find the reference..]
>
>1.
>
>The starting point as Symbol: Certainly, one can define this original
>Mind as a type of symbol – but not the human understanding of the term
>which puts it in a mode of Thirdness or art-i-factual, but I  understand
>it as will, or desire to continuity of that material existence without the
>awareness of this existence;  and the nature of this existence is, as
>evolutionary, open in its expression. Therefore it is not an iconic or
>indexical mode of articulation which would reject diversity and spontaneity
>of new forms and complexity but symbolic in that the articulation is free
>and open.
>
>
>2.
>
>I understand these ‘things’ as having, necessarily FORM. The form,
>which sets up a differential boundary, sets matter up in a mode of  
> Secondness,
>which is stabilized by the habits-of-formation of Thirdness.
>
>
>
>I won’t go into the many references to Secondness in Peirce’s work -  since
>there are so many – but it is obvious that matter within a mode of
>Secondness MUST have a differential FORM – or it would be unable to carry
>out the key action of Secondness, which is – to interact.
>
>
>1.
>
>The method of this movement from pure Mind [pure energy] to particular
>Matter – is by the triadic process of the Sign, which I understand as
>irreducibly triadic.
>
> “I will sketch a proof that the idea of meaning is irreducible to those of
> quality and reaction. It depends on two main premises. The first is that
> every genuine triadic relation involves meaning, as meaning is obviously a
> triadic relation. The second is that a triadic relation is inexpressible by
> means of dyadic relat