Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's classifications of the sciences
Helmut, Gary F, John S, list, Helmut asked: " But I have not understood, what people mean by "metaphysics". Is it the same as "transcendence"?" First, to answer your second question, for Peirce metaphysics is most certainly *not* *transcendence* if by 'transcendental' one means experience or existence which is beyond the natural. Quite the contrary as I hope will become clear from my comments below. I would agree with Gary F that the optimal way to get a grasp of what metaphysics is for Peirce is to study his discussions of it in the CP and EP. But for now, just a few general remarks which I hope might be helpful to you in approaching what might be termed Peirce's* scientific metaphysics*. I'll begin by commenting on this within the framework of Peirce's outline of the Sciences of Discovery (Peirce's term) which John Sowa's diagram means to contemporize in certain ways for a particular purpose he's already commented on. As Fernando Zalamea remarked, and with which comment. John has agreed, there is nothing particularly new in Sowa's diagam, which is equivalent to Peirce's outline of the "perennial classification" to use Beverly Kent's expression (Kent's book outlines and analyzes several earlier attempts by Peirce to classify discovery science, Peirce finally arriving at the classification under discussion, one that he did not further modify). And, as just suggested, this was not meant by Peirce to be a classification of all Science, but only of its arguably most important grand division, Science of Discovery. As previously noted (following Albert Adkins following Comte), in Peirce's classification 'super-ordinate' sciences give general principles to 'sub-ordinate' sciences while these, in turn, provide more concrete cases to those 'higher' in the classification. There are, however, and this seems to me important as to the terminology used at the head of Sowa's diagram, that there are two other Grand Sciences for Peirce, namely, Practical Science, what we today call 'applied science' (which Peirce made some unsatisfactory attempts at classifying) and Science of Review, which if any part of science ought be headed 'Knowledge', this branch should be as it brings together (in outlines, diagrams, digests, works of 'the philosophy of science', etc.) the findings of Science of Discovery (Sowa's 'Knowledge'), again Peirce's own expression for the classification diagrammed in this discussion. Of course the contents of such a Review Science will itself be at times in need of modification and enlargement as new findings are made in science of discovery; so even this 'knowledge in review' is not meant to be at all static, certainly not a final repository of scientific knowledge. But now turning to metaphysics within Discovery Science, or, Knowledge (or, Scientific Inquiry as I've suggested as closer to Peirce's notion of the Science of Discovery), I'd like to point to the following concepts and principles, imagining that none of what follows is much in question as Peirce's view whether or not ones agree with him in these matters or not. (It might be helpful to have Sowa's diagram at hand in following these comments.) So, according to Peirce's schema, metaphysics is sub-ordinate to mathematics and philosophy while super-ordinate to the two branches of the Special Sciences (what Sowa terms 'Empirical', 'Organized Experience') which it resembles in being less abstract than mathematics and the other philosophical sciences, indeed, meaning to go beyond theoretical abstraction in investigating *what is in fact real in nature*. It seems to me that some writers on Peirce have conflated at least facets of his phenomenology and metaphysics, for example, in this way: while metaphysics draws principles from phenomenology (and the other sciences 'above' it in the classification), it's findings are *not*, like phenomenology's, a matter of inquiring into a 'seeming reality' (that which merely 'appears' to be real for the inquirer) but, rather, inquires in order to determine exactly what *is real *in the natural world in the interest of preparing the ground for the specific types of observations which the special sciences make, using their particular methodologies, techniques, and instruments (microscopes, telescopes, etc.) So it is super-ordinate to these physical and social sciences while, in the sense just mentioned, it gains real concrete examples from them. As it is sub-ordinate to mathematics and the philosophical sciences which precede it, it will for example, be subject to a severe logical-matematical criticism (which, btw, will involve discussions of categoriality in reality). As Peirce argues, everyone has metaphysical views whether he admits it or not (we all have notions of the nature of reality; Peirce remarks that even the "practical man" has them), so that it is better that they be brought to light and criticized and so, then, possibly refined or revised if that seems warranted. This scrutiny is far
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's classifications of the sciences
On 9/2/2017 8:31 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: [Metaphysics is] "First in dignity, last in the order of learning": What is meant by "learning"? Is it the learning of the researcher, or the learning of the pupil, who is being taught by the researcher the results of the research? The word Aquinas used was 'addiscendo'. I checked a Latin dictionary for the verbs 'discere' (to learn), 'adiscere' (to learn by heart or memorize), and 'addiscere' (to learn further or in addition to). This implies that 'addiscendo' may be considered advanced learning. In those days, the university curriculum began with the seven liberal arts. More advanced science and philosophy would come later. The order would be approximately the same for both pupil and researcher. I think, that Thomas of Aquino has seen everything much more complicatedly than necessary Aquinas is considered one of the best and clearest commentators on Aristotle. Even today, his commentaries are highly regarded. He limited the religious issues to his theological writings. But I also received an offline note that recommended an article "The Historicity of Peirce’s Classification of the Sciences" by Chiara Ambrosio: https://ejpap.revues.org/625 Some excerpts: At least since Beverley Kent’s landmark study Charles S. Peirce: _Logic and the Classification of the Sciences_ (Kent 1987), Peirce’s classification has been regarded as the key to solve some of the most complex puzzles surrounding his approach to logic, epistemology and metaphysics... I aim to re-contextualise Peirce’s classification and investigate it as a quintessentially nineteenth century pursuit... Peirce himself, in a later note which will turn out to be quite important for my argument, admits to have examined “upward of a hundred attempts to classify the sciences” ... I hope to show that the classification of the sciences, far from being a philosophical pursuit conducted in isolation, is more productively investigated as Peirce’s effort to balance and reconcile the internal consistency of his scheme with broader, external trends to reconfigure the sciences and their relationships as a conduit to social order... The strongest influence on Peirce’s classification of the sciences was Comte’s scheme... [which] placed the sciences on a ladder in order of abstractness or generality... It started from mathematics, the most abstract of the sciences, and continued with astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology and social physics or sociology. More concrete sciences depended on more abstract ones... [Peirce 1892] "My own classification is a direct reformation of that of Comte... But I separate from Comte, in making pure mathematics a science, in making philosophy a science, in recognizing the psychical sciences as a series parallel to the physical sciences..." I believe that the dependencies I highlighted in the dotted lines of CSPsciences.jpg can be clarified by Ambrosio's article and by the previous article that discussed Avicenna and Aquinas: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11406-013-9484-8.pdf John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's classifications of the sciences
Kirsti, John, Tommi, List, "First in dignity, last in the order of learning": What is meant by "learning"? Is it the learning of the researcher, or the learning of the pupil, who is being taught by the researcher the results of the research? I think, that trying to find out what is behind nature (metaphysics), these metaphysical laws are learned lastly by the researcher. But when the researcher teaches them to his/her pupils, it didactically is better to mention them first. Because they are perhaps quite simple, eg. a "GUT" (Great unifying theory), or the three Peircean categories, or mathematics, or something like that, and for the pupil it will be more effective to learn them first, so he/she will better be able to understand the unfolding complexity of reality, already knowing the basis for this complexity, so can mentally reduce this complexity then. But I have not understood, what people mean by "metaphysics". Is it the same as "transcendence"? That would be the necessary conditions for experience, or something like that Kant wrote. Why does the easy-to-understand part of laws of nature not belong to metaphysics then? Not mysterious enough? I think, that Thomas of Aquino has seen everything much more complicatedly than necessary, because of his religion, in which God´s ways are unfathomable, or what is the saying again. And why ever should there be different basic rules for different sciences? Why should the same logical laws that apply to mathematics not apply to psychology? I think they do: If people go crazy, they do it because of a reason, don´t they? Best, Helmut 02. September 2017 um 22:57 Uhr kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: There is a link between ideas of recursion and that of cyclical arithmetics. Has this not been recognized? Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 2.9.2017 20:53: > On 9/1/2017 6:37 PM, Tommi Vehkavaara wrote: >> I do not see how those who take ontology as the first philosophy could >> be convinced with this diagram, because in it, metaphysics >> is presented rather as the last philosophy, instead. > > I googled "prima philosophia" and found an interesting discussion > of the commentaries by Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas on Aristotle: > https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11406-013-9484-8.pdf > > The question Avicenna raised and Aquinas analyzed is the seemingly > circular reasoning in calling metaphysics "prima philosophia et > ultima scientia". > > From p. 2 of the article: >> According to the beliefs of the Medieval philosopher, the system >> of knowledge encompasses mathematics as well as ethics, natural >> sciences as well as theology... >> I hope to disclose what Thomas Aquinas meant by metaphysics as >> the first and simultaneously the last philosophy (prima in >> dignitate, ultima in addiscendo, first in dignity, last in the >> order of learning), while also revealing the difficulties faced >> by those who ask: “What is first” in this particular context. > > Since Peirce had studied Scholastic logic and philosophy early > in his career, he must have been aware of these issues for many > decades before his 1903 classification. I believe that the dotted > lines in CSPsciences.jpg, for which Peirce cited Comte, represent > ideas he had been contemplating for many years. > > Tommi >> So because anything that can be found real can also be merely >> "imagined" (independently on its reality), it is always possible >> to draw a mathematical structure out of it, i.e. some mathematical >> concepts and structures are present in any other science (and >> therefore >> "nature appears to US as written in the language of mathematics"). > > Yes. That is why Peirce said that philosophy and the special sciences > depend on mathematics for their methods of reasoning. As he said, > mathematics is based on "diagrammatical reasoning": draw or imagine > a diagram of any kind and make observations about the connections > and patterns in it. The diagram need not conform to any prior > knowledge or experience. > > Tommi >> philosophical concepts should be somehow included in every theory >> in special science... But from such principle follows severe >> restrictions to the content of philosophical sciences (most of all >> to metaphysics) and their application to special sciences (e.g. in >> which sense psychology is dependent on logic). > > That would explain the phrase "ultima in addiscendo" by Aquinas. > But a restriction on the content of metaphysics would not affect > the principles it derives from mathematics, phenomenology, and > the normative sciences. > > I would also cite Peirce's article on "Logical Machines" (1887), > which he published in vol. 1 of the American Journal of Psychology: > http://history-computer.com/Library/Peirce.pdf > > From p. 4 of "Logical Machines": >> When we perform reasoning in our unaided minds, we do substantially >> the same thing, that is to say, we construct an image in our fancy >> under certain general conditions, and observe the result.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's classifications of the sciences
There is a link between ideas of recursion and that of cyclical arithmetics. Has this not been recognized? Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 2.9.2017 20:53: On 9/1/2017 6:37 PM, Tommi Vehkavaara wrote: I do not see how those who take ontology as the first philosophy could be convinced with this diagram, because in it, metaphysics is presented rather as the last philosophy, instead. I googled "prima philosophia" and found an interesting discussion of the commentaries by Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas on Aristotle: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11406-013-9484-8.pdf The question Avicenna raised and Aquinas analyzed is the seemingly circular reasoning in calling metaphysics "prima philosophia et ultima scientia". From p. 2 of the article: According to the beliefs of the Medieval philosopher, the system of knowledge encompasses mathematics as well as ethics, natural sciences as well as theology... I hope to disclose what Thomas Aquinas meant by metaphysics as the first and simultaneously the last philosophy (prima in dignitate, ultima in addiscendo, first in dignity, last in the order of learning), while also revealing the difficulties faced by those who ask: “What is first” in this particular context. Since Peirce had studied Scholastic logic and philosophy early in his career, he must have been aware of these issues for many decades before his 1903 classification. I believe that the dotted lines in CSPsciences.jpg, for which Peirce cited Comte, represent ideas he had been contemplating for many years. Tommi So because anything that can be found real can also be merely "imagined" (independently on its reality), it is always possible to draw a mathematical structure out of it, i.e. some mathematical concepts and structures are present in any other science (and therefore "nature appears to US as written in the language of mathematics"). Yes. That is why Peirce said that philosophy and the special sciences depend on mathematics for their methods of reasoning. As he said, mathematics is based on "diagrammatical reasoning": draw or imagine a diagram of any kind and make observations about the connections and patterns in it. The diagram need not conform to any prior knowledge or experience. Tommi philosophical concepts should be somehow included in every theory in special science... But from such principle follows severe restrictions to the content of philosophical sciences (most of all to metaphysics) and their application to special sciences (e.g. in which sense psychology is dependent on logic). That would explain the phrase "ultima in addiscendo" by Aquinas. But a restriction on the content of metaphysics would not affect the principles it derives from mathematics, phenomenology, and the normative sciences. I would also cite Peirce's article on "Logical Machines" (1887), which he published in vol. 1 of the American Journal of Psychology: http://history-computer.com/Library/Peirce.pdf From p. 4 of "Logical Machines": When we perform reasoning in our unaided minds, we do substantially the same thing, that is to say, we construct an image in our fancy under certain general conditions, and observe the result. In this point of view too, every machine is a reasoning machine, in so much as there are certain relations between its parts, which involve other relations that were not expressly intended... [But] every machine has two inherent impotencies... In this comment, Peirce admitted that machines could do mathematical reasoning. The two impotencies of a machine: "it is destitute of all originality, of all initiative"; and "it has been contrived to do a certain thing, and it can do nothing else". He added "the mind working with a pencil and plenty of paper has no such limitations... And this great power it owes, above all, to one kind of symbol, the importance of which is frequently entirely overlooked -- I mean the parentheses." With that comment, Peirce stated the importance of recursion. He used recursive methods in various writings, but most logicians and philosophers who read his writings missed that point because the word 'recursion' was not used in mathematics until the 1930s. And by the way, recursion looks circular, but useful recursions always include a test for stopping when the result is achieved. These issues about recursion came out of the debates of Gödel, Church, and Turing when they were together in Princeton. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's classifications of the sciences
On 9/1/2017 6:37 PM, Tommi Vehkavaara wrote: I do not see how those who take ontology as the first philosophy could be convinced with this diagram, because in it, metaphysics is presented rather as the last philosophy, instead. I googled "prima philosophia" and found an interesting discussion of the commentaries by Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas on Aristotle: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11406-013-9484-8.pdf The question Avicenna raised and Aquinas analyzed is the seemingly circular reasoning in calling metaphysics "prima philosophia et ultima scientia". From p. 2 of the article: According to the beliefs of the Medieval philosopher, the system of knowledge encompasses mathematics as well as ethics, natural sciences as well as theology... I hope to disclose what Thomas Aquinas meant by metaphysics as the first and simultaneously the last philosophy (prima in dignitate, ultima in addiscendo, first in dignity, last in the order of learning), while also revealing the difficulties faced by those who ask: “What is first” in this particular context. Since Peirce had studied Scholastic logic and philosophy early in his career, he must have been aware of these issues for many decades before his 1903 classification. I believe that the dotted lines in CSPsciences.jpg, for which Peirce cited Comte, represent ideas he had been contemplating for many years. Tommi So because anything that can be found real can also be merely "imagined" (independently on its reality), it is always possible to draw a mathematical structure out of it, i.e. some mathematical concepts and structures are present in any other science (and therefore "nature appears to US as written in the language of mathematics"). Yes. That is why Peirce said that philosophy and the special sciences depend on mathematics for their methods of reasoning. As he said, mathematics is based on "diagrammatical reasoning": draw or imagine a diagram of any kind and make observations about the connections and patterns in it. The diagram need not conform to any prior knowledge or experience. Tommi philosophical concepts should be somehow included in every theory in special science... But from such principle follows severe restrictions to the content of philosophical sciences (most of all to metaphysics) and their application to special sciences (e.g. in which sense psychology is dependent on logic). That would explain the phrase "ultima in addiscendo" by Aquinas. But a restriction on the content of metaphysics would not affect the principles it derives from mathematics, phenomenology, and the normative sciences. I would also cite Peirce's article on "Logical Machines" (1887), which he published in vol. 1 of the American Journal of Psychology: http://history-computer.com/Library/Peirce.pdf From p. 4 of "Logical Machines": When we perform reasoning in our unaided minds, we do substantially the same thing, that is to say, we construct an image in our fancy under certain general conditions, and observe the result. In this point of view too, every machine is a reasoning machine, in so much as there are certain relations between its parts, which involve other relations that were not expressly intended... [But] every machine has two inherent impotencies... In this comment, Peirce admitted that machines could do mathematical reasoning. The two impotencies of a machine: "it is destitute of all originality, of all initiative"; and "it has been contrived to do a certain thing, and it can do nothing else". He added "the mind working with a pencil and plenty of paper has no such limitations... And this great power it owes, above all, to one kind of symbol, the importance of which is frequently entirely overlooked -- I mean the parentheses." With that comment, Peirce stated the importance of recursion. He used recursive methods in various writings, but most logicians and philosophers who read his writings missed that point because the word 'recursion' was not used in mathematics until the 1930s. And by the way, recursion looks circular, but useful recursions always include a test for stopping when the result is achieved. These issues about recursion came out of the debates of Gödel, Church, and Turing when they were together in Princeton. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's classifications of the sciences
John, list You wrote: "Those dependencies are important to emphasize, especially for anyone who might claim that ontology is prima philosophia." I do not see how those who take ontology as the first philosophy could be convinced with this diagram, because in it, metaphysics is presented rather as the last philosophy, instead. Without giving up the idea of the primacy of metaphysical foundation, all these dependencies seem just epistemic confusions. In earlier mail you wrote: "Yes. There are two partial orders. The solid lines show how one science is more general (covers a broader range) than another. The dotted lines show dependencies (one science borrows or adopts principles from another). It's possible to emphasize either one." I am not sure if there are really two orders, but this appearance seems to follow from the way you have drawn your diagram, if we pay attention to the reasons for those dotted lines. They come from Peirce's idea what distinguishes (and identifies their content!) mathematical, philosophical, and "empirical" sciences: the kind of observation that they are based on. Mathematician observes "imagined objects", philosopher "those universal phenomena which saturate all experience through and through so that they cannot escape us" (EP 2:37, 1898), and Special scientist focuses his observation to the details of some special phenomenon. So because anything that can be found real can also be merely "imagined" (independently on its reality), it is always possible to draw a mathematical structure out of it, i.e. some mathematical concepts and structures are present in any other science (and therefore "nature appears to US as written in the language of mathematics"). To some extent similarly, philosophical concepts should be somehow included in every theory in special science, because it observes the features of "universal phenomena" that should be present in any special phenomena. But from such principle follows severe restrictions to the content of philosophical sciences (most of all to metaphysics) and their application to special sciences (e.g. in which sense psychology is dependent on logic). -Tommi -- *** "Cousins to the ameba that we are, how could we know for certain?" - Donald T. Campbell *** University of Tampere Faculty of Social Sciences - Philosophy Tommi Vehkavaara FI-33014 University of Tampere, Finland Phone: +358-50-3186122 (work), +358-45-2056109 (home) e-mail: tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi homepage: http://people.uta.fi/~attove https://uta-fi.academia.edu/TommiVehkavaara *** - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's classifications of the sciences
On 8/31/2017 6:41 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: FZ: About Sowa’s classification of the sciences, compared to Peirce’s, I don’t see something new. I strongly agree. I was *not* attempting anything new. And I was most definitely *not* attempting to produce a classification of the sciences. I did not call it a classification. FZ: Peirce’s classification (as deeply studied by Beverley Kent) goes well beyond. I strongly agree. As I said, my goal was to draw a diagram that emphasizes the dependence of one science on another. As Peirce said in CP 1.180, B depends on A if B takes some of its principles from A. My purpose in drawing the diagram CSPsciences.jpg was to highlight those dependencies in the dotted lines. And I drew that diagram for a discussion about proposed ontologies in Ontolog Forum. My purpose for that group was to emphasize the dependencies of ontology (AKA metaphysics) on mathematics, phenomenology, and normative science. Those dependencies are important to emphasize, especially for anyone who might claim that ontology is prima philosophia. But before I sent that diagram to Ontolog Forum, I sent it to Peirce-L to get some comments about it. I did receive some good comments, which led me to make some revisions. I don't know which version Fernando saw, but I attached the most recent version to this note. Summary: the diagram CSPsciences.jpg is intended to emphasize the dependencies (dotted lines) in relation to a *simplified* version of the classification Peirce described in CP 1.180-202. In CP 1.186, Peirce did not say that phenomenology depends on mathematics. But after some discussion, I realized that his comments in CP 1.417-421 could be interpreted as showing that mathematics may be used in analyzing phenomena. So I extended the dotted line from mathematics to phenomenology to normative science to metaphysics. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's classifications of the sciences
Jerry LRC, Tommi, Gary F, and Kirsti, Jerry Thanks for collecting and posting the references to Simons works. His views have changed hues since his book! Yes. I'd say that the theoretical analysis in his 1987 book is still valid, but Simons got hit with a large dose of reality in his dozen years of consulting on engineering projects. I know some of the people who worked at Ontek, and they were always very supportive of both theory and practice -- and so was Peirce. Since applied ontology is the primary interest of Ontolog Forum, I wanted to emphasize those issues in my note. Tommi My own current thought is that the main reason for Peirce's classification was to argue for those dotted lines in John's diagram, i.e. for dependencies between different studies, also that these dependencies form a partially hierarchical structure Yes. There are two partial orders. The solid lines show how one science is more general (covers a broader range) than another. The dotted lines show dependencies (one science borrows or adopts principles from another). It's possible to emphasize either one. But there is a question whether phenomenology depends on mathematics. In CP 1.186, Peirce did not say that it does. In 1.417-421, he indicates that the perception of the phenomena does not depend on anything else, but he also suggests that mathematics is used in analyzing the phenomena. Therefore, I revised CSPsciences.jpg to draw the dotted line from mathematics to phenomenology to normative science. For CP 1.417-421, see http://www.textlog.de/4283.html . Gary I think the issues raised by Tommi are of a similar sort, being based on dynamic tensions that resist any final resolution. But I think we agree that John’s diagram, by showing the dependencies within the broader divisions of the sciences, does contribute to the kind of dialogue we need for any “synthetic philosophy.” Thanks for the note of support. Kirsti Changing 'science' into 'knowledge' in CSPsciences jpg cannot be justified by current English dictionaries or other records of current use of the word 'science' in US or UK. In Finnish usage, for example, the word for 'sciences' includes human sciences, and philosophy. That's also true of the German 'Wissenschaft'. Since Peirce knew German very well, he was probably thinking of the German sense. But the current English usage has changed. One reason why I chose the word 'knowledge' is that it's a direct translation of the Latin 'scientia'. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's classifications of the sciences
Kirsti, John, Tommi, list,
Kirsti, your objections to John’s diagram seem to be based entirely on
terminological choices. But in the case of “phenomenology” you haven’t
suggested an alternative you would prefer. I don’t think “phaneroscopy” would
work very well in that slot, for people who are not Peirce specialists. What
would you propose?
More important, I think, your objections seem to ignore what John has said is
the main purpose of the diagram, namely to show the dependencies among the main
divisions of sciences (or “inquiry” or “knowledge”). I agree with Tommi that
diagramming those relationships does raise some unresolved questions; but I
think some of them are unresolvable, i.e. they represent inherent tensions
within the practice of science, or inquiry, insofar as it is dialogic.
One of those tensions is felt in the ethics of terminology. It seems to me that
the dependence of all the “special” or “empirical” sciences on philosophy
implies that philosophy should not be treated as a special science, with its
own precise but non-vernacular terminology, because that would result in
specialized scientists being even more ignorant of philosophy than many of them
are already. Physicists, for instance, would remain unaware of their own
metaphysical assumptions because they don’t know how to examine them, or why
they should. I think both analytical philosophy and continental phenomenology
have rendered themselves largely irrelevant to people in other fields by
wrapping themselves in specialized jargon.
On the other hand, Peirce sometimes insisted (for instance in letters to James)
that philosophy should follow the example of more special sciences by adopting
a more precise terminology, or at least preserving the precision of the
Scholastic terms (as Peirce generally did). But unless they can express their
arguments in a language familiar to physicists, philosophers cannot enter into
dialogue with physicists. Genuine dialogue depends on maintaining an optimal
balance, or making continuous compromises, between precision and familiarity of
terms. This becomes more difficult as specialization increases, because the
specialist has to invest much of his or her time in learning and applying the
jargon peculiar to the discipline.
I think the issues raised by Tommi are of a similar sort, being based on
dynamic tensions that resist any final resolution. But I think we agree that
John’s diagram, by showing the dependencies within the broader divisions of the
sciences, does contribute to the kind of dialogue we need for any “synthetic
philosophy.” (Which by the way is a Spencerian term which Peirce sometimes used
precisely because it was familiar to many at the time.)
Gary f.
} Man has no Body distinct from his Soul. [Blake] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
Sent: 29-Aug-17 12:40
To: PEIRCE L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
Cc: John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net>; Tommi Vehkavaara <tommi.vehkava...@uta.fi>;
Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's classifications of the sciences
As wished by John, some comments to the jpg, as well as on some comments
presented:
I find the diagram a misleading, not a clarifying one.
I found the quote provided by Tommi a highly relevant problematization of the
issue. I also agree with the critical notes provided by Jerry, up to a point.
The essence of anything lies in what it aims at, wrote Peirce. He also
emphasized that meaning lies in effects, not just in words.
Changing 'science' into 'knowledge' in CSPsciences jpg cannot be justified by
current English dictionaries or other records of current use of the word
'science' in US or UK. - In Finnish usage, for example, the word for
'sciences' includes human sciences, and philosophy.
Who could say, on any grounds, that here and now we have a state of affairs
(in science) CSP aimed at? The future he was aiming at?
What has truly and really changed from the day CSP died to this day, is that
by now CSP has become popular in academic circles. That is a new, quite recent
phenomena.
With fame comes all the misfortunes always attached to it. – People just do not
like to change their habits of thought. (Which truly is
cumbersome!)
People are inclined to accomondate whatever is presented to accord and follow
their habits. With even acrobatic twists and turns in their (mostly spontaneus
and nonconscious) moves of mind in the process of making sense of whatever is
offered.
CSP was a radical, in the sense of not following the well-trodded-on pathways.
His ways of thinking still are radical in that respect.
Easy-to-digest presentations will do no good.
To cut it short: I do find this CSPsciences.jpg a misrepresentation.
The latin rooted "idio"
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's classifications of the sciences
As wished by John, some comments to the jpg, as well as on some comments presented: I find the diagram a misleading, not a clarifying one. I found the quote provided by Tommi a highly relevant problematization of the issue. I also agree with the critical notes provided by Jerry, up to a point. The essence of anything lies in what it aims at, wrote Peirce. He also emphasized that meaning lies in effects, not just in words. Changing 'science' into 'knowledge' in CSPsciences jpg cannot be justified by current English dictionaries or other records of current use of the word 'science' in US or UK. - In Finnish usage, for example, the word for 'sciences' includes human sciences, and philosophy. Who could say, on any grounds, that here and now we have a state of affairs (in science) CSP aimed at? The future he was aiming at? What has truly and really changed from the day CSP died to this day, is that by now CSP has become popular in academic circles. That is a new, quite recent phenomena. With fame comes all the misfortunes always attached to it. – People just do not like to change their habits of thought. (Which truly is cumbersome!) People are inclined to accomondate whatever is presented to accord and follow their habits. With even acrobatic twists and turns in their (mostly spontaneus and nonconscious) moves of mind in the process of making sense of whatever is offered. CSP was a radical, in the sense of not following the well-trodded-on pathways. His ways of thinking still are radical in that respect. Easy-to-digest presentations will do no good. To cut it short: I do find this CSPsciences.jpg a misrepresentation. The latin rooted "idio" was used by CSP for a deep reason, in accord with his comprehension of the web of (semeiotic) relations between minds and meanings. – It just is not something to be thrown into a bin as 'outdated'. This web of relations I have been studying for almost half a century. First without Peirce, then with Peirce. So I have deep reasons, just as well. Jerry has been approaching the idea of 'idio' from the viewpoint of identity and perplexity. And has met with conundrums, id est (ie) cul-de-sac's. Hegel tried to tackle the question with his Phänomenologie des Geistes. –It is to be noted that whilst Peirce quite harshly mocked Hegels 'Logik', he later on took a much more mellow view with Hegel's phenomenology. Even stated that the three moments by Hegel bore a clear resemblance with his three elements of (all) experience. (Which is what the quote presented by Tommi is basicly about). Peirce found a positive accord with the phenomenology of Hegel, but definitely not so with Husserl & followers. – However, nowadays the WORD phenomenology is commonly understood as refering to Husserlian phenomenology. With whatever variation of its meaning that may apply with any given audience. This is a problem to be addressed, not something to be overlooked. Especially with audiences not familiar with CSP. Best, Kirsti - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
