Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens (was A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jack, List:

Peirce writes, "What is reality? Perhaps there isn’t any such thing at all.
As I have repeatedly insisted, it is but a retroduction, a working
hypothesis which we try, our one desperate forlorn hope of knowing
anything" (NEM 4:343, 1898). Hence, the only way to "verify" that there is
a dynamical object "outside the sign" is no different from the only way to
"verify" any other retroductive hypothesis--by deductively explicating its
necessary consequences, and then inductively evaluating whether those
predictions are borne out by additional observations and experiments. If
so, then the hypothesis is corroborated, although it can never be
"verified" with absolute certainty. If not, then the hypothesis is
falsified.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 11:02 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <
jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> Thanks for that explanation, Jon.
>
> Another thing that occurred to me recently: in his letter to Lady Welby,
> Peirce posits that the dynamic object is that which "exists outside the
> sign" (EP 2: 480). What I'm wondering is if there's any way to "verify"
> this? Again, I'm mindful of the distinction Peirce makes about his
> semeiotic as not corresponding to metaphysical proofs (or something along
> these lines?). The point is that if we take experience (conscious or
> somatic) to be a series of signs comprised of impressions from immediate
> objects, and immediate objects as one side of dual relationship in which
> dynamic objects (the object as it exists beyond the immediacy of the sign)
> comprise the other side, what uses do people think we can make of the
> dynamical object in practical analysis? It's been rebuffed many times over,
> but every time I read Peirce's theory (regarding the two objects) I am
> always drawn back into a Kantian notion of the thing in itself (with the
> distinction between the two, perhaps, that Peirce says we can experience
> the dynamic object directly via its immediate form whereas Kant's noumena
> and so on is less amenable or wholly denied to perception?).
>
> Just trying to think of Peirce in practical terms by skeletonising his
> theory as much as possible, adding parts when needed.
>
> Jack
>
> --
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* Thursday, November 4, 2021 1:06 AM
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Signs, Types, and Tokens (was A key
> principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)
>
> Jack, List:
>
> There is nothing "heretical" or even "heterodox" here from a Peircean
> perspective. It just strikes me as another situation where the boundaries
> are somewhat arbitrary, such that we deliberately draw them in accordance
> with the purpose of a particular analysis.
>
> I tend to focus on one sign (type/token/tones) along with its two objects
> (immediate/dynamical) and three interpretants (immediate/dynamical/final),
> which is a task for speculative grammar, the first branch of the normative
> science of logic as semeiotic. Focusing instead on the different dynamical
> interpretants that one sign token determines in different individual
> (quasi-)minds seems more like a task for speculative rhetoric (or
> methodeutic), the third branch of the normative science of logic as
> semeiotic.
>
> Of course, the latter approach depends to an extent on the former because
> within Peirce's overall theory, each of the interpreting (quasi-)minds is
> itself a sign. In fact, I have suggested that this is why the same uttered
> sign token with the same tones can have different dynamical
> interpretants--the one sign that is constituted by connecting the uttered
> sign to any particular (quasi-)mind is different from the one sign that is
> constituted by connecting the uttered sign to any other (quasi-)mind.
>
> As for "the performative/practical domain," Francesco Bellucci suggests that
> "*speculative grammar came to include a pioneering speech act theory. *For
> the *general *distinction between the immediate, the dynamic, and the
> final interpretant was needed in order to differentiate the illocutionary,
> the perlocutionary, and the locutionary levels of analysis" (*Peirce's
> Speculative Grammar: Logic as Semiotics*, p. 327). However, he also
> points out that in Peirce's late taxonomies for classifying signs, the
> divisions based on perlocutionary effects and illocutionary forces are both
> associated with the *dynamical* interpretant--its nature and its relation
> to the sign, respectively.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Nov 3, 2021 at 12:53 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <
> jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote:
>
> Jon, List,
>
> One thing that is not entirely settled in my mind yet is whether the term
> "token" is more properly applied to the physical 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens (was A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

[JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY]

Jon, List,

Thanks for that explanation, Jon.

Another thing that occurred to me recently: in his letter to Lady Welby, Peirce 
posits that the dynamic object is that which "exists outside the sign" (EP 2: 
480). What I'm wondering is if there's any way to "verify" this? Again, I'm 
mindful of the distinction Peirce makes about his semeiotic as not 
corresponding to metaphysical proofs (or something along these lines?). The 
point is that if we take experience (conscious or somatic) to be a series of 
signs comprised of impressions from immediate objects, and immediate objects as 
one side of dual relationship in which dynamic objects (the object as it exists 
beyond the immediacy of the sign) comprise the other side, what uses do people 
think we can make of the dynamical object in practical analysis? It's been 
rebuffed many times over, but every time I read Peirce's theory (regarding the 
two objects) I am always drawn back into a Kantian notion of the thing in 
itself (with the distinction between the two, perhaps, that Peirce says we can 
experience the dynamic object directly via its immediate form whereas Kant's 
noumena and so on is less amenable or wholly denied to perception?).

Just trying to think of Peirce in practical terms by skeletonising his theory 
as much as possible, adding parts when needed.

Jack


From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Thursday, November 4, 2021 1:06 AM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Signs, Types, and Tokens (was A key 
principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

Jack, List:

There is nothing "heretical" or even "heterodox" here from a Peircean 
perspective. It just strikes me as another situation where the boundaries are 
somewhat arbitrary, such that we deliberately draw them in accordance with the 
purpose of a particular analysis.

I tend to focus on one sign (type/token/tones) along with its two objects 
(immediate/dynamical) and three interpretants (immediate/dynamical/final), 
which is a task for speculative grammar, the first branch of the normative 
science of logic as semeiotic. Focusing instead on the different dynamical 
interpretants that one sign token determines in different individual 
(quasi-)minds seems more like a task for speculative rhetoric (or methodeutic), 
the third branch of the normative science of logic as semeiotic.

Of course, the latter approach depends to an extent on the former because 
within Peirce's overall theory, each of the interpreting (quasi-)minds is 
itself a sign. In fact, I have suggested that this is why the same uttered sign 
token with the same tones can have different dynamical interpretants--the one 
sign that is constituted by connecting the uttered sign to any particular 
(quasi-)mind is different from the one sign that is constituted by connecting 
the uttered sign to any other (quasi-)mind.

As for "the performative/practical domain," Francesco Bellucci suggests that 
"speculative grammar came to include a pioneering speech act theory. For the 
general distinction between the immediate, the dynamic, and the final 
interpretant was needed in order to differentiate the illocutionary, the 
perlocutionary, and the locutionary levels of analysis" (Peirce's Speculative 
Grammar: Logic as Semiotics, p. 327). However, he also points out that in 
Peirce's late taxonomies for classifying signs, the divisions based on 
perlocutionary effects and illocutionary forces are both associated with the 
dynamical interpretant--its nature and its relation to the sign, respectively.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Nov 3, 2021 at 12:53 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote:
Jon, List,
One thing that is not entirely settled in my mind yet is whether the term 
"token" is more properly applied to the physical "vehicle" of the sign, such 
that one token can have different dynamical interpretants in different 
quasi-minds, or to the "event of semiosis" that occurs whenever a token 
determines a dynamical interpretant in an individual quasi-mind, such that 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between tokens and dynamical 
interpretants. For example, if I utter a sentence out loud to a group of five 
listeners, is there one token that has five dynamical interpretants, or are 
there five tokens, each of which has exactly one dynamical interpretant?
JAS: I am inclined toward the former analysis, such that the token is "counted" 
when it is uttered, not each time it is interpreted, because that utterance is 
a sign token even if it is never actually interpreted--it only has to be 
capable of determining a dynamical (external) interpretant by virtue of 
conforming to a type that has an 

[PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens (was A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

I agree that where we diverge is in treating a type and one of its tokens
as two *different *signs vs. two "aspects" (I still need a better term
here) of the *same *sign. I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more
consistent with Peirce's various taxonomies for sign classification, in
which every sign is *either *a type or a token (or a tone). However, mine
is grounded in the idea that every type can (and usually does) have
multiple tokens, which can (and often do) have different tones. In other
words, a sign *involves *types, which *involve *tokens, which *involve *
tones.

After all, Peirce writes elsewhere that "a sign is not a real thing. It is
of such a nature as to exist in *replicas*" (EP 2:303, 1904). He states
that every *individual *utterance of a certain proverb is "one and the same
representamen" even when it "is written or spoken" or "is thought of" in
different languages; and that the same is true of every *individual* instance
of a certain diagram, picture, physical sign, or symptom, as well as
every *individual
*weathercock (CP 5.138, EP 2:203, 1903). Regarding a proposition, he says
that its *individual *embodiments are existents *governed *by the general
type, such that each of them *conforms *to that type (CP 8.313, 1905).

One thing that is not entirely settled in my mind yet is whether the term
"token" is more properly applied to the physical "vehicle" of the sign,
such that one token can have different dynamical interpretants in different
quasi-minds, or to the "event of semiosis" that occurs whenever a token
determines a dynamical interpretant in an individual quasi-mind, such that
there is a one-to-one correspondence between tokens and dynamical
interpretants. For example, if I utter a sentence out loud to a group of
five listeners, is there one token that has five dynamical interpretants,
or are there five tokens, each of which has exactly one dynamical
interpretant? I am inclined toward the former analysis, such that the token
is "counted" when it is uttered, not each time it is interpreted, because
that utterance is a sign token even if it is never *actually *interpreted--it
only has to be *capable *of determining a dynamical (external) interpretant
by virtue of conforming to a type that has an immediate (internal)
interpretant.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Nov 2, 2021 at 6:01 AM  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> GF: So in that sense a dynamical interpretant is a translation, not a mere
> replica or copy of the sign.
>
> JAS: That is what I expected you to say, and I agree. However, it seems
> inconsistent with your previous statement--"A printed, written or uttered
> text is only replicable, not translatable." A printed, written, or uttered
> text is *translated *every single time it is read or heard, thus
> producing another dynamical interpretant, and therefore is obviously
> *translatable* as well as replicable. What am I missing?
>
> GF: My previous statement assumes that the type is one sign and its
> embodiment (the token, the *existing* “text”) is another. Your perception
> of inconsistency is based on the assumption that type and token are not two
> “signs” but one. Both assumptions are arbitrary
> . That’s all.
>
> Gary f.
>
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