subject:"\[PEIRCE\-L\] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric"

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-21 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

> On May 21, 2019, at 1:27 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> GR
>> I truly doubt that Jon needs your "help," while insulting and
>> hubristic comments such as saying that if he refuses to accept your
>> "help" that he has "nothing but a puffy cloud of words" is, in my
>> opinion, below any serious scholar's dignity.
> 
> When it comes to logic, I treat Jon as a student.  He's not happy
> when I say that, so I haven't said that recently.  Instead, I stated
> the most appropriate analogy for his style of reasoning:  "puffy
> clouds of words".   If that's considered insulting, I'll just give
> him a "gentleman's C".

List:

The following is merely my opinion of the on-going comments of John Sowa that I 
find grossly misleading interpretations of CSP’s writings.

First, in my opinion, the special forms of logic that CSP created are rooted in 
CSP’s knowledge of chemistry as it developed in the period of 1850-1910.  The 
notion of spots and his attempt to relate these to chemical roots and 
propositions and graph theory are highly speculative 

Sowa's attempts to relate CSP’s logic to the of continuous functions, first 
order predicate logic and 
the CSP’s graphs is, at best, mystical, at worst, I will comment out of 
politeness…

Secondly, it is clear, in my opinion,  from history of John’s posts that his 
philosophy of mathematics is at a very primitive level, and at odds with CSP’s 
philosophy of mathematics.. In my opinion, all readers of this list serve 
should very very carefully evaluate all of John’s mathematical claims. Beware.  
Enough said.

Thirdly, I have stopped responding to Sowa’s posts because, in my analysis, 
Sowa’s views are remote from the bedrock of CSP’s writings.  As I understand 
his views, first order predicate logic is the ultimate test of CSP’s logical 
forms.  But, first order predicate logic is very remote from logic of chemistry 
and the bedrock of CSP’s graph theory. The logic of the table of elements 
associates several physical attributes (indices) and hence the propositions of 
chemical logic can not be antecedents of predicate logics. The grammar of 
chemical sentences requires both copula and predicates.  Enough said.

Finally, I would compliment Jon Alan Schmidt for his intellectual integrity, 
persistent consistency  careful linguistic analyses.  While I occasionally 
disagree with Jon’s interpretations, his views are meaningful to me. 

In closing, if I may be so bold, a question for John Sowa.

Would you consider becoming a student of Jon Alan Schmidt?
It is rare opportunity for you to cast away the imprisoning chains of predicate 
logic.  
It is also an opportunity to probe the illations between scientific thought and 
semiotics.
>From my reading of your book on Knowledge Representation, both opportunities 
>are possible approaches to improving your work on artificial intelligence.

Cheers

Jerry

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Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-21 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }1]
JAS- This is what I was responding to: You wrote:
 "As with any logical or mathematical "proof"--i.e., any deductive
argumentation--the conclusion is only as strong as the premisses.  If
one premiss is false, then the conclusion is false, or at least
unwarranted on the basis of  that premiss; but anyone who affirms all
of the premisses is rationally required to affirm the conclusion, as
well."

You said nothing about the form of the argument; you based your
assertion only on the premises and clearly stated that if one accepts
the premises as true, then, one is 'rationally required to affirm the
conclusion'.

I merely showed you some examples where the premises were all true -
but one couldn't consider the conclusion as true. Once I had done that
- you then introduced the requirement for 'logical form'.

2] My interest in this thread is to reject the idea of an external
metaphysical agency for the Universe [aka God] and to focus instead
on the self-generating and self-organizing properties of the semiosic
process. .As outlined, for example, in Peirce's description of the
emergence of the Universe [1.412]

Edwina
 On Tue 21/05/19  6:37 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET:  My understanding of science is that its axioms are based on
objective empirical evidence; repeatable observations; quantitative
measurements and fallibility.
 Then your definition of "science" is narrower than Peirce's.
  ET:  Your comments referred only to the premises being true - and
you declared that if the premises are true then the conclusion must
be true. I simply showed you some examples which invalidated your
assertion.
 No, for (at least) the third time, the requirement is that the
premisses are true and the form of argumentation is valid.  Your
examples met the first criterion, but not the second.  My Semeiotic
Argumentation meets both. 
 ET:  I consider it reductionism - and therefore, have every right to
my opinion. You may reject it, but I don't really think that you have
the right to tell me to stop having this opinion.
 The double standard appears again.  What precludes someone from
making exactly the same statement, but substituting "unPeircean" for
"reductionism"?  What makes some such opinions acceptable, and others
out of bounds?  Who gets to decide where that line is drawn--i.e.,
whose  opinion about this is authoritative?
 ET:   I'm not going to get into any discussion of God or creation of
the Universe etc.
 In that case, given its subject line, why are you participating in
this thread at all?
 Regards,
 Jon S. 
 On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 3:16 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
  Please see my responses below
 On Tue 21/05/19  3:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 1] ET:  I don't think that these discussions on religion and logic
have anything to do with bridging the chasm between religion and
science. They have no scientific content whatsoever.
 JAS] Peirce held that both Logic as Semeiotic and Metaphysics are
sciences, so their content is scientific  content; but not religion. 
Of course, the line between Metaphysics and religion is not sharp,
especially when the topic of discussion is the Reality of God.
 EDWINA My understanding of science is that its axioms are based on
objective empirical evidence; repeatable observations; quantitative
measurements and fallibility. I don't think that any of these
criteria apply to any of the discussions we've had.
 2] ET:  Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true,
in the sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set
up as, in themselves, true--and the format of their syllogistic
placement is valid, this does not make the content of this argument
true. It merely sets up a valid argument. 
 JAS: Again, if the premisses are true and the form of the
argumentation is valid, then the conclusion is necessarily true;
i.e., the argumentation as a whole is sound.  This is the most basic
logical leading principle of all deductive syllogisms.  We can
certainly disagree on whether each of the premisses is true, but
someone who endorses  all of them is rationally required to endorse
the conclusion, as well.
 EDWINA Your comments referred only to the premises being true - and
you declared that if the premises are true then the conclusion must
be true. I simply showed you some examples which invalidated your
assertion. 
  3] ET:  I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's
insistence that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is
perfused with signs' and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept
that multiple signs can be 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to
conclude that the Universe is A single Sign.
 JAS: Peirce's  theorem was not that multiple Signs can be merged to
be considered one Sign; it is that multiple Signs that are connected
constitute one Sign.

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-21 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Edwina, List:

ET:  My understanding of science is that its axioms are based on objective
empirical evidence; repeatable observations; quantitative measurements and
fallibility.


Then your definition of "science" is narrower than Peirce's.

ET:  Your comments referred only to the premises being true - and you
declared that if the premises are true then the conclusion must be true. I
simply showed you some examples which invalidated your assertion.


No, for (at least) the third time, the requirement is that the premisses
are true *and *the form of argumentation is valid.  Your examples met the
first criterion, but not the second.  My Semeiotic Argumentation meets both.

ET:  I consider it reductionism - and therefore, have every right to my
opinion. You may reject it, but I don't really think that you have the
right to tell me to stop having this opinion.


The double standard appears again.  What precludes someone from making
exactly the same statement, but substituting "unPeircean" for
"reductionism"?  What makes some such opinions acceptable, and others out
of bounds?  Who gets to decide where that line is drawn--i.e., whose *opinion
*about this is authoritative?

ET:   I'm not going to get into any discussion of God or creation of the
Universe etc.


In that case, given its subject line, why are you participating in this
thread at all?

Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 3:16 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Please see my responses below
>
> On Tue 21/05/19 3:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> 1] ET:  I don't think that these discussions on religion and logic have
> anything to do with bridging the chasm between religion and science. They
> have no scientific content whatsoever.
>
> JAS] Peirce held that both Logic as Semeiotic and Metaphysics are sciences,
> so their content is scientific content; but not religion.  Of course, the
> line between Metaphysics and religion is not sharp, especially when the
> topic of discussion is the Reality of God.
>
> EDWINA My understanding of science is that its axioms are based on
> objective empirical evidence; repeatable observations; quantitative
> measurements and fallibility. I don't think that any of these criteria
> apply to any of the discussions we've had.
>
> 2] ET:  Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true, in
> the sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set up as,
> in themselves, true--and the format of their syllogistic placement is
> valid, this does not make the content of this argument true. It merely sets
> up a valid argument.
>
> JAS: Again, if the premisses are true and the form of the argumentation
> is valid, then the conclusion is necessarily true; i.e., the
> argumentation as a whole is sound.  This is the most basic logical
> leading principle of all deductive syllogisms.  We can certainly disagree
> on whether each of the premisses is true, but someone who endorses all of
> them is rationally required to endorse the conclusion, as well.
>
> EDWINA Your comments referred only to the premises being true - and you
> declared that if the premises are true then the conclusion must be true. I
> simply showed you some examples which invalidated your assertion.
>
> 3] ET:  I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's
> insistence that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is perfused
> with signs' and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept that multiple
> signs can be 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to conclude that the
> Universe is A single Sign.
>
> JAS: Peirce's theorem was not that multiple Signs can be merged to be
> considered one Sign; it is that multiple Signs that are connected
> constitute one Sign.  Consequently, according to Peirce, if the entire
> Universe consists of connected Signs, then the Universe is one Sign; and
> as I keep pointing out, he explicitly affirmed not only that "the
> Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol ... that Universe being
> precisely an argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903), but also that "the
> entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all thought to be more or
> less connected" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904).
>
> EDWINA I'm not going to get into diversions of semantics - ie between
> 'merged' and 'connected'. The point is, that the Representamen is a
> mediative function - an ACTION - and I ackknowledge that the Universe is
> one vast ACTION of semiosis, but the nature of the representamen, as a
> system of LAWS - is not homogeneous. That is, the laws of organization of
> matter are NOT identical - ie the laws which produce a tree are quite
> different from the laws that produce a giraffe. So, to my interpretation,
> 'the universe is a vast mediative function-of-the-production-of-laws. But
> these laws are not identical.
>
> 4] ET:   I question such reductionism, for that denies the actual
> complexity of the Universe and indeed, the functionality of semiosis ...
>
> JAS:I

Re: Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-21 Thread Edwina Taborsky

  BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }My
comments below
 On Tue 21/05/19  3:27 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, Helmut, List:
 1] ET:  Science requires empirical evidence ...
 JAS: The truth of this statement depends on how we define
"empirical."  In the popular sense, only the Special Sciences require
empirical evidence.  According to Peirce, philosophy--including both
Logic as Semeiotic and Metaphysics--requires empirical evidence,
defined as  experiential evidence of the kind that is common to
anyone and everyone; and even Mathematics requires empirical
evidence, in the sense that it depends upon observation.  That is why
he classified all of these fields as sciences.
 EDWINA I refer only to the sciences that require objective empirical
evidence. I don't think that a pragmatic life can be lived without
such objectivity. 
 2]ET:  Logic can only show us that our beliefs are logical but can't
provide any proof of their pragmatic reality. 
 Deductive logic shows us what Propositions follow necessarily from
other Propositions.  In that sense, it reveals what else we must
believe in accordance with what we already believe; i.e., it only
provides "proof" of other pragmatic realities that are entailed by
what we already have ascertained to be pragmatic realities.
 EDWINA So? Again - without objective evidence, then our logical
analyses are irrelevant.
 3] ET:  My understanding of the sign/representamen is that it is A
PROCESS OF MEDIATION, an ACTION  and is not a 'thing' in itself.
 JAS: There is no need to shout.  Indeed, "a sign is not a real
thing" (EP 2:303; 1904); however, Peirce generally used "thought" or
"semeiosis" for the process, and "Sign" or "Representamen" for each
constituent of the process.  On the other hand, an Argument is a Sign
that is  also a continuous "inferential process," which we describe
using definite Propositions as if they were the constituent Signs of
that process.  That is why I reject the charge of
"reductionism"--saying that the Universe (or any other Argument) is a
Sign says nothing whatsoever about its complexity, except that is more
complex than a Proposition, which in turn is more complex than a Seme.
 EDWINA I'm not shouting but emphasizing. My computer doesn't do
italics or underlining very well - it somehow forgets how to shut
itself off from such methods. My focus is on the action [ACTION] of
the Repesentamen - and I think that we forget it is is an action.
 4] ET:  As such a process of mediation, the sign/representamen only
functions within a semiosic triad of relations, made up of the R-O;
the R-R; and the R-I.
 JAS: Absolutely not; this treats the one triadic relation between
the Sign, Object, and Interpretant as if it were composed of three
dyadic relations.  If anything merits the label of "reductionism,"
this is it.  A Sign can be classified  in accordance with its own
nature (Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign or Tone/Token/Type), that of its
relation to its Dynamic Object (Icon/Index/Symbol), and that of its
relation to its Final Interpretant (Rheme/Dicisign/Argument or
Seme/Pheme/Delome); these result in the ten classes of Peirce's 1903
taxonomy.  However, a Sign does not consist of these three relations;
I consider such a notion to reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of
Peirce's entire Speculative Grammar.
 EDWINA And I disagree. The triad is not reducible to dyads. I don't
say that the Representamen CONSISTS of these three relations. I say
that the Representamen, as a mediative process, engages in these
three relations.  See 8.335, where Peirce discusses 'In respect to
their relations to their Dynamic Objects, ….
 5] ET:  Therefore - reductionism, which, despite JAS's objection to
the term, is the only one I can come up with that describes the
concept that 'all signs are one' ...
 JAS: So you acknowledge my objection to the term, but persist in
continuing to use it anyway.  That seems rather hypocritical for
someone who routinely accuses me of calling her "unPeircean," even
though I have conscientiously  avoided using that word myself.  If I
claimed to be unable to come up with any other term to describe your
views, would that be justification for me to start using it now?  Of
course not.
 EDWINA There is no comparison between accusing someone of outlining
a semiosis that has nothing to do with Peirce [aka unPeircean whether
or not you use the term] - and my opinion that your outline of Peirce
is a reductionist one. I can't describe your reduction of 'plethora
of signs' to 'one sign' in any other way than 'reductionist'. 
 6] ET:  In addition, I object to the 'backwards reasoning' as I see
it, where you proceed from a conclusion to a premise. If we conclude
that all signs/representamens must refer to objects external from
themselves [and this is a debatable conclusion] - can we actually say
that this 'proves' that the Universe, as a sign/representamen actually
has an Object-external-to-itself? I don't

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-21 Thread Edwina Taborsky

  BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Please see my responses below
 On Tue 21/05/19  3:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 1] ET:  I don't think that these discussions on religion and logic
have anything to do with bridging the chasm between religion and
science. They have no scientific content whatsoever.
 JAS] Peirce held that both Logic as Semeiotic and Metaphysics are
sciences, so their content is scientific  content; but not religion. 
Of course, the line between Metaphysics and religion is not sharp,
especially when the topic of discussion is the Reality of God.
 EDWINA My understanding of science is that its axioms are based on
objective empirical evidence; repeatable observations; quantitative
measurements and fallibility. I don't think that any of these
criteria apply to any of the discussions we've had.
 2] ET:  Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true,
in the sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set
up as, in themselves, true--and the format of their syllogistic
placement is valid, this does not make the content of this argument
true. It merely sets up a valid argument. 
 JAS: Again, if the premisses are true and the form of the
argumentation is valid, then the conclusion is necessarily true;
i.e., the argumentation as a whole is sound.  This is the most basic
logical leading principle of all deductive syllogisms.  We can
certainly disagree on whether each of the premisses is true, but
someone who endorses all of them is rationally required to endorse
the conclusion, as well.
 EDWINA Your comments referred only to the premises being true - and
you declared that if the premises are true then the conclusion must
be true. I simply showed you some examples which invalidated your
assertion. 
  3] ET:  I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's
insistence that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is
perfused with signs' and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept
that multiple signs can be 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to
conclude that the Universe is A single Sign.
 JAS: Peirce's  theorem was not that multiple Signs can be merged to
be considered one Sign; it is that multiple Signs that are connected
constitute one Sign.  Consequently, according to Peirce, if the
entire Universe consists of connected Signs, then the Universe is one
Sign; and as I keep pointing out, he explicitly affirmed not only that
"the Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol ... that
Universe being precisely an argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903),
but also that "the entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all
thought to be more or less connected" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904).
 EDWINA I'm not going to get into diversions of semantics - ie
between 'merged' and 'connected'. The point is, that the
Representamen is a mediative function - an ACTION - and I
ackknowledge that the Universe is one vast ACTION of semiosis, but
the nature of the representamen, as a system of LAWS - is not
homogeneous. That is, the laws of organization of matter are NOT
identical - ie the laws which produce a tree are quite different from
the laws that produce a giraffe. So, to my interpretation, 'the
universe is a vast mediative function-of-the-production-of-laws. But
these laws are not identical.
  4] ET:   I question such reductionism, for that denies the actual
complexity of the Universe and indeed, the functionality of semiosis
...
 JAS:I have asked you before, and now ask you again, to stop calling
it "reductionism."  If the entire Universe is indeed a
Sign--specifically, an Argument, a continuous "inferential process"
of semeiosis--that indicates  nothing whatsoever about its
complexity.  On the contrary, it reveals just how vast and complex a
Sign can be, rather than implying that the Universe is any simpler
than we otherwise would have suspected.
 EDWINA I consider it reductionism - and therefore, have every right
to my opinion. You may reject it, but I don't really think that you
have the right to tell me to stop having this opinion. I consider
that semeiosis, i.e., the fact that the Representamen has the ability
to transform input data from an external Object [or Objects] and, via
its generative habits/laws...produce something quite unique as an
Interpretant - I consider that this freedom enables complexity. 
 5] ET:  I also question the soundness of JAS's insistence that a
sign requires an external object - for my reading of Peirce is that,
indeed, the semiosic function requires 'dialogue' which does set up a
'this' and a 'not this' which interact. 
 JAS: I thought we agreed that every Sign is determined by an
external Object.  However, the Sign and its Object do not interact,
since that would imply both of them acting on each other; by
contrast, Peirce explicitly affirmed that while the Object acts on
the Sign, the Sign has no effect on its Object.
 CSP:  For the purpose of this inquiry a

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-21 Thread Helmut Raulien

Supplement: I put an "other" in my second paragraph. Individual signs cannot communicate using quantum entanglement. But perhaps the universe can use quantum entanglement for communication in itself, so may have an event horizon as big as itself..

Edwina, list,

I agree. I too think, that a sign is an action, an event, and is therefore limited by its event horizon. Though a part of any sign is due to universal laws, but that does not connect all signs to one (not completely, because only a part of the sign is due to universal laws like efficient causation, other parts follow limitedly ranged laws, habits, needs, volitions, etc.).

To your last paragraph about backwards reasoning: I also think, that it is not justified to conclude from subsystems and usual signs to the universe, because the universe is the biggest possible system, and has, other that any other system, no supersystem, and no event horizon bigger than itself. This makes it unique: Even if every other sign would have an object external to it, and if the universe was a sign, then a conclusion that the universe would have an external object too, would still be not justified.

On the other hand it is possible to assume, that a part of any sign has the universe as event horizon, e.g. by divine interaction or communication by quantum entanglement. I think, Peirce has assumed so, when he wrote, that he does not entertain a doubt, that what is present to one mind, is present to all minds. But again, this only would apply to a (quite small) part of the sign, I think.

Helmut

21. Mai 2019 um 20:16 Uhr

"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:

Helmut

Science requires empirical evidence - and discussions about 'God' rarely provide that. Logic can only show us that our beliefs are logical but can't provide any proof of their pragmatic reality.

I consider that a major problem in discussion of 'the sign' is the view, almost, that it is a 'thing', a discrete entity. My understanding of the sign/representamen is that it is A PROCESS OF MEDIATION, an ACTION and is not a 'thing' in itself. As such a process of mediation, the sign/representamen only functions within a semiosic triad of relations, made up of the R-O; the R-R; and the R-I.

Therefore, one has to examine the functioning nature of this mediative action- which never 'exists' or functions on its own. My understanding of it is that the sign/representamen operates by developing habits of organization or laws which enable matter to develop as morphological forms.

Therefore - reductionism, which, despite JAS's objection to the term, is the only one I can come up with that describes the concept that 'all signs are one'seems to me to ignore these laws or habits. These laws and habits are real and not only real but existent [we can scientifically examine the laws of chemistry, physics, biology] - can or should they be ignored?

And are all these laws reducible? Can a biological entity, eg, a swan, be reduced to a pile of chemicals? My view is that these normative rules of formation are relatively stable and scientifically, I don't see how we can ignore them such that we can conclude that ALL mediation is actually using the same law.

In addition, I object to the 'backwards reasoning' as I see it, where you proceed from a conclusion to a premise. If we conclude that all signs/representamens must refer to objects external from themselves [and this is a debatable conclusion] - can we actually say that this 'proves' that the Universe, as a sign/representamen actually has an Object-external-to-itself? I don't think we can do this that easily.

Edwina

On Tue 21/05/19 11:18 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

Edwina, All,

I think there is (and will be) a premiss missing: Scale-invariance / connectedness / noncontingency. A forest consisting of different (nonconnected) trees is not a tree, it is not scale-invariant. But there may be a forest in which the trees are connected by their roots, which make them one plant, so you can say that this forest is one tree. Now to the question whether the universe is one sign: Do all signs have a connectibility towards each other, or are they separated, made contingent, by event-horizons due to the limitations by light-velocity and other speed/space limits? Or are there nonlocal and nontemporal ways of connections between signs, such as divine interactions? Is the universe scale-invariant or not? Does religion as reconnection in reality (whatever that is) provide such a scale-invariance, or is religion a collusion (shared illusion)? Nobody knows, but everybody is free to guess, or "believe" (whatever that is). I think it is ok. to assume that these things (justified religion, connectedness...) may exist. I mean, though it is unscientific to take unproven things for premiss, it is unscientific too to claim for premiss that something cannot exist because it is not proved.

Helmut

21. Mai 2019 um 14:48 Uhr
Von: "Edwina

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-21 Thread Jerry Rhee

Dear John, list,



I have heard that we, the general public, have contempt for experts.



If by that, it is meant that we do not have high regard for arguments “that
take more than one step”, I tend to agree..



Well, more than three steps, in general;

for abstrusity tends to count against experts.



On the other hand, experts are not experts in all matters.

And especially on matters relating to things political.

For if there are such experts, then show them to me.



And this question of God is of the utmost political matter.



So then, do me a favor and extend to me your offer to JAS.

Show me what EGs can do on the matter of this question of God.



In what way is God the Sign or the Object, according to EGs?



In what way is the word “God,” so “capitalized” *the* definable proper
name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really creator of all
three Universes of Experience, according to EGs?



For I am of the persuasion that I count myself among the careless cavillers
who might say, “what, then, precisely, is your neglected argument?”



With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 1:27 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Edwina and Gary R,
>
> I endorse Edwina's caveats.  Her examples are among the "puffy clouds"
> that create ambiguities in any reasoning stated in ordinary language.
> After half a century of using and inventing symbolic logics, Peirce
> could keep the distinctions clear in his own mind, but any excerpt
> from his writings could easily be ambiguous when taken out of context.
>
> That's why formal logic is essential to clarify any reasoning that
> relates quotations from different MSS.
>
> GR
> > I truly doubt that Jon needs your "help," while insulting and
> > hubristic comments such as saying that if he refuses to accept your
> > "help" that he has "nothing but a puffy cloud of words" is, in my
> > opinion, below any serious scholar's dignity.
>
> When it comes to logic, I treat Jon as a student.  He's not happy
> when I say that, so I haven't said that recently.  Instead, I stated
> the most appropriate analogy for his style of reasoning:  "puffy
> clouds of words".   If that's considered insulting, I'll just give
> him a "gentleman's C".
>
> Ambiguities are the primary reason why words, by themselves, can
> be misleading.  Even in Peirce's technical vocabulary, there are
> ambiguities in the words 'subject' (grammatical or logical) and
> 'universe' (the universe of discourse on the sheet of assertion
> or one of the three modalities -- possible, actual, necessary).
>
> The sheet of assertion, as a piece of paper, is in the universe
> of actuality.  But the universe of discourse represented by the
> EGs on that paper is an abstraction in the universe of possibilities.
> No matter where God may be, any statement about God that is written
> on that paper exists in actuality, and its universe of discourse
> is in the universe of possibility.
>
> Those distinctions provide enough universe-like combinations to
> support any talk about God or anything else.  Another realm for
> God is both semeiotically unnecessary and anti=Peircean.
>
> I admit that Jon has done good work in studying Peirce and relating
> passages from various MSS.  But when he draws inferences that go
> beyond anything Peirce said, there is usually a good reason why
> Peirce did not make those inferences.  It's important to ask why.
>
> It's not acceptable to attribute any position to Peirce that
> he did not explicitly state -- for example, the assumption that
> anything could or even must exist outside his three universes.
>
> Since Gary questioned my qualifications to grade Jon's claims,
> I'll summarize a few points.  I spent 30 years in R & D at IBM,
> where I used math & logic for projects in AI, computational
> linguistics, and parsers and inference engines.  I published
> papers and books and taught courses at IBM and elsewhere.
>
> In 1987, for example, I taught a graduate course at Stanford in the
> Computer Science Dept., which also had many students in linguistics.
> The only prerequisite was "knowledge of first-order logic and natural
> language syntax".  For the course description and student evaluations:
> http://jfsowa.com/pubs/su309a.pdf .  Note that my rating was higher
> than the average for the CS department in nearly all categories.
>
> For the first homework assignment, the students were supposed to
> translate 10 English sentences to first-order logic.  None of the
> sentences had any syntactic or semantic ambiguities.  There were
> about 30 students in the class, but only one student got all 10
> sentences correct.  He was a post-doc, who had just finished his
> PhD in linguistics and was just auditing the course.
>
> For more recent work, see the 73-page article on "Reasoning with
> diagrams and images", which was published in 2018 in the Journal
> of Applied Logics, vol. 5:5, pp. 987-1059 of
> http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/downloads/ifcolog00025.pdf
>
> Re helping Jon to

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-21 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina, list,

To your last paragraph about backwards reasoning: I also think, that it is not justified to conclude from subsystems and usual signs to the universe, because the universe is the biggest possible system, and has, other that any other system, no supersystem, and no event horizon bigger than itself. This makes it unique: Even if every sign would have an object external to it, and if the universe was a sign, then a conclusion that the universe would have an external object too, would still be not justified.

Helmut

21. Mai 2019 um 20:16 Uhr

"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:

Helmut

Science requires empirical evidence - and discussions about 'God' rarely provide that. Logic can only show us that our beliefs are logical but can't provide any proof of their pragmatic reality.

Edwina

On Tue 21/05/19 11:18 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

Edwina, All,

Helmut

21. Mai 2019 um 14:48 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" Gary R, list

I think we have to be very cautious here. I don't think that these discussions on religion and logic have anything to do with bridging the chasm between religion and science. They have no scientific content whatsoever.

Furthermore, because an

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-21 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Edwina, Helmut, List:

ET:  Science requires empirical evidence ...

The truth of this statement depends on how we define "empirical."  In the
popular sense, only the Special Sciences require empirical evidence.
According to Peirce, philosophy--including both Logic as Semeiotic and
Metaphysics--requires empirical evidence, defined as *experiential *evidence
of the kind that is common to anyone and everyone; and even Mathematics
requires empirical evidence, in the sense that it depends upon *observation*.
That is why he classified *all *of these fields as *sciences*.

ET:  Logic can only show us that our beliefs are logical but can't provide
any proof of their pragmatic reality.

Deductive logic shows us what Propositions follow necessarily from other
Propositions.  In that sense, it reveals what *else *we must believe in
accordance with what we *already *believe; i.e., it only provides "proof"
of *other *pragmatic realities that are entailed by what we *already *have
ascertained to be pragmatic realities.

ET:  My understanding of the sign/representamen is that it is A PROCESS OF
MEDIATION, an ACTION  and is not a 'thing' in itself.

There is no need to shout.  Indeed, "a sign is not a real thing" (EP 2:303;
1904); however, Peirce generally used "thought" or "semeiosis" for the
*process*, and "Sign" or "Representamen" for each *constituent *of the
process.  On the other hand, an Argument is a Sign that is *also *a
continuous "inferential process," which we *describe *using definite
Propositions *as if* they were the constituent Signs of that process.  That
is why I reject the charge of "reductionism"--saying that the Universe (or
any other Argument) is a Sign says *nothing whatsoever* about its
complexity, except that is *more *complex than a Proposition, which in turn
is *more *complex than a Seme.

ET:  As such a process of mediation, the sign/representamen only functions
within a semiosic triad of relations, made up of the R-O; the R-R; and the
R-I.

Absolutely not; this treats the *one triadic* relation between the Sign,
Object, and Interpretant as if it were composed of *three dyadic*
relations.  If anything merits the label of "reductionism," this is it.  A
Sign can be *classified *in accordance with its own nature
(Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign or Tone/Token/Type), that of its relation to
its Dynamic Object (Icon/Index/Symbol), and that of its relation to its
Final Interpretant (Rheme/Dicisign/Argument or Seme/Pheme/Delome); these
result in the ten classes of Peirce's 1903 taxonomy.  However, a Sign does
not *consist *of these three relations; I consider such a notion to reflect
a fundamental misunderstanding of Peirce's entire Speculative Grammar.

ET:  Therefore - reductionism, which, despite JAS's objection to the term,
is the only one I can come up with that describes the concept that 'all
signs are one' ...

So you acknowledge my objection to the term, but persist in continuing to
use it anyway.  That seems rather hypocritical for someone who routinely
accuses me of calling her "unPeircean," even though I have conscientiously
*avoided *using that word myself.  If I claimed to be unable to come up
with any other term to describe your views, would that be justification for
me to start using it now?  Of course not.

ET:  In addition, I object to the 'backwards reasoning' as I see it, where
you proceed from a conclusion to a premise. If we conclude that all
signs/representamens must refer to objects external from themselves [and
this is a debatable conclusion] - can we actually say that this 'proves'
that the Universe, as a sign/representamen actually has an
Object-external-to-itself? I don't think we can do this that easily.

There is nothing "backwards" about reasoning from true premisses to a
necessary conclusion; that is the nature of deductive argumentations in
general, and syllogisms in particular.  In this summary, you conveniently
left out the minor premiss, that the entire Universe is a Sign.  *Denying *that
premiss warrants denying the conclusion; but *given *that additional
premiss, if every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself, then
it *necessarily *follows that the Universe is determined by an Object other
than itself.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 1:16 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Helmut
>
> Science requires empirical evidence - and discussions about 'God'
> rarely provide that. Logic can only show us that our beliefs are logical
> but can't provide any proof of their pragmatic reality.
>
> I consider that a major problem in discussion  of 'the sign' is the view,
> almost, that it is a 'thing', a discrete entity. My understanding of the
> sign/representamen is that it is A PROCESS OF MEDIATION, an ACTION  and is
> not a 'thing' in itself. As such a process of mediation, the
> sign/representamen only

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-21 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Edwina, List:

ET:  I don't think that these discussions on religion and logic have
anything to do with bridging the chasm between religion and science. They
have no scientific content whatsoever.


Peirce held that both Logic as Semeiotic and Metaphysics are *sciences*, so
their content is *scientific *content; but not religion.  Of course, the
line between Metaphysics and religion is not sharp, especially when the
topic of discussion is the Reality of God.

ET:  Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true, in the
sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set up as, in
themselves, true--and the format of their syllogistic placement is valid,
this does not make the content of this argument true. It merely sets up a
valid argument.


Again, if the premisses are true and the *form *of the argumentation is
valid, then the conclusion is *necessarily *true; i.e., the argumentation
as a whole is *sound*.  This is the most basic logical leading principle of
all deductive syllogisms.  We can certainly disagree on whether each of the
premisses is true, but someone who endorses *all *of them is *rationally
required* to endorse the conclusion, as well.

ET:  I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's insistence
that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is perfused with signs'
and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept that multiple signs can be
'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to conclude that the Universe is A
single Sign.


Peirce's *theorem *was not that multiple Signs *can be* merged to *be
considered* one Sign; it is that multiple Signs that *are *connected
*constitute *one Sign.  Consequently, according to Peirce, if the entire
Universe *consists *of connected Signs, then the Universe is *one *Sign;
and as I keep pointing out, he *explicitly *affirmed not only that "the
Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol ... that Universe being
precisely an argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903), but also that "the
entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all thought to be more or
less connected" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904).

ET:   I question such reductionism, for that denies the actual complexity
of the Universe and indeed, the functionality of semiosis ...


I have asked you before, and now ask you again, to stop calling it
"reductionism."  If the entire Universe is indeed a Sign--specifically, an
Argument, a continuous "inferential process" of semeiosis--that
indicates *nothing
whatsoever* about its complexity.  On the contrary, it reveals just how
vast and complex a Sign can be, rather than implying that the Universe is
any simpler than we otherwise would have suspected.

ET:  I also question the soundness of JAS's insistence that a sign requires
an external object - for my reading of Peirce is that, indeed, the semiosic
function requires 'dialogue' which does set up a 'this' and a 'not this'
which interact.


I thought we agreed that every Sign is determined by an external Object.
However, the Sign and its Object do not *interact*, since that would
imply *both
*of them acting on *each other*; by contrast, Peirce *explicitly *affirmed
that while the Object acts on the Sign, the Sign has *no effect *on its
Object.

CSP:  For the purpose of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium for
the communication of a Form ... As a *medium*, the Sign is essentially in a
triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and to its
Interpretant which it determines. In its relation to the Object, the Sign
is *passive*; that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought
about by an effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected. (EP
2:544n22; 1906)


The Sign *does *have an effect on its *Interpretant*; in fact, it fulfills
the function of a Sign precisely to the degree that it has the *same *effect
on the Interpretant as the Object *itself *would have had in the right
conditions.

CSP:  On the other hand, in its relation to the Interpretant the Sign is
*active*, determining the Interpretant without being itself thereby
affected ... in respect to the Form communicated, the Sign produces upon
the Interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object itself would
under favorable circumstances. (EP 2:544n22; 1906)

CSP:  A sign, on the other hand, just in so far as it fulfills the function
of a sign, and none other, perfectly conforms to the definition of a medium
of communication. It is determined by the object, but in no other respect
than goes to enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and the
more perfectly it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it has
upon that quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object
itself had acted upon it. (EP 2:391; 1906)


This is not at all a "linear" or "mechanical" process consisting of
sequential *dyadic *relations, but rather a *mediative *process consisting
of an irreducible *triadic *relation.

CSP:  I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-21 Thread John F Sowa


Edwina and Gary R,

I endorse Edwina's caveats.  Her examples are among the "puffy clouds"
that create ambiguities in any reasoning stated in ordinary language.
After half a century of using and inventing symbolic logics, Peirce
could keep the distinctions clear in his own mind, but any excerpt
from his writings could easily be ambiguous when taken out of context.

That's why formal logic is essential to clarify any reasoning that
relates quotations from different MSS.

GR

I truly doubt that Jon needs your "help," while insulting and
hubristic comments such as saying that if he refuses to accept your
"help" that he has "nothing but a puffy cloud of words" is, in my
opinion, below any serious scholar's dignity.


When it comes to logic, I treat Jon as a student.  He's not happy
when I say that, so I haven't said that recently.  Instead, I stated
the most appropriate analogy for his style of reasoning:  "puffy
clouds of words".   If that's considered insulting, I'll just give
him a "gentleman's C".

Ambiguities are the primary reason why words, by themselves, can
be misleading.  Even in Peirce's technical vocabulary, there are
ambiguities in the words 'subject' (grammatical or logical) and
'universe' (the universe of discourse on the sheet of assertion
or one of the three modalities -- possible, actual, necessary).

The sheet of assertion, as a piece of paper, is in the universe
of actuality.  But the universe of discourse represented by the
EGs on that paper is an abstraction in the universe of possibilities.
No matter where God may be, any statement about God that is written
on that paper exists in actuality, and its universe of discourse
is in the universe of possibility.

Those distinctions provide enough universe-like combinations to
support any talk about God or anything else.  Another realm for
God is both semeiotically unnecessary and anti=Peircean.

I admit that Jon has done good work in studying Peirce and relating
passages from various MSS.  But when he draws inferences that go
beyond anything Peirce said, there is usually a good reason why
Peirce did not make those inferences.  It's important to ask why.

It's not acceptable to attribute any position to Peirce that
he did not explicitly state -- for example, the assumption that
anything could or even must exist outside his three universes.

Since Gary questioned my qualifications to grade Jon's claims,
I'll summarize a few points.  I spent 30 years in R & D at IBM,
where I used math & logic for projects in AI, computational
linguistics, and parsers and inference engines.  I published
papers and books and taught courses at IBM and elsewhere.

In 1987, for example, I taught a graduate course at Stanford in the
Computer Science Dept., which also had many students in linguistics.
The only prerequisite was "knowledge of first-order logic and natural
language syntax".  For the course description and student evaluations:
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/su309a.pdf .  Note that my rating was higher
than the average for the CS department in nearly all categories.

For the first homework assignment, the students were supposed to
translate 10 English sentences to first-order logic.  None of the
sentences had any syntactic or semantic ambiguities.  There were
about 30 students in the class, but only one student got all 10
sentences correct.  He was a post-doc, who had just finished his
PhD in linguistics and was just auditing the course.

For more recent work, see the 73-page article on "Reasoning with
diagrams and images", which was published in 2018 in the Journal
of Applied Logics, vol. 5:5, pp. 987-1059 of
http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/downloads/ifcolog00025.pdf

Re helping Jon to translate Peirce's statements to EGs:  I meant
that offer in all sincerity.  I doubt that Jon could correctly
translate the relevant quotations from Peirce to EGs or any other
version of symbolic logic.  Note that Stanford graduate students
in computer science or linguistics couldn't do that.

In any case, I would be pleasantly surprised if Jon could translate
the relevant quotations by Peirce to EGs.  If he can't do that, I
would automatically dismiss any of his claims about any arguments
that take more than one step.

John

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Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-21 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 

Helmut

Science requires empirical evidence - and discussions about 'God'
rarely provide that. Logic can only show us that our beliefs are
logical but can't provide any proof of their pragmatic reality.

I consider that a major problem in discussion  of 'the sign' is the
view, almost, that it is a 'thing', a discrete entity. My
understanding of the sign/representamen is that it is A PROCESS OF
MEDIATION, an ACTION  and is not a 'thing' in itself. As such a
process of mediation, the sign/representamen only functions within a
semiosic triad of relations, made up of the R-O; the R-R; and the
R-I.

Therefore, one has to examine the functioning nature of this
mediative action- which never 'exists' or functions on its own. My
understanding of it is that the sign/representamen operates by
developing habits of organization or laws which enable matter to
develop as morphological forms. 

Therefore - reductionism, which, despite JAS's objection to the
term, is the only one I can come up with that describes the concept
that 'all signs are one'seems to me to ignore these laws or
habits. These laws and habits are real and not only real but existent
[we can scientifically examine the laws of chemistry, physics,
biology] - can or should they be ignored?

And are all these laws reducible? Can a biological entity, eg, a
swan, be reduced to a pile of chemicals? My view is that these
normative rules of formation are relatively stable and
scientifically, I don't see how we can ignore them such that we can
conclude that ALL mediation is actually using the same law.

In addition, I object to the 'backwards reasoning' as I see it,
where you proceed from a conclusion to a premise. If we conclude that
all signs/representamens must refer to objects external from
themselves [and this is a debatable conclusion] - can we actually say
that this 'proves' that the Universe, as a sign/representamen actually
has an Object-external-to-itself? I don't think we can do this that
easily. 

Edwina
 On Tue 21/05/19 11:18 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, All,   I think there is (and will be) a premiss missing:
Scale-invariance / connectedness / noncontingency. A forest
consisting of different (nonconnected) trees is not a tree, it is not
scale-invariant. But there may be a forest in which the trees are
connected by their roots, which make them one plant, so you can say
that this forest is one tree. Now to the question whether the
universe is one sign: Do all signs have a connectibility towards each
other, or are they separated, made contingent, by event-horizons due
to the limitations by light-velocity and other speed/space limits? Or
are there nonlocal and nontemporal ways of connections between signs,
such as divine interactions? Is the universe scale-invariant or not?
Does religion as reconnection in reality (whatever that is)  provide
such a scale-invariance, or is religion a collusion (shared
illusion)? Nobody knows, but everybody is free to guess, or "believe"
(whatever that is). I think it is ok. to assume that these things
(justified religion, connectedness...) may exist. I mean, though it
is unscientific to take unproven things for premiss, it is
unscientific too to claim for premiss that something cannot exist
because it is not proved.   Helmut 21. Mai 2019 um 14:48 Uhr
 Von: "Edwina Taborsky" Gary R, list  

I think we have to be very cautious here. I don't think that these
discussions on religion and logic have anything to do with bridging
the chasm between religion and science. They have no scientific
content whatsoever. 

Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true, in the
sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set up
as, in themselves, true -- and the format of their syllogistic
placement is valid, this does not make the content of this argument
true. It merely sets up a valid argument. 

I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's insistence
that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is perfused with
signs' and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept that multiple
signs can be 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to conclude that
the Universe is A single Sign.  I question such reductionism, for
that denies the actual complexity of the Universe and indeed, the
functionality of semiosis - which includes, among its other functions
- the ability and necessity to 'make matter complex' rather than
simple. We can intellectually reduce a complexity to singularity but
can we make this an existential simplicity? 

I also question the soundness of JAS's insistence that a sign
requires an external object - for my reading of Peirce is that,
indeed, the semiosic function requires 'dialogue' which does set up a
'this' and a 'not this' which interact. BUT, this external object is
only that when it becomes an integral part of the semiosic
interactionand

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-21 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina, All,

Helmut

21. Mai 2019 um 14:48 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" Gary R, list

Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true, in the sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set up as, in themselves, true -- and the format of their syllogistic placement is valid, this does not make the content of this argument true. It merely sets up a valid argument.

I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's insistence that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is perfused with signs' and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept that multiple signs can be 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to conclude that the Universe is A single Sign. I question such reductionism, for that denies the actual complexity of the Universe and indeed, the functionality of semiosis - which includes, among its other functions - the ability and necessity to 'make matter complex' rather than simple. We can intellectually reduce a complexity to singularity but can we make this an existential simplicity?

I also question the soundness of JAS's insistence that a sign requires an external object - for my reading of Peirce is that, indeed, the semiosic function requires 'dialogue' which does set up a 'this' and a 'not this' which interact. BUT, this external object is only that when it becomes an integral part of the semiosic interactionand becomes an Immediate Object. Therefore - does this externality, God, have any reality before being part of the Universe as its Immediate Object? If it is forever outside the realm of immanent semiosic interaction - does it have any reality?

And - as Jeff D has pointed out, a so-called external Object is not necessarily morphologically external to the semiosic Triad.

Therefore, I think that we have to be very cautious about these discussions.

Edwina

On Tue 21/05/19 12:31 AM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:

John, Jon, List

John quoted Jon, then wrote:

Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

> If each of my premisses is true, and the form of my argumentation

> is valid --which it unquestionably is, as demonstrated below --

> then the conclusion must also be true; i.e., my argumentation

> is sound.

JS: That is the most anti-Peircean dogma imaginable. Peirce would

never state or accept any such claim.

Nonsense. To begin with, Jon is claiming nothing more than what a deductive syllogism can. There is nothing anti-Peircean and dogmatic about it whatsoever. And you should really stop name-calling ("anti-Peircean" and "dogmatic"). It's intellectually unbecoming.

Here's a version of the syllogism Jon offers:

Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of God.

Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself [that is a basic principle of Peircean semeiotic, GR]
The entire Universe is a Sign [Jon has offered textual evidence that Peirce claimed this, GR]
The entire Universe is determined by an Object other than itself [this necessarily follows, call that Object what you will; (It indeed "necessarily follows" in a deductive syllogism; and this Object Peirce (and Jon) call God, GR].

John wrote:

JS: First, your premises are your interpretations of Peirce's writings

taken from different contexts where he was focusing on different

topics.

GR: Peirce offers us semeiotic tools to tackle all sorts of topics: Here's one: Peirce presented arguments for the Reality of God. Jon's

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-21 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list

I think we have to be very cautious here. I don't think that these
discussions on religion and logic have anything to do with bridging
the chasm between religion and science. They have no scientific
content whatsoever. 

Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true, in the
sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set up
as, in themselves, true -- and the format of their syllogistic
placement is valid, this does not make the content of this argument
true. It merely sets up a valid argument. 

I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's insistence
that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is perfused with
signs' and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept that multiple
signs can be 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to conclude that
the Universe is A single Sign.  I question such reductionism, for
that denies the actual complexity of the Universe and indeed, the
functionality of semiosis - which includes, among its other functions
- the ability and necessity to 'make matter complex' rather than
simple. We can intellectually reduce a complexity to singularity but
can we make this an existential simplicity?

I also question the soundness of JAS's insistence that a sign
requires an external object - for my reading of Peirce is that,
indeed, the semiosic function requires 'dialogue' which does set up a
'this' and a 'not this' which interact. BUT, this external object is
only that when it becomes an integral part of the semiosic
interactionand becomes an Immediate Object.  Therefore - does
this externality, God, have any reality before being part of the
Universe as its Immediate Object? If it is forever outside the realm
of immanent semiosic interaction - does it have any reality?

And - as Jeff D has pointed out, a so-called external Object is not
necessarily morphologically external to the semiosic Triad.

Therefore, I think that we have to be very cautious about these
discussions. 

Edwina
 On Tue 21/05/19 12:31 AM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 John, Jon, List
 John quoted Jon, then wrote:
  Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:> If each of my premisses is true, and the
form of my argumentation> is valid --which it unquestionably is, as
demonstrated below -- > then the conclusion must also be true; i.e.,
my argumentation> is sound.
  JS: That is the most anti-Peircean dogma imaginable.  Peirce
wouldnever state or accept any such claim.
 Nonsense. To begin with, Jon is claiming nothing more than what a
deductive syllogism can. There is nothing anti-Peircean and dogmatic
about it whatsoever. And you should really stop name-calling
("anti-Peircean" and "dogmatic"). It's intellectually unbecoming.  
 Here's a version of the syllogism Jon offers:
 Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of God. 
*Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself [that is
a basic principle of Peircean semeiotic, GR]
* The entire Universe is a Sign [Jon has offered textual evidence
that Peirce claimed this, GR]
*The entire Universe is determined by an Object other than itself
[this necessarily follows, call that Object what you will; (It indeed
"necessarily follows" in a deductive syllogism; and this Object
Peirce (and Jon) call God, GR].
John wrote:
  JS: First, your premises are your interpretations of Peirce's
writingstaken from different contexts where he was focusing on
differenttopics.   
 GR:  Peirce offers us semeiotic tools to tackle all sorts of topics:
Here's one: Peirce presented arguments for the Reality of God. Jon's
Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of God merely follows
Peirce's strong suggestion as offered in A Neglected Argument for the
Reality of God  (and elsewhere) in the context of certain basic
semeiotic principles.  
 John wrote:
JS: As Peirce himself said, symbols grow.  Formal logic is a
fossilized version of language.  That is its greatest strength and
its greatestweakness.  Fossils are precise only because they stopped
growing.
 GR: Who has denied this? What in Jon's argumentation denies this?
And whose thinking is fossilized here? Jon offers a way to think
further about what Peirce adumbrated in "A Neglected Argument."
Personally, I am very interested in efforts to help bridge the chasm
between religion and science, and it seems to me that Jon's efforts
tend toward that desideratum. 
JS: Second, Peirce devoted his life to studying, inventing, and
usingthe most advanced logics of his day -- which are still at the
forefront of research in the 21st c.  He would not accept
anyreasoning stated in ordinary language as "unquestionably"
precise,valid, and sound -- not even his own.
  We should all feel free to use Peirce's advanced logic in whatever
ways seems productive to each inquirer. Peirce himself reasoned "in
ordinary language"--thousands and thousands of pages of this

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-20 Thread Gary Richmond

John, Jon, List

John quoted Jon, then wrote:

Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> If each of my premisses is true, and the form of my argumentation
> is valid --which it unquestionably is, as demonstrated below --
> then the conclusion must also be true; i.e., my argumentation
> is sound.

JS: That is the most anti-Peircean dogma imaginable.  Peirce would
never state or accept any such claim.

Nonsense. To begin with, Jon is claiming nothing more than what a deductive
syllogism can. There is nothing anti-Peircean and dogmatic about it
whatsoever. And you should really stop name-calling ("anti-Peircean" and
"dogmatic"). It's intellectually unbecoming.

Here's a version of the syllogism Jon offers:

Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of God.

   - Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself [that is a
  basic principle of Peircean semeiotic, GR]
  - The entire Universe is a Sign [Jon has offered textual evidence
  that Peirce claimed this, GR]
  - The entire Universe is determined by an Object other than itself
  [this necessarily follows, call that Object what you will; (It indeed
  "necessarily follows" in a deductive syllogism; and this Object
Peirce (and
  Jon) call God, GR].

John wrote:

JS: First, your premises are your interpretations of Peirce's writings
taken from different contexts where he was focusing on different
topics.

GR:  Peirce offers us semeiotic tools to tackle all sorts of topics: Here's
one: Peirce presented arguments for the Reality of God. Jon's Semeiotic
Argumentation for the Reality of God merely follows Peirce's strong
suggestion as offered in A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God  (and
elsewhere) in the context of certain basic semeiotic principles.

John wrote:

JS: As Peirce himself said, symbols grow.  Formal logic is a fossilized
version of language.  That is its greatest strength and its greatest
weakness.  Fossils are precise only because they stopped growing.

GR: Who has denied this? What in Jon's argumentation denies this? And whose
thinking is fossilized here? Jon offers a way to think further about what
Peirce adumbrated in "A Neglected Argument." Personally, I am very
interested in efforts to help bridge the chasm between religion and
science, and it seems to me that Jon's efforts tend toward that
desideratum.

JS: Second, Peirce devoted his life to studying, inventing, and using
the most advanced logics of his day -- which are still at the
forefront of research in the 21st c.  He would not accept any
reasoning stated in ordinary language as "unquestionably" precise,
valid, and sound -- not even his own.

We should all feel free to use Peirce's advanced logic in whatever ways
seems productive to each inquirer. Peirce himself reasoned "in ordinary
language"--thousands and thousands of pages of this discursive reasoning
ought demonstrate that point. Meanwhile, and again, a deductive syllogism
is sound as long as the premises are asserted to be true, and there is
nothing "anti-Peircean" about that (just consider the myriad deductive
syllogisms Peirce offers in his work).

JS: Third, Peirce's long experience of using formal logics enabled
him to do the diagrammatic reasoning in his own head in a way
that enabled him to write English more precisely than almost
anybody else.  I have never read any commentary about anything
Peirce wrote that is more precise, or even as precise, as the
original quotations by Peirce.

GR: And yet you have written discursively extensively about Peirce's
thought, sometimes offering supporting quotes, often not, occasionally
offering EGs. I do not see any Peirce scholars "translating each statement
by Peirce to an EG," etc., you included.

JS:  Peirce developed his methodeutic as a "critic" of reasoning.
Diagrammatic reasoning is the centerpiece, and EGs are his
preferred system.  If you want to make any claim that resembles
the one at the top of this note, you must translate each statement
by Peirce to an EG, translate your statements to EGs, and apply
the EG rules of inference to derive the conclusion.

GR: That may be *your* ideal, and even were it Peirce's, again, you
yourself do not do that, and it is impossible for anyone to do so on an
email list.

JS: If you're willing to do that, I'll offer to help.  But if you
refuse to do that, you have nothing but a puffy cloud of words.

GR: I truly doubt that Jon needs your "help," while insulting and hubristic
comments such as saying that if he refuses to accept your "help" that  he
has "nothing but a puffy cloud of words" is, in my opinion, below any
serious scholar's dignity.

Again, you ought to stop this intellectual assault. "Blocking the way of
inquiry is the worst possible sin." John Sowa
.
Best,

Gary R

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-20 Thread John F Sowa


On 5/20/2019 4:27 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

If each of my premisses is true, and the form of my argumentation
is valid --which it unquestionably is, as demonstrated below --
then the conclusion must also be true; i.e., my argumentation
is sound.


That is the most anti-Peircean dogma imaginable.  Peirce would
never state or accept any such claim.

First, your premises are your interpretations of Peirce's writings
taken from different contexts where he was focusing on different
topics.  The meanings of words, even for Peirce, shift subtly
from one context to another.

As Peirce himself said, symbols grow.  Formal logic is a fossilized
version of language.  That is its greatest strength and its greatest
weakness.  Fossils are precise only because they stopped growing.

Second, Peirce devoted his life to studying, inventing, and using
the most advanced logics of his day -- which are still at the
forefront of research in the 21st c.  He would not accept any
reasoning stated in ordinary language as "unquestionably" precise,
valid, and sound -- not even his own.

Third, Peirce's long experience of using formal logics enabled
him to do the diagrammatic reasoning in his own head in a way
that enabled him to write English more precisely than almost
anybody else.  I have never read any commentary about anything
Peirce wrote that is more precise, or even as precise, as the
original quotations by Peirce.

Peirce developed his methodeutic as a "critic" of reasoning.
Diagrammatic reasoning is the centerpiece, and EGs are his
preferred system.  If you want to make any claim that resembles
the one at the top of this note, you must translate each statement
by Peirce to an EG, translate your statements to EGs, and apply
the EG rules of inference to derive the conclusion.

If you're willing to do that, I'll offer to help.  But if you
refuse to do that, you have nothing but a puffy cloud of words.

John

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-20 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Edwina, List:

1.  Please reread what you quoted from CP 5.484 very carefully.  It states
that *semeiosis *is "an action or influence" that involves *three
*subjects, one of
which is a *Sign*.  Hence the word "Sign" does not denote the *action*, but
one of the three *subjects *involved in that action; i.e., it does not
denote the *triad *or *triadic relation*, but one of its three *correlates*,
as I have been saying all along.

2.  Please stop calling my view "reductionism" and pretending that I
invented it myself.  I am *directly quoting *Peirce when I say that "if any
signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one
sign" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904).  Denying what Peirce explicitly called a
"theorem" of the "science of semeiotics" is straightforwardly *disagreeing
with him*, and he also went on to state *explicitly *the implication that
"the body of all thought is a sign" (singular).

ET:  Therefore although each of your premises might be in itself valid in
its own domain, I consider that putting them together leads to a false
conclusion ...


If each of my premisses is *true*, and the form of my argumentation is
*valid*--which it unquestionably is, as demonstrated below--then the
conclusion *must *also be true; i.e., my argumentation is *sound*.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 11:32 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, list
>
> 1] I disagree with your assertion that Peirce never said that the triad is
> a sign. See.. "by 'semiosis' I mean, on the contrary, an action or
> influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as
> a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not
> being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs...'semeiosis' in
> Greek of the Roman period, as early as Cicero's time, if I remember
> rightly, meant the action of any kind of sign; and my definition on
> anything that so acts the title of a 'sign' 5.484. I read that to mean
> that the title of 'sign' refers to the semiosic tri-relative action'. My
> emphasis on the words of 'action' and 'act'. Therefore - I continue to use
> the term of Sign to refer to this tri-relative action.
>
> 2] My reading of 'the entire universe is perfused with signs, if it is not
> composed exclusively of signs'  is that the universe is a continuous
> semiosic process - of that triad. You, on the other hand, seem to
> understand this to mean a reductionism which declares that All signs are
> connected and therefore, are ONE sign' - whereas I understand Peircean
> semiosis to be a continuous process but not a material reductionism of its
> material results.
>
> It's almost like saying that 'The forest is perfused with trees;
> therefore, the forest is a tree'.
>
> Therefore although each of your premises might be in itself valid in its
> own domain, I consider that putting them together leads to a false
> conclusion -especially if we differ on the meaning of the terms [Sign].
>
> Edwina
>
> On Mon 20/05/19 11:28 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  All dogs are animals/All cats are animals.  BOTH these premises are
> true. Can I logically then state that All dogs are cats?
>
>
> No, and why not?  Because the conclusion does not follow necessarily from
> the premisses; the form of the argumentation is invalid.  The same is
> true of the other examples below.  Now consider a different one--all dogs
> are animals, and Rover is a dog; can I logically then state that Rover is
> an animal?  Yes, because the conclusion does follow necessarily from the
> premisses; the form of the argumentation is valid.  My Semeiotic
> Argumentation has exactly the same form as the second case, not the first
> case or any of the others below; therefore, it is valid, such that the
> conclusion does follow necessarily from the premisses.
>
>- Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself = all dogs
>are animals, and
>- The entire Universe is a Sign = Rover is a dog; therefore,
>- The entire Universe is determined by an Object other than itself =
>Rover is an animal.
>
> So I suppose that I should have said explicitly what I took to be
> obviously implied--for any valid deductive argumentation, the conclusion
> is only as strong as the premisses.  If one premiss is false, then the
> conclusion is false, or at least unwarranted on the basis of  that premiss;
> e.g., if the entire Universe is not a Sign, or if Rover is not a dog.
> However, anyone who affirms all of the premisses is rationally required
>  to affirm the conclusion, as well.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 8:04 AM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> JAS, list
>>
>> The problem I have with this claim is that it is invalid.
>>
>> JAS:  As with any logical or mathematical "proof"--i.e., any

Re: Re: Tolerance of others in the forum, was, [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-20 Thread Stephen Curtiss Rose

Thanks. For me love is more what you reject and affirm. Reject hurt harm
and fear and you are poised to live decently. Affirm DIY -- recognizing the
necessary difference among spirits-material persons as they engage in their
playing out of freedom. I see everyone this way. Everything anyone does is
a form of love. Some just happen to be hurt, harm and fear.

Buy 99 cent Kindle books at http://buff.ly/1ulPHlK
 Join KIVA https://buff.ly/2ZSAv83



On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 12:56 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Stephen, list,
>
> I did not find your post offensive. I think it is a valuable thesis, that
> the concept of God is sometimes too much complexified. The same, I
> sometimes guess, applies to the concepts of money and sexuality: What
> "God", "money", and "sex" have in common is ontologically, that it is good
> for one to have it, and deontologically, that it should be shared. I guess
> it might be a bad move in reality (history) and theory, to both construct
> complexes as reaction products of these three topics, and also to give
> either of them a surplus meaning, including the other two. Examples:
> Calvinism, I think, did a divination of money. Neoliberalism, social
> darwinism, and marxism too, by naturalizing economy. Baghwan/Oshoism and
> pietism built complexes between sex and religion, either by
> overliberalizing or overlimitating sexuality. In the western cultures, I
> think, money is divinated, and sexuality is economized.
> I think it is good sometimes to attempt a deconstruction of these
> complexes, to see whether they are justified or malconstructions.
> I guess, that deconstruction of complex collusions might put the emphasis
> back to the natural commonities well-being and sharing, and that acceptance
> of these commonities for values is love: Let God be God, economy economy,
> and sex sex. Have it and share it. Love is not merely sexual, but also
> material and religious. This was just expressing a vague sketch based on
> impression.
>
> Helmut
>
> 20. Mai 2019 um 02:33 Uhr
> "Stephen Curtiss Rose" 
> wrote:
> I said the two words you cite and they were repeated but I assume I am the
> one addressed. I am deeply sorry where offense has been taken. I regard
> every human being as beyond judgment and judging others as a futile and
> uncalled for activity.
>
> . Buy 99 cent Kindle books at http://buff.ly/1ulPHlK
>  Join KIVA https://buff.ly/2ZSAv83
> 
>
> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 4:53 PM Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> List,
>>
>> Again I read, "Enough already."
>>
>> Indeed. Enough already of blocking the way of inquiry. If you disagree
>> with someone's interpretation of something posted to this list, then say so
>> and give your reasons. That ought to be sufficient.
>>
>> If you aren't interested in a threaded topic, don't read in that thread.
>> No one's going to miss you.
>>
>> If you aren't at all interested in what some particular list member has
>> to say, delete his or her posts before commenting on them, perhaps even
>> before reading them. No one will know or care.
>>
>> The lack of tolerance that I as list moderator have recently seen here is
>> simply not acceptable in this forum. In my view, such a lack of tolerance
>> reflects badly on the character of the intolerant person and not at all on
>> the person harshly treated.
>>
>> As Joe Ransdell, the founder of Peirce-L wrote in "How the Forum Works"
>> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM
>>
>>
>> [Forum members expect] that those who are at odds with one another. . .
>> be both generous in their tolerance of the other when excess occurs and in
>> their readiness to make verbal amends when excess is imputed to them. *When
>> in doubt, apologize: you are never diminished by it *[emphasis in the
>> original]*.*
>>
>>
>> While I believe some apologies are in order, I don't really expect to see
>> them. I do, however, believe that certain folk here should read over *their
>> own *recent comments to see if, upon reflection, they think they might
>> have shown  intolerance toward the views and/or scholarship of another
>> forum member. If the answer is that they do* not* believe that they did,
>> then that is that, and there is nothing more to be said. But if the answer
>> is that they must admit *to themselves* that they indeed did express
>> some intolerance, then that person at least ought to consider if they want
>> to see that intolerance (or pique, or insults, etc.) published in
>> perpetuity on the Internet as an expression of their character. If not,
>> they should simply refrain from conducting themselves in such an
>> inappropriate manner in the future. As Ben Udell wrote here over a decade
>> ago, "Peirce-L is a salon, not a saloon."
>>
>> I sincerely hope that no one here will attempt to justify untoward
>> conduct on the list, although I can imagine that a list member or so will
>> claim that I'm "scolding" folk

Aw: Re: Tolerance of others in the forum, was, [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-20 Thread Helmut Raulien

Stephen, list,

I did not find your post offensive. I think it is a valuable thesis, that the concept of God is sometimes too much complexified. The same, I sometimes guess, applies to the concepts of money and sexuality: What "God", "money", and "sex" have in common is ontologically, that it is good for one to have it, and deontologically, that it should be shared. I guess it might be a bad move in reality (history) and theory, to both construct complexes as reaction products of these three topics, and also to give either of them a surplus meaning, including the other two. Examples:

Calvinism, I think, did a divination of money. Neoliberalism, social darwinism, and marxism too, by naturalizing economy. Baghwan/Oshoism and pietism built complexes between sex and religion, either by overliberalizing or overlimitating sexuality. In the western cultures, I think, money is divinated, and sexuality is economized.

I think it is good sometimes to attempt a deconstruction of these complexes, to see whether they are justified or malconstructions.

I guess, that deconstruction of complex collusions might put the emphasis back to the natural commonities well-being and sharing, and that acceptance of these commonities for values is love: Let God be God, economy economy, and sex sex. Have it and share it. Love is not merely sexual, but also material and religious. This was just expressing a vague sketch based on impression.

Helmut

20. Mai 2019 um 02:33 Uhr
"Stephen Curtiss Rose"
wrote:

I said the two words you cite and they were repeated but I assume I am the one addressed. I am deeply sorry where offense has been taken. I regard every human being as beyond judgment and judging others as a futile and uncalled for activity.

. Buy 99 cent Kindle books at http://buff.ly/1ulPHlK Join KIVA https://buff.ly/2ZSAv83

On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 4:53 PM Gary Richmond wrote:

List,

Again I read, "Enough already."

Indeed. Enough already of blocking the way of inquiry. If you disagree with someone's interpretation of something posted to this list, then say so and give your reasons. That ought to be sufficient.

If you aren't interested in a threaded topic, don't read in that thread. No one's going to miss you.

If you aren't at all interested in what some particular list member has to say, delete his or her posts before commenting on them, perhaps even before reading them. No one will know or care.

The lack of tolerance that I as list moderator have recently seen here is simply not acceptable in this forum. In my view, such a lack of tolerance reflects badly on the character of the intolerant person and not at all on the person harshly treated.

As Joe Ransdell, the founder of Peirce-L wrote in "How the Forum Works"

http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM

[Forum members expect] that those who are at odds with one another. . . be both generous in their tolerance of the other when excess occurs and in their readiness to make verbal amends when excess is imputed to them. When in doubt, apologize: you are never diminished by it [emphasis in the original].

While I believe some apologies are in order, I don't really expect to see them. I do, however, believe that certain folk here should read over their own recent comments to see if, upon reflection, they think they might have shown intolerance toward the views and/or scholarship of another forum member. If the answer is that they do not believe that they did, then that is that, and there is nothing more to be said. But if the answer is that they must admit to themselves that they indeed did express some intolerance, then that person at least ought to consider if they want to see that intolerance (or pique, or insults, etc.) published in perpetuity on the Internet as an _expression_ of their character. If not, they should simply refrain from conducting themselves in such an inappropriate manner in the future. As Ben Udell wrote here over a decade ago, "Peirce-L is a salon, not a saloon."

I sincerely hope that no one here will attempt to justify untoward conduct on the list, although I can imagine that a list member or so will claim that I'm "scolding" folk here. Nonsense. Scold yourself if the uncomfortable shoe fits. Everyone should feel safe and free to express any Peirce-related thoughts that they have in the Peirce e-forum. That is all I'm saying.

So, in a word, enough of blocking the way of inquiry; enough of intolerance.

Sincerely,

Gary Richmond (writing as forum moderator)

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 3:01 PM John F Sowa wrote:

Gary F,

Thank you for a post that doesn't go off the "deep end" by attributing
arguments to Peirce that he never

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-20 Thread Edwina Taborsky

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

1] I disagree with your assertion that Peirce never said that the
triad is a sign. See.. "by 'semiosis' I mean, on the contrary, an
action or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three
subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this
tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions
between pairs...'semeiosis' in Greek of the Roman period, as early as
Cicero's time, if I remember rightly, meant the action of any kind of
sign; and my definition on anything that so acts the title of a
'sign' 5.484. I read that to mean that the title of 'sign' refers to
the semiosic tri-relative action'. My emphasis on the words of
'action' and 'act'. Therefore - I continue to use the term of Sign to
refer to this tri-relative action.

2] My reading of 'the entire universe is perfused with signs, if it
is not composed exclusively of signs' is that the universe is a
continuous semiosic process - of that triad. You, on the other hand,
seem to understand this to mean a reductionism which declares that
All signs are connected and therefore, are ONE sign' - whereas I
understand Peircean semiosis to be a continuous process but not a
material reductionism of its material results.

It's almost like saying that 'The forest is perfused with trees;
therefore, the forest is a tree'.

Therefore although each of your premises might be in itself valid in
its own domain, I consider that putting them together leads to a false
conclusion -especially if we differ on the meaning of the terms
[Sign].

Edwina
On Mon 20/05/19 11:28 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, List:
ET: All dogs are animals/All cats are animals. BOTH these premises
are true. Can I logically then state that All dogs are cats?
No, and why not? Because the conclusion does not follow necessarily
from the premisses; the form of the argumentation is invalid. The
same is true of the other examples below. Now consider a different
one--all dogs are animals, and Rover is a dog; can I logically then
state that Rover is an animal? Yes, because the conclusion does
follow necessarily from the premisses; the form of the argumentation
is valid. My Semeiotic Argumentation has exactly the same form as
the second case, not the first case or any of the others below;
therefore, it is valid, such that the conclusion does follow
necessarily from the premisses.
*Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself = all
dogs are animals, and
*The entire Universe is a Sign = Rover is a dog; therefore,
*The entire Universe is determined by an Object other than itself
= Rover is an animal.

So I suppose that I should have said explicitly what I took to be
obviously implied--for any valid deductive argumentation, the
conclusion is only as strong as the premisses. If one premiss is
false, then the conclusion is false, or at least unwarranted on the
basis of that premiss; e.g., if the entire Universe is not a Sign,
or if Rover is not a dog. However, anyone who affirms all of the
premisses is rationally required to affirm the conclusion, as well.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 8:04 AM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
JAS, list

The problem I have with this claim is that it is invalid.

JAS: As with any logical or mathematical "proof"--i.e., any
deductive argumentation--the conclusion is only as strong as the
premisses. If one premiss is false, then the conclusion is false, or
at least unwarranted on the basis of that premiss; but anyone who
affirms all of the premisses is rationally required to affirm the
conclusion, as well."

For example,

All dogs are animals/All cats are animals. BOTH these premises are
true. Can I logically then state that All dogs are cats?

How about:

The robber wears size 12 boots/ You wear size 12 boots. Both
premises are true. So, YOU are the bank robber.

All plumbers repair sinks/ Henry repaired this sink. [both premises
are true]. So- can we say that Henry is a plumber?

All men are rational animals/No woman is a man. [All true].
Therefore no woman is a rational animal.
And so on...

Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-20 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Edwina, List:

ET:  All dogs are animals/All cats are animals.  BOTH these premises are
true. Can I logically then state that All dogs are cats?

No, and why not?  Because the conclusion *does not* follow necessarily from
the premisses; the *form *of the argumentation is *invalid*.  The same is
true of the other examples below.  Now consider a different one--all dogs
are animals, and Rover is a dog; can I logically then state that Rover is
an animal?  Yes, because the conclusion *does *follow necessarily from the
premisses; the *form *of the argumentation is *valid*.  My Semeiotic
Argumentation has *exactly the same form *as the second case, not the first
case or any of the others below; therefore, it is *valid*, such that the
conclusion *does *follow necessarily from the premisses.

   - Every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself = all dogs are
   animals, and
   - The entire Universe is a Sign = Rover is a dog; therefore,
   - The entire Universe is determined by an Object other than itself =
   Rover is an animal.

So I suppose that I should have said explicitly what I took to be obviously
implied--for any *valid *deductive argumentation, the conclusion is only as
strong as the premisses.  If one premiss is false, then the conclusion is
false, or at least unwarranted on the basis of that premiss; e.g., if the
entire Universe is *not *a Sign, or if Rover is *not *a dog.  However, anyone
who affirms all of the premisses is rationally required to affirm the
conclusion, as well.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 8:04 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, list
>
> The problem I have with this claim is that it is invalid.
>
> JAS:  As with any logical or mathematical "proof"--i.e., any deductive 
> argumentation--the
> conclusion is only as strong as the premisses.  If one premiss is false,
> then the conclusion is false, or at least unwarranted on the basis of
> that premiss; but anyone who affirms all of the premisses is rationally
> required to affirm the conclusion, as well."
>
> For example,
>
> All dogs are animals/All cats are animals.  BOTH these premises are true.
> Can I logically then state that All dogs are cats?
>
> How about:
>
> The robber wears size 12 boots/ You wear size 12 boots. Both premises are
> true. So, YOU are the bank robber.
>
> All plumbers repair sinks/ Henry repaired this sink. [both premises are
> true]. So- can we say that Henry is a plumber?
>
> All men are rational animals/No woman is a man. [All true]. Therefore no
> woman is a rational animal.
>
> And so on...
>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-20 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

The problem I have with this claim is that it is invalid.

JAS:  As with any logical or mathematical "proof"--i.e., any
deductive argumentation--the conclusion is only as strong as the
premisses.  If one premiss is false, then the conclusion is false, or
at least unwarranted on the basis of that premiss; but anyone who
affirms all of the premisses is rationally required to affirm the
conclusion, as well."

For example, 

All dogs are animals/All cats are animals.  BOTH these premises are
true. Can I logically then state that All dogs are cats?

How about:

The robber wears size 12 boots/ You wear size 12 boots. Both
premises are true. So, YOU are the bank robber.

All plumbers repair sinks/ Henry repaired this sink. [both premises
are true]. So- can we say that Henry is a plumber?

All men are rational animals/No woman is a man. [All true].
Therefore no woman is a rational animal.
And so on...
 On Sun 19/05/19 11:09 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 John, List:
 For the record, I have consistently referred to my Semeiotic
Argumentation, and have never--not once--attributed it to Peirce. 
What I have said is that Peirce affirmed each of its premisses, and I
have provided ample evidence from his explicit statements to support
that claim.  Moreover, the only time that I used the word "proof" was
in response to  someone else mentioning "logical proof of the reality
of God," and I put quotation marks around it accordingly.
 JAS:  As with any logical or mathematical "proof"--i.e., any
deductive argumentation--the conclusion is only as strong as the
premisses.  If one premiss is false, then the conclusion is false, or
at least unwarranted on the basis of that premiss; but anyone who
affirms all of the premisses is rationally required to affirm the
conclusion, as well.
 On the other hand, Peirce himself used the word "proof" without such
quotation marks in a passage that I have quoted a couple of times.
 CSP:  ... the discoveries of science, their enabling us to predict
what will be the course of nature, is proof conclusive that, though
we cannot think any thought of God's, we can catch a fragment of His
Thought, as it were. (CP 6.502; c. 1906)
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]  -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
 On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 2:01 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
 Gary F,
 Thank you for a post that doesn't go off the "deep end" by
attributing
 arguments to Peirce that he never stated, implied, ot even hinted.
 GF
 > any knowledge that any mind can have of God must consist of
 > predicates attributed to the real Subject we call “God” —
which
 > name, says Peirce, is different from all other proper names
because
 > it is definable. Every other proper name is an index of an entity
 > who, at some time in some universe of discourse, has existed in
 > some embodied form, and the prerequisite for knowledge of that
 > subject is collateral experience of it.
 I would just add that Peirce also considered proper names, such
 as Hamlet or Napoleon, for which collateral experience with the
 individual is impossible (EP 2:493).  For both of them, our only
 source collateral experience is in what we read or hear.
 The same could be said about God.  For most people, knowledge of
 God comes from the same kind of sources as our knowledge of Hamlet
 or Napoleon.  Even people who can remember any definition from any
 catechism depend mainly on stories they read or heard.
 GF
 > If there is no evidence, no means of testing a hypothesis
 > inductively, there is no knowledge, no matter how fallible
 > or provisional we take it to be.
 Yes.  Jon's so-called proof is a hypothesis about the existence
 and actions of something that conforms to some definition.  The
 same conclusion could be derived by replacing the name 'God' with
 the name of any deity, demiurge, or monster.  Benevolence is not a 
 prerequisite.
 GF
 > I hope that will suffice, and is sufficiently focused on the 
 > semiotic/logical/cognitive issues, because I’d rather not go 
 > any further into theology than I have here.
 I very strongly agree.  And I'll repeat Stephen's point:
 "Enough already."
 John


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'s...@bestweb.net\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-19 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

John, List:

For the record, I have consistently referred to *my* Semeiotic
Argumentation, and have never--*not once*--attributed it to Peirce.  What I
*have* said is that Peirce *affirmed *each of its *premisses*, and I have
provided ample evidence from his *explicit* statements to support that
claim.  Moreover, the only time that I used the word "proof" was in
response to *someone else *mentioning "logical proof of the reality of
God," and I put quotation marks around it accordingly.

JAS:  As with any logical or mathematical "proof"--i.e., any
*deductive *argumentation--the
conclusion is only as strong as the premisses.  If one premiss is false,
then the conclusion is false, or at least unwarranted on the basis of
*that *premiss; but anyone who affirms *all *of the premisses is *rationally
required* to affirm the conclusion, as well.

On the other hand, Peirce himself used the word "proof" *without *such
quotation marks in a passage that I have quoted a couple of times.

CSP:  ... the discoveries of science, their enabling us to *predict *what
will be the course of nature, is proof conclusive that, though we cannot
think any thought of God's, we can catch a fragment of His Thought, as it
were. (CP 6.502; c. 1906)

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 2:01 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Gary F,
>
> Thank you for a post that doesn't go off the "deep end" by attributing
> arguments to Peirce that he never stated, implied, ot even hinted.
>
> GF
> > any knowledge that any mind can have of God must consist of
> > predicates attributed to the real Subject we call “God” — which
> > name, says Peirce, is different from all other proper names because
> > it is definable. Every other proper name is an index of an entity
> > who, at some time in some universe of discourse, has existed in
> > some embodied form, and the prerequisite for knowledge of that
> > subject is collateral experience of it.
>
> I would just add that Peirce also considered proper names, such
> as Hamlet or Napoleon, for which collateral experience with the
> individual is impossible (EP 2:493).  For both of them, our only
> source collateral experience is in what we read or hear.
>
> The same could be said about God.  For most people, knowledge of
> God comes from the same kind of sources as our knowledge of Hamlet
> or Napoleon.  Even people who can remember any definition from any
> catechism depend mainly on stories they read or heard.
>
> GF
> > If there is no evidence, no means of testing a hypothesis
> > inductively, there is no knowledge, no matter how fallible
> > or provisional we take it to be.
>
> Yes.  Jon's so-called proof is a hypothesis about the existence
> and actions of something that conforms to some definition.  The
> same conclusion could be derived by replacing the name 'God' with
> the name of any deity, demiurge, or monster.  Benevolence is not a
> prerequisite.
>
> GF
> > I hope that will suffice, and is sufficiently focused on the
> > semiotic/logical/cognitive issues, because I’d rather not go
> > any further into theology than I have here.
>
> I very strongly agree.  And I'll repeat Stephen's point:
> "Enough already."
>
> John
>

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Re: Tolerance of others in the forum, was, [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-19 Thread Stephen Curtiss Rose

I said the two words you cite and they were repeated but I assume I am the
one addressed. I am deeply sorry where offense has been taken. I regard
every human being as beyond judgment and judging others as a futile and
uncalled for activity.

. Buy 99 cent Kindle books at http://buff.ly/1ulPHlK
 Join KIVA https://buff.ly/2ZSAv83



On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 4:53 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> List,
>
> Again I read, "Enough already."
>
> Indeed. Enough already of blocking the way of inquiry. If you disagree
> with someone's interpretation of something posted to this list, then say so
> and give your reasons. That ought to be sufficient.
>
> If you aren't interested in a threaded topic, don't read in that thread.
> No one's going to miss you.
>
> If you aren't at all interested in what some particular list member has
> to say, delete his or her posts before commenting on them, perhaps even
> before reading them. No one will know or care.
>
> The lack of tolerance that I as list moderator have recently seen here is
> simply not acceptable in this forum. In my view, such a lack of tolerance
> reflects badly on the character of the intolerant person and not at all on
> the person harshly treated.
>
> As Joe Ransdell, the founder of Peirce-L wrote in "How the Forum Works"
> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM
>
> [Forum members expect] that those who are at odds with one another. . . be
> both generous in their tolerance of the other when excess occurs and in
> their readiness to make verbal amends when excess is imputed to them. *When
> in doubt, apologize: you are never diminished by it *[emphasis in the
> original]*.*
>
>
> While I believe some apologies are in order, I don't really expect to see
> them. I do, however, believe that certain folk here should read over *their
> own *recent comments to see if, upon reflection, they think they might
> have shown  intolerance toward the views and/or scholarship of another
> forum member. If the answer is that they do* not* believe that they did,
> then that is that, and there is nothing more to be said. But if the answer
> is that they must admit *to themselves* that they indeed did express some
> intolerance, then that person at least ought to consider if they want to
> see that intolerance (or pique, or insults, etc.) published in perpetuity
> on the Internet as an expression of their character. If not, they should
> simply refrain from conducting themselves in such an inappropriate manner
> in the future. As Ben Udell wrote here over a decade ago, "Peirce-L is a
> salon, not a saloon."
>
> I sincerely hope that no one here will attempt to justify untoward conduct
> on the list, although I can imagine that a list member or so will claim
> that I'm "scolding" folk here. Nonsense. Scold yourself if the
> uncomfortable shoe fits. Everyone should feel safe and free to express any
> Peirce-related thoughts that they have in the Peirce e-forum. That is*
> all* I'm saying.
>
> So, in a word, enough of blocking the way of inquiry; enough of
> intolerance.
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Gary Richmond (writing as forum moderator)
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 3:01 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
>
>> Gary F,
>>
>> Thank you for a post that doesn't go off the "deep end" by attributing
>> arguments to Peirce that he never stated, implied, ot even hinted.
>>
>> GF
>> > any knowledge that any mind can have of God must consist of
>> > predicates attributed to the real Subject we call “God” — which
>> > name, says Peirce, is different from all other proper names because
>> > it is definable. Every other proper name is an index of an entity
>> > who, at some time in some universe of discourse, has existed in
>> > some embodied form, and the prerequisite for knowledge of that
>> > subject is collateral experience of it.
>>
>> I would just add that Peirce also considered proper names, such
>> as Hamlet or Napoleon, for which collateral experience with the
>> individual is impossible (EP 2:493).  For both of them, our only
>> source collateral experience is in what we read or hear.
>>
>> The same could be said about God.  For most people, knowledge of
>> God comes from the same kind of sources as our knowledge of Hamlet
>> or Napoleon.  Even people who can remember any definition from any
>> catechism depend mainly on stories they read or heard.
>>
>> GF
>> > If there is no evidence, no means of testing a hypothesis
>> > inductively, there is no knowledge, no matter how fallible
>> > or provisional we take it to be.
>>
>> Yes.  Jon's so-called proof is a hypothesis about the existence
>> and actions of something that conforms to some definition.  The
>> same conclusion could be derived by replacing the name 'God' with
>> the name of any deity, demiurge, or monster.  Benevolence is not a
>>

Tolerance of others in the forum, was, [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-19 Thread Gary Richmond

List,

Again I read, "Enough already."

Indeed. Enough already of blocking the way of inquiry. If you disagree with
someone's interpretation of something posted to this list, then say so and
give your reasons. That ought to be sufficient.

If you aren't interested in a threaded topic, don't read in that thread. No
one's going to miss you.

If you aren't at all interested in what some particular list member has to
say, delete his or her posts before commenting on them, perhaps even before
reading them. No one will know or care.

The lack of tolerance that I as list moderator have recently seen here is
simply not acceptable in this forum. In my view, such a lack of tolerance
reflects badly on the character of the intolerant person and not at all on
the person harshly treated.

As Joe Ransdell, the founder of Peirce-L wrote in "How the Forum Works"
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM

[Forum members expect] that those who are at odds with one another. . . be
both generous in their tolerance of the other when excess occurs and in
their readiness to make verbal amends when excess is imputed to them. *When
in doubt, apologize: you are never diminished by it *[emphasis in the
original]*.*

While I believe some apologies are in order, I don't really expect to see
them. I do, however, believe that certain folk here should read over *their
own *recent comments to see if, upon reflection, they think they might have
shown  intolerance toward the views and/or scholarship of another forum
member. If the answer is that they do* not* believe that they did, then
that is that, and there is nothing more to be said. But if the answer is
that they must admit *to themselves* that they indeed did express some
intolerance, then that person at least ought to consider if they want to
see that intolerance (or pique, or insults, etc.) published in perpetuity
on the Internet as an expression of their character. If not, they should
simply refrain from conducting themselves in such an inappropriate manner
in the future. As Ben Udell wrote here over a decade ago, "Peirce-L is a
salon, not a saloon."

I sincerely hope that no one here will attempt to justify untoward conduct
on the list, although I can imagine that a list member or so will claim
that I'm "scolding" folk here. Nonsense. Scold yourself if the
uncomfortable shoe fits. Everyone should feel safe and free to express any
Peirce-related thoughts that they have in the Peirce e-forum. That is* all*
I'm saying.

So, in a word, enough of blocking the way of inquiry; enough of
intolerance.

Sincerely,

Gary Richmond (writing as forum moderator)

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 3:01 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Gary F,
>
> Thank you for a post that doesn't go off the "deep end" by attributing
> arguments to Peirce that he never stated, implied, ot even hinted.
>
> GF
> > any knowledge that any mind can have of God must consist of
> > predicates attributed to the real Subject we call “God” — which
> > name, says Peirce, is different from all other proper names because
> > it is definable. Every other proper name is an index of an entity
> > who, at some time in some universe of discourse, has existed in
> > some embodied form, and the prerequisite for knowledge of that
> > subject is collateral experience of it.
>
> I would just add that Peirce also considered proper names, such
> as Hamlet or Napoleon, for which collateral experience with the
> individual is impossible (EP 2:493).  For both of them, our only
> source collateral experience is in what we read or hear.
>
> The same could be said about God.  For most people, knowledge of
> God comes from the same kind of sources as our knowledge of Hamlet
> or Napoleon.  Even people who can remember any definition from any
> catechism depend mainly on stories they read or heard.
>
> GF
> > If there is no evidence, no means of testing a hypothesis
> > inductively, there is no knowledge, no matter how fallible
> > or provisional we take it to be.
>
> Yes.  Jon's so-called proof is a hypothesis about the existence
> and actions of something that conforms to some definition.  The
> same conclusion could be derived by replacing the name 'God' with
> the name of any deity, demiurge, or monster.  Benevolence is not a
> prerequisite.
>
> GF
> > I hope that will suffice, and is sufficiently focused on the
> > semiotic/logical/cognitive issues, because I’d rather not go
> > any further into theology than I have here.
>
> I very strongly agree.  And I'll repeat Stephen's point:
> "Enough already."
>
> John
>

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[PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

2019-05-19 Thread John F Sowa


Gary F,

Thank you for a post that doesn't go off the "deep end" by attributing
arguments to Peirce that he never stated, implied, ot even hinted.

GF

any knowledge that any mind can have of God must consist of
predicates attributed to the real Subject we call “God” — which
name, says Peirce, is different from all other proper names because
it is definable. Every other proper name is an index of an entity
who, at some time in some universe of discourse, has existed in
some embodied form, and the prerequisite for knowledge of that
subject is collateral experience of it.


I would just add that Peirce also considered proper names, such
as Hamlet or Napoleon, for which collateral experience with the
individual is impossible (EP 2:493).  For both of them, our only
source collateral experience is in what we read or hear.

The same could be said about God.  For most people, knowledge of
God comes from the same kind of sources as our knowledge of Hamlet
or Napoleon.  Even people who can remember any definition from any
catechism depend mainly on stories they read or heard.

GF

If there is no evidence, no means of testing a hypothesis
inductively, there is no knowledge, no matter how fallible
or provisional we take it to be.


Yes.  Jon's so-called proof is a hypothesis about the existence
and actions of something that conforms to some definition.  The
same conclusion could be derived by replacing the name 'God' with
the name of any deity, demiurge, or monster.  Benevolence is not a 
prerequisite.


GF
I hope that will suffice, and is sufficiently focused on the 
semiotic/logical/cognitive issues, because I’d rather not go 
any further into theology than I have here.


I very strongly agree.  And I'll repeat Stephen's point:
"Enough already."

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

Re: Tolerance of others in the forum, was, [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

Tolerance of others in the forum, was, [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

[PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric

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