Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, Helmut, List:

I could comment on what I consider to be several fundamental
misunderstandings throughout this exchange, but Gary R. already pointed out
a few of them; so instead, I will simply take the opportunity to illustrate
(and hopefully clarify further) why I am now advocating the notion of
a *General
*Object for every Sign (Type).

The word "dog" is a common noun, which makes it a *term *in traditional
logic, a *Rheme *in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy ("_ is a dog"), and a *Seme *in
his later taxonomies.  As such, the Immediate Interpretant is its
*meaning *within
the Sign System of written English, and the Immediate Object is the *range *of
what a Replica of "dog" *possibly could *denote accordingly to someone with
mere Sign System Acquaintance, consisting entirely of *all *such
definitions and nothing else (Essential Knowledge).

The Dynamic Object is the *individual *that a Replica of "dog" *actually
does* denote to someone with previous Collateral Experience of dogs in a
single concrete Instance of the Sign, which is an *occurrence *that
produces a feeling, exertion, or other Sign-Instance as the Dynamic
Interpretant in accordance with *fallible *Interpretative Habits (Informed
Knowledge).  I agree with Edwina that this only (or at least primarily)
happens when the Replica of the term/Rheme/Seme is *involved* in a Replica
of a proposition/Dicisign/Pheme, such as "Buster is a dog," "Any dog is a
mammal," "This dog is a poodle," "Some dog is black," or even a child
simply pointing at a dog and saying "Dog!"

The General Object is the *collection *of all Real dogs, which is what the
Sign (Type) *necessarily would* denote in the final opinion at the end of
infinite inquiry by an infinite community, corresponding to the Final
Interpretant that *would be* produced in accordance with *infallible
*Interpretative
Habits (Substantial Knowledge).  I disagree with Edwina that this implies
Platonism, because--entirely consistent with Aristotelianism, specifically
Peirce's extreme scholastic realism--the General Object is a Reality that
only *exists* in its members, which are all *particular* dogs.  Likewise,
the Sign (Type) only *exists *in its Replicas; or more precisely, in its
Instances (Tokens).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 3:25 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Helmut, you wrote:
>
> "I think, a specific dog is not the DO of the rheme, but of the dicent the
> rheme is part of, that would be Buster in "Buster is a dog"."
>
> Yes - you have to process the Rhematic Iconic Qualisign further to get the
> specifics, but - the FACT that a rhematic iconic qualisign emerged in your
> sensations - is due to the fact that a dog or something/animal is in the
> room. Your experience of that dog is as a rhematic iconic qualisign, i.e,
> that sensation/feeling of something there..You then process it further -
> and can interpret as 'a dog' and even 'that dog'...
>
> Edwina
>
> On Thu 13/09/18 4:19 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>
> Edwina, list,
>
> I think I agree that the extension is not the DO. I also agree, that, if
> you look very closely at a rheme, it has no object, is just a feeling, like
> what Peirce called "primisense".
> If you look less closely, but say that rheme is the complete sign, then I
> would say, that Peirces "altersense" comes into the game, when this feeling
> picks the connection towards the dog-species and its traits out of the
> interpreter´s memory, being rather a dicent or proposition then, like:
> "This feeling indicates to the dog-species and what I know about it:...".
> When the interpreter starts thinking about the traits of dogs, Peirces
> "medisense" is used too, and it even becomes argumental, like: "A cat is
> not a dog, because it does not bark".
> So perhaps we are merely quibbling about the boundary of the sign, how
> closely you look at it, and whether you separate it into subsigns or not.
> I think, a specific dog is not the DO of the rheme, but of the dicent the
> rheme is part of, that would be Buster in "Buster is a dog".
>
> Best,
> Helmut
> 13. September 2018 um 21:55 Uhr
>  "Edwina Taborsky" wrote:
>
> Helmut, list:
>
> My reference to Platonism was when you suggested that the extension "all
> existing dogs" would be the DO". I would think that a specific dog is the
> DO.
>
> The rhematic iconic qualisign is a pure feeling. In your example of, I
> suppose, a dog being in the room - you might 'feel/smell' something. That's
> an uninterpreted sensation. You'd have to process this sensation further,
> using your habits within the Representamen, to interpret those sensual data
> as 'there's a dog in the room'.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Thu 13/09/18 3:43 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>
> Edwina, list,
>
> I think, that to say the idea transported by the rheme "dog", resp. "is a
> dog" 

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut, you wrote:
 "I think, a specific dog is not the DO of the rheme, but of the
dicent the rheme is part of, that would be Buster in "Buster is a
dog"."

Yes - you have to process the Rhematic Iconic Qualisign further to
get the specifics, but - the FACT that a rhematic iconic qualisign
emerged in your sensations - is due to the fact that a dog or
something/animal is in the room. Your experience of that dog is as a
rhematic iconic qualisign, i.e, that sensation/feeling of something
there..You then process it further - and can interpret as 'a dog' and
even 'that dog'...

Edwina
 On Thu 13/09/18  4:19 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, list,   I think I agree that the extension is not the DO. I
also agree, that, if you look very closely at a rheme, it has no
object, is just a feeling, like what Peirce called "primisense". If
you look less closely, but say that rheme is the complete sign, then
I would say, that Peirces "altersense" comes into the game, when this
feeling picks the connection towards the dog-species and its traits
out of the interpreter´s memory, being rather a dicent or
proposition then, like: "This feeling indicates to the dog-species
and what I know about it:...". When the interpreter starts thinking
about the traits of dogs, Peirces "medisense" is used too, and it
even becomes argumental, like: "A cat is not a dog, because it does
not bark". So perhaps we are merely quibbling about the boundary of
the sign, how closely you look at it, and whether you separate it
into subsigns or not. I think, a specific dog is not the DO of the
rheme, but of the dicent the rheme is part of, that would be Buster
in "Buster is a dog".   Best, Helmut13. September 2018 um 21:55
Uhr
  "Edwina Taborsky"  wrote:
Helmut, list: 

My reference to Platonism was when you suggested that the extension
"all existing dogs" would be the DO". I would think that a specific
dog is the DO. 

The rhematic iconic qualisign is a pure feeling. In your example of,
I suppose, a dog being in the room - you might 'feel/smell' something.
That's an uninterpreted sensation. You'd have to process this
sensation further, using your habits within the Representamen, to
interpret those sensual data as 'there's a dog in the room'. 

Edwina 
 On Thu 13/09/18 3:43 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:   
Edwina, list,   I think, that to say the idea transported by the rheme
"dog", resp. "is a dog" is not platonic, because in this context
"idea" is a secondary thing, out of reflexion, intuition, in any case
out of the memory. For Platon, "idea" however had the reverse meaning:
Not a secondary, but a primordial thing. A ground, not an effect.
Trying to understand your point: Is it so, that a rheme just causes a
pure feeling (e.g. doggishness as an unconnected blur) in the sign,
and the further connection to the dog-species and its qualities is
another sign, a dicent, in which this by-itself-unconnected feeling
picks the remembered meaning of doggishness out of the interpreter´s
memory?   Best, Helmut 13. September 2018 um 20:03 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" wrote:
 Helmut, list 

It depends on what one means by the term 'rheme'. As I understand
it, just the term itself refers to the Interpretant in a mode of
Firstness. Another meaning is 'a proposition with the subject place
left blank'. In both outlines, the key thing is that are no relations
- with an Object, with a Subject, with a Predicate. The point is,
'it', as itself is unrelated to anything else. As such it is pure
feeling without awareness or meaning. It just IS, it's a state.
Isolate. 

Therefore, it is not 3-1 or Thirdness in a mode of Firstness.
Thirdness, after all, is Mind, is habit, and when it is also in a
mode of Firstness, 3-1 is an iconic habit [such as Natural Selection
which privileges icon repetitions of its stored habits]. 

My understanding of the IO is that it is the data - could be in a
mode of 1ns or 2ns or even 3ns- as 'contained' or 'accepted' within
the Quasi-Mind or Sign-Vehicle. That is, in an example where I hear a
loud sound, [I'm the Quasi-Mind or Sign-Vehicle], then the IO is the
data-within-my-unique-hearing-capacities. It would be in a mode of
subsequent 1ns and 2ns. It is not yet interpreted by the
Representamen [my knowledge base], so I don't know yet what that
sound is. It could be a clap of thunder, or a car accident, or the
kitchen cupboard falling off the wall. 

No, I don't think that 'all existing dogs' is the DO in your
example. I don't happen to agree with the argument advanced by JAS
about 'General Objects'. In my view, in your example, if you replaced
the blank space with the dog's name [Buster], then, Buster is the DO.
My view is that generalities function only within the mode of
Thirdness and only within articulation by individual or particular
forms. So, 'dog' as a generality is a reality but doesn't have any
reality 'in 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina, list,

 

I think I agree that the extension is not the DO. I also agree, that, if you look very closely at a rheme, it has no object, is just a feeling, like what Peirce called "primisense".

If you look less closely, but say that rheme is the complete sign, then I would say, that Peirces "altersense" comes into the game, when this feeling picks the connection towards the dog-species and its traits out of the interpreter´s memory, being rather a dicent or proposition then, like: "This feeling indicates to the dog-species and what I know about it:...". When the interpreter starts thinking about the traits of dogs, Peirces "medisense" is used too, and it even becomes argumental, like: "A cat is not a dog, because it does not bark".

So perhaps we are merely quibbling about the boundary of the sign, how closely you look at it, and whether you separate it into subsigns or not.

I think, a specific dog is not the DO of the rheme, but of the dicent the rheme is part of, that would be Buster in "Buster is a dog".

 

Best,

Helmut

 

13. September 2018 um 21:55 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky"  wrote:
 


Helmut, list:

My reference to Platonism was when you suggested that the extension "all existing dogs" would be the DO". I would think that a specific dog is the DO.

The rhematic iconic qualisign is a pure feeling. In your example of, I suppose, a dog being in the room - you might 'feel/smell' something. That's an uninterpreted sensation. You'd have to process this sensation further, using your habits within the Representamen, to interpret those sensual data as 'there's a dog in the room'.

Edwina



 

On Thu 13/09/18 3:43 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




Edwina, list,

 

I think, that to say the idea transported by the rheme "dog", resp. "is a dog" is not platonic, because in this context "idea" is a secondary thing, out of reflexion, intuition, in any case out of the memory. For Platon, "idea" however had the reverse meaning: Not a secondary, but a primordial thing. A ground, not an effect.

Trying to understand your point: Is it so, that a rheme just causes a pure feeling (e.g. doggishness as an unconnected blur) in the sign, and the further connection to the dog-species and its qualities is another sign, a dicent, in which this by-itself-unconnected feeling picks the remembered meaning of doggishness out of the interpreter´s memory?

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 13. September 2018 um 20:03 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" wrote:
 


Helmut, list

It depends on what one means by the term 'rheme'. As I understand it, just the term itself refers to the Interpretant in a mode of Firstness. Another meaning is 'a proposition with the subject place left blank'. In both outlines, the key thing is that are no relations - with an Object, with a Subject, with a Predicate. The point is, 'it', as itself is unrelated to anything else. As such it is pure feeling without awareness or meaning. It just IS, it's a state. Isolate.

Therefore, it is not 3-1 or Thirdness in a mode of Firstness. Thirdness, after all, is Mind, is habit, and when it is also in a mode of Firstness, 3-1 is an iconic habit [such as Natural Selection which privileges icon repetitions of its stored habits].

My understanding of the IO is that it is the data - could be in a mode of 1ns or 2ns or even 3ns- as 'contained' or 'accepted' within the Quasi-Mind or Sign-Vehicle. That is, in an example where I hear a loud sound, [I'm the Quasi-Mind or Sign-Vehicle], then the IO is the data-within-my-unique-hearing-capacities. It would be in a mode of subsequent 1ns and 2ns. It is not yet interpreted by the Representamen [my knowledge base], so I don't know yet what that sound is. It could be a clap of thunder, or a car accident, or the kitchen cupboard falling off the wall.

No, I don't think that 'all existing dogs' is the DO in your example. I don't happen to agree with the argument advanced by JAS about 'General Objects'. In my view, in your example, if you replaced the blank space with the dog's name [Buster], then, Buster is the DO. My view is that generalities function only within the mode of Thirdness and only within articulation by individual or particular forms. So, 'dog' as a generality is a reality but doesn't have any reality 'in itself' - for that would be a movement into Platonic Forms. Instead, 'dog' as a generality is a reality as manifested within particular individual material dogs. This is Aristotelian - and Peirce was an Aristotelian.

Edwina

 

On Thu 13/09/18 12:42 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




Edwina, list,

is a rheme pure firstness, so pure feeling, or is it firstness of thirdness, if one might say, that relation (or reference) to an interpretant is thirdness? So, if it was the quality of mediation, the aroused feeling would adress something. Like, if the rheme is the word "dog", or in the correct sense Francesco has explained, the property or predicate (?) of something that might be replaced with a name "is a dog", 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Helmut Raulien]

 

John, list,

Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same thing, yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object neither is. But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the thing the dynamic object, and the subject the immediate? I would be not happy with saying so, because the dynamic object is the object too.

To solve this problem, as the only way it seems to me to say:

The immediate object is what the sign carries for information about the thing. The dynamic object is not the thing, but the role the thing plays in the sign minus the immediate object. That would be e.g. the knowledge that the thing exists (or doesn´t, like a phenix), and that there is a lot about the thing unknown by the sign´s interpreter/s.

But that would be saying, that the dynamic object is internal to the sign in the way that it is plaing a role for it (has a function), and external, in the way that it is knowledge not shared by the sign´s interpreter´s.

So I think that both, immediate and dynamic object, are not the thing, but its roles or functions within the sign. Unknown knowledge is internal in the way, that, although the knowledge is external, the knowledge that the knowledge is unknown is a function inside the sign.

So the DO is external, but that doesn´t mean that it is not internal. Problem solved, Peirce not contradicted, everybody happy. If only that would be so easy.

Best, Helmut


 07. September 2018 um 16:39 Uhr
"John F Sowa"  wrote:
 

Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,

FB
> "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions" (EP 2:494)

Yes! And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
logicians today. This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
confirm the point I was trying to make: From age 12 to 74, Peirce
was a logician. Every version of logic that he used or invented
had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
and to the most widely used logics today.

Peirce was also a professional lexicographer. Note his letter
to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:

> The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
> same thing, all the ideas that seek _expression_, is the most
> stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
> logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
> man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
> faculty.

Implication: Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
the versions designed by other logicians in various ways. He also
explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
logics, and metalanguage. But his first-order logic was equivalent
to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
first-order logic" today. For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
by Hilary Putnam: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm

When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL. If they
can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.

ET
> I'm trying to emphasize... that Peircean semiotics is not
> expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic
> application to material life.
>
> My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce
> is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since
> Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the
> vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental
> nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism.

I completely agree. But Peirce's logic was constant while his
terminology was changing. Peirce put far more emphasis on mapping
logic to and from perception and action than anyone else. But his
terminology was idiosyncratic. His logic is the foundation for
relating his terminology to any versions in use today.

That foundation is key to bringing Peirce into the 21st century.
Logicians, philosophers, and computer scientists today will never
study Peirce unless we can show exactly how his writings relate
to what they're doing now and what they still need to do.

JAS
> my own purpose in focusing so much on Peirce's concepts and
> terminology in logic as semeiotic is not for its own sake, but
> primarily for the purpose of making our ideas clear.

Yes. That was Peirce's motivation throughout his career. And logic
was always his primary tool, as he said explicitly in 1877.

JAS
> Peirce defined pragmatism as "no attempt to determine any truth
> of things," but rather "merely a method of ascertaining the meanings
> of hard words and of abstract concepts" (CP 5.464, EP 2:400; 1907).

Yes. And remember his comment to Benjamin Smith.

JAS
> no one on the List is advocating "Platonic idealism."
> Why keep bringing it up?

I was citing Peirce's "three universes": possibility, actuality,
and the necessitated. 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Helmut Raulien]

Dear Francesco, list,

 

For understanding the argument with the replacement by a proper name, can you give an example with a rheme, in which the replacement works?

 

Best,

Helmut

 

02. September 2018 um 08:46 Uhr
 "Francesco Bellucci" 
wrote:





Dear All,
 

I am new in this list, so I think I should introduce myself. My name is Francesco Bellucci, I am Assitant Professor at the University of Bologna in Italy, and my principal research interest is in Peirce's logic.

 

Since some of the things which I wrote in my book (Peirce's Speculative Grammar, 2017) have been mentioned in a couple of threads here on Peirce's notion of immediate object, I would like to offer some further thoughts on this matter, in the hope to make some progress in the discussion.

 

One of the bones of contention is whether or not all signs have immediate objects. I think one argument in favour of the idea that not all signs have immediate objects is the fact – which has drawn little attention – that in the classification of signs of the period 1904–1906 (let's postpone discussion of 1908 for the moment) signs are divided according to their immediate object into vague, singular, and general. Now, the vague/singular/general division is, as Peirce sometimes says (Kaina Stoicheia) and as should be evident to those who know a little bit of the history of logic, a division of propositions according to their quantity: Peirce calls "vague" the proposition which traditionally is called particular (some men is wise), and "general" the proposition which traditionally is called universal (all men are wise). That the vague/singular/general division is a propositional division should suggest that in the phrase "signs divided according to their immediate object into...", we should take "sign" to mean "proposition". I think there has been some good posts in this list by Gary F. arguing that sometimes we should take "sign" to mean "proposition", or "complete sign", or at least that with "sign" we should sometimes mean what Peirce considered the "principal variety of signs", i.e. propositions.

 

Now, if the vague/singular/general division is a propositional division, then rhemes should not be capable of being divided according to their immediate objects. If the vague/singular/general division were applicable to rhemes, then I think we should conclude that "all men" is a rheme (a "general" rheme). For what does it mean that a trichotomy is applicable to a genus of signs, if not that that genus of signs has species corresponding to the members of that trichotomy? Thus I think that the supporters of the idea that all signs have immediate objects are forced to conclude that "all men" is a rheme. 

 

But here is an argument why "all men" cannot be a rheme. Peirce defines a rheme as that which remains of a proposition after something replaceable by a proper name has been removed from it, where "replacebale" means that when the replacement has occurred, we have again a proposition. Thus, if "all men" is a rheme, there must exist a proposition from which it has been extracted by removing something replaceable by a proper name. Let us imagine that "all men" has been extracted from the proposition "all men are mortal" by removing "are mortal". If we replace the removed part with a proper name, like "Hamlet", this does not yield again a proposition: "all men Hamlet". From this I conclude that "all men" is not a rheme. And since the only justification I can imagine for calling "all men" a rheme is that this would allow us to extend the vague/singular/general distinction to all signs, I conclude that this extension is unjustified.

 

Let me also ask a question about the following observation made by Jon:

 
"a Sign denotes its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), signifies some of that Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken together, constitute its Immediate Object--and determines its Interpretants to represent the unity of Matter and Form (Entelechy/3ns)"

 

If the Object's characters taken together constitute the Immediate Object of the Sign, what does it mean that such Immediate Object can be vague, singular, or general? Let's suppose the Sign mentioned here is the proposition "Halmet is mad". According to Jon, the Sign denotes the Dynamic Object (arguably, Hamlet), and signifies one of the Object's characters (arguably, his madness). Is this character vague, general, or singular? Can you provide examples of three propositions (which, arguably, are Signs) in one of which the character/Immediate Object is vague, in another is general, and in the third is singular? And can you provide an example of a proposition in which the characters signified are, taken together, singular?

 

Best,

Francesco

 

 

 



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Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

 



 
 

Suppsuppsupp: Sorry, that this is becoming a monologue, this will be the last part of it.

Instead of "imaginary" in the initial post, I think, that "ideational" is better, and it is not limited to the immediate object, which contains only the ideas transported by the sign. The DO too has an ideational part, the ideas in the world outside the sign.

I wrote "really complicated", but maybe too, not:

A function is a kind of relation. Relations are there or not, they dont unfold, they dont take time. But a relation (so a function too) is a being, something ontological, too (John Deely said so). It can arouse another function: A function of a function. This is a time-taking process again, and as a being, the first function is part of the spatiotemporal world. This process has to do with, or is,  information. After all, every being is a function-that-is: Matter, e.g., is effete mind (Peirce), and mind is function or something like that. Instaead of "mattergy-world" I should have written "matter-energy-informedness-world". It includes functions-as-beings, but not functions-as-functioning, the part of theirs which does not exist, but is real. In German "reality" means "Wirklichkeit", which by regarding the word parts would mean (though not in the common use of the word) "effectliness": Not the things, but their effects. All this has very much to do with scopes and scales.



 

Suppsupp: And between spatiotemporal and functional composition. Time is merely a matter of spatiotemporal composition. Functions are instants not taking time, having nothing to do with time. Bridging the gap takes time due to the spatiotemporal side of the gap. It looks like a sign process would take time, but it doesnt. What is taking time is its constant (not continuous) reaffirmation towards or from the mattergy world.

All this gap-talk sounds like dualism, but only because it is crude. To uncrudify and undualize it would make it really complicated.


Supp.: So the epistemic gap, pansemiotically generalized, is the gap between existence (being) and reality, thing and its function, mattergy-world and phaneron.




List,

One way that would make sense to me would be: Determination as a time-taking process is the shaping (indicating by limiting) of an object by a subject. When this process is finished, the sign is there and denotes the object. The subject is a being, and the object is a wordly real (dynamical) and an imaginary real (immediate). Being means that the subject exists, and real means that it functions (as an object). "Object" is the fuction of a subject in a sign, and (functionally) consists of dynamical and immediate object. 

In a function there is no time delay, only in the forming of a function (of reality being shaped or formed by being).

To say that the subject determines the object means that it determines the sign via the object, as the object is a (functional) part of the sign. I guess that Peirce did not sufficiently distinguish between the subject and the dynamical object, or did not explicitly say that the object is not the thing but its function. Or maybe I am completey wrong, but this way makes the most sense to me.

Best,

Helmut

 

29. Juni 2018 um 13:31 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Jon,

No, I haven’t found an instance of Peirce using “evolve” or “evolution” (or “involution”) in this kind of technical sense when discussing semeiotic. In fact, I’ve only found one place where he uses the verb “evolve” at all after 1903, and that one (in the “Neglected Argument” of 1908) puts it in quotation marks:

[[ The student, applying to his own trained habits of research the art of logical analysis,—an art as elaborate and methodical as that of the chemical analyst,—compares the process of thought of the Muser upon the Three Universes with certain parts of the work of scientific discovery, and finds that the “Humble Argument” is nothing but an instance of the first stage of all such work, the stage of observing the facts, of variously rearranging them, and of pondering them until, by their reactions with the results of previous scientific experience, there is “evolved” (as the chemists word it), an explanatory hypothesis. ]]

However, Peirce often refers to the “growth” and “development” of signs (more specifically, symbols), and this is clearly a process that takes time, like the process of “evolution” in our usual current sense of that word. “Involvement” on the other hand is not a process but a relation we discover by analysis. Peirce’s semeiotic trichotomies (three of them in 1903, ten in 1908) are all arrived at by analysis, and that analysis — including the order of elements in each — is based on the phenomenological categories. The problem is, how does the order of determination relate to the analysis that produces the trichotomies? Is determination a process that takes time, and does the time it takes have a single direction like experienced (phenomenological) time? If so, then we have a 

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 
 


 

Suppsupp: And between spatiotemporal and functional composition. Time is merely a matter of spatiotemporal composition. Functions are instants not taking time, having nothing to do with time. Bridging the gap takes time due to the spatiotemporal side of the gap. It looks like a sign process would take time, but it doesnt. What is taking time is its constant (not continuous) reaffirmation towards or from the mattergy world.

All this gap-talk sounds like dualism, but only because it is crude. To uncrudify and undualize it would make it really complicated.


Supp.: So the epistemic gap, pansemiotically generalized, is the gap between existence (being) and reality, thing and its function, mattergy-world and phaneron.




List,

One way that would make sense to me would be: Determination as a time-taking process is the shaping (indicating by limiting) of an object by a subject. When this process is finished, the sign is there and denotes the object. The subject is a being, and the object is a wordly real (dynamical) and an imaginary real (immediate). Being means that the subject exists, and real means that it functions (as an object). "Object" is the fuction of a subject in a sign, and (functionally) consists of dynamical and immediate object. 

In a function there is no time delay, only in the forming of a function (of reality being shaped or formed by being).

To say that the subject determines the object means that it determines the sign via the object, as the object is a (functional) part of the sign. I guess that Peirce did not sufficiently distinguish between the subject and the dynamical object, or did not explicitly say that the object is not the thing but its function. Or maybe I am completey wrong, but this way makes the most sense to me.

Best,

Helmut

 

29. Juni 2018 um 13:31 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Jon,

No, I haven’t found an instance of Peirce using “evolve” or “evolution” (or “involution”) in this kind of technical sense when discussing semeiotic. In fact, I’ve only found one place where he uses the verb “evolve” at all after 1903, and that one (in the “Neglected Argument” of 1908) puts it in quotation marks:

[[ The student, applying to his own trained habits of research the art of logical analysis,—an art as elaborate and methodical as that of the chemical analyst,—compares the process of thought of the Muser upon the Three Universes with certain parts of the work of scientific discovery, and finds that the “Humble Argument” is nothing but an instance of the first stage of all such work, the stage of observing the facts, of variously rearranging them, and of pondering them until, by their reactions with the results of previous scientific experience, there is “evolved” (as the chemists word it), an explanatory hypothesis. ]]

However, Peirce often refers to the “growth” and “development” of signs (more specifically, symbols), and this is clearly a process that takes time, like the process of “evolution” in our usual current sense of that word. “Involvement” on the other hand is not a process but a relation we discover by analysis. Peirce’s semeiotic trichotomies (three of them in 1903, ten in 1908) are all arrived at by analysis, and that analysis — including the order of elements in each — is based on the phenomenological categories. The problem is, how does the order of determination relate to the analysis that produces the trichotomies? Is determination a process that takes time, and does the time it takes have a single direction like experienced (phenomenological) time? If so, then we have a problem trying to map the order of determination onto an analytical classification of signs. This may explain apparent anomalies such as the fact that the Object determines the Sign, yet Peirce in one place says that the immediate object determines the sign. This is the kind of thing I was driving at with my distinction between “analytical” and “synechistic” approaches to semeiotic questions.

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: 28-Jun-18 20:41
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

 


Jeff, Gary F., List:


 



When I see the word "involve" or "involution" in a conversation about Peirce, I tend to think of how he used those terms with respect to his Categories--3ns involves 2ns, which involves 1ns.  In the context of semeiotic, this applies across each of the trichotomies--Necessitants involve Existents, which involve Possibles--rather than from one trichotomy to another, which is where the order of determination governs (cf. EP 2:481; 1908).  Specifically, according to NDTR (EP 2:291-297; 1903) ...




	Legisigns (indirectly) and Sinsigns (directly) involve Qualisigns.
	Symbols involve Indices, which involve Icons (restated in "New Elements," EP 2:318; 1904).
	Arguments involve Dicisigns, which involve
	 Rhemes.




Peirce went on to extend this notion to some of the ten classes of Signs--Rhematic Indexical Sinsigns and 

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Supp.: So the epistemic gap, pansemiotically generalized, is the gap between existence (being) and reality, thing and its function, mattergy-world and phaneron.




List,

One way that would make sense to me would be: Determination as a time-taking process is the shaping (indicating by limiting) of an object by a subject. When this process is finished, the sign is there and denotes the object. The subject is a being, and the object is a wordly real (dynamical) and an imaginary real (immediate). Being means that the subject exists, and real means that it functions (as an object). "Object" is the fuction of a subject in a sign, and (functionally) consists of dynamical and immediate object. 

In a function there is no time delay, only in the forming of a function (of reality being shaped or formed by being).

To say that the subject determines the object means that it determines the sign via the object, as the object is a (functional) part of the sign. I guess that Peirce did not sufficiently distinguish between the subject and the dynamical object, or did not explicitly say that the object is not the thing but its function. Or maybe I am completey wrong, but this way makes the most sense to me.

Best,

Helmut

 

29. Juni 2018 um 13:31 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Jon,

No, I haven’t found an instance of Peirce using “evolve” or “evolution” (or “involution”) in this kind of technical sense when discussing semeiotic. In fact, I’ve only found one place where he uses the verb “evolve” at all after 1903, and that one (in the “Neglected Argument” of 1908) puts it in quotation marks:

[[ The student, applying to his own trained habits of research the art of logical analysis,—an art as elaborate and methodical as that of the chemical analyst,—compares the process of thought of the Muser upon the Three Universes with certain parts of the work of scientific discovery, and finds that the “Humble Argument” is nothing but an instance of the first stage of all such work, the stage of observing the facts, of variously rearranging them, and of pondering them until, by their reactions with the results of previous scientific experience, there is “evolved” (as the chemists word it), an explanatory hypothesis. ]]

However, Peirce often refers to the “growth” and “development” of signs (more specifically, symbols), and this is clearly a process that takes time, like the process of “evolution” in our usual current sense of that word. “Involvement” on the other hand is not a process but a relation we discover by analysis. Peirce’s semeiotic trichotomies (three of them in 1903, ten in 1908) are all arrived at by analysis, and that analysis — including the order of elements in each — is based on the phenomenological categories. The problem is, how does the order of determination relate to the analysis that produces the trichotomies? Is determination a process that takes time, and does the time it takes have a single direction like experienced (phenomenological) time? If so, then we have a problem trying to map the order of determination onto an analytical classification of signs. This may explain apparent anomalies such as the fact that the Object determines the Sign, yet Peirce in one place says that the immediate object determines the sign. This is the kind of thing I was driving at with my distinction between “analytical” and “synechistic” approaches to semeiotic questions.

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: 28-Jun-18 20:41
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

 


Jeff, Gary F., List:


 



When I see the word "involve" or "involution" in a conversation about Peirce, I tend to think of how he used those terms with respect to his Categories--3ns involves 2ns, which involves 1ns.  In the context of semeiotic, this applies across each of the trichotomies--Necessitants involve Existents, which involve Possibles--rather than from one trichotomy to another, which is where the order of determination governs (cf. EP 2:481; 1908).  Specifically, according to NDTR (EP 2:291-297; 1903) ...




	Legisigns (indirectly) and Sinsigns (directly) involve Qualisigns.
	Symbols involve Indices, which involve Icons (restated in "New Elements," EP 2:318; 1904).
	Arguments involve Dicisigns, which involve
	 Rhemes.




Peirce went on to extend this notion to some of the ten classes of Signs--Rhematic Indexical Sinsigns and Dicent Sinsigns involve Iconic Sinsigns, Dicent Indexical Legisigns involve Iconic Legisigns, and Dicent Symbols involve Rhematic Symbols.  On the other hand, no passages come to mind where Peirce used "evolve" or "evolution" in this kind of technical sense when discussing semeiotic; are there any?



 



Regards,



 







Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA









- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Helmut Raulien]

List,

One way that would make sense to me would be: Determination as a time-taking process is the shaping (indicating by limiting) of an object by a subject. When this process is finished, the sign is there and denotes the object. The subject is a being, and the object is a wordly real (dynamical) and an imaginary real (immediate). Being means that the subject exists, and real means that it functions (as an object). "Object" is the fuction of a subject in a sign, and (functionally) consists of dynamical and immediate object. 

In a function there is no time delay, only in the forming of a function (of reality being shaped or formed by being).

To say that the subject determines the object means that it determines the sign via the object, as the object is a (functional) part of the sign. I guess that Peirce did not sufficiently distinguish between the subject and the dynamical object, or did not explicitly say that the object is not the thing but its function. Or maybe I am completey wrong, but this way makes the most sense to me.

Best,

Helmut

 

29. Juni 2018 um 13:31 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Jon,

No, I haven’t found an instance of Peirce using “evolve” or “evolution” (or “involution”) in this kind of technical sense when discussing semeiotic. In fact, I’ve only found one place where he uses the verb “evolve” at all after 1903, and that one (in the “Neglected Argument” of 1908) puts it in quotation marks:

[[ The student, applying to his own trained habits of research the art of logical analysis,—an art as elaborate and methodical as that of the chemical analyst,—compares the process of thought of the Muser upon the Three Universes with certain parts of the work of scientific discovery, and finds that the “Humble Argument” is nothing but an instance of the first stage of all such work, the stage of observing the facts, of variously rearranging them, and of pondering them until, by their reactions with the results of previous scientific experience, there is “evolved” (as the chemists word it), an explanatory hypothesis. ]]

However, Peirce often refers to the “growth” and “development” of signs (more specifically, symbols), and this is clearly a process that takes time, like the process of “evolution” in our usual current sense of that word. “Involvement” on the other hand is not a process but a relation we discover by analysis. Peirce’s semeiotic trichotomies (three of them in 1903, ten in 1908) are all arrived at by analysis, and that analysis — including the order of elements in each — is based on the phenomenological categories. The problem is, how does the order of determination relate to the analysis that produces the trichotomies? Is determination a process that takes time, and does the time it takes have a single direction like experienced (phenomenological) time? If so, then we have a problem trying to map the order of determination onto an analytical classification of signs. This may explain apparent anomalies such as the fact that the Object determines the Sign, yet Peirce in one place says that the immediate object determines the sign. This is the kind of thing I was driving at with my distinction between “analytical” and “synechistic” approaches to semeiotic questions.

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: 28-Jun-18 20:41
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

 


Jeff, Gary F., List:


 



When I see the word "involve" or "involution" in a conversation about Peirce, I tend to think of how he used those terms with respect to his Categories--3ns involves 2ns, which involves 1ns.  In the context of semeiotic, this applies across each of the trichotomies--Necessitants involve Existents, which involve Possibles--rather than from one trichotomy to another, which is where the order of determination governs (cf. EP 2:481; 1908).  Specifically, according to NDTR (EP 2:291-297; 1903) ...




	Legisigns (indirectly) and Sinsigns (directly) involve Qualisigns.
	Symbols involve Indices, which involve Icons (restated in "New Elements," EP 2:318; 1904).
	Arguments involve Dicisigns, which involve
	 Rhemes.




Peirce went on to extend this notion to some of the ten classes of Signs--Rhematic Indexical Sinsigns and Dicent Sinsigns involve Iconic Sinsigns, Dicent Indexical Legisigns involve Iconic Legisigns, and Dicent Symbols involve Rhematic Symbols.  On the other hand, no passages come to mind where Peirce used "evolve" or "evolution" in this kind of technical sense when discussing semeiotic; are there any?



 



Regards,



 







Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA









- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, list,

I doubt that the object is the meaning of the sign. I think, that meaning is something  having to do with the sign process that produces it (meaning) more and more. So perhaps it is rather the interpretant, but the interpretant mostly becomes a new sign, and as such contributes to it (to meaning) in the following sign. So meaning is not something definite, denoted, but something like a work in progress, I guess, something that is produced (or sometimes even annihilated) on and on. At least in the Peircean context it is so, I think. In Ogden/Richard´s  it is different.

Denotation too is not a one way thing, as it would be if you would say, that the sign would denote the subject. It denotes the object, but the object is an object because of the sign, being then a part of it´s. Otherwise it would be just a subject, like it was before. So denotation is a fetching process: Not an arrow, but an arrow with two tips, like give and take.

Determination is something else again. It is like an arrow with one tip, but I think it should not be overestimated, because I guess it is just a special technical term for a limited nonsemiotic sub-causality having to do rather with spatiotemporality than with function.

Best, Helmut

 

 23. Juni 2018 um 23:31 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
 


Gary F., List:
 

Of course I have read Bellucci's book (very recently) and paper (several months ago).  My objection is to your insistence on the shorthand of characterizing my (and Gary R.'s) position as a "Fregean interpretation," since (as I said before) I do not know anything about Frege's views on these matters or how they are relevant to Peirce's views, other than what Bellucci claims.

 


In any case, Bellucci is clearly incorrect--at least from a Peircean standpoint--when he states that a Sign "signifies its interpretant."  On the contrary ...

 




CSP:  Thus, while the complete Object of a Symbol, that is to say, its meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must denote an individual, and must signify a character. A genuine Symbol is a Symbol that has a general meaning. There are two kinds of degenerate Symbols, the Singular Symbol whose Object is an existent individual, and which signifies only such characters as that individual may realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose only Object is a character. (EP 2:275; 1903)


 



CSP:  The word signify has been the regular technical term since the twelfth century, when John of Salisbury (Metalogicus, II, xx) spoke of "quod fere in omnium ore celebre est, aliud scilicet esse quod appellativa [i.e., adjectives] significant, et aliud esse quod nominant. Nominantur singularia [i.e., existent individual things and facts], sed universalia [i.e., Firstnesses] signifcantur." (EP 2:281n; 1903)




 



CSP:  In addition however to denoting objects, every sign sufficiently complete [there is that phrase again] signifies characters, or qualities ... Every sign signifies the "Truth." But it is only the Aristotelian Form of the universe that it signifies. (EP 2:304; 1904).


 



CSP:  It will be observed that the icon is very perfect in respect to signification, bringing its interpreter face to face with the very character signified ... An icon is a sign fit to be used as such because it possesses the quality signified. (EP 2:307; 1904)


 

I thus side with Mats Bergman on this issue.  As I have summarized before, a Sign denotes its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), signifies some of that Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken together, constitute its Immediate Object--and determines its Interpretants to represent the unity of Matter and Form (Entelechy/3ns).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt





 

On Sat, Jun 23, 2018 at 11:43 AM,  wrote:




Jon,

As I said before, “Fregean interpretation” is Bellucci’s label for your position, which I assumed you were already familiar with. Whether it should be called “pejorative” or not, I don’t know. Here is his note on the subject from Peirce’s Speculative Grammar (p. 350):

[[ Peirce's distinction between the immediate and the dynamic object of a sign has often been taken to account for something similar to the Fregean distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung, and accordingly it has been assumed that the immediate object should have something to do with the “meaning” or “sense” of a sign. For a criticism of this interpretation see Bellucci (2015c). Here I can observe that, as Peirce explains to Lady Welby, “signification is only one of the two chief functions of signs; as the elegant and correct John of Salisbury notices, in referring to ‘quod £ere in omnium ore celebre est, aliud scilicet esse quod appellativa significant, et aliud esse quod nominant. Nominantur singularia, sed universalia significantur’” (RL 463 ISP 148). A sign both denotes and connotes, nominat 

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Supplement: Though a term is just a rheme. I was thinking, how can be claimed that rhemes donot have an IO, as in my view all signs have all functional parts. My guess now is, that, as rhemes are neither true or false, there may be no big or no difference between the IO and the II. If this was so, my opinion would be, that you dont need say that one of them doesnt exist, just because they are alike.




List,

I was just thinking about the german term "Begriff". I think in English it is something between "concept" and "term", or both. It has an intension and an extension. Now my question: To compare it with the Peircean sign, might we say, that the immediate object is intension, and the dynamical extension? But also, that intension and extension are more, because the immediate interpretant too belongs to the intension (the intension of the meaning), and the dynamical interpretant belongs to the Begriff´s extension (the extension of its meaning), and the final interpretant is something like the assumed proper meaning?

But I guess, that "Begriff" is something more general, like a type, and a sign a certain application of its, like a token. So immediate object and immediate interpretant would be only a small subset of the "Begriff´s" intension?

Best,

Helmut

 

23. Juni 2018 um 15:32 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:




Jeff,

Thanks for drawing attention to the very important point that understanding any one of Peirce’s distinctions has to involve understanding his reasons for making them in the first place. This is a major virtue of Bellucci’s book on speculative grammar, which follows his development chronologically.

The question of how the immediate object of a sign in Peirce’s late speculative grammar is related to the “immediate object of thought” in Peirce’s 1871 review is an interesting one. Certainly the “doctrine of immediate perception” is crucial to his early realism, and is closely related to his concept of “direct experience” which I posted about in the message that started this thread. Bellucci throws some light on the terminology by quoting this bit from Peirce’s Logic Notebook: “I use the terms immediate and direct, not according to their etymologies but so that to say that A is immediate to B means that it is present in B” (R 339 DDR 243v). 

The question then is: What’s the connection — and the difference — between “being in the mind” and being in the sign, or being part of the sign, as Peirce’s immediate object definitely is (in a way that the dynamic object is not).

In the light of all this I’ve been taking a critical look at the way I dealt with these philosophical issues in Turning Signs; as usual, I’m finding that a closer look at how Peirce deals with them is very helpful for that purpose. But at this point I don’t think i have anything new to contribute to Peirce scholarship on these issues; and as for my book, it speaks for itself.

Gary f.

 



From: Jeffrey Brian Downard 
Sent: 23-Jun-18 01:16
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object



 


Hello,

 

Thus far in this ongoing discussion about the nature of immediate object, considerable attention has been paid to the question of what passages support one or another interpretation of Peirce's account and how those passages ought to be read. I'm wondering if we might make some progress by also considering the reasons that seemed to be guiding Peirce when he developed the distinctions between the two different kinds of objects and the three different kinds of interpretants. If we pay attention to the reasons that seemed to be controlling in the development of the distinctions, can an argument be given--for or against--one or another line of interpretation? Or, can an argument be given for or against one or another way of developing and interpreting these conceptions within the context of the semiotic theory?

 

The aim of a theory of critical logic is to explain what is essential for abductive, deductive and inductive arguments to be valid. The aim of a speculative grammar is to explain what is essential for any kind of sign to have a significant character. Taking these two related aims in mind, why is the conception of the immediate object essential for the further development--by Peirce or by us--of a pragmatically oriented semiotic theory? Peirce is not the kind of philosopher who theorizes in a vacuum. Rather, he sees a need to develop hypothetical explanations that engage with other leading theorists on disputed questions. So, consider what he says in his review of Fraser's edition of the works of Berkeley:

 

This realistic theory is thus a highly practical and common-sense position. Wherever universal agreement prevails, the realist will not be the one to disturb the general belief by idle and fictitious doubts. For according to him it is a consensus or common confession which constitutes reality. What he wants, therefore, is to see questions put to rest. And if a general belief, 

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Helmut Raulien]

List,

I was just thinking about the german term "Begriff". I think in English it is something between "concept" and "term", or both. It has an intension and an extension. Now my question: To compare it with the Peircean sign, might we say, that the immediate object is intension, and the dynamical extension? But also, that intension and extension are more, because the immediate interpretant too belongs to the intension (the intension of the meaning), and the dynamical interpretant belongs to the Begriff´s extension (the extension of its meaning), and the final interpretant is something like the assumed proper meaning?

But I guess, that "Begriff" is something more general, like a type, and a sign a certain application of its, like a token. So immediate object and immediate interpretant would be only a small subset of the "Begriff´s" intension?

Best,

Helmut

 

23. Juni 2018 um 15:32 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:




Jeff,

Thanks for drawing attention to the very important point that understanding any one of Peirce’s distinctions has to involve understanding his reasons for making them in the first place. This is a major virtue of Bellucci’s book on speculative grammar, which follows his development chronologically.

The question of how the immediate object of a sign in Peirce’s late speculative grammar is related to the “immediate object of thought” in Peirce’s 1871 review is an interesting one. Certainly the “doctrine of immediate perception” is crucial to his early realism, and is closely related to his concept of “direct experience” which I posted about in the message that started this thread. Bellucci throws some light on the terminology by quoting this bit from Peirce’s Logic Notebook: “I use the terms immediate and direct, not according to their etymologies but so that to say that A is immediate to B means that it is present in B” (R 339 DDR 243v). 

The question then is: What’s the connection — and the difference — between “being in the mind” and being in the sign, or being part of the sign, as Peirce’s immediate object definitely is (in a way that the dynamic object is not).

In the light of all this I’ve been taking a critical look at the way I dealt with these philosophical issues in Turning Signs; as usual, I’m finding that a closer look at how Peirce deals with them is very helpful for that purpose. But at this point I don’t think i have anything new to contribute to Peirce scholarship on these issues; and as for my book, it speaks for itself.

Gary f.

 



From: Jeffrey Brian Downard 
Sent: 23-Jun-18 01:16
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object



 


Hello,

 

Thus far in this ongoing discussion about the nature of immediate object, considerable attention has been paid to the question of what passages support one or another interpretation of Peirce's account and how those passages ought to be read. I'm wondering if we might make some progress by also considering the reasons that seemed to be guiding Peirce when he developed the distinctions between the two different kinds of objects and the three different kinds of interpretants. If we pay attention to the reasons that seemed to be controlling in the development of the distinctions, can an argument be given--for or against--one or another line of interpretation? Or, can an argument be given for or against one or another way of developing and interpreting these conceptions within the context of the semiotic theory?

 

The aim of a theory of critical logic is to explain what is essential for abductive, deductive and inductive arguments to be valid. The aim of a speculative grammar is to explain what is essential for any kind of sign to have a significant character. Taking these two related aims in mind, why is the conception of the immediate object essential for the further development--by Peirce or by us--of a pragmatically oriented semiotic theory? Peirce is not the kind of philosopher who theorizes in a vacuum. Rather, he sees a need to develop hypothetical explanations that engage with other leading theorists on disputed questions. So, consider what he says in his review of Fraser's edition of the works of Berkeley:

 

This realistic theory is thus a highly practical and common-sense position. Wherever universal agreement prevails, the realist will not be the one to disturb the general belief by idle and fictitious doubts. For according to him it is a consensus or common confession which constitutes reality. What he wants, therefore, is to see questions put to rest. And if a general belief, which is perfectly stable and immovable, can in any way be produced, though it be by the fagot and the rack, to talk of any error in such belief is utterly absurd. The realist will hold that the very same objects which are immediately present in our minds in experience really exist just as they are experienced out of the mind; that is, he will maintain a doctrine of immediate perception. He will not, 

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Sorry, Gary, not Gray! In the second entry he also writes: "In respect to its immediate object a sign may either be a sign of a quality, of an existent, or of a law." Does that not mean qualisign, sinsign, legisign?




Gray, list,

by having looked at the entries about the catchword "immediate object" in Commens dictionary, I donot see a reason to believe that for Peirce rhemes donot have one. In one place he writes that "many signs" have one, but mostly he writes "signs", even "every sign" has an immediate object. Why should the object as cognized in the sign, the idea, not be conveyed with a rheme? I guess it is merely more "vague", I would prefer "general", than with a proposition.

Best,

Helmut

 

 22. Juni 2018 um 17:46 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Jon, list,

Jon, I’m well aware that your “understanding is that what a Sign signifies are certain qualities/characters of its Dynamic Object, which taken together constitute its Immediate Object.” But I’m only interested in continuing this dialogue if we can base it on Peirce’s definition of the Immediate Object — not yours. The problem I have with yours is that you take it as definitive of the IO that “every sign” has one — including rhematic signs. But I have yet to see any text where Peirce refers explicitly to the immediate object of any rhematic sign. As Bellucci says (even in the paragraph you quoted from him!) only dicisigns are said by Peirce to have immediate objects, because a dicisign has two objects by definition.

Please review the Commens Dictionary entry for the IO (http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/immediate-object). (That was your serve, as it were, but I’m now returning it to your court.) Peirce’s definitions of the IO are stated there quite clearly, and I don’t think I need to repeat them again. But you’ve apparently paid attention only to the quotes in that entry that you can interpret as confirmations of your prior “understanding.” I think that’s a problem when your prior understanding becomes the basis of your definition.

Originally you said that “Peirce explicitly stated on multiple occasions that every Sign has an Immediate Object.” Now you admit that the “multiple occasions” are down to two; and those two are both excerpted from manuscript sources which, to my knowledge, have not been published. I haven’t seen those manuscripts (have you?) to ascertain what context those quotes were taken out of. I think this matters, because Peirce’s usage of the term “sign” — and thus of “every sign” — varies with the context in which he’s using it.

One obvious case in point is Kaina Stoicheia (KS). For instance, those “signs” which are designated as “sinsigns” in the 1903 Syllabus (and elsewhere) are excluded from the universe of “signs” in KS, by Peirce’s statement that “In the first place, a sign is not a real thing” (EP2:303). Also, KS declares itself to be a “scholium” (EP2:303); and “It is the Proposition which forms the main subject of this whole scholium” (EP2:311). In this scholium, Peirce often uses the word “sign” where the reference is to propositions, as we can see from the examples and the analysis he gives of these “signs.” For example (EP2:303-4):

[[ The sentence “Roxana was the queen of Alexander” is a sign of Roxana and of Alexander, and though there is a grammatical emphasis on the former, logically the name “Alexander” is as much a subject as is the name “Roxana”; and the real persons Roxana and Alexander are real objects of the sign. Every sign that is sufficiently complete refers to sundry real objects. ]]

In the context of KS, it’s clear that Peirce has propositional signs in mind in the sentence which begins “Every sign.” For all we know, the same may be true of his usage of “every sign” in the two quotes in the Commens entry where that phrase occurs. After all, Peirce was a logician, and logicians give most of their attention to propositions and arguments; Peirce’s “speculative grammar” is a branch of logic as semiotic, and his taxonomy (including the distinction between dynamic and immediate objects) is part of his speculative grammar. He quite naturally and often uses the terms “sign” and “symbol” as shorthand for the kind of sign that logicians are traditionally concerned with. That’s one reason why it’s unwise to ignore the context in which Peirce uses the word “sign” — and why there is no need to cite an “occasion where Peirce stated explicitly that only propositions have IOs.” It’s quite enough to see that everything Peirce does say about IOs is in a context of which the subject is propositions (or other dicisigns). You’re welcome to give a counter-example to that if you can.

Two of Peirce’s important innovations in logic are (1) his division of objects into dynamic and immediate (1904), and (2) his 1903 recasting of the term/proposition/argument trichotomy, which was a division of symbols, into the rheme/dicisign/argument trichotomy, where neither rhemes nor dicisigns are necessarily symbols. 

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Helmut Raulien]

Gray, list,

by having looked at the entries about the catchword "immediate object" in Commens dictionary, I donot see a reason to believe that for Peirce rhemes donot have one. In one place he writes that "many signs" have one, but mostly he writes "signs", even "every sign" has an immediate object. Why should the object as cognized in the sign, the idea, not be conveyed with a rheme? I guess it is merely more "vague", I would prefer "general", than with a proposition.

Best,

Helmut

 

 22. Juni 2018 um 17:46 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Jon, list,

Jon, I’m well aware that your “understanding is that what a Sign signifies are certain qualities/characters of its Dynamic Object, which taken together constitute its Immediate Object.” But I’m only interested in continuing this dialogue if we can base it on Peirce’s definition of the Immediate Object — not yours. The problem I have with yours is that you take it as definitive of the IO that “every sign” has one — including rhematic signs. But I have yet to see any text where Peirce refers explicitly to the immediate object of any rhematic sign. As Bellucci says (even in the paragraph you quoted from him!) only dicisigns are said by Peirce to have immediate objects, because a dicisign has two objects by definition.

Please review the Commens Dictionary entry for the IO (http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/immediate-object). (That was your serve, as it were, but I’m now returning it to your court.) Peirce’s definitions of the IO are stated there quite clearly, and I don’t think I need to repeat them again. But you’ve apparently paid attention only to the quotes in that entry that you can interpret as confirmations of your prior “understanding.” I think that’s a problem when your prior understanding becomes the basis of your definition.

Originally you said that “Peirce explicitly stated on multiple occasions that every Sign has an Immediate Object.” Now you admit that the “multiple occasions” are down to two; and those two are both excerpted from manuscript sources which, to my knowledge, have not been published. I haven’t seen those manuscripts (have you?) to ascertain what context those quotes were taken out of. I think this matters, because Peirce’s usage of the term “sign” — and thus of “every sign” — varies with the context in which he’s using it.

One obvious case in point is Kaina Stoicheia (KS). For instance, those “signs” which are designated as “sinsigns” in the 1903 Syllabus (and elsewhere) are excluded from the universe of “signs” in KS, by Peirce’s statement that “In the first place, a sign is not a real thing” (EP2:303). Also, KS declares itself to be a “scholium” (EP2:303); and “It is the Proposition which forms the main subject of this whole scholium” (EP2:311). In this scholium, Peirce often uses the word “sign” where the reference is to propositions, as we can see from the examples and the analysis he gives of these “signs.” For example (EP2:303-4):

[[ The sentence “Roxana was the queen of Alexander” is a sign of Roxana and of Alexander, and though there is a grammatical emphasis on the former, logically the name “Alexander” is as much a subject as is the name “Roxana”; and the real persons Roxana and Alexander are real objects of the sign. Every sign that is sufficiently complete refers to sundry real objects. ]]

In the context of KS, it’s clear that Peirce has propositional signs in mind in the sentence which begins “Every sign.” For all we know, the same may be true of his usage of “every sign” in the two quotes in the Commens entry where that phrase occurs. After all, Peirce was a logician, and logicians give most of their attention to propositions and arguments; Peirce’s “speculative grammar” is a branch of logic as semiotic, and his taxonomy (including the distinction between dynamic and immediate objects) is part of his speculative grammar. He quite naturally and often uses the terms “sign” and “symbol” as shorthand for the kind of sign that logicians are traditionally concerned with. That’s one reason why it’s unwise to ignore the context in which Peirce uses the word “sign” — and why there is no need to cite an “occasion where Peirce stated explicitly that only propositions have IOs.” It’s quite enough to see that everything Peirce does say about IOs is in a context of which the subject is propositions (or other dicisigns). You’re welcome to give a counter-example to that if you can.

Two of Peirce’s important innovations in logic are (1) his division of objects into dynamic and immediate (1904), and (2) his 1903 recasting of the term/proposition/argument trichotomy, which was a division of symbols, into the rheme/dicisign/argument trichotomy, where neither rhemes nor dicisigns are necessarily symbols. These two innovations are not unrelated. For one thing, they allow Peirce (and Stjernfelt and Bellucci) to say that not only propositions but dicisigns or “quasi-propositions” must have immediate objects, because the