Re: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness

[Gary Richmond]

s that Peirce not only wrote that "Logic is Rooted
in the Social Principle'', but also wrote the reverse: that the social
principle is rooted in logic (logic as semeiotic). So, while it is perhaps
possible to ignore it, there is truly no way to circumvent "the social
principle" if we are in pursuit of "the truth" of any matter.

It seems to me that the conclusion of your post, Martin, makes this point
in a somewhat different way.

MK: The essence of pragmatism, I would say, lies in grasping not only that
there is no scientific practice independent of the open system, wherein we
can draw probabilistic inferences based on hypotheses and inductions, but
also that there is also no theory independent of the practices that inform
it.


 Thank you both for getting me to reflect on M-P's contribution to
phenomenology and how it might be connected to Peirce's philosophy. There
is, of course, much more to be said on that topic.

[I should note that in my M-P crash course which included rereading some of
his work, that, among the several secondary sources I consulted, I am
especially indebted to Jack Reynolds and Marc Richir articles which brought
back much that I had forgotten of M-P's phenomenology.]

Best,

Gary R


On Sat, Apr 27, 2024 at 9:11 PM Martin Kettelhut  wrote:

> Dear Gary and List,
>
> I'll never forget the transcendent experience I had when I read the
> passage in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception, where he endeavors
> to account for his left hand's touching the right hand's touching something
> else.
>
> I agree that the mystery of Merleau-Ponty's continual process of
> perception, and Peirce's' intrinsic independence of reality from human
> consciousness are sibling renderings of experience, both recognizing the
> limitations of the Kantian Age's attachment to "Das Ding an Sich."
>
> Even the most atomic of conceptions in science have prototypes,
> indeterminate conditions, and histories. There are bundles of shared
> interests, habits, and commitments that inform them. These factors
> constitute what Peirce calls “the social impulse” at the base of any
> concept. When we treat a theory as if it were an absolutely determinate,
> individual state, we cover over the vagueness involved in implementing it,
> and we ignore its general significance. We neglect the social impulse.
>
> The essence of pragmatism, I would say, lies in grasping not only that
> there is no scientific practice independent of the open system, wherein
> we can draw probabilistic inferences based on hypotheses and inductions,
> but also that there is also no theory independent of the practices that
> inform it.
>
> Appreciative regards, Martin Kettelhut
>
> --
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
> on behalf of Gary Richmond 
> *Sent:* Saturday, April 27, 2024 4:10 PM
> *To:* g...@gnusystems.ca 
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness
>
>
> [Note: I'd like to replace my earlier response to Gary Fuhrman's post with
> this one. The first was written in haste and, in fact, I'd forgotten I'd
> sent it as it was nothing but a rough draft of some of the ideas I wanted
> to reflect on. I hope that the present post will offer something of
> substance to discuss. GR]
>
>
> gary f., List,
>
>
> I'm sorry to have taken so long to respond, but I've been unexpectedly
> busy dealing with off List issues (plus a bout of Covid 19 -- I'm finally
> testing negative).
>
> Your post is such a rich cornucopia of ideas that I've decided to focus on
> just a short segment of it with some comments centered around the
> quotations by Merleau-Ponty, Peirce, and William James. I'll start with
> what amounts to little more than a paraphrase of the two quotations by M-P
> and Peirce which you juxtaposed.
>
> Merleau-Ponty remarks that our experiences are given as a unified whole
> with synthesis occurring, *not* because they express a fixed quality or
> identity, but because they are gathered together in an elusive 'ipseity'.
> Each perceived aspect of a thing only serves as an invitation to perceive
> beyond it. This leads to a *continual process of perception* [and of
> semiosis?]  If it were possible for the thing to be fully grasped it would
> cease to be a thing since its reality lies precisely in that 'mystery'
> which prevents us from fully possessing it.
>
> On the other hand, Peirce's statement defines the real as that which
> maintains its characteristics regardless of our thoughts or perceptions. It
> suggests that the true nature of something is independent of our subjective
> interpretations or opinions about it. Even if people have diverse opinions
> regarding something, even if they want something to be different, i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness

[Gary Richmond]

 a catastrophic collapse.
>
>
>
> I think Peircean semiotic is highly valuable for analyzing and
> understanding the role of communication media in this situation. They all
> deploy symbols, of course, and it's crucial to recognize that “Symbols are
> particularly remote from the Truth itself” (EP2:307
> <https://gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm#3f>). But Peirceans also have
> to use symbols in order to communicate that insight, and the message is
> submerged in the flood of mis- and disinformation. It seems that no matter
> what people believe these days, however implausible to scientific (or even
> common) sense, they can find sources online that will reinforce their
> beliefs. Personally i'm not optimistic that semiotics can do much to
> reverse the trend of the Anthropocene. Maybe we can hope that human or
> posthuman survivors of the ongoing degradation of the planet will learn
> something from whatever is left of semiotic science.
>
>
>
> Love, gary
>
> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg
>
> } The creature that wins against its environment destroys itself. [G.
> Bateson] {
>
> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/>
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *Gary Richmond
> *Sent:* Saturday, April 27, 2024 6:10 PM
> *To:* g...@gnusystems.ca
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness
>
>
>
> [Note: I'd like to replace my earlier response to Gary Fuhrman's post with
> this one. The first was written in haste and, in fact, I'd forgotten I'd
> sent it as it was nothing but a rough draft of some of the ideas I wanted
> to reflect on. I hope that the present post will offer something of
> substance to discuss. GR]
>
>
>
> gary f., List,
>
>
>
> I'm sorry to have taken so long to respond, but I've been unexpectedly
> busy dealing with off List issues (plus a bout of Covid 19 -- I'm finally
> testing negative).
>
> Your post is such a rich cornucopia of ideas that I've decided to focus on
> just a short segment of it with some comments centered around the
> quotations by Merleau-Ponty, Peirce, and William James. I'll start with
> what amounts to little more than a paraphrase of the two quotations by M-P
> and Peirce which you juxtaposed.
>
> Merleau-Ponty remarks that our experiences are given as a unified whole
> with synthesis occurring, *not* because they express a fixed quality or
> identity, but because they are gathered together in an elusive 'ipseity'.
> Each perceived aspect of a thing only serves as an invitation to perceive
> beyond it. This leads to a *continual process of perception* [and of
> semiosis?]  If it were possible for the thing to be fully grasped it would
> cease to be a thing since its reality lies precisely in that 'mystery'
> which prevents us from fully possessing it.
>
> On the other hand, Peirce's statement defines the real as that which
> maintains its characteristics regardless of our thoughts or perceptions. It
> suggests that the true nature of something is independent of our subjective
> interpretations or opinions about it. Even if people have diverse opinions
> regarding something, even if they want something to be different, its
> fundamental characteristics remain what they are.
>
> So while both excerpts emphasize the elusive nature of attempting to grasp
> reality within the limitations of human perception, both putting forth the
> idea that reality is not dependent on our thoughts or interpretations,
> Merlea-Ponty focuses on the *continual process of perception and the
> 'mystery' surrounding the ipseity of things*; while Peirce emphasizes the*
> intrinsic independence of reality from human consciousness*. There is
> certainly some considerable correspondence here, however.
>
> I *have* been a bit perplexed by M-P use of 'mystery' which always
> sounded rather too 'literary' for the topic. In a review of Bryan E.
> Bannon's, *From Mastery to Mystery: A Phenomenological Foundation for an
> Environmental Ethic *
> https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/from-mastery-to-mystery-a-phenomenological-foundation-for-an-environmental-ethic/
>  *,* Michael E. Zimmerman finds the source of M-P's notion of 'mystery'
> in Heidegger.
>
> Counseling attunement to the "mystery" of things, a mystery that
> techno-science cannot countenance, Heidegger surmised that modernity's
> one-dimensional understanding of being is only temporary. In a few
> centuries, he prophesized, the clearing may be altered, thereby making
> possible a non-domineering relationship between human *Dasein *[and
> nature].
>
> This emphasis on the 'mystery' of nature challenges the idea of the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness

[gnox]

 peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness

 

[Note: I'd like to replace my earlier response to Gary Fuhrman's post with this 
one. The first was written in haste and, in fact, I'd forgotten I'd sent it as 
it was nothing but a rough draft of some of the ideas I wanted to reflect on. I 
hope that the present post will offer something of substance to discuss. GR]

 

gary f., List,

 

I'm sorry to have taken so long to respond, but I've been unexpectedly busy 
dealing with off List issues (plus a bout of Covid 19 -- I'm finally testing 
negative).

Your post is such a rich cornucopia of ideas that I've decided to focus on just 
a short segment of it with some comments centered around the quotations by 
Merleau-Ponty, Peirce, and William James. I'll start with what amounts to 
little more than a paraphrase of the two quotations by M-P and Peirce which you 
juxtaposed.

Merleau-Ponty remarks that our experiences are given as a unified whole with 
synthesis occurring, not because they express a fixed quality or identity, but 
because they are gathered together in an elusive 'ipseity'. Each perceived 
aspect of a thing only serves as an invitation to perceive beyond it. This 
leads to a continual process of perception [and of semiosis?]  If it were 
possible for the thing to be fully grasped it would cease to be a thing since 
its reality lies precisely in that 'mystery' which prevents us from fully 
possessing it.

On the other hand, Peirce's statement defines the real as that which maintains 
its characteristics regardless of our thoughts or perceptions. It suggests that 
the true nature of something is independent of our subjective interpretations 
or opinions about it. Even if people have diverse opinions regarding something, 
even if they want something to be different, its fundamental characteristics 
remain what they are.

So while both excerpts emphasize the elusive nature of attempting to grasp 
reality within the limitations of human perception, both putting forth the idea 
that reality is not dependent on our thoughts or interpretations, Merlea-Ponty 
focuses on the continual process of perception and the 'mystery' surrounding 
the ipseity of things; while Peirce emphasizes the intrinsic independence of 
reality from human consciousness. There is certainly some considerable 
correspondence here, however.

I have been a bit perplexed by M-P use of 'mystery' which always sounded rather 
too 'literary' for the topic. In a review of Bryan E. Bannon's, From Mastery to 
Mystery: A Phenomenological Foundation for an Environmental Ethic  
https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/from-mastery-to-mystery-a-phenomenological-foundation-for-an-environmental-ethic/
 , Michael E. Zimmerman finds the source of M-P's notion of 'mystery' in 
Heidegger.

Counseling attunement to the "mystery" of things, a mystery that techno-science 
cannot countenance, Heidegger surmised that modernity's one-dimensional 
understanding of being is only temporary. In a few centuries, he prophesized, 
the clearing may be altered, thereby making possible a non-domineering 
relationship between human Dasein [and nature].

This emphasis on the 'mystery' of nature challenges the idea of the "mastery" 
of nature.

Bannon proposes that intertwining the views of Latour, Heidegger, and 
Merleau-Ponty "opens the possibility for us to experience certain kinds of 
feelings toward various human behaviors," feelings that might challenge the 
idea of mastery "by embracing nature's mystery." 

Perhaps my earlier parenthetical question as to whether 'continuous perception' 
ties up with 'continuous' (sometimes termed 'infinite' semiosis) might be worth 
exploring in this regard. Does continuous perception 'married' to continuous 
semiosis lead to this growth of human consciousness (in the sense that 'symbols 
grow') towards a better balance with nature? A related question (at least in my 
mind) is: Have we already passed the tipping point where our attempt to master 
nature is leading to imminent ecological disaster? That is, that we don't have 
the several centuries Heidegger suggested we needed.

Be that as it may, I agree that, as you commented, the statements of M-P and 
Peirce are consistent with each other, however with a subtle difference of 
emphasis, M-P stressing the experience, Peirce the reality underlying the 
experience. And, yes, James offers a decidedly different, decidedly 
psychological take on the matter, emphasizing the fluid nature of knowing, 
suggesting that most of what we perceive and understand remains in a state of 
flux, never fully solidified or 'settled'. Rather, he highlights the tendency 
for most people to accept new experiences without often challenging or 
verifying them. Well, that also suggests to me something of the psycho-social 
reason why we may be approaching an ecological crisis: we accept technological 
advances willy-nilly, but question earth/ecological

Re: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness

[Martin Kettelhut]

Dear Gary and List,

I'll never forget the transcendent experience I had when I read the passage in 
Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception, where he endeavors to account for 
his left hand's touching the right hand's touching something else.

I agree that the mystery of Merleau-Ponty's continual process of perception, 
and Peirce's' intrinsic independence of reality from human consciousness are 
sibling renderings of experience, both recognizing the limitations of the 
Kantian Age's attachment to "Das Ding an Sich."

Even the most atomic of conceptions in science have prototypes, indeterminate 
conditions, and histories. There are bundles of shared interests, habits, and 
commitments that inform them. These factors constitute what Peirce calls “the 
social impulse” at the base of any concept. When we treat a theory as if it 
were an absolutely determinate, individual state, we cover over the vagueness 
involved in implementing it, and we ignore its general significance. We neglect 
the social impulse.

The essence of pragmatism, I would say, lies in grasping not only that there is 
no scientific practice independent of the open system, wherein we can draw 
probabilistic inferences based on hypotheses and inductions, but also that 
there is also no theory independent of the practices that inform it.

Appreciative regards, Martin Kettelhut


From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Gary Richmond 
Sent: Saturday, April 27, 2024 4:10 PM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca 
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness


[Note: I'd like to replace my earlier response to Gary Fuhrman's post with this 
one. The first was written in haste and, in fact, I'd forgotten I'd sent it as 
it was nothing but a rough draft of some of the ideas I wanted to reflect on. I 
hope that the present post will offer something of substance to discuss. GR]


gary f., List,


I'm sorry to have taken so long to respond, but I've been unexpectedly busy 
dealing with off List issues (plus a bout of Covid 19 -- I'm finally testing 
negative).

Your post is such a rich cornucopia of ideas that I've decided to focus on just 
a short segment of it with some comments centered around the quotations by 
Merleau-Ponty, Peirce, and William James. I'll start with what amounts to 
little more than a paraphrase of the two quotations by M-P and Peirce which you 
juxtaposed.

Merleau-Ponty remarks that our experiences are given as a unified whole with 
synthesis occurring, not because they express a fixed quality or identity, but 
because they are gathered together in an elusive 'ipseity'. Each perceived 
aspect of a thing only serves as an invitation to perceive beyond it. This 
leads to a continual process of perception [and of semiosis?]  If it were 
possible for the thing to be fully grasped it would cease to be a thing since 
its reality lies precisely in that 'mystery' which prevents us from fully 
possessing it.

On the other hand, Peirce's statement defines the real as that which maintains 
its characteristics regardless of our thoughts or perceptions. It suggests that 
the true nature of something is independent of our subjective interpretations 
or opinions about it. Even if people have diverse opinions regarding something, 
even if they want something to be different, its fundamental characteristics 
remain what they are.

So while both excerpts emphasize the elusive nature of attempting to grasp 
reality within the limitations of human perception, both putting forth the idea 
that reality is not dependent on our thoughts or interpretations, Merlea-Ponty 
focuses on the continual process of perception and the 'mystery' surrounding 
the ipseity of things; while Peirce emphasizes the intrinsic independence of 
reality from human consciousness. There is certainly some considerable 
correspondence here, however.

I have been a bit perplexed by M-P use of 'mystery' which always sounded rather 
too 'literary' for the topic. In a review of Bryan E. Bannon's, From Mastery to 
Mystery: A Phenomenological Foundation for an Environmental Ethic  
https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/from-mastery-to-mystery-a-phenomenological-foundation-for-an-environmental-ethic/
 , Michael E. Zimmerman finds the source of M-P's notion of 'mystery' in 
Heidegger.

Counseling attunement to the "mystery" of things, a mystery that techno-science 
cannot countenance, Heidegger surmised that modernity's one-dimensional 
understanding of being is only temporary. In a few centuries, he prophesized, 
the clearing may be altered, thereby making possible a non-domineering 
relationship between human Dasein [and nature].

This emphasis on the 'mystery' of nature challenges the idea of the "mastery" 
of nature.

Bannon proposes that intertwining the views of Latour, Heidegger, and 
Merleau-Ponty "opens the possibility for us to experience certain kinds of 
feelings toward various hu

Re: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness

[Gary Richmond]

[Note: I'd like to replace my earlier response to Gary Fuhrman's post with
this one. The first was written in haste and, in fact, I'd forgotten I'd
sent it as it was nothing but a rough draft of some of the ideas I wanted
to reflect on. I hope that the present post will offer something of
substance to discuss. GR]


gary f., List,


I'm sorry to have taken so long to respond, but I've been unexpectedly busy
dealing with off List issues (plus a bout of Covid 19 -- I'm finally
testing negative).

Your post is such a rich cornucopia of ideas that I've decided to focus on
just a short segment of it with some comments centered around the
quotations by Merleau-Ponty, Peirce, and William James. I'll start with
what amounts to little more than a paraphrase of the two quotations by M-P
and Peirce which you juxtaposed.

Merleau-Ponty remarks that our experiences are given as a unified whole
with synthesis occurring, *not* because they express a fixed quality or
identity, but because they are gathered together in an elusive 'ipseity'.
Each perceived aspect of a thing only serves as an invitation to perceive
beyond it. This leads to a *continual process of perception* [and of
semiosis?]  If it were possible for the thing to be fully grasped it would
cease to be a thing since its reality lies precisely in that 'mystery'
which prevents us from fully possessing it.

On the other hand, Peirce's statement defines the real as that which
maintains its characteristics regardless of our thoughts or perceptions. It
suggests that the true nature of something is independent of our subjective
interpretations or opinions about it. Even if people have diverse opinions
regarding something, even if they want something to be different, its
fundamental characteristics remain what they are.

So while both excerpts emphasize the elusive nature of attempting to grasp
reality within the limitations of human perception, both putting forth the
idea that reality is not dependent on our thoughts or interpretations,
Merlea-Ponty focuses on the *continual process of perception and the
'**mystery'
surrounding the ipseity **of things*; while Peirce emphasizes the*
intrinsic independence of reality from human consciousness*. There is
certainly some considerable correspondence here, however.

I *have* been a bit perplexed by M-P use of 'mystery' which always sounded
rather too 'literary' for the topic. In a review of Bryan E. Bannon's, *From
Mastery to Mystery: A Phenomenological Foundation for an Environmental
Ethic *
https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/from-mastery-to-mystery-a-phenomenological-foundation-for-an-environmental-ethic/
 *,* Michael E. Zimmerman finds the source of M-P's notion of 'mystery' in
Heidegger.

Counseling attunement to the "mystery" of things, a mystery that
techno-science cannot countenance, Heidegger surmised that modernity's
one-dimensional understanding of being is only temporary. In a few
centuries, he prophesized, the clearing may be altered, thereby making
possible a non-domineering relationship between human *Dasein *[and nature].

This emphasis on the 'mystery' of nature challenges the idea of the
"mastery" of nature.

Bannon proposes that intertwining the views of Latour, Heidegger, and
Merleau-Ponty "opens the possibility for us to experience certain kinds of
feelings toward various human behaviors," feelings that might challenge the
idea of mastery "by embracing nature's mystery."

Perhaps my earlier parenthetical question as to whether 'continuous
perception' ties up with 'continuous' (sometimes termed 'infinite'
semiosis) might be worth exploring in this regard. Does continuous
perception 'married' to continuous semiosis lead to this growth of human
consciousness (in the sense that 'symbols grow') towards a better balance
with nature? A related question (at least in my mind) is: Have we already
passed the tipping point where our attempt to master nature is leading to
imminent ecological disaster? That is, that we don't have the several
centuries Heidegger suggested we needed.

Be that as it may, I agree that, as you commented, the statements of M-P
and Peirce are consistent with each other, however with a subtle difference
of emphasis, M-P stressing the *experience*, Peirce the *reality*
underlying the experience. And, yes, James offers a decidedly different,
decidedly psychological take on the matter, emphasizing the fluid nature of
knowing, suggesting that most of what we perceive and understand remains in
a state of flux, never fully solidified or 'settled'. Rather, he highlights
the tendency for most people to accept new experiences without often
challenging or verifying them. Well, that also suggests to me something of
the psycho-social reason why we may be approaching an ecological crisis: we
accept technological advances willy-nilly, but question earth/ecological
science.

So, I'd be especially interested in thoughts on what role science, and
philosophy (including phenomenology and semeiotic) might have to play 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness

[Gary Richmond]

gary f., List,

Your post is such a rich cornucopia of ideas that I've decided to focus in
on just a short segment of it with some comments centered around the
quotations by Merleau-Ponty, Peirce, and William James. I'll start with
what amounts to little more than a paraphrase of the two quotations by M-P
and Peirce which you juxtaposed.

Merleau-Ponty offers the idea that our experiences are presented as a
unified whole, with synthesis occurring, not because they express a fixed
quality or identity, but because they are gathered together in an 'ipseity'
which remains elusive. Each perceived aspect of a thing only serves as an
invitation to perceive beyond it. This leads to a *continual process of
perception* [and of semiosis?] Indeed, if it were possible for the thing to
be fully grasped it would cease to be a thing since its reality lies
precisely in that 'mystery' which prevents us from fully possessing it.

On the other hand, Peirce's statement defines the real as that which
maintains its characteristics regardless of our thoughts or perceptions. It
suggests that the true nature of something is independent of subjective
interpretations or opinions. Even if people imagine, have opinions
regarding, or will something to be different, the real thing's fundamental
characters remain what they are.

So while both excerpts emphasize the elusive nature of reality and the
limitations of human perception,' suggesting that reality is not dependent
on our thoughts or interpretations, Merlea-Ponty focuses on the continual
process of perception and the 'mystery' surrounding the ipseity of things;
while Peirce emphasizes the intrinsic independence of reality from human
consciousness. Perhaps that parenthetical question as to whether
'continuous perception' is equivalent to 'continuous' (sometimes termed
'infinite' semiosis) might be worth exploring

In any case, I agree that, as you commented, the two statements are
consistent with each other although with a subtle difference of emphasis:
M-P emphasizing the experience, Peirce emphasizing the reality underlying
the experience.

And, yes, James offers a decidedly psychological take on the matter, stressing
the fluid and ongoing nature of knowing, suggesting that most of what we
perceive and understand remains in a state of flux, never fully solidified
or 'settled', and certainly not confirmed. Rather, he highlights the
tendency for people to accept new experiences without much challenging or
verifying them. For M-P experience is a cohesive whole since experiences
are bound together by that mysterious 'ipseity'. He articulates a process
of continual perception, each aspect of a thing serving as a gateway to
further understanding. Peirce takes a different approach, describing the
real as independent of human thought or perception: the true nature of a
thing is what it is regardless of subjective interpretations or, for that
matter, the opinions of communities -- even historical scientific
communities.

Best,

Gary R

On Sun, Apr 21, 2024 at 10:04 AM  wrote:

> List,
>
> After so much striving for precision, perhaps a shift to the subject of
> indeterminacy would be in order. The following is excerpted from Content
> and Context (TS ·15) (gnusystems.ca)
> , where it includes a dozen or so
> links to its larger context (omitted below). I don’t think it says anything
> controversial among Peircean specialists, but it does make a salient point
> about ordinary everyday communication.  — gary f.
>
> _
>
> According to Peirce, ‘*No* concept, not even those of mathematics, is
> absolutely precise; and some of the most important for everyday use are
> extremely vague’ (CP 6.496, c. 1906). Genuinely informative communication
> depends on taking this necessary vagueness into account. Properly
> understanding any utterance requires us to interpret it with the degree of
> vagueness appropriate to the situational context. To meet this requirement,
> every language user has to develop a sensitivity to context at an early
> age, though few are conscious of it.
>
> [[ The perspectival nature of linguistic systems means that as children
> learn to use words and linguistic constructions in the manner of adults,
> they come to see that the exact same phenomenon may be construed in many
> different ways for different communicative purposes depending on many
> factors in the communicative context. ]]  (Tomasello 1999, 213)
>
> To construe is to simplify, and to simplify is to generalize: a symbol, by
> referring to a *type* of experience, can thus refer to many *tokens* of
> it on various occasions, including future occasions. Even proper nouns
> (names of specific things, places, people etc.) are general signs insofar
> as each implies the continuity of its object through time: each momentary
> manifestation of the object is a token of that type, and some features of
> it may vary from one occurrence to another –