Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?
John S., List: JFS: I would also add that phenomenology is not a normative science. But Peirce used logic to analyze and specify the phenomenological categories. That application of logic is prior to normative science, and it establishes the theory of semiotic. I agree that phenomology is not a Normative Science, and that is precisely why it is misleading to say that "Peirce used logic [which *is *a Normative Science] to analyze and specify the phenomenological categories." On the contrary, that was an application of *mathematics*--including "the Mathematics of Logic," "the simplest mathematics," "dichotomic mathematics"--as *every *science *must *be. CSP: Indeed all formal logic is merely mathematics applied to logic. (CP 4.228; 1902) JFS: But you have to distinguish formal logic from logic applied to something other than mathematics. This juxtaposition makes evident a fundamental error--mathematics is applied to logic, and to *every *other science; but logic is *not *applied to mathematics *at all*, nor is *any *other science. Moreover, the context of that Peirce quote--a chapter of the "Minute Logic" entitled "The Simplest Mathematics," thereby indicating its primary subject matter--sheds additional light on this. CSP: In this chapter, I propose to consider certain extremely simple branches of mathematics which, owing to their utility in logic, have to be treated in considerable detail, although to the mathematician they are hardly worth consideration. In Chapter 4, I shall take up those branches of mathematics upon which the interest of mathematicians is centred, but shall do no more than make a rapid examination of their logical procedure. In Chapter 5, I shall treat formal logic by the aid of mathematics. There can really be little logical matter in these chapters; but they seem to me to be quite indispensable preliminaries to the study of logic. It does not seem to me that mathematics depends in any way upon logic. It reasons, of course. But if the mathematician ever hesitates or errs in his reasoning, logic cannot come to his aid. He would be far more liable to commit similar as well as other errors there. On the contrary, I am persuaded that logic cannot possibly attain the solution of its problems without great use of mathematics. Indeed all formal logic is merely mathematics applied to logic. It was Benjamin Peirce, whose son I boast myself, that in 1870 first defined mathematics as "the science which draws necessary conclusions." (CP 4.227-229; 1902) As Peirce put it later in the same manuscript, "mathematics is the science which *draws* necessary conclusions," while logic is the (normative) "science of *drawing *necessary [and other] conclusions" (CP 4.239; 1902). Metaphysics and the Special Sciences depend on the latter, but *no other* sciences do--not mathematics, phenomenology, esthetics, or ethics. Again, all of these rely entirely on our *logica utens*, not our *logica docens*. CSP: Mathematical logic is formal logic. Formal logic, however developed, is mathematics. Formal logic, however, is by no means the whole of logic, or even its principal part. (CP 4.240; 1902) JFS: That principal part, which is critical for evaluating truth in any actual application, is methodeutic. Here you claim that Methodeutic is the "principal part of logic," but even in your chart it is the third branch of the Normative Science of Logic as Semeiotic, which you previously characterized as logic only from "a partial and narrow" standpoint. Which is it? Once again the context of the Peirce quote is instructive. CSP: But, indeed, the difference between the two sciences is far more than that between two points of view. Mathematics is purely hypothetical: it produces nothing but conditional propositions. Logic, on the contrary, is categorical in its assertions. True, it is not merely, or even mainly, a mere discovery of what really is, like metaphysics. It is a normative science. It thus has a strongly mathematical character, at least in its methodeutic division; for here it analyzes the problem of how, with given means, a required end is to be pursued. This is, at most, to say that it has to call in the aid of mathematics; that it has a mathematical branch. But so much may be said of every science. There is a mathematical logic, just as there is a mathematical optics and a mathematical economics. Mathematical logic is formal logic. Formal logic, however developed, is mathematics. Formal logic, however, is by no means the whole of logic, or even its principal part. It is hardly to be reckoned as a part of logic proper. Logic has to define its aim; and in doing so is even more dependent upon ethics, or the philosophy of aims, by far, than it is, in the methodeutic branch, upon mathematics. We shall soon come to understand how a student of ethics might well be tempted to make his science a branch of logic; as, indeed, it pretty nearly was in the mind of Socrates. But this would be no
Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?
Jerry R, Helmut, and Jon AS, This note is rather long, but each of your questions requires a lot of explanation supported by quotations. JR But my reservation about not treating bacteria as quasi-mind remains. How is this even possible? I'll answer that question with another question: A brain is a colony of one-celled neurons. How would it be it possible for a brain to support a mind unless each cell had at least a quasi-mind? See the attached intention.gif. Note the Following comment: A bacterium swimming upstream in a glucose gradient marks the beginning of goal-directed intentionality. That kind of behavior is possible with living things as simple as a bacterium. But it's not possible with a rock, which Peirce said had an 'effete mind'. By comparison, a bacterium would have a far more robust quasi-mind. Remember that I'm just trying to explain what Peirce said. I agree with him, but one could define mind in different ways that are not Peircean. But I trust Peirce's intuition -- especially when it's supported by modern experts, such as Lynn M. HR linguistics can only be better developed than biosemiotics, if it is not a branch of it´s, i.e. if there are inanimate things that speak. Linguistics is *not* based on psychology or biology. Linguists have always derived grammars from large corpora of examples. There were no native speakers of ancient Greek, Latin, or Egyptian, but there were thousands of documents in Greek and Latin, including many more examples of how they evolved over the centuries. For Egyptian, they discovered the Rosetta Stone, which had parallel texts in Greek, Egyptian hieroglyphics, and a later notation called demotic. As a starting point, they made a guess that the Coptic language, which was still in use for church services, evolved from ancient Egyptian. That proved to be true. And they were able to derive the meaning, the grammar, and even the pronunciation of Egyptian. Of course, their pronunciation would be closer to Coptic than the way the Pharaohs actually spoke. But that's good enough. HR Mathematics is only the basis of it all, if it is more than mere tautology, but then it would be dependent on new experience too Pure mathematics is indeed "mere tautology". If you're using Peirce's rules of inference, the proof of every mathematical theorem begins with a blank sheet of paper. Next, draw a double negation around a blank. That produces an EG of the form "If blank, then blank". Next, insert the hypothesis and all the axioms into the If-area. From that derive the conclusion in the Then-area. For examples, see slides 31 to 41 of the intro to existential graphs: http://jfsowa.com/talks/egintro.pdf Re experience: Pure mathematics is independent of any other subject. But every science, including common sense. is applied mathematics. It begins with some observations and assumptions, selects an appropriate version of pure math, and links the actual entities to the If-part of some theorem. The conclusion in the Then-part is a prediction about those actual entities. By methodeutic, test that conclusion to see if it's true. If all the predictions turn out to be true, then you can have some confidence that the pure theorem, when applied to the actual subject matter, makes reliable predictions about that subject. You can call it a law. HR I doubt, that classification of sciences makes sense at all. That classification is central to everything that Peirce wrote. If you're not convinced, please read more by Peirce and by other authors who explain what Peirce meant JAS: Peirce repeatedly made it very clear that he considered Logic as Semeiotic to be a Normative Science, not a branch of phenomenology. JFS: No. He explicitly said that logic is a branch of mathematics. I would also add that phenomenology is not a normative science. But Peirce used logic to analyze and specify the phenomenological categories. That application of logic is prior to normative science, and it establishes the theory of semiotic. JAS Please provide a citation for this claim. The first branch of mathematics is "the Mathematics of Logic" (CP 1.185), not "formal logic" There are 106 instances of 'formal logic' in CP. See below for a few that explain these issues. In particular, CP 4.226: Indeed all formal logic is merely mathematics applied to logic. JAS He wrote elsewhere that "mathematics has such a close intimacy with one of the classes of philosophy, that is, with logic, that no small acumen is required to find the joint between them" (CP 1.245; 1902). However, note that here logic is still not a branch of mathematics, but of philosophy. Yes. But you have to distinguish formal logic from logic applied to something other than mathematics. Note CP 4.420 quoted below: Formal logic... is mathematics. Formal logic, however, is by no means the whole of logic, or even its principal part. That principal part, which is critical for evaluating truth in
RE: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?
John, I see that you still put semiotics beneath phenomenology. My question: if speculative grammar, with alternative name semiotics is not the first of the normative logic branch anymore, what occupies this spot instead? You seem to argue that because semiotic is not normative it cannot be part of normative logic. If this impression is correct I wonder why you argue thus. I see no problem in a sub-branch of a normative science that itself cannot properly be called normative. Normative logic: 1. concerned with study of most general characteristics of signs 2. concerned with relation of signs and objects 3. concerned with effectiveness of signs Note the close connection with the sign definition. Auke -Oorspronkelijk bericht- Van: John F Sowa Verzonden: vrijdag 14 september 2018 22:32 Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Onderwerp: Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified? Edwina, Jerry R, Jon AS, and Jerry LRC, Peirce answered your questions. I like his 1903 *outline* because it's a clean and simple summary of everything he wrote about the sciences and their interrelationships. But as an outline, it omits nearly all the details. ET > I wonder if this list will ever move beyond debates [and again, I > consider them debates and not discussions] about classification and > terminology I definitely do not want to debate. I consider this thread as a *collaborative inquiry* in trying to understand what Peirce said and fill in the gaps. My only goal is to get a clear understanding of that outline and its relationship to all of Peirce's writings. That classification has some very important implications for biology, but I'll have to address that separately because it requires more space. JR > From what I’ve read, biosemiotic suffers from not being a formal > theory at all. Rather, it is a science (?) that is still seeking to > understand itself. I agree. But I'll repeat the diagram in CSPsemiotic.jpg. Note that mathematics includes all possible theories about anything. Every theory, formal or informal, in every branch of philosophy and empirical science is an application of some theory of mathematics. JR > my question was about biosemiotic, which has a perspective that is > different from semiotic because of its special focus on living systems > (biology, hence biosemiotic). Semiotic also has a focus on living systems: human beings. Peirce himself talked about extensions to parrots, dogs, bees, and crystals. JR > I don’t treat bacteria as a quasi-mind. The biologist Lynn Margulis, who spent her career studying bacteria, considered bacteria on a continuum with all higher life forms: > The growth, reproduction, and communication of these moving, alliance- > forming bacteria become isomorphic with our thought, with our > happiness, our sensitivities and stimulations. Given what Peirce wrote, I believe that he would agree. My only correction would replace the word 'isomorphic' (equal form) with 'homomorphic' (similar form). This quotation comes from https://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/n-Ch.7.html At the end of that article are various comments by prominent researchers in biology and related fields. They're helpful for understanding Lynn M's contributions. JAS > The other two--quality and brute reaction--are not Signs themselves, > and cannot be reduced to Signs I agree. I thanked Gary F. for finding a quotation by Peirce that clarified that issue. JAS > Peirce repeatedly made it very clear that he considered Logic as > Semeiotic to be a Normative Science, not a branch of phenomenology. No. He explicitly said that logic is a branch of mathematics. As mathematics, it is applicable to every science without exception. But most sciences, including phenomenology, do not make value judgments. Under normative science, he explictly said that it is a "partial and narrow" point of view. See CP 1.573. Fundamental principle, which Peirce said many times in many ways: Mathematics and logic are the foundation every science without exception. In *every* science, logic is used in the broad sense. But normative science is an exception: it's used in a narrow sense. JLRC > Semantics alone is merely philosophy abused. > Mathematics alone is not even logic. I don't know how you define those terms. What I've been trying to do is to summarize Peirce's classification of the sciences as accurately as possible. If you can find any quotations by Peirce that support those two points, please let us know. JLRC > CSP focused on language as a path of syntaxies to arguments that > illuminated the natural groundings of human communication in an > extraordinary wide sense. I agree. He said that linguistics was the best developed of all the psychic sciences. That would probably imply that all the other psychic sciences depend on linguistics. But that does not negate his point that all sciences,
Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?
John S., List: JAS: Peirce repeatedly made it very clear that he considered Logic as Semeiotic to be a Normative Science, not a branch of phenomenology. JFS: No. He explicitly said that logic is a branch of mathematics. Please provide a citation for this claim. The first branch of mathematics is "the Mathematics of Logic" (CP 1.185; 1903), not "formal logic" as you have it in your chart, and certainly not "logic" in the broad sense. It is what Peirce sometimes called "the simplest mathematics" or "dichotomic mathematics." He wrote elsewhere that "mathematics has such a close intimacy with one of the classes of philosophy, that is, with logic, that no small acumen is required to find the joint between them" (CP 1.245; 1902). However, note that here logic is still not a branch of *mathematics*, but of *philosophy*. He confirmed this in some detail two paragraphs later. CSP: It might, indeed, very easily be supposed that even pure mathematics itself would have need of one department of philosophy; that is to say, of logic. Yet a little reflection would show, what the history of science confirms, that that is not true. Logic will, indeed, like every other science, have its mathematical parts. There will be a mathematical logic just as there is a mathematical physics and a mathematical economics. If there is any part of logic of which mathematics stands in need--logic being a science of fact and mathematics only a science of the consequences of hypotheses--it can only be that very part of logic which consists merely in an application of mathematics, so that the appeal will be, not of mathematics to a prior science of logic, but of mathematics to mathematics. Let us look at the rationale of this a little more closely. Mathematics is engaged solely in tracing out the consequences of hypotheses. As such, she never at all considers whether or not anything be existentially true, or not. But now suppose that mathematics strikes upon a snag; and that one mathematician says that it is evident that a consequence follows from a hypothesis, while another mathematician says it evidently does not ... because this dispute relates merely to the consequence of a hypothesis, the mere careful study of the hypothesis, which is pure mathematics, resolves it; and after all, it turns out that there was no occasion for the intervention of a science of reasoning. (CP 1.247; 1902) Mathematical logic is an application of mathematics to logic, not the other way around, because "logic [is] a science of fact and mathematics [is] only a science of the consequences of hypotheses." JFS: Mathematics and logic are the foundation every science without exception. Again, please provide a citation for this claim. On the contrary ... CSP: There is no science whatever to which is not attached an application of mathematics. This is not true of any other science, since pure mathematics has not, as a part of it, any application of any other science, inasmuch as every other science is limited to finding out what is positively true, either as an individual fact, as a class, or as a law; while pure mathematics has no interest in whether a proposition is existentially true or not. (CP 1.245; 1902) Mathematics *alone *is "the foundation [of] every science without exception." Logic, as a science of "finding out what is positively true," is *distinct *from mathematics, so this comment applies to it. Phenomenology, Esthetics, and Ethics are three *other *sciences that are *not *attached to an application of Logic as Semeiotic. Speaking of which, your chart is also incorrect in locating "Semiotic" as a separate branch under phenomenology, rather than recognizing it as a generalization of the Normative Science of logic, as Peirce did. I can understand the impulse at work here--at least with respect to Speculative Grammar--since phenomenology is the study of phenomena *in themselves*, while Normative Science is the study of phenomena *in their relations to ends* (cf. EP 2:197; 1903). However, Peirce placed Logic as Semeiotic under the latter, rather than the former, precisely because he viewed its subject matter as "those things whose end is to represent something" (EP 2:200)--not Signs as merely *apparent*, but Signs as *purposive*. Perhaps this is the basis for distinguishing mediation as 3ns in phenomenology from Signs as 3ns in Normative Science. If so, then my previous suggestion that there might be counterparts in Esthetics and Ethics to Speculative Grammar in Logic as Semeiotic should have likewise distinguished quality/reaction as 1ns/2ns in phenomenology from feeling/exertion as 1ns/2ns in Normative Science. Of course, these are not rigid separations, but they reflect different shades of meaning with respect to each Category. Phenomenology deals with what we *perceive*, while Normative Science deals with the resulting *effects *on us and how we *ought *to respond accordingly. I think that a key question, then, is whether
Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?
Dear John, list, You quotes Margolis: The growth, reproduction, and communication of these moving, alliance- forming bacteria become isomorphic with our thought, with our happiness, our sensitivities and stimulations. I agree with this, too. But my reservation about not treating bacteria as quasi-mind remains. How is this even possible? That is, I agree with Peirce’s statement Accordingly, just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a body we ought to say that we are in thought and not that thoughts are in us. So, there doesn’t seem to be a position that is wrong. Everything is admitted, which is to say that through one side of your mouth, there are purposes stated whereby we are supposed to be precise but at the same time, you constrain yourself not to isomorphy but to homomorphy. But where does that leave us? That is, you say such things as Given what Peirce wrote, I believe that he would agree. This all sounds like insanity where no one is not wrong but the goal remains to be right. These don’t appear to be the same, yet they do appear similar. Again, I admit that you have put forth a sincere historicist analysis. And as to whether Peirce answered my questions, I don’t think we’re looking to the same. Here, isomorphy and homomorphy, as you define it, matters. Best, Jerry R On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 3:32 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > Edwina, Jerry R, Jon AS, and Jerry LRC, > > Peirce answered your questions. I like his 1903 *outline* because > it's a clean and simple summary of everything he wrote about the > sciences and their interrelationships. But as an outline, it omits > nearly all the details. > > ET > >> I wonder if this list will ever move beyond debates [and again, I >> consider them debates and not discussions] about classification >> and terminology >> > > I definitely do not want to debate. I consider this thread as a > *collaborative inquiry* in trying to understand what Peirce said > and fill in the gaps. My only goal is to get a clear understanding > of that outline and its relationship to all of Peirce's writings. > > That classification has some very important implications for biology, > but I'll have to address that separately because it requires more space. > > JR > >> From what I’ve read, biosemiotic suffers from not being a formal theory >> at all. Rather, it is a science (?) that is still seeking to understand >> itself. >> > > I agree. But I'll repeat the diagram in CSPsemiotic.jpg. Note that > mathematics includes all possible theories about anything. Every > theory, formal or informal, in every branch of philosophy and empirical > science is an application of some theory of mathematics. > > JR > >> my question was about biosemiotic, which has a perspective that is >> different from semiotic because of its special focus on living >> systems (biology, hence biosemiotic). >> > > Semiotic also has a focus on living systems: human beings. Peirce > himself talked about extensions to parrots, dogs, bees, and crystals. > > JR > >> I don’t treat bacteria as a quasi-mind. >> > > The biologist Lynn Margulis, who spent her career studying bacteria, > considered bacteria on a continuum with all higher life forms: > >> The growth, reproduction, and communication of these moving, alliance- >> forming bacteria become isomorphic with our thought, with our happiness, >> our sensitivities and stimulations. >> > > Given what Peirce wrote, I believe that he would agree. My only > correction would replace the word 'isomorphic' (equal form) with > 'homomorphic' (similar form). This quotation comes from > https://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/n-Ch.7.html > > At the end of that article are various comments by prominent > researchers in biology and related fields. They're helpful > for understanding Lynn M's contributions. > > JAS > >> The other two--quality and brute reaction--are not Signs themselves, >> and cannot be reduced to Signs >> > > I agree. I thanked Gary F. for finding a quotation by Peirce > that clarified that issue. > > JAS > >> Peirce repeatedly made it very clear that he considered Logic as >> Semeiotic to be a Normative Science, not a branch of phenomenology. >> > > No. He explicitly said that logic is a branch of mathematics. > As mathematics, it is applicable to every science without exception. > But most sciences, including phenomenology, do not make value judgments. > Under normative science, he explictly said that it is a "partial and > narrow" point of view. See CP 1.573. > > Fundamental principle, which Peirce said many times in many ways: > Mathematics and logic are the foundation every science without > exception. In *every* science, logic is used in the broad sense. > But normative science is an exception: it's used in a narrow sense. > > JLRC > >> Semantics alone is merely philosophy abused. >> Mathematics alone is not even logic. >> > > I don't know how you define those terms. What I've been
Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?
Edwina, Jerry R, Jon AS, and Jerry LRC, Peirce answered your questions. I like his 1903 *outline* because it's a clean and simple summary of everything he wrote about the sciences and their interrelationships. But as an outline, it omits nearly all the details. ET I wonder if this list will ever move beyond debates [and again, I consider them debates and not discussions] about classification and terminology I definitely do not want to debate. I consider this thread as a *collaborative inquiry* in trying to understand what Peirce said and fill in the gaps. My only goal is to get a clear understanding of that outline and its relationship to all of Peirce's writings. That classification has some very important implications for biology, but I'll have to address that separately because it requires more space. JR From what I’ve read, biosemiotic suffers from not being a formal theory at all. Rather, it is a science (?) that is still seeking to understand itself. I agree. But I'll repeat the diagram in CSPsemiotic.jpg. Note that mathematics includes all possible theories about anything. Every theory, formal or informal, in every branch of philosophy and empirical science is an application of some theory of mathematics. JR my question was about biosemiotic, which has a perspective that is different from semiotic because of its special focus on living systems (biology, hence biosemiotic). Semiotic also has a focus on living systems: human beings. Peirce himself talked about extensions to parrots, dogs, bees, and crystals. JR I don’t treat bacteria as a quasi-mind. The biologist Lynn Margulis, who spent her career studying bacteria, considered bacteria on a continuum with all higher life forms: The growth, reproduction, and communication of these moving, alliance- forming bacteria become isomorphic with our thought, with our happiness, our sensitivities and stimulations. Given what Peirce wrote, I believe that he would agree. My only correction would replace the word 'isomorphic' (equal form) with 'homomorphic' (similar form). This quotation comes from https://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/n-Ch.7.html At the end of that article are various comments by prominent researchers in biology and related fields. They're helpful for understanding Lynn M's contributions. JAS The other two--quality and brute reaction--are not Signs themselves, and cannot be reduced to Signs I agree. I thanked Gary F. for finding a quotation by Peirce that clarified that issue. JAS Peirce repeatedly made it very clear that he considered Logic as Semeiotic to be a Normative Science, not a branch of phenomenology. No. He explicitly said that logic is a branch of mathematics. As mathematics, it is applicable to every science without exception. But most sciences, including phenomenology, do not make value judgments. Under normative science, he explictly said that it is a "partial and narrow" point of view. See CP 1.573. Fundamental principle, which Peirce said many times in many ways: Mathematics and logic are the foundation every science without exception. In *every* science, logic is used in the broad sense. But normative science is an exception: it's used in a narrow sense. JLRC Semantics alone is merely philosophy abused. Mathematics alone is not even logic. I don't know how you define those terms. What I've been trying to do is to summarize Peirce's classification of the sciences as accurately as possible. If you can find any quotations by Peirce that support those two points, please let us know. JLRC CSP focused on language as a path of syntaxies to arguments that illuminated the natural groundings of human communication in an extraordinary wide sense. I agree. He said that linguistics was the best developed of all the psychic sciences. That would probably imply that all the other psychic sciences depend on linguistics. But that does not negate his point that all sciences, including linguistics, depend on math and logic. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?
Helmut, list Could you explain to me the functional difference, to a research program, whether you define it as cenoscopic [study of the data already acquired] vs idioscopic [discovers new phenomena]. And what is 'language-based idioscopic' in biology? If you are a scientist, working within the scientific method then this includes both hypothesis construction [idioscopy would fit in here] and empirical observation [cenoscopic] - So why would you define your research into one OR the other - when both areas ought to be part of the research. Edwina On Fri 14/09/18 12:23 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent: Jerry LR Chandler, list, Yes! I both humbly (just pretending?) and provocatingly ask: Is biosemiotics cenoscopic, and language-based logic idioscopic? Best, Helmut 14. September 2018 um 18:07 Uhr "Jerry LR Chandler" wrote: List: The recent post by Jerry Rhee and Edwina deserve deep perusal. In spirit , these posts parallel my own feelings. Semantics alone is merely philosophy abused. Mathematics alone is not even logic. In my view, CSP focused on language as a path of syntaxies to arguments that illuminated the natural groundings of human communication in an extraordinary wide sense. Cheers Jerry Sent from my iPad On Sep 14, 2018, at 10:18 AM, Jerry Rhee wrote: Dear John, list, My question was a follow-up to your own question on where to place semiotic in CSPsemiotic.jpg. Question: Where is semeiotic? To which, you said, As a formal theory, it would be classified with formal logic under mathematics. But semeiotic is also an applied science when it is used in perception, action, communication... From what I’ve read, biosemiotic suffers from not being a formal theory at all. Rather, it is a science (?) that is still seeking to understand itself (cf., Kull, Velmezova). Even when compared to semiotic, which is this blob that hovers over The Sciences, Philosophical, Mathematical and Empirical, my question was about biosemiotic, which has a perspective that is different from semiotic because of its special focus on living systems (biology, hence biosemiotic). I would say I have done biosemiotic, and yet, I don’t treat bacteria as a quasi-mind. I see it as a thing that my mind treats. I recognize bacteria, how it is used in sciences and respond to it. Bacteria are grown as cultures or individually. We study it, we model its behaviors, we use it to study other things (eg., for cloning in medicine).. Therefore, your response is strange to me. Specifically this: Very simply. Every living thing, from a bacterium on up, has a quasi-mind with a phaneron that contains the kinds of signs it recognizes and responds to. Your discussion of the unconscious.. the even mention of it to my question.. that this is somehow consistent with modern views.. this is all very bizarre. And I am still left with not having an idea on how to use CSPsemiotic.jpg to classify biosemiotic. I am sure the image you created, and devoted much effort to, charts well what may be in the record of Peirce’s writings, but I still don’t see how it is to be used to classify anything novel at all. That is, it does not appear to be adaptable. Perhaps I do not have the proper perspective. Should I turn it, be over it, twist it, wrap it, fold it? I have a similar gripe as Edwina, above. We should listen to what she’s saying. Hth, Jerry ROn Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: John, list Agreed - and Pierce was quite specific that you don't need a conscious and separate Mind to be involved in semiosis. My point, again, is that I don't see the function of this list's focus on classification and terminology. How does that, for example, help us in examining the semiosic processes in a bacterium or in a meadow, filled with diverse species, or in a hurricane, or in a societal ideological movement or in artificial intelligence? And even more deeply - do we want to move out of the seminar room and into examining the semiosic processes of the outside world? Edwina On Fri 14/09/18 8:38 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net [3] sent: On 9/13/2018 11:27 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > How do you classify biosemiotic using your scheme? Very simply. Every living thing, from a bacterium on up, has a quasi-mind with a phaneron that contains the kinds of signs it recognizes and responds to. When Peirce said "present to the mind in any way", he did not rule out the unconscious. In fact, there are 51 instances of the word 'unconscious' in CP. Following is one of them: > I am prepared to maintain, operations of the mind which are logically > exactly analogous to inferences excepting only that they
