Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8
Helmut, List, It is in this sense that I understand "structure" as being logically out of time: "So here’s the point of the implied comparison. Intratextual units come into being and are chronotopically co”-eval” at their plane because they constitute a structure of indexicality, one unit pointing to the other as its co-occurrent counterpart within the discursive interaction coming to structure. Parallel to this, interdiscursive relations across events of using semiotic media also, in effect, constitute relations of “-eval”; they freeze the chronotope of independently occurrent and experienced social eventhood in a structure of likeness that is based on the nature of texts in relation to their contexts of occurrence. Something about the textual—and contextual—qualities of two events is “equivalent,”6 bespeaking likeness, direct or tropic, in the form of aligned discursive structures. Note how intra- and interdiscursivity are relational properties of real-time events and actions. By contrast, when indexically constituted structures of likeness come into being having no chronicity as such—for time as such is logically obliterated in the symmetric STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIP of likeness—such a structure of likeness is termed here intertextuality" (Silverstein 2005: 8-9). From Silverstein, Michael, Axes of Eval: Token versus Type Interdiscursivity, 2005. In the above, Silverstein is weaving a thread between Bakhtin, Peirce, and Jakobson. The point, I think, is that we can prescind logical sequences from time (at least theoretically) whilst acknowledging that time as a priori category is the base/structure upon/through which structures come to interact and/or simply be. But would be interested to hear others' views. Best Jack From: Helmut Raulien Sent: Wednesday, June 30, 2021 10:20 PM To: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8 List, to claim that a logical sequence is not dependent on time, would mean that the claimer has understood the nature of time. But I doubt, that anybody has. Is a universe with a space but no matter possible? Physicists say no, matter and space depend on each other. I find it likely that it is the same with logical sequences and time. Every logical sequence has a certain inertia, due to its vehicle, so it is not supposable, prescinadable, from time, I think. Best, Helmut 30. Juni 2021 um 22:38 Uhr "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" wrote: Jon, Gary F., List, Firstly, thank you both for your clarification(s). Just two quick questions: Gary F writes: "...but the pure “first” is conscious even for Adam before he had become conscious of his own existence. This is a broader usage of “consciousness” than we usually find in cognitive science or psychology, where many virtually identify it with self-consciousness." Is it safe to read this pure "first" as pure qualitative possibility (i.e., the pure possibility of firstness as a kind of semeiotic "consciousness" [corresponding to logic, maybe] so that self-consciousness may or may not be realised but we can take its possibility of being so realised (its potential) as an instance of "consciousness" in the Peircean sense? Secondly, JAS writes: "As embodied minds, our actual thinking always takes place in time, but we can nevertheless prescind reasoning from time--"the time-element may be omitted," because thought is logically possible without time. After all, Peirce states elsewhere, "A disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time" (CP 6.490, 1908)". This I find to be very useful insofar as it corresponds to other types of theory: the idea of a frozen chronotope, for example, in Bakhtinian studies, but also the concept of grammar [as structure] being logically out of time (Silverstein/Jakobson write on this extensively, as you will probably already know). It's an interesting area of overlap, albeit not necessarily directly analogous. JAS: "No, because we are not saying that we cannot access reality, just that in phaneroscopy we are not concerned with whether what is present to the mind is reality or figment." Yes, I think I understand. Joseph Ransdell notes that Peirce is not “concerned only with entities which satisfy some metaphysical condition [such as] being physical realities”, which seems to echo your point (Randsell 2013: 542). I don't want to jump ahead (or behind) but regarding precision, I had one comment. Following the train of Peirce's thought from CP 1.288: "I invite you to consider, not everything in the phaneron, but only its indecomposable elements, that is, those that are logically indecomposable, or indecomposable to direct inspection. I wish to make out a classification, or division,
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8
Jon, Gary F., List, Firstly, thank you both for your clarification(s). Just two quick questions: Gary F writes: "...but the pure “first” is conscious even for Adam before he had become conscious of his own existence. This is a broader usage of “consciousness” than we usually find in cognitive science or psychology, where many virtually identify it with self-consciousness." Is it safe to read this pure "first" as pure qualitative possibility (i.e., the pure possibility of firstness as a kind of semeiotic "consciousness" [corresponding to logic, maybe] so that self-consciousness may or may not be realised but we can take its possibility of being so realised (its potential) as an instance of "consciousness" in the Peircean sense? Secondly, JAS writes: "As embodied minds, our actual thinking always takes place in time, but we can nevertheless prescind reasoning from time--"the time-element may be omitted," because thought is logically possible without time. After all, Peirce states elsewhere, "A disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time" (CP 6.490, 1908)". This I find to be very useful insofar as it corresponds to other types of theory: the idea of a frozen chronotope, for example, in Bakhtinian studies, but also the concept of grammar [as structure] being logically out of time (Silverstein/Jakobson write on this extensively, as you will probably already know). It's an interesting area of overlap, albeit not necessarily directly analogous. JAS: "No, because we are not saying that we cannot access reality, just that in phaneroscopy we are not concerned with whether what is present to the mind is reality or figment." Yes, I think I understand. Joseph Ransdell notes that Peirce is not “concerned only with entities which satisfy some metaphysical condition [such as] being physical realities”, which seems to echo your point (Randsell 2013: 542). I don't want to jump ahead (or behind) but regarding precision, I had one comment. Following the train of Peirce's thought from CP 1.288: "I invite you to consider, not everything in the phaneron, but only its indecomposable elements, that is, those that are logically indecomposable, or indecomposable to direct inspection. I wish to make out a classification, or division, of these indecomposable elements; that is, I want to sort them into their different kinds according to their real characters. I have some acquaintance with two different such classifications, both quite true; and there may be others. Of these two I know of, one is a division according to the form or structure of the elements, the other according to their matter". (CP 1.288). There were comments made previously regarding the precision of "vivid" qualities from "weak" contexts (I'm interpreting the memory/frame as the context and the sensation -- whether red, hot, cold, etc., -- as the quality). This seems to me as if "weak" memories can carry "strong/vivid" perceptions. Without getting bogged down in quantity/quality, this also seems to correspond to a qualitative abstraction whereby the "narrative" matter (its "syntactic", "quantitative", or indeed "metrical" value) is parsed for a qualitative element which so predominates as to transcend its original context (almost as if we "prescind" the paradigmatic element/quality from its "syntactic" structure). As an example (and examples of this type proliferate throughout the part of Peirce's CPs I have so far managed to read, as well as within this slow-read) we can know what it is to have the sun hit our eyes disagreeably without ever being able to recall a singular instance of this happening. This again seems like a vivid quality carried forward from a "weak" memory. I'm not sure if this is strictly what you all mean when you speak of precision (I'm guessing to "prescind" is more logically "neat" than I here conceive of it). I might be completely misreading all of this as philosophy/logic is not my mainstay and Peirce comes to me very much secondhand; but I appreciate this slow-read and each of you taking time to respond. Best Jack ____________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Wednesday, June 30, 2021 7:58 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8 Jack, Gary F., List: JC: Isn't it a fact, though, that thirdness is the irreducible mode of consciousness? I agree with Gary F.'s response. As we discussed a few slides back, Peirce identifies not just one but three modes of consciousness that align with his categories, calling them primisense/altersense/medisense in c. 1896 and qualisense/molition/habit-consciousness (the la
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8
Jack, Gary F., List:
JC: Isn't it a fact, though, that thirdness is the irreducible mode of
consciousness?
I agree with Gary F.'s response. As we discussed a few slides back, Peirce
identifies not just one but three modes of consciousness that align with
his categories, calling them primisense/altersense/medisense in c. 1896 and
qualisense/molition/habit-consciousness (the last is my shorthand) in 1909.
JC: I was wondering whether it is possible to prescind "time" from
"thought"?
As I discuss in my "Temporal Synechism" paper, Peirce seems to have it the
other way around--"logical sequence is a *simpler *concept than temporal
sequence ... and can be prescinded from it accordingly" (
https://rdcu.be/b9xVm, p. 25).
CSP: The idea of time must be employed in arriving at the conception of
logical consecution; but the idea once obtained, the time-element may be
omitted, thus leaving the logical sequence free from time. That done, time
appears as an existential analogue of the logical flow. (CP 1.491, c. 1896)
CSP: For we never think at all without reasoning; and if we try to do so,
the attempt merely results in our reasoning about reasoning. Now reasoning
takes place in Time; and so far as we can understand it, in a Time that
embodies our common-sense notion of Time. (R 300:54[53], 1908)
As embodied minds, our actual thinking always takes place *in *time, but we
can nevertheless prescind reasoning *from *time--"the time-element may be
omitted," because thought is logically possible *without *time. After all,
Peirce states elsewhere, "A disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being
out of time" (CP 6.490, 1908).
JC: Also, if we say there is "more to the phaneron than what we call
reality", are we also not moving in the direction of Kant's "thing as such"
or thing in and of itself?
No, because we are not saying that we *cannot *access reality, just that in
phaneroscopy we are not *concerned *with whether what is present to the
mind is reality or figment.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Wed, Jun 30, 2021 at 9:38 AM wrote:
> Welcome to the conversation on the Peirce list, Jack! I hope your post
> will inspire some of the other “novices” to join in as well.
>
> You may get a reply from Jon when he has the time, but for now I’ll just
> offer my own response to one key point in your post:
>
> JC: Isn't it a fact, though, that thirdness is the irreducible mode of
> consciousness?
>
> GF: Thirdness is the predominant mode of *cognition* and of *semiosis*,
> but not of *consciousness* according to Peirce’s usual employment of the
> term: “Consciousness may mean any one of the three categories” (CP 8.256,
> 1902). Secondness is felt or sensed as “dyadic consciousness” (R 300, 38)
> before it is abstracted and named as a category. As for Firstness,
>
> CSP: Stop to think of it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on
> the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or
> had become conscious of his own existence — that is first, present,
> immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid,
> conscious, and evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must
> be false to it. (W6:171, CP 1.357, 1887-8)
>
> GF: Description, being semiosic, is ‘contaminated’ with Thirdness; but the
> pure “first” is conscious even for Adam *before he had become conscious
> of his own existence*. This is a broader usage of “consciousness” than we
> usually find in cognitive science or psychology, where many virtually
> identify it with *self-*consciousness. But it’s the appropriate usage for
> phaneroscopy, where direct “observation” of the phaneron has to come before
> “generalization.” In the latter stage, where a “doctrine of categories”
> emerges, there does seem to be a kind of “feedback loop” where the
> investigator has to go back and forth between theory and observation in
> order to “test” the theory, as in any positive science. But preconceptions
> are not supposed to interfere with phaneroscopic “observation” proper.
>
> We should also address the questions you raise about time and about the
> Kantian thing-in-itself, but since André addresses that one directly in the
> next slide (9), I think I’ll wait until that’s been posted.
>
> Gary f.
>
> } This sentence contradicts itself—or rather—well, no, actually it
> doesn't! [Hofstadter] {
>
> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu *On
> Behalf Of *JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY
> *Sent:* 29-Jun-21 17:21
> *To:* g...@gnusystems.ca
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re
RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8
Welcome to the conversation on the Peirce list, Jack! I hope your post will
inspire some of the other “novices” to join in as well.
You may get a reply from Jon when he has the time, but for now I’ll just offer
my own response to one key point in your post:
JC: Isn't it a fact, though, that thirdness is the irreducible mode of
consciousness?
GF: Thirdness is the predominant mode of cognition and of semiosis, but not of
consciousness according to Peirce’s usual employment of the term:
“Consciousness may mean any one of the three categories” (CP 8.256, 1902).
Secondness is felt or sensed as “dyadic consciousness” (R 300, 38) before it is
abstracted and named as a category. As for Firstness,
CSP: Stop to think of it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on the
day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had
become conscious of his own existence — that is first, present, immediate,
fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and
evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it.
(W6:171, CP 1.357, 1887-8)
GF: Description, being semiosic, is ‘contaminated’ with Thirdness; but the pure
“first” is conscious even for Adam before he had become conscious of his own
existence. This is a broader usage of “consciousness” than we usually find in
cognitive science or psychology, where many virtually identify it with
self-consciousness. But it’s the appropriate usage for phaneroscopy, where
direct “observation” of the phaneron has to come before “generalization.” In
the latter stage, where a “doctrine of categories” emerges, there does seem to
be a kind of “feedback loop” where the investigator has to go back and forth
between theory and observation in order to “test” the theory, as in any
positive science. But preconceptions are not supposed to interfere with
phaneroscopic “observation” proper.
We should also address the questions you raise about time and about the Kantian
thing-in-itself, but since André addresses that one directly in the next slide
(9), I think I’ll wait until that’s been posted.
Gary f.
} This sentence contradicts itself—or rather—well, no, actually it doesn't!
[Hofstadter] {
<https://gnusystems.ca/wp/> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On
Behalf Of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY
Sent: 29-Jun-21 17:21
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8
Gary, list,
GF: That’s why we can prescind Firstness from Secondness (or Thirdness), but we
can’t prescind Secondness from Firstness, because Secondness is not logically
possible without Firstness. And that’s why there must be more to the phaneron
than what we call reality, even though phaneroscopy (unlike mathematics) is a
positive science, and indeed the first of the positive sciences.
Isn't it a fact, though, that thirdness is the irreducible mode of
consciousness? That we can metaphorically arrive at ideas of firstness,
Secondness, and so on, but always from the vantage point of thirdness? I might
have this wrong, but if not it would seem to suggest a kind of feedback loop in
attempts to prescind Secondness from Thirdness or Firstness from Secondness.
Reading Jon Alan Schmidt's article, Temporal Synechism: A Peircean Philosophy
of Time, I was wondering whether it is possible to prescind "time" from
"thought"? I'm thinking of this in synechist terms (i.e., "Time is no
exception; in fact, it is 'the continuum par excellence, through the spectacles
of which we envisage every other continuum'
(Peirce in JAS 2020: 12). The problem being that surely "time" is, in
phenomenological terms, "thought"? Kant makes time the precondition for the
possibility of existence (or something along those lines) which seems to merely
reify its a priori status (along with space). And whilst we can take time and
space as a priori categories, it doesn't seem to me that we can "literally" do
this - that is, time and space are a priori for no one even though we suppose
they must, logically, be a priori for everyone. We know it/each only through
experience so that whilst we can suppose that time/space exist prior to our
experience of it as such, such judgement must still be made from within that
experiential prism.
So, in essence, how can we usefully prescind one from the other when the two
are either mutually constitutive (dialectical) or a kind of monadic firstness
to which we have no real access (except through consciousness which is always
at the level of mediation - of Thirdness)? Also, if we say there is "more to
the phaneron than what we call reality", are we also not moving in the
direction of Kant's "thing as such" or thing in and of itself? Again, absolute
novice here but I do know that Peirce
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8
Gary, list, GF: That’s why we can prescind Firstness from Secondness (or Thirdness), but we can’t prescind Secondness from Firstness, because Secondness is not logically possible without Firstness. And that’s why there must be more to the phaneron than what we call reality, even though phaneroscopy (unlike mathematics) is a positive science, and indeed the first of the positive sciences. Isn't it a fact, though, that thirdness is the irreducible mode of consciousness? That we can metaphorically arrive at ideas of firstness, Secondness, and so on, but always from the vantage point of thirdness? I might have this wrong, but if not it would seem to suggest a kind of feedback loop in attempts to prescind Secondness from Thirdness or Firstness from Secondness. Reading Jon Alan Schmidt's article, Temporal Synechism: A Peircean Philosophy of Time, I was wondering whether it is possible to prescind "time" from "thought"? I'm thinking of this in synechist terms (i.e., "Time is no exception; in fact, it is 'the continuum par excellence, through the spectacles of which we envisage every other continuum' (Peirce in JAS 2020: 12). The problem being that surely "time" is, in phenomenological terms, "thought"? Kant makes time the precondition for the possibility of existence (or something along those lines) which seems to merely reify its a priori status (along with space). And whilst we can take time and space as a priori categories, it doesn't seem to me that we can "literally" do this - that is, time and space are a priori for no one even though we suppose they must, logically, be a priori for everyone. We know it/each only through experience so that whilst we can suppose that time/space exist prior to our experience of it as such, such judgement must still be made from within that experiential prism. So, in essence, how can we usefully prescind one from the other when the two are either mutually constitutive (dialectical) or a kind of monadic firstness to which we have no real access (except through consciousness which is always at the level of mediation - of Thirdness)? Also, if we say there is "more to the phaneron than what we call reality", are we also not moving in the direction of Kant's "thing as such" or thing in and of itself? Again, absolute novice here but I do know that Peirce in general seems opposed to traditional "metaphysics" and "metaphysicians" which an attribution of there being "more to the phaneron than... reality" would suggest. This may just be a long-winded way of saying that there may be value in disregarding too rigidly defined conceptions of temporality. Thanks Jack From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of g...@gnusystems.ca Sent: Tuesday, June 29, 2021 9:08 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8 *Warning* This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe. Helmut, list, HR: So, in short: Dissociation, prescission, discrimination is imagining, supposing, representing one thing without the other. GF: That’s a bit too short, in the case of prescission, which Peirce says is supposing *a state of things* in which one element is present without the other, *the one being logically possible without the other*. That’s not the same as just supposing one thing without the other. When we suppose the existence of apples without oranges, we’re not supposing a whole state of things, a whole universe, which is what we’re doing when we prescind Firstness from the other elements. If we’re considering an ingredient of the phaneron, we can prescind its Firstness from the rest of it, or from the rest of the whole phaneron, because it is logically possible that this quale (First) is all there is, that there is nothing else for it to be other than. That is not possible in reality because Secondness and Thirdness are there too, in any real phenomenon. That’s why we can prescind Firstness from Secondness (or Thirdness), but we can’t prescind Secondness from Firstness, because Secondness is not logically possible without Firstness. And that’s why there must be more to the phaneron than what we call reality, even though phaneroscopy (unlike mathematics) is a positive science, and indeed the first of the positive sciences. Gary f. From: Helmut Raulien Sent: 29-Jun-21 13:13 To: g...@gnusystems.ca Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8 Gary F., List So, in short: Dissociation, prescission, discrimination is imagining, supposing, representing one thing without the other. But how were these two things originally combined? I guess, as we are talking about phaneroscopy / phenomenology, that the only required combination is, that the two things appear together as
