Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5
Gary, Why consciousness and not awareness or apperception? Those terms seem more adequate for the situation. Auke > Op 21 juni 2021 om 23:05 schreef Gary Richmond : > > Jon, Helmut, List, > > Thank you for correcting me, Jon. Yes, 1ns/2ns/3ns of consciousness. My > error. > > What I meant to get across is that Peirce says that phenomenology deals > with phenomena in their 1ns, that the normative sciences (esthetic, ethic, > logic as semeiotic) deals with them in their 2ns, and metaphysics with them > in their 3ns. But no logician, for example, limits himself to 2ns (or 1ns and > 2ns) just because normative science (in the classification of sciences) > relates phenomena to ends, their 2ns. > > > > > 1903 | Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism: Lecture V | CP > 5.121-127 > > > > Normative Science treats of the laws of the relation of phenomena > > to ends; that is, it treats of Phenomena in their Secondness. > > > > > > Similarly, phenomenology: > > > > > > 1903 | Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism: Lecture V | EP 2:196-197; CP > > 5.121-122 > > > > For Phenomenology treats of the universal Qualities of Phenomena in > > their immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as phenomena. It, thus, > > treats of Phenomena in their Firstness. > > > > > > > I apologize for my foolish error, made in haste, rather > > thoughtlessly. > > > > > > > > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > “Let everything happen to you > Beauty and terror > Just keep going > No feeling is final” > ― Rainer Maria Rilke > > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 4:25 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com > wrote: > > > > Helmut, Gary R., List: > > > > I understand primisense/altersense/medisense (c. 1896) or > > qualisense/molition/habit-consciousness (1909) to be the 1ns/2ns/3ns of > > consciousness, not the 1ns/2ns/3ns of 1ns. As such, they result from the > > application of Peirce's three categories to the phenomenon of consciousness > > itself. Does that clarify the matter? > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran > > Christianhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > > -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > > On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 3:19 PM Gary Richmond < > > gary.richm...@gmail.com mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com > wrote: > > > > > > > Helmut, List, > > > > > > May I ask you, then, why do you think that Peirce posits a > > > primisense, altersense, and medisense; why Peirce finds in the phaneron > > > not just categorial1ns, but also 2ns and 3ns? Phenomenology is indeed a > > > science which deals with phenomena in their 1ns, but it would a very > > > constricted science if it restricted itself to primisense. Remember, we > > > are speaking here of a science (or, at least a "science egg"), and > > > premisense, altersense, and medisense in consideration of the phaneron > > > are, again, Peirce's terms. Are you suggesting that he was in error > > > somehow by not restricting himself (and us) to primisense? > > > > > > Best, > > > > > > Gary R > > > > > > > > > > > > “Let everything happen to you > > > Beauty and terror > > > Just keep going > > > No feeling is final” > > > ― Rainer Maria Rilke > > > > > > > > > Gary Richmond > > > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > > > Communication Studies > > > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > > > > > On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 4:07 PM Helmut Raulien < > > > h.raul...@gmx.de mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > Gary, List > > > > > > > > Now I am confused. "already posited", so what? "2ns of > > > > 1ns", "3ns of 1ns"? Never heard of such things. Instead: 2ns and 3ns > > > > reentered into 1ns, like I wrote. Or do I have a serious error? > > > > > > > > Best > > > > Helmut > > > > > > > > > > > > 21. Juni 2021 um 21:40 Uhr > > > >"Gary Richmond" < gary.richm...@gmail.com > > > > mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > Helmut, > > > > > > > > You wrote: " I was thinking, phaneroscopy is the > > > > science of what happens in the primisense." > > > > > > > > I believe that it has already been
Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5
Jon, Helmut, List, Thank you for correcting me, Jon. Yes, 1ns/2ns/3ns of *consciousness*. My error. What I *meant* to get across is that Peirce says that phenomenology deals with phenomena in their 1ns, that the normative sciences (esthetic, ethic, logic as semeiotic) deals with them in their 2ns, and metaphysics with them in their 3ns. But no logician, for example, limits himself to 2ns (or 1ns and 2ns) just because normative science (in the classification of sciences) relates phenomena to ends, their 2ns. 1903 | Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism: Lecture V | CP 5.121-127 Normative Science treats of the laws of the relation of phenomena to ends; that is, it treats of Phenomena in their Secondness. Similarly, phenomenology: 1903 | Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism: Lecture V | EP 2:196-197; CP 5.121-122 For Phenomenology treats of the universal Qualities of Phenomena in their immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as phenomena. It, thus, treats of Phenomena in their Firstness. I apologize for my foolish error, made in haste, rather thoughtlessly. Best, Gary R “Let everything happen to you Beauty and terror Just keep going No feeling is final” ― Rainer Maria Rilke *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 4:25 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > Helmut, Gary R., List: > > I understand primisense/altersense/medisense (c. 1896) or > qualisense/molition/habit-consciousness (1909) to be the 1ns/2ns/3ns of > consciousness, not the 1ns/2ns/3ns of 1ns. As such, they result from the > application of Peirce's three categories to the phenomenon of consciousness > itself. Does that clarify the matter? > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 3:19 PM Gary Richmond > wrote: > >> Helmut, List, >> >> May I ask you, then, why do *you *think that Peirce posits a primisense, >> altersense, and medisense; why Peirce finds in the phaneron not just >> categorial1ns, but also 2ns and 3ns? Phenomenology is indeed a science >> which deals with phenomena in their 1ns, but it would a very constricted >> science if it restricted itself to primisense. Remember, we are speaking >> here of a *science* (or, at least a "science egg"), and premisense, >> altersense, and medisense in consideration of the phaneron are, again, >> Peirce's terms. Are you suggesting that *he* was in error somehow by not >> restricting himself (and us) to primisense? >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> “Let everything happen to you >> Beauty and terror >> Just keep going >> No feeling is final” >> ― Rainer Maria Rilke >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> >> On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 4:07 PM Helmut Raulien wrote: >> >>> Gary, List >>> >>> Now I am confused. "already posited", so what? "2ns of 1ns", "3ns of >>> 1ns"? Never heard of such things. Instead: 2ns and 3ns reentered into 1ns, >>> like I wrote. Or do I have a serious error? >>> >>> Best >>> Helmut >>> 21. Juni 2021 um 21:40 Uhr >>> "Gary Richmond" >>> wrote: >>> Helmut, >>> You wrote: "I was thinking, phaneroscopy is the science of what happens >>> in the primisense." >>> >>> I believe that it has already been posited that primisense >>> (alternatively, qualisense) entails, in the context of phaneroscopy, the >>> 1ns of 1ns, altersense, the 2ns of 1ns, and medisense, the 3ns of 1ns. >>> After all, one discerns phenomenal 'content'/'expression' of not one but of >>> three categories. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> “Let everything happen to you >>> Beauty and terror >>> Just keep going >>> No feeling is final” >>> ― Rainer Maria Rilke >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> >>> On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 3:24 PM Helmut Raulien wrote: >>> List, Are primisense, altersense, medisense the categorial parts of consciousness, or the categories in general, or the three categorial parts of the/a phaneron? I thought the first (consciousness). And when phaneroscopy became the topic, I was thinking, phaneroscopy is the science of what happens in the primisense. I think, in the primisense not only original qualities (qualia) appear, but also re-entered memories from the altersense and thoughts from the medisense, though iconicized, turned into quasi-qualities, to have a whole picture again, to be further processed again in altersense and medisense. Best Helmut >>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5
Jon, Instead of consciousness I would prefer awareness or, maybe still better, apperception (in the sense of leibniz) but for the remainder it is a good correction of Gary R's erronous response to Helmut and I think in line with the intention of Helmuts remark. Auke > Op 21 juni 2021 om 22:24 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt : > > Helmut, Gary R., List: > > I understand primisense/altersense/medisense (c. 1896) or > qualisense/molition/habit-consciousness (1909) to be the 1ns/2ns/3ns of > consciousness, not the 1ns/2ns/3ns of 1ns. As such, they result from the > application of Peirce's three categories to the phenomenon of consciousness > itself. Does that clarify the matter? > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran > Christianhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 3:19 PM Gary Richmond < gary.richm...@gmail.com > mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com > wrote: > > > > Helmut, List, > > > > May I ask you, then, why do you think that Peirce posits a > > primisense, altersense, and medisense; why Peirce finds in the phaneron not > > just categorial1ns, but also 2ns and 3ns? Phenomenology is indeed a science > > which deals with phenomena in their 1ns, but it would a very constricted > > science if it restricted itself to primisense. Remember, we are speaking > > here of a science (or, at least a "science egg"), and premisense, > > altersense, and medisense in consideration of the phaneron are, again, > > Peirce's terms. Are you suggesting that he was in error somehow by not > > restricting himself (and us) to primisense? > > > > Best, > > > > Gary R > > > > > > > > “Let everything happen to you > > Beauty and terror > > Just keep going > > No feeling is final” > > ― Rainer Maria Rilke > > > > > > Gary Richmond > > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > > Communication Studies > > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > > > On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 4:07 PM Helmut Raulien < h.raul...@gmx.de > > mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de > wrote: > > > > > > > Gary, List > > > > > > Now I am confused. "already posited", so what? "2ns of 1ns", > > > "3ns of 1ns"? Never heard of such things. Instead: 2ns and 3ns reentered > > > into 1ns, like I wrote. Or do I have a serious error? > > > > > > Best > > > Helmut > > > > > > > > > 21. Juni 2021 um 21:40 Uhr > > >"Gary Richmond" < gary.richm...@gmail.com > > > mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com > > > > wrote: > > > > > > Helmut, > > > > > > You wrote: " I was thinking, phaneroscopy is the science of > > > what happens in the primisense." > > > > > > I believe that it has already been posited that primisense > > > (alternatively, qualisense) entails, in the context of phaneroscopy, the > > > 1ns of 1ns, altersense, the 2ns of 1ns, and medisense, the 3ns of 1ns. > > > After all, one discerns phenomenal 'content'/'expression' of not one but > > > of three categories. > > > > > > Best, > > > > > > Gary R > > > > > > > > > > > > “Let everything happen to you > > > Beauty and terror > > > Just keep going > > > No feeling is final” > > > ― Rainer Maria Rilke > > > > > > > > > Gary Richmond > > > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > > > Communication Studies > > > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > > > > > On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 3:24 PM Helmut Raulien < > > > h.raul...@gmx.de mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > List, > > > > Are primisense, altersense, medisense the categorial > > > > parts of consciousness, or the categories in general, or the three > > > > categorial parts of the/a phaneron? I thought the first > > > > (consciousness). And when phaneroscopy became the topic, I was > > > > thinking, phaneroscopy is the science of what happens in the > > > > primisense. I think, in the primisense not only original qualities > > > > (qualia) appear, but also re-entered memories from the altersense and > > > > thoughts from the medisense, though iconicized, turned into > > > > quasi-qualities, to have a whole picture again, to be further processed > > > > again in altersense and medisense. > > > > > > > > Best > > > > Helmut > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5
Helmut, Gary R., List: I understand primisense/altersense/medisense (c. 1896) or qualisense/molition/habit-consciousness (1909) to be the 1ns/2ns/3ns of consciousness, not the 1ns/2ns/3ns of 1ns. As such, they result from the application of Peirce's three categories to the phenomenon of consciousness itself. Does that clarify the matter? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 3:19 PM Gary Richmond wrote: > Helmut, List, > > May I ask you, then, why do *you *think that Peirce posits a primisense, > altersense, and medisense; why Peirce finds in the phaneron not just > categorial1ns, but also 2ns and 3ns? Phenomenology is indeed a science > which deals with phenomena in their 1ns, but it would a very constricted > science if it restricted itself to primisense. Remember, we are speaking > here of a *science* (or, at least a "science egg"), and premisense, > altersense, and medisense in consideration of the phaneron are, again, > Peirce's terms. Are you suggesting that *he* was in error somehow by not > restricting himself (and us) to primisense? > > Best, > > Gary R > > “Let everything happen to you > Beauty and terror > Just keep going > No feeling is final” > ― Rainer Maria Rilke > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 4:07 PM Helmut Raulien wrote: > >> Gary, List >> >> Now I am confused. "already posited", so what? "2ns of 1ns", "3ns of >> 1ns"? Never heard of such things. Instead: 2ns and 3ns reentered into 1ns, >> like I wrote. Or do I have a serious error? >> >> Best >> Helmut >> 21. Juni 2021 um 21:40 Uhr >> "Gary Richmond" >> wrote: >> Helmut, >> You wrote: "I was thinking, phaneroscopy is the science of what happens >> in the primisense." >> >> I believe that it has already been posited that primisense >> (alternatively, qualisense) entails, in the context of phaneroscopy, the >> 1ns of 1ns, altersense, the 2ns of 1ns, and medisense, the 3ns of 1ns. >> After all, one discerns phenomenal 'content'/'expression' of not one but of >> three categories. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> “Let everything happen to you >> Beauty and terror >> Just keep going >> No feeling is final” >> ― Rainer Maria Rilke >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> >> On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 3:24 PM Helmut Raulien wrote: >> >>> List, >>> Are primisense, altersense, medisense the categorial parts of >>> consciousness, or the categories in general, or the three categorial parts >>> of the/a phaneron? I thought the first (consciousness). And when >>> phaneroscopy became the topic, I was thinking, phaneroscopy is the science >>> of what happens in the primisense. I think, in the primisense not only >>> original qualities (qualia) appear, but also re-entered memories from the >>> altersense and thoughts from the medisense, though iconicized, turned into >>> quasi-qualities, to have a whole picture again, to be further processed >>> again in altersense and medisense. >>> >>> Best >>> Helmut >>> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5
Helmut, List,
May I ask you, then, why do *you *think that Peirce posits a primisense,
altersense, and medisense; why Peirce finds in the phaneron not just
categorial1ns, but also 2ns and 3ns? Phenomenology is indeed a science
which deals with phenomena in their 1ns, but it would a very constricted
science if it restricted itself to primisense. Remember, we are speaking
here of a *science* (or, at least a "science egg"), and premisense,
altersense, and medisense in consideration of the phaneron are, again,
Peirce's terms. Are you suggesting that *he* was in error somehow by not
restricting himself (and us) to primisense?
Best,
Gary R
“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 4:07 PM Helmut Raulien wrote:
> Gary, List
>
> Now I am confused. "already posited", so what? "2ns of 1ns", "3ns of 1ns"?
> Never heard of such things. Instead: 2ns and 3ns reentered into 1ns, like I
> wrote. Or do I have a serious error?
>
> Best
> Helmut
>
>
>
>
> 21. Juni 2021 um 21:40 Uhr
> "Gary Richmond"
> wrote:
>
> Helmut,
>
> You wrote: "I was thinking, phaneroscopy is the science of what happens
> in the primisense."
>
> I believe that it has already been posited that primisense (alternatively,
> qualisense) entails, in the context of phaneroscopy, the 1ns of 1ns,
> altersense, the 2ns of 1ns, and medisense, the 3ns of 1ns. After all, one
> discerns phenomenal 'content'/'expression' of not one but of three
> categories.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
> “Let everything happen to you
> Beauty and terror
> Just keep going
> No feeling is final”
> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 3:24 PM Helmut Raulien wrote:
>
>> List,
>> Are primisense, altersense, medisense the categorial parts of
>> consciousness, or the categories in general, or the three categorial parts
>> of the/a phaneron? I thought the first (consciousness). And when
>> phaneroscopy became the topic, I was thinking, phaneroscopy is the science
>> of what happens in the primisense. I think, in the primisense not only
>> original qualities (qualia) appear, but also re-entered memories from the
>> altersense and thoughts from the medisense, though iconicized, turned into
>> quasi-qualities, to have a whole picture again, to be further processed
>> again in altersense and medisense.
>>
>> Best
>> Helmut
>>
>>
>> 21. Juni 2021 um 19:19 Uhr
>> "Jon Alan Schmidt"
>> wrote:
>>
>> Gary R., List:
>>
>>
>> GR: First, "habit-consciousness" is *not *Peirce's term but your
>> invention based on the phrase he used in outlining that trichotomy.
>>
>>
>> Peirce does not provide a single term for the 3ns counterpart of
>> qualisense and molition in his 1909 letter to William James. Instead, he
>> refers to "the recognition of Habit in any kind of consciousness" (CP
>> 8.303) and "Consciousness of habit" (CP 8.304), prompting my equivalent use
>> of "habit-consciousness." He defines it as "a consciousness at once of the
>> substance of the habit, the special case of application, and the union of
>> the two" (ibid). Admittedly, this only loosely matches his earlier
>> definition of "medisense" as "the consciousness of a thirdness, or medium
>> between primisense and altersense, leading from the former to the latter
>> ... the consciousness of a process of bringing to mind ... the
>> consciousness of means," as well as its division into "three modes,
>> *Abstraction*, *Suggestion*, *Association*" (CP 7.551, c. 1896).
>>
>>
>> GR: And it is also the case that your final "fudging" of Peirce's two
>> phaneroscopic trichotomies by combining them as you have ("we could replace
>> "primisense" with "qualisense") will have to be treated with at least as
>> much "contempt and indignation" as my seeing parallels in semeiotic
>> terminology (viz., "sinsense" and "legisign" to go along with Peirce's
>> "qualisense") which, rather than possibly conflating facets of the two
>> sciences might possibly prove helpful in showing significant relations
>> between them.
>>
>>
>> The difference is that "qualisense" is still *Peirce's *term, and at
>> least arguably names the very same phenomenon. Moreover, he proposes it
>> some 13 years later than "primisense," so we can plausibly interpret it as
>> reflecting his more considered view of the matter. He invents "molition" on
>> the same occasion for a very specific reason, defining it as "volition
>> minus all desire and purpose, the mere consciousness of *exertion *of
>> any kind" (CP 8.303)--desire and purpose manifesting 3ns rather than
>> 2ns--as well as "a double consciousness of exertion and resistance" (CP
>> 8.304), all quite consistent with "altersense" as "The
Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5
Jon,
You wrote:
In our current context, I fully agree that we are each making "good faith
attempts to arrive at a terminology we can serviceably use in discussing
Peirce's phaneroscopic practice."
--
1
Please specify current context. I get the impresion that context ought to be
interpreted as triumvirate of Gary, Gary and Jon.
2
How do we.other lister, have to relate the freedom of terminology you allow
your party with the rigor you demand from others to stick to Peirce's terms ?
Auke
> Op 21 juni 2021 om 19:19 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
>
> Gary R., List:
>
>
> > > GR: First, "habit-consciousness" is not Peirce's term but
> your invention based on the phrase he used in outlining that trichotomy.
> >
> > >
> Peirce does not provide a single term for the 3ns counterpart of
> qualisense and molition in his 1909 letter to William James. Instead, he
> refers to "the recognition of Habit in any kind of consciousness" (CP 8.303)
> and "Consciousness of habit" (CP 8.304), prompting my equivalent use of
> "habit-consciousness." He defines it as "a consciousness at once of the
> substance of the habit, the special case of application, and the union of the
> two" (ibid). Admittedly, this only loosely matches his earlier definition of
> "medisense" as "the consciousness of a thirdness, or medium between
> primisense and altersense, leading from the former to the latter ... the
> consciousness of a process of bringing to mind ... the consciousness of
> means," as well as its division into "three modes, Abstraction, Suggestion,
> Association" (CP 7.551, c. 1896).
>
>
> > > GR: And it is also the case that your final "fudging" of
> Peirce's two phaneroscopic trichotomies by combining them as you have ("we
> could replace "primisense" with "qualisense") will have to be treated with at
> least as much "contempt and indignation" as my seeing parallels in semeiotic
> terminology (viz., "sinsense" and "legisign" to go along with Peirce's
> "qualisense") which, rather than possibly conflating facets of the two
> sciences might possibly prove helpful in showing significant relations
> between them.
> >
> > >
> The difference is that "qualisense" is still Peirce's term, and at least
> arguably names the very same phenomenon. Moreover, he proposes it some 13
> years later than "primisense," so we can plausibly interpret it as reflecting
> his more considered view of the matter. He invents "molition" on the same
> occasion for a very specific reason, defining it as "volition minus all
> desire and purpose, the mere consciousness of exertion of any kind" (CP
> 8.303)--desire and purpose manifesting 3ns rather than 2ns--as well as "a
> double consciousness of exertion and resistance" (CP 8.304), all quite
> consistent with "altersense" as "The sense of reaction or struggle between
> self and another" (CP 7.543). By contrast, he never uses "sinsense" or
> "legisense," and I am not yet convinced that borrowing prefixes from
> speculative grammar is a good idea within phaneroscopy. For one thing, I
> notice that you accidentally wrote "legisign" rather than "legisense" in this
> quoted statement.
>
> Nevertheless, your other points are well-taken. Even in speculative
> grammar, Peirce replaces qualisign/sinsign/legisign (1903) with
> tone/token/type (1906-1908) and experiments further with alternatives for
> "tone." However, most of that is in unpublished manuscripts and personal
> letters, so it seems harsh to criticize him as violating his own ethics of
> terminology where he is not deliberately writing for the wider scientific
> community. In our current context, I fully agree that we are each making
> "good faith attempts to arrive at a terminology we can serviceably use in
> discussing Peirce's phaneroscopic practice."
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran
> Christianhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 12:35 AM Gary Richmond < gary.richm...@gmail.com
> mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com > wrote:
>
> > > Jon, Gary F, List,
> >
> >
> > > > > JAS: I did not say that the terminology of
> > "qualisense," "sinsense," and "legisense" conflates phaneroscopy with
> > semeiotic, I said that it runs the risk of fostering such conflation.
> > >
> > > > >
> > GR: A subtle distinction; perhaps you are right. But I think that
> > it's a slight risk and, as I've wrote yesterday, the very different roots
> > ("sense" and "sign") not only make it quite unlikely that the terms will be
> > conflated, but that the prefixes suggest a possible relation between those
> > trichotomies, re: "senses" and "signs," in their respective sciences, viz.,
> > phenomenology and logic as semeiotic.
> >
> >
Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5
Helmut,
You wrote: "I was thinking, phaneroscopy is the science of what happens in
the primisense."
I believe that it has already been posited that primisense (alternatively,
qualisense) entails, in the context of phaneroscopy, the 1ns of 1ns,
altersense, the 2ns of 1ns, and medisense, the 3ns of 1ns. After all, one
discerns phenomenal 'content'/'expression' of not one but of three
categories.
Best,
Gary R
“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 3:24 PM Helmut Raulien wrote:
> List,
> Are primisense, altersense, medisense the categorial parts of
> consciousness, or the categories in general, or the three categorial parts
> of the/a phaneron? I thought the first (consciousness). And when
> phaneroscopy became the topic, I was thinking, phaneroscopy is the science
> of what happens in the primisense. I think, in the primisense not only
> original qualities (qualia) appear, but also re-entered memories from the
> altersense and thoughts from the medisense, though iconicized, turned into
> quasi-qualities, to have a whole picture again, to be further processed
> again in altersense and medisense.
>
> Best
> Helmut
>
>
> 21. Juni 2021 um 19:19 Uhr
> "Jon Alan Schmidt"
> wrote:
>
> Gary R., List:
>
>
> GR: First, "habit-consciousness" is *not *Peirce's term but your
> invention based on the phrase he used in outlining that trichotomy.
>
>
> Peirce does not provide a single term for the 3ns counterpart of
> qualisense and molition in his 1909 letter to William James. Instead, he
> refers to "the recognition of Habit in any kind of consciousness" (CP
> 8.303) and "Consciousness of habit" (CP 8.304), prompting my equivalent use
> of "habit-consciousness." He defines it as "a consciousness at once of the
> substance of the habit, the special case of application, and the union of
> the two" (ibid). Admittedly, this only loosely matches his earlier
> definition of "medisense" as "the consciousness of a thirdness, or medium
> between primisense and altersense, leading from the former to the latter
> ... the consciousness of a process of bringing to mind ... the
> consciousness of means," as well as its division into "three modes,
> *Abstraction*, *Suggestion*, *Association*" (CP 7.551, c. 1896).
>
>
> GR: And it is also the case that your final "fudging" of Peirce's two
> phaneroscopic trichotomies by combining them as you have ("we could replace
> "primisense" with "qualisense") will have to be treated with at least as
> much "contempt and indignation" as my seeing parallels in semeiotic
> terminology (viz., "sinsense" and "legisign" to go along with Peirce's
> "qualisense") which, rather than possibly conflating facets of the two
> sciences might possibly prove helpful in showing significant relations
> between them.
>
>
> The difference is that "qualisense" is still *Peirce's *term, and at
> least arguably names the very same phenomenon. Moreover, he proposes it
> some 13 years later than "primisense," so we can plausibly interpret it as
> reflecting his more considered view of the matter. He invents "molition" on
> the same occasion for a very specific reason, defining it as "volition
> minus all desire and purpose, the mere consciousness of *exertion *of any
> kind" (CP 8.303)--desire and purpose manifesting 3ns rather than 2ns--as
> well as "a double consciousness of exertion and resistance" (CP 8.304), all
> quite consistent with "altersense" as "The sense of reaction or struggle
> between self and another" (CP 7.543). By contrast, he *never *uses
> "sinsense" or "legisense," and I am not yet convinced that borrowing
> prefixes from speculative grammar is a good idea within phaneroscopy. For
> one thing, I notice that you accidentally wrote "legisign" rather than
> "legisense" in this quoted statement.
>
> Nevertheless, your other points are well-taken. Even in speculative
> grammar, Peirce replaces qualisign/sinsign/legisign (1903) with
> tone/token/type (1906-1908) and experiments further with alternatives for
> "tone." However, most of that is in unpublished manuscripts and personal
> letters, so it seems harsh to criticize him as violating his own ethics of
> terminology where he is not deliberately writing for the wider scientific
> community. In our current context, I fully agree that we are each making
> "good faith attempts to arrive at a terminology we can serviceably use in
> discussing Peirce's phaneroscopic practice."
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 12:35 AM Gary Richmond
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, Gary F, List,
>>
>>
>> JAS: I did not say that the terminology of "qualisense," "sinsense," and
>>
Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5
Gary R, You wrote: > Nevertheless, your other points are well-taken. Even in speculative > grammar, Peirce replaces qualisign/sinsign/legisign (1903) with > tone/token/type (1906-1908) and experiments further with alternatives for > "tone." However, most of that is in unpublished manuscripts and personal > letters, so it seems harsh to criticize him as violating his own ethics of > terminology where he is not deliberately writing for the wider scientific > community. In our current context, I fully agree that we are each making > "good faith attempts to arrive at a terminology we can serviceably use in > discussing Peirce's phaneroscopic practice." > Udell. > -- The experimentation with different terms pertaining to the sigfn regarded in itself has nothing to do with ethics of tewrminology or wider audience. It is a justified differentiation of different perspectives on the same joint in the proces of semiosis. Auke > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5
Gary R., List:
GR: First, "habit-consciousness" is *not *Peirce's term but your invention
based on the phrase he used in outlining that trichotomy.
Peirce does not provide a single term for the 3ns counterpart of qualisense
and molition in his 1909 letter to William James. Instead, he refers to
"the recognition of Habit in any kind of consciousness" (CP 8.303) and
"Consciousness of habit" (CP 8.304), prompting my equivalent use of
"habit-consciousness." He defines it as "a consciousness at once of the
substance of the habit, the special case of application, and the union of
the two" (ibid). Admittedly, this only loosely matches his earlier
definition of "medisense" as "the consciousness of a thirdness, or medium
between primisense and altersense, leading from the former to the latter
... the consciousness of a process of bringing to mind ... the
consciousness of means," as well as its division into "three modes,
*Abstraction*, *Suggestion*, *Association*" (CP 7.551, c. 1896).
GR: And it is also the case that your final "fudging" of Peirce's two
phaneroscopic trichotomies by combining them as you have ("we could replace
"primisense" with "qualisense") will have to be treated with at least as
much "contempt and indignation" as my seeing parallels in semeiotic
terminology (viz., "sinsense" and "legisign" to go along with Peirce's
"qualisense") which, rather than possibly conflating facets of the two
sciences might possibly prove helpful in showing significant relations
between them.
The difference is that "qualisense" is still *Peirce's *term, and at least
arguably names the very same phenomenon. Moreover, he proposes it some 13
years later than "primisense," so we can plausibly interpret it as
reflecting his more considered view of the matter. He invents "molition" on
the same occasion for a very specific reason, defining it as "volition
minus all desire and purpose, the mere consciousness of *exertion *of any
kind" (CP 8.303)--desire and purpose manifesting 3ns rather than 2ns--as
well as "a double consciousness of exertion and resistance" (CP 8.304), all
quite consistent with "altersense" as "The sense of reaction or struggle
between self and another" (CP 7.543). By contrast, he *never *uses
"sinsense" or "legisense," and I am not yet convinced that borrowing
prefixes from speculative grammar is a good idea within phaneroscopy. For
one thing, I notice that you accidentally wrote "legisign" rather than
"legisense" in this quoted statement.
Nevertheless, your other points are well-taken. Even in speculative
grammar, Peirce replaces qualisign/sinsign/legisign (1903) with
tone/token/type (1906-1908) and experiments further with alternatives for
"tone." However, most of that is in unpublished manuscripts and personal
letters, so it seems harsh to criticize him as violating his own ethics of
terminology where he is not deliberately writing for the wider scientific
community. In our current context, I fully agree that we are each making
"good faith attempts to arrive at a terminology we can serviceably use in
discussing Peirce's phaneroscopic practice."
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 12:35 AM Gary Richmond
wrote:
> Jon, Gary F, List,
>
> JAS: I did not say that the terminology of "qualisense," "sinsense," and
> "legisense" conflates phaneroscopy with semeiotic, I said that it *runs
> the risk of fostering* such conflation.
>
>
> GR: A subtle distinction; perhaps you are right. But I think that it's a
> *slight* risk and, as I've wrote yesterday, the very different roots
> ("sense" and "sign") not only make it *quite* unlikely that the terms
> will be conflated, but that the prefixes suggest a possible relation
> between those trichotomies, re: "senses" and "signs," in their respective
> sciences, viz., phenomenology and logic as semeiotic.
>
> Below you yourself suggest a trade off of terminology from one trichotomy
> to another. But first:
>
>
> Jon quoted me:
>
> GR: (2) primisense/altersense/medisense are yet three 'novel' terms to add
> to the already problematic neologistist terminology employed by Peirce.
>
>
> Then wrote:
>
> JAS:True, but "sinsense" and "legisense" are even more novel (and arguably
> even more problematic) as terms that Peirce himself never used. With that
> in mind, consider this passage from his text on the ethics of terminology
> [the complete Peirce passage can be found in JAS's post below].
>
>
> GR: Yes, that familiar, for Peirceans, rather famous passage on the
> ethics of terminology makes it imperative that not only does the
> scientist who introduces a new concept into a particular science have the
> right and duty to assign it *suitable* scientific terminology, and at least
> as important, that "it becomes the duty of all [. . .] to accept his
> [terminology and . .] that whoever deliberately uses a
RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5
Jon, Gary R, list, As you said, Gary, this post of Jon’s is a very rich one, and after reading it through three times I’m still learning from it. I don’t have much to add, or any particular objections to it, and don’t have strong feelings on the terminological issue. But something about your exchange reminds me of the last sentence I quoted from CP 1.280: “Original work in this department, if it is to be real and hitherto unformulated truth, is — not to speak of whether it is difficult or not — one of those functions of growth which every man, perhaps, in some fashion exercises once, some even twice, but which it would be next to a miracle to perform a third time.” What kind of work can be done by almost everybody once but three times by almost nobody? The “department” is of course phenomenology, and formulation of a truth is certainly part of it. But the hard part, apparently, is the originality. The reason is that Firstness is predominant in originality, while Thirdness is predominant in formulation. Once you’ve learned to recognize the elementarity or indecomposability of a category, and given it a name, no amount of reformulation or renaming can restore the originality of the insight. Your cognition of it will continue to be re-cognition. Unless you lose your memory altogether, your prior formulation is going to influence your perceptual judgment about every percept that you recognize. You can prescind its Firstness, if you are good at prescission, but the originality of the perception is lost as soon as you formulate it in any way. But if you are lucky, the work of formulation may bear fruit for somebody else by directing their attention to elements of the phenomena that they had not already seen as elementary. When I first read that sentence of Peirce’s, I found it puzzling, and I don’t claim to have seen the full truth of it yet, which is why I keep coming back to it. But I’m going to stop here for today and hope that others can pick out some of the pieces of the puzzle from what I’ve said above, in spite of its awkwardness. Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 20-Jun-21 16:40 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5 Gary R., Gary F., List: GR: My reservations for now: (1) again, I do not see the use of quali-, sin-, and legisense in phenomenology as conflating aspects of it with quali-, sin-, and legisign in logic as semeiotic, but as revealing the underlying influence (which is not a conflation, as 'sense' and 'sign' are two very different concepts) of the ideas and terminology found in phenomenology on those which appear logic as semeiotic; I did not say that the terminology of "qualisense," "sinsense," and "legisense" conflates phaneroscopy with semeiotic, I said that it runs the risk of fostering such conflation. GR: (2) primisense/altersense/medisense are yet three 'novel' terms to add to the already problematic neologistist terminology employed by Peirce. True, but "sinsense" and "legisense" are even more novel (and arguably even more problematic) as terms that Peirce himself never used. With that in mind, consider this passage from his text on the ethics of terminology. CSP: [W]hen a man has introduced a conception into science, it naturally becomes both his privilege and his duty to assign to that conception suitable scientific expressions, and that when a name has been conferred upon a conception by him to whose labors science is indebted for that conception, it becomes the duty of all,--a duty to the discoverer, and a duty to science,--to accept his name, unless it should be of such a nature that the adoption of it would be unwholesome for science; that should the discoverer fail in his duty either by giving no name or an utterly unsuitable one, then, after a reasonable interval, whoever first has occasion to employ a name for that conception must invent a suitable one; and others ought to follow him; but that whoever deliberately uses a word or other symbol in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by its sole rightful creator commits a shameful offense against the inventor of the symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat the act with contempt and indignation. (CP 2.224, EP 2:265, 1903) In short, we should not invent new names for conceptions that he (or anyone else) has already introduced into science under other names, unless those original names are "utterly unsuitable." Accordingly, if we wish to preserve "qualisense" from 1909, it should be accompanied by "molition" and "habit-consciousness" as in that same passage, rather than the neologisms "sinsense" and "legisense." On the other hand, if we wish to preserve "-sense" as the co
Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5
Jon, Gary F, List,
JAS: I did not say that the terminology of "qualisense," "sinsense," and
"legisense" conflates phaneroscopy with semeiotic, I said that it *runs the
risk of fostering* such conflation.
GR: A subtle distinction; perhaps you are right. But I think that it's a
*slight* risk and, as I've wrote yesterday, the very different roots
("sense" and "sign") not only make it *quite* unlikely that the terms will
be conflated, but that the prefixes suggest a possible relation between
those trichotomies, re: "senses" and "signs," in their respective sciences,
viz., phenomenology and logic as semeiotic.
Below you yourself suggest a trade off of terminology from one trichotomy
to another. But first:
Jon quoted me:
GR: (2) primisense/altersense/medisense are yet three 'novel' terms to add
to the already problematic neologistist terminology employed by Peirce.
Then wrote:
JAS:True, but "sinsense" and "legisense" are even more novel (and arguably
even more problematic) as terms that Peirce himself never used. With that
in mind, consider this passage from his text on the ethics of terminology
[the complete Peirce passage can be found in JAS's post below].
GR: Yes, that familiar, for Peirceans, rather famous passage on the
ethics of terminology makes it imperative that not only does the scientist
who introduces a new concept into a particular science have the right and
duty to assign it *suitable* scientific terminology, and at least as
important, that "it becomes the duty of all [. . .] to accept his
[terminology and . .] that whoever deliberately uses a word or other symbol
in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by its sole
rightful creator commits a shameful offense against the inventor of the
symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat
the act with contempt and indignation. (CP 2.224, EP 2:265, 1903)
JAS: In short, we should *not *invent new names for conceptions that [have
been] already introduced into science under other names, unless those
original names are "utterly unsuitable." Accordingly, if we wish to
preserve "qualisense" from 1909, it should be accompanied by "molition" and
"habit-consciousness" as in that same passage, rather than the neologisms
"sinsense" and "legisense." On the other hand, if we wish to preserve
"-sense" as the consistent root word for all three categories, then we
should stick with "primisense," "altersense," and "medisense" from c. 1896.
Or I suppose that *we could replace "primisense" with "qualisense" as a
later and more descriptive alternative, giving us
qualisense/altersense/medisense* as a trichotomy that is even more
suggestive of quality/reaction/mediation applied specifically to
consciousness [bold emphasis added by GR].
GR: First, "habit-consciousness" is *not* Peirce's term but your invention
based on the phrase he used in outlining that trichotomy. I personally have
no problem with this.
And it is also the case that your final "fudging" of Peirce's two
phaneroscopic trichotomies by combining them as you have ("we could replace
"primisense" with "qualisense") will have to be treated with at least as
much "contempt and indignation" as my seeing parallels in semeiotic
terminology (viz., "sinsense" and "legisign" to go along with Peirce's
"qualisense") which, rather than *possibly *conflating facets of the two
sciences might *possibly* prove helpful in showing significant relations
between them.
But I hope and expect that neither of us -- nor others -- will see our
separate attempts at developing a potentially useful phaneroscopic
terminology as anything more nor less than *that*: good faith attempts to
arrive at a terminology we can serviceably use in discussing Peirce's
phaneroscopic practice.
And, indeed, what I rudely referred to as your "fudging" ought to remind us
that while Peirce may not have exactly "fail[ed] in his duty either by
giving no name or an utterly unsuitable one," that he had a very strong
penchant to reconsider and revise terminology that he has previously
introduced. Perhaps there is no science in which this is clearer than in *logic
as semeiotic* (I'm sure we could all provide examples of this), but it
appears in other sciences as well -- including, as I've been arguing,
phaneroscopy.
So, in a significant sense one might say, that Peirce doesn't -- at least *not
strictly* -- observe his own terminological ethic, and not doing so -- in
his modifying and revising terminology throughout his career so that it
becomes problematic to decide what terms to settle on -- makes it extremely
difficult for us who come more than a century after him to settle on just
that optimal terminology which he might approve of and which we might
advantageously use to help further develop his phenomenology.
I'll conclude this post with what I consider to be an important question:
what is to be *our* ethics of terminology given this challenge which
Peirce, a "backwoodsman" not only in semeiotic but
Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5
Gary R., List:
GR: Qualisense refers, of course, to 'quality' while 'primisense' implies
first or 1ns.
Again, I am very much open to the terminological substitution of
"qualisense" (1909) for "primisense" (c. 1896), especially since in its
original context the latter is synonymous with "Feeling" as "the
momentarily present contents of consciousness taken in its pristine
simplicity, apart from anything else" (CP 7.551).
GR: "Molition" ("volition minus all desire and purpose") brings to mind
action (and, so, reaction as well) and so may not be considered all that
different from "altersense" (while they are certainly not synonymous).
The main difference is that "altersense" encompasses *more *than
"molition"--not just volition/will as the *active *aspect of reaction in
consciousness (2ns of 2ns), but also sensation as its *passive *aspect (1ns
of 2ns).
GR: Finally, the sense of "habit" seems quite different from its parallel
term in the trichotomy Jon pointed to, namely, "medisense," that is, the
sense of mediating between "something" and "something other."
Likewise, the main difference is that "medisense" encompasses *more *than
"habit-consciousness"--not just association (3ns of 3ns), but also
suggestion (2ns of 3ns) and abstraction (1ns of 3ns). Here "suggestion" is
not "in reference to the phenomena of hypnotism," but instead, "What takes
place in suggestion is that an idea when it rises gives an upward motion to
all other ideas belonging to the same set" (CP 7.548-549). Moreover,
"abstraction" is "a separative process, the centrifugal tendency of
thought, by which any idea by following out its own development becomes
separated from those with which it is connected" (CP 7.544). Hence, it
encompasses prescission, which the next few slides will highlight as an
especially powerful tool of phaneroscopy.
GR: Of course all the above have associations with either 1ns, 2ns, or 3ns
(as there are many such associations with each of the three universal
categories) ...
Indeed, but if we are going to take seriously Peirce's designation of
quality/reaction/mediation as "the purest conceptions" of 1ns/2ns/3ns, such
that "what you are striving to apprehend is pure Firstness, the Firstness
of Secondness--that is what Secondness is, of itself--and the Firstness of
Thirdness" (CP 1.530, 1903), then I propose that
qualisense/altersense/medisense is the best option currently on the table
for their counterparts in consciousness.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Sun, Jun 20, 2021 at 3:55 PM Gary Richmond
wrote:
> Gary F, Jon, List,
>
> For the moment I'd like to direct our attention to a subtlety which at
> first mainly eluded me regarding the 'sense' aspect of phaneroscopic
> practice and the terminology used to express it.
>
> So far we have:
>
> "primisense," "altersense," and "medisense" (Peirce)
> "qualisense," "molition," and a sense of recognizing "habit" (Peirce)
> "qualisense," "sinsense," and "legisense"
>
>
> The last trichotomy above is the result of my entertaining the notion of
> retaining "qualisense" but renaming "molition," *sinsense, *and
> recognizing "habit," *legisense. *Jon and I seem to disagree whether this
> possible renaming employing '-sense' rather than '-sign' constitutes a
> feature (my position) or the *possibility* of a conflating bug (Jon's).
>
> Be that as it may I'd like to point to something which I first overlooked,
> namely, that "primisense," "altersense," and "medisense" bring to mind
> categoriality, obvious in 'primisense', but clear enough for the other two,
> the three of them paralleling his much earlier 'something'. 'other' (in
> relation to that 'something'), and 'medium'.
>
> Now contrast those associations (however you may wish to characterize them
> other than I have) with the those of the three I first pointed to, namely,
> "qualisense," "molition," and a sense of recognizing "habit".
>
> Here the associations are somewhat different. Qualisense refers, of
> course, to 'quality' while 'primisense' implies first or 1ns. "Molition"
> ("volition minus all desire and purpose") brings to mind action (and, so,
> reaction as well) and so may not be considered all that different from
> "altersense" (while they are certainly not synonymous). Finally, the
> sense of "habit" seems quite different from its parallel term in the
> trichotomy Jon pointed to, namely, "medisense," that is, the sense of
> mediating between "something" and "something other."
>
> Of course all the above have associations with either 1ns, 2ns, or 3ns (as
> there are many such associations with each of the three universal
> categories), so I suppose that this is merely to suggest that this also, as
> you wrote, Gary, "makes it hard to even talk about it." Still, if we are
> to go beyond the challenging phaneroscopic practice towards developing a
>
Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5
Gary R., Gary F., List: GR: My reservations for now: (1) again, I do not see the use of quali-, sin-, and legisense in phenomenology as conflating aspects of it with quali-, sin-, and legisign in logic as semeiotic, but as revealing the underlying influence (which is not a conflation, as 'sense' and 'sign' are two very different concepts) of the ideas and terminology found in phenomenology on those which appear logic as semeiotic; I did not say that the terminology of "qualisense," "sinsense," and "legisense" conflates phaneroscopy with semeiotic, I said that it *runs the risk of fostering* such conflation. GR: (2) primisense/altersense/medisense are yet three 'novel' terms to add to the already problematic neologistist terminology employed by Peirce. True, but "sinsense" and "legisense" are even more novel (and arguably even more problematic) as terms that Peirce himself never used. With that in mind, consider this passage from his text on the ethics of terminology. CSP: [W]hen a man has introduced a conception into science, it naturally becomes both his privilege and his duty to assign to that conception suitable scientific expressions, and that when a name has been conferred upon a conception by him to whose labors science is indebted for that conception, it becomes the duty of all,--a duty to the discoverer, and a duty to science,--to accept his name, unless it should be of such a nature that the adoption of it would be unwholesome for science; that should the discoverer fail in his duty either by giving no name or an utterly unsuitable one, then, after a reasonable interval, whoever first has occasion to employ a name for that conception must invent a suitable one; and others ought to follow him; but that whoever deliberately uses a word or other symbol in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by its sole rightful creator commits a shameful offense against the inventor of the symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat the act with contempt and indignation. (CP 2.224, EP 2:265, 1903) In short, we should *not *invent new names for conceptions that he (or anyone else) has already introduced into science under other names, unless those original names are "utterly unsuitable." Accordingly, if we wish to preserve "qualisense" from 1909, it should be accompanied by "molition" and "habit-consciousness" as in that same passage, rather than the neologisms "sinsense" and "legisense." On the other hand, if we wish to preserve "-sense" as the consistent root word for all three categories, then we should stick with "primisense," "altersense," and "medisense" from c. 1896. Or I suppose that we could replace "primisense" with "qualisense" as a later and more descriptive alternative, giving us qualisense/altersense/medisense as a trichotomy that is even more suggestive of quality/reaction/mediation applied specifically to consciousness. GF: The hard part of phaneroscopy is not to allow the prior naming of things to interfere with the observation, where Firstness has to be predominant. And that makes it hard to even talk about it. Indeed, this is another way of highlighting the distinction that Gary F. properly (in my view) draws between observation and generalization as tasks of phaneroscopy; or perhaps as tasks of phenomenology as the broader science, with phanersocopy corresponding to observation and trichotomic category theory to generalization. However, since 1ns is predominant in the former and 3ns in the latter, the question arises--in what additional task of phenomenology is 2ns predominant? De Tienne's iconoscopy does not strike me as a good fit here, and in any case, he states plainly in his paper about it ( https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/rssi/2013-v33-n1-2-3-rssi02379/1035282ar.pdf) that he *is not* proposing it as an additional branch in Peirce's classification of the sciences. ADT: This somewhat new word is not intended to point out a flaw in Peirce’s classification of the sciences by demonstrating that we need to add one more science between phaneroscopy and the normative sciences, especially semeiotic. Indeed there is no need to do so. The real intention is to show that, precisely because of the nature of the connection between phaneroscopy and semeiotic, and especially of the transition between phaneron and sign, one needs to surmise that there exists a type of activity that is common to both, that that activity must have to do, as already suggested, with icons and iconic signs, and that a good name for that transitional activity is iconoscopy, that is, the activity of selecting portions of the phaneron for the sake of reducing them to representational unity. ... Iconoscopy is not a science ... . Being transitional, iconoscopy goes on both in phaneroscopy and in semeiotic ... (p. 26) On the other hand, Daniel Campos has written about *mathematical *reasoning requiring three faculties--imagination, concentration, and generalization (
