Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's "Proof" of Pragmatism
Jerry, List: The distinction is one that Peirce himself makes elsewhere, even when the relevant perception would only occur in the future. CSP: This is intelligible from the point of view of pragmatism, according to which the objects of which ordinary general propositions have to be true, if they are to be true at all, are the body of future percepts. (EP 2:328, 1904) CSP: Now experiences seem to me to be rather the object of a conception than its meaning. They are too external to the mind to be meanings; and as for expectations of experiences, if they cannot conceivably have any effect upon conduct, the concept of them cannot be of the intellectual kind. Besides, an experience is a single event, and so is the mental act of expecting it. Now no aggregate of single objects can constitute the meaning of a general concept. This objection does not apply to the effects of a concept upon conduct, since these effects are of the nature of a habit, and a habit is a general principle. (R 320:7-8, 1907) Again, according to Peirce, pragmatism is the doctrine that the ultimate meaning (logical interpretant) of an intellectual concept expresses itself either in the general shape of conduct to be recommended or in the general habits that must result from experiences (including perceptions) to be expected--not in those individual experiences (and perceptions) themselves, nor in individual mental acts of expecting them. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Sep 8, 2022 at 11:34 PM Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > Jon, List: > > On Sep 8, 2022, at 5:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Even here, it seems clear that perception has to do with the *object *of > a concept, while pragmatism has to do with its (ultimate logical) > *interpretant*. > > It is not at all clear to me that this proposed separation is reasonable > or even of interest. The cybernetic feed-forward loop that ties rhema to > index to legisign appears to contradict your supposition. > > Cheers > Jerry > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's "Proof" of Pragmatism
Jeff, Your questions about Peirce's proof of pragmatitiicsm are important. Jeff> I tend to think the later writings often build on the earlier. As such, I wonder what the later proof borrows by way of premisses from the arguments developed in the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism. Once that is clearer, we can then ask what might have been added to the later argument by way of additional premisses. Peirce's ideas were constantly evolving up to the very end. He frequently went back to earlier ideas, but always with some new insights or directions from his later developments. For pragmaticism, his 1903 Harvard and Lowell lectures were an important starting point. And the word 'prolegomena' in 1906 is an important clue. An interesting occurrence in December 1902: Carus published a new English translation of Kant's "Prolegomena to any future metaphysics" and Peirce published a notice of it in the Nation in June 1903. -- he must have been reading (or rereading) it around the same time as he was preparing those Lectures. Peirce must have read it (in German) during the time that he and his father were studying Kant. After Kant finished the first edition of KdrV (or CdrV as Peirce preferred to refer to it), he wrote the short Prolegomena as an intro and overview of the questions that he tried to answer in the first edition of the K(C)drV. Those questions were the prelude to his second edition, which he finished a few years later. Although Peirce had criticized some of Kant's fundamental assumptions, he always had a high regard for Kant, and he cited him frequently throughout CP.And he had a very high regard for Kant's questions, which are the main topic of his own Prolegomena. If you (a) read Kant's questions and (b) read Peirce's writings from 1903 onwards, you can see a strong influence of Kant's questions on Peirce. In fact, Peirce's 1903 classification of the sciences seems to be part of Peirce's answers to K's three transcendental questions. Even stronger evidence for Kant's influence is Peirce's 1906 Apology for Pragmaticism, which is written as a prelude to a series of articles he planned for the Monist. Unfortunately, he ran into difficulties around 1909, which led him to the series of ten MSS on "Assurance" (R661 to R670) from 1910 to 1911. There's much more to be said about all these issues. I recommend an article about Peirce's Apology by Max Fisch (1982) and reprinted in a book by Fisch in 1986. In that article, Max F. wrote that methodeutic is a key topic that Peirce was addressing in his planned proof. I agree. And I also believe that there were two reasons why Peirce stopped in 1909: (1) problems with phaneroscopy as a science egg (R645) and (2) problems with logic, which were the reason for his ten studies (R661 to R670) from 1910 to 1911. These are the reasons for major revisions that Peirce made in 1911 and 1912. It's sad that he was converging on important new ideas just when he had that accident in 1911 followed by the cancer. There is, of course, much more to say about all these issues. And as Max Fisch also said, that's why we need all of Peirce's late MSS available in suitable formats. As Peirce's late letters show -- he was thinking very hard about all these issues. And he didn't hesitate to make major revisions when necessary. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's "Proof" of Pragmatism
Jeff, List: Again, my sketch is not a deductive argumentation "proceeding upon definitely formulated premisses." Nevertheless, what do you consider to be "the key premisses in the 1903 attempt to offer a defense of pragmatism"? According to Nathan Houser, "In his Harvard Lectures, Peirce built his case for pragmatism on a new theory of perception, grounded in his theory of categories and on results from phenomenology, esthetics, and ethics" (EP 2:xxv). None of these subjects appears in my sketch, which instead has more in common with the "proof from Peirce's theory of signs" that Houser reconstructs from the 1907 drafts for an introductory article (EP 2:xxxv-xxxvi). That said, none of Peirce's restatements and elaborations of his maxim of pragmatism that I compiled from those lectures says anything about them, either--except his famous concluding remark, "The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason" (CP 5.212, EP 2:241, 1903). Even here, it seems clear that perception has to do with the *object *of a concept, while pragmatism has to do with its (ultimate logical) *interpretant*. Regards, Jon On Thu, Sep 8, 2022 at 2:38 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Hi Jon, List, > > Thank you for sharing your questions about Peirce's proof of pragmatism. > > The focus of your inquiries is on the interpretation of Peirce's attempt > to offer a proof of pragmatism around 1908. I tend to think the later > writings often build on the earlier. As such, I wonder what the later proof > borrows by way of premisses from the arguments developed in the 1903 > Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism. Once that is clearer, we can then ask what > might have been added to the later argument by way of additional premisses. > > Are any of the key premisses in the 1903 attempt to offer a defense of > pragmatism missing in your reconstruction of the later argument? If so, > might the addition of those premisses make the argument stronger? > > Yours, > > Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > -- > *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* Tuesday, September 6, 2022 7:14:39 PM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's "Proof" of Pragmatism > > List: > > About 18 months ago, I posted my sketch of what Peirce might have had in > mind for his "proof" of pragmatism using Existential Graphs ( > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-03/msg00086.html). Some > lively exchanges on Twitter over the holiday weekend prompted me to revisit > it, and I thought that the following slightly updated summary might be of > interest. In Peirce's terminology, it is in the form of an *argument*, > "any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a definite belief," > rather than an *argumentation*, "an Argument proceeding upon definitely > formulated premisses" (CP 6.456, EP 2:435, 1908). Any feedback or > discussion would be welcome, as always. > > 1. Intellectual concepts are symbols and thus indeterminate, so their only > mode of composition is mutual determination by means of propositions--"Some > stones possess the character of hardness." > > 2. The logical meaning of an intellectual concept (second grade of > clearness) is the continuum of all possible propositions that would > truthfully affirm or deny it of something--"Any diamond possesses the > character of hardness." > > 3. Belief in an intellectual concept corresponds to *individual *habits > of expectation described by indicative judgments--"If *this *stone > possesses the character of hardness, then when I rub it with a knife, it *will > *resist scratching." > > 4. The pragmatistic meaning of an intellectual concept (third grade of > clearness) is a *general *mental habit described by a subjunctive > conditional--"If I *were *to rub any diamond with a knife, then it *would > *resist scratching." > > 5. Beliefs are subject to revision with further experiences, especially > surprising observations that call for explanatory hypotheses--"When I rub > *this > *stone with a knife, it resists scratching, and if it *were *a diamond, > then that would be a matter of course." > > 6. A general mental habit *manifests *in self-controlled conduct > described by a practical syllogism with #4 as the major premiss and a > relevant intention as the minor premiss--"I *desire *a stone that > possesses the character of hardness, so I *shall * obtain a diamond." > > Many scholars make the mistake of stopping at #4 (verification) or #5 > (abduction/retroduction), but #6 (prescription) is the *ultimate *meaning > of an intellectual concept in accordance with the maxim of pragmatism as > clarified by Peirce's various
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's "Proof" of Pragmatism
Hi Jon, List, Thank you for sharing your questions about Peirce's proof of pragmatism. The focus of your inquiries is on the interpretation of Peirce's attempt to offer a proof of pragmatism around 1908. I tend to think the later writings often build on the earlier. As such, I wonder what the later proof borrows by way of premisses from the arguments developed in the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism. Once that is clearer, we can then ask what might have been added to the later argument by way of additional premisses. Are any of the key premisses in the 1903 attempt to offer a defense of pragmatism missing in your reconstruction of the later argument? If so, might the addition of those premisses make the argument stronger? Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Tuesday, September 6, 2022 7:14:39 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's "Proof" of Pragmatism List: About 18 months ago, I posted my sketch of what Peirce might have had in mind for his "proof" of pragmatism using Existential Graphs (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-03/msg00086.html). Some lively exchanges on Twitter over the holiday weekend prompted me to revisit it, and I thought that the following slightly updated summary might be of interest. In Peirce's terminology, it is in the form of an argument, "any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a definite belief," rather than an argumentation, "an Argument proceeding upon definitely formulated premisses" (CP 6.456, EP 2:435, 1908). Any feedback or discussion would be welcome, as always. 1. Intellectual concepts are symbols and thus indeterminate, so their only mode of composition is mutual determination by means of propositions--"Some stones possess the character of hardness." 2. The logical meaning of an intellectual concept (second grade of clearness) is the continuum of all possible propositions that would truthfully affirm or deny it of something--"Any diamond possesses the character of hardness." 3. Belief in an intellectual concept corresponds to individual habits of expectation described by indicative judgments--"If this stone possesses the character of hardness, then when I rub it with a knife, it will resist scratching." 4. The pragmatistic meaning of an intellectual concept (third grade of clearness) is a general mental habit described by a subjunctive conditional--"If I were to rub any diamond with a knife, then it would resist scratching." 5. Beliefs are subject to revision with further experiences, especially surprising observations that call for explanatory hypotheses--"When I rub this stone with a knife, it resists scratching, and if it were a diamond, then that would be a matter of course." 6. A general mental habit manifests in self-controlled conduct described by a practical syllogism with #4 as the major premiss and a relevant intention as the minor premiss--"I desire a stone that possesses the character of hardness, so I shall obtain a diamond." Many scholars make the mistake of stopping at #4 (verification) or #5 (abduction/retroduction), but #6 (prescription) is the ultimate meaning of an intellectual concept in accordance with the maxim of pragmatism as clarified by Peirce's various reformulations of it, which I present and discuss in my Transactions paper on the subject (https://muse.jhu.edu/article/787776). For example, consider how he contrasts his view with that of James in the first complete draft of his introductory article: CSP: The most prominent of all our school and the most respected, William James, defines pragmatism as the doctrine that the whole "meaning" of a concept expresses itself either in the shape of conduct to be recommended or of experience to be expected. Between this definition and mine there is certainly a slight theoretical divergence ... These examples bear out James’s definition of pragmatism, which I have never denied is true of the logical meaning. My slight objection to it is that it seems to be true also of the existential meaning. Intellectual concepts are general or derivatives of generals, and therefore their meanings must be general. The general forms of psychic action besides concepts themselves are desires and habits. Desires are previous to the existential realization, while habits result from repeated such realizations. If, in place of James’s "experiences to be expected," we substitute the habits which must result from those experiences,--must result, I mean, if the defined concept be intellectual, but not if it be existential or emotional,--we finally extract, I think, the very quintessence of the logical meaning. (https://doi.org/10.23925/2316-5278.2022v23i1:e51310, pp. 4&9, 1907) Incorporating Peirce's amendment into James's definition,
