Helmut- you have it right.
That's why I prefer to use the term of 'representamen' rather than 'sign'
(note, as you say, lower case first letter). Peirce often used the term 'sign'
to mean not only the representamen, but even the relations ..eg..that between
the Representamen and the Object and so on. And I do indeed use the term Sign
(upper case first letter) to mean the triad.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Helmut Raulien
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2014 6:15 PM
Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:7077] iconic commitment (was:
Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6)
I suspect, that in this quote Peirce meant sign for representamen, and by
writing whether they be... he meant whether their object relation was
This is inaccurate by Peirce. Edwina writes more accurately, and is right, I
think: With Sign (first letter capital) she means the whole sign, and with
sign (first letter small) representamen. Icon, index, symbol are not
Signs, but possible object relations with a sign, and therefore also
possible object relations within a Sign. But a Sign consists of three
relations (sign-sign, sign-object, sign-interpretant)(and a sign has three
relations: with sign, object, and interpretant), of which the object relation
is only one third. I hope I have got it right, it is not unconfusing.
Von: Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com
I'm confused.
ET: my understanding of the 'icon' in that it is not a Sign, even though
many seem to consider it as such.
CP: 1, Speculative Grammar, or the general theory of the nature and meanings
of signs, whether they be icons, indices, or symbols Peirce: CP 1.192
Cross-Ref:††
Evidently CP is among the many.
@stephencrose
On Sat, Oct 4, 2014 at 5:00 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote:
Part of the problem may also be due to my understanding of the 'icon' in
that it is not a Sign, even though many seem to consider it as such. It is the
term for the Relation between the Dynamic Object and the Representamen. A Sign
is a triad and the Icon, as a single Relation, is not a Sign.
This Relation between the Dynamic Object and the Representamen (which I
also term 'input') can be in any of the three categorical modes and as such, is
termed: icon, index or symbol.
To actually function as an icon, that 'input sensation' must be in a
Relation or connection. Otherwise, ...nothing. But an iconic input certainly
has no 'committment' in itself as to how it will be 'read' by the mediative
rules of the Representamen or understood within the Interpretant. That is why
it, as Firstness, can be considered as open and offering potentiality rather
than closed actuality.
So, I'd agree that a Sign (that triad) operating within Firstness would
indeed by nothing but a Rheme (Rhematic Iconic Qualisign). It is only when an
attachment to a more specific categorical mode is made (operating within
Secondness or Thirdness) that a commitment is made, as you point out.
Thanks for your input.
Edwina
- Original Message - From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List' PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2014 4:22 PM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:7077] iconic commitment (was: Natural
Propositions, Chapter 3.6)
Gary F., Edwina, Lists,
I find myself agreeing with both sides in this disagreement. Am I confused?
Icons themselves involve connectivity and thus continuity because a
qualisign may be connected to a token figure and a rule for interpreting those
connections--and not yet have the kind of object and interpretant needed to
make a positive assertion of fact. As such, I read the claim that icons
commit themselves to nothing at all to be based on an understanding of what is
needed for a sign to involve such a commitment. The kinds of commitment that
he is talking about is similar in kind to what a person does when making an
affidavit.
When those three things are connected to one another as parts of our
percepts, we are then in a position to make a perceptual judgment about some
object. In making such a judgment, those three connected things can function
as qualisign, iconic sinsign, and iconic legisign--where we attribute qualities
with an intensity to some object at a place and a time. At this point, we have
enough for a dicisign--and an assertion is thereby made.
Couldn't we simplify matters by saying that no theme taking as an
unsaturated sign alone commits itself to anything? One a rheme that is part of
a larger design involves such a commitment. If that is right, then the reason
icons commit themselves to nothing at all is that such signs, taken by
themselves, are never more than a rheme.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
