Helmut- you have it right.
That's why I prefer to use the term of 'representamen' rather than 'sign'
(note, as you say, lower case first letter). Peirce often used the term 'sign'
to mean not only the representamen, but even the relations ..eg..that between
the Representamen and the Object and so on. And I do indeed use the term Sign
(upper case first letter) to mean the triad.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Helmut Raulien
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2014 6:15 PM
Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:7077] iconic commitment (was:
Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6)
I suspect, that in this quote Peirce meant "sign" for "representamen", and by
writing "whether they be..." he meant "whether their object relation was...".
This is inaccurate by Peirce. Edwina writes more accurately, and is right, I
think: With "Sign" (first letter capital) she means the whole sign, and with
"sign" (first letter small) representamen. "Icon", "index", "symbol" are not
"Signs", but possible object relations with a "sign", and therefore also
possible object relations within a "Sign". But a "Sign" consists of three
relations (sign-sign, sign-object, sign-interpretant)(and a "sign" has three
relations: with sign, object, and interpretant), of which the object relation
is only one third. I hope I have got it right, it is not unconfusing.
Von: "Stephen C. Rose" <stever...@gmail.com>
I'm confused.
> ET: my understanding of the 'icon' in that it is not a Sign, even though
many seem to consider it as such.
CP: 1, Speculative Grammar, or the general theory of the nature and meanings
of signs, whether they be icons, indices, or symbols .... Peirce: CP 1.192
Cross-Ref:††
Evidently CP is among the "many".
@stephencrose
On Sat, Oct 4, 2014 at 5:00 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Part of the problem may also be due to my understanding of the 'icon' in
that it is not a Sign, even though many seem to consider it as such. It is the
term for the Relation between the Dynamic Object and the Representamen. A Sign
is a triad and the Icon, as a single Relation, is not a Sign.
This Relation between the Dynamic Object and the Representamen (which I
also term 'input') can be in any of the three categorical modes and as such, is
termed: icon, index or symbol.
To actually function as an icon, that 'input sensation' must be in a
Relation or connection. Otherwise, ...nothing. But an iconic input certainly
has no 'committment' in itself as to how it will be 'read' by the mediative
rules of the Representamen or understood within the Interpretant. That is why
it, as Firstness, can be considered as open and offering potentiality rather
than closed actuality.
So, I'd agree that a Sign (that triad) operating within Firstness would
indeed by nothing but a Rheme (Rhematic Iconic Qualisign). It is only when an
attachment to a more specific categorical mode is made (operating within
Secondness or Thirdness) that a commitment is made, as you point out.
Thanks for your input.
Edwina
----- Original Message ----- From: "Jeffrey Brian Downard"
<jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>
To: <biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>; "'Peirce List'" <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2014 4:22 PM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:7077] iconic commitment (was: Natural
Propositions, Chapter 3.6)
Gary F., Edwina, Lists,
I find myself agreeing with both sides in this disagreement. Am I confused?
Icons themselves involve "connectivity and thus continuity" because a
qualisign may be connected to a token figure and a rule for interpreting those
connections--and not yet have the kind of object and interpretant needed to
make a positive assertion of fact. As such, I read the claim that "icons
commit themselves to nothing at all" to be based on an understanding of what is
needed for a sign to involve such a commitment. The kinds of commitment that
he is talking about is similar in kind to what a person does when making an
affidavit.
When those three things are connected to one another as parts of our
percepts, we are then in a position to make a perceptual judgment about some
object. In making such a judgment, those three connected things can function
as qualisign, iconic sinsign, and iconic legisign--where we attribute qualities
with an intensity to some object at a place and a time. At this point, we have
enough for a dicisign--and an assertion is thereby made.
Couldn't we simplify matters by saying that no theme taking as an
unsaturated sign alone commits itself to anything? One a rheme that is part of
a larger design involves such a commitment. If that is right, then the reason
icons commit themselves to nothing at all is that such signs, taken by
themselves, are never more than a rheme.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Gary Fuhrman [g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2014 9:45 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List'
Subject: [biosemiotics:7077] iconic commitment (was: Natural Propositions,
Chapter 3.6)
ET: nowhere in my post did I disagree with Peirce that 'icons commit
themselves to nothing at all'. Where do you come up with that conclusion?
GF: The first sentence of your previous post said: “I think that Icons
commit themselves to connectivity and thus continuity”. Now you claim to have
agreed with Peirce that 'icons commit themselves to nothing at all'.
I think that’s enough to show that any further comment would be
superfluous, and any further attempt at dialogue along these lines would be
fruitless.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 4-Oct-14 12:11 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:7075] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6
Gary F - nowhere in my post did I disagree with Peirce that 'icons commit
themselves to nothing at all'. Where do you come up with that conclusion? Nor
do I disagree with the 'fortuitous variations in reproduction' play a role in
adaptation. I've constantly focused on the vital role of chance/Firstness. My
comment was on the nature of the connections, where I pointed out that the
function of Thirdness was not merely mediation but also continuity of type. It
isn't easy for novelty to get Thirdness to change! Therefore, chance - if we
consider it only as randomness (and I don't think it is)...is necessary
restrained within the general constraints of Thirdness.
Constructive deviations do not, in my view, emerge within random chance
mutations -- and Peirce also rejected that evoluation/adaptation was guided
only by mechanical randomness and held that an agapastic 'connected and
informed' force was the key agent in adaptation/evolution). Chance or Firstness
is a much stronger force than mere mechanical randomness. Its connectedness
enables it to offer informed potentiality rather than mechanical uninformed
randomness.
As for my disagreement with your 'Man-as-Sinner' - we'll have to leave it
at that. I disgree and point to the various research on complex adaptive
systems which disagree with the one-way linearity of your view. I strongly
promote CAS (complex adapative systems) functioning in all realms - biological
as well as societal, economic, etc..and view semiosis as the basic process in
the CAS....lots of articles on biology as a CAS and the saltational dynamics
that take place.
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Fuhrman<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee<mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee> ; 'Peirce
List'<mailto:PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2014 11:50 AM
Subject: RE: [biosemiotics:7072] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions,
Chapter 3.6
Edwina, I guess you don’t agree with Peirce that icons “commit themselves
to nothing at all” (MS 599, as quoted). You also seem to disagree with his
suggestion that “fortuitous variations in reproduction” (or what you call
“deviations from the norm”) play a role in evolution analogous to the role of
icons in cognition (and the role of chance as Firstness in Peirce’s cosmology).
This may well indicate a major difference between you and Peirce concerning
Firstness as a mode of being.
I’m more surprised, though, at your denial that this is an age of mass
extinction in biology — the seventh in the history of the planet, by the usual
count of evolutionary biologists, and the first to be caused mainly by a single
species (guess who). What I hear from biologists is that biodiversity is in
steep decline. I’d like to see your evidence that the complexity of the
biosphere is increasing … but not at the cost of distracting the list from the
main argument of NP. So I’ll just leave it at that.
gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 4-Oct-14 10:38 AM
To: Gary Fuhrman;
biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee<mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>; 'Peirce List'
Subject: [biosemiotics:7072] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter
3.6
Gary F wrote:
1) "Icons, representing Firstness, commit themselves to nothing, but their
connection (Thirdness) with experiential external Secondnesses constitutes
information. The Dicisign is the kind of sign which actually makes such a
connection. The generalized (and fallible!) commitment to that connection is
what we call “knowledge” or “belief” and is represented by assertion as a
speech act. The analogous commitment in biology is the adaptation of the
species, which furthers the survival of its form (sometimes by modifying it)."
I think that Icons commit themselves to connectivity and thus continuity-
even though in themselves they convey no information; what is vital is their
role of connectivity. And this connectivity is to Thirdness which functions as
the general communal long term mode of identity. Therefore, this is not merely
to promote adaptation of the species, which I suggest is informed more by
deviations from the norm; it functions to promote continuity and robust
stability of the species. Deviations emerge within connections with other Sign
systems that provide their information to the 'home system'.
2) I don't think we live in a 'biological age of mass extinction'. Species
always die and new ones or adaptations of the old, emerge. I'd say we are
living in a biological age, as always, which operates as a complex adaptive
system - and this complexity is increasing, which promotes both increasing
decay and diversity. [I'd certainly agree with the 'information overload'
comment!]
Edwina
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