Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
Edwina, list, I completely agree with your outline of what a thing categorially is. My proposal about a thing is: Category 1 is matter/material, cat. 2 is form, and cat. 3 is interaction. 2.1. (firstness of secondness) is the form from the inside, the thing´s perspective, and 2.2. (secondness of secondness) is the form from the outside perspective. 3.1. is the interaction possibility, 3.2. the actual interactions, and 3.3. the interactional habits. Where exactly the border between existence and reality is, I don´t know. Maybe, depending on the depth of analysis, always between secondness and thirdness? so between 2 and 3, but also between 3.2. and 3.3., between 3.3.2. and 3.3.3.,...? Best, Helmut 17. Oktober 2017 um 01:19 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" Gary R, list Thanks for the quote. I've two, hopefully brief, comments. 1] I don't think that a 'thing' is real in itself, It is existential, but its attributes, its modal nature, can be real - if that modal nature includes Thirdness, which is to say, includes generals or habits. 2] Thirdness, or generality or habits, has to be understood as distinct - spatially and temporally - from the modal categories of Firstness and Secondness. Firstness operates in the Open Here and Now - ...this undifferentiated 'instant'..and 'this space'..with no sense of past or future time and no sense of 'other space. It is that immediate sensation. Secondness operates in the Distinct Here and Now - this 'instant' as differentiated from the past or next instant and this space as differentiated from Other Space. It is that distinct, closed oppositional awareness of self-not self. Thirdness operates in Past/Future or Progressive Time and non-local space. That is, its properties, as generals, have no 'glue' confining them to 'hic et nunc' time; they are spread out; they are the same in the past and in the future; they are continuity. And - they are common to a lot of 'instances' over space. As such, these Generals are of course, real general possibilities. 3] BUT Thirdness or 'the real' , being composed of generals operating only in past/future time and non-local space, can only exist, within the temporal and spatial finiteness, the 'nowness' of matter operating in the mode of Firstness and/or Secondness. These two modal categories provide the 'hic and nunc' existentiality to Thirdness. Therefore - a General or an open general possibility, is 'real' but, being without current time and space, it remains an abstract open, vague continuous force. As a force, does Thirdness depend on being articulated within existential Firstness/Secondness? I think it does; its properties are general and open to change within the 'being made existential' - but - I don't see that Thirdness/ generals can continue-to-be-Real without that semiosic connection. That is, I don't see Thirdness/generals as functioning separated from Firstness/Secondness. Edwina On Mon 16/10/17 5:12 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent: Edwina, list, I'm glad the quotation proved helpful to you. There does remain the question of the generality and reality of habits and habit formation towards the future, evolutionary tendencies, 'would-bes', etc. Since I've decided to rest my eyes for the rest of the day (I may in fact listen to that Mozart concerto), I'll just offer another quote and a brief comment to suggest what I have in mind for perhaps future discussion (I'd recommend that if we do take the discussion further that we do so in a separate thread). 1911 | A Sketch of Logical Critics | EP 2:457-458 (in Commens Dictionary) For what is it for a thing to be Real? [—] To say that a thing is Real is merely to say that such predicates as are true of it, or some of them, are true of it regardless of whatever any actual person or persons might think concerning that truth. Unconditionality in that single respect constitutes what we call Reality. Consequently, any habit, or lasting state that consists in the fact that the subject of it would, under certain conditions, behave in a certain way, is Real, provided this be true whether actual persons think so or not; and it must be admitted to be a Real Habit, even if those conditions never actually do get fulfilled. I would assume that we are in agreement as to Peirce's initial answer to the question he poses as to what it is for something to be Real. But the question of the reality of habits as "would bes" yet remains to be considered. Note that his description here of a habit--a "lasting state that consists in the fact that the subject would, under certain conditions, behave in a certain way, is Real" concludes with the idea that "it must be admitted to be a Real Habit, even if those conditions never actually do get fulfilled." Now I recall Jon S also suggesting that something like this is the case not only for real generals (habits) but for real possibilities as well. It seems to me that Peirce's "extreme
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list
Thanks for the quote. I've two, hopefully brief, comments.
1] I don't think that a 'thing' is real in itself, It is
existential, but its attributes, its modal nature, can be real - if
that modal nature includes Thirdness, which is to say, includes
generals or habits.
2] Thirdness, or generality or habits, has to be understood as
distinct - spatially and temporally - from the modal categories of
Firstness and Secondness.
Firstness operates in the Open Here and Now - ...this
undifferentiated 'instant'..and 'this space'..with no sense of past
or future time and no sense of 'other space. It is that immediate
sensation.
Secondness operates in the Distinct Here and Now - this 'instant' as
differentiated from the past or next instant and this space as
differentiated from Other Space. It is that distinct, closed
oppositional awareness of self-not self.
Thirdness operates in Past/Future or Progressive Time and non-local
space. That is, its properties, as generals, have no 'glue'
confining them to 'hic et nunc' time; they are spread out; they are
the same in the past and in the future; they are continuity. And -
they are common to a lot of 'instances' over space. As such, these
Generals are of course, real general possibilities.
3] BUT Thirdness or 'the real' , being composed of generals
operating only in past/future time and non-local space, can only
exist, within the temporal and spatial finiteness, the 'nowness' of
matter operating in the mode of Firstness and/or Secondness. These
two modal categories provide the 'hic and nunc' existentiality to
Thirdness.
Therefore - a General or an open general possibility, is 'real'
but, being without current time and space, it remains an abstract
open, vague continuous force. As a force, does Thirdness depend on
being articulated within existential Firstness/Secondness? I think it
does; its properties are general and open to change within the 'being
made existential' - but - I don't see that Thirdness/ generals can
continue-to-be-Real without that semiosic connection. That is, I
don't see Thirdness/generals as functioning separated from
Firstness/Secondness.
Edwina
On Mon 16/10/17 5:12 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, list,
I'm glad the quotation proved helpful to you. There does remain the
question of the generality and reality of habits and habit formation
towards the future, evolutionary tendencies, 'would-bes', etc.
Since I've decided to rest my eyes for the rest of the day (I may in
fact listen to that Mozart concerto), I'll just offer another quote
and a brief comment to suggest what I have in mind for perhaps future
discussion (I'd recommend that if we do take the discussion further
that we do so in a separate thread).
1911 | A Sketch of Logical Critics | EP 2:457-458 (in Commens
Dictionary)
For what is it for a thing to be Real? [—] To say that a thing is
Real is merely to say that such predicates as are true of it, or some
of them, are true of it regardless of whatever any actual person or
persons might think concerning that truth. Unconditionality in that
single respect constitutes what we call Reality. Consequently, any
habit, or lasting state that consists in the fact that the subject of
it would, under certain conditions, behave in a certain way, is Real,
provided this be true whether actual persons think so or not; and it
must be admitted to be a Real Habit, even if those conditions never
actually do get fulfilled.
I would assume that we are in agreement as to Peirce's initial
answer to the question he poses as to what it is for something to be
Real. But the question of the reality of habits as "would bes" yet
remains to be considered. Note that his description here of a
habit--a "lasting state that consists in the fact that the subject
would, under certain conditions, behave in a certain way, is Real"
concludes with the idea that "it must be admitted to be a Real Habit,
even if those conditions never actually do get fulfilled."
Now I recall Jon S also suggesting that something like this is the
case not only for real generals (habits) but for real possibilities
as well. It seems to me that Peirce's "extreme Scholastic realism"
does argue that there are both real generals and real possibles, and
that their reality is not dependent on whether the conditions
bringing them into existence "actually do get fulfilled."
Best,
Gary R
Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718
482-5690
On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 3:17 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Gary R - thanks; that's a great quotation. And yes, it does bring
in his 'objective idealism' which is NOT equivalent to 'idealism'.
Agreed - without the reality of generals, a theory is nominalistic -
it can't be other
Re: Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
Edwina, list, I'm glad the quotation proved helpful to you. There does remain the question of the generality and reality of habits and habit formation towards the future, evolutionary tendencies, 'would-bes', etc. Since I've decided to rest my eyes for the rest of the day (I may in fact listen to that Mozart concerto), I'll just offer another quote and a brief comment to suggest what I have in mind for perhaps future discussion (I'd recommend that if we do take the discussion further that we do so in a separate thread). 1911 | A Sketch of Logical Critics | EP 2:457-458 (in *Commens *Dictionary) For what is it for a thing to be Real? [—] To say that a thing is Real is merely to say that such predicates as are true of it, or some of them, are true of it regardless of whatever any actual person or persons might think concerning that truth. Unconditionality in that single respect constitutes what we call Reality. Consequently, any habit, or lasting state that consists in the fact that the subject of it *would*, under certain conditions, behave in a certain way, is *Real*, provided this be true whether actual persons think so or not; and it must be admitted to be a *Real Habit*, even if those conditions never actually do get fulfilled. I would assume that we are in agreement as to Peirce's initial answer to the question he poses as to what it is for something to be *Real*. But the question of the reality of habits as "would bes" yet remains to be considered. Note that his description here of a habit--a "lasting state that consists in the fact that the subject *would*, under certain conditions, behave in a certain way, is *Real*" concludes with the idea that "it must be admitted to be a* Real Habit*, even if those conditions never actually do get fulfilled." Now I recall Jon S also suggesting that something like this is the case not only for *real generals *(habits) but for* real possibilities* as well. It seems to me that Peirce's "extreme Scholastic realism" does argue that there are both real generals and real possibles, and that their reality is *not* dependent on whether the conditions bringing them into *existence *"actually do get fulfilled." Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 3:17 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Gary R - thanks; that's a great quotation. And yes, it does bring in his > 'objective idealism' which is NOT equivalent to 'idealism'. Agreed - > without the reality of generals, a theory is nominalistic - it can't be > otherwise, for it is reduced to only two modal categories: Firstness and > Secondness. > > That's a vital comment - that > ". . . reality means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought, and so > is a cognitionary character > > Essentially, to me that means that reality doesn't depend upon what you or > I may think of it but is itself, an operation of a general Mind. And most > certainly, universals as generals do not, per se, in themselves, 'exist'. > Instead, these generals 'exist'...within instantiations. "Matter is..mind > hidebound with habits' 6.158 > > BUT - we can certainly have semiosic Signs [that triad] without generals. > Just think of a rhematic indexical sinsign [a spontaneous cry] operative > only in Secondness and Firstness. > > Edwiina > > > > > > > > On Mon 16/10/17 2:38 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent: > > Jon S, Edwina, list, > > This remains a thorny issue, apparently. I personally have found the > quotation below useful in thinking about the distinction Peirce makes > between 'reality' and 'existence' and, by extension, the difference between > realism and nominalism. In his late work Peirce held any theory which did > not accept real generals and real possibles to be nominalistic. > > In this passage the first sentence, which makes reality "non-dependent on > thought" and of a "cognitionary character," has led some commentators to > suggest that the passage also points to Peirce's "objective idealism." > > ". . . reality means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought, and so > is a cognitionary character, while existence means reaction with the > environment, and so is a dynamic character; and accordingly the two > meanings, he [the pragmatist] would say, are clearly not the same. > Individualists are apt to fall into the almost incredible misunderstanding > that all other men are individualists, too -- even the scholastic realists, > who, they suppose, thought that "universals exist." [But] can any such > person believe that the great doctors of that time believed that generals > exist? They certainly did not so opine. . . Hence, before we treat of the > evidences of pragmaticism, it will be needful to weigh the pros and cons of > scholastic realism. For pragmaticism could hardly have entered a head that > was not already convinced that there are real
Re: Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
Something has to embrace everything. The word is less important than the thought. I see Reality as that which leads evolution through its stages until there is some unification -- say more than now. In that sense reality is now and whatever it becomes. Enough said. Cheers, S amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 3:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Stephen - I confine my understanding of 'reality' to it as referring to > Generalities, to Thirdness. And I see 'existence' as a reference to > individual finite entities - which can be a molecule, a cell, a word, > a flower, a human being - i.e., no consciousness is required. > > Edwina > > > > On Mon 16/10/17 3:04 PM , "Stephen C. Rose" stever...@gmail.com sent: > > For what its worth, I see Reality as embracing all, everything, by any > name or with no name, known or unknown. I see existence as a reference to > beings with consciousness. The distinction is obvious. > > And for argument's sake, my jaw drops at any suggestion that we can speak > of parts of reality in firsts, seconds or thirds. If reality is all it is > everything no matter what we call them or if we call them or don't yet call > them because they aren't yet known. The main value I see in triadic is its > enablement of logical thinking tending toward the good, true-beautiful. > > > > amazon.com/author/stephenrose > > On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Gary Richmond > wrote: > >> Jon S, Edwina, list, >> >> This remains a thorny issue, apparently. I personally have found the >> quotation below useful in thinking about the distinction Peirce makes >> between 'reality' and 'existence' and, by extension, the difference between >> realism and nominalism. In his late work Peirce held any theory which did >> not accept real generals and real possibles to be nominalistic. >> >> In this passage the first sentence, which makes reality "non-dependent on >> thought" and of a "cognitionary character," has led some commentators to >> suggest that the passage also points to Peirce's "objective idealism." >> >> ". . . reality means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought, and >> so is a cognitionary character, while existence means reaction with the >> environment, and so is a dynamic character; and accordingly the two >> meanings, he [the pragmatist] would say, are clearly not the same. >> Individualists are apt to fall into the almost incredible misunderstanding >> that all other men are individualists, too -- even the scholastic realists, >> who, they suppose, thought that "universals exist." [But] can any such >> person believe that the great doctors of that time believed that generals >> exist? They certainly did not so opine. . . Hence, before we treat of >> the evidences of pragmaticism, it will be needful to weigh the pros and >> cons of scholastic realism. For pragmaticism could hardly have entered a >> head that was not already convinced that there are real generals" (CP >> 5.503). >> >> >> Well, whether that quotation proves useful or not, I think that it's >> probably unlikely that this issue will be resolved in this thread, and that >> it may be indeed be a good time for Gary F to commence posting material >> from Lowell 2. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> [image: Blocked image] >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690> >> >> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 1:48 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Edwina, List: >>> >>> Your response seems rather uncharitable; I honestly have neither the >>> time nor the inclination to revisit the argument right now. >>> >>> That said, I offer my sincere thanks for clarifying how you distinguish >>> reality and existence, as well as your careful limitation of "things" to >>> the latter. I would simply question the notion that anything can exist >>> while having no generality whatsoever. >>> >>> And we explicitly agreed a few months ago to use the term Sign to >>> designate the triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate >>> Interpretant. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 12:21 PM, Edwina Taborsky >>> wrote: >>> Jon - that's a specious attempt to revisit this argument - i.e., your saying that 'some people might not have heard this debate before'. Well, tough, frankly it's not worth hearing about - and - I'm not going to revisit it with you. I disagree that existence is a subset of reality, for that implies that both have the same qualities. An existence/ entity can exist within only the mode of Secondness and thus, have no generality in it, but reality requires generality. I disagree that 'some THING' can be real yet not exist'. If it's a 'thing' then it exists. Reality is Thirdness, or generality and is not a thing. And we've been over your rejection of the Sign as a triad of Object-Repr
Re: Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Stephen - I confine my understanding of 'reality' to it as referring
to Generalities, to Thirdness. And I see 'existence' as a reference to
individual finite entities - which can be a molecule, a cell, a word,
a flower, a human being - i.e., no consciousness is required.
Edwina
On Mon 16/10/17 3:04 PM , "Stephen C. Rose" stever...@gmail.com
sent:
For what its worth, I see Reality as embracing all, everything, by
any name or with no name, known or unknown. I see existence as a
reference to beings with consciousness. The distinction is obvious.
And for argument's sake, my jaw drops at any suggestion that we can
speak of parts of reality in firsts, seconds or thirds. If reality is
all it is everything no matter what we call them or if we call them or
don't yet call them because they aren't yet known. The main value I
see in triadic is its enablement of logical thinking tending toward
the good, true-beautiful.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose [1]
On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Jon S, Edwina, list,
This remains a thorny issue, apparently. I personally have found the
quotation below useful in thinking about the distinction Peirce makes
between 'reality' and 'existence' and, by extension, the difference
between realism and nominalism. In his late work Peirce held any
theory which did not accept real generals and real possibles to be
nominalistic.
In this passage the first sentence, which makes reality
"non-dependent on thought" and of a "cognitionary character," has led
some commentators to suggest that the passage also points to Peirce's
"objective idealism."
". . . reality means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought,
and so is a cognitionary character, while existence means reaction
with the environment, and so is a dynamic character; and accordingly
the two meanings, he [the pragmatist] would say, are clearly not the
same. Individualists are apt to fall into the almost incredible
misunderstanding that all other men are individualists, too -- even
the scholastic realists, who, they suppose, thought that "universals
exist." [But] can any such person believe that the great doctors of
that time believed that generals exist? They certainly did not so
opine. . . Hence, before we treat of the evidences of pragmaticism,
it will be needful to weigh the pros and cons of scholastic realism.
For pragmaticism could hardly have entered a head that was not
already convinced that there are real generals" (CP 5.503).
Well, whether that quotation proves useful or not, I think that it's
probably unlikely that this issue will be resolved in this thread, and
that it may be indeed be a good time for Gary F to commence posting
material from Lowell 2.
Best,
Gary R
Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718
482-5690 [3]
On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 1:48 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Edwina, List:
Your response seems rather uncharitable; I honestly have neither the
time nor the inclination to revisit the argument right now.
That said, I offer my sincere thanks for clarifying how you
distinguish reality and existence, as well as your careful limitation
of "things" to the latter. I would simply question the notion that
anything can exist while having no generality whatsoever.
And we explicitly agreed a few months ago to use the term Sign to
designate the triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate
Interpretant.
Regards,
Jon
On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 12:21 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Jon - that's a specious attempt to revisit this argument - i.e.,
your saying that 'some people might not have heard this debate
before'. Well, tough, frankly it's not worth hearing about - and -
I'm not going to revisit it with you.
I disagree that existence is a subset of reality, for that implies
that both have the same qualities. An existence/ entity can exist
within only the mode of Secondness and thus, have no generality in
it, but reality requires generality. I disagree that 'some THING'
can be real yet not exist'. If it's a 'thing' then it exists. Reality
is Thirdness, or generality and is not a thing.
And we've been over your rejection of the Sign as a triad of
Object-Representamen-Interpretant and your confining of the term
'Sign' to refer only to the mediate Representamen. Again, read 4.551
to its end.
There is no positive point in continuing this discussion since it's
been done to exhaustion before.
Edwina
On Mon 16/10/17 1:02 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[6] sent:
Edwina, List:
I know that we have been over this ground before, and I am not
interested in repeating our past discussions, but there may be some
following along now who were not on the List back then.
Especially late in his life, Peirce carefully distinguished reality
from existence, treating
Re: Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R - thanks; that's a great quotation. And yes, it does bring
in his 'objective idealism' which is NOT equivalent to 'idealism'.
Agreed - without the reality of generals, a theory is nominalistic -
it can't be otherwise, for it is reduced to only two modal
categories: Firstness and Secondness.
That's a vital comment - that ". . . reality means a certain kind of
non-dependence upon thought, and so is a cognitionary character
Essentially, to me that means that reality doesn't depend upon what
you or I may think of it but is itself, an operation of a general
Mind. And most certainly, universals as generals do not, per se, in
themselves, 'exist'. Instead, these generals 'exist'...within
instantiations. "Matter is..mind hidebound with habits' 6.158
BUT - we can certainly have semiosic Signs [that triad] without
generals. Just think of a rhematic indexical sinsign [a spontaneous
cry] operative only in Secondness and Firstness.
Edwiina
On Mon 16/10/17 2:38 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
Jon S, Edwina, list,
This remains a thorny issue, apparently. I personally have found the
quotation below useful in thinking about the distinction Peirce makes
between 'reality' and 'existence' and, by extension, the difference
between realism and nominalism. In his late work Peirce held any
theory which did not accept real generals and real possibles to be
nominalistic.
In this passage the first sentence, which makes reality
"non-dependent on thought" and of a "cognitionary character," has led
some commentators to suggest that the passage also points to Peirce's
"objective idealism."
". . . reality means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought,
and so is a cognitionary character, while existence means reaction
with the environment, and so is a dynamic character; and accordingly
the two meanings, he [the pragmatist] would say, are clearly not the
same. Individualists are apt to fall into the almost incredible
misunderstanding that all other men are individualists, too -- even
the scholastic realists, who, they suppose, thought that "universals
exist." [But] can any such person believe that the great doctors of
that time believed that generals exist? They certainly did not so
opine. . . Hence, before we treat of the evidences of pragmaticism,
it will be needful to weigh the pros and cons of scholastic realism.
For pragmaticism could hardly have entered a head that was not
already convinced that there are real generals" (CP 5.503).
Well, whether that quotation proves useful or not, I think that it's
probably unlikely that this issue will be resolved in this thread, and
that it may be indeed be a good time for Gary F to commence posting
material from Lowell 2.
Best,
Gary R
Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York718 482-5690
On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 1:48 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Edwina, List:
Your response seems rather uncharitable; I honestly have neither the
time nor the inclination to revisit the argument right now.
That said, I offer my sincere thanks for clarifying how you
distinguish reality and existence, as well as your careful limitation
of "things" to the latter. I would simply question the notion that
anything can exist while having no generality whatsoever.
And we explicitly agreed a few months ago to use the term Sign to
designate the triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate
Interpretant.
Regards,
Jon
On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 12:21 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Jon - that's a specious attempt to revisit this argument - i.e.,
your saying that 'some people might not have heard this debate
before'. Well, tough, frankly it's not worth hearing about - and -
I'm not going to revisit it with you.
I disagree that existence is a subset of reality, for that implies
that both have the same qualities. An existence/ entity can exist
within only the mode of Secondness and thus, have no generality in
it, but reality requires generality. I disagree that 'some THING'
can be real yet not exist'. If it's a 'thing' then it exists. Reality
is Thirdness, or generality and is not a thing.
And we've been over your rejection of the Sign as a triad of
Object-Representamen-Interpretant and your confining of the term
'Sign' to refer only to the mediate Representamen. Again, read 4.551
to its end.
There is no positive point in continuing this discussion since it's
been done to exhaustion before.
Edwina
On Mon 16/10/17 1:02 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[3] sent:
Edwina, List:
I know that we have been over this ground before, and I am not
interested in repeating our past discussions, but there may be some
following along now who were not on the List back then.
Especially late in his life, Peirce carefully distinguished reality
from existence, trea
