RE: [PEIRCE-L] AndrÃ(c) De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[gnox]

Helmut, yes, that’s exactly why I didn’t use the word “type”, and only used the 
word “token” because I couldn’t think of a better word to get the idea across.

 

Gary f.

From: Helmut Raulien  
Sent: 20-Jun-21 02:26
To: gary.richm...@gmail.com
Cc: Peirce-L ; Gary Fuhrman 
Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] AndrÃ(c) De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

Gary, Gary, List

 

Of course I agree, that Peirce´s own explanation and your interpretation are 
much better than my attempt. Still though I feel a little unwell about the 
token-type relation between "the phaneron" and "a phaneron": Usually the type 
is a class between other classes on the same level of classification. But the 
phaneron, I´d say, is alone on its level. But I see, you did not mention the 
term "type", you just wrote, that a single phaneron is a token of the generic 
phaneron.

 

Best

Helmut

  

  

19. Juni 2021 um 18:40 Uhr
"Gary Richmond" mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> >
wrote:

 

 

I like your answers better too, Gary, much better; but your quoted text arrived 
on the List as blank spaces, likely because of your reverse type color (white 
on black) in your book, Turning Sings.  Here's the text as I darkened it. 

 

Cheers,

 

Not-G-man

  

-- Forwarded message -
From: mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> >
Date: Sat, Jun 19, 2021 at 9:00 AM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4
To: mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >

  

Helmut, that’s a good question, but I don’t much care for any of your answers. 
Here’s mine:

In CP 1.286-7 (which has been quoted before in this thread), Peirce speaks of 
phaneroscopy as a science which, being public like any other science, depends 
on multiple observations. He therefore refers to a plurality of 
phaneroscopists, each of whom has to make his or her own direct observations of 
the phaneron. Thus we must refer to a plurality of “phanerons” when we consider 
what they are doing. We might say that each of these phanerons is a token of 
the generic phaneron, and each observer a token of the mind that the phaneron 
is present to. Here is the quotation again:

[[ There is nothing quite so directly open to observation as phanerons; and 
since I shall have no need of referring to any but those which (or the like of 
which) are perfectly familiar to everybody, every reader can control the 
accuracy of what I am going to say about them. Indeed, he must actually repeat 
my observations and experiments for himself, or else I shall more utterly fail 
to convey my meaning than if I were to discourse of effects of chromatic 
decoration to a man congenitally blind. What I term phaneroscopy is that study 
which, supported by the direct observation of phanerons and generalizing its 
observations, signalizes several very broad classes of phanerons; describes the 
features of each; shows that although they are so inextricably mixed together 
that no one can be isolated, yet it is manifest that their characters are quite 
disparate; then proves, beyond question, that a certain very short list 
comprises all of these broadest categories of phanerons there are; and finally 
proceeds to the laborious and difficult task of enumerating the principal 
subdivisions of those categories. ]]

 

The reason that Peirce usually insists on the oneness of the phaneron (or 
phenomenon) is explained (in his typical convoluted fashion) in EP2:472, 1913:

[[ … what I am aware of, or, to use a different expression for the same fact, 
what I am conscious of, or, as the psychologists strangely talk, the ‘contents 
of my consciousness’ (just as if what I am conscious of and the fact that I am 
conscious were two different facts, and as if the one were inside the other), 
this same fact, I say, however it be worded, is evidently the entire universe, 
so far as I am concerned.]]

 


If that doesn’t help, there’s a much longer explanation in  
 Turning Signs 5: Inside Out (gnusystems.ca).


 


“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke


 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York





 

  

On Sat, Jun 19, 2021 at 9:00 AM mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
> wrote:

Helmut, that’s a good question, but I don’t much care for any of your answers. 
Here’s mine:

In CP 1.286-7 (which has been quoted before in this thread), Peirce speaks of 
phaneroscopy as a science which, being public like any other science, depends 
on multiple observations. He therefore refers to a plurality of 
phaneroscopists, each of whom has to make his or her own direct observations of 
the phaneron. Thus we must refer to a plurality of “phanerons” when we consider 
what they are doing. We might say that each of these phanerons is a token of 
the generic phaneron, and each observer a token of the mind that the phaneron 
is present to. Here is the quotation again:

[[ There is 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] AndrÃ(c) De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary, Gary, List

 

Of course I agree, that Peirce´s own explanation and your interpretation are much better than my attempt. Still though I feel a little unwell about the token-type relation between "the phaneron" and "a phaneron": Usually the type is a class between other classes on the same level of classification. But the phaneron, I´d say, is alone on its level. But I see, you did not mention the term "type", you just wrote, that a single phaneron is a token of the generic phaneron.

 

Best

Helmut

 
 

19. Juni 2021 um 18:40 Uhr
"Gary Richmond" 
wrote:

 




 

I like your answers better too, Gary, much better; but your quoted text arrived on the List as blank spaces, likely because of your reverse type color (white on black) in your book, Turning Sings.  Here's the text as I darkened it. 

 

Cheers,

 

Not-G-man















 

-- Forwarded message -
From: 
Date: Sat, Jun 19, 2021 at 9:00 AM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4
To: 
 


Helmut, that’s a good question, but I don’t much care for any of your answers. Here’s mine:

In CP 1.286-7 (which has been quoted before in this thread), Peirce speaks of phaneroscopy as a science which, being public like any other science, depends on multiple observations. He therefore refers to a plurality of phaneroscopists, each of whom has to make his or her own direct observations of the phaneron. Thus we must refer to a plurality of “phanerons” when we consider what they are doing. We might say that each of these phanerons is a token of the generic phaneron, and each observer a token of the mind that the phaneron is present to. Here is the quotation again:

[[ There is nothing quite so directly open to observation as phanerons; and since I shall have no need of referring to any but those which (or the like of which) are perfectly familiar to everybody, every reader can control the accuracy of what I am going to say about them. Indeed, he must actually repeat my observations and experiments for himself, or else I shall more utterly fail to convey my meaning than if I were to discourse of effects of chromatic decoration to a man congenitally blind. What I term phaneroscopy is that study which, supported by the direct observation of phanerons and generalizing its observations, signalizes several very broad classes of phanerons; describes the features of each; shows that although they are so inextricably mixed together that no one can be isolated, yet it is manifest that their characters are quite disparate; then proves, beyond question, that a certain very short list comprises all of these broadest categories of phanerons there are; and finally proceeds to the laborious and difficult task of enumerating the principal subdivisions of those categories. ]]

 

The reason that Peirce usually insists on the oneness of the phaneron (or phenomenon) is explained (in his typical convoluted fashion) in EP2:472, 1913:

[[ … what I am aware of, or, to use a different _expression_ for the same fact, what I am conscious of, or, as the psychologists strangely talk, the ‘contents of my consciousness’ (just as if what I am conscious of and the fact that I am conscious were two different facts, and as if the one were inside the other), this same fact, I say, however it be worded, is evidently the entire universe, so far as I am concerned.]]

 



If that doesn’t help, there’s a much longer explanation in Turning Signs 5: Inside Out (gnusystems.ca).































 

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York





 

















 


On Sat, Jun 19, 2021 at 9:00 AM  wrote:




Helmut, that’s a good question, but I don’t much care for any of your answers. Here’s mine:

In CP 1.286-7 (which has been quoted before in this thread), Peirce speaks of phaneroscopy as a science which, being public like any other science, depends on multiple observations. He therefore refers to a plurality of phaneroscopists, each of whom has to make his or her own direct observations of the phaneron. Thus we must refer to a plurality of “phanerons” when we consider what they are doing. We might say that each of these phanerons is a token of the generic phaneron, and each observer a token of the mind that the phaneron is present to. Here is the quotation again:

[[ There is nothing quite so directly open to observation as phanerons; and since I shall have no need of referring to any but those which (or the like of which) are perfectly familiar to everybody, every reader can control the accuracy of what I am going to say about them. Indeed, he must actually repeat my observations and experiments for himself, or else I shall more utterly fail to convey my meaning than if I were to discourse 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., Gary F., List:

GR: My reservations for now: (1) again, I do not see the use of quali-,
sin-, and legisense in phenomenology as conflating aspects of it with
quali-, sin-, and legisign in logic as semeiotic, but as revealing the
underlying influence (which is not a conflation, as 'sense' and 'sign' are
two very different concepts) of the ideas and terminology found in
phenomenology on those which appear logic as semeiotic;


I did not say that the terminology of "qualisense," "sinsense," and
"legisense" conflates phaneroscopy with semeiotic, I said that it *runs the
risk of fostering* such conflation.

GR: (2) primisense/altersense/medisense are yet three 'novel' terms to add
to the already problematic neologistist terminology employed by Peirce.


True, but "sinsense" and "legisense" are even more novel (and arguably even
more problematic) as terms that Peirce himself never used. With that in
mind, consider this passage from his text on the ethics of terminology.

CSP: [W]hen a man has introduced a conception into science, it naturally
becomes both his privilege and his duty to assign to that conception
suitable scientific expressions, and that when a name has been conferred
upon a conception by him to whose labors science is indebted for that
conception, it becomes the duty of all,--a duty to the discoverer, and a
duty to science,--to accept his name, unless it should be of such a nature
that the adoption of it would be unwholesome for science; that should the
discoverer fail in his duty either by giving no name or an utterly
unsuitable one, then, after a reasonable interval, whoever first has
occasion to employ a name for that conception must invent a suitable one;
and others ought to follow him; but that whoever deliberately uses a word
or other symbol in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by
its sole rightful creator commits a shameful offense against the inventor
of the symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to
treat the act with contempt and indignation. (CP 2.224, EP 2:265, 1903)


In short, we should *not *invent new names for conceptions that he (or
anyone else) has already introduced into science under other names, unless
those original names are "utterly unsuitable." Accordingly, if we wish to
preserve "qualisense" from 1909, it should be accompanied by "molition" and
"habit-consciousness" as in that same passage, rather than the neologisms
"sinsense" and "legisense." On the other hand, if we wish to preserve
"-sense" as the consistent root word for all three categories, then we
should stick with "primisense," "altersense," and "medisense" from c. 1896.
Or I suppose that we could replace "primisense" with "qualisense" as a
later and more descriptive alternative, giving us
qualisense/altersense/medisense as a trichotomy that is even more
suggestive of quality/reaction/mediation applied specifically to
consciousness.

GF: The hard part of phaneroscopy is not to allow the prior naming of
things to interfere with the observation, where Firstness has to be
predominant. And that makes it hard to even talk about it.


Indeed, this is another way of highlighting the distinction that Gary F.
properly (in my view) draws between observation and generalization as tasks
of phaneroscopy; or perhaps as tasks of phenomenology as the broader
science, with phanersocopy corresponding to observation and trichotomic
category theory to generalization. However, since 1ns is predominant in the
former and 3ns in the latter, the question arises--in what additional task
of phenomenology is 2ns predominant? De Tienne's iconoscopy does not strike
me as a good fit here, and in any case, he states plainly in his paper
about it (
https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/rssi/2013-v33-n1-2-3-rssi02379/1035282ar.pdf)
that he *is not* proposing it as an additional branch in Peirce's
classification of the sciences.

ADT: This somewhat new word is not intended to point out a flaw in Peirce’s
classification of the sciences by demonstrating that we need to add one
more science between phaneroscopy and the normative sciences, especially
semeiotic. Indeed there is no need to do so. The real intention is to show
that, precisely because of the nature of the connection between
phaneroscopy and semeiotic, and especially of the transition between
phaneron and sign, one needs to surmise that there exists a type of
activity that is common to both, that that activity must have to do, as
already suggested, with icons and iconic signs, and that a good name for
that transitional activity is iconoscopy, that is, the activity of
selecting portions of the phaneron for the sake of reducing them to
representational unity. ... Iconoscopy is not a science ... . Being
transitional, iconoscopy goes on both in phaneroscopy and in semeiotic ...
(p. 26)


On the other hand, Daniel Campos has written about *mathematical *reasoning
requiring three faculties--imagination, concentration, and generalization (

[PEIRCE-L] KQL (Knowledge Query Language)

[John F. Sowa]

Alex, 
Everybody on planet Earth knows and uses an excellent
Knowledge Query Language every day.  It's our native language or some
other NL that we choose to use or are required to use for some
purpose.
But KQL is a bad acronym, because it puts too much emphasis
on the Q.  It's better to emphasize D for dialogue than Q for question. 
For an overview of the issues, see the slides (and references in them)
about Cognitive Memory:  http://jfsowa.com/talks/cogmem.pdf
The
cogmem.pdf slides discuss projects that our old VivoMind company
implemented over a dozen years ago, and every one of those projects was
specified by customers who paid for the implementations.  They weren't toy
examples.  The bad news is that every one of them required a great deal of
work by the VivoMind company to implement them.  There wasn't a single
universal system that could be tailored by the customers
themselves.
But there is newer technology that is customizable by
anybody, not just the computer scientists.  I discussed that issue in a
talk I presented at the Knowledge Graph Conference in 2020.  (By the way,
it was awarded the Best Presentation prize.)  And I revised and extended
it for the European Semantic Web Conference in June 2020.  I later added
more slides from other presentations in
http://jfsowa.com/talks/eswc.pdf
And by the way, I cc'd the Peirce
email list because both the cogmem.pdf slides and the eswc.pdf slides
build on the logic and semiotic of C.  S. Peirce.  I discuss that in some
detail in the eswc.pdf slides.  Peirce called his existential graphs
"the logic of the future", and he was right.
John
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

GR: Qualisense refers, of course, to 'quality' while 'primisense' implies
first or 1ns.


Again, I am very much open to the terminological substitution of
"qualisense" (1909) for "primisense" (c. 1896), especially since in its
original context the latter is synonymous with "Feeling" as "the
momentarily present contents of consciousness taken in its pristine
simplicity, apart from anything else" (CP 7.551).

GR: "Molition" ("volition minus all desire and purpose") brings to mind
action (and, so, reaction as well) and so may not be considered all that
different from "altersense" (while they are certainly not synonymous).


The main difference is that "altersense" encompasses *more *than
"molition"--not just volition/will as the *active *aspect of reaction in
consciousness (2ns of 2ns), but also sensation as its *passive *aspect (1ns
of 2ns).

GR: Finally, the sense of "habit" seems quite different from its parallel
term in the trichotomy Jon pointed to, namely, "medisense," that is, the
sense of mediating between "something" and "something other."


Likewise, the main difference is that "medisense" encompasses *more *than
"habit-consciousness"--not just association (3ns of 3ns), but also
suggestion (2ns of 3ns) and abstraction (1ns of 3ns). Here "suggestion" is
not "in reference to the phenomena of hypnotism," but instead, "What takes
place in suggestion is that an idea when it rises gives an upward motion to
all other ideas belonging to the same set" (CP 7.548-549). Moreover,
"abstraction" is "a separative process, the centrifugal tendency of
thought, by which any idea by following out its own development becomes
separated from those with which it is connected" (CP 7.544). Hence, it
encompasses prescission, which the next few slides will highlight as an
especially powerful tool of phaneroscopy.

GR: Of course all the above have associations with either 1ns, 2ns, or 3ns
(as there are many such associations with each of the three universal
categories) ...


Indeed, but if we are going to take seriously Peirce's designation of
quality/reaction/mediation as "the purest conceptions" of 1ns/2ns/3ns, such
that "what you are striving to apprehend is pure Firstness, the Firstness
of Secondness--that is what Secondness is, of itself--and the Firstness of
Thirdness" (CP 1.530, 1903), then I propose that
qualisense/altersense/medisense is the best option currently on the table
for their counterparts in consciousness.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Jun 20, 2021 at 3:55 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Gary F, Jon, List,
>
> For the moment I'd like to direct our attention to a subtlety which at
> first mainly eluded me regarding the 'sense' aspect of phaneroscopic
> practice and the terminology used to express it.
>
> So far we have:
>
> "primisense," "altersense," and "medisense" (Peirce)
> "qualisense," "molition," and a sense of recognizing "habit" (Peirce)
> "qualisense," "sinsense," and "legisense"
>
>
> The last trichotomy above is the result of my entertaining the notion of
> retaining "qualisense" but renaming "molition," *sinsense, *and
> recognizing "habit," *legisense. *Jon and I seem to disagree whether this
> possible renaming employing '-sense' rather than '-sign' constitutes a
> feature (my position) or the *possibility* of a conflating bug (Jon's).
>
> Be that as it may I'd like to point to something which I first overlooked,
> namely, that "primisense," "altersense," and "medisense" bring to mind
> categoriality, obvious in 'primisense', but clear enough for the other two,
> the three of them paralleling his much earlier 'something'. 'other' (in
> relation to that 'something'), and 'medium'.
>
> Now contrast those associations (however you may wish to characterize them
> other than I have) with the those of the three I first pointed to, namely,
> "qualisense," "molition," and a sense of recognizing "habit".
>
> Here the associations are somewhat different. Qualisense refers, of
> course, to 'quality' while 'primisense' implies first or 1ns. "Molition"
> ("volition minus all desire and purpose") brings to mind action (and, so,
> reaction as well) and so may not be considered all that different from
> "altersense" (while they are certainly not synonymous). Finally, the
> sense of "habit" seems quite different from its parallel term in the
> trichotomy Jon pointed to, namely, "medisense," that is, the sense of
> mediating between "something" and "something other."
>
> Of course all the above have associations with either 1ns, 2ns, or 3ns (as
> there are many such associations with each of the three universal
> categories), so I suppose that this is merely to suggest that this also, as
> you wrote, Gary, "makes it hard to even talk about it." Still, if we are
> to go beyond the challenging phaneroscopic practice towards developing a
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Gary F, List,

JAS: I did not say that the terminology of "qualisense," "sinsense," and
"legisense" conflates phaneroscopy with semeiotic, I said that it *runs the
risk of fostering* such conflation.


GR: A subtle distinction; perhaps you are right. But I think that it's a
*slight* risk and, as I've wrote yesterday, the very different roots
("sense" and "sign") not only make it *quite* unlikely that the terms will
be conflated, but that the prefixes suggest a possible relation between
those trichotomies, re: "senses" and "signs," in their respective sciences,
viz., phenomenology and logic as semeiotic.

Below you yourself suggest a trade off of terminology from one trichotomy
to another. But first:


Jon quoted me:

GR: (2) primisense/altersense/medisense are yet three 'novel' terms to add
to the already problematic neologistist terminology employed by Peirce.


Then wrote:

JAS:True, but "sinsense" and "legisense" are even more novel (and arguably
even more problematic) as terms that Peirce himself never used. With that
in mind, consider this passage from his text on the ethics of terminology
[the complete Peirce passage can be found in JAS's post below].


GR: Yes, that familiar, for Peirceans, rather famous passage on the
ethics of terminology makes it imperative that not only does the scientist
who introduces a new concept into a particular science have the right and
duty to assign it *suitable* scientific terminology, and at least as
important, that "it becomes the duty of all [. . .] to accept his
[terminology and . .] that whoever deliberately uses a word or other symbol
in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by its sole
rightful creator commits a shameful offense against the inventor of the
symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat
the act with contempt and indignation. (CP 2.224, EP 2:265, 1903)

JAS: In short, we should *not *invent new names for conceptions that [have
been] already introduced into science under other names, unless those
original names are "utterly unsuitable." Accordingly, if we wish to
preserve "qualisense" from 1909, it should be accompanied by "molition" and
"habit-consciousness" as in that same passage, rather than the neologisms
"sinsense" and "legisense." On the other hand, if we wish to preserve
"-sense" as the consistent root word for all three categories, then we
should stick with "primisense," "altersense," and "medisense" from c. 1896.
Or I suppose that *we could replace "primisense" with "qualisense" as a
later and more descriptive alternative, giving us
qualisense/altersense/medisense* as a trichotomy that is even more
suggestive of quality/reaction/mediation applied specifically to
consciousness [bold emphasis added by GR].


GR: First, "habit-consciousness" is *not* Peirce's term but your invention
based on the phrase he used in outlining that trichotomy. I personally have
no problem with this.

And it is also the case that your final "fudging" of Peirce's two
phaneroscopic trichotomies by combining them as you have ("we could replace
"primisense" with "qualisense") will have to be treated with at least as
much "contempt and indignation" as my seeing parallels in semeiotic
terminology (viz., "sinsense" and "legisign" to go along with Peirce's
"qualisense") which, rather than *possibly *conflating facets of the two
sciences might *possibly* prove helpful in showing significant relations
between them.

But I hope and expect that neither of us -- nor others -- will see our
separate attempts at developing a potentially useful phaneroscopic
terminology as anything more nor less than *that*: good faith attempts to
arrive at a terminology we can serviceably use in discussing Peirce's
phaneroscopic practice.

And, indeed, what I rudely referred to as your "fudging" ought to remind us
that while Peirce may not have exactly "fail[ed] in his duty either by
giving no name or an utterly unsuitable one," that he had a very strong
penchant to reconsider and revise terminology that he has previously
introduced. Perhaps there is no science in which this is clearer than in *logic
as semeiotic* (I'm sure we could all provide examples of this), but it
appears in other sciences as well -- including, as I've been arguing,
phaneroscopy.

So, in a significant sense one might say, that Peirce doesn't -- at least *not
strictly* -- observe his own terminological ethic, and not doing so -- in
his modifying and revising terminology throughout his career so that it
becomes problematic to decide what terms to settle on -- makes it extremely
difficult for us who come more than a century after him to settle on just
that optimal terminology which he might approve of and which we might
advantageously use to help further develop his phenomenology.

I'll conclude this post with what I consider to be an important question:
what is to be *our* ethics of terminology given this challenge which
Peirce, a "backwoodsman" not only in semeiotic but